NIDHIversusRAM KRIPAL SHARMA (D) THROUGH LRS.

                        [2017) I S.C.R. 897



                               NIDHI                                     A
                                  v.
         RAM KRIPAL SHARMA (D) THROUGH LRS. ·
                  (Civil Appeal No. 1008 of 20 I 7)
                       FEBRUARY 07, 2017                                 B

         [DIPAK MISRA AND R. BANUMATHI, JJ.)
        Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent
and Eviction) Act, 1972 - s.2J(J)(a) - Release of building under
occupation of tenant - Release sought by landlady on the ground
a/bona fide requirement for her grandparents -Prescribed Authority
                                                                         c
holding that balance of convenience was in favour of the landlady,
found that she required the premises bona fide - Appellate court
held that need for tenanted premises was not based on bona fide
requirement - The High Court held that the alleged bona fide need
extinguished in view of the subsequent circumstance viz. marriage        D
of the landlady - On appeal, held: Though the court has the power
to take note of the. subsequent events, court has to consider the
effect of subsequent development on the bona fide need of the
landlord - For the purpose of coming to the conclusion on bona
fide need, comparative hardship of the parttes have to be taken into
                                                                         E
consideration - In the present case though the landlady, during
pendency of the appeal, got married, but still her requirement to
accommodate the grandparents continued - The subsequent event
of marriage of landlady did not extinguish her c/qim for requirement
considering the comparative hardship in the facts of the present
case - The High Court, while taking note of subsequent events,           F
failed to consider comparative hardship to the landlady - Rent
Control and Eviction.
        Rent Control and Eviction - Landlord-tenant dispute - The
legislations made for dealing with !::::dlord-tenant disputes are pro-
tenant - The court tends to bend tu"'"'ds the tenant in order to do      G
;ustice - But in the process of doing justice, the court cannot be
over-zealous' and forget its duty towards !h" landlord.
       Allowing the appeal, the Court
       HELD: 1. The legislations made for dealing with such
                                                                         H
                                 897
898            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2017] I S.C.R.


.A    landlord-tenant disputes were pro-tenant as the court tends to
      bend towards the tenant in order to do justice with the tenant;
      but in the process of doing justice, the Court cannot be over
      zealous and forget its duty towards the landlord also as ultimately,
      it is the landlord who owns the property and is entitled tO
      possession of the same when he proves his bona fide beyond
B
      reasonable doubt. [Para 13] (904-B-C]
              2. Section 2l(l)(a) of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings
      (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 shows that
      the landlord of rented property is entitled to the vacant possession
      of his rented premises in the event of his bona fide requirement
 c    of the said premises for his own residential or professional
      requirements or for any person related to him. [Para 11] [902-E;
      903-A-B]
              3. Ordinarily, rights of the parties stand crystallised on
      th_e date of institution of the suit. However, the court has power
 D    to take note of the subsequent events and mould the relief
      accordingly. Though the court has the power to take note of the
      subsequent events, court has to consider the effect of subsequent
      development on the bona fide need of the landlord. [Paras 15,
      16] [904-E; 905-E-FJ
 E           Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad (1981) 3 SCC 103 :
             (1981) 3 SCR 605; Ramesh Kumar v. Kesha Ram
             (1992) Suppl. (2) SCC 623: Om Prakash Gupta v.
             Ranbir B. Goyal (2002) 2 SCC 256 : [2002] 1 SCR
             359: Ram Kumar Barnwal v. Ram Lakhan (Dead)
 F           (2007) 5 SCC 660 : [2007] 6 SCR 576 - relied on.
             Kedar Nath Agrawal and Anr. v. Dhanraji Devi and
             Anr. 2004 (4) AWC 3709 (SC) - referred to.
             4. For the purpose of coming to the conclusion on bona
      fide need of the landlord, comparative hardship to the parties
 G    will have to be taken into consideration. In the present case, the
      appellant got married during the pendency of the appeal and
      settled with her husband; still her requirement to accommodate
      her parents and grandparents continued. Appellant has established
      her hmw fide requirement for accommodating her parents and
      grandparents in the suit premises merely because the appellant
 H
    NIDHI v. RAM KRIPAL SHARMA (D) THROUGH LRS.                          899


