NIRANJAN HEMCHANDRA SASHITTAL AND ANOTHERversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA

                   (2013] 4 S.C.R. 767


 NIRANJAN HEMCHANDRA SASHITTAL AND ANOTHER                   A
                            v.
              STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
           (Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 50 of 2012)
                    MARCH 15, 2013
                                                             B
   [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]

     Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 32 - Powers under -
Exercise of -Scope - Accused, a public servant, allegedly
acquired disproportionate assets - Trial under the Prevention C
of Corruption Act - Prayer for quashing of the trial on the
ground of delay - Held: No time limit can be stipulated for
disposal of criminal trial - The delay caused has to be weighed
on the factual score, regard being had to the nature of the
offence and the concept of social justice and the cry of the D
collective - In the case at hand, the gravity of the offence is
not to be adjudged on the bedrock of the quantum of bribe -
An attitude to abuse the official position to extend favour in
lieu of benefit is a crime against the collective and an
anathema to the basic tenet of democracy - Also, on facts, E
the delay occurred due to dilatory tactics adopted by the
accused, laxity on the part of the prosecution and faults on
the part of the system, i.e., to keep the court vacant-Accused
precluded from advancing a plea that the delay in trial caused
him colossal hardship and agony warranting quashment of F
the entire criminal proceedings - The accused, as alleged,
had acquired assets worth Rs. 33.44 lacs - The value of the
said amount at the time of launching of the prosecution has
to be kept in mind - The balance to continue the proceeding
against the accused tilts in favour of the prosecution -
Jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution accordingly G
not exercised to quash the proceedings - Prevention of
 Corruption Act, 1988 - s.13(2) rlw s.13(1)(e).
    The Anti Corruption Bureau (ACB) filed an FIR
                        767                                  H
    768    SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2013] 4 S.C.R.


A against a public servant. Charge-sheet was lodged
  against him alongwith two old ladies before the Special
  Court. The offence alleged against the public servant was
  under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the
  Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Allegations against
B the ladies were abetment for the main offences. As there
  was delay in conducting the investigation and filing of
  charge-sheet and disposal of certain interlocutory
  applications, the High Court was moved for quashing of
  the criminal proceedings. The High Court declined to
c interfere and, hence, all the accused persons approached
  this Court in appeal, wherein the criminal case in respect
  of the old ladies was delinked and quashed, but the
  appeals preferred by the petitioner-public servant and his
  wife stood dismissed.
D     It is asserted in the instant petition preferred by the
  public servant and his wife under Article 32 of the
  Constitution that after this Court disposed of the earlier
  criminal appeals, charges were framed nearly after expiry
  of seven years; that nearly after four years of framing of
E charges, the Investigating Officer, was partly examined by
  the prosecution and, thereafter, the matter was adjourned
  on many an occasion; that despite the last opportunity
  being granted by the Special Judge, the Investigating
  Officer was not produced for examination; that the
F examination-in-chief of PW-1 has not yet been completed
  and the other witnesses have not been produced for
  examination by the prosecution; that despite prayer made
  by the petitioner that the prosecution case ought to be
  closed because of its inability to produce the witnesses,
G the Special Judge has not closed the evidence; and that
  more than ten years have elapsed since the earlier
  judgment of this Court was rendered and, therefore, the
  whole proceeding deserved to be quashed.
      The gravamen of grievance of the petitioners
H pertained to procrastination in trial, gradual corrosion of
NIRANJAN HEMCHANDRA SASHITTAL v. STATE OF 769
             MAHARASHTRA
their social reputation, deprivation of respectable            A
livelihood because of order of suspension passed
against the petitioner No. 1 during which he was getting
a meagre subsistence allowance and reached the age of
superannuation without being considered for promotion,
extreme suffering of emotional and mental stress and           B
strain, and denial of speedy trial that impaired their
Fundamental Right enshrined under Article 21 of the
Constitution.
    The question which therefore arose for consideration
was whether in the instant petition, this Court, in exercise C
of powers under Article 32 of the Constitution, should
quash the criminal trial on the ground of delay.
    Disposing of the writ petition, the Court
     HELD: .1.1. On one hand, the right of the accused is      D
to have a speedy trial and on the other, the quashment
of the indictment or the acquittal or refusal for sending
the matter for re-trial has to be weighed, regard being had
to the impact of the crime on the society and the
confidence of the people in the. judicial system. There        E
cannot be a mechanical approach. No time limit can be
stipulated for disposal of the criminal trial. The delay
caused has to be weighed on the factual score, regard
being had to the nature of the offence and the concept
of social justice and the cry of the collective. In the case   F
at hand, the accused has been charge-sheeted under the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for disproportionate
assets. The said Act has a purpose to serve. The
Parliament intended to eradicate corruption and provide
deterrent punishment when criminal culpability is proven.      G
The intendment of the legislature has an immense social
relevance. In the present day scenario, corruption has
been treated to have the potentiality of corroding the
marrows of the economy. There are cases where the
amount is small and in certain cases, it is extremely high.    H
   770     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              (2013] 4 S.C.R.


