Holding

A judicial officer cannot be removed on the ground of merely erroneous or wrong bail orders without evidence of corrupt motive or extraneous consideration; disciplinary action requires proof of a dishonest exercise of judicial power.

Summary

The appellant, an Additional District Judge with 27 years of unblemished service, was removed from service after a departmental inquiry relied solely on four bail orders in which he allegedly failed to refer to Section 59‑A of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act. A complaint alleged that the judge took bribes through his stenographer, but the inquiry did not examine the complainant and produced no material showing extraneous consideration. The High Court upheld the removal, finding the inquiry fair, but the Supreme Court examined whether a mere erroneous bail order can constitute misconduct. The Court held that a wrong or erroneous exercise of discretion, without evidence of corrupt motive or extraneous influence, is insufficient to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a judicial officer. It emphasized that disciplinary action requires proof of an dishonest exercise of judicial power and that protecting judicial independence is paramount. Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the removal order, reinstated the appellant, and awarded full back wages with consequential benefits.

Issues considered

Whether the removal of a judicial officer on the basis of four bail orders, without any other evidence, is justified.
Whether a wrong or erroneous exercise of discretion in granting bail, absent proof of extraneous consideration, constitutes misconduct warranting departmental action.
Whether the High Court can act as an appellate authority over the findings of a departmental inquiry.
What standard of proof is required to infer corruption or extraneous considerations in disciplinary proceedings against judicial officers.

Legislation cited

Subjects

District judiciaryDisciplinary Inquiry against Judicial OfficersDisciplinary action against Judicial OfficersDepartmental proceedings against Additional District & Sessions JudgeRemoval from service based on judicial orders granting bailFindings in inquiry report perverseSection 59-A, Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915MisconductAlleged extraneous considerationsBail ordersError of judgmentWrong orderWrong exercise of discretion in grant of bailNo ground to initiate departmental proceedingsBona fide error of judgmentSeized liquorErroneous decisionPreliminary inquiry by District JudgeUnblemished serviceRemoval from service not justifiedBribe through steno for grant of bailIndependent judiciaryFalse and frivolous complaints against judicial officersIll-conceived or motivated complaint against judicial officersComplaint of misconduct against judicial officer if prima facie found to be trueDishonest judgmentsReinstatement with consequential benefitsFear of initiation of departmental proceedingsTrial court judges reluctant in exercising discretion for the purpose of grant of bail

Judgment

[2026] 1 S.C.R. 91 : 2026 INSC 7

Nirbhay Singh Suliya
v.
State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
(Civil Appeal No. 40 of 2026)
05 January 2026
[J.B. Pardiwala* and K.V. Vishwanathan,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether on facts, based on the four judicial orders of grant of bail
per se and without anything more, the authorities were justified in
removing the appellant-Judicial Officer from service.

Headnotes†
Judiciary – District judiciary – Departmental proceedings
against Judicial Officer on the allegation that extraneous
considerations actuated passing of bail orders – Mere wrong
order or wrong exercise of discretion in grant of bail by itself
without anything more, not a ground to initiate departmental
proceedings against Judicial Officers – Complainant lodged
complaint with the Chief Justice of the High Court inter alia
alleging that the appellant-Additional District Judge was taking
bribe through his steno for grant of bail in cases under the
Excise Act in which the quantity of seized liquor was 50 Bulk
liters or more – Appellant was removed from service after
27 years of unblemished service solely on the basis of four
judicial orders by which he enlarged certain parties therein
on bail – Those four orders were contrasted with fourteen
other orders of bail and after finding that in the four orders
s.59-A, Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915 was not referred to,
it was held that it was proved that for corrupt motive or for
some extraneous consideration bail applications were allowed
contrary to s.59-A, Excise Act – Appellant filed writ petition
before the High Court challenging the order of removal and
the order of appellate authority and prayed for reinstatement
with consequential benefits – Dismissed – Interference with:
Held: Only because an order is wrong or there is an error of
judgment, without anything more, a judicial officer should not

* Author
92 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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be put through the ordeal of a disciplinary proceeding or a
prosecution – Merely because a different conclusion was possible
is not an indicium for misconduct – Disciplinary Authority has to
examine whether there has emerged from the record, one or more
circumstances that indicate that the decision which forms the basis
of the charge of misconduct was not an honest exercise of judicial
power – Appellant was held guilty of misconduct only based on
certain judicial orders granting bail without anything more – No
material on record to show that there are circumstances from
which inference could be drawn that extraneous considerations
actuated the passing of those orders of bail – The hypothesis was
drawn only on the basis that the order did not make reference
to the statutory provision expressly – Moreover, a perusal of the
four orders show that reasons were given, though there is no
express mention s.59-A (2), Excise Act – The finding that in 14
other orders he referred to s.59-A (2), Excise Act is by itself not
enough to infer misconduct in the passing of the four bail orders in
question – It will be a dangerous proposition to hold that judgments
and orders which do not refer expressly to statutory provisions
are per se dis-honest judgments – Findings in the inquiry report
are perverse and not supported by the evidence on record – High
Court erred in not interfering with the order – Order of removal, the
order of Appellate Authority and the impugned order of the High
Court set aside – Appellant shall be deemed to have continued
in service till he attained the normal age of superannuation –
Since the appellant has been kept out of service for no fault of
his, full back wages with all consequential benefits be given to
him – Per Pardiwala, J. [Concurring] Mere wrong order or wrong
exercise of discretion in grant of bail by itself without anything
more, cannot be a ground to initiate departmental proceedings.
[Paras 29, 33, 35, 39, 40, 41, 43, 1]

Judiciary – District judiciary – Allegations against judicial
officers – Duty of High Court – Note of caution:
Held: High Court which is vested with the supervisory control has
to exercise great caution and circumspection – Only because an
order is wrong or there is an error of judgment, without anything
more, a judicial officer should not be put through the ordeal of a
disciplinary proceeding or a prosecution – Merely because the order
is wrong, disciplinary action is not warranted and each case will
depend upon the facts and no absolute rule can be postulated –
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 93

Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.

