Holding

The State may, under the Police Act, lawfully entrust investigation to the CBI and the High Court may direct such investigation; Section 36 CrPC does not preclude CBI involvement, and a second FIR is permissible when it concerns a distinct conspiracy.

Summary

A writ petition challenged the selection of Panchayat Secretaries and alleged irregularities involving the former Rural Development Minister, Nirmal Singh Kahlon. The High Court, after a prima facie finding of fraud, directed an inquiry which led to a Vigilance Department FIR and charge‑sheet. The Court then ordered the investigation to be handed over to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and a second FIR was lodged by the CBI. The appellants contended that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to direct a fresh CBI investigation after a charge‑sheet, that Section 36 of the CrPC barred a CBI officer from being a "superior" officer, and that a second FIR on the same cause of action was impermissible. The Supreme Court held that under the Police Act the State may entrust investigation to the CBI, that Section 36 CrPC must be read purposively and does not preclude CBI involvement, and that a second FIR is permissible when it relates to a distinct, larger conspiracy. The Court also affirmed the High Court’s power under Articles 226 and 142 to direct such investigation and ordered the trial judge to segregate the portion of the trial relating to the CBI‑investigated scam.

Issues considered

The High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 to direct a fresh CBI investigation after a charge‑sheet had been filed.
Whether Section 36 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, bars a CBI officer from being a "superior officer" for supervision of investigation.
Whether the State, under the Police Act, 1861, can lawfully entrust investigation to the CBI notwithstanding provisions of the CrPC.
The permissibility of lodging a second FIR by the CBI when a first FIR had already been lodged by the Vigilance Department.
The scope of Section 173(8) CrPC for further investigation after a charge‑sheet.
The power of the High Court to order removal of officials and to direct segregation of trial portions under Article 142.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 173(8), s. 36
Constitution of Indias. Article 142, s. Article 20, s. Article 21, s. Article 226
Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946s. 6
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 420, s. 467, s. 468
Police Act, 1861s. 3
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13(1)(d)(e), s. 13(2)

Subjects

public interest litigationCBI investigationSection 36 CrPCSection 173(8) CrPCPolice Act 1861second FIRjurisdiction Art 226Article 142selection scandalPanchayat Secretariesconspiracycharge sheet

Judgment

[2008] 14 S.C.R. 1049

NIRMAL SINGH KAHLON A
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.
(Civi·I Appeal Nos. 6198-6199 of 2008 etc.)
OCTOBER 22, 2008
B
[S.8. SINHA AND AFTAB ALAM, JJ.]

'-f Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973/Police Act, 1861:
ss. 36 and 173 (8)/s.3 - Writ petition challenging selec-
tion of Panchayat Secretaries - Direction by High Court to c.
hold investigation - Pursuant to investigation by State lnves-
tigating Agency, FIR lodged and consequently charge-sheet
filed - Further, High Court opining either to entrust investiga-
tion to CBI to make further investigation by removing the per-
sons against whom a/legations made, from their respective D
offices - State entrusting the investigation to CBI FIR lodged
~
by CBI - Challenge to entrustment of investigation to CBI dis-
missed ..by High Court - On appeal, held: Investigation was
rightly entrusted to CBI- State as well as High Court had power
to direct investigation by CBI - Lodging of second FIR was E
not impermissible in ~aw - The first and the second FlRs were
different in character - Since the charge sheet filed on the
basis of first FIR and evidence of some witnesses recorded,
direction to trial Judge to segregate the portion of trial which
has any bearing with the scam related to second FIR by CBI - F
t CBI Manual - Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 226 and
; ' 142 - Public Interest Litigation.
I
s. 36 rlw s. 3 of Police Act ands. 173 (8) - Distinction between.
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 226 - Jurisdiction
G
under - Nature of
Public Interest Litigation - Powers of Court under - Dis-
tinction from private interest litigation - Discussed.

1049 H

-t
1050 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 14 S.C.R. ).
I

A A writ petition was filed challenging selection of 908 ~- I-

candidates to the post of Panchayat Secretaries, made at I-
the time when the appellant in C.A. No. 6198-99 of 2008 r
was the Rural Development and Panchayat Minister in the
State. High Court formed a prima facie opinion that irregu-
B larities in selection process had been committed. It directed
inquiry in the matter. Pursuant thereto enquiry was made
by Financial Commissioner, Rural Development and ~

Panchayat Department and he opined that the whole se- y ~
lection process be set aside and recommended investiga-
c tion by Vigilan_ce Department. Vigilance Department, after
investigation lodged FIR on 14.6.2002 against several per-
sons including the appellant-Minister for alleged commis-
sion of offences u/ss. 420, 467, 468; 120B IPC and u/ss. 13
t"
(1) (d) (e) and 13 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Charge-sheets were filed against the appellant-Minister and
D
appellant No. 1 (Ex. Deputy Director of Rural Development
and Panchayats in (C.A.No. 6200-6201 of 2008). k (
Secretary of the Department concerned recom- ··- ~
mende_d investigation of the case by the Crime Branch of
E ttie State Police. In view of the same, High Court by order
dated 31.10.2002 observed that the State Government had
the option either to make further investigation by remov-
r
I
I-
ing the persons named in the report from their respective
offices or to direct CBI probe. State opted to handover t
the investigation to CBI. Pursuant to direction of High
•
~
F
Court dated 30.4.2003, State issued Notification, notify- t ~

ing handing over of the investigation to CBI. By order
dated 7.5.2003, High Court observed that in the interest .I
of justice, investigation by CBI was fit. CBI filed its FIR on
26.6.2003. I
G
I-
Appellants filed applications seeking recalling of or-
.._
ders of High Court dated 30.4.2003 and 7.5.2003 and for- ~-
~
quashing the Notification and the consequential FIR dated '
26.6.2003. The applications were dismissed by High
H Court. Hence the present appeals.

r
~ i
NIRMAL SINGH KAHLON v. STATE OF PUNJAB 1051
& ORS.

-; Appellants contended interalia that High Court had A
no jurisdiction u/Art. 226 of the Constitution to direct fresh
investigation by CBI, after filing of the chargesheet in the
matter; thats. 173 (8) Cr.P.C. does not envisage any in-
vestigation by a Central agency after filing of
chargesheet; that s. 36 of Cr.P.C. is not applicable in the B
present case as the expression 'superior police Officer'
would mean an officer superior in the same hierarchy i.e.
the State Police and not an officer of CBI; and that sec- '
ond FIR by CBI was impermissible as an FIR had already
been lodged by the Vigilance Department for the same C
cause of action.
Respondent-state contended that the Police Act be-
ing a special statute, would prevail over the provisions of
Cr.P.C; that the State was entitled to entrust the investi-
gation to CBI, being the ultimate authority u/s. 3 of the q
Act; that the expression 'rank' u/s, 36 Cr.P.C. cannot be
confined only to the same agency but would mean the
investigating agency; and that second FIR was permis-
sible as the first FIR was different in character from the
second FIR. E
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The State in terms of the special statute,
viz., the Police Act can always request the CBI to make
an investigation I further investigation. The said power of Fi
the State is wholly unrestricted by Section 36 Cr.P.C. or
otherwise. The State as in terms of the provisions of
Cr.P.C. and Police Act, exercises two different and distinct
jurisdictions. The power of supervision over investiga-
tion vested in the State in terms of Section 3 of the Police G
Act is absolute. It may in a given case, having regard to
the nature and complexity of the offence may also direct
that further investigation in)he matter may be carried out
by a central agency. [Para 61] (1088-F, G, H)
1.2 In terms of Section 3 of the Police Act, the State H
1052 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

'r
A has the ultimate say in the matter of superintendence of
investigation. Section 36 Cr.P.C. must be read harmoni-
1-
ously with the said provision. Therefore, when Section
36 Cr.P.C uses the words 'in rank', it should be given a
I
purposive construction. Although a plain reading of the .....
~

B aforementioned provision appears to be containing three
ingredients, namely, (i) the investigation must be carried
out by an Officer in charge; (ii) which may be supervised \.
by ari Officer superior in rank; and (iii) in respect of a lo- 'y j...

cal area to which they are appointed, but in the context of
c the power of the State vis-a-vis the provisions of the
Act, the same, deserves a wider application. [Para 27]
(1071-E, F)
1.3 The· power of the investigating Officer to make •;,
further investigation in exercise of its statutory jurisdic- l
D tion under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. and at the instance of
,..
the State having regard to Section 36 Cr.P.C. thereof read
~
with Section 3 of the Police Act, 1861 should be consid-
ered in different contexts. Section 173(8) is an enabling
provision. Only when cognizance of an offence is taken,
E the Magistrate may have some say. But, the restriction r
imposed by judicial legislation is mer~ly for the purpose
of upholding the independence and impartiality of the ju-
diciary. [Para 60] (1087-H; 1088-AB)
Sakiri Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. 2008 (2)
F sec 409 - referred to. . ...
1.4 When serious allegations were made against a *-
former Minister of the State, save and except the cases of
political revenge amounting to malice, it is for the State to t
)-
entrust one or the other agency for the purpose of inves-
G
tigation into the matter. The State for achieving the said
object at any point of time may consider handing over of
f--
investigation to any other ~gency including a central ..
~
agency which has acquired specialization in such cases. .-I
[Paras 28 and 29] (1072-A, B)
H
NIRMAL SINGH KAHLON v. STATE OF PUNJAB 1053
& ORS.