got married amidst the proceedings, does not extinguish her claim        A
for the relief of possession of the suit premises. Therefore, the
subsequent event, namely, marriage of appellant does not
extinguish her requirement considering the comparative
hardship. The respondents have another business of sweet shop
and thus, is not going to suffer, if- ordered to vacate the suit
                                                                          B
premises as they can shift the place of business to some other
place without suffering any loss of occupation, whereas the parents
of the appellant would be subjected to hardship as she has no
other premises to accommodate her grandparents as well as her
parents. While taking note of the subsequent events, the High
Court has not considered the comparative hardship to the                 c
appellant and erred in declining the relief to the appellant. [Para
16] [905-F-H; 906-A-B]
                       Case Law Reference
[1'!81] 3 SCR 605               relied on               Para 14
                                                                          D
(1992) Suppl. (2) sec 623       relied on               Para 14
(2Q02] 1 SCR 359                relied on               Para 15
(2Q07] 6 SCR 576                relied on               Para 15
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1008
                                                                          E
of2017.
       From the Judgment and Order dated 23.01.2013 of the High
Cou11 of Judicature at Allahabad in WRIA No. 19835 of2003.
      Anup Bhambhani, Sr. Adv., Ms. Mayuri Raghuvanshi, Vyom
Raghuvanshi, Advs. for the Appellant.                                     F
      Arpit Maheshwari, Dr. (Mrs.) Vipin Gupta, Advs. for the
Respondents.
       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
        R. BANUMATHI, J. 1. This appeal by way of special leave is       G
preferred against the order dated 23.01.2013 passed by the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Appeal No.19835 of 2003, wherein
the High Court affirmed the order passed by Additional District Judge,
Moradabad, thereby setting aside release order dated 29.10.1991 passed
by the Prescribed Authority.
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900             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2017] 1 S.C.R.


A              2. Brief facts of the present case are that the appellant is the
      owner and landlord of the premises in question, which is a non-residential
      accommodation. Allegedly, the premises was let out by ancestors of the
      appellant's family when they did not require the premises for personal
      use as the previous owner of the accommodation Smt. Krishna Devi
      'vife of Kunwar Mahendra Pratap Singh had adequate place to reside
B
      in. After the demise of Smt. Krishna Devi, appellant Nidhi became the
      owner of the premises in question and continued to receive rent from
      the respondent. The appellant filed a release application being PCS No.97
      of 1987, under Section 2 l(l)(a) of Uttar .Pradesh Urban Buildings
      (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred
c     to as U.P. Act XIII of 1972), seeking possession of the suit premises on
      the ground of her bona fide personal requirement. The appellant alleged
      that she is in need of the premises as the appellant wants to accommodate
      her grandparents in the demised house who live in village and are in
      need of care and medical treatment. Moreover, the appellant alleged
      that she and her younger sister required separate room for study. It was
D
       alleged that the respondent carries out the said hotel business for
       namesake only and is being carried out by the servant of the respondent.
      It was further alleged by the appellant that the respondent's main business
       is that of a sweet shop and he has sufficient means to take some other
       place on rent to run his hotel business.
E               3. Respondent-tenant admitted the tenancy in the property in
      dispute and resisted the application for release of accommodation,
      claiming that the appellant and her sister live in a big house called Kath
      Mahal which has sufficient space comprising of large rooms and large
      halls. It was averred that the grandparents of the appellant are big landlords
 F    in the village and live in a palatial house there and they are unable to
      climb stairs in the suit premises. Also, the alleged business of sweet
      shop is run by his son and the entire family is dependent upon the income
      from hotel business.
              4. Upon consideration of evidence and on hearing the parties,
 G    the Prescribed Authority held that the balance of convenience lies in
      favourofthe appellant and taking into consideration the social status of
      family and that the grandparents of the appellant want to live with her
      parents, found that the appellant bona fide requires the premises and
      vide order dated 29. I 0.1991 allowed the application for release of suit
      premises. The Prescribed Authority directed the appellant-landlord to
 H
     NIDHJ v. RAM KRIPAL SHARMA (D) THROUGH LRS.                             901
                   [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