Inference of misconduct or about extraneous considerations having
actuated, the decision cannot be drawn merely from a hypothesis
that a decision is erroneous – A wrong decision can yet be a bona
fide error of judgment and inadvertence is consistent with an
honest error of judgment – It is not the correctness of the verdict
but the conduct of the Officer in question which is determinative –
Per Pardiwala, J. [Concurring] High Court vested with the
supervisory control must keep in mind that a judicial officer of the
district judiciary works mostly in a charged atmosphere – A mere
wrong order or wrong exercise of discretion in grant of bail by itself
without anything more, cannot be a ground to initiate departmental
proceedings. [Paras 32, 35, 1]

Directions by Supreme Court – False and frivolous complaint
against a judicial officer vis-à-vis complaints of misconduct
against the judicial officer if prima facie found to be true –
Course of action by High Courts:
Held: Strict and strong action in accordance with law should be
taken against individuals filing a false and frivolous complaint
against a judicial officer and/or if found to be engineering the
false and frivolous complaints – Such proceedings would include
in appropriate cases, proceedings for contempt of court – In case
the person filing or engineering false and frivolous complaints is a
recalcitrant member of the Bar, apart from proceedings for contempt
of court, reference to the bar council should be made for disciplinary
action – Bar councils, on receipt of such references, have to dispose
of the matter expeditiously – Equally, if the complaint of misconduct
against the judicial officer is prima facie found to be true, prompt
action to initiate disciplinary proceeding should be taken and no
leniency should be shown if the charges are established – In
appropriate cases where criminal prosecution is warranted against
a judicial officer, the High Court should not hesitate to have the
same initiated – However, due care and caution must be exercised
by the High Court in initiating such proceedings – Only because an
order is wrong or there is an error of judgment, without anything
more, a judicial officer should not be put through the ordeal of a
disciplinary proceeding or a prosecution. [Paras 28, 29]

Justice delivery system – Judiciary – District judiciary – Bail –
Exercise of discretion for grant of bail – Reluctance of trial
court judges – Fear of initiation of departmental proceedings
on mere suspicion:
94 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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Held: Per Pardiwala, J. [Concurring] Initiation of departmental
proceedings on mere suspicion is one of the primary causes
why trial court judges are reluctant when it comes to exercising
discretion for the purpose of grant of bail – It should not happen
that because of the lurking fear in the mind of a trial court judge,
of some administrative action being taken that even in a deserving
case, well within the principles of law, bail is declined – This is
one reason why the High Courts and the Supreme Court are
flooded with bail applications – Courts of the district judiciary
wield powers necessary for the functioning of the justice delivery
system in India and when their autonomy is compromised by higher
courts and fear takes precedence over judicial duties, democracy
and the rule of law suffer – Over a period of time, the trial court
judges have exhibited tendency to shirk from their solemn judicial
function and responsibility when it comes to exercising discretion
in matters relating to bail – Courts of the district judiciary wield
powers necessary for the functioning of the justice delivery system
in India and when their autonomy is compromised by higher courts
and fear takes precedence over judicial duties, democracy and the
rule of law suffer – For functioning of democracy, an independent
judiciary to dispense justice without fear and favour is paramount.
[Paras 2, 3]

Case Law Cited
Sadhna Chaudhary v. State of U.P and Another [2020] 4 SCR
888 : (2020) 11 SCC 760; R.R. Parekh v. High Court of Gujarat
and Another [2016] 5 SCR 906 : (2016) 14 SCC 1; Union of
India and Others v. K.K. Dhawan [1993] 1 SCR 296 : (1993) 2
SCC 56; P.C. Joshi v. State of U.P. and Others [2001] Supp. 1
SCR 369 : (2001) 6 SCC 491; Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court
of Punjab and Haryana and Another [1988] Supp. 1 SCR 396 :
(1988) 3 SCC 370; Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of
Allahabad and Another [2007] 3 SCR 198 : (2007) 4 SCC 247;
Krishna Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar and Others [2019] 12
SCR 861 : (2019) 10 SCC 640; Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of
Maharashtra and Another [1999] Supp. 2 SCR 490 : (1999) 7
SCC 739 – relied on.
Abhay Jain v. High Court of Rajasthan [2022] 16 SCR 693 : (2022)
13 SCC 1 – referred to.
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 95

Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.

List of Acts
Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915; Contract Act, 1872.

List of Keywords
District judiciary; Disciplinary Inquiry against Judicial Officers;
Disciplinary action against Judicial Officers; Departmental
proceedings against Additional District & Sessions Judge;
Disciplinary Inquiry against Additional District & Sessions Judge;
Removal from service based on judicial orders granting bail;
Findings in inquiry report perverse; Section 59-A, Madhya Pradesh
Excise Act, 1915; Misconduct; Alleged extraneous considerations;
Bail orders; Error of judgment; Wrong order; Wrong exercise of
discretion in grant of bail; No ground to initiate departmental
proceedings; Bona fide error of judgment; Seized liquor; 50 Bulk
liters; Erroneous decision; Preliminary inquiry by District Judge;
Unblemished service; Removal from service not justified; Bribe
through steno for grant of bail; Independent judiciary; District
judiciary; Bail; False and frivolous complaints against judicial
officerss; Ill-conceived or motivated complaint against judicial
officers; Complaint of misconduct against judicial officer if prima
facie found to be true; Dishonest judgments; Reinstatement
with consequential benefits; Fear of initiation of departmental
proceedings; Trial court judges reluctant in exercising discretion
for the purpose of grant of bail.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 40 of 2026
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.07.2024 of the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh Principal Seat at Jabalpur in WP No.
8623 of 2016

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Dama Seshadri Nadu, Sr. Adv., Yash S. Vijay, Kanu Agarwal,
Chetan Kanungo, Shikhar Aggarwal, Ms. Anisha Mahajan.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Harmeet Singh Ruprah, DAG, Arjun Garg, Ms. Sagun Srivastava,
Ms. Arushi Kulshrestha, Saaransh Shukla, Ankit Rajgarhia,
Ms. Muskan Bensla, Sarad Kumar Singhania, Shashank Shekhar,
Meghraj Singh, Ratnesh Kumar.
96 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

K.V. Viswanathan, J.