___, 1.5 Director, CBI exercises his power of superinten- A
dence in respect of the matters enumerated in Chapter VI
of the CBI M~nual which includes reference by the State
and/ or reference by the High Courts and this Court as
also the registration thereof. The reference thereof may
be received from (a) Prime Minister of India, (b) Cabinet B
Ministers of Government of India/ Chief Ministers of State
Governments or their equivalent; (c) The State Govern-
'i ments and Supreme Court/ High Courts. Thus, even as-
suming that reference had been made by the State Gov-
ernment at the instance of the High Court, the same by c
itself would not render the investigation carried out by it
to be wholly illegal and without jurisdiction as assuming
~ that the reference had been made by the High Court in
exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitu-
tion of India in a public interest litigation, the same would
also be valid. [Paras 57 and 58] (1086-G, H; 1087-A to D)
D

""' 2.1 If the State has the ultimate supervisory jurisdic-
tion over an investigation for an offence and if it intends
to hand over a further investigation even after filing of the
chargesheet, it may do so. However, it appears from the E
records that those officers including the Chief Secretary
who were dealing with the public interest litigation were
not aware that the chargesheet had been filed in the ear-
lier case. The State Government and the High Court had
proceeded on the basis that the investigation was to be F
~ handed over to the CBI. The High Court came to know
... thereof only when an application for modification was
filed by the appellants therein. It may be true that the High
Court proceeded on the basis that although the CBI had
lodged the FIR, the same would be deemed to have been
lodged only for the purpose of carrying out further inves-
cs
tigation, but, in the opinion of the Court its conclusions
4 are correct. [Para 54] (1085-F, G, H; 1086-A)
2.2 The High Court in this case was not monitoring
any investigation. It only desired that the investigation hl
1054 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

•
A should be carried out by an independent agency. If that t-
be so, the contention that the monitoring of an investiga-
tion comes to an end after the chargesheet is filed, loses
all significance. [Para 55) (1086-B, C)
Vineet Narain v. Union af India 1998 (1) SCC 226; MC.
8 Mehta (Taj Corridor Scam) v. Union of India and Ors. 2007 (1)
sec 110 - referred to.
2.3 Moreover, it was not a case where the High Court y I

had assumed a jurisdiction in regard to the same offence
in respect whereof the Special Judge had taken cogni-
c zance pursuant to the chargesheet filed. The chargesheet
was not filed in the FIR which was lodged on the inter-
vention of the High Court. As the offences were distinct ~
and different, the High Court never assumed the jurisdic-
tion of the Special Judge to direct reinvestigation. [Para
D 56) (1086-D, E)
),:-
3.1 The High Court while entertaining the writ peti-
tion formed a prima facie opinion as regards the system-
atic commission _of fraud. While dismissing the writ peti-
~-

E tion filed by the selected candidates, it initiated a suo motu
public interest litigation. It was entitled to do so. The na-
ture of jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, in a pri-
vate interest litigation and in a public interest litigation is
different. Whereas in the. latter it is inquisitorial in nature,
in the former it is adversorial. In a public interest litiga-
F
tion, the court need not strictly follow the ordinary proce- t
dure. It may not only appoint committees but also issue ..
directions upon the State from time to time. [Para 32) (1072-
G, H; 1073-A, 8)

G Indian Bank vs. Godhara Nagrik Co-op. Credit Society
Ltd. and Anr. 2008 (7) SCALE 363; Raju Ramsing Vasave v.
Mahesh Deorao Bhavpurkar and Ors. 2008 (1 ?) SCALE 252 f-
- relied on.
3.2 In an ordinary case, it could be said that the High
H Court should not direct CBI to investigate into a particu-
NIRMAL SINGH KAHLON v. STATE OF PUNJAB 1055
& ORS.

lar offence. The offence, however, is not ordinary in na- A
ture. It involved investigation into the allegations of com-
mission of fraud in a systematic manner. It had a wide
ramification as a former Minister of the State is said to be
involved. The instant case was not a case where investi-
gation could be carried out in a slip-shod manner [Paras B
34 and 37] (1073-F, G; 1076-C)
'1 3.3 The High Court was concerned only with ap-
poiritment of Panchayat Secretaries. Public Interest Liti-
gation was confined to such appointments only. In regard
thereto, the only allegation which was made was that he c
got his favourites appointed who did not fulfill the qualifi-
cations. [Para 38] (1076-F, G)
Vineet Narain v. Union of India 1998 (1) SCC 226; State
of Bihar v. PP Sharma, 1992 Sup. (1) SCC 222 ; Union of
India v. Sushi/ Kumar Modi, 1998 (8) SCC 661; Rajiv Ranjan D
-,t
Singh 'La/an' v. Union of India 2006 (6) SCC 613; Rajesh v.
,,... .
Ramdeo, 2001 (10) SCC 759; Sasi Thomas v. State 2006
(12) SCC 421; State of WB. v. Committee for Protection of
Democratic Rights WB. and Ors. 2006 (12) SCC 534 - re-
ferred to. E
4.1 Lodging of the second FIR was not impermissible
in law. The second FIR lodged by CBI was on a wider can-
vass. It was lodged after holding a detailed preliminary
inquiry. CBI collected a large number of materials. It had
~
+ also recorded the statements of a large number of per- F
sons. Whereas the first FIR contained the misdeeds of
individuals, the second one depicts a crime committed in
the course of selection process of Panchayat Secretar-
ies involving a large number of officers. [Paras 40 and 53]
(1085-E; 1077-B, C)
G
-';- 4.2 It may be true that in both the FIRs the ex. minis-
ter was named. He was considered to be the prime ac-
cused. But, it is one thing to say that he acted in his indi-
vidual capacity and it is another thing to say that he con-
spired with a large number of persons to facilitate com- H
1056 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

1-
A mission of crime by him as a result whereof all of them
had made unlawful gains. When two conspiracies are al-
leged; one is larger than the other, there may be some
common factors but the nature of offence would differ.
An offence committed would not be judged by mere men-
B tioning of the Sections but the mode and manner in which
the same was committed as also the nature thereof. The
canvass of two FIRs is absolutely different. The numbers ·y
of accused in both the FIRs are also different. There is a
distinction between crime committed by an individual or
c a group of persons vis-a-vis a scam. [Paras 46, 47, 49 and
50] (1080-D, E, F; 1083-8, C)
4.3 The second FIR, would be maintainable not only
because there were different versions but when new dis-
covery is made on factual foundations. Discoveries may
D be made by the police authorities at a subsequent stage.
Discovery about a larger conspiracy can also surface in
another proceeding, as in a case of this nature. If the po- ... ~

lice authorities did not make a fair investigation and left
out conspiracy aspect of the matter from the purview of
E its investigation, as and when the same surfaced, it was
open to the State and/ or the High Court to direct investi-
gation in respect of an offence which is distinct and sepa-
rate from the one for which the FIR had already been
lodged. [Para 59] (1087-E, F, G)
F Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Administration) 1979 (2)
,.
SCC 322; Kari Choudhary v. Mst. Sita Devi and Ors. 2002 (1)
SCC 714; State of A. P v. A. S. Peter 2008 (2) SCC 383; Upkar
Singh v. Ved Prakash and Ors. 2004 (13) SCC 292 - relied
on.
G
TT Antony v. State of Kera/a, 2001 (6) SCC 181; H. N. y..~
Rishbud and lnder Singh v. The State of Delhi 1955 (1) SCR
1150- referred to.
Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd edition, 2005, page 4237 -
H referred to.
NIRMAL SINGH KAHLON v. STATE OF PUNJAB 1057
& ORS.
... -1· 5. In order to do complete justice to the parties, cer- A
tain directions are issued in exercise of jurisdiction un-
der Article 142 of Constitution of India. In view of the fact
that a chargesheet has been filed on the basis of the first
FIR and it is stated that two witnesses had also been ex-
amined, Trial Judge is directed to segregate that portion B I

of the trial which has any bearing with the scam relating
to the appointment of the Panchayat Secretaries. Appel-
lants, in the other appeals, who had been cited as wit-
nesses therein should not be allowed to be examined ex-
cept with their consent. All the materials collected by the c
investigating officer pertaining to the said scam shall be
transferred to the Court of Sub-Judge dealing with the
CBI matters forthwith so as to enable it to hear that part
of the case either independently or together with the
chargesheet which may be submitted by the CBI before i
D
it. [Para 64) (1089-G, H; 1090-A, B)
-+
#> • CASE LAW REFERENCE
2008 (7) SCALE 363 Relied on. Para 32
2008 (12) SCALE 252 Relied on. Para 32
E
1998 (1) sec 226 Referred to. Para 35
1992 Sup. (1) sec 222 Referred to. Para 35
1998 (8) sec 661 Referred to. Para 35
2006 (6) sec 613 Referred to. Para 35
,. i F
2001 (10) sec 759 Referred to. Para 35
2006 (12) sec 421 Referred to. Para 35
2006 (12) sec 534 Referred to. Para 36
1979 (2) sec 322 Relied on. Para 45 G
41 2002 (1) sec 114 Relied on. Para 45
2008 (2) sec 383 Relied on. Para 48
2001 (6) sec 181 Referred to. Para 48
H
1058 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 14 S.C.R.