A The gravity of the offence in such a case is not to be
  adjudged on the bedrock of the quantum of bribe. An
  attitude to abuse the official position to extend favour in
  lieu of benefit is a crime against the collective and an
  anathema to the basic tenet of democracy, for it erodes
B the faith of the people in the system. It creates an
  incurable concavity in the Rule of Law. The system of
  good governance is founded on collective faith in the
  institutions. If corrosions are allowed to continue by
  giving allowance to quash the proceedings in corruption
c cases solely because of delay without scrutinizing other
  relevant factors, a time may come when the unscrupulous
  people would foster and garner the tendency to pave the
  path of anarchism. [Para 19] [785-A-G]
       1.2. It can be stated without any fear of contradiction
D that corruption is not to be judged by degree, for
  corruption mothers disorder, destroys societal will to
  progress, accelerates undeserved ambitions, kills the
  conscience, jettisons the glory of the institutions,
  paralyses the economic health of a country, corrodes the
E sense of civility and mars the marrows of governance.
  Immoral acquisition of wealth destroys the energy of the
  people believing in honesty, and history records with
  agony how they have suffered. The only redeeming fact
  is that collective sensibility respects such suffering as it
F is in consonance with the constitutional morality.
  Therefore, the relief for quashing of a trial under the 1988
  Act has to be considered in the above backdrop. [Para
  20] [785-H; 786-A-C]
        1.3. It is perceivable that delay has occurred due to
G dilatory tactics adopted by the accused, laxity on the part
  of the prosecution and faults on the part of the system,
  i.e., to keep the court vacant. Though there was no order
  directing stay of the proceedings before the trial court,
  yet at the instance of the accused, adjournments were
H sought. After the High Court clarified the position, the
NIRANJAN HEMCHANDRA SASHITTAL v. STATE OF 771
             MAHARASHTRA
accused, by exhibition of inherent proclivity, sought A
adjournment and filed miscellaneous applications for
prolonging the trial, possibly harbouring the notion that
asking for adjournment is a right of the accused and filing
applications is his unexceptional legal right. It cannot be
said that the accused is debarred in law to file applications, B
but when delay is caused on the said score, he cannot
advance a plea that the delay in trial has caused colossal
hardship and agony warranting quashment of the entire
criminal proceeding. In the present case, the accused, as
alleged, had acquired assets worth Rs. 33.44 lacs. The c
value of the said amount at the time of launching of the
prosecution has to be kept in mind. The tendency to abuse
the official position has spread like an epidemic and has
shown its propensity making the collective to believe that
unless bribe is given, the work may not be done. Some 0
citizens do protest but the said protest may not inspire
others to follow the path of sacredness of boldness and
sacrosanctity of courage. Many may try to deviate. This
deviation is against the social and national intere~t. Thus,
the balance to continue the proceeding against the
accused tilts in favour of the prosecution and, hence, this E
Court is not inclined to exercise the jurisdiction under
Article 32 of the Constitution to quash the proceedings.
However, the Special Judge is directed to dispose of the
trial by the end of December, 2013 positively. [Para 21]
[786-D-H; 787-A·C]                                             F

     Rajdeo Sharma v. State of Bihar (1998) 7 SCC 507:
1998 (2) Suppl. SCR 130; Abdul Rehman Antulay and
Others v. R.S. Nayak and Another (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1991
(3) Suppl. SCR 325; Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994)      G
3 SCC 569: 1994 (2) SCR 375; "Common Cause", A
Registered Society through its director v. Union of India and
Others (1996) 4 SCC 33: 1996 (2) Suppl. SCR 196;
"Common Cause'; A Registered Society through its director
v. Union of India and Others (1996) 6 SCC 775: 1996 (9)         H
    772      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 4 S.C.R.