1. Leave granted.
2. This case highlights the unfortunate plight of a judicial officer
(appellant herein) who, after 27 years of unblemished service, was
removed from service. The sole and exclusive basis on which the
appellant has been removed are four judicial orders by which he
enlarged certain parties thereon on bail. Those four orders were
contrasted with fourteen other orders of bail and after finding that
in the four orders Section 59-A of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act,
1915 (for short the “Excise Act”) was not referred to, action has been
taken. According to the High Court, in the fourteen other orders the
appellant referred to the said Section implying thereby that he was
conscious of the existence of the said Section on the statute. Section
59-A prescribes what has now famously come to be known as “twin
conditions” for grant of bail.
3. The question before us is whether on facts, based on the four
judicial orders of grant of bail per se and without anything more,
the authorities were justified in removing the appellant from service?
4. The facts lie in a very narrow compass. The appellant joined service
on 31.10.1987 as Civil Judge (Junior Division) in the Madhya Pradesh
Judicial Service. The appellant scaled the ladder up and in 2003
was promoted as Additional District Judge and in September, 2008
was confirmed in the said post. On 16.05.2011, he was transferred
to Khargone, District Mandaleshwar (MP), where he joined as First
Additional District & Sessions Judge. In the course of discharge of
his duties, he dealt with several matters, including bail applications
under the Excise Act.
5. One Jaipal Mehta, a resident of Jaitapur, Khargone, lodged a
complaint with the Chief Justice of the Madhya Pradesh High Court,
Jabalpur. The complaint which did not set out any details of the bail
orders and which was in very general terms reads as under:-
“Subject: Regarding disposal of cases under Section
34(2) of IPC.
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 97

Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.

Sir,
In reference to above subject matter, it is requested that
First ADJ Sh. Suliya posted in Khargone, District-West
Nimar, Mandleshwar by taking bribe through his Steno
namely Anil Joshi, Clerk, is granting bails in the cases of
Section 34/2 of Excise Act i.e. of 50 Bulk Ltrs. of liquor,
whereas, ADJ/Sessions Judge has no power to allow said
bail applications. Said Bails are allowed by the High Court.
Anil Joshi, Steno challenges in each and every case that
either you bring case of 302, 307, Claim or Civil Case, I
have good setting with sir, I will get it resolved, rest you
have to pay money as per my wishes. Due to such corrupt
employee, the judiciary is getting defamed. Injustice is
being done with the aggrieved parties in place of giving
them justice. Who will be responsible for it? Previously in
the year 1995-196, the serious complaints of bribe were
also made against the said corrupt employee, on which,
no action was taken. Aforesaid employee is posted in
Khargone since last 25 years and is earning money by
doing setting with Advocates openly. If the enquiry of his
account be conducted, then, the truth will be exposed. If,
the trust of public loses confidence in judiciary then, will
be possible of military rule jungle raj.”
6. It will be seen that according to the complaint, the allegation was
that the appellant was taking bribe through his steno, namely, Anil
Joshi for grant of bail in cases under the Excise Act in which the
quantity of seized liquor was 50 Bulk liters or more; that the said
Anil Joshi was claiming that he will get the work done through the
appellant for extraneous consideration; that due to such corrupt
employee, the judiciary was getting defamed; that even in 1995-96,
serious complaints of bribery were made against the said employee
on which no action was taken; that the said employee has been
posted in Khargone for more than 25 years and is earning money
through illegal means and that an inquiry is essential.
7. It appears from the counter affidavit filed before this Court by R-2 -
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, that a preliminary inquiry was
conducted by the District Judge (I & V), Indore Zone, Indore, against
the appellant and on 06.10.2012, the Principal Registrar (I & V) put
98 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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up a note based on which it was decided to initiate departmental
proceedings against the appellant.
8. What emerges is that in the preliminary inquiry certain orders passed
by the appellant in bail proceedings seem to have been examined
and few orders pulled out. Two charges were framed against the
appellant of which the second charge admittedly was held not proved
by the inquiry officer. The charges read as under:-
“Whereas, you Shri Nirbhay Singh Suliya while functioning as
Additional Sessions Judge, Khargone, distt. Mandleshwar,
have committed following acts which if proved would
amount to grave misconduct:-
ARTICLE OF CHARGE - I
That, you, with corrupt of oblique motive or for some
extraneous considerations, while functioning as Additional
& Sessions Judge, allowed Bail Application No. 129/11
Lokesh Vs. State of MP vide order dated 1.8.11, Bail
Application No. 136/11 Babulal & Ors. Vs. State vide order
dated 4.8.11, Bail Application No.200/11 Mohan Vs. State
of MP vide order dated 7.12.11, Bail Application No. 123/12
Jitendra & Nantiya Vs. State & No. 122/12 Gulab & Ors.
Vs. State of MP, vide order dated 31-08-12, against the
provisions of Section 59-A of the M.P. Excise Act wherein
all the cases, quantity of seized liquor was 50 and more
bulk litres. On the contrary, you rejected Bail Application
No.89/11 vide order dated 16.06.2011, Bail Application No.
92/11, vide order dated 23.06.11, Bail Application No.104/11,
vide order dated 1.7.2011, Bail Application No.103/11, vide
order dated 4.7.11, Bail Application no. 111/11, vide order
dated 11.7.11, Bail Application No. 121/11, vide order
dated 21.07.11, Bail Application No.140/11, vide order
dated 12.08.11, Bail Application No. 160/11 vide order
dated 22.09.11 and six other bail applications in which the
quantity of seized liquor was 50 bulk litres or more. In this
manner you have applied double standard, malafidely, in
allowing the aforesaid bail applications.
ARTICLE OF CHARGE - II
That, you, with corrupt or oblique motive or for some
extraneous consideration allowed the first bail application
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 99

Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.

No. 101/2012 Pappu Vs. State of MP in Crime No. 101/2012
under section 439 of CrPC for offense punishable under
363, 366, 376(2)(g) of the IPC in a serious offence of gang
rape without assigning any sufficient reason, whereas the
accused was already facing trial in another similar crime no.
103/2012 PS Oon for offence punishable under sections
363, 366, 376(2)(g) 3 of the IPC.
Your aforesaid acts being unbecoming of Judicial Officer
amount to grave misconduct under Rule 3 of M.P. Civil
Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965 and are punishable under
Rule 10 of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control
& Appeal) Rules, 1966.”
9. A perusal of “Charge-I” reveals that the orders in the following bail
applications where Bail was granted to the applicants therein were
the basis of the gravamen of the charge:-