A 1955 (1) SCR 1150 Referred to. Para 51 f-
2004 (13) sec 292 Referred to. Para 52
1998 (1 > sec 226 Referred to. Para 55
2001 (1) sec 110 Referred to. Para 55
B 2008 (2) sec 409 Referred to. Para 60
2008 (3) sec 542 Relied on. Para 64
2008 (3) sec 542 Relied on. Para 64
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
c 6198-6199 of 2008
From the Judgment and final Order dated 4/10/2005 of
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil
Misc. Nos. 6907 and 6908 of 2005 in CWP No. 20005 of 2002
D WITH
C.A. Nos. 6200-6201 of 2008
P.P. Malhotra, A.S.G., P.P. Rao, L.N. Rao, A.K. Pandey,
Aseem Malhotra, Sunita R Singh, Shefali Jain, Purushottam S.T.,
Sahar Bakht, Utsav, Febin ·AK., Rajesh Prasad Sil)gh, Amit
E Kumar, Satyakam, B.K. Prasad, F. Rarmeswaran,Ajay Pal, Nikhil
Jain and Pranab Kumar Mullick fortheAppearing Parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. Leave granted.
F
1. These two appeals involving similar questions of law
and fact were taken up for hearing together and are being dis-
posed of by this common judgment.
2. Nirmal Singh Kahlon, Appellant in appeals arising out
G of SLP (C) Nos. 24777-24778 of 2005 was the Rural Develop-
ment and Panchayats Minister in the Government of Puniab while
the three appellants in appeals arising out of SLP ~ (C)Nos. t·
25226-25227 of 2005 were working as Deputy Directors in the
Department of Rural Development and Panchayats, Govern-
H ment of Punjab at the relevant time<
NIRMAL SINGH KAHLON v. STATE OF PUNJAB 1059
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
-~
3. The State of Punjab had enacted the Punjab Panchayati A
Raj Act, 1994.
4. An advertisement for recruitment of 190 Panchayat Sec-
retaries was issued in the year 1992 for which written test was
held in the year 1994 ; however, the posts could not be filled. In
the meantime 545 Panchayat Secretaries were appointed on 8
ad hoc basis by the State.
5. One of the applicants, who applied for the post in re-
sponse to the advertisement of 190 posts, challenged the said
ad hoc appointments by way of a writ petition which was marked c
as C.W.P. No.9835 of 1996, titled Palvinder Singh v. State of
Punjab, which was disposed of by a Division Bench of the Court
on 20th September, 1996 by directing inter alia the completion
of the selection process as well as for available posts with the
department. Selection against 190 posts of Panchayat Secre-
D
·1 taries, for which written test had already been held was to be
finalized on or before 201h November, 1996.
~ .
6. Two more advertisements were issued; first on 17/18th
September, 1996 for filling up 700 posts and second on 14th
October, 1996 for filling up 800 posts of Panchayat Secretar- E
ies respectively.
Another advertisement was issued on 19th September,
1998 inviting applications from the female candidates also for
the post of Panchayat Secretaries.
i F
In response to the abovementioned advertisements over
" 1.5 lacs applications were received, the processing job whereof
was handed over to a Delhi based computer firm. Result of the
written test was declared on or about 14th October, 2000 in
which 3286 candidates were declared successful. They were
G
called for interview.
~~

However, no further action appears to have been taken
pursuant thereto or in furtherance thereof. Another writ petition
was filed in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana which was
marked as CWP No.11912 of 2000, titled Harmesh Singh and H
1060 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A others v. State of Punjab and others. By an order dated 30 1h +-
August, 2001, selection for the post of Panchayat Secretaries
was directed to be completed within one month. The said order
was not interfered with by this Court in a Special Leave Petition
filed by the State which was marked Special Leave Petition
B (Civil) No. 15843 of 2001 by an order dated 241h September,
2001. Interviews of the eligible candidates were held thereafter
arid 908 candidates were selected.
7. In or about March, 2002 a change in the State .Govern-
ment took place. The Congress Party came into power after
C election. The new Government made an attempt to reinstate
the Panchayat Patwaris whose services had been terminated
by the previous Government pursuant to the orders of the High
Court.
D 8. Selection of the said 908 candidates was the subject
matter of another writ petition which was marked as CWP
No.5283 of 2003 entitled Veero Devi v. State of Punjab and
others. In the said writ petition the Court formed a prima facie . "
opinion that irregularities in the selection process had been
committed. By an order dated 3rd April, 2002, the High Court
E issued the following directions :-
"The Bench Secretary is directed to give copy of this order
to learned Deputy Advocate General who shall forward
the same to the Advocate General, Punjab. The Advocate
F General, Punjab shall send the copy of the order to the
Chief Secretary, Punjab, who shall ensure that a thorough ..
probe is conducted into the selections made by the
Directorate of Department of Rural Development and
Panchayats by an officer not below the rank of Secretary
to the Government. After conducting the probe, the report
G
be produced before the Court within a period of 8 weeks.
The desirability of issuing other directions would be
considered by the Court after examining the report."
The nature of litigation, therefore, was changed from pri-
H vate interest litigation to public interest litigation.
NIRMAL SINGH KAHLON v. STATE OF PUNJAB 1061
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
-t
9. In terms of the said order an enquiry was made by one A
Shri P. Ram, the then Financial Commissioner, Rural Develop-
ment and Panchayat Department. He was of the opinion that
the entire selection process was required to be set aside. A
recommendation was made that an investigation into the whole
affair be made by the Vigilance Department. B
10. Pursuant thereto a first information report was lodged
'f
by the Vigilance Department on 141h June, 2002 against sev-
eral persons including appellant, Nirmal Singh Kahlon, for al-
leged commission of offences under Sections 420, 467, 468,
120(8) of the· Indian Penal Code and Sections 13(1 )(d)(e) and c
13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the material
portion whereof reads as under :-
"It has come to knowledge that Sh. N.S. Kah Ion Ex. Minister
Rural Department and Panchayat had during his tenure
D
'( made recruitments to the various posts of Tax Collector,
.... Patwaris, Peons, Clerks etc. for his benefit by illegal means
by taking heavy amounts of money as bribes. In this way
for his favourites who were not fulfilling the requirement
like less age, less qualification and manipulating the marks
in the answer sheet, recruitment were made to P. Sect E
and deserving candidates were side lined. Similarly, to
fulfil the backlog in handicap category recruitments of Gram
Sewaks were made and the candidates, who were
deserving were not recruited. It has also come to
, 1 knowledge that Kamalpreet Kaur, Advocate District F
Fatehgrah Sahib who was fulfilling the basic qualifications
in handicap quota for the "Mukh Sewak" was also
sidelined. Rs. 3 lacs were demanded from her by sending
Manjet Singh Steno, office of R.D.P. to her residence.
When she was not able to give money in bribe, then she G
'1' was not recruited to the post. In this way, Kahlon has
accepted heavy amounts as bribes for transfers,
appointments and promotions and he has accumulated
moveable and immovable assets in excess of the known
resources. This has also come to knowledge that Kahlon H
1062 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A has got leased 2 acres of Sham lat land at village Phabhat, f-
Tehsil Dera Bassi, District Patiala for 7 years in the name
of his close relative Burwinder Singh s/o. Ajnala by mis-
using his position, whereas Shamlat land cannot be leased
out for such a long period. In this way Ex.R.D.P.M. has
B earned crores of rupees by mis-using his position through
recruitments, transfers, appointments and promotions and
has accumulated countless assets and cash. By misusing
his powers, he had made wrong appointments for his
benefit and the deserving candidates were overlooked.
By doing this Ex.RE.D.P.M. has committed crime under
c Section 420, 467, 468, 120(B), 13(1)(d)(e) read with
13(2)."
11. A charge sheet was filed against Nirmal Singh Kahlon
and J.P. Singla (appellant No. 1 in Civil Appeals arising out of
D SLP (C) Nos. 25226-25227 of 2005), Ex. Deputy Director of
Rural Development and Panchayats. Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 in ~-

Civil Appeals arising out of SLP (C) 25226-25227 of 2005 were ...
shown as the witnesses in the said report.
12. It appears somewhat strange that despite the same a
E statement was made before the Court on behalf of the State of
Punjab on 1st November, 2002 that the investigation was pro-
posed to be handed over to the Central Bureau of lnvestiga-
tion.