A Suppl. SCR 296; Raj Deo Sharma (II) v. State of Bihar (1999)
  7 SCC 604: 1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 124; P. Ramchandra Rao
  v.· State of Karnataka (2002) 4 SCC 578; Vakil Prasad Singh
  v. State of Bihar (2009) 3 SCC 355: 2009 (1) SCR 517;
  Sudarshanacharya v. Purushottamacharya and Another
B (2012) 9 SCC 241; Mohd. Hussain alias Julfikar Ali v. State
  (Government of NCT of Delhi) (2012) 9 SCC 408; Zahira
  Habibulla H. Shekh and Another v. State of Gujarat and
  Others (2004) 4 SCC 158: 2004 (3) SCR 1050 and Satyajit
  Banerjee and Others v. State of West Bengal and Others
c (2005) 1 SCC 115: 2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 294 - referred to.
                          Case Law Reference:
      1998 (2) Suppl. SCR 130           referred to Para 3, 15
      1991 (3) Suppl. SCR 325           referred to Para 12, 16
D
      1994 (2) SCR 375                  referred to Para 14, 15
      1996 (2) Suppl. SCR 196           referred to Para 15
      1996 (9) Suppl. SCR 296           referred to Para 15
E     1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 124           referred to Para 15
      (2002) 4 sec 578                  referred to Para 15, 16,
                                                    17
      2009 (1) SCR 517                  referred to Para 17
F
      (2012) 9 sec 241                  referred to Para 17
      (2012) 9 sec 408                  referred to Para 18
      2004 (3) SCR 1050                 referred to Para 18
G
      2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 294           referred to Para 18
         CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Writ Petition
    (Criminal) No. 50 of 2012

H         Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
NIRANJAN HEMCHANDRA SASHITTAL v. STATE OF 773
             MAHARASHTRA
    Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, Braj Kishore Mishra, Vijay Kumar,              A
Aparna Jha, Abhishek Yadav, Aditya S., for the Petitioners.

    Sanjay V. Kharde, Asha Gopalan Nair for the Respondent.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                      B
      DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. The gravamen of grievance of the
petitioners in this petition preferred under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India pertains to procrastination in trial, gradual
corrosion of their social reputation, deprivation of respectable
livelihood because of order of suspension passed against the          C
petitioner No. 1 during which he was getting a meagre
subsistence allowance and has reached the age of
superannuation without being considered for promotion,
extreme suffering of emotional and mental stress and strain,
and denial of speedy trial that has impaired their Fundamental        o
Right enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. The
asseverations pertaining to long delay in trial have been made
on the constitutional backdrop leading to the prayer for
quashment of the proceedings of Special Case No. 4 of 1993
pending in the court of learned Special Judge, Greater                E
Bombay.

      2. Before we proceed to state the factual score, it is
necessary to mention that this is not the first time that the
petitioners have approached this Cour!. They, along with others,
had assailed the order of the High Court of Bombay declining          F
to quash the criminal proceedings against the petitioners and
others on the ground of delay in investigation and filing of
charge sheet in three special leave petitions which were
converted to three criminal appeals, namely, Criminal Appeal
Nos. 176 of 2001, 177 of 2001 and 178 of 2001. This Court             G
adverted to the facts and expressed the view that there was
no justification to quash the criminal prosecution on the ground
of delay highlighted by the appellants in all the appeals.
However, this Court took note of the allegations against two
 senescent ladies who were octogenarians relating to their            H
   774      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 4 S.C.R.


A abetment in the commission of the crime and opined that the
  materials were insufficient to prove that the old ladies
  intentionally abetted the public servant in acquiring assets which
  were disproportionate to his known sources of income and
  further it would be unfair and unreasonable to compel them, who
B by advancement of old age, would possibly have already
  crossed into geriatric stage, to stand the long trial having no
  reasonable prospect of ultimate conviction against them and,
  accordingly, on those two grounds, allowed the appeals
  preferred by them and quashed the criminal prosecution as far
c as they were concerned. The other appeals, preferred by the
  public servant and his wife, stood dismissed.

        3. Be it noted, in the said judgment, while quashing the
  proceedings against the two ladies, this Court referred to the
  decision in Rajdeo Sharma v. State of Bihar' and observed
D that the trial was not likely to end within one or two years, even
  if the special court would strictly adhere to the directions issued
  by this Court in Rajdeo Sharma's case.

       4. The facts as uncurtained are that the Anti Corruption
E Bureau (ACB), after conducting a preliminary enquiry, filed an
  FIR on 26.6.1986 against the petitioner No. 1 who was a Deputy
  Commissioner in the Department of Prohibition and Excise,
  Maharashtra Government, for offence punishable under Section
  5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The lodgement
F of the FIR led to conducting of raids at various places and,
  eventually, it was found that the petitioner, a public servant, had
  acquired assets worth Rs.33.44 lakhs which were in excess of
  his known sources of income. After the investigation, the
  Government of Maharashtra was moved for grant of sanction
G which was accorded on 22.1.1993 and thereupon, the charge-
  sheet was lodged against the petitioners along with two old
  ladies on 4.3.1993 before the Special Court. The offence
  alleged against the petitioner, the public servant, was under
  Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1 )(e) of the Prevention of
H 1.   (1998) 1 sec so1.
NIRANJAN HEMCHANDRA SASHITTAL v. STATE OF 775
       MAHARASHTRA [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
Corruption Act, 1988. Allegations against the ladies were            A
abetment for the main offences. As there was delay in
conducting the investigation and filing of charge-sheet and
disposal of certain interlocutory applications, the High Court of
Bombay was moved on 15.4.1997 for quashing of the criminal
proceedings. As has been stated earlier, the High Court              B
declined to interfere and, hence, all the accused persons
approached this Court in appeal, wherein the criminal case in
respect of the old ladies was delinked and quashed,

      5. It is asserted in this petition that after this Court
disposed of the earlier criminal appeals, charges were framed        C
only on 15.12.2007 nearly after expiry of seven years. It is put
forth that during the pendency of the trial, the wife of the
petitioner No. 1 has breathed her last on 23.5.2008. It is averred
that nearly after four years of framing of charges, on 1.2.2011,
Shri Vasant S. Shete, the Investigating Officer, was partly          D
examined by the prosecution and, thereafter, the matter was
adjourned on many an occasion. Despite the last opportunity
being granted by the learned Special Judge, the Investigating
Officer was not produced for examination. As pleaded, the
Investigating Officer appeared before the Special Judge on           E
20. 7.2011 and sought further time instead of getting himself
examined. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned on 25.8.2011,
21.9.2011 and 18.10.2011 and the examination of the
Investigating Officer could not take place. On 15.11.2011, the
Investigating Officer submitted a letter to the Assistant            F
Commissioner of Police, ACB, stating that he had already taken
voluntary retirement and due to bad health was unable to attend
the court and follow up the case. He made a request to the ACP
to appoint some other officer for prosecuting the case.
Thereafter, the Investigating Officer absented himself before the    G
learned trial judge to give his evidence. It is contended that
because of the said situation, the examination-in-chief of PW-
1 has not yet been completed and the other witnesses have
not been produced for examination by the prosecution. It is
 urged that despite prayer made by the petitioner that the           H
    776     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 4 S.C.R.


A prosecution case ought to be closed because of its inability to
  produce the witnesses, the learned Special Judge has not
  closed the evidence. It is urged that more than ten years have
  elapsed since the earlier judgment of this Court was rendered
  and, therefore, the whole proceeding deserved to be quashed.
B Emphasis has been laid on the loss of reputation, mental
  suffering, stress and anxiety and the gross violation of the
  concept of speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the
  Constitution.

       6. The stand of the State of Maharashtra, respondent No.
C 1, is that after delivery of the judgment in the earlier appeals,
  the accused on 29.3.2001 moved numerous miscellaneous
  applications seeking various reliefs and made a prayer that
  framing of charges should be deferred till all the miscellaneous
  applications were decided. He moved the High Court in its
D revisional jurisdiction and writ jurisdiction and though the High
  Court did not grant stay, yet the case was adjourned at the
  instance of the accused. On number of occasions, the accused
  himself moved applications for adjournment and some times
  sought adjournment to go out of the country to Bangkok,
E Thailand and Singapore.

          7. Even after the trial commenced, the accused did not
    cooperate and remained non-responsive. A chart has been filed
    showing the manner in which adjournments were taken by the
F accused at the stage of framing of charge on the ground that
    the matter was pending before the High Court. A reference has
    been made to the order dated 30.1.2003 directing all the
    accused to remain present on the next date of hearing, i.e.,
    07.2.2003, for framing of charge. Reference has been made
    to the orders passed wherefrom it is clear that the accused
0
    persons had sought adjournment on the ground that writ
    oetitions were pending before the High Court. It is also put forth
    chat certain applications were filed by the accused persons
    seeking longer date by giving personal reasons and sometimes
    on the ground of non-availability of the counsel. It is the case
f-1
NIRANJAN HEMCHANDRA SASHITTAL v. STATE OF 777
       MAHARASHTRA [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
of the prosec1Jtion that because of adjournments, the charges           A
could not be framed within a reasonable time but ultimately, on
15.12.2007, the charges were framed. The factual narration
would further reveal that certain miscellaneous applications
were filed and they were ultimately dismissed on 20.2.2008.
On 04.4.2009, an order was passed requiring the counsel for             B
the accused to submit admission and denial of the documents
as per the description mentioned in the application under
Section 294 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Some time
was consumed to carry out the said exercise. The matter was
also adjourned as PW.1 had undergone an operation. On                   c
26.8.2012, the trial Court recorded that the witness, Shetye, was
unable to attend the Court and on the next date, i.e., 13.7.2012,
the Prosecution Witness No. 1 stated that he was suffering from
mental imbalance and was not in a position to depose and in
view of the said situation, the Court directed the prosecution          0
to lead evidence of other witnesses on the next date. Relying
on the documents annexed to the counter affidavit, it is
contended that on most of the dates, the accused has take.n
adjournment on some pretext or the other.                       ·

      8. In the body of the counter affidavit, various dates have       E
been referred to and, computing the same, it has been stated
that delay attributable to the accused is 15.5 ye;;us and the
delay in bringing the matter in queue in the trial Court is one
year. The rest of the delay is caused as the prosecution has
taken time on certain occasions and on some dates, the learned          F
trial Judge was on leave. In this backdrop·, it has been
contended that it is not a fit cas~. where this Court should quash
the proceedings in exercise of-powers under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India.
                                                                        G
     9. An affidavit-in-rejoinder has been filed stating, inter alia,
that applications were filed for release which were within the
legal rights and hence, the delay cannot be attributed to the
accused persons. It is urged that though number of orders have
been passed, yet not a single witness has been examined. The            H
    778     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2013] 4 S.C.R.


A allegation that the accused had gone on vacation has been
  seriously disputed. Emphasis has been laid on the order dated
  18.3.2005 passed by the High Court clarifying the position that
  it had not granted stay and the pendency of the matter should
  not be a ground to adjourn the case. It is contended that the
B Investigating Officer is neither serious nor interested to see the
  progress of the trial but is desirous of delaying as he is aware
  that the case of the prosecution is totally devoid of merit. It is
  further stated that there has been gross and unexplained delay
  at each stage of the proceedings and hence, the same
c deserves to be quashed.

        10. We have heard Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned senior
    counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. Sanjay V. Kharde, learned
    counsel for the respondent-State.

D       11. To appreciate the centripodal issue whether in such a
  case this Court, in exercise of powers under Article 32 of the
  Constitution, should quash the criminal trial on the ground of
  delay, it is requisite to state that in the present petition, we are
  only concerned with the time spent after 02.3.2001, i.e., the date
E of pronouncement of the judgment in the earlier criminal
  appeals, and further the factual matrix as already exposited
  shows how the delay has occurred. The factum of delay and
  its resultant effect are to be tested on the basis of the exposition .
  of law by this Court.
F       12. In Abdul Rehman Antulay and Others v. R.S. Nayak
  and Anothe~. a proponement was advanced that unless a time
  limit is fixed for the conclusion of the criminal proceedings, the
  right to speedy trial would be illusory. The Constitution Bench,
  after referring to the factual matrix and various submissions,
G opined that there is a constitutional guarantee of speedy trial
  emanating from Article 21 which is also reflected in the Code
  of Criminal Procedure. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to state
  as follows:-

H 2. (1992) 1 sec 22s.
NIRANJAN HEMCHANDRA SASHITTAL v. STATE OF 779
       MAHARASHTRA [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
     "83. But then speedy trial or other expressions conveying             A
     the said concept - are necessarily relative in nature. One
     may ask - speedy means, how speedy? How long a delay
     is too long? We do not think it is possible to lay down any
     time schedules for conclusion of criminal proceedings. The
     nature of offence, the number of accused, the number of               B
     witnesses, the workload in the particular court, means of
     communication and several other circumstances have to
     be kept in mind."

      After so stating, the Court gave certain examples relating
to a murder trial where less number of witnesses are examined              C
and certain trials which involve !arge number of witnesses. It also
referred to certain offences which, by their very nature, e.g.,
conspiracy cases, cases of misappropriation, embezzlement,
fraud, forgery, sedition, acquisition of disproportionate assets
by public servants, cases of corruption against high public                D
officials, take longer time for investigation and trial. The Court
also took note of the workload in each court, district, regional
and State-wise and the strikes by the members of the Bar which
 interfere with the work schedules. The Bench further proceeded
to observe that in the very nature of things, it is difficult to draw      E
 a time limit beyond which a criminal proceeding will not be
 allowed to go, and if it is a minor offence, not an economic
offence and the ·delay is too long, not caused by the accused,
different considerations may arise but each case must be left
to be decided on its own facts and the right to speedy trial does          F
notbecome illusory when a time limit is not fixed.

      13. In the said case, in paragraph 86, the Court culled out
11 propositions which are meant to sub-serve as guidelines.
The Constitution Bench observed that the said propositions are
not exhaustive as it is difficult to foresee all situations and further,   G
it is not possible to lay down any hard and fast rules. The
propositions which are relevant for the present purpose are
reproduced below:-

     "(5) While determining whether undue delay has occurred               H
    780        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 4 S.C.R.

A         (resulting in violation of Right to Speedy Trial) one must
          have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including
          nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the
          workload of the court concerned. prevailing local conditions
          and so on - what is called, the systemic delays. It is true
B         that it is the obligation of the State to ensure a speedy trial
          and State includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and
          practical approach should be adopted in such matters
          instead of a pedantic one.

                 xxx                    xxx                xxx
c
          (8) Ultimately, the Court has to balance and weigh the
          several relevant factors - 'balancing test' or 'balancing
          process' - and determine in each cai;e whether the right
          to speedy trial has been denied in a given case.
D
          (9) Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the
          conclusion that right to speedy trial of !ln accused has bet90
          infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case ma1y
          be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open.
          The nature of the offence and other circumstances in a
E
          given case may be such that quashing of proceedingn
          may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it is
          open to the court to make such other appropriate order ··
          including an order to conclude the ·trial within a fixed timf.1
          where the trial, is not concluded or reducing the sentence
F         where the trial has concluded - as may be deemed just and
          equitable in the circumstances of the case.

       It has been laid down therein that it is neither advisable
  nor practicable to fix any time-limit for trial of offences inasmuch
G as any such rule is bound to be qualified one.

           14. Jn Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab 3 , another
    Constitution Bench, while acceptinfJ the principle that denial of
    the right to speedy trial to the accui;ed may eventually result in
H   3.    (1994) a sec sas.
NIRANJAN HEMCHANDRA SASHITTAL v. STATE OF 781
       MAHARASHTRA [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
a decision to dismiss the indictment or a reversal of conviction,       A
further went on to state as follows:-
      "92. Of course, nu length of time is per se too long to pass
      scrutiny under this principle nor the accused is called upon
      to show the actual prejudice by delay of disposal of cases.       B
      On the other hand, the court has to adopt a balancing
      approach by taking note of the possible prejudices and
      disadvantages to be suffered by the accused by avoidable
      delay and to determine whether the accused in a criminal
      proceeding has been deprived of his right of having
      speedy trial with unreasonable delay which could be               C
      identified by the factors - (1) length of delay, (2) the
      justification for the delay, (3) the accused's assertion of his
      right to speedy trial, and (4) prejudice caused to the
      accused by such delay."
                                                                        D
      15. However, thereafter, certain pronouncements, namely,
"Common Cause", A Registered Society through its director
v. Union of India and Others•, "Common Cause", A
Registered Society through its director v. Union of India and
Others5, Raj Deo Sharma (supra) and Raj Deo Sharma (II) v.
 State of Bihar6; came to the field relating to prescription of outer   E
limit for the conclusion of the criminal trial and the
consequences of such delay, being either discharge or acquittal
of the accused. The controversy required to be addressed and,
accordingly, the matter was referred to a Seven-Judge Bench
in P. Ramchandra Rao v. State of Karnataka 7 and the larger             F
Bench by the majority opinion, analyzing the dictum of A.R.
Antulay's case and Kartar Singh's case and other legal
principles relating to the power of the Legislature, the power
of the Court and spectrums of jurisdiction, recorded certain
conclusions. The conclusion Nos. 3 and 4, which are pertinent           G
for the present case, are as under:-
4.   (1996) 4 sec 33.
5.   (1996) 6 sec 775.
6.   (1999) 1 sec 604.
1.   c2002) 4 sec 578.                                                  H
    782      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     (2013) 4 S.C.R.


A         "(3) The guidelines laid down in AR. Antulay case are not
          exhaustive but only illustrative. They are not intended to
          operate as hard-and-fast rules or to be applied like a
          straitjacket formula. Their applicability would depend on
          the fact situation of each case. It is difficult to foresee all
B         situations and no generalization can be made.

          (4) It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially
          permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for
          conclusion of all criminal proceedings. The time-limits or
          bars of limitation prescribed in the several directions made
c         in Common Cause (/), Raj Deo Sharma (/) and Raj Deo
          Sharma (II) could not have been so prescribed or drawn
          and are not good law. The criminal courts are not obliged
          to terminate trial or criminal proceedings merely on
          account of lapse of time. as prescribed by the directions
D         made in Common Cause Case (I), Raj Dea Sharma Case
          (I) and (II). At the most the periods of time prescribed in
          those decisions can be taken by the courts seized of the
          trial or proceedings to act as reminders when they may be
          persuaded to apply their judicial mind to the facts and
E         circumstances of the case before them and determine by
          taking into consideration the several relevant factors as
           pointed out in A.R. Antulay case and decide whether the
          trial or proceedings have become so inordinately delayed
          as to be called oppressive and unwarranted. Such time-
F          limits cannot and will not by themselves be treated by any
           Court as a bar to further continuance of the trial or
           proceedings and as mandatorily obliging the court of
           terminate the same and acquit or discharge the accused."

                                                    [Emphasis added]
G
       16. At this juncture, we may notice few decisions to show
  how the principles laid down in Abdul Rehman Antulay (supra)
  and P. Ramachandra Rao (supra) have been applied by this
  Court either for the purpose of quashing of the prosecution or
H refusal to accede to the prayer in that regard. In Vakil Prasad
NIRANJAN HEMCHANDRA SASHITTAL v. STATE OF 783
       MAHARASHTRA [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
Singh v. State of Bihar8, the two-Judge Bench took note of          A
factual scenario that the investigation was conducted by an
officer who had no jurisdiction to do so; that the accused-
appellant therein could not be accused of causing delay in the
trial because he had successfully exercised his right to
challenge an illegal investigation; that despite direction by the   B
High Court to complete the investigation within a period of three
months on 7 .9.1990, nothing had happened till 27 .2.2007 and
the charge-sheet could only be filed on 1.5.2007 and,
accordingly, opined that it was not a case where there was any
 exceptional circumstance which could be possibly taken into        c
 consideration for condoning the inordinate delay of more than
 two decades in investigation and, accordingly, quashed the
 proceedings before the trial court.

     17. In Sudarshanacharya v. Purushottamacharya and
Another8, a criminal prosecution was launched for commission        D
of an offence for misappropriation and criminal breach of trust.
On an application being filed for quashing of the proceedings,
the High Court declined to quash the proceedings taking note
of the fact that the accused had also played a role in the
procrastination of the proceeding and directed that the case        E
be heard on day-to-day basis. The matter travelled to this Court
and a contention was advanced that it would be unfair to submit
the accused-appellant to the agony of a trial after a lapse of
long time. The Division Bench referred to the principles laid
down in P. Ramachandra Rao (supra) and, further taking note         F
of the conduct of the accused, declined to quash the
proceedings.

    18. At this stage, we think it apposite to advert to another
aspect which is some times highlighted. It is quite common that     G
a contention is canvassed in certain cases that unless there is
a speedy trial, the concept of fair trial is totally crucified.
Recently, in Mohd. Hussain alias Julfikar Ali v. State
a.   c2009) 3 sec 355.
9.   (2012) 9 sec 241.                                              H
    784       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2013) 4 S.C.R.


A (Government of NCT of Oelhi)1°, a three-Judge Bench, after
  referring to the pronouncements in P. Ramchandra Rao's
  case, Zahira Habibu/la H. Shekh and Another v. State of
  Gujarat and Others", Satyajit Banerjee and Others v. State
  of West Bengal and 0thers 12, pointed out the subtle distinction
B between the two in the following manner:-

          "40 "Speedy trial" and "fair trial" to a person accused of
          a crime are integral part of Article 21. There is. however.
          qualitative difference between the right to speedy trial and
          the accused's right of fair trial. Unlike the accused's right
c         of fair trial, deprivation of the right to speedy trial does not
          per se prejudice the accused in defending himself. The
          right to speedy trial is in its very nature relative. It depends
          upon diverse circumstances. Each case of delay in
          conclusion of a criminal trial has to be seen in the facts
D         and circumstances of such case. Mere lapse of several
          years since the commencement of prosecution by itself
          may not justify the discontinuance of prosecution or
          dismissal of indictment. The factors concerning the
          accused's right to speedy trial have to be weighed vis-a-
E         vis the impact of the crime on society and the confidence
          of the people in judicial system. Speedy trial secures rights
          to an accused but it does not preclude the rights of public
          justice. The nature and gravity of crime, persons involved,
          social impact and societal needs must be weighed along
F         with the right of the accused to speedy trial and if the
           balance tilts in favour of the former the long delay in
          conclusion of criminal trial should not operate against the
           continuation of prosecution and if the right of the accused
           in the facts and circumstances of the case and exigencies
G          of situation tilts the balance in his favour, the prosecution
           may be brought to an end."