compensate the respondent by giving him a sum equivalent to two years         A
ofrent before taking possession.
        5. Respondent-tenant challenged the aforesaid order by way of
Rent Control Appeal No.72of1991 under Section 22 ofU.P. Act Xlll
of 1972, before the Additional District Judge at Moradabad, who vide
order dated 04.02.2003, allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed     B
by the Prescribed Authority holding that the appellant's need for the suit
premises is not based on bona fide requirement and her need for
accommodation is not immediate or pressing.
         6.Aggrieved by the said order of the appellate court, the appellant
filed Writ Appeal No.19835 of2003 before the High Court of Judicature        c
at Allahabad. The High Court upon consideration of the facts and
materials placed on record before it and after hearing the contentions of
the parties before it dismissed the writ appeal holding that the relief
claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent development in
circumstances, become inappropriate. The High Court found that when
the statement of appellant was recorded, she was a student of B.Sc.          D
and was of marriageable age and as the matter went before the appellate
authority, the situation changed as the Court noticed that the appellant
was married on 23.01 .1996 and her husband was a member oflndian
Revenue Service who was, at that time, posted at Delhi and subsequently
in Mumbai. The High Court also observed that the sisters ofthe appellant     E
also got married and were living with their husbands, elsewhere and that
the alleged need had disappeared long back. The High Court relied on .
the judgments of this Court in Hasmat Rai vs. Ragltunatft Prasad
 ( 1981) 3 SCC 103 and Kedar Natft Agrawal and Anr. vs. Dftanraji
Devi and Anr. 2004 (4) AWC 3709 (SC), to take the cognizance of
 subsequent events.                                                          F

        7. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the first
appellate court and the High Court have erroneously denied the relief
sought by the appellant in the release application only because during
the pendency of the appeal filed by the respondent, the appellant got
married which is a subsequent development which would naturally take          G
place and the appellant cannot be made to suffer on account of delay in
adjudication. It was further contended that only because the husband of
the appellant has been allotted a government accommodation, the need
of the appellant did not disappear as the appellant required the scheduled
premises for her own use and occupation as well as for the use and            H
902            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2017] I S.C.R.



A     occupation of her family and the appel Iant requires the scheduled premises
      for herself as well as for her parents and grandparents and her bona
      fide requirement has not been properly considered by the High Court.
               8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted
      that this Court has in numerous cases held that in case of eviction on the
B     ground of bona fide need and comparative hardship, the court must
      consider the subsequent changes in events to decide the bona fide
      requirement of the landlord. It was further submitted that in her release
      application, the appellant had set up her bona fide need but failed to
      substantiate her stand and hence the first appellate court and the High
      Court rightly dismissed the release application.
c             9. We have considered the rival contentions of learned counsel
      for the parties and pernsed the impugned order and other materials on
      record.
              10. The point falling for consideration is whether the marriage of
      the appellant/landlady as subsequent event can extinguish the bona fide
D     requirement of a landlady and disentitle her for the relief sought in the
      release application filed prior to her marriage.
              11. Before proceeding fu11her, it is apposite to have a look over
      the related provision under Section 21(1) of the U.P. Act which deals
      with proceedings for release of building underoccupation of tenant, clause
 E    (a) of sub-Section (I) of Section 21 of the Act alone is germane in the
      present proceedings and the said clause reads as under:-
              "21. Proceedings for release of building under occupation
              of tenant.- (I) The Prescribed Authority may, on an application
              of the landlord in that behalf, order the eviction ofa tenant from
 F            the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is
              satisfied that any of the following grounds exists namely-
                 ( a)   thatthe building is bonafide required either in its existing
                        forn1 or after den1olition and ne'v construction by the
                        landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his
G                       family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him,
                        either for residential purposes or for purposes of any
                        profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the
                        trustee of a public charitable trust, for the objects of the
                        trust;