Bail Application Nos. Date of Order
129/2011 01.08.2011
136/2011 04.08.2011
200/2011 07.12.2011
123/2012 & 122/2012 31.08.2012
10. The charge was that for corrupt motive or that for some extraneous
consideration, bail applications were allowed contrary to Section
59-A of the Excise Act. A contrast was made with 14 other bail
orders, where the appellant had rejected bail. It is significant to
note that among the five bail orders, Bail Application No.200/2011
that was disposed of on 07.12.2011 was actually a case where the
appellant had rejected bail. Somehow that order also made its way
into “Charge-I”, as an order of grant of bail. Be that as it may. In
the list of witnesses, Jaipal Mehta was named apart from a general
statement – “any other witnesses that may be felt necessary”.
11. The appellant gave his reply and dealt with each bail order that was
subject matter of the charge.
12. We have perused the actual bail orders. In the bail order in Bail
Application No.129/2011 (60 liters of liquor) the reasoning given
was as under:-
100 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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“After hearing arguments of both the parties, Criminal
Case No.1685/11 Filed before Chief Judicial Magistrate
was perused. On perusal, it is clear that on 25.07.2011,
challan has been filed against both the Applicants/
Accused in violation of Section 34(2) of M.P. Excise Act,
and possibility of consuming time in it’s trial cannot be
overruled. In view of the nature of crime, allegations, and
without commenting on the merits of evidences collected
in the present case i.e. Crime No. 232/11, and by placing
reliance on the said case laws, where trial is likely to take
time, and Applicant/Accused are theirselves [sic] being
permanent resident, there is no flight risk or tempering
evidences on their part, thereupon, it appears justifiable to
grant benefit of bail to these Applicants/ Accused Persons.
Due to this reason, the present Bail Application u/s 439
Cr.P.C. is hereby allowed.”
13. Similarly, in other orders, reasons like filing of challan, the applicants
being rural farmers with no flight risk were mentioned. There was
no express reference to the twin conditions under Section 59-A(2)
of the Excise Act.
14. At the inquiry, the complainant Jaipal Mehta was not examined.
Instead the executive clerk of ADJ, Khargone Court, Gendalal
Chauhan was examined as witness No.1, in support of the charge.
The witness marked all the exhibits and categorically deposed as
under which actually was in favour of the appellant :-
“It is correct to say that while passing orders, Anil Joshi
was posted as Steno in the Court of First Additional
Sessions Judge. He is posted in Khargone since last 7-8
years, whom I know due to being my colleague. I never
seen Anil (sic) asking anyone that he has good relations
with Suliya Sahab and I will get done the work by doing
setting. None of the Advocates has told me that Anil Joshi
has setting with Suliya Sahab.”
15. The appellant in defense examined the prosecutor K.P. Tripathi who
appeared in all the 18 bail applications which were subject matter
of the charge. He deposed as under:-
“I did not feel that the double standard has been adopted by
the Court. If it would happen, then, I would give my opinion
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 101

Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.

to the State for taking action in Hon’ble High Court. In Exh.
P-19, only one Crime i.e. Crime No.102/12 is registered
against Accused Pappu in P.S. Oon. Moreover, as per
my knowledge, no other crime is registered against this
accused. Because in Police Report, there is no mention
of registration of any other crime against him. I find the
functioning of Court to be completely impartial.”
……
“That, three Bail Applications of Excise Act have been
allowed, and out of the said Applications, 15 Applications
have been rejected. In my opinion, in the cases of Bail
marked as Exh. P-1, P-2 and P-4, those orders of allowing
bail application which have been passed in view of the facts
and circumstances of respective cases, nature of crime,
and in pursuance of the case laws of Hon’ble High Court
and Supreme Court, those orders are completely based
on merits and are relevant and true as per law. Those 15
Bail Applications which have been rejected by the Ld. Trial
Court, out of those cases, in the orders marked as Exh.
P-9, Exh. P-12, Exh. P-13, Exh. P-17 and Exh. P-18, the
case was at the initial stage of investigation.”
……
“Note: Question by Enquiry Officer:-
Question: The bail orders, in which bail applications have
been allowed, whether those orders according to your
goodself or in the opinion of Public Prosecutor, are proper
or improper? What you say in this regard.
Answer: In my opinion i.e. in the capacity of Public
Prosecutor, the orders of granting bail were absolutely
proper and on proper grounds.”
16. Notwithstanding the above evidence the inquiry officer held “Charge-I”,
proved by recording the following findings:-
“Therefore, on the basis of aforesaid analysis, as a final
conclusion, it is proved in favour of the Department that
Delinquent Officer Sh. N.S. Suliya in the capacity of
Additional Sessions Judge, not being impartial in the
102 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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disposal of Bail Applications for the offences of Section
34(2), 49-A of the Excise Act, and with oblique motive
and by deliberately violating the mandatory provisions
of Section 59-A of the aforesaid Act, has committed
misconduct by allowing some Bail Application Nos.
129/11, 136/11, 123/12, 122/12 and by rejecting some
bail Applications by applying double standards in malafide
and arbitrary manner, who has violated Rule 3 of the M.P.
Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 196, which is punishable
under Rule 10 of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification,
Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966.”
17. On 21.03.2014, a copy of the inquiry report was furnished to the
appellant and he was asked to show cause on the punishment. The
appellant filed a detailed reply by his letter dated 10.04.2014.
18. On 02.09.2014, on the recommendation of the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh, order was passed by the Principal Secretary, Government
of M.P., Law & Legislative Affairs Department, removing the appellant
from service. A representation/appeal filed against the said order
was rejected on 17.03.2016.
19. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh at Jabalpur (Writ Petition No.8623/2016) challenging the
order of removal and the order of the appellate authority and prayed
for reinstatement with consequential benefits.
20. By the impugned order dated 25.07.2024, the High Court has
dismissed the Writ Petition by recording the following finding:-
“If the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, in the
case referred to herein above, are taken note of, then a
reasonable finding arrived at by the Inquiring Authority in
the present case based on material available on record
can neither be interfered with by this Court nor can it
termed as perverse or unreasonable to such an extent
that interference can be made by this Court.
Considering the material available in the present case,
it is apparent that the petitioner was holding the post
of Additional Sessions Judge with which comes a great
responsibility and he was under obligation to conduct
himself in a manner befitting the post held by him. He was
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 103

Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.