F 13. On or about 16th November, 2002 Secre_tary to the t
Government of Punjab, Department of Rural Development is- 'it.

sued a letter addressed to the Chief Secretary to the Govern-
ment of Punjab, opining that the case should be investigated by
the Crime Branch of the State Police.
G 14. In view of the aforementioned report the High Court, by an
order dated 31st October, 2002, directed the Additional Advocate f--~

General to obtain instructions as to what action the Government has
been contemplating on the enquiry report. It was observed :-
"The State Government will have the option of suo moto
H
NIRMAL SINGH KAHLON v. STATE OF PUNJAB 1063
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

-t making further investigation by removing all those named A
in the report from their respective offices so as to ensure
that the further enquiry is not influenced by any of those
officers. It may also order a CBI probe into the entire
scandal involving appointment of Panchyat Secretaries."
15. On 1st November, 2002 the State Government made a B.
statement that a decision had been taken to handover the in-
--1 vestigation in regard to the scandal involving selection of
Panchayat Secretaries to the Central Bureau of Investigation
and also to take action against the officers named in the en-
quiry report. c
Selection of the candidates, however, was cancelled by
State Government by its order dated 1Oth December, 2002.
16. The Central Bureau of Investigation, however, ex-
pressed its inability to take up investigation opining that the D
same may be conducted by the State Vigilance Department.
¥
One of the grounds on which the said stand was taken was lack
~
of man power as also infra structure.
An affidavit to that effect was to be filed on or before 13th
November, 2002 and the matter was adjourned to 15th Novem- E
ber, 2002. On that date a prayer was made for· some more time
to file a comprehensive affidavit. The writ petition was listed
before the High Court on 1Oth February, 2003 on which date it
noticed the decision of the State Government to handover the
investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation. The State F
i
~ took some adjournments. Proceedings sheet of the High Court
dated 25th April, 2003 reads as under :-
" From the records, it appears that for very good reasons,
the Government of Punjab decided to hand over the
G
investigation of scandal involving selection of Panchayat
Secretaries, who are writ petitioners, to Central Bureau of
·--t
Investigation and also to take· action against the officers
named in the inquiry report, that the Central Bureau of
Investigation stands impleaded as Respondent No.5 in
H
1064 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R. -}-

A Civil Writ Petition No.5283 of 2002 and that today an
application has been filed for placing on record DO No.18/ t-
79-02-4/RDE 4/560 dated 04/03/2003 and DO No. l/C/
2003-CHG/NZ dated 02/04/2003 of the Director Central
Bureau of Investigation, Government of India, New Delhi,
B as Annexure R-1 and Annexure R-2 on behalf of
Respondent No.1 and 2, stating, inter alia, that Central
Bureau of Investigation has communicated that it would
not be able to take up the investigation of the above said ~-
scandal and it may get probed through the State Vigilance
c after the court had adjourned the further hearing of the
case awaiting the submission of the report of Central
Bureau of Investigation. Unfortunately, even though Central
Bureau of Investigation is Respondent No.5 in Civil Writ
Petition No.5283 of 2002, a copy of aforementioend
~
application has been served on Shri Rajan Gupta,
D
Advocate so that we could have a positive response of
Central Bureau of Investigation through its counsel and "f
adjudge the correctness or otherwise of the stand of the ...
Central Bureau of Investigation as communicated to the
State."
E
17. Despite the same no notification was issued by the
State of Punjab handing over the investigation to the Central
Bureau of Investigation. Proceedings sheet dated 30th April,
2003 inter alia reads :-
F "In regard to one of the submissions made by Shri Rajan
Gupta, Learned counsel that no notification has been t
.
made by the Punjab Government handing over the
investigation to the CBI, we hope and trust that necessary
notification in that regard will be published by the Punjab
G Government within couple of days."
18. On or about 2nd May, 2003 the State Government is-
'f-•
sued a Notification in terms of Section 6 of the Delhi Special '
Police Establishment Act, 1946 (for short the 'Act'), the relevant
portion whereof reads as under:-
H
NIRMAL SINGH KAHLON v. STATE OF PUNJAB 1065
& ORS. [S.S. SINHA, J.]

" And whereas during the course of arguments, after A
considering the reply of the CBI and the arguments of the
Standing Counsel for the CBI on 31.4.2003, Hon'ble Punjab
and Haryana High Court directed the State Government
to issue necessary Notification well before the next date
of hearing i.e. 7.5.2003 to enable the CBI to take into B
hands the investigation of the recruitment of 909 Panchayat
Secretaries.
Now, therefore, in pursuance of the provisions of Section
6 of the Delhi Special Policed Establishment Act, 1946
(Central Act 25 of 1946) and all others powers enabling c
him in this behalf, the Government of Punjab is pleased to
accord his consent to the extension of powers and
jurisdiction of the members of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment to the whole of the State of Punjab for
investigating into the alleged scandal of selection of 909 D
Panchayat Secretaries made in the year 1!)96 to 2001 in
-¥'
the Department of Rural Development and Panchayats
.>
under the relevant provisions of the law and any other
offence in relation to or in connection with the said alleged
scandal of appointments committed in the course of the E
same transaction or arising out of the said matter."
19. In view of the aforementioned Notification the High
Court by its order dated 71h May, 2003 directed :-
" Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of F
-f the instant case, it was the court which took a view earlier
;.
that mater is such, which requires, in the interest of justice,
investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation and
then the State of Punjab came to nearly agreeing to the
observations made by the court, though after sometime
G
the Court noticed some dilly dallying on the part of the
·1 State Government but ultimately it decided to hand over
the investigation to the C.B. I. We reiterate that in the
peculiar facts and circumstances investigation by Central
Bureau of Investigation appears to be not only just and
H
1066 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 14 S.C.R.

A proper but a necessity. Accordingly, we hope and trust t-
that the Central Bureau of Investigation will do its best to
investigate and book the real culprits. We respect that
Central Bureau of Investigation will do its investigation
within a reasonable time though we appreciate the limited
B resources, which it is having. We are sure that if the
Director of Central Bureau of Investigation moves the
Government of India to provide more funds and/or offices,
y~
it will consider the request, if so made, objectively and
suitable decision will be taken by the Government of India."
c 20. The Central Bureau of Investigation, however, informed
the High Court on 13th August, 2003 that a special team had
been sent for a meaningful investigation in respect of the alle-
gations, and the same had proceeded to a considerable length.
The Central Bureau of Investigation thereafter registered a first
D information report on 26th June, 2003
...... 21. Appellants filed applications which were marked as 'f-
CM Nos. 6907 - 6908 of 2005 and 18993-18994 for recalling ~

of the orders dated 30th April, 2003 and 7th May, 2003; the
prayers made wherein read as under:-
E
"(a) Recall the orders dated 30.4.2003 (Annexure C-4) I
~
and orders dated 7.5.2003 (Annexure C-6) which have
resulted in the notification dated 2nd May, 2003 of the
State Government hading over the investigation to C.B.I.
F and the second FIR No. 8(s) of 2003 dated 26.6.2003. r
t .._
(b) set aside and quash the notification of the Government
dated 2nd May, 2003 (Annexure C-6) and the consequential
second F.1.R. No.8 (s) of 2003 dated 26.6.2003." r
By reason of the impugned judgment dated 4th October, t
G
2005, the said applications have been dismissed.
22. This Court on 12th December, 2005 while issuing no- ·t---
tice passed the following interim order:-
"The C.B.I. may continue with the investigation, but the
H
NIRMAL SINGH KAHLON v. STATE OF PUNJAB 1067
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

final report shall not be filed till the next date of hearing" A
23. Mr. P.P. Rao and Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned
senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellants, would
submit:-
1) As per the records and in particular the affidavit of B,
Chief Secretary of the State the High Court was not
made aware of the fact that the charge sheet had
- f already been submitted on 19th September, 2002
before a court of competent jurisdiction and
cognizance in the matter had been taken and thus c
the High Court acted illegally and without any
jurisdiction in directing fresh investigation by the
Central Bureau of Investigation.
2) Although the High Court in its impugned judgment
noticed that the charge sheet had been submitted D
-;-·
on 19th September, 2002 but failed and/or neglected
to deal with the implication thereof which
. ~
demonstrates total non application of mind on its
part.
3) The Act does not envisage a State Government to E
give consent for inve$tigation by the Central Bureau
of Investigation in respect of an offence which had
already been investigated and charge sheet
submitted.
F
-f 4) In any event the learned Magistrate before whom the
. ).
charge sheet had been filed did not form an opinion
that the investigation was faulty and/or did not satisfy
~ the requirements of law, no reinvestigation could have
been directed by the High Court in exercise of its
G
power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
or otherwise. Even such an order of reinvestigation
~""" or further investigation is not contemplated ur:ider
Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(for short 'the Code').
H
1068 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A 5) Section 173(8) of the Code does not envisage any
investigation by a central agency created under the
+-
Act after filing of a charge sheet, in which event, the
Court of Magistrate alone has the jurisdiction to issue
any further direction regarding investigation.
B 6) As a first information report had already been lodged
by the Vigilance Department, another first information
report for the same cause of action could not have ~·~
been lodged by the Central Bureau of Investigation
in view of the decisions of this Court in I I Antony
c v. State of Kera/a, [(2001) 6 SCC 181]. and Kari
Choudhary v. Mst. Sita Devi and others, [(2002) 1
sec 714].
7) The Central Bureau of Investigation itself in IAs. 3
and 4 stated that a fresh first information report had
D
been registered on 25th June, 2003 , which goes to
show that earlier first information report as also the 'f-
material collected therein had been totally ignored. ...