H                       "
     NIDHI v. RAM KRIPAL SHARMA (D) THROUGH LRS.                                903
                   [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

An analysis of the above provision would show that the landlord of rented       A
property is entitled to the vacant possession of his rented premises in the
event of his bona fide requirement of the said premises for his own
residential or professional requirements or for any person related to him.
           12. In the facts of present case, the appellant-landlady herein
was living in a small house with her family comprising four members              B
and was not able to accommodate her ailing grandparents who used to
visit them frequently for medication purposes and were willing to reside
with them permanently as they were living alone in their village where
nobody was there to look after them. Appel Iant in order to accommodate
her grandparents with them and in the light of growing needs of her and
her younger sister (who were then studying) filed the release application       c
before the prescribed authority and the release order was granted by
the prescribed authority in favour of the appellant/landlady directing
respondent-tenant to handover vacant possession of suit premises to the
appellant. As noticed earlier, during the pendency of appeal, preferred
by the respondent-tenant, the appellant got married and settled with her        D
husband. The first appellate court as wel I as the High Court took note of
this as subsequent development and held that the requirement no longer
subsists and the claim of personal requirement has disappeared. Of
course, during the pendency of !is between the parties, situation
underwent a change and the appellant got married to an Indian Revenue
Service Officer and started residing with him in Delhi and Mumbai etc.           E
Though the appellant is married and settled with her husband, her bona
fide requirement cannot be said to have ended as she wanted the premises
not just for herself but to accommodate her parents and grandparents in
the suit premises so that they can live together. The family of the appellant
is still said to be residing in rented premises in Moradabad, despite having     F
their own suit premises to reside in. In the facts of present case, the
change in subsequent events is not such that would deprive the appellant
of her right to vacant possession of suit premises as it is a natural event
that the daughter of the house would get married and settle with her
husband. Though the appellant has got married and shifted to different
accommodation with her husband, the actual bona fide requirement of             G
premises is still the same, since her parents and grandparents are still
residing separately from each other with no one to look after them.
More so, the appellant got married but the family stays where it is and
the bona fide requirement of pre1nises for accommodation of parents
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904            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2017] I S.C.R.



A     remains the same. Being married and shifting to other place does not
      automatically result in extinguishing of bona fide requirement of the
      appellant as being the owner of property, she alone is to decide what she
      wants to do with her property.
               13. The legislations made for dealing with such landlord-tenant
B     dispute 3 were pro-tenant as the court tends to bend towards the tenant
      in order to do justice with the tenant; but in the process of doing justice
      the Court cannot be over zealous and forget its duty towards the landlord
      also as ultimately, it is the landlord who owns the property and is entitled
      to possession of the same when he proves his bona fide beyond
      reasonable doubt as it is in the case before this Court.
c
              I 4. First appellate court as well as the High Court observed that
      during the pendency of the appeal, the appellant got married, her husband
      a member of Indian Revenue Service (IRS) posted at Delhi, Mumbai
      and other places and this subsequent event has extinguished the personal
      requirement of the appellant. In the impugned judgment, the High Court
D     referred to number of judgments Has111at Rai and Another vs.
      Raglw11atft Prasad (I 981) 3 SCC I 03; Ra111esft Kumar vs. Keslw
      Ram (I 992) Suppl. (2) SCC 623 and other judgments.
               15. Ordinarily, rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date
      of institution of the suit. However, the court has power to take note of
 E    the subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly. Power of the
      court to take note of subsequent events came up for consideration in a
      number of decisions. In 0111 Prakash Gupta vs. Ranhir B. Goval
      (2002) 2 SCC 256, this Court held as under:-
              "11. The ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties
 F            stand crystallised on the date of the institution of the suit and,
              therefore, the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of
              the parties as they stood at the commencement of the !is.
              However, the Court has power to take note of subsequent events
              and mould the reliefaccordingly subject to the following conditions
 G            being satisfied: (i) that the relief, as claimed originally has, by
              reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot
              be granted; (ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or
              changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable
              complete justice bein:; done to the parties: and (iii) that such
              subsequent event is brought to the notice of the court promptly
 H
    NIDHI v. RAM KRIPAL SHARMA (D) THROUGH LRS.                                  905
                  [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