under duty to conduct the proceedings of bail applications
in conformity with the provisions of law. He extended
the benefit of bail to some applicants relying on the
pronouncement of High Court and refused to grant bail
to others without considering those pronouncements. No
violation of principles of natural justice or error is found in
the procedure followed in the enquiry in the present case.
In the absence of any procedural illegality, irregularity in
the conduct of departmental enquiry, in the considered
opinion of this Court, no interference is warranted and after
considering the over all material available in the record
and in view of the settled position of law, we do not find
any reason to interfere in the order of punishment/removal
dated 02.09.2014 and the order of rejection of appeal on
17.03.2016 and accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.”
21. Aggrieved, the appellant is before us.
22. We have heard Mr. Dama Seshadri Naidu, learned senior counsel
assisted by Mr. Kanu Agarwal, learned counsel for the appellant
and Mr. Arjun Garg, learned counsel for the respondent no. 2, the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh, who ably presented the case of the
said respondent. We have perused the records, including the written
submissions and the compilation of case law filed by the parties.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT: -
23. Learned senior counsel for the appellant contends that the allegations
were directly against Anil Joshi – the Stenographer; that neither the
complainant – Jaipal Mehta nor the Stenographer was produced as
witnesses during the Departmental Inquiry and that the bail orders
which were subject matter of the inquiry were passed on valid
grounds. Even in the case of special statute “bail is the rule and jail
is the exception”; that the Inquiry Officer has examined the legality
and propriety of the orders of bail acting as an Appellate Authority.
That the departmental witness Gendalal Chauhan and the public
prosecutor in their deposition did not support the charge and finally
it was contended that merely because on a given set of facts, a
different conclusion is possible, is no ground to indict a Judicial
Officer. It was further submitted that wrong exercise of jurisdiction
or mistake of law or wrong interpretation of law cannot be the basis
for initiating disciplinary proceedings.
104 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENT NO.2 – THE HIGH COURT OF
MADHYA PRADESH:-
24. The learned Counsel for the respondent no. 2 - the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh submitted that the procedure for Inquiry has been
duly followed; that the consistent view of this Court has been that the
Court will not function as an Appellate Court over the Inquiry report
and the only consideration was whether the Inquiry had been fairly
conducted after giving due opportunity to the delinquent. It was further
submitted that Section 59-A (2) of the Excise Act was not even referred
to in the bail orders in question, while in the other bail orders it was
mentioned while rejecting bail. The learned counsel submitted that
the Inquiry Officer has come to the conclusion that the conduct of the
appellant was not impartial and the appellant violated the mandate
of Section 59-A and applied double standards in a mala fide and
arbitrary manner. It was submitted that a judicial officer is required to
maintain a very high standard of devotion to duty. So contending, it
was pleaded that the impugned order did not call for any interference.

QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION: -
25. The questions for consideration are whether the order removing the
appellant from service based on the inquiry report is justified in law
and whether any good ground has been made out for interference?

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION: -
26. The present is the case of a Disciplinary Inquiry against the senior
Judicial Officer. Before we set out the parameters laid down by this
Court as to in what circumstances a Judicial Officer can be subjected
to penalty in the discharge of his duties, it is apposite to make certain
preliminary observations.
27. A fearless judge is the bedrock of an independent judiciary, as
much as an independent judiciary itself is the foundation on which
rule of law rests. A judicial Officer is tasked with the onerous duty
of deciding cases. Invariably one party to the case would lose and
go back unhappy. Disgruntled elements amongst them, wanting
to settle scores may raise frivolous allegations. The Trial Judiciary
also has tremendous work pressure and works under trying working
conditions. Large number of cases are listed in a day and most of the
Judicial Officers give their very best while discharging their duties.
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 105

Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.

28. Instances have also emerged from different parts of the country, where
not just disgruntled parties but some mischievous elements in the Bar
have also resorted to intimidatory tactics against the members of the
Trial Judiciary by engineering false and anonymous complaints. Strict
and strong action in accordance with law should be taken against such
individuals filing a false and frivolous complaint against a judicial officer
and/or if found to be engineering the false and frivolous complaints.
Such proceedings would include in appropriate cases, proceedings
for contempt of court. In case the person filing or engineering false
and frivolous complaints is a recalcitrant member of the Bar, apart
from proceedings for contempt of court, reference to the bar council
should be made for disciplinary action. Bar councils, on receipt of
such references, have to dispose of the matter expeditiously.
29. Equally, if the complaint of misconduct against the judicial officer
is prima facie found to be true, prompt action to initiate disciplinary
proceeding should be taken and no leniency should be shown if
the charges are established. Not only this, in appropriate cases
where criminal prosecution is warranted against a judicial officer,
the High Court should not hesitate to have the same initiated. That
is the only way to weed out black-sheeps sullying the fair name of
the judiciary. Due care and caution must be exercised by the High
Court in initiating such proceedings. It should be ensured that only
because an order is wrong or there is an error of judgment, without
anything more, a judicial officer is not put through the ordeal of a
disciplinary proceeding or a prosecution.
30. It is trite to recall the observations of this Court in Sadhna
Chaudhary v. State of U.P and Another.1:-
“20. We are also not oblivious to the fact that mere suspicion
cannot constitute “misconduct”. Any “probability” of
misconduct needs to be supported with oral or documentary
material, even though, the standard of proof would obviously
not be on a par with that in a criminal trial. While applying
these yardsticks, the High Court is expected to consider the
existence of differing standards and approaches amongst
different Judges. There are innumerable instances of
judicial officers who are liberal in granting bail, awarding

1 (2020) 11 SCC 760
106 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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compensation under MACT or for acquired land, back
wages to workmen or mandatory compensation in other
cases of tortious liabilities. Such relief-oriented judicial
approaches cannot by themselves be grounds to cast
aspersions on the honesty and integrity of an officer.
21. Furthermore, one cannot overlook the reality of ours
being a country, wherein countless complainants are
readily available without hesitation to tarnish the image
of the judiciary, often for mere pennies or even cheap
momentary popularity. Sometimes, a few disgruntled
members of the Bar also join hands with them, and
the officers of the subordinate judiciary are usually
the easiest target. It is, therefore, the duty of the High
Courts to extend their protective umbrella and ensure
that the upright and straightforward judicial officers
are not subjected to unmerited onslaught.
26. We can find no fault in the proposition that the end
result of adjudication does not matter, and only whether
the delinquent officer had taken illegal gratification
(monetary or otherwise) or had been swayed by
extraneous considerations while conducting the
process is of relevance. Indeed, many-a-times it is
possible that a judicial officer can indulge in conduct
unbecoming of his office whilst at the same time giving
an order, the result of which is legally sound. Such
unbecoming conduct can either be in the form of a
Judge taking a case out of turn, delaying hearings
through adjournments, seeking bribes to give parties
their legal dues, etc. None of these necessarily need to
affect the outcome. However, importantly in the present
case, a perusal of the charge-sheet shows that no such
allegation of the process having been vitiated has been
made against the appellant.”
(Emphasis supplied)

31. In Abhay Jain vs. High Court of Rajasthan2, this Court quoted with
approval the observations in Sadhna Chaudhary (supra).

2 (2022) 13 SCC 1
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 107

Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.