8) The High Court in its impugned judgment, although
E accepted that a second first information report on
the same set of allegations, (not being a counter
case) cannot be allowed but did not advert to the
legal implication thereof.
9) After the submission of the report under sub-section
F (2) of Section 173 of the Code, a further investigation
by another agency is impermissible in law.
r
10) The High Court committed a serious error in opining
that the first information ~eport has been lodged only
for the purpose of further investigation arising out of
G
the first information report lodged by the Vigilance
Department. ,,._ ..
11) The Investigating Officer appointed by the Central
Bureau of Investigation being not superior in the rank
H to the police officers of the State Government who
NIRMAL SINGH KAHLON v. STATE OF PUNJAB 1069
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

-1 had inves,tigated and submitted the report on 19th· A
September, 2002, Section 36 of the Code
whereupon reliance has been placed by the State is
inapplicable inasmuch the expression 'superior
police officer' would mean an officer superior in the
same hierarchy i.e. in the State Police and not an B
officer of the Central Bureau of Investigation.

. -). 12) The Notification issued by the State permitting
investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation
into the offence pursuant to the order of the High
Court must be held to be illegal as the High Court, in c
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India could not have issued such a
direction. In any event the finding of the High Court
that there was no direction to Central Bureau of
Investigation to take over investigation is contrary to D
the record of the case, as such a direction had been
-+'
issued by the High Court on 7th May, 2003, on the
.> basis of which first information had been lodged by
the Central Bureau of Investigation as per the order
of the High Court. E
1•
13) The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India in a public
interest litigation or otherwise cannot issue such a
direction particularly when the jurisdiction to monitor
an investigation comes to an end when a charge F
).
1 sheet is filed in view of the decisions of this Court in
Vineet Narain v. Union of India, [(1998) 1 SCC 226].
; State of Bihar v. PP Sharma, [1992 Sup. (1) SCC
222] ; Union of/ndia v. Sushi/ Kumar Modi, [(1998)
8 SCC 661] ; Rajiv Ranjan Singh 'La/an' v. Union G
of India, [(2006) 6 SCC 613) ; Rajesh v. Ramdeo,
..4 [(2001) 10 SCC 759) and Sasi Thomas v. State,
'""' {(2006) 12 SCC 421) ; the High Court having no
constitutional power in this behalf which is vested
only in the Court of Magistrate. H
I-
1070 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A 14) Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 in appeals arising out of SLP
(Civil) Nos. 25226 - 25227 of 2005, having been
r.-
cited witnesses could not have been made accused
which is violative of Article 20 of the Constitution of
India.
B 24. Mr. Ravi Shankar Prasad, learned senior counsel ap-
pearing on behalf of the State of Punjab, supported the conten-
tions of Mr. Rao. ~-
\
25. Mr. P. P. Malhotra, learned Additional Soiicitor General,
c appearing for the Central Bureau of Investigation, on the other.
hand, would submit:-
1) The Act being a special statute, the provision-thereof
would prevail over the provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'the Code') ..
D
2) The expression 'rank' used in Section 36 of the Code
cannot be held to be confined only to the same 1-
agency but would mean the investigating agency. •, I
3) In terms of Section 3 of the Act the ultimate authority
E being the State, it was entitled to entrust the
investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation. •
4) The purport and object of inserting sub-section (8) of ·
Section 173, in the Code, as would appear from the
report of the Law Commission being laudable in
F nature, the same deserves liberal interpretation.
t ..
5) The earlier first information report lodged by the
Vigilance Department was general in characterwhHe
the later First Information Report being in respect of
the scam relating to the appointment ·of Panchayat
G
Secretaries is_ the real first information report.
26. A criminal proceeding is initiated on the basis of lodged 'P ....
'
F.l.R. Commencement of investigation in the matter may be pre-
ceded by a preliminary inquiry.
H
NIRMAL SINGH KAHLON v. STATE OF PUNJAB 1071
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
-4
The term 'investigation' has been defined in Section 2(h) A
of the Code to include all the proceedings under the Code for
collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any
person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorized by a Magis-
trate in this behalf.
'Officer in charge of a police station' is defined in Section B
2(o) of the Code to mean 'officer in charge of a police station'
-f
includes, when the officer in charge of the police station is ab-
sent from the station-house or unable from illness or other cause
to perform his duties, the police officer present at the station -
house who is next in rank to such officer and is above the rank c
~ of constable or, when, the State Government so directs, any
other police officer so present.
Both the definitions are inclusive ones. They have expan-
sive meaning. The interpretation clause thus must receive a lib-
D
-1( eral interpretation.
,;. 27. In terms of Section 3 of the Police Act, 1861, the State
has the ultimate say in the matter of superintendence of investi-
gation. Section 36 of the Code must be read harmoniously with
the said provision. Therefore, when Section 36 of the Code uses E
the words 'in rank', it should be given a purposive construction.
Although a plain reading of the aforementioned provision ap-
pears to be containing three ingredients, namely, (i) the investi-
gation must be carried out by an Officer in charge; (ii) which
may be supervised by an Officer superior in rank; and (iii) in
1 F
. ).
respect of a local area to which they are appointed, but in the
context of the power of the State vis-a-vis the provisions of Act,
the same, in our opinion, deserves a wider application.

An accused is entitled to a fair investigation. Fair investi-
gation and fair trial are concomitant to preservation of funda- G
... 4, mental right of an accused under Article 21 of the Constitution
of India. But the State has a larger obligation i.e. to maintain
law and order, public order and preservation of peace and har-
mony in the society. A victim of a crime, thus, is equally entitled
to a fair investigation. H
1072 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A 28. When serious allegations were made against a former
r-
Minister of the State, save and except the cases of political re-
venge amounting to malice, it is for the State to entrust one or
the other agency for the purpose of investigating into the mat-
ter.
B 29. The State for achieving the said object at any point of
time may consider handing over of investigation to any other
~-
agency including a central agency which has acquired special-
· ization in such cases.

c In that backdrop, it is necessary to examine the rival con-
tentions raised before us. .,._
y
30. Lodging of a First Information Report by.CBI is gov-
erned by a manual. It may hold a preliminary inquiry; it has been
given the said power in Chapter VI of the CBI Manual. A prima
D facie case may be held to have been established only on
-;--
completion of a preliminary enquiry.
..
Whether the First Information Report lodged by the Vigi-
lance Department of the State and the one lodged by the CBI
related to the same cause of action is the question?
E
31. We would proceed on the basis that on the self same
cause of action, two First Information Reports would not be
maintainable. A bare perusal of the First Information Report
dated 14.6.2002 lodged at the instance of the Vigilance Officer
F shows that the same was general in nature. One of the several t
allegations contained therein referred to was that irregularities ..
have been committed in the matter of recruitment of Panchayat
Secretaries. No detail, however, was furnished. All the persons
involved were not named. What types of irregularities have been
committed were not stated.
G
32. The High Court while entertaining the writ petition f- ...
\.--
formed a prima facie opinion as regards the systematic com- ,
mission of fraud. While dismissing the writ petition filed by the
selected candidates, it initiated a suo motu public interest liti-
H gation. It was entitled to do so. The nature of jurisdiction exer-
NIRMAL SINGH KAHLON v. STATE OF PUNJAB 1073
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
-1 cised by the High Court, as is well known, in a private interest A
litigation and in a public interest litigation is different. Whereas
in the latter it is inquisitorial in nature, in the former it is
adversorial. In a public interest litigation, the court need not
strictly follow the ordinary procedure. It may not only appoint
committees but also issue directions upon the State from time B
to time. {See Indian Bank vs. Godhara Nagrik Co-op. Credit
--r Society Ltd. & Anr. [2008 (7) SCALE 363] and Raju Ramsing
Vasave v. Mahesh Deorao Bhavpurkar and others, [2008 (12)
SCALE 252].

33. The process began by calling for a report from a re- c
sponsible officer of the State. The Financial Commissioner sub-
mitted a report. The High Court in its order dated 31.10.2002,
as noticed heretobefore, gave two options to the State. The
State itself came out with the suggestion that it would like to get
the scam investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation. D
_,,
Indisputably, the Central Bureau of Investigation had shown an
# initial reluctance to take over the investigation in view of lack of
infrastructure but the records of the High Court reveal that at a
later stage it had shown interest in the matter. However, in view
of the dilly dallying tactics adopted by the State in issuing ap- E
propriate notification in terms of Section 6 of the Act, the High
Court expected the State to issue a notification at an early date,
by an order dated 30.4.2003. The State concededly exercised
the said power.
1 34. In an ordinary case, we might have accepted the sub- F.
>
mission of Mr. Rao that the High Court should not direct Central
Bureau of Investigation to investigate into a particular offence.
The offence, however, is not ordinary in nature. It involved in-
vestigation into the allegations of commission of fraud in a sys-
tematic manner. It had a wide ramification as a former Minister G
;,_ "'\ of the State is said to be involved.

