NISAR AND ANRversusSTATE OF U.P

A                              NISAR AND ANR
                                     v.
                                STATE OF U.P

                             NOVEMBER 9, 1994

B               [DR. A.S ANAND'AND M.K. MUKHERJEE, JJ.]

        Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 : Section 193- Summoning of
    persons- Absence of order of committal against them- Whether Court of
    Session could summon them in exercise ofpower u!s 193- Held, yes.

c         Section 319 (1)-Applicability of-Power u!s 319 (1) can be exercised
    at a stage when evidence was led

         Deceased met with an unnatural death in her matrimonial home. A
    First Information Report was lodged that her husband, grand mother-
    in-law and the two appellants being the brother-in-law and sister-in-
D   law were responsible for her death. A case was registered u/ss 304-B
    and 306 of Indian Penal _Code against all of them. On completion of
    investigation the police submitted charge sheet u/s 306 IPC only against
    the deceased's husband and grand mother.:.in -law. The case was
    committed to the Court of Session under Section 209 Cr.P.C.

E       When the matter came up for hearing, an application was moved
    that though during investigation sufficient materials were furnished to
    prove that the two appellants had also demanded a scooter as dowry
    and physically tortured and ill treated the deceased, no chargesheet
    was submitted against them and praying for invoking the provisions of
    Section 193 of the Code to summon them.
F
        The two appellants were summoned holding that a prlma facie case
    was made out against them and Section 193 of the Code empowered the
    Court to summon them. Revision filed against the impugned order was
    rejected by High Court. It was held that under Section 319 ·er. P.C
G   even on the basis of existing material person appearing to be guilty
    might be summoned.

        This appeal had been filed against the Judgment of the High Court.
    It was submitted by the appellants that neither the provisions of Section
    193 nor those of Section 319 of the Code empowered the Court of
H   Session to pass the impugned order and in absence of any order

                                      368
                          NISAR v. STATE OF U.P                        369

·committing the appellants to the Court of Session, the Judge could not A
 have issued process against the appellants to stand trial by invoking
 Section 193 of the Code; and that having regard to the fact that Section
 319 of the Code could be invoked only at a stage when evidence was led,
 the High Court was not justified in upholding the order relying upon
 the provision, as that stage was yet to be reached.
                                                                              B
     Dismissing the appe2I, this Court

     HELD 1.1 In view of the plain and unambiguous language of
 Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the power u/s 319 (1)
 can be exercised only in those cases where involvement of persons other
 than those arraigned in the charge sheet comes to light in the course of     C
 evidence recorded during the inquiry of trial. In the instant case as that
 stage has not yet reached the appellants could not have been summoned
 invoking Section 319 of the Code. (371-F)

       2. On the plain reading of Section 193 of the Code of Criminal
  Procedure, once the case is committed to the Court of Session by a D
  Magistrate under the Code, the restriction placed on the power of the
  Court of Session to take cognizance of an offence as a Court of original
· jurisdiction gets lifted. On the Magistrate committing the case under
  Section 209 to the Court of Session the bar of Section 193 is lifted
  thereby investing the Court of Session complete and unfettered
  jurisdiction of the Court of original jurisdiction to take cognizance of E
  the offence which would include the summoning of the person or
  persons whose complicity in the commission of the crime can prima
 facie be gathered from the material available on record. (371-G, H,
 372-A)

     Kishan Singh v. State ofBihar, [1993) 2 SCC 16, relied on.               F
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 769
 of 1994.

    From the Judgment and Order dated 28.7.94 of the Allahabad High
 Court in R. No.1088of1994.                                         G
     Anis Ahmed Khan for Appellants.

     A.S. Pundir for the Respondent.

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                               H
A
    370                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS

          M.K. MUKHERJEE. J. Special Leave Granted.
                                                             [1994) SUPP. S S.C.R.    -
         The appellant No. I is the brother-in-law of Shakvin who met with an
    unnatural death in her matrimonial home on June 22, 1991. The appellant
    no.2 is his wife. On the following day Le.on June 23, 1991 Noor
    Mohammad, father of the deceased lodged a First Information Report
B   alleging that her husband, grand mother-in-law and the two appellants were
    responsible for her death. On the information a case was registered under
    sections 304 B and 306 of the India Penal Code ( IPC for Short} against all
    of them and on completion of investigation the police summitted charge
    sheet under section 306 IPC only against the deceased's husband and grand
    mother-in-law. In due course the case was committed to the Court of
c   Session by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Orai, Magistrate for short in
    accordance with section '209 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Code for
    short).

         When the matter came up for hearing before an Additional Session
D   Judge of Orai, an application was moved on behalf of Noor Mohammad
    alleging that though during investigation sufficient materials wer-;: furnished
    to prove that the two appelJants had also demanded a scooter as dowry and
    physically tortured and ill treated the deceased the Investigating agency did
    not submit charge sheet against them and praying for invoking the
    provisions of section 193 of the Code to summon them. The application
E   was opposed on behalf of the appellants on the ground that in absence of
    any ordP.r of their committal in accordance with section 209 of the Code
    the Court of Session could not summon them in exercise of power under
    section 193 of the Code.

        After hearing the parties and going through the statements recorded
F   under section 161 of the. Code the learned Judge summoned the two
    appellants as according to the learned Judge, a prima facie case was made
    out against them and section 193 of the Code empowered him to summon
    them.                -

G        Aggrieved by the above order the appellants moved the High Court in
    revision which was rejected with the following order :

                    "learned counsel for the applicants has submitted that the
                    learned Judge has exercised his power under Section 193
                    Cr.P.C and not 319 Cr.P.C. which could not be exercised as
H                   no evidence has yet led in the case.
              NISAR v. STATE OF U.P [M.K. MUKHERJEE. J.]                371

               In my opinion, the submission is not correct. Under Section A
               319 Cr.P.C even on the basis of existing material person
               appearing to be quilty may be summoned. The learned
               Sessions Judge has perused the material and has found that
               there are allegations against the applicants. Merely because
               Section 193 has been mentioned by the Court below. It will
               not invalidate the order. "                                  B
               Hence this appeal.

     It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that neither the provisions
of section t93 nor those of 319 of the Code empowered the Court of
Session to pass the impugne.d order. According to the learned counsel for C
the appellants in absence of any order committing the appellants to the
Court of Session, the learned Judge could not have issued process against ·
the appellants to statld trial by invoking section 193 of the Code. The
learned counsel next submitted that having regard to the fact that Section
319 of the Code could be invoked only at a stage when evidence was led,
the High Court was not justified in upholding the order of the learned Judge D
relying upon the said section, as admittedly that stage was yet to be
reached.

     As regards the second contention of the appellants it must be said that ·
in view of the plain and unambigous language of section 319 of the Code,
the earlier quoted reason which weighed with the High Court in sustaining E
the order of the .learned Judge is patently incorrect. The power under
section 319 (l) can be exercised only in those cases where involvement of
persons other than those arraigned in the charge sheet comes to light in the
course of evidence recorded during the enquiry or trial. As that stage has
not yet reached the appellants could not have been summoned invoking
section 319 of the Code.                                                       F
     As regards the other contention of appellants we may mention that tl\is
Court has in Kishan Singh·v. State of Bihar, [1993) 2 SCC 16 categorically
rejected a similar contention with the following observations:

               "Thus on a plain reading of Section . 193, as it presently G
               stands once the case is committed to the Court of Session
               by a Magistrate under the Code the restriction placed on the
               power of the Court of Session to take cogni:zance of an
               offence as a court of original jurisdiction gets lifted. On the
               Magistrate committing the case under Section 209 to the
               Court of Session the bar of Section 193 is lifted thereby H
    372                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A                  . investing the Court of Session complete and unfettered
                    jurisdiction of the court of original jurisdiction to take
                     cognizance of the offence which would include the
                     summoning of the person or persons whose complicity in
                     the commission of the crime can prima facie be gathered
                     from the material available on records."
B
          Since we are in respectful agreement with the principle so laid down
    the contenti.on of the appellants in this regards must be rejected. The appeal
    is, therefore, dismissed.

    A.G.                                                       Appeal dismissed.