32. When false allegations fly thick and fast, the judicial officers cannot
react. Here is where the High Court which is vested with the supervisory
control has to exercise great caution and circumspection. As to what
the parameters are, when the High Court on the Administrative side
is faced with such a scenario, has been felicitously set out by Chief
Justice D.Y. Chandrachud J. speaking for the Court in R.R. Parekh v.
High Court of Gujarat and Another3 as under: -
“16. The issue of whether a judicial officer has been
actuated by an oblique motive or corrupt practice has to
be determined upon a careful appraisal of the material on
the record. Direct evidence of corruption may not always
be forthcoming in every case involving a misconduct of
this nature. A wanton breach of the governing principles of
law or procedure may well be indicative in a given case of
a motivated, if not reckless disregard of legal principle. In
the absence of a cogent explanation to the contrary, it is
for the disciplinary authority to determine whether a pattern
has emerged on the basis of which an inference that the
judicial officer was actuated by extraneous considerations
can be drawn. Cases involving misdemeanours of a judicial
officer have to be dealt with sensitivity and care. A robust
common sense must guide the disciplinary authority. At one
end of the spectrum are those cases where direct evidence
of a misdemeanour is available. Evidence in regard to
the existence of an incriminating trail must be carefully
scrutinised to determine whether an act of misconduct is
established on the basis of legally acceptable evidence. Yet
in other cases, direct evidence of a decision being actuated
by a corrupt motive may not be available. The issue which
arises in such cases is whether there are circumstances
from which an inference that extraneous considerations
have actuated a judicial officer can legitimately be drawn.
Such an inference cannot obviously be drawn merely
from a hypothesis that a decision is erroneous. A wrong
decision can yet be a bona fide error of judgment.
Inadvertence is consistent with an honest error of

3 (2016) 14 SCC 1
108 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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judgment. A charge of misconduct against a judicial
officer must be distinguished from a purely erroneous
decision whether on law or on fact. The legality of a
judicial determination is subject to such remedies
as are provided in law for testing the correctness
of the determination. It is not the correctness of the
verdict but the conduct of the officer which is in
question. The disciplinary authority has to determine
whether there has emerged from the record one or
more circumstances that indicate that the decision
which forms the basis of the charge of misconduct
was not an honest exercise of judicial power. The
circumstances let into evidence to establish misconduct
have to be sifted and evaluated with caution. The threat of
disciplinary proceedings must not demotivate the honest
and independent officer. Yet on the other hand, there is a
vital element of accountability to society involved in dealing
with cases of misconduct. There is on the one hand a
genuine public interest in protecting fearless and honest
officers of the District Judiciary from motivated criticism
and attack. Equally there is a genuine public interest in
holding a person who is guilty of wrongdoing, responsible
for his or her actions. Neither aspect of public interest
can be ignored. Both are vital to the preservation of the
integrity of the administration of justice.”
(Emphasis supplied)

33. As held in R.R. Parekh (supra), it should be borne-in-mind that
inference of misconduct or about extraneous considerations having
actuated, the decision cannot be drawn merely from a hypothesis that
a decision is erroneous. It has been held that a wrong decision can yet
be a bona fide error of judgment and inadvertence is consistent with
an honest error of judgment. Ultimately, it is not the correctness of the
verdict but the conduct of the Officer in question which is determinative.
34. It is apposite to recall the observations of this Court in Union of
India and Others vs. K.K. Dhawan4, which has been followed in

4 (1993) 2 SCC 56
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 109

Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.

P.C. Joshi v. State of U.P. and Others5. This Court in K.K. Dhawan
(supra), while illustrating certain cases for which disciplinary action
can be initiated, took care to administer a note of caution also. In
K.K. Dhawan (supra), this Court held:-
“28. Certainly, therefore, the officer who exercises judicial
or quasi-judicial powers acts negligently or recklessly or in
order to confer undue favour on a person is not acting as
a Judge. Accordingly, the contention of the respondent has
to be rejected. It is important to bear in mind that in the
present case, we are not concerned with the correctness or
legality of the decision of the respondent but the conduct of
the respondent in discharge of his duties as an officer. The
legality of the orders with reference to the nine assessments
may be questioned in appeal or revision under the Act.
But we have no doubt in our mind that the Government
is not precluded from taking the disciplinary action for
violation of the Conduct Rules. Thus, we conclude that
the disciplinary action can be taken in the following cases:
(i) Where the officer had acted in a manner as would
reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or
devotion to duty;
(ii) if there is prima facie material to show recklessness
or misconduct in the discharge of his duty;
(iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming
of a Government servant;
(iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted
the prescribed conditions which are essential for the
exercise of the statutory powers;
(v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party;
(vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive,
however small the bribe may be because Lord Coke
said long ago “though the bribe may be small, yet
the fault is great”.
29. The instances above catalogued are not exhaustive.
However, we may add that for a mere technical violation

5 (2001) 6 SCC 491
110 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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or merely because the order is wrong and the action not
falling under the above enumerated instances, disciplinary
action is not warranted. Here, we may utter a word of
caution. Each case will depend upon the facts and no
absolute rule can be postulated.”
35. This Court held that merely because the order is wrong, disciplinary
action is not warranted and that each case will depend upon the
facts and no absolute rule can be postulated. What is significant to
notice is that even though in the illustrated case [para 28 (iv)] K.K.
Dhawan (supra), cases of omission of prescribed conditions which
are essential for the exercise of statutory powers may in a given
case furnish a ground for disciplinary enquiry, it is not an absolute
rule and each case will depend upon the facts. As observed in R.R.
Parekh (supra), the Disciplinary Authority has to examine whether
there has emerged from the record, one or more circumstances
that indicate that the decision which forms the basis of the charge
of misconduct was not an honest exercise of judicial power.
36. In Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana and
Another6, this Court highlighted how the functioning of the Trial
Judiciary would be seriously impacted and fearless discharge of duties
would become a casualty, if inquiries are launched on ill-conceived
or motivated complaints. This Court in Ishwar Chand Jain (supra)
held as under:-
“14. Under the Constitution the High Court has control
over the subordinate judiciary. While exercising that
control it is under a constitutional obligation to guide
and protect judicial officers. An honest strict judicial
officer is likely to have adversaries in the mofussil
courts. If complaints are entertained on trifling matters
relating to judicial orders which may have been upheld
by the High Court on the judicial side no judicial officer
would feel protected and it would be difficult for him
to discharge his duties in an honest and independent
manner. An independent and honest judiciary is a sine
qua non for rule of law. If judicial officers are under
constant threat of complaint and enquiry on trifling

6 (1988) 3 SCC 370
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 111

Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.