                                                     [Emphasis added)
    10. c2012) 9 sec 408.
    11. (2004) 4 sec 158.
H   12. (2005) 1 sec 115.
NIRANJAN HEMCHANDRA SASHITTAL v. STATE OF 785
       MAHARASHTRA [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
       19. It is to be kept in mind that on one hand, the right of      A
the accused is to have a speedy trial and on the other, the
quashment of the indictment or the acquittal or refusal for
sending the matter for re-trial has to be weighed, regard being
had to the impact of the crime on the society and the confidence
of the people in the judicial system. There cannot be a                 B
mechanical approach. From the principles laid down in many
an authority of this Court, it is clear as crystal that no time limit
can be stipulated for disposal of the criminal trial. The delay
caused has to be weighed on the factual score, regard being
 had to the nature of the offence and the concept of social justice     c
and the cry of the collective. In the case at hand, the appellant
has been charge-sheeted under the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 for disproportionate assets. The said Act has a
purpose to serve. The Parliament intended to eradicate
corruption and provide deterrent punishment when criminal               0
culpability is proven. The intendment of the legislature has an
immense social relevance. In the present day scenario,
corruption has been treated to have the potentiality of corroding
the marrows of.the economy. There are cases where the amount
 is smaill and in certain cases, it is extremely high. The gravity
                                                                        E
 of the offence in such a case, in our considered opinion, is not
to be adjudged on the bedrock of the quantum of bribe. An
 attitude to abuse the official position to extend favour in lieu of
benefit is a crime against the collective and an anathema to
the basic tenet of democracy, for it erodes the faith of the people
 in the system. It creates an incurable concavity in the Rule of        F
 Law. Be it noted, system of good governance is founded on
 collective faith in the institutions. If corrosions are allowed to
 continue by giving allowance to quash the proceedings in
 corruption cases solely because of delay without scrutinizing
 other relevant factors, a time may come when the unscrupulous          G
 people would foster and garner the tendency to pave the path
 of anarchism.

     20. It can be stated without any fear of contradiction that
corruption is not to be judged by degree, for corruption mothers        H
    786     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 4 S.C.R.

A disorder, destroys societal will to progress, accelerates
  undeserved ~mb'.tions, kills the conscience, jettisons the glory
  of the institutions, paralyses the economic health of a country,
  corrodes the sense of civility and mars the marrows of
  governance. It is worth noting that immoral acquisition of wealth
B destroys the energy of the people believing in honesty, and
  history records with agony how they have suffered. The only
  redeeming fact is that collective sensibility respects such
  suffering as it is in consonance with the constitutional morality.
  Therefore, the relief for quashing of a trial under the 1988 Act
c has to be considered in the above backdrop.

          21. It is perceivable that delay has occurred due to dilatory
    tactics adopted by the accused, laxity on the part of the
    prosecution and faults on the part of the system, i.e., to keep
    the court vacant. It is also interesting to note that though there
D   was no order directing stay of the proceedings before the trial
    court, yet at the instance of the accused, adjournments were
    sought. After the High Court clarified the position, the accused,
    by exhibition of inherent proclivity, sought adjournment and fifed
    miscellaneous applications for prolonging the trial, possibly
E   harbouring the notion that asking for adjournment is a right of
    the accused and filing applications is his unexceptional legal
    right. When we say so, we may not be understood to have said
    that the accused is debarred in law to file applications, but when
    delay is caused on the said score, he cannot advance a plea
F   that the delay in trial has caused colossal hardship and agony
    warranting quashment of the entire criminal proceeding. In the
    present case, as has been stated earlier, the accused, as
    alleged, had acquired assets worth Rs. 33.44 lacs. The value
    of the said amount at the time of launching of the prosecution
G   has to be kept in mind. It can be stated with absolute assurance
    that the tendenr.y to abuse the official position has spread like
    an epidemic and has shown its propensity making the
    collective to believe that unless bribe is given, the work may
     not be done. To put it differently, giving bribe, whether in cash
H   or in kind, may become the "mantra" of the people. We may
NIRANJAN HEMCHANDRA SASHITTAL v. STATE OF 787
       MAHARASHTRA [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
hasten to add, some citizens do protest but the said protest        A
may not inspire others to follow the path of sacredness of
boldness and sacrosanctity of courage. Many may try to deviate.
This deviation is against the social and national interest. Thus,
we are disposed to think that the balance to continue the
proceeding against the accused-appellants tilts in favour of the    8
prosecution and, hence, we are not inclined to exercise the
jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution to quash the
proceedings. However, the learned Special Judge is directed
to dispose of the trial by the end of December, 2013 positively.

    22. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.               c
8.8.8.                               Writ Petition disposed of.