35. This Court in Vineet Narain (supra) held:

"8. The sum and substance of these orders is that the CBI
and other governmental agencies had not carried out their H
1074 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A public duty to investigate the offences disclosed; that none r-
stands above the law so that an alleged offence by him is
not required to be investigated; that we would monitor the
investigations, in the sense that we would do what we
permissibly could to see that the investigations progressed
B · while yet ensuring that we did not direct or channel those
investigations or in any other manner prejudice the right of
those who might be accused to a full and fair trial. We t-
made it clear that the task of the monitoring court would
end the moment a charge-sheet was filed in respect of a
c particular investigation and that the ordinary processes of
the law would then take over. Having regard to the direction
in which the investigations were leading, we found it
necessary to direct the CBI not to report the progress of
the investigations to the person occupying the highest
office in the political executive; this was done to eliminate
D
any impression of bias or lack of fairness or objectivity ....
I

and to maintain the credibility of the investigations. In short, ~

the procedure adopted was of "continuing mandamus"
In P.P. Sharma, /AS and another (supra) this Court held:
E "31. Finally, we are at a loss to understand as to why and
on what reasoning the High Court assumed extraordinary '
jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of
India at a stage when the Special Judge was seized of the
matter. He had heard the arguments on the question of .
F cognisance and had reserved the orders. The High Court
did not even permit the Special Judge to pronounce the
orders.
" ..._

32. The Directors of the firm who are also accused persons
in this case had approached the Rajasthan High Court for
G
the quashing of the FIR and prosecution against them.
The Rajasthan High Court dismissed the writ petition with 'f-"'
the following order:
"Sri Bhandari states that in this matter chalan has
H already been filed in court. The writ petition has,
NIRMAL SINGH KAHLON v. STATE OF PUNJAB 1075
& ORS. [S.S. SINHA, J.]
---1
therefore, become infructuous. The writ petition is A
dismissed as having become infructuous. No order
as to costs."
33. The above order was brought to the notice of the Patna
High Court but the High Court refused to be persuaded to
adopt the same course. We are of the considered view B
that at a stage when the police report under Section 173
--;
CrPC has been forwarded to the Magistrate after
completion of the investigation and the material collected
by the Investigating Officer is under the gaze of judicial
scrutiny, the High Court would do well t9 discipline itself c
not to undertake quashing proceedings at that stage in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. We could have set
aside the High Court judgment on this ground alone but
elaborate argument having been addressed by the learned
counsel for the parties we thought it proper to deal with all D
~ the aspects of the case."
In Sushi/ Kumar Modi, (supra), it was opined :-
"6. This position is so obvious that no discussion of the
point is necessary. However, we may add that this position E
has never been doubted in similar cases dealt with by this
Court. It was made clear by this Court in the very first
case, namely Vineet Narain v. Union of India that once a
charge-sheet is filed in the competent court after
., completion of the investigatiori. the process of monitoring F
> by this Court for the purpose of making the CBI and other
investigative agencies concerned perform their function
of investigating into the offences concerned comes to an
end; and thereafter it is only the court in which the charge-
sheet is filed which is to deal with all matters relating to the
G
trial of the accused, including matters falling within the
~A
scope of Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. We make this observation only to reiterate
this clear position in law so that no doubts in any quarter
may survive. It is, therefore, clear that the impugned order
H
1076 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A of the High Court dealing primarily with this aspect cannot
be sustained."
[See also Rajiv Ranjan Singh 'La/an' and Sasi Thomas
(supra)).

B 36. The question as to whether the Court-can order C.B.I.
to investigate a cognizable offence in a State without the con-
sent of the State Government stands referred to a larger Bench
in State of WB. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic
t-
Rights WB. and others, [(2006) 12 sec 534], but then con-
c cededly the law as it stands recognizes such a power in the
High Court.
37. It was not a case where investigation could b~ carried
out in a slip-shod manner. The first FIR was lodged on
14.06.2002 as against individuals. It referred to the acts of omis-
D sions and commissions of the accused named therein. During
his tenure as a former Minister, recruitments of various posts of
Tax Collectors, Patwaris, Peons, Clerks were allegedly made ""
by him by illegal means i.e. by taking heavy amount of money -
as bribe. Even those Who were not eligible were allegedly se-
E lected. Allegations were also made in regard to filling up of the
backlog vacancies in handicap category of Gram Sewaks. Ap-
pellant is said to have accepted heavy amount as bribe for trans-
fers, appointments and promotions and, thus, accumulated
movable and immovable assets which were said to be dispro-
F portionate to his known sources of income. t
38. The High Court, however, was concerned only with
....
appointment of Panchayat Secretaries. Public interest litiga-
tion was confined to such appointments only. In regard thereto,
the only allegation which was made was that he got his favourites
G appointed who did not fulfill the qualifications, such as, under-
aged person, person possessing less qualification, wherefor t-·-
· allegedly marks on the answer sheets were tempered and can-
didature of suitable candidates was ignored.
39. The Finance Commissioner, of course, had submit-
H
NIRMAL SINGH KAHLON v. STATE OF PUNJAB 1077
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
_,
ted a report earlier, i.e., on 4.09.2001. It refers to a large num- A
ber of irregularities which were found out by the Committee.
According to the Committee, not only criminal action should be
initiated but also departmental action should be taken against
a large number of officers.
40. The second FIR lodged by the Central Bureau of In- B
vestigation (CBI), however, was on a wider canvass. It was
-1'
lodged after holding a detailed preliminary inquiry. CBI collected
. a large number of materials. It had also recorded the statements
of a large number of persons. Whereas the first FIR dated
14.06.2002, thus, contained the misdeeds of individuals, the c
second one depicts a crime committed in course of selection
process of Panchayat Secretaries involving a large number of
officers.
The High Court was not concerned with individual acts. It
D
~
was concerned with a scam involving appointment of Panchayat
Secretaries.
"
41. The second FIR dated 26.06.2003 enumerates as
many as fifteen categories of irregularities committed by vari-
ous persons involved in the said selection process. Responsi- E
bility has not only been fixed upon the appellant but also upon
Shri Mandeep Singh, Shri C.L. Premmy, Shri J.S. Kesar, Shri
Joginder Singh as also the then Additional Deputy Commis-
sioners of Bhatinda, Ropar and Muktsar. The number of ac-
1 cused who were involved as per preliminary report of the CBI F
.>
were as many as fourteen. The first FIR pointed out offences
under Sections 420, 467, 468, 120B of the Indian Penal Code
and Sections 13(1)(d)(e) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Car-
ruption Act but no allegation of conspiracy was made. In the
second FIR dated 26.06.2003, the persons involved were not
G
~~
only the then Minister but also the then Director, the then Divi-
sion Deputy Director, the then Deputy Directors, the then Addi-
tional Deputy. Commissioners, the then Block Development Of-
ficers, etc.
42. It is in the aforementioned factual backdrop the order H
1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A of the High Court dated 31.10.2002 assumes significance. By
reason of the said order, the State Government was given two
options, viz.:
(i) to make further investigation by removing all those
names in the report from their respective offices so
B as to ensure that further inquiry was not influenced by
any of those officers; or
(ii) to order a CBI probe into the entire scandal involving
the appointment of Panchayat Secretaries.
C 43. It is in the aforementioned situation the State Govern-
ment had taken a decision to hand over the investigation of the
scandal involving selection of Panchayat Secretaries to the CBI.
44. An offence committed by an individual or two and an
offence disclosed ih a scandal involving a large number of of-
0
ficers from the l.owest category to the highest category is dis-
tinct and different. In the first FIR although the provision of Sec-
tion 120B of the Indian Penal Code was mentioned, no allega-
tion of conspiracy had been made. As indicated hereinbefore,
it centered round a large number of acts of omissions and com-
E missions on the part of the appellant Kah Ion alone, as would be
evident from the following:
" ... By misusing his powers, he has made wrong
appointments for his benefit and the deserving candidates
F were overlooked. By doing this Ex. R.D.P.M. has
committed crime under Section 420, 467, 468, 120(8),
13(1)(d)(e) read with 13(2) ... "
45. In the aforementioned circumstances, the decision of
this Court in Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Administration)
G [(1979) 2 SCC 322] assumes significance. This Court therein
was concerned with two Fl Rs; both lodged by the Central Bu- ,-. r

reau of Investigation. The first one contained allegations against
two persons, viz., Malik and Mehra under Section 120B of the
Indian Penal Code read with Sections 406 and 420 thereof
H wherein the CBI filed a chargesheet. Later on, however, some
NIRMAL SINGH KAHLON v. STATE OF PUNJAB 1079
&ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
--{ subsequent events emerged resulting in lodging the FIR not only A
against Malik and Mehra but also against Narang and his two
brothers. This Court opined:
"The offences alleged in the first case were Section 120-
Bread with Section 420 and Section 406 IPC, while the
offences alleged in the second case were Section 120-B B
read with Section 411 IPC and Section 25 of the Antiquities
-· ->- and Art Treasures Act, 1972. It is true that the Antiquities
and Art Treasures Act had not yet come into force on the
date when the FIR was registered. It is also true that Omi
Nar~ng and Manu Narang were not extradited for the c
offence under the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, and,
therefore, they could not be tried for that offence in India.
But the question whether any of the accused may be tried
for a contravention of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act
or under the corresponding provision of the earlier Act is D
really irrelevant in deciding whether the two conspiracies
-+ are one and the same. The trite argument that a Court
~
takes cognizance of offences and not offenders was also
advanced. This argument is again of no relevance in
determining the question whether the two conspiracies E
which were taken cognizance of by the Ambala and the
Delhi Courts were the same in substance. The question is
not whether the nature and character of the conspiracy
has changed by the mere inclusion of a few more
conspirators as accused or by the addition of one more
F
i among the objects of the conspiracy. The question is
,I.
whether the two conspiracies are in substance and truth
•the same. Where the conspiracy discovered later is found
to cover a much larger canvas with broader ramifications,
it cannot be equated with the earlier conspiracy which
G
covered a smaller field of narrower dimensions. We are
-. ~
clear, in the present case, that the conspiracies which are
the subject-matter of the two cases cannot be said to be
identical though the conspiracy which is the subject..matter
of the first case may, perhaps, be said to have turned out
H

"
1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A to be part of the conspiracy which is the subject-matter of
the second case. As we mentioned earlier, when l ,_
investigation commenced in FIR R.C. 4 of 1976, apart
from the circumstance that the property involved was the
same, the link between the conspiracy to cheat and to
B misappropriate and the conspiracy to dispose of the stolen
property was not known.
12. The further connected questions arising for ~- ·>
consideration are, what was the duty of the police on
discovering that the conspiracy, which was the subject-
c matter of the earlier case, was part of a larger conspiracy,
whether the police acted without jurisdiction in investigating
or in continuing to 1nvestigate into the case and whether
the Delhi Court acted illegally in taking cognizance of the
case?"
D
46. It may be true that in both the Fl Rs Kahlon was.named.
He was considered to be the prime accused. But, it is one thing t-
to say that he a.cted in his individual capacity· and it is anoth.er ("

thing to say that he conspired with a large number of persons to
facilitate commission of crime by him as a result whereof all of
E them had made unlawful gains.
47. Even in Ram Lal Narang (supra), we have seen that
two of the acct,1sed, viz., Mehra and Malik, were common. When
two conspiracies are alleged; one is larger than the other, there
F may be some common factors but the nature of offence would
differ. An offence committed would not be judged by mere men-
tioning of the sections but the mode and manner in which the
same was committed as also the nature thereof.
48. Strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Rao on TT
G Antony (supra) and Kari Choudhary (supra). ·
In TT Antony (supra), the first FIR was lodged in 1994;
another FIR was lodged three years thereafter on the self-same
cause of action. Ram Lal Narang (supra) in the said fact-situa-
tion was distinguished on facts, opining:
H
NIRMAL SINGH KAHLON v. STATE OF PUNJAB 1081
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

-~ " ... This Court indicated that the real question was whether A
the two conspiracies were in truth and substance the same
and held that the conspiracies in the two cases were not
identical. It appears to us that' the Court did not repel the
contention of the appellant regarding the illegality of the
second FIR and .the investigation based thereon being B
vitiated, but on facts found that the two FIRs in truth and
substance were different - the first was a smaller
~ -r conspiracy and the second was a larger conspiracy as it
turned out eventually ... "
In Kari Choudhary (supra), the mother-in-law of the de- c
ceased Sugnia Devi lodged an FIR that some persons from
outside had entered into her bedroom and murdered her by
strangulation. During the process of investigation, it was found
that the murder took place in a manner totally different from the
version furnished in the FIR. According to the investigating of- D
ficer, the murder was committed pursuant to a conspiracy
-t
hatched by her mother-in-law and her other daughters-in-law. A
• final report was sent. However, another FIR was lodged. The
first FIR was lodged on 27.06.1988 and the second FIR was
lodged in 30.11.1988. The validity of the first FIR was in ques- E
tion. In that case, another chargesheet was filed on 31.03.2000.
This Court held:
"11. Learned counsel adopted an alternative contention
that once the proceedings initiated under FIR No. 135
-1 ended in a final report the police had no authority to register F
.). a second FIR and number it as FIR No. 208. Of course the
' legal position is that there cannot be two Fl Rs against the
same accused in respect of the same case. But when
there are rival versions in respect of the same episode,
they would normally take the shape of two different Fl Rs and G
\
investigation can be carried on under both of them by the
---~ same investigating agency. Even that apart, the report
submitted to the court styling it as FIR No. 208 of 1998
need be considered as an information submitted to the
court regarding the new discovery made by the police H
1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A during investigation that persons not named in FIR No.
135 are the real culprits. To quash the said proceedings
merely on the ground that final report had been laid in FIR
No. 135 is, to say the least, too technical. The ultimate
object of every investigation is to find out whether the
. B offences alleged have been committed and, if so, who
I
have committed it."
..I"
Kari Choudhary (supra) should be read with Ram Lal
Narang (supra). · t ·I
)c

In State ofA.P. v. A. S. Peter[(2008) 2 SCC 383], this Court ,
c held:
'

"16. Even in regard to an independent investigation I

undertaken by the police authorities, it was observed:
(Na rang case, SCC p. 338, para 21)
~
D
"21 .... In our view, notwithstanding that a Magistrate had ~
taken cognizance of the offence upon a police report t-
submitted under Section 173 of the 1898 Code, the right f
of the police to further investigate was not exhausted and ...
the police could exercise such right as often as necessary \-
I
E when fresh information came to light. Where the police
desired to make a further investigation, the. police could ~
express their regard and respect for the court by seeking
\
its formal permission to make further investigation."

F 17. It is not a case where investigation was carried out in
relation to a separate conspiracy. As allegations had been
made against the officer of a local police station in regard
to the mode and manner in which investigation was carried
out, a further investigation was directed. The court was
informed thereabout. Although, no express permission was
G
granted, but evidently, such a permission was granted by
necessary implication as further proceeding was stayed
by the learned Magistrate. It is also not a case where two
charge-sheets were filed before two different courts. The
court designated to deal with the matters wherein
H
NIRMAL SINGH KAHLON v. STATE OF PUNJAB 1083
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

investigation had been carried out by CID, is located at A
Chittoor. It is in the aforementioned situation, the Sessions
Judge transferred the case pending in the Tirupati Court
to the Designated Court at Chittoor. Cognizance of further
offence had also been taken by the Chittoor Court."
49. The instant case, in our opinion, stands on a better B ·
footing vis-a-vis Ram Lal Narang (supra) in the sense that
whereas the first FIR did not make any allegation as regards
... f existence of a conspiracy, the second FIR did. The canvass of
two Fl Rs is absolutely different. The numbers of accused in both
the Fl Rs are also different. C
50. We must also bear in mind the distinction between
crime committed by an individual or a group of persons vis-a-
vis a scam which means "to get money or property from, an-
other, under false pretences, by gaining the confidence of the
victim, also includes; swindle; defraud". [See Advanced Law D
Lexicon, 3rt1 edition, 2005, page 4237]
51. We may also notice that in H.N. Rishbud and Jnder
Singh v. The State of Delhi [1955 (1) SCR 1150] the appellant
Rishbud was an Assistant Development Officer and another E
appellant lnder Singh was the Assistant Project Section Officer.
A number of criminal proceedings were pending against them.
The cases against them were that they along with some others
entered into criminal conspiracies to obtain for themselves or _, ·
for others iron and steel materials in the name of certain bogus F
firms and that they actually obtained quota certificates, on the
strength of which some of the members of the conspiracy took
delivery of quantities of iron and steel from the stock-holders of
those articles. They were prosecuted under Sections_ 1208 and
420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 7 of the Essential
Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1947. The public servants
G
were also charged with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Cor-
ruption Act, 1947.
Whereas investigations in respect of Section 5(2) of the·
Prevention of Corruption Act were required to be made by a H
1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A police officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of
Police without the order of a Magistrate of the First Class, in- r-
vestigations under other provisions were not. Therein, the Fl Rs
were lodged in April and June, 1949 but permission for investi-
gation as against the public servants by a police officer below
B the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police was given in March
and April, 1951.
The question which arose for consideration therein was
whether the chargesheets filed i~ those cases were illegal. This
Court examined the scheme of the Code to hold :-
c
"9. The question then requires to be considered whether
and towhat extent the trial which follows such investigation
is vitiated. Now, trial follows cognizance and cognizance
is preceded by investigation. This is undoubtedly the basic
scheme of the Code in respect of cognizable cases. But
D
it does not necessarily follow that an invalid investigation
nullifies the cognizance or trial based thereon. Here we t-
are not concerned with the effect of the breach of a ".
mandatory provision regulating the competence or
procedure of the Court as regards cognizance or trial. It is
E only with reference to such a breach that the question as
to whether it_ constitutes an illegality vitiating the
proceedings or a mere irregularity arises. A defect or
illegality in investigation, howew~r serious, has no direct
bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to
F cognizance or trial. No doubt a police report which results
from an investigation is provided in Section 190 of the t ;..

Code of Criminal Procedure as the material on which
cognizance is taken. But it cannot be maintained that a
valid and legal police report is the foundation of the
G jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance. Section 190
of the Code of Criminal Procedure is one out of a group
of sections under the heading "Conditions requisite for t- -
initiation of proceedings". The language of this section is
in marked contrast with that of the other sections of the
H group under the same heading i.e. Sections 193 and 195
·i
.......

NIRMAL SINGH KAHLON v. STATE OF PUNJAB 1085
& ORS. [S.B SINHA J.]

-"I to 199. These latter sections regulate the competence of A
the Court and bar its jurisdiction in certain cases excepting
in compliance therewith. But Section 190 does not. While
no doubt, in one sense, clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section
190(1) are conditions requisite for taking of cognizance,
it is not possible to say that cognizance on an invalid B
police report is prohibited and is therefore a nullity. Such
an invalid report may still fall either under clause (a) or (b)
"-1 of Section 190(1 ), (whether it is the one or the other we
need not pause to consider) and in any case cognizance
so taken is only in the nature of error in a proceeding c
antecedent to the trial. .. "
52. Yet again, in Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash and Others
[(2004) 13 SCC 292], a Three-Judge Bench of this Court held:
"21. From the above it is clear that even in regard to a
D
complaint arising out of a complaint on further investigation
...;- if it was found that there was a larger conspiracy than the
----"--.
,..., one referred to in the previous complaint then a further
investigation under the court culminating in another
complaint is permissible."
E
53. If, in a situation of this nature, lodging of the second
FIR was not impermissible in law, the main plank of submission
of Mr. Rao that whereas in terms of Section 173(8) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure further investigation is permissible, re-
investigation is not, takes a back seat.
F
,..).
-+
54. The question can be considered from another angle. If
the State has the ultimate supervisory jurisdiction over an in-
vestigation for an offence and if it intends to hand over a further
investigation even after filing of the chargesheet, it may do so.
However, it appears from the records that those officers includ- G
ing the Chief Secretary who were dealing with the public inter-
- ....
' est litigation were not aware that the chargesheet had been
filed in the earlier case. The State Government and the High
Court had proceeded on the basis that the investigation was to
be handed over to the CBI. The High Court came to know thereof H
1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

only when an application for modification was filed by the ap-
A
pellants therein. It may be true·that the High Court proceeded r-
on the basis that although the CBI had lodged the FIR, the same
would be deemed to have been lodged only for the purpose of
carrying out further investigation, but, in our opinion, for the views
B we have taken, its conclusions are correct.
55. The High Court in this case was not monitoring any
investigation~ It only desired that the investigation should be
~
carried out by an independent agency. Its anxiety, as is evident
from the order dated 3.04.2002, was to see that the officers of
c the State do not get away. If that be so, the submission of Mr.
Rao that the monitoring of an investigation comes to an end
after the chargesheet is filed, as has been held by this Court in
·Vineet Narain (supra) and M. C. Mehta (Taj Corridor Scam) v.
Union of India and Others [(2007) 1 sec 11 O], loses all sig-
D nificance.
56. Moreover, it was not a case where the High Court had +.
assumed a jurisdiction in regard to the same offence in respect
whereof the Special Judge had taken cognizance pursuant to
.
the chargesheet filed. The chargesheet was not filed in the FIR
E which was lodged on the intervention of the High Court.
As the offences were distinct and different, the High Court
never assumed the jurisdiction of the Soecial Judge to direct
reinvestigation as was urged or otherwise.
F 57. The Act is a special statute. By reason of the said en-
t-
actment, the CBI was constituted. In relation to the matter which ....
were to come within the purview thereof, the CBI could exer-
cise its jurisd,ictlon. The law and order, however, being a State
subject, the CBI derives jurisdiction only when a consent there-
G for is given by the statute. It is, however, now beyond any con-
. troversy that the High Court and this Court also direct investiga-
tion bytheCBI. Our attention has been drawn to the provisions ~ -
of the CBI Manual, from a perusal whereof it appears that the
Director, CBI exercises his power of superintendence in respect
H of the matters enumerated in Chapter VI ofthe CBI Manual which
·
NIRMAL SINGH KAHLON v. STATE OF PUNJAB 1087
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
ii
--..,
includes reference by the -State and/ or reference by the High A
Courts and this Court as also the registration thereof. The ref-
erence thereof may be received from the following:
"(a) Prime Minister of India
(b) Cabinet Ministers of Government of India/ Chief B
· Ministers of State Governments or their equivalent ·
'- -r
(c) The State Governments
(d) Supreme Court/ High Courts"
The CBI Manual having been framed by the Union of In- c
dia, evidently, it has accepted that reference for investigation to
the CBI may be made either by this Court or by the High Court.
58. Thus, even assuming that reference had been made
by the State Government at the instance of the High Court, the
same by itself would not render the investigation carried out by
0
~
it to be wholly iilegal and without jurisdiction as assuming that
' the reference had been made by the High Court in exercise of
its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in a pub-
lie interest litigation, the same would also be valid.
E·
59. The second FIR, in our opinion, would be maintain-
able not only because there were different versions but when
new discovery is made on factual foundations. Discoveries may
be made by the police authorities at a subsequent stage. Dis-
1 covery about a larger conspiracy can also surface in another F
.>
proceeding, as for example, in a case of this nature. If the po-
lice authorities did not make a fair investigation and left out con-
spiracy aspect of the matter from the purview of its investiga-
ti on, in our opinion, as and when the same surfaced, it was open
to the State and/ or the High Court to direct investigation in re- G,
- i spect of an offence which is distinct and separate from the one
for which the FIR had already been lodged.
60. An order of further investigation in terms of Section
173 (8) of the Code by the State in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 36 thereof stands on a different footing. The power H
1088 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A of the investigating officer to make further investigation in exer-
cise of its statutory jurisdiction under Section 173(8) of the Code
and at the instance of the State having regard to Section 36
thereof read with Section 3 of the Police Act, 1861 should be
considered in different contexts. Section 173(8) of the Code is
B an enabling provision. Only when cognizance of an offence is
taken, the learned Magistrate may have some say. But, the re-
striction imposed by judicial legislation is merely for the pur-
pose of upholding the independence and impartiality of the ju-
diciary. It is one thing to say that the court will have supervisory
C jurisdiction to ensure a fair investigation, as has been observed
by a Bench of this Court in Sakiri Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh
and Others [(2008) 2 SCC 409], correctness whereof is open
to question, but it is another thing to say that the investigating
officer will have no jurisdiction whatsoever to make any further
investigation without the express permission of the Magistrate.
0
The ratio laid down in A. S. Peter (supra) (wherein one of
us was a member), to which reliance has been placed by Mr.
Rao should be considered from that angle.
61. Contention raised that the investigating officer ap-
E pointed by the CBI would not be a superior officer in rank to the
police officer of the State Government in terms of Section 36 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure may not detain us in view of
our findings aforementioned ..
F We may, however, observe that the State as in terms of
the provisions of the Code and the Act exercises two different
and distinct jurisdictions. The power of supervision over inves-
tigation vested in the State in terms of Section 3 of the Police
Act, 1861 is absolute. It may in a given case having regard to
G the nature and complexity of the offence may also direct that
further investigation in the matter may be carried out by a cen- } -
tral agency. The State in terms of the special statute, viz., the
Act can always request the CBI to make an investigation I fur-
ther investigation. The said power of the State is wholly unre-
stricted by Section 36 of the Act or otherwise. As a logical cor-
H
NIRMAL SINGH KAHLON v. STATE Of PUNJAB 1088
& ORS. [S.1:3. SINHA, J.]
----1
ollary if while making prel1rrnnary inquiry pursuant to the nol1fi A
cation issued by the State in terms of Section 6 of the Act, U1e
CBI comes to know of commission of other and further otfence
involving a larger conspiracy which required prosecution against
a large number of persons who had not been proceeded
against at all by the local police officers, we are of the opinion 8

---
._.,,,,,
that even lodging of second FIR would not be a bar
62. If lodging of the second F'IR is legally µem11ss:b1e. onl;·
because the same has been done at the im>lance of the } li~l 1
Court could not lead this Court to arrive at a conclusion that its
direction in that behalf was wholly without jurisdic!1on. Ii will bear c
repetition to state that law as it stands permits the High Court
and this Court to direct invest1gat1on made by the CBI. As ind1-
cated hereinbefore, 1t 1s also recognised by the Central Gov-
ernment, as would appear from the provisions of the CBI Manual
,.j referred to hereinbefore. D
_,, 63. We must, howE;ver, not lose sight of the fact that be
fore the High Court it was the State Gove1 nment who stated
that it would like to get the scam investigated by the CBI. The
direction was issued only in view of the said offer and not de'hors
the same. E

64. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any
merit in these appeals.

-~ We would, however, in exercise of our jurisdiction under
J Article 142 of the Constitution of India, like to issue some di rec- F
tions.

In view of the fact that a chargesheet has been filed on the
basis of the first FIR and it is stated that two witnesses had also
been examined, we would direct the learnea Trial Juuge to seg- G,
- -t regate that portion of the trial which has any bearing with the
scam relating to the appo111lmenl of the Panchayat Secretar-
ies. Appellants, in the other appeals, who had been cited as
witnesses therein should not be allowed to be exammed ex-
cept with their consent. All the materials collected by the inves-
H
1090 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A tigating officer pertaining to the said scam shall be transferred
to the Court of Sub-Judge dealing with the CBI matters forth-
with-so as to enable it to hear that part of the case either inde-
. pendently or together with the chargesheet which may be sub-
mitted by the CBI before it. These directions are issued for do-
B ing complete justice to the parties and in terms of the decision
of this Court in Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kera/a and
Others [(2008) 3 SCC 542], whereupon Mr. Rao himself placed
strong reliance.
65. As the investigation is complete, the CBI may file
C chargesheet before a court having appropriate jurisdiction.
66. The appeals are dismissed with aforementioned di-
rections.
K.K.T. Appeals dismissed.