matters and if High Court encourages anonymous
complaints to hold the field the subordinate judiciary
will not be able to administer justice in an independent
and honest manner. It is therefore imperative that
the High Court should also take steps to protect its
honest officers by ignoring ill-conceived or motivated
complaints made by the unscrupulous lawyers and
litigants. Having regard to facts and circumstances of
the instant case we have no doubt in our mind that the
resolution passed by the Bar Association against the
appellant was wholly unjustified and the complaints made
by Shri Mehlawat and others were motivated which did
not deserve any credit. Even the vigilance Judge after
holding enquiry did not record any finding that the appellant
was guilty of any corrupt motive or that he had not acted
judicially. All that was said against him was that he had
acted improperly in granting adjournments.”
[Emphasis supplied]

37. Similar sentiments were expressed in Ramesh Chander Singh v.
High Court of Allahabad and Another7, wherein this Court held
as under:-
“12. This Court on several occasions has disapproved
the practice of initiation of disciplinary proceedings
against officers of the subordinate judiciary merely
because the judgments/orders passed by them are
wrong. The appellate and revisional courts have
been established and given powers to set aside such
orders. The higher courts after hearing the appeal
may modify or set aside erroneous judgments of the
lower courts. While taking disciplinary action based
on judicial orders, the High Court must take extra
care and caution.
17. In Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India
[(1999) 7 SCC 409 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1299 : AIR 1999
SC 2881] this Court held that wrong exercise of
jurisdiction by a quasi-judicial authority or mistake

7 (2007) 4 SCC 247
112 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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of law or wrong interpretation of law cannot be the
basis for initiating disciplinary proceeding. Of course,
if the judicial officer conducted in a manner as would
reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or
there is a prima facie material to show recklessness
or misconduct in discharge of his duties or he had
acted in a manner to unduly favour a party or had
passed an order actuated by corrupt motive, the High
Court by virtue of its power under Article 235 of the
Constitution may exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, under such circumstances it should
be kept in mind that the Judges at all levels have to
administer justice without fear or favour. Fearlessness
and maintenance of judicial independence are very
essential for an efficacious judicial system. Making
adverse comments against subordinate judicial
officers and subjecting them to severe disciplinary
proceedings would ultimately harm the judicial system
at the grassroot level.”
38. Highlighting various options available before the High Court to deal
with judicial officers and the need for clearly establishing misconduct
and extraneous influences or illegal gratification before resorting to
disciplinary measures, this Court in Krishna Prasad Verma v. State
of Bihar and Others8, had the following to say:-
“16. We would, however, like to make it clear that we are
in no manner indicating that if a judicial officer passes a
wrong order, then no action is to be taken. In case a judicial
officer passes orders which are against settled legal norms
but there is no allegation of any extraneous influences
leading to the passing of such orders then the appropriate
action which the High Court should take is to record such
material on the administrative side and place it on the
service record of the judicial officer concerned. These
matters can be taken into consideration while considering
career progression of the judicial officer concerned. Once
note of the wrong order is taken and they form part of the
service record these can be taken into consideration to

8 (2019) 10 SCC 640
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 113

Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.

deny selection grade, promotion, etc., and in case there is
a continuous flow of wrong or illegal orders then the proper
action would be to compulsorily retire the judicial officer,
in accordance with the Rules. We again reiterate that
unless there are clear-cut allegations of misconduct,
extraneous influences, gratification of any kind, etc.,
disciplinary proceedings should not be initiated merely
on the basis that a wrong order has been passed by
the judicial officer or merely on the ground that the
judicial order is incorrect.”
[Emphasis supplied]

39. That merely because a different conclusion was possible is not an
indicium for misconduct was highlighted in P.C. Joshi (supra).
“7. In the present case, though elaborate enquiry has been
conducted by the enquiry officer, there is hardly any material
worth the name forthcoming except to scrutinize each one
of the orders made by the appellant on the judicial side to
arrive at a different conclusion. That there was possibility
on a given set of facts to arrive at a different conclusion
is no ground to indict a judicial officer for taking one view
and that too for alleged misconduct for that reason alone.
The enquiry officer has not found any other material,
which would reflect on his reputation or integrity or
good faith or devotion to duty or that he has been
actuated by any corrupt motive. At best, he may say
that the view taken by the appellant is not proper or
correct and not attribute any motive to him which
is for extraneous consideration that he had acted
in that manner. If in every case where an order of a
subordinate court is found to be faulty a disciplinary
action were to be initiated, the confidence of the
subordinate judiciary will be shaken and the officers
will be in constant fear of writing a judgment so as
not to face a disciplinary enquiry and thus judicial
officers cannot act independently or fearlessly. Indeed
the words of caution are given in K.K. Dhawan case
[(1993) 2 SCC 56 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 325 : (1993) 24 ATC
1] and A.N. Saxena case [(1992) 3 SCC 124 : 1992 SCC
(L&S) 861 : (1992) 21 ATC 670] that merely because the
114 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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order is wrong or the action taken could have been
different does not warrant initiation of disciplinary
proceedings against the judicial officer. In spite of
such caution, it is unfortunate that the High Court has
chosen to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the
appellant in this case.”
40. Applying the above principles to the facts of the present case, we
find that the appellant has been held guilty of misconduct only based
on certain judicial orders granting bail without anything more. We
say so for the following reasons:-
(i) The complaint, as originally filed by Jaipal Mehta, was primarily
against Anil Joshi, the stenographer who has been working in
Khargone for a long time even before the appellant assumed
office in Khargone.
(ii) The complaint neither set out any particulars nor set out any
judicial order. It was general in nature.
(iii) The complainant was not examined in the inquiry. The witnesses
examined in support of the charge Gendalal Chauhan did not
support the charge.
(iv) The prosecutor who appeared in each of the 18 bail orders was
examined on behalf of the defence and even he deposed that
the State accepted the orders granting bail without mounting
any challenge in the higher court. He categorically deposed
that the orders were absolutely proper and were passed on
proper grounds.
(v) A perusal of the four orders show that reasons have been
given, though there is no express mention Section 59-A (2) of
the Excise Act. In one bail order, the appellant mentions about
the filing of the challan and the possibility of the trial consuming
lot of time. In fact, in the said order, the appellant has relied on
Article 21 though he has not expressly mentioned the same. In
the other bail orders, he mentions about the applicants being
rural farmers and not being a flight risk and so on.
(vi) There is absolutely no material placed on record to show that
there are circumstances from which inference could be drawn that
extraneous considerations actuated the passing of those orders
of bail. The hypothesis was drawn only on the basis that the
order did not make reference to the statutory provision expressly.
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 115

Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.