        and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the            A
        opposite party is not taken by surprise. In Pasupuleti
       · Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders (1975) 1 SCC
         770 this Court held that a fact arising after the !is, coming to the
         notice of the court and having a fundamental impact on the right
        to relieforthe mannerof moulding it and brought diligently to the
                                                                                 B
         notice of the court cannot be blinked at. The court may in such
        cases bend the rules of procedure if no specific provision oflaw
         or rule of fair play is violated for it would promote substantial
         justice provided that there is absence of other disentitling factors
         or just circumstances. The Court speaking through Krishna Iyer,
         J. affirmed the proposition that the court can, so long as the          c
         litigation pends, take note ofupdated facts to promote substantial
         justice. However, the Court cautioned: (i) the event should be
         one as would stultify or render inept the decretal remedy, (ii)
         rules of procedure may be bent if no specific provision or fair
         play is violated and there is no other special circumstance repelling
                                                                                  D
         resort to that course in law or justice, (iii) such cognizance of
         subsequent events and developments should be cautious, and
         (iv) the rules of fairness to both sides should be scrupulously
         obeyed.
      Om Prakaslt Gupta's case was referred with approval in Ram
Kumar Barnwal vs. Ram Lakltan (Dead) (2007) 5 SCC 660.                            E

         I 6. Though the court has the power to take note of the subsequent
events, court has to consider the effect of subsequent development on
the bona fide need of the landlord. For the purpose of coming to the
conclusion on bona fide need of the landlord, comparative hardship to
the parties will have to be taken into consideration. As discussed above,         F
in the present case, the appellant got married during the pendency of the
appeal and settled with her husband; still her requirement to accommodate
her parents and grandparents continued. Appellant has established her
bona fide requirement for accommodating her parents and grandparents
in the suit premises merely because the appellant got married amidst the          G
proceedings does not extinguish her claim for the relief of possession of
the suit premises. In our view, the subsequent event, namely, marriage
of appellant does not extinguish her requirement considering the
comparative hardship, it is to be pointed out that the respondents have
another business of sweet shop and thus, is not going to suffer if ordered
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906             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          (2017] I S.C.R.



A     to vacate the suit premises as they can shift the place of business to
      some other place without suffering any loss of occupation, whereas the
      parents of the appel.lant would be subjected to hardship as she has no
      other premises to accommodate her grand parents as well as her parents.
      While taking note of the subsequent events, the High Court has not
      considered the comparative hardship to the appellant and erred in
B
      declining the relief to the appellant.
              17. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order of the
      High Court is set aside and the order passed by the prescribed authority
      i.e. Court of Second Upper Civil Judge, Moradabad dated 29.l 0.1991 is
      restored. The appellant shall deposit the compensation before the
c     prescribed authority payable to the respondent within four weeks from
      today. The respondent shall handover the possession of the suit premises
      within one month from the date of deposit of the amount, failing which
      the respondent-tenant shall be liable for committing contempt of this
      Court. No costs.


      Kalpana K. Tripathy                                          Appeal allowed.