(vii) The finding that in 14 other orders he referred to Section 59-A
(2) of the Excise Act is by itself not enough to infer misconduct
in the passing of the four bail orders in question.
(viii) It will be a dangerous proposition to hold that judgments and
orders which do not refer expressly to statutory provisions are
per se dis-honest judgments.
41. The High Court has erred in not interfering with the order. A valiant
attempt was made by Mr. Arjun Garg to sustain the impugned order by
contending that a writ court or this Court cannot act as an appellate
court over the inquiry report and the only consideration was whether
the inquiry had been fairly conducted. We are unable to accept the
said contention. In our opinion, for the reasons stated above, the
findings in the inquiry report are perverse and are not supported by
the evidence on record.# We make bold to record a finding that on
the available material, no reasonable person would have reached
the conclusion that enquiry officer reached.
42. In Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra and Another9,
Saghir Ahmad, J. lucidly explained the principle thus:-
“51. It was lastly contended by Mr Harish N. Salve that
this Court cannot reappraise the evidence which has
already been scrutinised by the enquiry officer as also by
the Disciplinary Committee. It is contended that the High
Court or this Court cannot, in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution, act as
the appellate authority in the domestic enquiry or trial and
it is not open to this Court to reappraise the evidence. The
proposition as put forward by Mr Salve is in very broad
terms and cannot be accepted. The law is well settled
that if the findings are perverse and are not supported
by evidence on record or the findings recorded at the
domestic trial are such to which no reasonable person
would have reached, it would be open to the High
Court as also to this Court to interfere in the matter. In
Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [(1999) 2 SCC 10 :
1999 SCC (L&S) 429 : JT (1998) 8 SC 603] this Court,

9 (1999) 7 SCC 739
# Ed. Note: “supported by the evidence on record” instead of “supported by findings on record” in terms of
subsequent corrigendum.
116 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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relying upon the earlier decisions in Nand Kishore
Prasad v. State of Bihar [(1978) 3 SCC 366 : 1978 SCC
(L&S) 458 : AIR 1978 SC 1277 : (1978) 3 SCR 708] ,
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC
1723 : (1964) 3 SCR 25] , Central Bank of India Ltd. v.
Prakash Chand Jain [AIR 1969 SC 983 : (1969) 2 LLJ
377] , Bharat Iron Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel
[(1976) 1 SCC 518 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 92 : AIR 1976
SC 98 : (1976) 2 SCR 280] as also Rajinder Kumar
Kindra v. Delhi Admn. [(1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985 SCC
(L&S) 131 : AIR 1984 SC 1805 : (1985) 1 SCR 866] laid
down that although the court cannot sit in appeal over
the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority
or the enquiry officer in a departmental enquiry, it
does not mean that in no circumstance can the court
interfere. It was observed that the power of judicial
review available to a High Court as also to this Court
under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic
enquiry as well and the courts can interfere with the
conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence
to support the findings or the findings recorded were
such as could not have been reached by an ordinary
prudent man or the findings were perverse.”
(Emphasis supplied)

43. For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed. The order of removal
dated 02.09.2015, the order of Appellate Authority dated 17.03.2016
and the impugned order of the High Court are all set aside. The
appellant shall be deemed to have continued in service till he attained
the normal age of superannuation. Since the appellant has been
kept out of service for no fault of his, we are of the opinion that full
back wages with all consequential benefits should be given to the
appellant. Let the monetary benefits be released within a period of
eight weeks from today with interest @ 6 per cent. No order as to
costs.
44. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to all the Registrar
Generals of the respective High Courts in the country, so as to
enable them to draw the attention of the Chief Justices of the High
Courts to the same.
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 117

Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.

Judgment

J.B. Pardiwala, J.

1. My esteemed brother Justice K.V. Viswanathan has penned an ineffable
judgment. This judgment will go a long way in protecting judicial officers
of the district judiciary from being subjected to departmental action
for alleged wrong or incorrect exercise of discretion in passing orders
of bail without anything more. Brother Viswanathan has put it very
pithily, saying that if the complaint of misconduct against the judicial
officer is prima facie found to be true then, in such circumstances,
disciplinary proceedings must be taken, and no leniency should be
shown if the charges are established. In an appropriate case, even
criminal prosecution may be instituted against a judicial officer. Such
action is necessary to weed out tainted judges from the judiciary. It goes
without saying that corruption in the judiciary at any level is intolerable,
as corruption severely undermines the core of the administration of
justice and erodes public trust in the rule of law. However, the High
Court, which is vested with the supervisory control must keep in mind
that a judicial officer of the district judiciary works mostly in a charged
atmosphere. A mere wrong order or wrong exercise of discretion in
grant of bail by itself without anything more, cannot be a ground to
initiate departmental proceedings.
2. Initiation of departmental proceedings on mere suspicion is one
of the primary causes why trial court judges are reluctant when it
comes to exercising discretion for the purpose of grant of bail. It
should not happen that because of the lurking fear in the mind of
a trial court judge, of some administrative action being taken that
even in a deserving case, well within the principles of law, bail
is declined. This is one reason why the High Courts are flooded
with bail applications. The same is the scenario even so far as the
Supreme Court is concerned. Over a period of time, the trial court
judges have exhibited tendency to shirk from their solemn judicial
function and responsibility when it comes to exercising discretion in
matters relating to bail. Courts of the district judiciary wield powers
necessary for the functioning of the justice delivery system in India
and when their autonomy is compromised by higher courts and fear
takes precedence over judicial duties, democracy and the rule of
law suffer.
118 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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3. For functioning of democracy, an independent judiciary to dispense
justice without fear and favour is paramount. As held by this Court
in M.S. Bindra versus Union reported in (1998) 7 SCC 310 while
evaluating the materials the authority should not altogether ignore
the reputation in which the officer was held till recently. The maxim
“Nemo Firut Repente Turpissimus” (no one becomes dishonest all
of a sudden) is not unexceptional but still is a salutary guideline to
judge human conduct, particularly in the field of Administrative Law.
The authorities should not keep the eyes totally closed towards the
overall estimation in which the delinquent officer was held in the
recent past by those who were supervising him earlier. To dunk an
officer into the puddle of “doubtful integrity” it is not enough that
the doubt fringes on a mere hunch. That doubt should be of such
a nature as would reasonably and consciously be entertainable by
a reasonable man on the given material. Mere possibility is hardly
sufficient to assume that it would have happened. There must be
preponderance of probability for the reasonable man to entertain
doubt regarding that possibility. Only then there is justification to
ram an officer with the label ‘doubtful integrity’.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey