Holding

Article 142 cannot be invoked to legitimize admissions obtained by fraud; the cancellation orders stand.

Summary

The appellants were admitted to MBBS courses in Madhya Pradesh through a systematic fraud involving computer manipulation, roll‑number tampering and assistance from meritorious candidates. Vyapam cancelled their admissions, a decision upheld by the High Court and earlier by this Court. The appellants sought relief under Article 142 of the Constitution, arguing that their acquired medical knowledge should be preserved for societal benefit and that they were juveniles. The Supreme Court examined whether the larger interest of justice or manifest injustice justified invoking Article 142, considered the principle that fraud vitiates all rights, and rejected the contention that public‑health needs or juvenility outweighed the need to uphold the law. The Court held that Article 142 cannot be used to override the cancellation orders, and that the fraud‑based admissions must remain invalid. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The validity of invoking Article 142 of the Constitution to preserve the appellants' medical education despite fraudulent admission.
Whether the cancellation of the appellants' MBBS admissions by Vyapam is legally sustainable.
Whether the principles of "larger interest of administration of justice" and "preventing manifest injustice" justify overriding statutory provisions.
Whether the appellants' age or lack of maturity can mitigate liability for the fraud.
Whether public‑health considerations, such as doctor shortages, can outweigh the rule that fraud vitiates rights.

Legislation cited

Subjects

admission fraudVyapam scamArticle 142medical educationpublic interestfraud vitiatesjudicial discretionjuvenile offenders

Judgment

[2017] 2 S.C.R. 527

NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER A
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 1727of2016)
FEBRUARY 13,2017 B
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI, KURIAN JOSEPH AND
ARUN MISHRA, JJ.]
Madhya Pradesh Professional Examination Board Act,
2007- Examination process - Tampering of - Entrance examination
for admissions into medical colleges - Allegation of conspiracy and
c
use of unfair means in the examination - Cancellation of admissions
of appellants and others - Challenge against - Held: The
manipulation by which the appellants obtained admission involved
not only a breach in the computer system, whereby roll numbers
were allotted to the appellants. to effectuate their plans, it also D
involved the procurement of meritorious persons, .to assist them, in
answering the questions (in the Pre-Medical Test) - The seating
arrangement of appellants next to the concerned helper, at the
examination, was also based on further computer interpolations -
Not only were the seating plans distorted for achieving the purpose,
E
even the institutions where the appellants were to take the Pre-
Medical Test, were arranged in a manner, as would suit the
appellants, again by a similar process of computer falsification -
The admission of appellants to the MBBS course was, thus, based
on a well orchestrated plan based on established fraud - In view of
the sequence offacts, it is not possible to accept, that the deception F
and deceit, adopted by the appellants, was a simple ajfab; which
can be overlooked - The involvement of the appellants was indeed
the most grave and extreme - In view thereof, the consequence of
established fraud cannot be ignored, to do complete justice in a
matter, in exercise of jurisdiction vested in this Court, u!Art.142 of
G
the Constitution - Constitution of India - Art. I 42 - Scam.
Constitution of India:
Art.142 - Mass fraud - Admission obtained by fraud -
Invocation of Art. I 42, to do complete justice, determining
H
527
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A parameters - Held: The /ll'o important parameters for consideration
are, "larger interest of administration oj justice", and "preventing
manifest injustice" - The facts and circumstances of the instant
case do not reveal the existence. of either of these two factors -
With Vyapam having cancelled the appellants' admission lo the MBBS
course, and the said orders having been upheld by the High Court,
B
as well as, by this Court, ii cannot be said that the cancellation
orders were unjust - If the admission of the appellants to the MBBS
course, was improper, the cancellation orders, were obviously proper
- If the academic benefits of the appellants, arising out of their
admission cancelled by Vyapam are restored, tht cancellation orders
c would be set at naught - That would not serve the "larger interest
of administration of justice" - On the contrary, such an initiative
would cause "manifest injustice" - It is, therefore, not possible in
the facts of the instant case to invoke Art. 142 of the Constitution
in the larger interest of the administration ofjustice - It is also not
possible to accept, that any manifest injustice would be done to the
D
appellants, if their admissions are cancelled - Scam.
Art. I 42 - Exercise of power u/Art. I 42 to do complete
;us/ice - Connotation of words "complete justice"- Held: The words
"complete justice" used in Art.142 would not include the power, to
disregard even statutory provisions, and/or a declared
E pronouncement of law under Art.141, even in exceptional
circumstances - Debates and deliberations in Parliament, leading
to a valid legislation, represent the will of the majority- It is difficult,
to visualize a situation, wherein a valid legislation, would render
injustice to the parties, or would lead to a situation of incomplete
F ;ustice for one or the other party - In view of the conscious
involvement of the appellants in gaining admission to the MBBS
course, by means of a fraudulent stratagem of trickery, the
declaration of law with reference to fraud cannot be ignored or
overlooked - Nothing obtained by fraud, can be sustained - This
declaredproposition of law, must apply to the case of the appellants,
G as well.
Art. I 42 - Admission obtained by fraud - Invocation of
Art. 142 on plea of being young and immature - The submission of
appellants was that they should not be identified, as a part of the
syndicate, engaged in manipulating their admissions, even though
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 529
PRADESH AND OTHERS

they were the beneficiaries thereof and that they were young, and A
not mature enough to understand the consequences of their actions -
These submissions are outrightly rejected - Even a juvenile
wrongdoer faces trial and is subjected to statutory consequences -
The appellants in this case, irrespective of their age, were conscious
of the regular process of admission - They breached the same by
B
devious means - They must therefore, suffer the consequences of
their actions - Each one of the appellants, was aware of the fact,
that their admission to the MBBS course, would be determined 011
the basis of their performance in the Pre-Medical Test - Rather
than appearing in the qualifying test 011 their own, they chose to
seek assistance of meritorious students, to garner higher marks - c
Probably, the appellants were sure, that they would not be able to
gain admission to the MBBS' course, on their own merit - That is
why, they had to strategize their admission to the MBBS cour~e -
Therefore, the contention that the appellants were· meritorious
students, and as such, their admission to the MBBS course, deserved
D
to be preserved is rejected -In that view of the matter, relief wArt.142
not granted - Appellants had consciously sought the assistance of
a syndicate, engaged in manipulating admissions to medical
institutions - They were beneficiaries of acts of deceit and
deception - In that view of the matter, the case of the appellants
does not commend, as a matter deserving of any sympathetic E
consideration.
Art.142 - Jurisdiction 1inder, scope - Held: The jurisdiction
exercisable u!Art.14:;- cannot ever be invoked, to salvage, and
legitimize acts offraudulent character - Fraud, cannot be allowed
to trounce, on thi stratagem of public good - The issue in hand, F
has an infinitely vast dimension - If immediate social or societal
gains is kept in mind, the perspective. of consideration would be
different - The basic fundamental right of equality before law and
equal protection of the laws, is extended to citizens and non-citizens
alike, through Art.14 on the fountainhead of fairness - The actions
of the appellants, are founded on unacceptable behaviour, and in G
complete breach of the rule of law - Their actions, constitute acts
of deceit, invading into a righteous social order - National character
cannot be sacrificed for benefits, individual or societal - In the
facts and circumstances of the case in hand, it would not be proper
to legitimize the admission of the appellants, to the MBBS course, H
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20 l 7] 2 S.C.R.

A in exercise of the jurisdiction vested in this Court u/Art.1./2 of the
Constitution.
Administration of Justice - Fair play and equity - Nothing,
obtained by fraud, can be sustained; as fraud unravels
everything - No person can be allowed to keep an advantage he
B has obtained by fraud - Where two options are open to a Court,
and both are equally beckoning, it would be most prudent to choose
the one, which is founded on truth and honesty, and the one which
is founded on fair play and legitimacy - Siding with the option
founded on the deceit or fraud, or on favour as opposed to merit,
or by avoiding the postulated due process, would be imprudent - In
c the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there was absolutely
no cause to legitimize the admissions of the appellants to the MBBS
course, since the same clearly fell in the imprudent category.
Dismissing the appeals, the. Court

D HELD: 1.1. 1t·is not disputed that none of the appellants
would have been admitted to the MBBS course, as their merit
eosition hi the Pre-Medical Test, was not as a result of their own
efforts, but was based on extraneous assistance. The appellants
were helped in answering the questions in the Pre-Medical Test,
by meritorious candidates. The manipulation by which the
E appellants obtained admission, involved, not only a breach in the
computer system, whereby roll numbers were allotted to the
appellants, to effectuate their plans. It also involved the
procurement of meritorious candidates/persons, who would .assist
them, in answering the questions (in the Pre-Medical Test). The
F appellants' position, next to the concerned helper, at the
examination, was also based on further computer interpolations.
Not only were the seating plans distorted for achieving the
purpose, even the institutions where the appellants were to take
the Pre-Medical Test, were arranged in a manner, as would suit
the appellants, agaiu by a similar process of computer falsification.
G This could only be effectuated, by a corrupted administrative
machinery. Whether, the nefarious and crooked administrative
involvement, was an inside activity, or an outside pursuit, is
inconsequential. All in all, the entire scheme of events, can well
be described as a scam. The appellants or their parents, would
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 531
PRADESH AND OTHERS

obviously have had to pay large amounts of money, to the Vyapam A
authorities. The appellants' admission to the MBBS course, was
therefore dearly based on a well orchestrated plan as based on
established fraud. [Paras 64, 65] (595-A; 596-E-G; 597-H]
Roscoe Pound-An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, (Sixth
Indian Reprint - 2012) published by the Universal Law Publishing B
Co. Pvt. Ltd. - referred to.
1.2. The controversy in the instant case, does not relate
to a singular academic session. Whether or not, this vitiated
process of obtaining admission to the MBBS course, was adopted
during the year 2007, and prior thereto, is not known as there c
was no investigation prior to 2008. Investigation was initiated in
the first instance, with reference to admissions, for the year 2013.
Thereafter, investigation was extended to those, who had gained
admission to the MBBS course during the years 2008 to 2012.
Investigation revealed, a well thought out unethical plan, involving
administrative support, during six consecutive academic sessions D
.•. from 2008 to 2013. Vyapam was certain, about the system
having been manipulated, at the hands of at least 634 candidates
(during the years 2008 to 2012 itself). There may well have been
others, but no action was taken against them, as their cases fell
beyond the realm of suspicion (on the parameters approved and E
adopted by Vyapam). This Court, while dealing with admissions
during the years 2008 to 2012, followed the earlier judgment,
wherein admissions to the MBBS course during the year 2013,
were annulled. The factual and the legal position, with reference
to the admission of the appellants, to the MBBS course being
vitiated, thus attained finality. The fact that the appellants, had F
gained admission to the MBBS course, by established fraud, does
not require any further consideration. In view of the sequence of
facts, it is not possible to accept, that the deception and deceit,
adopted by the appellants, was a simple affair, which can be
overlooked. [Para 65] [597-D-H; 598-A-B] G
2.1. For invoking Article 142 of the Constitution, two
important parameters for consideration are, "larger interest of
administration of justice'', and ... preventing manifest injustice".
The facts and circumstances of the present case do not reveal
H
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 2 S.C.R.

A the existence, of either of these two factors. With Vyapam having
cancelled the appellants' admission to the MBBS course, and
with the above orders having been upheld by the High Court, as
well as, by this Court, it cannot be said that the cancellation orders
were unjust. If the academic benefits of the appellants, arising
out of their admission - cancelled by Vyapam are restored, the
B
cancellation orders would be set at naught. That, would undo,
the Vyapam orders, upheld by the High Court and this Court.
And this would not serve the "larger interest of administration
of justice". On the contrary, such an initiative would cause
"manifest injustice". It is therefore not possible to accept, that it
c is possible in the facts of the present case, to invoke Article 142
of the Constitution - in the larger interest of the administration
of justice. ·u is also not possible to accept, that any manifest
injustice would be done to the appellants, if their admissions are
cancelled. To do justice in the matter, the order passed by Vypam
must be upheld, without any further modification or alteration.
D
[Paras 66, 67] (598-G-H; 599-A, B-D]
2.2. It is not possible to accept, that the words "complete
justice" used in Article 142 of the Constitution, wo.uld include
the power, to disregard even statutory provisions, and/or a
declared pronouncement of law under Article 141 of the
E Constitution, even in exceptional circumstances. Undoubtedly,
the proposition can certainly be acceptable to a very limited
extent, - to the extent of self-aggrandizement. The hypothesis -
that the Supreme Court can do justice as it perceives, even when
contrary to statute (and, declared pronouncement of law), should
F never as a rule, be entertained by any Court/Judge, however
high or noble. Can it be overlooked, that legislation is enacted,
only with the object of societal good, and only in support of societal
causes? Legislation, always flows from reason and logic. Debates
and deliberations in Parliament, hading to a valid legislation,
represent the will of the majority. That will and determination,
G must be equally "trusted", as much as the "trust" which is
reposed in a Court. Any legislation, which does not satisfy the
above parameters, would per se be arbitrary, and would be open
to being declared as constitutionally invalid. In such a situation,
the legislation itself would be struck down. It is difficult, to
visualize a situation, wherein a valid legislation, would render
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 533
PRADESH AND OTHERS

injustice to the parties, or would lead to a situation of incomplete A
justice- for one or the other party. Keeping in mind the conscious
involvement of the appellants in gaining admission to the MBBS
course, by means of a fraudulent stratagem of trickery, the
declaration of law with reference to fraud cannot be ignored or
overlooked .. Nothing obtained by fraud, can be sustained. This
B
declared proposition of law, must apply to the case of the
appellants, as well. This is the outcome of the "trust" reposed in
this Court, as being fully equipped, to determine at its own, when
Article 142 of the Constitution can be invoked to render complete
justice, and when it cannot be so invoked. [Para 68] [600-C-D, E-
G; 601-B-D] c
3.1. Conferring rights or benefits on the appellants, who
had consciously participated in a well thought of, and meticulously
orchestrated plan, to circumvent well laid down norms, for gaining
admission to the MBBS course, would amount to espousing the
cause of 'the unfair'. It would seem like, allowing a thief to retain D
the stolen property. It would seem as if, the Court was not
supportive of the cause of those who had adopted and followed
rightful means. Such a course, would cause people to question
the credibility, of the justice delivery system itself. In the name
of doing complete justice, it is not possible for this Court to
support the vitiated actions of the appellants, through which they E
gained admission to the MBBS course. [Para 69] [602-A-D]
3.2. There cannot be any defined parameters, within the
framework whereof, this Court would exercise jurisdiction under
Article 142 of the Constitution. The complexity of administration,
and of human affairs, would give room for the exercise of the F
power vested in this Court under Article 142, in a situation where
clear injustice appears to have been caused, to any party to a /is.
In the absence of any legislation to the contrary, it would be open
to this Court, to remedy the situation. The submission of
appellants was that they should not be identified, as a part of the
G
syndicate, engaged in manipulating their admissions, even though
they were the beneficiaries thereof and that they were young,
and not mature enough to understand the consequences of their
actions. These submissions are outrightly rejected. Even in
situations where a juvenile indulges in crime, he has to face trial,
H
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 2 S.C.R.

A and is subjected to the postulated statutory consequences'. Law,
has consequences. And the consequences of law brook no
exception. The appellants in this case, irrespective of their age,
were conscious of the regular process of admission. They
breached the same by devious means. They must therefore, suffer
the consequences of their actions. It is not the first time, that
B
admissions obtained by deceitful means, would be cancelled. This
Court has consistently annulled, academic gains, arising out of
wrongful admissions. Acceptance of the prayer made by the
appellants on the parameter suggested by them, would result in
overlooking the large number of judgments, on the point.
c Adoption of a different course, for the appellants, would trivialize
the declared legal position. [Paras 70, 71] [602-E-G; 603-E-G]
3.3. It is not possible to accept, either that the appellants
were innocent, or that they were immature in understanding the
consequences of their actions. Each one of the appellants, was
D aware of the fact, that their admission to the MBBS course, would
be determined on the basis of their performance in the Pre-
Medical Test. Rather than appearing in the qualifying test on
their own, they chose to seek assistance of meritorious students,
to garner higher marks. Probably, the appellants were sure, that
they would not be able to gain admission to the MBBS course,
E
on their own merit. That is why, they had to strategize their
admission to the MBBS course. Therefore, the contention that
the appellants were meritorious students, and as such, their
admission to the MBBS course, deserved to be preserved is
rejected. If this is where the truth lies (which we are sure, it
F does), namely, that the appellants were quite sure that they would
not be able to gain admission to the MBBS course on their own
merit, surely the appellants are not entitled to any equitable
consideration. And, in that view of the matter, it would not be
proper to extend to the appellants, relief under Article 142 of the
Constitution. The appellants had consciously sought the
G assistance of a syndicate, engaged in manipulating admissions to.
medical institutions. They were beneficiaries of acts of deceit
and deception. In the above view of the matter, the case of the
appellants does not commend, as a matter deserving of any
sympathetic consideration. The admission of the appellants to
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 535
PRADESH AND OTHERS

the MBBS course, cannot be legalized (or legitimized), in the A
name -0f justice. [Paras-72, 73] [604-A-H; 605-A] •
4. Where two options are open to a Court, and both are
equally beckoning, it would be most prudent to choose the one,
which is founded on truth and honesty, and the one which Is
founded on fair play and legitimacy. Siding with the u·ption founded B
on the deceit or fraud, or on favour as opposed to merit, or by
avoiding the postulated due process, would be imprudent.
Judicial conscience must only support the righteous cause. If,
despite its beiug righteous, a decision is seen as causing manifest
injustice, the exercise of the _power under Article 142 of the
Constitution, would be prudent. In such situations, an onerous c
duty is cast on the Court, to step in, to render complete justice.
By adopting the above course, a Court would feel satisfied, in
having exercised. its discretion, on the touchstone of justice -
the concept which triggers the invocation of Article 142 of the
Constitution. ln the facts and circumstances of the present case, D
there seems to be absolutely no cause to legitimize the admissions
of the appellants to the MBBS course, since the same clearly fall .
in the imprudent category. [Para 74] [605-D-F]
5. No matter how extensive the societal gains may be, the
jurisdiction conceived of under Article 142 of the Constitution, E
to do complete justice in a matter, cannot be im:oked, in. a
situation as the one in hand. Even the trivialist act of wrong
doing, based on a singular act of fraud, cannot be countenanced,
in the name of justice. The present case, unfolds a mass fraud.
Truthful conduct, must always remain the hallmark of the rule of
law. No matter the gains, or the losses. The jurisdiction F
exercisable by this Court under Article 142, cannot ever be
invoked, to salvage, and legitimize acts of fraudulent character.
Fraud, cannot be allowed to trounce, on the stratagem of public
good. The issue in hand, has an infinitely vast dimension. If
immediate social or societal gains is kept in mind, the perspective G
of consideration wouid be different. The basic fundamental right, .
of equality before law and equal·protection of the laws, is extended.
to citizens and non-citizens alike, through Article 14 of the
Constitution, on the fountainhead of faimess. ·The actions of the
appellants, are founded on unacceptable behaviour, and in
H
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A complete breach of the rule of law. Their actions, constitute acts
of deceit, invading into a righteous social order. National character
cannot be sacrificed for benefits - individual or societal. In the
facts and circumstances of the case in hand, it would not be proper
to legitimize the admission of the appellants, to the MBBS course,
in exercise of the jurisdiction vested in this Court under Article
B
142 of the Constitution. (Paras 75, 76 and 79) (606-A-C, E, G-H;
607-A-B; 609-F)
Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India
(1998) 2 SCR 795 : (1998) 4 SCC 409 - followed.
c Priya Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh (2012) 5 SCR
768 : (2012) 7 sec 433 - distinguished.
Gaurav Jain v. Union of India [1998) 2 SCR 493 :
(1998) 4 SCC 270; Union Carbide Corporation v.
Union of India [1991) 1 Suppl. SCR 251 : (1991) 4
D SCC 584; State v. Sanieev Nanda [2012] 12 SCR 881
: (2012) 8 SCC 450; Sushi! Ansa/ v. State [2015) 9
SCR 552 : (2015) 10 SCC 359; Academy of Nutrition
Improvement v. Union of India (2011) 8 SCR 680 :
(2011) 8 SCC 274; Priyanka Estates International
Private Limited v. State of Assam [2009) 16 SCR 80 :
E (2010) 2 SCC 27; Ramji Veerji Patel & Ors. v. Revenue
Divisional Officer & Ors. (2011) 14 SCR 821 : (2011)
10 SCC 643; State ~f Punjab v. Rafiq Masih
(Whitewasher) (2014] 8 SCR 228 : (2014) 8 SCC 883;
Empress v. !du Beg !LR (1881) 3 All 776; Vinod
F Bhandari v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2015] 2 SCR
354 : (2015) 11 SCC 502; Mridul Dhar v. Union of
India (2005] 1 SCR 380 : (2005) 2 SCC 65; Gurdeep
Singh v. State of J&K 1995 Supp (1) SCC 188; Tanvi
Sarwal v. Central Board of Secondary Education
(2015) 7 SCR 780 : (2015) 6 SCC 573; Abhyudya
G Sanstha v. Union of India [2011] 7 SCR 611 : (2011)
6 SCC 145; Director (Studies), D1: Ambedkar Institute
of Hotel Management, Nutrition and Catering
Technology, Chandigarh v. Vaibhav Singh Chauhan
[2008] 15 SCR 224 : (2009) 1 SCC 59; Kerala Solvent
H
Extractions Ltd. v. A. Unnikrishnan (2006) 13 SCC
NIDHI KA!M AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 537
PRADESH AND OTHERS

619; E.M Sankaran Namboodripad v. T. Narayanan A
Nambiar [1971] 1 SCR 697 : (1970) 2 SCC 325;
Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India
(2005) 5 SCC 363; Lazarus Estates, Ltd. v. Beasley
(1956) 1 All E.R.341 - referred to.
Case Law Reference B

11'!98] 2 SCR 493 referred to Para3
[1991] 1 Suppl. SCR 251 referred to Para 15
[2012] 12 SCR 881 referred to Para 17
c
[2Q15] 9 SCR 552 referred to Para 18
[2Q121 5 SCR 768 distinguished Para 19
[2Q11] 8 SCR 680 referred to Para 20
D
[2Q09] 16 SCR 80 referred to Para 21
[2011] 14 SCR 821 referred to Para 21
[2Q14] 8 SCR 228 referred to Para 22
ILR (1881) 3 All 776 referred to Para35 E

[2Q15] 2 SCR 354 referred to Para 58(i)
[2Q05] 1 SCR 380 referred to Para 58(ii)
1995 Supp (1) sec 188 referred to Para 58(iii)
F
[2Q15] 7 SCR 780 referred to Para 58(iv)
[2Qll] 7 SCR 611 referred to Para 58 (v)
[2008] 15 SCR 224 referred to Para 58(vi)
(2006) 13 sec 619 referred to Para 58(vii) G

[1971] 1 SCR 697 referred to Para 60
(2Q05) 5 sec 363 referred to Para60
[1~98] 2 SCR 795 followed Para 68 H
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1727
of2016.
From the Judgment and Order dated 07.10.2014 of the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Jabalpur in Writ Petition No. 7676
of2014
B WITH
C.A.Nos. 1720-1724, 1726, 1728, 1729, 1733, 1734-1741, 1742-
1749, 1750-1751, 1752, 1753-1758, 1759-1764, 1765, 1766, 1767-1768,
1769-1774, 1776-1787, 1788, 1789-1791, 1792-1794, 1795-1798, 1799-
1805, 1806-1808, 1809, 1810-1811, 1812, 1813-1814, 1815, 1816-1817,
c 1818-1819, 1820, 1822-1824, 1825, 1826, 1827, 1828, 1830, 1831-1832,
1833, 1834, 1835, 1836-183}, 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842, 1843, 1844,
1845, I846and 1847-1852of2016
C. A. Nos. 2503-2504 and 2505 of2017.

D R.Venkataramani, Ms. Indu Malhotra, Raju Ramachandran, Sr.
Advs. Purushaindra Kaurav,AAG, Vijay Kumar, Mrs. V. Vijaya Laxmi,
Yashraj Singh Bundela, Mrs. Neelam Singh, Rajeev Kumar, Thomas
Oommen, Ms. Bharti Tyagi, Vikram Mehta, Varun Singh, Tanvir Nayar,
Prashant Singh, Varun Kumar Tikmani, Raka Chatterjee, Vikas Mehta,
Nar Hari Singh, Ms.Pragati Neekhra, Sunny Choudhary, Ms. Rupali
E Bandhopadhaya, Nikhil Jain, Aniruddha P. Mayee, Varinder Kumar
Sharma, Mohd. Shahid Hussain, Bharat Singh, A. K. Upadhyay, Amit
Pawan, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Rajender Prasad, Ms. Abha R.
Sharma, N&vin Prakash, Purushottam Sharma Tripathi, Mukesh Kumar
Singh, K. S. Srinivasan, Ravi Chandra Prakash, Luv Kumar, L. Nidhi
Ram Sharma, T. Mahipal, Mithilesh Kumar Singh, Mrs. M. Singh, E. C.
F
Agrawala, Divyakant Lahoti, Parikshit Ahuja, Shashank Gari;, Gaurav
Jain, Raju! Shrivastava, K. Krishna Kumar, Abhinav Shrivastava, R.
Balasubramanian, R. K. Rathore, Vibhu Shanker Mishra, Prabhas Bajaj,
Santosh Kumar, Akshay Amritanshu, M. K. Maroria, Mishra Saurabh,
Ankit Kr. Lal, Rajeev Kumar Bansal, Brahma Prakash, Sanjeev Bansal,
G Akshay K.Ghai, C. D. Singh, Dharmendra Kumar Sinha, Arjun Garg,
Manish Yadav, Ishan Nagar, Shashank Shekher, Mritunjay Kumar Sinha,
Gaurav Sharma, Prateek Bhatia, Vara Gaur, Pramod Kumar Sharma,
Abhinav Gupta (For Ms.Pratibha Jain), Hemani Sharma, Ashwani
Bhardwaj, Advs. for the appearing parties.
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 539
PRADESH AND OTHERS

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI I. Leave granted in the
special leave petitions.
2. Orders were passed by the Madhya Pradesh Professional
Examination Board (hereinafter referred to as, 'Vyapam'), cancelling
the results of the appellants, of their professional MBBS course, on the B
ground that the appellants had gained admission to the course, by resorting
to unfair means, during the Pre-Medical Test. These orders were passed,
with reference to candidates, who had been admitted to the above course,
during the years 2008 to 2012. A challenge to the orders of cancellation,
was raised by the appellants, by invoking the jurisdiction of the High c
Court of Madhya Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as, 'the High Court')
under Article 226 of the Constitution. All writ petitions raising the above
challenge were dismissed. Resultantly, the appellants approached this
Court. The orders of the High Court were affirmed by a Division Bench
(hereinafter referred to as, the 'former Division Bench'), on 12.05.2016.
However, in exercise of jurisdiction vested in this Court, under Article D
142 of the Constitution, J. Chelameswar, J. (the Hon'ble Presiding Judge,
of the 'former Division Bench') expressed the view, that complete justice
in the matter would be rendered, ifthe qualifications successfully acquired
by the appellants were not annulled, and the knowledge gained by them,
was not wasted. This, for the' simple reason, that knowledge could not E
be transferred to those, who had been wrongfully deprived of admission,
and cancellation of the results of the appellants, would not serve any
purpose. Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. (the Hon'ble Companion Judge- in
the 'former Division Bench') expressed his disinclination for invoking
jurisdiction under Article 142, to sustain the benefit of education acquired
by the appellants, through a separate orderofthe same date - 12.5.2016. F
This, for the simple reason, that those who had adopted unfair means,
could not be extended any indulgence.
3. On account of the divergence of opinion expressed by the
'former Division Bench', through their separate orders (dated 12.5.2016)
referred to above, Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India, constituted this G
larger Division Bench, to deal with the matter. During the course of
hearing, Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel submitted, that this
Court had granted leave, in the petition filed by his client (and many
others, similarly situated) on 24.2.2016. It was pointed out, that all these
H
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 2 S.C.R.

A appeals had remained pending before this Court, wherein the correctness
of the impugned judgment(s) rendered by the High Court, was under
consideration. It was submitted, that leave having been granted, the
principle underlying the doctrine of merger would entail, that the judgments
rendered by the High Court would eventually merge in the final or
operative determination of this Court. It was also pointed out, that in
B
terms ofArticle 145(5) ofthe Constitution, nojudgmentcould be delivered
by this Court, save with the concurrence of majority of Judges, present
and hearing the case. It was submitted, that there was no majority
judgment on 12.5.2016, when the two Hon'ble Judges constituting the
'former Division Bench', passed separate orders. According to learned
c counsel, in the absence of merger, all the civil appeals in hand, must be
deemed to have remained on the docket of this Court, awaiting decision
by an appropriate bench. It was contended, that the correct coU>se to
be followed, where there is a divergence of opinion between the two
Hon 'hie Judges was, a rehearing of the entire matter by a larger Bench.
The above determination, according to learned counsel, emerges from
D
the legal position expressed by this Court in Gaurav Jain v. Union of
India, ( 1998) 4 SCC 270. It was submitted, that in the absence of a
majority judgment, in terms of Article 145{5), and consequently in the
absence of an effective judgment of this Court (despite the two separate
orders passed by the 'former Division Bench' on 12.05.2016), there
E existed no judgment in the eyes of law. It was accordingly submitted,
that the present Division Bench (of three-Judges) by a mandate of law,
was required to adjudicate upon the civil appeals fully, on all issues. It is
therefore, thatthis Bench passed the following order on 28.7.2016:
"After hearing had gone on for sometime, wherein the limited
F issue canvassed was, whether this Court was justified in exercising
jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, our
attention was invited to the mandate contained in Article 145(5)
of the Constitution, so as to suggest, that the entire controversy
needed to be heard afresh, in view of the following order passed
by the Bench on 12th May, 2016:
G
"In view of the divergence of opinion in terms of separate
judgments pronounced by us in these appeals today, the
Registry is directed to place the papers before Hon 'hie the
Chief Justice oflndia for appropriate further orders."
We are of the view that the instant issue can be resolved by
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 541
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!)

referring the matter back to the Bench, for a clarification, of the A
order dated 12th May, 2016, whether the reference required re-
hearing of the entire matter, and if not, the limited issue referred
for consideration.
We have chosen to adopt the above course, so as to save precious
time of the Court. In the above view of the matter, the Registry B
is directed to place the files of this case, before Hon 'ble the
Chief Justice oflndia, for seeking clarification of the Division
Bench which passed the order dated 12th May, 2016.
Post the matters for hearing, after clarification."
4. On 30.8.2016, the 'former Division Bench' passed another c
order, in furtherance of the order extracted above. Relevant extract of
the same is reproduced below:
"Pursuant to the Order dated 28th July, 2016 of the larger Bench,
the matter was placed before this Bench.
D
Heard the learned counsel.
It appears from the above-mentioned order that, it was argued
before the larger Bench that by the Order of this Bench dated
12th May, 2016, a Reference was made to a larger Bench. The
submission is factually incorrect.
E
It is clear from the Order dated 12th May, 2016 that there was a
disagreement between both of us regarding the final order to be
passed in the app~als before us. Both of us recorded a concurrent
opinion that the examination .process in issue in these appeals,
conducted by Vyapam for the years 2008 to .2012 was vitiated
F
with reference to the appellants before this Court and few others.
We also agreed upon the conclusion that the appellants herein
are the beneficiaries of such vitiated process.
The only point of divergence between both ofus is that whether
the appellants should be disentitled to retain the benefits of the
training in medical course which they secured by virtue of their G
being beneficiaries of a tainted examination process conducted
for the purpose of admitting them for training in medical colleges.
While one ofus (JusticeAbhay Manohar Sapre) is clearly of the
op in ion that the case of the appellants deserves no further
H
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A consideration, the moment we concluded that they are the
beneficiaries of such tainted examination process, the other
(Justice J. Chelameswar) opitied for the reasons recorded that
their cases deserve some consideration and also opined that the
appellants should be permitted to pursue their medical course
and complete the same subject to certain conditions indicated in
B
the order.
We completely fail to understand the reference made to Article
145(5) of the Constitution in the Order dated 28th July, 2016. We
are of the opinion that neither the Constitution of India nor any
other law of this country provides an intra-court appeal insofar
c as the Supreme Court is concerned. A re-hearing of the entire
matter as apparently suggested to the larger Bench, in our opinion,
would amount to an intra-court appeal. If the larger Bench of
this Court wishes to create such an intra-court appeal, we
obviously are powerless to stop it. We can only record our
D understanding of the law on the question and it is as recorded
above.
Ordered accordingly."
In view of the order extracted above, it is apparent that, we are
only dealing with the issue, whether the jurisdiction vested in this Court
E under Article I 42 of the Constitution, should be invoked in favour of the
appellants, in order to render complete justice in the matter.
5. According to Mr. R. Venkataramani, learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellants in Civil Appeal Nos. 1727, 1720-1724, 1726,
I 728, 1776-1787 and 1846 of2016, the invocation ofArticle 142 in favour
F of the appellants was a just and rightful determination, inasmuch as,
complete justice was sought to be rendered without adversely affecting
or impinging upon the rights of any other party. It was submitted, that
there is a distinction between "inherent jurisdiction" and "inherent power".
Likewise, there is a distinction between ensuring, that the ends ofjustice
G are met - as against, rendering of complete justice. It was pointed out,
that Section 151 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred.
to as, 'the CPC') and Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (hereinafter referred to as, 'the CrPC') provide for situations,
wherein a Court can exercise inherent powers. It was submitted, that
inherent powers as contemplated under Sectio~ • 151 of the CPC, and
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 543
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR. CJI]

Section 482 of the CrPC, are controlled, and had limitations. It was A
asserted, that the power conferred on the Supreme Court under Article
142 ofthe Constitution, was aimed at allowing this Court to do complete
justice, in any cause or matter. The instant power vested in this Court, it
was submitted, is unlimited. It was pointed out, that the expanse ofArticle
142, was clearly distinct from the inherent power contemplated under
B
the two procedural enactments, referred to above. In order to substantiate
his contention, learned counsel placed reliance on a treatise by Roscoe
Pound-An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, (Sixth Indian Reprint
-2012, published by the Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd.). Learned
counsel invited the Court's attention to the following opinion expressed
by the author: . c
."If we look back at the means of individualizing the aprilication
oflawwhich have developed in our legal system, it will be seen
that almost without exception they have to do with cases involving
the moral quality of individual conduct or of the conduct of
enterprises, as distinguished from matters of prope11y and of D
commercial law. Equity uses its powers of individualizing to the
best advantage in connection with the conduct of those in whom
trust and confidence has been reposed. Juiy lawlessness is an
agency of justice chiefly in connection with the moral quality of
conduct where the special circumstances exclude that
"intelligence without passion" which, according to Aristotle, E
characterizes the law. It is significant that in England today the
civil jury is substantially confined to cases of fraud, defamation,
malicious prosecution, assault and battery, and breach of promise
of marriage. Judicial individualization through choice of a rule is
most noticeable in the law of torts, in the law of domestic relations, F
and in passing upon the conduct of enterprises.
The Application of Law
The elaborate system of individualization in criminal procedure
has to do wholly with individual human conduct. The informal
methods of petty courts are meant for tribunals which pass upon G
conduct in the crowd and hurry of our large cities. The
administrative tribunals, which are setting up on every hand, are
most called for and prove most effective as means of regulating
the conduct of enterprises.
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544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 2 S.C.R.

A A like conclusion is suggested when we look into the related
controversy as to the respective provinces of common law and
oflegislation. Inheritance and succession, definition of interests
in property and the conveyance thereof, matters of commercial
law and the creation, incidents, a.nd transfer of obligations have
proved a fruitful field for legislation. In these cases the social
B
interest in the general security is the controlling element. But
where the questions are not of interests of substance but of the
weighing of human conduct and passing upon its moral aspects,
legislation has accomplished little. No codification of the law of
torts has done more than provide a few significantly broad
c generalizations. On the other hand, succession to property is
everywhere a matter of stature law, and commercial law is
codified or codifying throughout the world. Moreover the common
law insists upon its doctrine of stare decisis chiefly in the two
cases of property and commercial law. Where legislation is
effective. there also mechanical application is effective and
D
desirable. Where legislation is ineffective. the same difficulties
that prevent its satisfactorv operation require us to leave a wide
margin of discretion in application. as in the standard of the
reasonable man in our law of negligence and the standard of the
upright and diligent head of a family applied by the Roman law,
E and especially by the modern Roman law, to so many questions
of fault, where the question is really one of good faith. All
attempts to cut down this margin have proved futile. Mey we
not conclude that in the part of the law which has to do
immediately with conduct complete justice is not to be attained
by the mechanical application of fixed rules? ls it not clear that
F
in this part of the administration of justice the trained intuition
and disciplined judgment of the judge must be our assurance that
causes will be decided on principles ofreason and not according
to the chance dictates of caprice. and that a due balance will be
maintained between the general securitv and the individual human
G life?"
Based on the aforesaid, it was submitted, that matters involving
individual conduct, or conduct of enterprises, need to be distinguished
from matters of property and commercial law. It was pointed out, that
the rule of equity, in dealing with individual conduct or conduct of
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 545
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!]

enterprises, was a tool adopted to the best advantage of the parties A
concerned, especially when, the controversy did not relate to property
matters or commercial law. Referring to the law of inheritance and
succession, which had a direct nexus to interest in property (and
conveyance), it was submitted, thatthere was a feeling, that social interest
was generally the controlling element, in such matters. However, where
B
the question was not of substance, but of human conduct (or the moral
aspect thereof), legislation could not be depended upon, to furnish any
answer. According to learned counsel, on the subject being dealt with,
there is no express legislation. Therefore, it is necessary to keep in
mind, that the controversy in hand, is not one which would return a
finding of breach ofany existing legislative enactment. It was submitted, c
that if there had been any such legislation, on the issue being dealt with,
the matter would have to be examined-differently. However, in the
absence oflegislation, or in situations where legislation is ill-effective,
Courts had a wide margin of discretion. For such situations, determination
has to be made, on the touchstone of reasonableness founded on good
D
faith. It was submitted, that in the facts and circumstances of the present
controversy, a trained intuition and disciplined judgment of the adjudicator,
would have to be invoked. Because, the cause would have to be
adjudicated on the principle ofprudence and rationality. Herein, according
to learned counsel, the remedy provided would have to be handcrafted,
rather than the routine - mechanical exercise of enforcing legislative E
intent. Herein, the events would have to be evaluated, keeping in mind
the special circumstances - and their significance, in order to render
complete justice.
6. It was submitted, that in exercise ofjudicial intuition and judicial
discretion, J. Chelameswar, J. had categorized the controversy as one F
where the appellants had acquired "knowledge". The canceliation of
their admission would not be of any advantage to the.more meritorious
candidates, who were deprived of admission, as it is not possible to
transfer the "knowledge" acquired by the appellants. In the present
situation, it was submitted, that it was not possible to restore status quo
ante. The instant controversy, it was pointed out, could not be dealt with G
like a dispute concerning immovable property, wherein, on the culmination
of the /is, the property can be restored to the rightful owner. Htrein, the
meritorious candidates, who ought to have been admitted in place of the
appellants, cannot have the advantage of transfer of "knowledge"
H
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A acquired by the appellants. It was submitted, thatto deal with the acquired
"knowledge", J. Chelameswar, J., had taken recourse to Article 142, to
legitimize only the "knowledge" acquired by the appellants, and not their
actions or conduct. This determination, was also considered to be, of
societal advantage. It would take five years (- the duration of medical
course) of national resources, to acquire what had been annulled by
B
Vyapam. Invalidation of the fruits of gained "education" was considered
by the Hon'ble Presiding Judge of the 'former Division Bench', as an
inappropriate means, to deal with the situation. It was submitted, that
this advantage was far superior to the individual gains which would accrue
to the appellants, or the individual loss which may have been suffered by
c the meritorious candidates deprived of admission. It was also asserted,
that while invoking Article 142 to the advantage of the appellants, the
situations wherein the jurisdiction could not be invoked, were dealt with
in detail. Only after arriving at the conclusion, that the situation in hand,
would not trample upon the determined legal position, the Hon'ble
Presiding Judge had chosen to exercise its discretion, to do complete
D
justice in the matter. It was submitted, that in the absence of, violation
of any laid down parameters, it would be unjust, if this Court was to set
at naught, long years of educational endeavour, successfully undertaken
by the appellants, which had resulted in acquisition of" knowledge" - an
ability, which would enable the appellants to render valuable service to
E the society- and thereby se"rve the citizens of this country.
7. It was also the contention of learned counsel, that at the time
of their admission, most of the appellants (-ifnot all) were juvenile, and
as such, could not be blamed of the irregularity and/or illegality in the
procurement of admission to the MBBS course. It was submitted, that
F this Court must also take into consideration, the fact that the impugned
orders set at naught, admissions gained by the appellants to the MBBS
course, during the years 2008 to 2012, and as such, may be well beyond
the purview of consideration, under the law of limitation, even for
examining their culpability/criminality.

G 8. As a special emphasis, learned counsel invoked the conscience
of this Court, by reiterating .that the "knowledge" acquired by the
appellants, could not be described as tainted, even though the means of
acquiring the "knowledge", may have been tainted. As such, it was
submitted, that the purity of "knowledge", acquired by the appellants,
consequent upon their admission to the professional institutions, needed
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 547
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, <;:JIJ

to be preserved, through the invocation of Article 142 - to do complete A
justice.
9. Based on an analysis of the judgments rendered by this Court,
it was submitted, that in the judgments of this Court wherein Article 142
had been invoked, would demonstrate, that whenever the law applicable
to, and governing a particular cause, was found to be inadequate, or B
whenever the law applicable did not provide means for a complete
resolution of the dispute, the endeavourofa Court oughtto be, to discover
and to address the manner of doing complete justice. It was submitted,
that even though the law provided for the situation obtaining in a particular
cause, and there was scope for a better and more fulfilling outcome, this
Court should search fclr the same, and give effect to it. It was contended, c
that this Court had found good reason to invoke the power vested in it, to
do complete justice between the parties (·through the reasoned order,
of the Hon'ble Presiding Judge, of the 'former Division Bench'). It was
submitted;.that whenever legal resources and materials were found to
be in a state of iiideterminacy, calling for articulation of.new principles, D
and fashioning new remedies, this Court w.ould reach out to a just cause,
by invoking Article 142, by filling up the lacuna. It was pointed out, that
indeterminacy or
- ' .
lack of c6mpleieness
\
of law and legal resources, in a
given case, was the foundatfon for invocation of Article 142. Learned
counsel ventured to clarify, that in doing complete justice, whilst a Court
woilld·not act in disregard to binding provisions.oflaw, the said restraint E
was applicable only with reference to an available statutory regime/
scheme. Thus viewed, whenever there was an available statutory scheme,
Courts wo.uld not ordinarily take recourse to Article 142, but in the
absence thereof, the field would always remain wide open, for thiS Court
to intervene, and render complete justice. "It was pleaded, that there F
could not been a better case, than the one in hand, to invoke such power.
IO. It was also submitted; that the power conferred·on this Court
through Article 142, could not be put in a straightjacket. Being
constitutionai in conferment, this Coun whenever persuaded for a just
cause, would step in to render c0mplete justice, by exercising its inherent · G
power. This exercise of inherent power, accoi:ding to leamed.counseJ.,,
·was free from· any fetters. And for exercise of sush pow\)r, this Court··
ought never and never, close the doors for creative· engagement.
Whenevi;r a situation for" exer¢ise of. such power is triggered by its
consdence~.this C-ourt shouldnot be lax, in providing the de.sired relief.
H
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A It was submitted, that the present controversy exhibited an important
perception fordoingjustice. Based on an exploration ofa relevant legal
principle, the Hon'ble Presiding Judge of the 'former Division Bench',
had invoked the inherent power to render complete justice. According
to learned counsel, the Hon'ble Presiding Judge, had balanced the cause
of justice, by extending societal benefits to the citizens of the country,
B
and at the same time. provided for measures to be taken against the
appellants, and also made sure, that there was sufficient deterrence. It
was submitted, that the course adopted for the invocation of Article 142,
had successfully preserved the "knowledge" acquired by the appellants,
which constituted a national resource. It was contended, that by requiring
c the appellants to render service in the field of medicine, on the payment
of nominal charges, would result in a win-win situation, for all concerned.
It was asserted, that trained minds should not be lost, merely because
the appellants had gained admission, to the MBBS course by foul means.
Service by the appellants, to the nation, for a period of 5 years (postulated
in the order passed by the Hon'ble Presiding Judge), according to learned
D
counsel, was an apt balancing factor, which would also act as a deterrent
to others in future.
11. It was also submitted, that on a composite understanding of
various facts and circumstances of the case, it was clear, that the view
taken by the Hon'ble Presiding Judge (of the 'former Division Bench'),
E cannot be described outlandish. Nor could it be considered, as being
violative of any accepted principle of law, and not even in contravention
ofany statutory scheme. It was submitted, that the exercise ofjurisdiction
under Article 142, by one of the Hon 'ble Judges of the 'former Division
Bench', could be termed as an act ofrendering corrective justice. Justice
F which was particularly invoked, to ameliorate the ruinous effect, which
the appellants would have to suffer, consequent to the cancellation of
their admission to the MBBS course.
12. It was submitted, that in ordinary circumstances of wrongful
gain, principles of law can be invoked to legitimately require the
G beneficiary to surrender the fruits of his gains. Such wrongful fruits of
gain, would then be transferred to the rightful beneficiary. Referring to
the present controversy, it was submitted, that the alleged wrong
committed by the appellants in the present case, had resulted in the
acquisition of"knowledge". It was submitted, that the appellants were
beneficiaries of intellectual prope1fy. Such intellectual property, cannot
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 549
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI]

be withdrawn from the appellants, and transferred to those who oug~t to A
have been granted admission (in place of the appellants). Since the
"knowledge" wrongfully gained by the appellants, was not transferable,
according to learned counsel, the principles ordinarily invoked, whereby
gains are transferred to the rightful beneficiary, cannot be implemented,
in this case. It was pointed out, that the State and the students have
B
invested considerable resources, both monetary and human, ever since
the appellants had been admitted to the MBBS course. Based whereon,
the appellants had pursued their academic careers, and thereby, gained
knowledge in the field of medicine. By any order, cancelling the
appellants' admission to the MBBS course-the institutions would lose,
the State would lose, and the appellants would also lose. It needed to be c
kept in mind, that such cancellation would not result in a reciprocal gain,
for those who had been deprived of admission. And as such, this Court
should affirm the invocation of Article 142 in the manner expressed by
the Hon'ble Presiding Judge (of the 'former Division Bench'), so that,
all is not lost.
D
13. It was also the submission of learned counsel, that the
prosecution(s) which had been initiated, and were pending against some
of the appellants, or which may be launched against them, should not
restrain this Court from taking such action, as it considers just and proper.
Alternatively, it was submitted, that if the appellants were to be acquitted,
none of these adverse or impinging consequences would flow. It was E
submitted, that while examining the controversy in hand, the criminality
of the charges which the appellants may be blamed of, should be kept
apart, as the relevant statutory provisions provide for appropriate
measures of punishment. Insofar as the civil aspect of the matter is
concerned, namely, the validity of the "knowledge" acquired by the F
appellants, in pursuit of their academic qualifications -should not be
jeopardized. Rather, according to learned counsel, the way forward,
suggested by the Hon'ble Presiding Judge (of the 'former Division
Bench'), was the most appropriate course, for dealing with the
controversy, as it rendered complete justice in the matter. The course
adopted, according to learned counsel, while benefiting the appellants,
would also benefit the citizens of this country, and would not result in
any consequential loss.
14. It was pointed out, that the proceedings which the appellants
have pursl!ed, whilst challenging the cancellation of their admission,
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550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017) 2 S.C.R.

A through the current litigation(s), and the proceedings which the appellants
might have to suffer, consequent upon the criminal cases which have
been commenced - or which may be instituted against them, would result·
in an unfathomable amount of strain and suffering, which will always
remain with them, for the rest of their Jives, as an inseparable shadow.
According to learned counsel, this pain and sorrow, would serve tlie
B
purpose of justice, in the facts and circumstances of this case. In this
behalf, it was also submitted, that the diminished respect of the appellants,
in the eyes of the general public (which the public would perceive, because
of the wrongful admission of the appellants), should also weigh with the
Court, as a relevant co~sideration for the invocation of Article 142. It
c was submitted, that the conclusions drawn, on relevant and acceptable
parameters, in favour.ofthe appellants, (by the Hon'ble Presiding°Judge,
of the 'former Division Bench'), should not be negated, so as to deny to
the appellants, the right of utilization of the "knowledge" acquired by
them.

D 15. On the issue in hand, learned counsel placed reliance on
Union Carbide Corporation v. Union oflndia, (1991) 4 SCC 584, and
referred to contentions (A) and (B) delineated in paragraph 55 thereof,
which are being extracted herein below:
"Contention.(A)
E The proceedings before this Court were merely in th_e nature of
appeals against an interlocutory order pertaining t_o the interim-
compensation. Consistent with the limited scope and subject-
matter of the appeals, the main suits themselves could not be
finally disposed of by the settlement. The jurisdiction ofthis Court
F to withdraw or transfer a suit or proceeding to itself is exhausted
by Article 139-A of the Constitution. Such transfer implicit in
the final disposal of the suits having been impermissible suits
were not before the Court so as to be amenable to final disposal
by recording a settlement. The settlement is, therefore, without
jurisdiction. ·
G
Contention (B)
Likewise the pending criminal prosecution was a separate and
distinct proceeding unconnected with the suit from the
interlocutory order in which the appeals before this Court arose.
The criminal proceedings were not under or relatable to the 'Act'.
H
· NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 551
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!]

The Court had rio power to withdraw to itself those criminal A.
proceedings and quash them. The orders of the Court dated
February 14 and I 5, 1989, in so far as they pertain to the quashing
of criminal proceedings are without jurisdiction."
In order to invite our attention to the conclusions recorded by
this Court, with reference to the above two contentions, learned counsel B.
pointed out to the following paragraphs of the above judgment:
"62. The purposed constitutional plenitude of the powers of the
Apex Court to ensure due and proper administration ofjustice is
intended to be co-extensive in each case with the needs ofjustice
ofa given case and to meeting any exigency. Indeed, in Harbans c
Singh v. State ofU.P., (1982) 2 SCC 101, the Court said: (SCC
pp. 107-08, para 20)
"Very wide powers have been conferred on this Court for due
and proper administration of justice. Apart from the jurisdiction
and powers conferred on this Court under Arts. 32 and 136 of D
the Constitution I am of the opinion that this Court retains and
must retain. an inherent power and jurisdiction for dealing with
any extra-ordinary situation in the larger interests of administration
of justice and for preventing manifest injustice being done. This
power must necessarily be sparingly used only in exceptional
circumstances for furthering the ends of justice. Having regard E
to the facts and circumstances of this case. I am of the opinion
that this is a fit case where this Court should entertain the present
petition ofHarbans Singh and this Court should interfere."
63. We find absolutely no merit in this hypertechnicalsubmission
of the petitioners' learned counset We reject the argument as F
_unsound."
Based on the aforesaid conclusions, it was submitted, that a similar
approach should be adopted in this matter also, as it was rightful to
preserve the "knowledge" acquired by the appellants, to enable them to
use the same, to the best advantage of the society, and the citizens of the G
country.
16. In his endeavour to persuade this Court, that the exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 142, had rightly been invoked in favour of the
appellants (by the Hon'ble Presiding Judge, of the 'former Division
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552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A Bench'), our attention was drawn, to a treatise by Fali S. Nariman -
India's Legal System: Can it be saved?, published by Penguin Books
India Pvt. Ltd., wherein the author also expressed his views, with
reference to the exercise ofjurisdiction by this Court, under Article 142.
Relevant extract of the opinion, is reproduced below:
B "If the framers of the Constitution had contemplated an era when
judicial power (not prompted by any legal provision) would be
exercised in the vaccum created by governmental or state
inaction, they may have been a little surprised; but then (I like to
believe) they may have felt the compulsion to remove the fetter
of Article 37, making the Directive Principles of State Policy
c directly enforceable by the courts!
Individual notions of justice according to individual judges,
unguided by law, sometimes known as 'palm-tree justices' or
'Cadi justice' appear to be excluded under our Constitution. As
if to emphasize this, the oath required to be taken by all judges of
D the higher judiciary significantly omit any reference to 'justice'.
Every judge of a high court or Supreme Court takes an oath to
perform the duties of his or her office without fear or favour,
without affection or ill will, and to 'uphold the Constitution and
the law'.
·E But some judges are more equal than others, and in our three-
tier system of court administration,judges of the Supreme Court
are constitutionally placed in a class apart.
Under Article 136 of the Constitution, 'the Supreme Court may
in its discretion grant special leave to appeal from any judgment,
F appeal, determination, sentence or order, in any cause or matter
passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory oflndia'.
The goveming words are 'in its discretion'. And there is a plethora
of case law to support the proposition that even where a court or
tribunal below the Supreme Court has transgressed the law, the
Supreme Court is not bound to interfere, and wi II not interfere
G
and set it aside under its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article
136, ifit is satisfied that the interests of justice have been served.
There is no compulsion for the highest court to set aside even
incorrect or illegal decisions of lower courts, high courts or
tribunals, if the overriding considerations of justice do not so
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 553
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!]

warrant. Even after special leave is granted under Article 136, A
and an appeal gets admitted, the appellant must show that
exceptional and special circumstances do exist, and that ifthere
is no interference by the highest court, substantial and grave
injustice would result.
Underour Constitution, judges of the Supreme Court have been B
conferred a special and unique power, not conferred on judges
of high courts or judges of any other courts in the country. Article
142(1) provides that the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, may pass such decree or make such order as is
necessarv 'for doing complete justice in any cause or matter
pending before it', and any decree so passed, or order so made.
c
is enforceable throughout the territory of India. Judges of the
highest court, conferred with this extraordinary power, are
apparently empowered to disregard statutory prohibitions-
'apparently' .because there has been a flip-flop in the approach
of the court- judges speaking in different voices at different D
times.
In I 99 l, reading Article 142, a Constitution Bench of the Court
said that any prohibition. stipulation or restriction contained in
ordinary law could not act as a limitation on its constitutional
powers under Article 142. But seven years later, another E
Constitution Bench of five Justices read Article 142( 1) as not
empowering the Supreme Court to bypass or override a specific
statutory provision. The latter was an instance of a hard case
making bad law. For the shocking behavior in Court of an
advocate (always an officer of the Court), the advocate was not
only punished (by a Bench of three Justices of the Supreme F
Court) for contempt of court, but he was also suspended from
practice for a period of three years. Since the power of
suspension was statutorily vested only in the Bar Council oflndia.
and could be reviewed by the highest court only on an appeal
from a decision of the Bar Council to it. a Bench of five Justices G
set asidethe earlier order of suspension. holding that the Bench
of three Justices ought not to have overlooked an express
statutory provision.
In my view, the apex court has virtually denuded itself of its
constitutional power to do 'complete justice'. To be at all
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554 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A meaningful. the words 'complete justice' must comprehend a
power to disregard statutory provisions in exceptional
circumstances. unless the provisions are themselves based on
some fundamental principles of public oolicy.
When declining to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under
B Article 136 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may (and
often does) refuse to correct orders and decisions passed by
high courts and other courts and tribunals even where they are
illegal and contrary to law. i.e., where the justice of the case
calls for no-interference. Yet under the law as now declared by
the Constitution Bench. the highest court whilst deciding a
c particular case before· it cannot consciously overlook or bypass
enacted law when exercising its wide powers under Article 142.
An obvious inconsistency in approach. If the Supreme Court
can be trusted under Article 136 to cock a blind eye at a decision
of ahigh court which is contrary to law (but which is otherwise
D 'just'), the highest court must be likewise trusted when it
deliberately ignores the law in the overriding interest of doing
complete justice in a particular case before it under Article 142 ."
17. Learned counsel, then drew our attention to the decision in
State v. Sanjeev Nanda, (2012) 8 SCC 450, and pointed outto the following
E observations recorded therein:
"122. Convicts in various countries, now, voluntarily come forward
to serve the community, especially in crimes relating to motor
vehicles. Graver the crime greater the sent~nce. But, serving
the society actually is not a punishment in the real sense where
F the convicts pay back to the community whatthey owe. Conduct
of the convicts will not only be appreciated by the community, it
wi 11 also give a lot of solace to him, especially in a case where
because of one's action and inaction, human lives have been
lost."
Based on the above, it was the contention ofleamed counsel for
G
the appellants, that Courts can consider, whether it was necessary to
travel one extra mile, to do complete justice. It was submitted, that. the
question whether this Court should travel an extra mile, in the facts of
this case, is not difficult to answer. It was submitted, that this Court
must travel the extra mile, to preserve the "knowledge" acquired by the
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 555
PRADESH AND OTHERS (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!]

appellants, which would enable them to give effect to the same, by A
effectively utilizing it for the welfare of the nation. According to learned
counsel, in his opinion, the case in hand, did not present a situation, where
anyone could have a second thought, simply because, there would be no
one adversely affected, by adoption of such a course.
18. Learned counsel also placed reliance on Sushi I Ansal v. State, B
(2015) I 0 SCC 359, and highlighted the position expressed in paragraph
11, which is extracted below:
"I I. In view of the aforestated undisputed facts, the issue with
regard to imposition of sentence upon the appellants is to be
decided by us. We are concerned with imposition of sentence in c
a criminal case and not with awarding damages in a civil case.
Principles for deciding both are different."
It was submitted, that on the basis of the aforesaid determination,
cumulative benefit of the society, in receiving service rendered ·by
professionals (like the appellants), should also be taken into consideration. D
19. Last of all, reliance was placed on Priya Gupta v. State of
Chhattisgarh, (2012) 7 SCC 433, wherein also, illegal admissions were
dealt with. In the above judgment, this Court held as under:
"71. In the present case, we have no doubt in our mind that the
fault is attributed to all the stakehblders involved in the process E
of admission, i.e., the Ministry concerned of the Union oflndia,
the Directorate of Medical Education in the State ofChhattisgarh,
the Dean ofJagdalpurCallege and all the three members of the
Committee which granted admission to both the appellants on
30-9-2006. But the students are also not innocent. They have
F
certainly taken advantage of being persons of influence. The
father of Appellant 2 AkanshaAdile was the Director of Medical
Education, State of Chhattisgarh at the relevant time and as
noticed above, the entire process of admission was handled
through the' Directorate. The students well knew that the
admissions can only be given on the basis of merit in the entrance G
test and they had not ranked so high that they were entitled to
the admission on that basis alone. In fact, they were also aware
of the fact that no other candidate had been informed and that
no one was present due to non-intimation. Out of favouritism
and arbitrariness, they had been given admission by completing
H

•
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A the entire admission process within a few hours on 30-9-2006.

*** *** •••
73. In the present case, we are informed that the students have
already sat for their final examination and are about to complete
their courses. Even if we have to protect their admissions on the
B ground of equity, they cannot be granted such relief except on
appropriate terms. By their admissions, firstly, other candidates
of higher merit have been denied admission in the MBBS course.
Secondly, they have taken advantage of a very low professional
college fee, as in private or colleges other than the government
c colleges. the fee payable would be Rs. 1,95,000/- per year for
general admission and for management quota, the fee payable
would be Rs. 4,00,000/- per year, but in government colleges, it
is Rs. 4,000/- per year. So, they have taken a double advantage.
As per their merit, they obviously would not have got admission
into the Jagdalpur College and would have been given admission
D in private colleges. The ranks that they obtained in the competitive
examination clearly depict this possibility, because there were
only 50 seats in Jagdalpur College and there are hundreds of
candidates above the appellants in the order of merit. They have
also, arbitrarily and unfairly, benefited from lower fees charged
E in JagdalpurCollege.
74. On the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, though
we find no legal or other infirmity in the judgment under appeal,
but to do complete justice between the parties within the ambit
of Article 142 of the Constitution oflndia, we would permit the
F appellants to complete their professional courses, subject to the
condition that each one of them pay a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs to
JagdalpurCollege, which amount shall be utilized for developing
the infrastructure in Jagdalpur College."
20. Jn order to further illustrate the scope of the exercise of
jurisdiction, vested in this Court under Article 142, learned counsel placed
G
reliance on Academy ofNutrition Improvement v. Union oflndia, (2011)
8 sec 274. It was submitted, that in the above case, the controversy
related to a ban on non-iodized salt. The said ban was unsustainable in
law. Be that as it may, the Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article I 42, invoked the ground of public health, to continue the existing
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 557
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!]

position, till such time as remedial action was taken by Parliament. In A
this behalf, our attention was drawn to the following observations of this
Court:
"What Relief?
68. We have already noticed that as at present there is no material
to show that universal salt iodisation will be injurious to public B
health (that is to the majority of populace who do not suffer from
iodine deficiency). But we are constrained to hold that Rule 44-
1 is ultra vi res the Act and therefore, not valid. The result would
be that the ban on sale of non-iodised salt for human consumption
will be raised, which may not be in the interest of public health. c
We are therefore, of the view that the Central Government should
have at least six months' time to thoroughly review the compulsory
iodisation policy (universal salt iodisation for human consumption)
with reference to latest inputs and research data and if after
such review, is of the view that universal iodisation scheme
requires to be continued, bring appropriate legislation or other D
measures in accordance with law to continue the compulsory
iodisation programme.
69. The question is having held that Rule 44-1 to be invalid,
whether we can permit the continuation of the ban on sale of
non-iodised salt for human consumption for any period. E
Article 142 of the Constitution vests unfettered independent
jurisdiction to pass any order in public interest to do complete
justice. if exercise of such jurisdiction is not be contrary to any
express provision of law.
70. In Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 F
SCC 409, this Court observed: (SCC p. 432, para 48)
"48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article 142 has the power to make such order as is necessary
for doing coniplete justice 'between the parties in any cause
or matter pending before it'. The very nature of the power G
must lead the comt to set limits for itself within which to
exercise those powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a
statutory provision governing a subject. except perhaps to
balance the equities between the conflicting claims of the
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558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A litigating parties by 'ironing out the creases' in a cause or
- matter before it. Indeed this Court is not a court ofrestricted
jurisdiction of only dispute settling. It is well recognised and
established that this Court has always been a law maker and
its role travels beyond merely dispute settling. It is a 'problem
solver in the nebulous areas' (see. K. Veeraswami v. Union
B
of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655) but the substantive statutory
provisions dealing with the subject-matter of a given case,
cannot be altog_e\her ignored by this Court, while making an
order under Artick 142. Indeed. these constitutional powers
cannot, in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions
c but at the same time these powers are not meant to be
exercised when their exercise may come directly in
conflict with what has been expressly provided for in statute
dealing expressly with the subject."
71. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2005) 3 SCC
D 284, this Court after reiterating that this Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution would not pass
any order which would amount to supplanting substantive law
applicable to the case or ignoring express statutory provisions
dealing with the subject, observed as follows: (SCC p. 294, para
27)
E
"27. It may therefore be understood that the plenary powers
of this Court under Article 142 ofthe Constitution are inherent
in the court and are complementary to those powers which
are specifically conferred on the court by various statutes
though are not limited by those statutes. These powers also
F exist independent of the statutes with a view to do complete
justice between the parties ... and are in the nature of
supplementary powers ... (andl may be put on a different and
perhaps even wider footing than ordinary inherent powers
of a court to prevent injustice. The advantage that is derived
G from a constitutional provision couched in such a wide
compass is that it prevents 'clogging or obstruction of the
'stream of justice'. (See: Supreme Court Bar Assn. (supra))".
72. In view of the above' and to do complete justice between the
parties in the interest of public health, in exercise ofour jurisdiction
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 559
. PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI]

under Article 142 of the Constitution, we direct the continuation A
of the ban contained in Rule 44-1 for a period of six months. The
Central Government may within that period review the
compulsorv iodisation programme and if it decides to continue,
may introduce appropriate legislative or other measures. It is
needless to say that if it fails to take any action within the expiry
B
of six months from today, Rule 44-1 shall cease to operate."
Based on the conclusions drawn in the above judgments, it was
submitted, th.at in the same manner in which judicial notice was taken by
this Court, on the ground of"public health", this Court needed to take
into consideration, the "knowledge" component (acquired by the
appellants), and the impossibility of transferability of the intellectual
c
property, to invoke Article 142 of the Constitution, to legitimize the
curriculum successfully completed by the appellants. As such, it was
pointed out, that the present consideration also falls within the permissible
constitutional parameters. It was accordingly pleaded, that the view
expressed by the Hon'ble Presiding Judge (of the 'former Division D
Bench'), should be affirmed.
21. Having adverted to the situations wherein this Court. has
positively exercised power under Article 142, to provide relief to the
concerned parties, learned counsel also placed for our consideration,
two judgments r~ndered by this Court, wherein the Court had declined E
to exercise the power vested in it under Article 142. First or all, reference
was made to Priyanka Estates International Private Limited v. State of
Assam, (20 I 0) 2 SCC 27, wherein this Court held as under:
"58. In the case in hand, it is noted that a number of occupiers
were put in possession of the respective flats by the builder/ F
developer constructed unauthorisedly in violation of the laws.
Thus, looking to the matter from all angles it cannot be disputed
that ultimately the flat owners are going to be the greater sufferers
rather than builder who has already pocketed the price of the
flat.
G
59. It is a sound policy to punish the wrong-doer and it is in that
spirit that the courts have moulded the reliefs of granting
compensation to the victims in exercise of the powers conferred
on it. In doing so, the courts are required to take into account not
only the interest of the petitioners and the respondents but also
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560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 2 S.C.R.

A the interest of public as a whole with a view that public bodies or
officials or builders do not act u,{]awfully and do perform their
duties properly.
60. In the case in hand. admitted Iv. at no point oftime Appellant
I. Mis. Priyanka Estates International (P) Ltd. was able to show
B to its prospective purchasers the Occupancy Certificate or
Completion Certificate issued by the authorities concerned. The
same could not even be shown to us and without it. Appellant 1
could not have embarked into sale of flats as it was mandatorily
required.

c 61. The instant case is not a case of breach of contract. It is a
clear case of breach of the obligation undertaken to erect the
building in accordance with building regulations and failure to
truthfully inform the warranty of title and other allied
circumstances.

D 62. Even though at the first instance, we thought of invoking this
Court's jurisdiction conferred under Article 142 of the Constitution
of India so as to do complete justice between the parties and to
direct awarding ofreasonable/suitable compensation/interest to
the flat owners. whose flats are ultimately going to be demolished.
but. with a heavv heart. we have restrained ourselves from doing
E so. for variety of reasons and on account of various disputed
questions that may be posed in the matter. However. we grant
libertv to those. whose flats are ultimately going to be demolished.
to exhaustthe remedy that may be available to them in accordance
with law."
F It was submitted, that the aforesaid judgment pertained to
violations of building norms, and the Court considered it inappropriate, to
provide relief to the persons who had purchased flats, despite their
vehement contention, that they were not guilty of violating the building
regulations (as the builders who had sold the flats to them, had raised
constructions in violation of the building norms). Additionally, reference
G
was made to Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Uttar Pradesh
Power Corporation Limited, (2011) I 0 SCC 643, wherein our attention
was invited to the fol lowing observations:
"29. Mr. Pallav Shishodia, learned Senior Counsel also urged
that the appellants are migrants from Gujarat. They have settled
H
N!DHl KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 561
PRADESH AND OTHERS (JAGD!SH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!]

in Chidambaram aboutthirtyyears back and the livelihood of the A
entire family of the appellants which comprised of about 40
members is dependant on the saw mill existing on the subject
land. Having regard to these facts, he would submit that we
invoke our jurisdiction under Article l 42 of the Constitution and
declare the acquisition of the appellants' land bad in law to do
B
complete justice.
30. There is no doubt that by compulsory acquisition of their
land, the appellants have been put to hardship. As a matter of
fact, the RDO was alive to this problem. In his report dated 14-
. 9-1989, the RDO did observe that the landowners have spent
·considerable money to raise the level ofthe land for constructing
c
compound wall and running saw mill. He was, however, of the
opinion that the appellants' land was very suitable for the
expansion of the depot and that suitable compensation can be
paid to the landowners to enable them to purchase an alternative
land. The appellants, however, proceeded to challenge the D
acquisition. The litigation has traversed upto this Court and taken
about 22 years. The public purpose has been stalled for more
than two decades.
31. Being the highest court, an extraordinary power has been
conferred on this Court under Article 142 to pass any decree, E
order or direction in the matter to do complete justice between
the parties. The power is plenary in nature and not inhibited by
constraints or limitations. However, the power under Article 142
is not exercised routinely. It is rather exercised sparingly and
very rarely. In the name of justice to the appellants, under Article
l 42, nothing should be done that would result in frustrating the F
acquisition of land which has been completed long back by
following the procedure under the Act and after giving full
opportunitvto the appellants under Section 5-A. The possession
of the land has also been taken as far back as on 25-7-2001."
It was submitted, that the contours and parameters of the G
consideration recorded in the two cases referred to by him, could not be
extended to the case of the appellants, which is unique and distinguishable
from the cited cases, for reasons already expressed above.
22. Our attention was also drawn to the judgment rendered in
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562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih (Whitewasher), (2014) 8 SCC 883, wherein
this Court recorded the distinction between the exercise of jurisdiction
vested in this Court under Article 136 as against Article 142. The relevant
determination was expressed in the following paragraphs:
"8. In our view, the law laid down in Chandi Prasad Uniyal case,
B no way conflicts with the observations made by this Court in the
other two cases. In those decisions, directions were issued in
exercise of the powers of this Court under Article 142 of the
Constitution, but in the subsequent decision this Court under
Article 136 of the Constitution, in laying down the law had
dismissed the petition of the employee. This Court in a number
c of cases had battled with tracing the contours of the provision in
Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution oflndia. Distinctively,
although the words employed under the two aforesaid provisions
speak of the powers of this Court, the former vest a plenary
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court in the matter of entertaining
D and hearing of appeals by granting special leave against any
judgment or order made by a Court or Tribunal in any cause or
matter. The powers are plenary to the extent that they .are
paramount to the limitations under the specific provisions for
appeal contained in the Constitution or other laws. Article 142 of
the Constitution oflndia, on the other hand is a step ahead of the
E powers envisaged Under Article 136 of the Constitution oflndia.
It is the exercise ofjurisdiction to pass such enforceable decree
or order as is necessary for doing 'complete justice' in any cause
or matter.

*** *** •••
F
12. Article 142 of the Constitution of India is supplementary in
nature and cannot supplant the substantive provisions, though
they are not limited by the substantive provisions in the statute.
It is a power that gives preference to equity over law. It is a
justice-oriented approach as against the strict rigours of the law.
G The directions issued by the court can normally be "Categorized
into one, in the nature of moulding of relief and the other, as the
declaration of law. "Declaration of law" as contemplated in
Article 141 of the Constitution: is the speech express or. ·
necessarily implied by the highest court of the land. This Court
in the case of Indian Bank v. ABS Marine Products (P) Ltd.,
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 563
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI]

(2006) 5 SCC 72, Ram Pravesh Singh v. State ofBihar, (2006) 8 A
sec 381 and in State ofU.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi, (2006) 1 sec
667, has expounded the principle and extolled the power of
· · Article 142 of the Constitution oflndia t-0 new heights .by laying
down thatthe directions issued under Article 142 cfo not constitute
a binding precedent unlike Article 141 of the Constitution of India.
B
They are direction issued to do proper justice and exercise of
such power, cannot be considered as law laid down by the
Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.
The Court has compartmentalized and differentiated the reliefin
the operative portion of the judgment by exercise of powers under
Article 14~ of the Constitution as against the law declared. The.· c
directions 6fthe Court under Article 142 of the Constitution;while
moulding the relief, that relax the application of law or exempt
the case in hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar
facts and circumstances do not comprise the ratio decidendi and
therefore lose its basic premise of making it" a binding precedent. ·
This Court on the qui vive has expanded the horizons of D.
Article 142 of the Constitution by keeping it outside the purview
ofArticle 141 of the Constitution and by declaring it a direction
of the Court thaf:changes its complexion with the peculiarity in
the facts and circwnstances ofthe·case."
Based on the above distinction between the exercise ofjurisdiction E
under Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution, it was submitted, that the
power to do complete justice under Article 142, was far-far beyond the
power vested in this Court under Article 136. It was therefore, the
submission of learned counsel, that this Court should not retrain from
extending complete justice to the appellants, in the manner expressed by F
the Hon'ble Presiding Judge (of the 'former Division Bench').
23. Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel, entered appearance
on behalf of an appellant (in C.A. No.1752 of2016). Some of the
submissions advanced by le.arned counsel, were the same as were
canvassed .by Mr. R. Venkataramani. Rather than repeating the same, G
we have incorporated the said submissions, along with the contenti9ns
advanced by Mr. R. Venkataramani. Mr. Shyam Divan during the course
of advancing his submissions, pointed out, that even though the appellant
represented by him, was admitted to the MBBS course in 2008, he had
not yet qualified all the professional examinations of the course. It was
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564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 2 S.C.R.

A submitted, that the cancellation order in case of the appellant, was passed
after 6 years of his admission (-in April 2014 ). Referring to the factual
position noticed in the impugnedj"dgment dated 7.10.2014 (rendered
by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh), it '"is submitted. that in the
Pre-Medical Test conducted for admissions in the year 2008, the
candidatures of 42 students were cancel led. on account of discovery of
B
tampering in their roll numbers. It was highlighted, that only I 0 of the
above 42 candidates, whose roll numbers were discovered to have been
tampered, had actually taken admission to the MBBS course. And 32 of
the said candidates, who could have been admitted, did not even come
forward to enrol themselves for the course. This. according to learned
c counsel, is a vital factor which needs to be taken into consideration. Jn
addition, learned counsel invited the Court's attention to certain
observations made by the Hon'ble Presiding Judge. which are extrncted
hereunder:
''7. The enquiry was conducted. The pattern of the enquiry is
D similar to the one conducted concerning PMT 2013. Based on
the enquiry reports, the Board came to two conclusions: (i) there
was a tampering with the examination process in each one of
the abovementioned five years; and (ii) the appellants as well as
some others students resorted to unfair means at the said
examinations. They were beneficiaries of such tampered
E
examination process. The BOARD. therefore, cancelled the
admissions of the appel lams and some others ......"
••• ••• ***
''12. Adm!!t_edlv. there was no shqw cause notice to any one of
f the S!Jlclents bef9J:\' cancel[irrg_tl)cirJ!QmissjQns. No ~peaking order
indicating the reasons which formed the basis for the cancellation
Qflhe admissions was either .12asscd or served on anv one of the
appellants. Reasons were spelt out for the first time in the High
Court. It appears fr_om the ilDJ2'~ judgment and the
submissions made befon,-fil.J.biit respondents relied u.PQ!!
G circun1stantial ~vidence_l.Q_[~'l-~_b_ the _t\VO conclusions referred
to.in para 7 (supra)."'
*** *** ***
"36. There is nothing inherently irrational or perverse in the
BOARD's conclusions (i) that the examination process was
1-1
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 565
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR. CJ!]

tampered with: and {ji) that all. the appellant~.J1erein_1ybo a~ A
identified to be members of the ·pairs' (referred to earlier) are
beneficiaries of such manipulated examination process, relying
upon the circumstances (mentioned in Footnote 7 supra) if they
are unimpeachable. Each one of the circumstances is an inference
which flows from certain basic facts which either individually or
B
in combination with some other facts constituted the
circumstance. One or more of such facts (constituting
circumstances mentioned in (iii) to (vi) ofFootnote 7 supra) are
demonstrated to be not true (with reference to some of the
appellants)."
Footnote 7, referred to in paragraph 36 extracted above, is C
reproduced below:
··7 . The Circumstances are:-
(i) with respect to each of the five years in question. a definite
pattern was followed by the BOARD in allotment of Roll numbers
D
as well as examination centres. But, it is detected on enquiry
that allotment of both the Roll number and the examination centre
with respect to some of the students was in deviation from the
J)attern adopted for the year:
(ii) Such deviations with reference to several centres occurred
in pairs. The logical pattern employed for the generation of Roll E
numbers was broken with respect to some pairs of students.
They were allotted sequential Roll numbers, though they could
not have been allotted those numbers if the logical pattern were
followed. Further, such pairs of students were allotted examination
Centres which they could not have been allotted having regard F
to Roll numbers allotted to them, and the .2attern of the Roll
numbers allotted to the paiticular examination Centre.
(iii) in such pairs, once again there is a pattern i.e. the more
accomplished stitdent is made to sit in front of the other of the
pair (referred to in the impugned judgment as "Scorer" and G
"beneficiary" respectively). Such an arrang"ment was made in
order to enable the "beneficiary" to copv from the "scorer";
(iv) with refere1ice to most of the identified pairs, the candidates
not only got substantially similar (ifnot identical) marks. but also
their answers, both correct and incorrect, with reference to each
H
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 2 S.C.R.

A one of the questions answered by them matched to a substantial
extent.
(v) in most of the cases of the identified pairs, the 'scorer' did
not belong to Madhya Pradesh:
(vi) Such ·~corers' in most of the cases though secured
B sufficiently high marks in the PMT, did not take admission in any
one of the medical colleges of Madhya Pradesh. The respondents,
therefore, believe that the 'scorers' were not genuinely interested
in securing admission in any medical college of MP and they
appeared in the examination only to facilitate the 'beneficiarv' to
c obtain good marks to enable the beneficiary to secure admission."
Based on the aforesaid observations, learned counsel was
emphatic in highlighting, that even the Hon 'ble Presiding Judge (of the
'former Division Bench'), was conscious of the fact, that some of the
findings recorded with reference to some of the appellants, were not
D correct, in respect of the parameters adopted. Stated differently, it was
submitted, that the Hon'ble Presiding Judge had a lurking feeling, that
some of the appellants were innocent. It was submitted, that this was
one of the considerations, which must have weighed with the Hon'ble
Presiding Judge, to invoke Article 142, to render complete justice in the
matter.
E
24. In continuation of the above submission, learned counsel
invited our attention to the principles culled out by the Bench for, recording
its conclusions, based on the analysis of the judgments relied upon by
learned counsel for the rival parties, which are extracted hereunder:
"34. From an analysis of the above decisions, the following
F
principles emerge:-
,'J;'t
I. Normally, the rule of audi alteram partem must be
scrupulously followed in the cases of the cancellation of the
examinations of students on the ground that they had resorted
to unfair means (copying) at the examinations.
G
2. But the &bovementioned principle is not applicable to the
cases where unfair means were adopted by a relatively large
number of students and also to certain other situations where
either the examination process is vitiated or for reasons
beyond the control of both students and the examining body,
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 567
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!]

it would be unfair or impracticable to continue the examination A
process to insist upon the compliance with audi alteram
partem rule.
3. The fact that unfair means were adopted by students at
an examination could be established by circumstantial
evidence. B
4. The scope ofjudicial review of the decision of an examining
body is very limited. If there is some reasonable material
before the body to come to the conclusion that unfair means
were adopted by the students on a large scale, neither such
conclusion nor the evidence forming the basis thereof could c
be subjected to scrutiny on the principles governing the
assessment of evidence in a criminal court .
.. ses such as the one on hand where there are allegations of
criminal conspiracies resulting in the tampering with the
examination process for the benefit of a large number of students D
would be certainly one of the exceptional circumstances indicated
in Sinha's case provided there is some justifiable material to
support the conclusion that the examination process had been
tampered with.
In the light of the principles oflaw emerging from scrutiny of the E
abovementioned judgments, we are of the opinion that case on
hand can fall within the category of exceptions to the rule of
audi alteram partem ifthere is reliable material to come to the
conclusion that the examination process is vitiated.
That leads me to the next question - whether the material relied
F
upon by the BOARD for reaching the conclusion that the
examination process was contaminated insofar as the appellants
(and also some more students) are concerned and the appellants
are the beneficiaries of such contaminated process, is tenable?"
Based on the principles culled out, the Hon 'hie Presiding Judge,
G
recorded the following conclusion in paragraph 38:
"38. The other submission of the appellants in this regard is that
if there is a deviation from the general pattern with regard to the
allotment of Roll Numbers and the examination Centres, the
appellants could not be blamed or 'penalised' because the entire
H
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A process of the allotment was done by the BOARD and its
officials. In my opinion, the question of either 'blame' or 'penalty'
does not arise in the context. lftampering with the examination
process took place, whether all or some of the appellants are
culpable is a matter for a criminal court to examine as and when
any of the appellants is sought to be prosecuted.
B
But the fact that the examination process was tampered with is.
relevant for achninistri!J.i.Y.<: action such as the one impugned
herein. The said fact formed the foundation for the further enquiry
for identifying the beneficiaries of such contaminated process.
Having regard to the circumstances relied upon, 1 do not see
c anything illogical or untenable in the conclusions drawn by the
expert committee which formed the basis for the impugned action
of the BOARD. It is argued that the formula adopted by the
BOARD to record the conclusion that the members of the
identified pairs resorted to unfair means at the examination is
D without any scientific basis. I do not see any irrationality either
in the formula or the decision ofthe BOARD to assign greater
weightage to the incorrect matching answers. There is nothing
inherently suspicious about two candidates sitting in close
proximity in an exa1ni11~fi9.!1.~nd giving the sa1ne correct answer
to a question because there can only one correct answer to a
E question. On the other hand, if they give the same wrong answer
to a given question and if the number of such wrong answers is
high, it can certainly generate a doubt and is a strong circumstance
indicating the occurrence of some malpractice. Such a test was
approved bY.!hi.LCourt in Bagleshwar Prasad's case.
F Even otherwise, in my opinion, it would be futile to pursue the
filgui1:y in this regard. Assuming for the sake of argument that
the submission of the appellants is right and there are some cases
(of appellants) where the appellants can demonstrate (if an
opportunity is given to them) that the circumstantial evidence is
G not foolproof and therefore the impugned order must be set aside
on the ground of failure of natural justice, the BOARD would
still be entitled (in fact it would be obliged in view of the allegation
of systematic tampering with the examination process year after
year) in law to conduct afresh enquiry after giving notice to each
of the appellants. That would mean spending enormous time both
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE Of MADHYA 569
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISI-1 SINGH KHEHAR. CJI]

Q)' the BOARD and by the appellants for the enquir)' and the A
9onsequenti11I (inevitable) litigation regarding the correctness of
the eventual deci_sion..Qf_the BOARD.
For the abovementioned reasons. I do not Qropose to interfere
wi11L111e imp_t1gnecij_udg1uent on the ,:ount that the rule .of audi
fl/[!;_rQllJJ2U!.1!!111.'Y'1S not CQDJQ.lj.ed with Q)' th.e__r.e~pondents before B
cance llingJhe admissions of the appellants herein.··
A perusal of the aforesaid consideration. according to learned
counsel, leads to the inevitable impression, that the Hon'ble Presiding
Judge (of the 'former Division Bench') was of the view, that the question
of holding an inquiry in the matter was futile, even if the contention c
advanced at the hands of the appellants was correct (namely, that the
appellants could demonstrate, that the material relied upon by the
authorities would not have the effect of being absolutely conclusive). It
was accordingly submitted. that it was apparent from the order itself,
that the 1-lon'ble Presiding Judge, did not allow the appellants an
opportunity to substantiate their claim(s) of innocence before the D
authorities, as that would take "enormous time''. Be that as it may, it
was the submission oflearned counsel, that the conclusions recorded by
the 1-lon'ble Presiding Judge (in paragraph 38, extracted above), reveal
a lurking impression in the Court's mind, that some of the appellants may
not have been blamewo11hy, of what they were being accused of. E
25. Likewise, for the same purpose, learned counsel placed
reliance on the observations recorded by the I-Ion 'ble Presiding Judge
(of the 'former Division Bench'):
39. The next question that requires examination is the legality of
the action of the respondents after a lapse ofconsiderable time. F
It varies between one to five years with reference to each of the
appellants. The decision of the respondents necessarily led to
litigation which consumed another three years. The net result is
that appellants, who belong to 20 I 2 batch, spent four years ·
undergoing the training in medical course; others progressively
G
longer periods extending up to eight years but could not acquire
their degrees because of the impugned action and the pendency
of this Iitigation. Most of the appellants would have acquired
their degree in medicine by now ifthev had been successful at
the examinati.QJ)~."
H
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A Relying on the above observations, it was submitted, that the lapse of
considerable time, also weighed heavily in the mind of the Hon 'ble
Presiding Judge, for not interfering with the determination rendered by
Vyapam. It was therefore, that the Hon'ble Presiding Judge expressed
the view, that adoption of the aforesaid course, would prolong the process
of litigation for another three years, which in turn would result in the
B
prolongation of the period required by the appellants, to clear their
professional examinations (by a further period of three years). It was
therefore submitted, that the decision rendered by the Hon 'ble Presiding
Judge, by taking recourse to Article 142, was aimed at putting a quietus
to the judicial process, and thereby, alleviating young fertile minds from
c the dgors of any strict interpretation oflaw.
26. For the same purpose, as has been recorded hereinabove,
learned counsel for the appellants, placed reliance on paragraph 46 of
the judgment dated 12.5.2016. The same is reproduced below:
"46. Coming to the case in hand, the numberof students involved
D is relatively huge. (They are the beneficiaries of a tampered
examination process. The tampering took place systematically
and repeatedly for a number of years virtually destroying the
credibility of the examination process. It deprived a number of
other more deserving students from securing admissions to the
E medical colleges). In view of the conclusion recorded by me
earlier that neither the procedure adopted by the respondents
nor the evidence relied upon by the respondents for taking
impugned action against the appellants could be .characterised
as illegal, is it permissible for this Court to interfere with the
impugned action of the respondents either on the ground that
F there is a considerable time lapse or that such action would have
ruinous effect on the lives and careers of the appellants? and
therefore, inequitable, is a troubling question."
It was submitted, on the basis of the observations extracted
above, that the Hon 'ble Presiding Judge (of the 'forn1er Division Bench'),
G was conscious of the ruinous effect on the lives and careers of the
appellants, and therefore, felt the necessity of rendering justice to the
appellants, by taking recourse to the power vested in this Court, under
Article 142 of the Constitution.
27. Last of all, it was the submission of learned counsel for the
H
NIDfll KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 571
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!]

appellants, that the Hon'ble Presiding Judge, in his order dated I 2.5.2016, A
was also conscious of the fact, that most of the appellants may well
have been juvenile, and as such, could not have been blamed for the role
attributed to them;in~he process of having gained wrongful admission,
to the MBBS course. This aspect of the matter was noticed in paragraph
55 of the judgment dated 12.5.2016, wherein the Hon 'ble Presiding Judge
B
observed as under:
"55. Another important consideration in the context is that most
of(ifnot all) the appellants, whatever be their respective role, if
any, in the tampering of the examination process, must have been
'juveniles' as defined under the Juvenile Justice Act. They cannot
be subjected to any 'punishment' prescribed under the criminal c
law even if they ar~ not only the beneficiaries of the tampered
examination process but also the perpetrators of the various acts
which constitute offences contaminating the examination
process."
Taking note of the observations extracted above, according to D
learned counsel, it would not be incorrect to suggest, that the Hon'ble
Presiding Judge, felt the necessity of taking recpurse to Article 142, and
thereby, the compulsion to render complete justice to the appellants.
28. Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel canvassed, that it
was essential for us, to take into consideration all the aspects, referred E
to above. It was submitted, that each one of the aforesaid aspects, must
be deemed to have been consciously taken into consideration, by the
Hon'ble Presiding Judge (of the 'former Division Bench'), for eventually
taking recourse to Article 142 of the Constitution, to render complete
justice to the appellants. These reasons, according to learned counsel, F
should be read in conjunction with the submissions advanced at the hands
of Mr. R. Venkataramani, Senior Advocate, wherein the emphasis laid
on was, that the appellants had gained "knowledge", which could not be
transferred/transposed to those who may have been better claimants
for admission, to the MBBS course, than the appellants.
G
29. All put together, learned counsel for the appellants,
endeavoured to demonstrate an absolute justification for the exercise of
jurisdiction at the hands of the Hon'ble Presiding Judge, vested in this
Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. Learned counsel accordingly
beseeched this Court repeatedly, to give expression to each and every
H
572 SUPREl\1E COURT REPORTS [20 I 7] 2 S.C .R.

A facet of the understanding of the proposition, at the hands of the Hon 'ble
Presiding Judge (of the 'former Division Bench'), and to uphold the
order passed by him, in favour of the appellants.
30. Mr. Sidharth Luthra. Senior Advocate. represented the
appellants in Civil Appeal Nos. 1729. 1761-1768. 1813-1814 and 1838 of
B 2016. At the outset, it was submitted. that the appellants in the above
mentioned civil appeals. were seeking directions in terms of Article 142
of the Constitution. which provides plenary powers to this Court whereby,
this Court can pass such orders, as may be necessary for doing complete
justice. It was submitted, that in the instant case, the instant prayer was
also being made by keeping the larger public interest in mind. Learned
c counsel, adverted to the divergent views expressed by the members of
the 'former Division Bench' (through their respective orders, dated
12.5.2016) with respect to the exercise of the above power. Referring
to the order passed by the Hon'ble Presiding Judge (of the 'former
Division Bench'), our attention was drawn to the following view expressed
D by him:
''Society 1nust receive so1ne co111pensation fro111 the \Vrongdoers.
Compensation need not be monetary and in the instant case it
should not be. In my view. it would serve the larger public
interests, by making the appellants serve the nation for a period
E of five years as and when they become gualified doctors, without
any regular salary and attendant benefits of service under the
State, nor any claim for absorption into the service of the State
subject of course to the payment of some allowance (either in
cash or kind) for their survival. 1 would prefer them serving the
Indian Armed Forces subject to such conditions and disciplines
F to which the armed forces normally subject their regular medical
corps. I would prefer that the appellants be handed over the
certificates of their medical degrees only after they complete
!11..,_.~_l:iQvern_entioned five years. The abovementioned exercise
would require the ascertainment of the views of Ministry of
G Defence, Government oflndia, and passing of further appropriate
orders by this Court thereafter. In view of the disagreement of
views in this regard, I am not proposing such an exercise."
Thereupon, our attention \vas drawn lo the order of the Hon 'ble
Companion Judge (of the 'former Division Bench'), who expressed his
views as under:
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 573
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI]

"123. Al!Q])ling the aforesaid law tothe facts of the case at hand. A
I find that the ap_nellants are not entitled to claim any equitable
relief on the ground that they have almost completed their course
during the interITgnum period and hence no action on the basis
of their PMT Examination results is called for.

*** *** *** B
126. l11J.!1~~e cjrcui:nst_a.ri.c:.>~<;,Jl~~tate_!!!~y_s:gnsider permitting
the appellants and other candidates alike the appel Ian ts to appear
in the competitive examination whenever it is held and consider
grantingl!fil'_relaxation to those candidates who have crossed
the age-limit. if prescribed. Such liberty, if granted, would not c
cause any prejudice to any one and at the same time would do
substantial justice to all such candidates as was done in Bihar
School Examination (supra). Beyond this. in my view. the
@rellants are not entitled to claim any ind)llgence."
31. Learned counsel, to support the cause of the appellants, drew D
our attention to the year of admission and status of the appellants. It
was submitted, that the appellant in Civil A rpeal N o.1729 of 2016 had
completed her medical courses by clearing all four professional
examinations, while the appellants in Civil Appeal Nos. 1767-1768 of
2016, 1813-1814 and I 83 8 of 2016 had cleared the second/third
professfonal examinations, under orders of the High Court and/or this E
Court. Their academic record in school (class X and Xll results), was
also highlighted to demonstrate, that they were meritorious students. It
was also pointed out, that none of these appellants were named in any
First Information Report, nor were they ever subjected to any criminal
investigation/prosecution, as on date. It was further pointed out, that F
their admissions were cancelled, not on finding of any overt act being
proved on their part, but based on conclusions recorded by the Expert
Computer Committee constituted by Yypam, which had evolved a formula
to examine, whether the candidates sitting in pairs, had adopted unfair
means, during their Pre-Medical Test. It was submitted, that the
conclusions drawn against the appellants, was based on a general analysis, G
and not, on any individual determination of gui It.
32. Learned counsel pointed out, that in a report prepared by the
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India, it had
been concluded, that there was an acute shortage of medical professionals
H
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A (medical doctors) in India, specially at the primary care level, both in the
government and the private sector, as a consequence of which, citizens
were deprived of basic health care, including preventive care. It was
also highlighted, that the rural health statistics compiled by the Ministry
of Health and Family Welfare, Government oflndia, affirm for the year
2015, that the State of Madhya Pradesh had vacancies of 659 doctors in
B
Primary Health Centres alone. According to data compiled by the
WHO for 201. 5, India had one doctor per 1681 people. It was contended,
that although the number of health facilities had risen in the past decade,
workforce shortages were substantial. Replying on statistics of March
31, 2015, it was submitted, that more than 8% of the 25,300 primary
c health centres in the country were without a doctor, 38% were without
a laboratory technician, and 22% had no pharmacist. And, nearly 50%
of posts offemale health assistants, and 61 % of male health assistants,
were vacant. In community health centres, it was submitted, the shortage
was huge - surgeons were short by 83% - and pediatricians by 82%.
Even in health facilities where doctors, specialists, and paramedical staff
D
were posted, their availability remained in question, because of a high
rate of absenteeism (for the above data, reliance was placed on an article
titled "India still struggles with rural doctor shortages", -
www.thelancet.com, of December 12, 2015).
33. Keeping in view the factual position stated above, it was
E p·rayed, that the appellants be granted such relief, as would enable them,
to serve society and humanity. This, according to learned counsel, can.
be achieved by allowing the appellants to put their medical education to
use - by allo;wing them to serve the needs of society. It was contended,
that an element of sympathetic consideration towards the appellants,
F was called for.
34. It was submitted, that many of the appellants may have crossed
the maximum age limit for entry to any other graduate course, and may
not be able to undertake another course of education. To permit them,
as proposed by the Hon 'ble Companion Judge, to retake the examination,
G after having completed years of medical education, would put them at
an extremely disadvantageous position. It was submitted, that such
action, would not further public interest. Even though it was
acknowledged, that the same would act as a deterrent, on account of
years of academic career lost. Learned counsel also highlighted, that
most of the appellants were juvenile, at the relevant time. It was
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 575
PRADESH AND OTHERS (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!]

submitted, that the utilitarian principle, commended the use of the A
appellants' education and training, for the public policy of promoting
healthcare. ·It was submitted, that the principle that "fraud vitiates
everything", should not be allowed to trounce, the cause of public good.
Further, ifthe undertaking as given was considered, and accepted, that
itself would act as a deterrent, for other students in future. The
B
undertakings given by these appellants is extracted below:
"The Appellants would serve in Government Hospitals/
Government Health Centers on an undertaking or on a bond for
10 years period or any.higher period as may be directed by this
Court.
c
And/Or
The Appellants would serve in rural areas and rural health centers
on an undertaking or on a bond for l 0 years period or any higher
period as may be directed by this Court.
And/Or D

The Appellants would serve in medical centers ofNational Rural
Health Mission for l 0 years period or any higher period as may
be directed by this Court.
Note I: Based on the directions as may be issued, the Appellants
could undertake to serve in Madhya Pradesh or such other place
as may be directed by this Court.
Note II: The effect of directing the Appellants to serve -in
G.overnment hospitals for the rest of their professional career
would have the effect of entitling the Appellants to be considered
F
as Government Servants and would entitle them to dues. payable
to government servants including protection accorded to
government servants and hence they could be put to bonds for
the period specified. ·
B. Alternatively, the Appellants can do community service for a
2 year period under the aegis of the State Social Welfare G
Department followed by medical service as per Para A above.
C. The Appellants can teach at Government Schools for a 2
year period followed by medical service as per Para A above. ·

H
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A D. Quantum of compensation per candidate may be fixed at
Rs. I 0 lakhs or as directed to be deposited in the Chief Ministers
Welfare Fund or State Treasury within a prescribed time period
[Refer State v. Sanjeev Nanda (2012) 8 SCC 450].
E. Additionally, a percentage of the yearly income of the
B Appellants could be deposited in the Chief Minister's Welfare
Fund or State Treasury for such period as may be prescribed by
this Court."
In this behalf. reliance was placed on the Rafiq Masih case
(supra). wherein the scope of Article 142 of the Constitution and the
c nature of the power vested in this Court under the above provisions, was
considered. In the above judgment, it was pointed out, that it was held
as under:
"12. Article 142 of the Constitution oflndia is supplementary in
nature...ill]d cannQt supD!!!!1t the substantive provisions. though
D !b.~Y.11re not limited by the substantive provisions in the statute.
It is a power that gives preference to equity over law. It is a
justice-oriented approach as against the strict rigours of the law.
The directions issued by the Court can normally be categorised
into one, in the nature of moulding of relief and the other, as the
declaration of law. "Declaration of law" as contemplated in
E Article 141 of the Con.stitution: is the speech express or
necessarily implied by the highest court of the land. This Court
in Indian Bank v. ABS Marine Products (P) Ltd. (2006) 5 SCC
72, Ram Pravcsh Singh v. State of Bihar (2006) 8 SCC 381 and
in State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi (2006) I SCC 667, has
F <0JJOunded the principle and extolled the power of Article 142 of
the Constitution oflndia to new heights by laying down that the
directions issued under Article 142 do not constitute a binding
precedent unlike A11icle 141 of the Constitution of India. They
are direction issued to_QQJ:iroper justice and exercise of such
power. cannot be considered as law laid down by the Supreme
G Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The Court
has compartmentalised and differentiated the relief in the operative
portion of the judgment by exercise ofoowers under Article 142
of the Co1~titutionjl~l!fillinst the law declared. The directions of
the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, while moulding
the relieL!liat relax the ap_Qlication of law or exempt the case in
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 577
PRADESH AND OTHERS f.IAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR. C.11]

hand from the rigour of the law in_yicw qfi.bS'J?."'-ct0.h1Lfocts '\!Hl A
c ire u111 stanc~dQJl ot conlJi rise 1h!'J;'lli!l_~.s:.c:ici.'-!l<ti. Q.l!clJ)1erefore
lose~-l1_asic m:eJ11 is~_QU!!aking).LaJii nd l!lli.J:>.recedent. Th is
Court on the qui vive has expj!nded the horizons of Article 142
oftl1e_<;::Q!~!ituti9_11_b_y_~~rni.1Jgj_tout~i.de tlic::_.11!l.LVi!'.'Yof Articlt;.
l!L2f theJJlJ!>li!!J\ion and b.x..Qcclari!}gjll!_(jiregj_9_11 of the
B
Cou11 that changes its com 12!cxion with the peculiarity.ill the facts
an<;l_cj•:"-'.!!filt3!JC:.t:.Lo.t'..!11e_c:Jli~. •·

35. Even in criminal law. it was pointed out, that a distinction
was made between acts having the same consequences. but done with
differing intent, and different lc\cl of culpability. In Empress v. ldu Beg
!LR (1881) 3 All 776. the Allahabad High Court. it was pointed out. had c
explained the varying degrees of culpability in cases of murder, r<hh and
negligent acts, and culpable homicide, whereupon it was held as under:
" ... The category of intentional acts ofkilling, or of acts ofkilling
committed with the knowledge that death, or injwy likely to cause
death, will be the most probable result. or with the knowledge D
that death will be a likely result, is contained in the provisions of
ss. 299 and 300 of the Penal Code. S. 304 creates no offence.
but provides the punishment for culpable horn icide not amounting
to murder, and draws a distinction in the penalty to be inflicted,
where, an intention to kill being present. the act would have E
amounted to murder but for its having fallen within one of the
Exceptions lo s. 300, and those cases in which the crime is
culpable homicide not amounting to murder, that is to say, where
there is knowledge that death will be a likely result, but intention
to cause death or bodily injury likely to cause death is absent.
Putting it shortly, all acts ofkilling done with the intention to kill F
Q!J9_iD.fli~t.liQ9jly_i1)jtU)I likely to cause_death, or with knowledn".,
that death must i)e the most.probable result are lll.iJna facie
murder, while tho~-'- con11]1ittcl with the knowledge that death
will be a likfil result are culpable homicide not amounting to
murder. Now it is to be observed that s. 304A. is directed at G
offenc~outsicl~.. the_i:.'!!]g_e_QL.>.s.299_and 300. and obviously
contemplates those cases into whi.ch neither intention nor
knowledge of the kind alrcacjy.!J!entioned enters. For the rash
or n~g!~nt act whif)ljs ckcla_Le_d_t9_J:iL<i_qj11J.e..!~._one_:"!!Ot
amounting to culpable horn ic ide:· and itJ.JlU.~t theisforc be taken
H
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 2 S.C.R.

A that intentionally or knowingly inflicted violence. directly and
willfully caused, is excluded. S. 304A does not say every
unjustifiable or inexcusable act of killing not hereinbefore
mentioned shall be punishable under the provisions of this section.
but it specifically and in terms limits itself to those rash or negligent
acts which cause death but fall short of culpable homicide of
B
either description."
36. Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned senior counsel, appearing
for the appellants in Civil Appeal Nos. 1795-1798 of 2016, canvassed
their claim, from a completely different angle. He acknowledged, that
there was unanimity in the Courts, which had adjudicated upon the
c controversy (first the High Court, and thereafter, this Court), that the
appellants were party to a tainted admission process. They were
admittedly, beneficiaries of such process. Even though the appellants
were not issued notices, and therefore, were not afforded an opportunity
to tender any explanation in their defence, it was acknowledged, that the
D formula adopted by Vyapam, for cancelling the results of the appellants,
was found to be fair, by all Courts. The dete1mination rendered by
Vyapam, was accordingly upheld. It was contended, thatthe submissions
advanced by him, were despite the aforestated acknowledged factual
(-and legal) position.

E 3 7. It was asserted by learned counsel, that admissions to
academic institutions ofhigher learning, involved a cut-throat competition.
The ·admission-competition, according to learned counsel, was maximum
in the case of medical institutions. !twas submitted, that in the above
competitive environment, children of tender years, find themselves
pressurized on account of the availability of limited seats. Not only that,
F it was pointed out, that pressure in the matter of admissions, as stated
above, was also fuelled by parents. It was pointed out, that parents on
their own part, felt a sense of personal failure, in case their children
were not successful in gaining admission to prestigious courses (-or, in
acclaimed institutions). And therefore it was.highlighted, that parents
G .also derived great pleasure. and satisfaction, when their wards gained
admission to important courses, and/or in prestigious in~titutions. Children
as also parents, therefore, strive for societal recognition,_ when they
compete for admission to professional courses; It was tlferefore submitted,
thalthe actions of the appellants in the present controversy, required to
be viewed, by keeping all the above factors in mind.
H
NTDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 579
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI]

38. Learned counsel also submitted, that the overwhelming desire A
of candidates, as well as, the expectation of their parents, had created
inroads, into the system of admission to professional courses, and the
admission system had become rotten. It was acknowledged, that this
has not been the position only in the recent past, but had been ongoing
for many years. In the present case, in the first instance, admissions of
B
·the year 2013, were annulled. Based on the manner in which wrongful
admissions were made, during the year 2013, an inquiry was conducted
for the preceding years, as well. This led to the cancellation of the
admission of the appellants (and others, similarly situated as them), in
respect of admissions during 2008 to 2012. It was submitted, that the
present controversy, should be viewed from the aforestated background c
(and perspective).
39. It was emphasized, by learned counsel, that the appellants
were not perpetrators of a fraud. It was an ongoing fraud, which had
been in existence for many years. The appellants were merely a willing
party to the existing fraud. Their willingness to seek benefit thereof. D
was based on a compelling atmosphere, including their own ambition. It
was submitted, that the appellants should not be dealt with by using a
common brush, which would wipe out their career(s), on the ground that
they were party to a fraud. It was reiterated, that the appellants were
innocent. The appellants, it was pointed out, were not mature enough, to
debate within their minds, the cause and effect of their actions. It was E
submitted, that all the appellants (or at least, most of them were) were
juvenile, when they had appeared for the Pre-Medical Test, and even
for this reason, they could not be held responsible for any wrong doing,
whether it emanated from a misrepresentation-simpliciter, or
misrepresentation- having the trappings of fraud. F
40. It was submitted, that the Hon'ble Presiding Judge (of the
'former Division Bench'), had approached the issue in the right
perspective. It was pointed out, that the Hon'ble Presiding Judge, not
only approved the formula adopted for short-listing the candidates, who
had obtained admissions by manipulating the process of admission, but G
had also upheld the orders passed by Vyapam, cancelling the admission
of the appellants, to the MBBS course. And yet, for societal benefit,
and certainly not forthe benefit of the appellants, invoked Article 142, to
uphold the validity of the academic course (or part thereot) successfully
completed by them. This invocation of Article 142 of the Constitution,
H
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A by the Hon'ble Presiding Judge, it was submitted, not only took away
the trauma from the minds of the young appellants, who had undoubtedly
committed a serious mistake, but had also taken care of a societal need,
in the field of professional medicine. The route adopted by the Hon 'ble
Presiding Judge, in preserving the academic career(s) successfully
completed by the appellants, according to learned counsel, was founded
B
on a regime of penance, to be served by the appellants.
41. Learned counsel repeatedly emphasized, that his solitary
contention was, that societal benefit was of much greater significance,
as compared to individual punishment. It was submitted, that in the
manner in which Article 142 has been interpreted by this Court, the
c determination rendered by the Hon'ble Presiding Judge, should be
endorsed by the instant Division Bench, also. In order to persuade us to
adopt the aforesaid course, reliance was placed on the Sanjeev Nanda
case, (supra), and our attention was drawn to the following:
"Community service for avoidingjail sentence
D
122. Convicts in various countries, now, voluntarily come forward
to serve the co1n1nunity, especially in cri111es relating to 1notor
vehicles. Graver the crime, greater the sentence. But, serving
the society actually is not a punishment in the real sense where
the convicts pay back to the communitv what they owe. Conduct
E of the convicts will not only be appreciated by the community, it
will also give a lot of solace to them, especially in a case where
because of one's action and inaction, human lives have been
lost.
123. In the facts and circumstances of the case, where six human
F lives were lost, we feel, to adopt this method would be good for
the society rather than incarcerating the convict further in jail.
Further sentence of fine also would compensate at least some
of the victims of such road accidents who have died, especially
in hit-and-run cases where the owner or driver cannot be traced.
G We, therefore, order as follows:
(!)The accused has to pay an amount of Rs 50 lakhs (Rupees
fifty lakhs) to the Union oflndia within six months, which will be
utilised for providing compensation to the victims of motor
accidents, where the vehicle owner, driver, etc. could not be
traced, like victims of hit-and-run cases. On default, he will have
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 581
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!)

to undergo simple imprisonment for one year. This amount be A
kept under a different head to be used for the aforesaid purpose
only.
(2) The accused would do community service for two years which
will be arranged by the Ministry of Social Justice and
Empowerment within two months. On default, he will have to B
undergo simple imprisonment for two years."
Learned counsel whilst placing reliance on the observations in
the Sanjiv Nanda case (supra) submitted, that personal ambition, parental
pressure, a corrupted system which had built inroads over the years (for
gaining admission, through administrative assistance), the juvenility of c
the appellants, and the societal benefit, should be assessed wholesomely
by this Court, before recording its final conclusions.
42. Ms. Indu Malhotra, learned senior counsel, representing some
of the appellants, adopted the submissions advanced by her learned
colleagues. In addition, learned counsel illustratively explained, by inviting D
the Court's attention to the factual position relating to some of the
individual appellants, that the parameters adopted by Vyapam, to
determine the culpability of the concerned students, could not conclusively
justify the guilt of some of the appellants.
43. It was submitted, that some of the appellants had a E
commendable academic record, during their school education. And
therefore, it would not be right, to assume that the appellants would not
have been in a position, on their own merit, to gain admission to the
MBBS course. !twas emphatically highlighted, thatthe conclusion drawn
by Vyapam, against the appellants, was based on a generalized formula,
which could not be assumed to be correct, with reference to all the F
appellants. But then, it was also contended, that even ifthe formula was
assumed to be correct, the findings recorded by Vyapam, were clearly
incorrect in respect of some of the parameters (incorporated in the
formula), with reference to some of the appellants. In this behalf, it may
be acknowledged, that learned counsel was at pains to highlight, some G
illustrative instances, with reference to some of those whose admissions
were cancelled by Yyapam.
44. We find no reason or cause, to delineate the facts relating to
some of the individual appellants, brought to our notice. This, because
the 'former Division Bench', through their separate orders dated
H
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

12.5.2016, and their subsequent order dated 30.8.2016, affirmed the
recording of a concurrent opinion, that the examination process for the
years 2008 to 2012, was vitiated with reference to the appellants, and
others. Both Hon'ble Judges comprising of the 'former Division Bench'
held, that the appellants herein were beneficiaries of a vitiated process.
In the above view of the 1natter, we would restrain ourselves, from a re-
B
appreciation of a finding concurrently recorded by the 'former Division
Bench', despite the submissions, emphatically advanced. We have placed
on record (in paragraph 4 hereinabove), the obse.rvations recorded by
the 'former Division Bench' in its order dated 30.8.2016. We record our
concurrence, with the said observations. Needless to-mention, that by
c passing our order dated 28. 7.2016, seeking a clarification from the 'former
Division Bench', we were successful in saving a number of days of
precious time of the Court, which would have otherwise been utilized, in
hearing and determining, the submission canvassed on behalf of the
appellants, founded on Article 145(5) of the Constitution. In fact, that
was the precise reason (recorded in our order, dated 28.7.2016), for
D
which the clarification was sought.
45. Mr. Purushaindra Kaurav, learned counsel appearing forthe
M.P. Professional Exaniination Board (Vyapam), drew our attention to
the sequence of facts which eventually culminated in the cancellation of
the results of the appellants (to the professional MBBS course). It was
E pointed out, that on 6.7.2013, the Crime Branch of Indore, received
infom1ation, that around twenty students from outside States (outside
the State of Madhya Pradesh) like U.P., Bihar etc., had appeared in the
Pre-Medical Test, with a fake identity, just to facilitate other students
(as the appellants herein), to gain higher marks. It was submitted, that
F these outside students, were not themselves desirous, of gaining admission
to the MBBS course. Their object was only to help the appellants, and
others similarly situated. Based on the al10ve information, the Crime
Branch, Indore, conducted a raid. During the course of the raid, 20
students with suspicious identity were detected. Crime Case No.539/
2013 was accordingly registered on 7.7.2013, at Rajendra Nagar Police
G Station, Indore.
46. Arrests of the accused in Crime No.539/2013 were made on
7. 7.2013 itself. Based 011 the information furnished by those arrested, it
emerged that a racket/scam supported by private doctors (as well as,
other individuals), was operating. The main accused were identified as
H
NIDHI KA!M AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 583
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR. CJI)

Sanjiv Shiplkar, Jagdish Sagar, Tarang Sharma, Bharat Mishra, etc .. After A
the arrest of the above persons, it became known, that Vyapam 's officials
were also involved. The names of Vyapam officials involved were -
Pankaj Trivedi (Controller/Director), Nitin Mahindra, (Principal System
Analyst),Ajay Kumar Sen (Senior System Analyst), Chandrakant Mishra
(Assistant Programmer) etc .. All the aforesaid Vyapam officials were
B
also arrested, between July and September 2013.
47. It was submitted, that the investigation of Crime Case No.539/
2013 was handed over to a Special Task Force, which recovered
incriminating data, from a computer hard disc. The information derived
from the hard disc, led to the registration of other crime cases, pertaining
to the examinations conducted by Vyapam, for admission to academic c
courses. Seeing the gravity and extent of the criminality, and the highly
placed persons involved, the investigation came to be entrusted to the
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).
48. It was pointed out, that after conducting a detailed inquiry, in
the Pre-Medical Examination 20 l 3, Vyapam cancelled the results of D
415, candidates. This was done through two orders, dated 9.10.2013
and 6.12.2013 (345 candidates by the former, and 70 candidates by the
latter). The aforesaid orders cancelling the results of 415 candidates,
".:re assailed by the aggrieved candidates, through Writ Petition No.
20342/2013 (Pratibha Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh), and other E
connected matters. All the writ petitions were dismissed by the High
Court, on 11.4.2014. The High Court upheld the orders dated 9.10.2013
and 6.12.2013 (cancelling the candidature of 415 candidates). It was
pointed out, that the order passed by the High Court on 11.4.2014, was
assailed before this Court, through SLP(C) Nos. 13629-13630 of2014
(Pooja Yadav v. State ofM.P.), and 16257 of2014 (Sumi! Sinha v. State F
of M.P.). This Court dismissed the former special leave petitions on
19.5.2014, and the latter on 8.8.2014. It was therefore contended, that
on a controversy identical to the one in hand, this Court has already
concluded the matter, against the appellants.
49. Having carried out a similar exercise, it was pointed out, G
with reference to admissions to the MBBS course, during the years
2008 to 2012, Vyapam had passed similar orders (cancelling the
candidature of students), on 15.4.2014 and 9.5.2014. Writ Petition
No.1918 of2014 (Nitu Singh Markam v. State ofM.P.) and connected
matters, were yet again, dismissed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,
H
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 7) 2 S.C.R.

A on 24.9.2014. It is therefore apparent, according to learned counsel,
that the challenge raised by the candidates who had gained admission
during the period 2008 to 2012, was not accepted by the High Court, for
exactly the same reasons, as were recorded by the High Court, for
upholding the cancellation orders pertaining to admissions made during
2013.
B
50. The above order dated 24.9.2014 was assailed by the
appellants herein, wherein the members of the 'former Division Bench',
passed separate orders on 12.5.2016, details whereof have already been
recorded hereinabove.

c 51. For the reason, that the appellants had not gained admission
to the MBBS course, on their own merit, it was contended by learned
counsel, that they would not enjoy the trust of the society, as they would
always carry a stigma of having obtained their qualifications by deceit
and fraud. It was pointedly asserted, that on account of the trust deficit
between the appellants, and their likely patients, a feeling of faith and
D confidence would never be entertained by their patients, however brilliant
or outstanding the appellants may actually be. It was submitted, that the
candidature of 634 students, admitted to the MBBS course during the
years 2008 to 2012, had been cancelled. Out of the students whose
candidature was cancelled, the appellants before this Court numbered
E only 139. It was clarified, that out of the 634 students, whose candidatures
were cancelled, only 268 candidates had actually taken admission to the
MBBS course. Based on the aforesaid data, it was submitted, that a
large number of students, whose admission to the MBBS course had
been cancelled, had already accepted the decision ofVyapam and/or of
the High Court, gracefully. It was pointed out, that forthe few appellants
F who have been agitating their claim before this Court, it would be unjust
and i1nproper to invoke the jurisdiction vested with this Court, under
Article 142 of the Constitution.
52. Premised on the factual position narrated above, it was
submitted, that all kinds of manipulation and fraud were adopted by the
G appellants, to gain admission to the MBBS course. It was asserted, that
this was not a simple case of mass copying. It was submitted, that the
instant case constituted a deep rooted conspiracy involving parents,
students, government officials, racketeers and various middle-men. The
instant scam, it was pointed out, was going on for years together, which
H had resulted in tarnishing the good name and veracity ofVyapam. lt was
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 585
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!]

submitted, that the need of the hour was, to assuage the reputation of A
Vyapam, by dealing with those involved, and the beneficiaries, with a
strong hand. It was pleaded, that Article 142 of the Constitution, needed
to be invoked, towards that end.
53. Learned counsel representingVyapam, highlighted, persons
similarly situated as the appellants, \'<ho were admitted to the MBBS B
course during the year 2013, were not allowed any equitable relief, as is
presently claimed by the appellants. After the dismissal of the challenge
raised by them, by the High Court, this Court also unequivocally rejected
their claims (on 19.5.2015 and 8.8.2014). It was submitted, that it was
not open to the appellants, to seek a relief, which was not granted to
others, similarly situated.
c
54. It was also pointed out, by learned counsel representing
Vyapam, that criminal cases had also been initiated against a number of
appellants, for having adopted fraudulent means, to gain admission to
the MBBS course. It was submitted, that as against the remaining
appellants, investigation was ongoing, and as soon as the same would be D
completed, criminal proceedings would be initiated against them, as well.
It was asserted, that the actions of the appellants, and of those with
whose connivance they gained entry into the MBBS course, constituted
a scam. In such circumstances, there could be no question of considering,
any contention advanced on behalf of the appellants, which would validate E
any acquisition based on fraud and deceit. This, according to learned
counsel, would amount to giving premium to the appellants, for their
wrongful actions.
5 S. It was also submitted by learned counsel representing Vyapam,
that such an attempt at the hands of this Court, would demoralise F
meritorious candidates. Such relief to the appellants, as has been accorded
by the Hon'ble Presiding Judge (of the 'former Division Bench'), would
encourage all and sundry, to gain admission in future as well, by adopting
malpractice of all kinds. In the instant view of the matter, it was submitted,
that benevolence shown to the appellants, would not be in the larger
public interest. G

56. On behalf ofVyapam, it was also asserted, that the appellants
were mostly juvenile at the time when they gained entry into the MBBS
course. As such, it was pointed out, that they were still young and could
turn a fresh leaf in their life by working hard, so as to re-achieve the
H
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A benefits of their individual merit. It was submitted, that such of the
appellants who had faith in themselves, would not lag behind. It was
pointed out, that the appellants and others similarly situated, may well be
granted the relief of competing in the Pre-Medical Test, by relaxation of
their age and qualification, in exercise of the power vested in this Court
under Article 142. It was submitted, that the appellants deserved no
B
n1ore.

57. It was also asserted, on behalf ofVyapam, that the fact that
the appellants had undergone the entire MBBS course, or a substantial
part thereof, should not weigh with this Court, as a determinative factor
whether or not the appellants, were entitled to any sympathetic
c consideration. It was submitted, that the delayed action against the
appellants was based on the fact, that the instant scam remained a guarded
secret, which came out for the first time, on account of the information
received by the Crime Branch oflndore, on 6. 7.2013. As already noticed
hereinabove, in the first instance, investigations were limited to the
D admission to the MBBS course, on the basis of the Pre-Medical Test,
conducted in the year 2013. Only when it was realized, that there had
been an ongoing racket, for admission to the MBBS course, the
iuvestigatingagency widened the scope of inqui1y, leading to the discovery
of adoption of similar unfair means, in the matter of admissions, even
during the years 2008 to 20012. As a matter of overall consideration, it
E was submitted, that keeping in mind the maxim "fraud vitiates everything",
no benefit could be claimed by the appellants, on the basis of any statutory
rights, including the law of limitation. It was therefore asserted, that it
would not be proper, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case,
to exercise the jurisdiction vested in this Court under Article 142 of the
F Constitution, to extend any benefit to the appellants.
58(i). Learned counsel representing Vyapam placed reliance on
Vinod Bhandari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2015) 11 SCC 502. The
instant judgment pertained to an application filed by an accused in the
Yyapam scam, seeking bail. Bail having been declined to him by the
G High Court, he approached this Court. This Court noticing the fact, that
the appellant was the Managing Director of Shri Aurobindo Institute of
Medical Sciences, Indore, and that, crores of rupees w~re collected, to
help undeserving students to pass the entrance examination to the MBBS
course, arrived at the conclusion, that an offence of a high magnitude,
leading to illegal admissions to large number of undeserving candidates,
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 587
PRADESH AND .OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!)

by corrupt means, undermined the trust of the people, and the integrity A
of the medical profession itself. In the aforesaid view of the matter, this
Couit also declined the prayer for bail.
(ii). Reliance was also placed on Mridul Dhar v. Union of India,
(2Q05) 2 SCC 65. The instant case also related to admission to the
MBBS course. The seriousness of the process of admission was noticed B
by this Court in paragraph 7 of the above judgment, which is extracted
below:
"7. It is a matter of anguish that despite various decisions of this
Court and laying down of a time schedule for completion of
admission process, the time schedule has not been adhered to at c
various stages by various authorities resulting in otherwise
'avoidable discontentment and hardship to the candidates. The
observance of the time schedule is paramount for effective
utilisation to all-India quota of medical and dental seats. The
denial of a seat in the college of choice on the basis of one's
merit position leads to frustration and results in injustice to the D
young students. The admission to a professional course based
on 1nerit position is paran1ount for the career of a student. The
omission and commission in respect of admissions this year, as is
evident from the orders aforenoted, adversely affected the career
of meritorious students in theirnot getting admission in the college E
of their choice. Any frustration and feeling of injustice at an
impressionable age at which the students compete in all-India
competition is neither desirable from the point of view of either
the young stL\dents nor forthe country's future. We are concerned
with the career of those bright candidates who compete in a
tough all-India competition. In this background, it is necessary to F
examine the acts of omission and commission at various levels,
the suggestions that have been made and submissions put forth,
to consider the issuance of directions for streamlining admissions
from the next academic year in MBBS/BDS courses."
Based on the aforesaid observations, it was contended, that unlike G
the submissions advanced at the behest of the appellants, it was also
necessary to keep in mind, the effect of regularization of a tainted
admission process, on those who had been deprived of admission, despite
their merit.
H
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 2 S.C.R.

A (iii) Reliance was also placed on Gurdeep Singh v. State of J&K,
1995 Supp(!) SCC 188. The instant case, also pertained to admission
to MBBS course, wherein this Court observed, as under:
"!I. In the result, we find that the denial of the seat to the
appellant in the sports category, cannot be justified. As Respondent
B 6 was not eligible, there was no question ofa tie. Appellant should
now be given the seat. By an earlier interlocutory order, a seat
had been directed to be kept vacant for appellant's benefit in the
event of his success. We direct the authorities to admit appellant
to the course within two weeks from today. We therefore, allow
this appeal, set aside the order dated August I 0, 1992 of the
c High Court and grant the reliefs claimed in the writ petition.
12. What remains to be considered is whether the selection of
Respondent 6 should be quashed. We are afraid, unduly lenient
view of the courts on the basis of human consideration in regard
to such excesses on the pait of the authorities, has served to
D create an impression ·that even where an advantage is secured
by stratagem and trickery, it could be rationalised in courts of
law. Courts do and should take human and sympathetic view of
matters. That is the very essence of justice. But considerations
of judicial policy also dictate that a tendency of this kind where
E advantage gained by illegal means is permitted to be retained
will jeopardise the purity of selection process itself; engender
cynical disrespect towards the judicial process and in the last
analysis embolden errant authorities and candidates into a sense
of complacency and impunity that gains achieved by such wrongs
could be retained by an appeal to the sympathy of the court.
F Such instances reduce the jurisdiction and discretion of courts
into private benevolence. This tendency should be stopped. The
selection of Respondent 6 in the sports category was, on the
material placed before us, thoroughly unjustified. He was not
eligible in the sports category. He would not be entitled 011 the
G basis of his marks, to a seat in general merit category. Attribution
of eligibility Jong after the selection process was over, in our
opinion, is misuse of power. While we have sympathy for the
predicament of Respondent 6, it should not lose sight of the fact
that the situation is the result of his own making. We think in
order to uphold the purity of academic processes. we should
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 589
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!]

quash the selection and admission of Respondent 6. We do so, A
though. however, reluctantly."
Based on the aforesaid observations, it was contended, that this
Court clearly and unequivocally arrived at the conclusion, that there should
be no judicial sympathy, to the advantage of persons, who secured
admission by stratagem and trickery. It was accordingly submitted, that B
any act of bestowing legality on admissions acquired through such a
selection process, would constitute a misuse of power vested in this
Court under Article l 42 of the Constitution.
(iv) Reliance was also placed on Tanvi Sarwal v. Central Board
of Secondary Education, (2015) 6 SCC 573. This case also pertained to c
admission, to the MBBS course. Herein, question papers were leaked
and large scale cheating and malpractices were adopted. Such fraudulent
admissions, were aided by an organised gang, for monetary consideration.
Learned counsel for Vyapam therefore asserted, that the conclusions
drawn in the cited case were of extreme relevance, to the present
controversy, herein also, similar allegations had been established. From D
the above judgment, learned counsel, placed reliance on the following
observations:
"18. As has been noticed hereinabove, the disclosures in the
investigation suggest that the benefit of answer key has been
av~iled by several candidates taking the examination, by illegal E
means. Though as on date, 44 such candidates have been
identified, having regard to the modus operandi put in place, the
numbers of cellphones and other devices used, it is not unlikely
that many more candidates have availed such undue advantage,
being a part of the overall design and in the process have been F
unduly benefited qua the other students who had made sincere
and genuine endeavours to solve the answer paper on the basis
of their devoted preparation and hard labour. In view of the
widespread network. that has operated, as the status reports
disclose and the admission of the persons arrested including some
beneficiary candidates. we are of the opinion, in view of the G
strong possibilities of identification of other candidates as well
involved in such malpractices, that the examination has become
a suspect. As it is, the system of examination pursued over the
decades. has been accepted by all who are rational. responsible
and sensible. to be an accredited one, for comparative evaluation
H
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 2 S.C.R.

A of the merit and worth of candidates vying for higher academic
pursuits. It is thus necessary. for all the role players in the process.
to secure and sustain the confidence of the public in general and
the student fraternity in particular in the system by its
!Inquestionable trustworthiness. Such a system is endorsed
]Jecause of its credibility informed with guarantee of fairness,
B
transparency. authenticity and sanctity. There cannot be any
compromise with these imperatives at any cost.
19. Segregation only of the already 44 identified candidates stated
to be the beneficiaries of the unprincipled manoeuvre by
withholding their results forthe time being, in our comprehension
c cannot be the solution to the problem that confronts all of us.
Not only thereby, ifthe process is allowed to advance, it would
be pushed to a vortex of litigation pertaining thereto in the
foreseeable future, the prospects of the candidates would not
only remain uncertain and tentative, they would also remain
D plagued with the prolonged anguish and anxiety if involved in the
ordeal of court cases. Acting on this option, would in our estimate,
amount to driving knowingly the students, who are not at fault, to
an uncertain future with their academic career in jeopardy on
many counts. Further. there would also be a lurking possibility of
unidentified beneficiaty candidates stealing a march over them,
E on the basis of the advantages availed by them through the
underhand dealings as revealed. Having regard to the fact, that
the course involved with time would yield the future generations
of doctors of the countty. who would be in charge of public health.
their inherent merit to qualify for taking the course can by no
F means be compromised."
Based on the above observations, it was submitted, that in matters
pertaining to fraudulent admissions, the consistent course adopted by
this Court has been, to ensure the purity of the process, and not to extend
any benefit to undeserving candidates.
G (v) Reliance was then placed on Abhyudya Sanstha v. Union of
India, (2011) 6 SCC 145. This case also pertained to adoption of a
tainted process of admission to educational courses, wherein the institute
(and not the students), had approached this Court. Learned counsel,
drew the Court's attention, to the following observations:
H
v.
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER STATE OF MADHYA 591
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, C.11]

"22. The question which remains to be considered is whether A
the Coui1 should direct regularisation of the admission of the
students, who were al lotted to the appellants by the State
Government, etc. pursuant to the directions given by this Court.
Although, in the absence of cogent material, it is not possible to
record a finding that the students were party to the patently wrong
B
and misleading statement made by the appellants, the Court cannot
overlook the fact that none of the appellants has been granted
recognition by WRC, Bhopal and in view of the prohibition
contained in Section 17-A of the Act read with Regulation 8( 12),
the appellants could not have admitted any student. However,
with a view to make business and earn profit in the name of c
education, the appellants successfully manipulated the judicial
process for allocation of the students. Therefore, there is no
valid ground much less justification to confer legitimacy upon
the admission made by the appellants in a clandestine manner.
Any such order by the Court will be detrimental to the national
D
interest. The students who may have taken admission and
completed the course from an institution, which had not been
granted recognition. will not be able to impart value based
education to the future generation of the country. Rather, they
may train young minds as to how one can succeed in life by
manipulations. Therefore, we do not consider it proper to issue E
direction for regularising the admissions made by the appellants
on the strength of the interim orders passed by this Court.
23. In the result, the appeals are dismissed. Each of the appellants
is saddled with costs of Rs. 2 lakhs, which shall be deposited
with the Maharashtra State Legal Services Authority within a F
period of three months. Ifthe needful is not done, the Secretary,
Maharashtra State Legal Services Authority shall be entitled to
recover the amount of cost as arrears of land revenue.
24. We also declare that none of the students, who had taken
admission on the basis of allotment made by the State G
Government, etc. shall be eligible for the award of degree, etc.
by the affiliating body. If the degree has already been a\varded
to any such student, the same shall not be treated val id for any
purpose whatsoever. WRC, Bhopal shall pub Iish a Iist of the
students, who were admitted by the appellants pursuant to the
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592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A interim orders passed by this Court and forward the same to the
Education Department of the Government of Maharashtra, which
shall circulate the same to all government and aided institutions
so that they may not employ the holders of such degrees."
Based on the aforesaid observations, it was submitted, that this
B Court in the above judgment consciously refused to regularize the
admission of students. Not only that, this Court declared that the students
admitted to the course by manipulation, would not be entitled to be
awarded degrees, etc. by the affiliating body. Even if such a degree had
already been awarded, the same was to be treated as invalid for all
purposes.
c
(vi) Learned counsel briefly invited our attention to Director
(Studies), Dr. Ambedkar Institute of Hotel Management, Nutrition and
Catering Technology, Chandigarh v. Vaibhav Singh Chauhan (2009) I
sec 59, and highlighted the following observations recorded therein:
D "12. The learned Single Judge in the interim order has then
emphasised on the fact that the respondent had apologised and
had confessed to the possession of the chit. In our opinion this
again is a misplaced sympathy. We are of the firm opinion that in
academic matters there should be strict discipline and
malpractices should be severely punished. If our country is to
E progress we must maintain high educational standards, and this
is only possible if malpractices in examinations in educational
institutions are curbed with an iron hand."
Learned counsel having referred to the above observations,
emphasized, that there could be no leniency for manipulations in dealing
F with the matter of admissions.
(vii) Last ofall, learned counsel placed reliance on Kerala Solvent
Extractions Ltd. v. A. Unnikrishnan, (2006) 13 SCC 619, so as to
emphasise on the words of caution, expressed by a three-Judge Division
Bench of this Court, wherein it observed as under:
G
"9. Shri Vaidyanathan, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant,
submitted, in ouropinion not without justification, thatthe Labour
Court's reasoning bordered on perversity and such unreasoned,
undue liberalism and misplaced sympathy would subvert all
discipline in the administration. He stated that the management
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 593
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!]

will have no answer to the claims of similarly disqualified A
candidates which might have come to be rejected. Those who
stated the truth would be said to be at a disadvantage and those
who suppressed it stood to gain. He further submitted that this
laxity of judicial reasoning will imperceptibly introduce slackness
and unpredictability in the legal process and, in the final analysis,
B
corrode legitimacy of the judicial process.
l 0. We are inclined to agree with these submissions. In recent
time·s, there is an increasing evidence of this, perhaps well meant
but wholly unsustainable tendency towards a denudation of the
legitimacy ofjudicial reasoning and process. The reliefs granted
by the courts must be seen to be logical and tenable within the
c
framework of the law and should not incur and justify the criticism
that the jurisdiction of the courts tends to degenerate into
misplaced sympathy, generosity and private benevolence. It is
essential to maintain the integrity of legal reasoning and the
legitimacy of the conclusions. They must emanate logically from D
the legal findings and the judicial results must be seen to be
principled and supportable on those findings. Expansive judicial
mood of mistaken and misplaced compassion at the expense of
the legitimacy of the process will eventually lead to mutually
irreconcilable situations and denude the judicial process of its
dignity, authority, predictability and respectability." E

Relying on the above observations, it was contended, that
legitimizing "knowledge", which had been obtained by unfair means,
would be perceived as an exercise of sympathy towards actions of fraud,
and would have the effect of eroding the integrity of the judicial process.
F
59. We have given our thoughtful consideration, to the
submissions advanced on behalf of the rival parties. Before we deal
with the contentions, we may record, that there is logic and legitimacy, in
the submissions advanced, on both sides. But only one out of them, can
be accepted. The one which has to be accepted, should be based on
legality, supported by reasons. Our consideration and reasons, are as G
follows.
60. During the course of hearing, learned counsel were asked to
assistthis Court, on the likely public perception, in case this Court decided
to exercise its jurisdiction, in favour of the appellants, under Article 142.
H
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A In response, it was pointed out, that public perception could never be
homogenous. It was submitted, that public perception had inevitably to
be heterogeneous, as the society itself was heterogeneous. According
to learned counsel, perception of the public, would depend on the section
of the society, to which the query was addressed. Each section of the
public, could have a different view, on the matter. This assertion made
B
by learned counsel, was sought to be substantiated, by placing reliance
on E.M. Sankaran Namboodripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar, (1970) 2
SCC 325, and People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union oflndia, (2005)
5 sec 363.
61. ln view of the position expressed by this Court, in the above
c judgments, it was submitted, that public perception should not be allowed
to weigh so heavy, in the mind of a Court, as would prevent it, from
rendering complete justice. According to learned counsel, taking into
consideration public perception, would render effectuating justice,
extremely difficult. It was pointed out, that by sheer experience gained
D by Judges, they were fully equipped, to determine at their own, whether
or not, the facts of a case, required to be dealt with differently, under
Article 142 - so as to render complete justice.
62. It was also the contention of learned counsel, that public
perception, was usually not based, on a complete data, of the dispute.
E And, unless the public was provided with the complete facts, and was
required to consciously take a call on the matter, the perception entertained
by the public, would be fanciful and imaginative, and it would be full of
deficiencies and inadequacies, and it may also be, an opinion based on
lack ofrightful understanding.

F 63. We are of the view, that public perception, despite being of
utmost significance, cannot be sought, except after an onerous exercise.
And that, any opinion, without the benefit of the entire sequence of facts,
may not be a dependable hypothesis. It is also true, that disseminating
full facts, for seeking public opinion, would be an immeasurably daunting
task. An endeavour, which was unlikely to yield any reasoned response,
G based on logic and rationale. We are accordingly of the view, that the
suggestion of learned counsel, needs to be respected, and we should
attempt a consideration, at our own, based on our experience and training,
in adjudicating disputes of unlimited variety ... and of inestimable
proportions. Our determination, is as follows.
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 595
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!]

64. During the course ofhearing, it could not be seriously disputed A
at the hands of learned counsel for the appellants, that the appellants'
admission to the MBBS course, was based on established deception and
manipulation. All the same, we will expressly deal with the instant aspect
of the matter, and the extent of the appellants' involvement, in the following
paragraph. It was also not disputed at the hands of learned counsel, that
B
the cause and effect of fraud, was determined by the Court of Appeal,
in Lazarus Estates, Ltd. v. Beasley, (1956) l All E.R.341. The
consequences of fraud, as determined by the Court of Appeal (in the
above judgment), have been repeatedly approved, by this Court. In the
above judgment Denning, L.J., had observed as under:
"We are in this case concerned only with this point: Can the c
declaration be challenged on the gror.nd that it was false and
fraudulent? It can clearly be challenged in the criminal courts.
The landlord can be taken before the magistrate and fined £30
(see Sch. 2, para. 6) or he can be prosecuted on indictment, and
(if he is an individual) sentto prison (sees. 5 of the Perjury Act, D
I 91 I). The landlords argued before us that the declaration cou Id
not be challenged in the civil courts at all, even though it was
false and fraudulent, and that the landlords can recover and keep
the increased rent even though it was obtained by fraud. If this
argument is correct, the landlords would profit greatly from their
fraud. The increase in rent would pay the fine many times over. E
I cannot accede to this argument for a moment. No court in this
land will allow a person to keep an advantage which he has
obtained by fraud. No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister,
can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud
unravels everything. The coult is careful notto find fraud unless F
it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is proved it vitiates
judgments. contracts and all transactions whatsoever; see, as to
deeds, Collins v. Blantern (2) ( 1767) (2 Wi!s. K.B. 342), as to
judgments, Duchess of Kingston's Case (3) (I 776) (l Leach
146), and, as to contracts, Master v. Mill er ( 4) (I 79 I) (4 Term
Rep. 320). So here I am of opinion that, if this declaration is G
proved to have been false and fraudulent, it is a nullity and void
and the landlords cannot recover any increase of rent by virtue
of it."

H
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A We need to say no more, in the manner how fraud has to be
dealt with, whenever it is established. However, stated simply, nothing
... nothing ... and nothing, obtained by fraud, can be sustained, as fraud
unravels everything. The question which arises for consideration is,
whether the consequence of established fraud, as repeatedly declared
by this Court, can be ignored, to do complete justice in a matter, in exercise
B
ofjurisdiction vested in this Court, under Article 142 ofthe Constitution.
And also, whether the consequences of fraud, can be overlooked in the
facts and circumstances of this case, in order to render complete justice
to the appellants.
65(i). Learned counsel for the appellants, attempted to persuade
c us very strongly, to overcome the law declared by this Court, on the
issue of established fraud. Is it possible to accept such a contention? If
the appellants' involvement is not serious, it may well be possible to
accept the contention. Therefore, before we deal with the submissions
canvassed, it is important to understand, the extent and proportion of the
D shenanigans of the appellants. It is not in dispute, that none of the
appellants would ha\-: been admitted to the MBBS course, as their merit
position in the Pre-Medical Test, was not as a result of their own efforts,
but was based on extraneous assistance. The appellants were helped in
answering the questions in the Pre-Medical Test, by meritorious
candidates. The manipulation by which the appellants obtained admission
E
involved, not only a breach in the computer system, whereby roll numbers
were allotted to the appellants, to effectuate their plans. It also involved
the procurement of meritorious candidates/persons, who would assist
them, in answering the questions (in the Pre-Medical Test). The
appellants' position, next to the concerned helper, at the examination,
F was also based on further computer interpolations. Not only were the.
seating plans distorted for achieving the purpose, even the institutions
where the appellants were to take the Pre-Medical Test, were arranged
in a manner, as would suit the appellants, again by a similar process of
computer falsification. This could only be effectuated, by a corrupted
administrative machinery. Whether, the nefarious and crooked
G administrative involvement, was an inside activity, or an outside pursuit,
is inconsequenti~i. All in all, the entire scheme of events, can well be
a
described as a scam ... ri)cket of sorts. The appellants or their parents,
would obviously have had to pay large amounts of money, to the Vyapam
authorities. The appellants' admission to the MBBS course, was therefore
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 597
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!]

clearly based on a well orchestrated plan, which we can safely conclude, A
as based on established fraud.
(ii). The challenge raised by the appellants, had failed before the
High Court, because the High Court had arrived at the conclusion, that
the appellants' admission to the MBBS course was vitiated. The order
of the High Court was assailed before this Court. Both Hon'ble Judges, B
of the 'former Division Bench', wrote separate orders. Both affirmed
the conclusion. drawn by the High Court, through their separate orders
dated 12.5.2016. On a reference by us, the 'former Division Bench',
passed a common orderon 30.8.2016, affirming," ... Both of us recorded
a concurrent opinion that the examination process in issue in these
appeals, conducted by Vyapam for the years 2008 to 20 l 2 was vitiated c
with reference to the appellants before this Court and few others. We
also agreed upon the conclusion that the appellants herein are the
beneficiaries of such vitiated process ... " The fact that the appellants
had gained admission to the MBBS course, through a vitiated process
has attained finality. D
(iii). The controversy in the present case, does not relate to a
singular academic session. Whether or not, this vitiated process of
obtaining admission to the MBBS course, was adopted during the year
2007, and prior thereto, is not known. Because, MBBS admissions prior
to 2008, were not investigated. Investigation was initiated in the first E
instance, with reference to admissions, for the year 2013. Thereafter,
investigation was extended to those, who had gained admission to the
MBBS course during the years 2008 to 2012. Investigation revealed, a
well thought out, unethical plan, involving administrative support, during
six consecutive academic sessions ... from 2008 to 2013. Vyapam was
certain, about the system having been manipulated, at the hands of at F
least 634 candidates (during the years 2008 to 2012 itself). There may
well have been others, but no action was taken against them, as their
cases fell beyond the realm of suspicion (on the parameters approved
and adopted by Vyapam).
(iv). This Court, while dealing with admissions during the years G
2008 to 2012, followed the earlier judgment, wherein admissions to the
MBBS course during the year 2013, were annulled. The High Court in
all the matters, consistently upheld, the cancellation orders passed by
Vyapam. This Court also reiterated, the validity of the orders passed by
H
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 2 S.C.R.

A the High Cou11, and thereby, upheld the Vyapam orders. In the above
view of the matter, the factual and the legal position, with reference to
the admission of the appellants, to the MBBS course being vitiated, has
attained finality. The fact that the appellants, had gained admission to
the MBBS course, by established fraud, does not (as it indeed, cannot)
require any further consideration.
B
( v). In view of the sequence of facts narrated above, it is not
possible for us to accept, that the deception and deceit, adopted by the
appellants, was a simple affair, which can be overlooked. In fact,
admission of the appellants to the MBBS course, was the outcome ofa
well orchestrated strategy of deceit and deception. And therefore, it is
c not possible to accept, that the involvement of the appellants was not
serious. In fact, it was indeed the most grave and extreme, as discussed
above.
(vi). In the above view of the matter, it is not possible for us, to
overlook the consequences of the declared legal position, with reference
D to the consequence of fraud, on the ground that the involvement of the
appellants in the acts of fraud, was not serious.
66. We shall now examine the other submissions advanced on
behalf of the appellants, to determine whether or not, the jurisdiction
vested in this Court, under Article 142, can be invoked, in this matter.
E Our instant consideration, i.e., whether to invoke (in the appellants' favour)
Article 142 of the Constitution, or not, must obviously proceed on the
position expressed by the two Hon'ble Judges (of the 'former Division
Bench'), through their separate orders dated 12.5.2016, and by their
common order dated 30.8.2016, that the admission of the appellants to
F the MBBS course, had been gained, through a vitiated process. And
also, on the basis of the conclusions recorded by us in paragraph 65,
hereinabove.
67. We may first examine, whether the appellants can seek relief,
from this Court, under Article 142 of the Constitution, as the provision is
generally perceived. Jn the Union Carbide case (supra), while dealing
G
with the scope of Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court felt, that the
jurisdiction of this Court under the above provision, extended inter a/ia
to deal " ... with any extraordinary situation in the larger interest of
administration of justice and from preventing manifest injustice being
done ... ". The two important parameters for consideration are, "larger
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 599
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI]

interest ofadministration ofjustice", and "preventing manifest injustice". A
The facts and circumstances of the present case, as have been debated
and discussed at great length, do not reveal the existence, of either of
the aforesaid factors. With Vyapam having cancelled the appellants'
admission to the MBBS course, and with the above orders having been
upheld by the High Court, as well as, by this Court, can it be said that the
B
cancellation orders were unjust? No, not at all. If the admission of the
appellants to the MBBS course, was improper, the cancellation orders,
were obviously proper. If we restore the academic benefits of the
appellants, arising out of their admission - cancelled by Vyapam, the
cancellation orders would be set at naught. That, would undo, the Vyapam
orders, upheld by the High Court and this Court. And this, we are satisfied, c
would not serve the "larger interest of administration ofjustice". On the
contrary, such an initiative would cause "manifest injustice''. It is therefore
not possible for us to accept, that it is possible in the facts of the present
case, to invoke Article- 142 of the Constitution - in the larger interest of
the administration ofjustice. It is also not possible for us to accept, that
D
any manifest injustice would be done to the appellants, iftheir admissions
are cancelled. In our considered view, to do justice in the matter, the
order passed by Vypam must be upheld, without any further modification
or alteration. Needless to mention, that the instant consideration, does
not take into account, the different submissions advanced on behalf of
the appellants. We will now endeavour to deal with the remaining E
submissions, which according to learned counsel, would persuade this
Court, to override the straitjacket examination of the matter, dealt with
in the manner, recorded hereinabove.
68. We shall now consider the submission, founded on the
interpretation placed by Mr. Fali S. Nariman (see paragraph 16, and F
onwards), on Article 142 of the Constitution. Ifthe instant contention is
acceptable, then surely, according to learned counsel, it would be possible
to overlook the consequences of fraud (refer to, paragraph 64,
hereinabove), in case sufficient justification was shown, for taking a
different course, for doing complete justice. Mr. Nariman's suggestion,
that the Supreme Court must be "trusted'', and that, this Court can even G
ignore statutory law, in the overriding interest of doing complete justice,
under Article 142 of the Constitution, has been put forth for our
consideration. The said view, was sought to be extended, by learned
counsel, even to· a declared pronouncement of law under Article 141 of
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600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A the Constitution (in addition to statutory law). Accepting the proposition
canvassed, we are sure, would substantially enhance the authority of
this Court. And for that reason, the hypothesis of Mr. Nariman is
extremely attractive. It is, however, not possible for us to ignore the
decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court, in Supreme Court Bar
Association v. Union oflndia, (1998) 4 SCC 409. The projection of Mr.
B
Fali S. Nariman, that this Court had virtually denuded itself of its
constitutional power, to do complete justice, through the above judgment,
is an expression of his opinion, which we respect. We are indeed bound,
by the declaration of the Constitution Bench. In terms of the above
judgment, with which we express our unequivocal concurrence, it is not
c possible to accept, that the words "complete justice" used in Article 142
of the Constitution, would include the power, to disregard even statutory
provisions, and/or a declared pronouncement of law under Article 141
of the Constitution, even in exceptionatcircumstances. Undoubtedly, the
proposition can certainly be acceptable to a very limited extent, -to the
extent of self-aggrandizement. The "trust" Mr. Nariman reposes in this
D
Court, is indeed heartening and reassuring. But then, Mr. Nariman, and
a number of other outstanding legal practitioners like him, undeniably
have the brilliance to mould the best of minds. And thereby, to persuade
a Court, to accept their sense of reasoning, so as to override statutory
law and/or a declared pronouncement of law. It is this, which every
E Court, should consciously keep out of its reach. In our considered view,
the hypothesis - that the Supreme Court can do justice as it perceives,
even when contrary to statute (and, declared pronouncement of law),
should never as a rule, be entertained by any Court/Judge, however high
or noble. Can it be overlooked, that legislation is enacted, only with the
object of societal good, and only in support of societal causes? Legislation,
F
always flows from reason and logic. Debates and deliberations in
Parliament, leading to a valid legislation, representthe will of the majority.
That will and determination, must be equally "trusted", as much as the
"trust" which is reposed in a Court. Any legislation, which does not
satisfy the above parameters, would per se be arbitrary, and would be
G open to being declared as constitutionally invalid. Jn such a situation, the
legislation itself would be stmck down. It is difficult, to visualize a situation,
wherein a valid legislation, would render injustice to the parties, or would
lead to a situation of incomplete justice - for one or the other party.
Imagination, perception and comprehension, of future events, have
inherent limitations. We would therefore refrain ourselves, from saying
H
NlDHl KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 601
1'RADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!)

anything beyond what we have. At the cost of repetition, we would A
reiterate, that such a situation, as is contemplated by Mr. Nariman, does
not seem to be possible. We would however not like to close the window,
for such thought and consideration. We would rather leave it to the
conscience of the concerned Court, to deal with such an exceptional
situation, if it ever arises. In our view, in the facts and circumstances of
B
the present case, the cause of the appellants, is not furthered, even by
the approach suggested by relying on the hypothesis of Mr. Nariman.
We can only conclude by observing, that keeping in mind the ~onscious
involvetnent of the appellants in gaining admission to the MBBS course,
by means of a fraudulent stratagem of trickery, it is not possible for us to
ignore or overlook, the declaration oflaw with reference to fraud. Nothing c
obtained by fraud, can be sustained. This declared proposition oflaw,
must apply to the case of the appellants, as well. This is the outcome of
the "trust" reposed in this Court, as being fully equipped, to determine at
its own, when Article 142 of the Constitution can be invoked to render
complete justice, and when it cannot be so invoked.
D
69. One of the contentions advanced by learned counsel forthe
appellants also was, that the appellants had acquired "knowledge" while
pursuing the MBBS course. It was pointed out, that even in the present
age of scientific development, it was not possible to transfer "knowledge"
(intellectual property) acquired by the appellants, to those who may have
been the rightful beneficiaries thereof. It was submitted, that besides E
the individual loss, which the appellants would suffer, the nation would
suffer a societal and monetary loss, if their admission to the MBBS
course, was not preserved. A detailed reference, in this behalf, was
made to the vacancies of medical doctors in the State of Madhya Pradesh,
at all levels of health care. To demonstrate authenticity, findings recorded F
by the World Health Organisation, were also brought to our notice (see
paragraph 32 hereinabove). Based on the above factual position, it was
submitted, that in extending relief to the appellants, this Court would be
extending relief to the society, and would be allowing the appellants to
serve humanity. It was submitted, that in case this Court exercised its
jurisdiction in favour of the appellants (under Article 142 of the G
Constitution), there would be societal gains, as the appellants would apply
their "knowledge", to serve humanity. It was therefore pleaded, that the
facts and circumstances of the present case, constituted a good ground,
to preserve the "knowledge", acquired by the appellants. It was also
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602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20 I 7] 2 S.C.R.

A pointed out, that if the suggested course was adopted, no one would
suffer any loss. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the above
submission, we are of the considered view, that conferring rights or
benefits on the appellants, who had consciously participated in a well
thought of, and meticulously orchestrated plan, to circumvent well laid
down norms, for gaining admission to the MBBS course, would amount
B
to espousing the cause of 'the unfair'. It would seem like, allowing a
thief to retain the stolen property. It would seem as if, the Court was not
supportive of the cause of those who had adopted and followed rightful
means. Such a course, would cause people to question the credibility, of
the justice delivery system itself. The exercise of jurisdiction in the
c manner suggested on behalf of the appellants, would surely depict, the
Court's support in favour of the sacrilegious. lt would also compromise
the integrity of the academic community. We are of the view, that in the
name of doing complete justice, it is not possible for this Court to support
the vitiated actions of the appellants, through which they gained admission
to the MBBS course.
D
70. Irrespective of what has been debated and concluded
hereinabove, we are of the view, that there cannot be any defined
parameters, within the framework whereof, this Court would exercise
jurisdiction under A11icle 142 of the Constitution. The complexity of
administration, and of human affairs, would give room for the exercise
E of the power vested in this Court under Article 142, in a situation where
clear injustice appears to have been caused, to any party to a /is. In the
absence ofany legislation to the contrary, it would be open to this Court,
to remedy the situation. The appellants submitted, that they fell in this
category, namely, that there was no legislative provision, to deal with
F admissions to academic institutions, involving juveniles, who had
innocently breached legal norms, and had strayed into forbidden territory.
The appellants urged, that they should not be identified, as a pa11 of the
syndicate, engaged in manipulating their admissions, even though they
were the beneficiaries thereof. It was submitted, that the appellants
were young, and not mature enough to understand the consequences of
G their actions. It was pointed out, that the appellants were students
engaged in the pursuit of education. The appellants asserted, on the
basis of their past academic record, and on the strength of their
performance in the MBBS course itself, that they could very well have
been successful in gaining entry into the MBBS course, on their own
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 603
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI]

merit, had they not chosen to seek the assistance of the sync! icate. That, A
they had done so, because of their lack of understanding. ufthe ways of
the world, should not be overlooked, whi'Je dealing with the relief being
sought. It was submitted, that the consequence of affirmation of the
Vyapam order(s) and its implications, would expose them to such hardship,
as they did not deserve. It was pointed out, that having gained entry into
B
medical institutions, they had spent a number of years of their lives, in
academic pursuit. They had also spent their parents', hard earned money.
It was submitted, that all that the appellants had achieved, should not be
allowed to go waste. Specially because, there would be no gainer. It
was contended, that it needed to be seriously considered, whether or
not, they were entitled to retain and use the "knowledge" acquired by c
them, for their own benefit, and for the benefit of the society at large.
During the course of hearing, learned counsel forthe appellants pleaded
for differential action. It was submitted, that all the appellants, were at
a very important crossroad of life, and were under immense pressure,
both parental and societal, at the relevant time, when they strayed into
D
forbidden territory. In these circumstances, it was contended, that they
may not be dealt with so harshly, as would scar their fragile minds. Or,
would leave them with no future.
71. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the issues
canvassed on behalf of the appellants, as has been narrated in the
foregoing paragraph, we have no hesitation to state, that all these E
submissions deserve an outright rejection. Even in situations where a
juvenile indulges in crime, he has to face trial, and is subjected to the
postulated statutory consequences. Law, has consequences. And the
consequences of law brook no exception. The appellants in this case,
irrespective of their age, were conscious of the regular process of F
admission. They breached the same by devious means. They must
therefore, suffer the consequences of their actions. It is not the first
time, that admissions obtained by deceitful means, would be cancelled.
This Court has consistently annulled, academic gains, arising out of
wrongful admissions. Acceptance of the prayer made by the appellants
on the parameter suggested by them, would result in overlooking the G
large number ofjudgments, on the point. Adoption of a different course,
for the appellants, would trivialize the declared legal position. Reference
in this behalf, may be made to the judgments relied upon by learned
counsel representing Vyapam.
H
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20 I 7] 2 S.C.R.

A 72. It is also not possible for us to accept the contention under
consideration, and vehemently canvassed on behalf of the appellants
(recorded in paragraph 70 above), for yet another reason. Because, it is
not possible for us to accept, either that the appellants were innocent, or
that they were immature in understanding the consequences of their
actions. Each one of the appellants, was aware of the fact, that their
B
admission to the MBBS course, would be determined on the basis of
their performance in the Pre-Medical Test. Rather than appearing in
the qualifying test on their own, they chose to seek assistance of
meritorious students, to garner higher marks. We may not be completely
wrong in our understanding, if we conclude, that the appellants were
c quite sure, that they would not be able to gain admission to the MBBS
course, on their own merit. That is why, they had to strategize their
admission to the MBBS course. We therefore, reject the contention
advanced on behalf of the appellants, that the appellants were meritorious
students, and as such, their admission to the MBBS course, desen cd to
be preserved. If this is where the truth Iies (which we are sure, i1 does),
D
namely, that the appellants were quite sure that they would not be able
to gain admission to the MBBS course on their own merit, surely the
appellants are not entitled to any equitable consideration. And, in that
view of the matter, it would not be proper to extend to the appellants,
relief under Article I 42 of the Constitution.
E 73. We wish to attempt, to examine the matter from another
perspective. Even a child, in the very first year of entering primary school,
is aware of the consequences of copying, during an examination.
Teachers supervise examinations, to make sure, that students do not
copy. Children caught copying, are dealt with severely. Every child
F observes this process, year after year. Can the appellants, who had
completed school education, and are on the verge of entering a
professional course, be treated as novices -unaware of the consequence
of copying? In our considered view, certainly not. It is therefore not
possible for us, to extend any benefit to the appellants, either on account
of their juvenility, or on account of their alleged lack ofunderstanding of
G the consequences of their actions. In our considered view, the appellants
had consciously sought the assistance of a syndicate, engaged in
manipulating admissions to medical institutions. They were beneficiaries
of acts of deceit and deception. In the above view of the matter, the
case of the appellants does not commend to us, as a matter deserving of
any sympathetic consideration. In our considered view, the admission
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 605
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI]

of the appellants to the MBBS course, cannot be legalized (or legitimized), A
in the name of justice.
74. We may examine the controversy, from yet another
perspective. Let us presume, that the position is equally balanced for
the two sides. Let us attempt to apply the test of a Court's conscience,
to a situation where on principle, a Court is not in a position to decide, B
whether it should, or it should not, exercise its discretion in fvour of a
party to a /is. A situation, wherein the Court's conscience commends to
it (in a matter, as the one in hand), to exercise its discretion under Article
· 142, to preserve the benefit of the appellants' admission to the MBBS
course; and at the same time, equally commends to it, not to so exercise
its jurisdiction (i.e., not to preserve to the appellants, the benefit of their c
admission to the MBBS course), in favour of the appellant. How should
this Court deal with such a situation? We are of the considered view,
that where two options are open to a Court, and both are equally
beckoning, it would be most prudent to choose the one, which is founded
on truth an.ct honesty, and the one which is founded on fair play and D
legitimacy. Siding with the option founded on the deceit or fraud, or on
favour as opposed to merit, or by avoiding the postulated due process,
would be imprudent. Judicial conscience must only support the righteous
cause. If, despite its being righteous, a decision is seen as causing
manifest injustice, the exercise of the power under Article 142 of the
Constitution, would be prudent. In such situations, an onerous duty is E
cast on the Court, to step in, to render complete justice. This is the
manner that we commend, judicial exercise of discretion, under Article
142 of the Co1istitution. By adopting the above course, a Court would
feel satisfied, in having exercised its discretion, on the touchstone of
justice -the concept which triggers the invocation of Article 142 of the F
Constitution. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, there
seems to be absolutely no cause for us to, legitimize the admissions of
the appellants to the MBBS course, since the same clearly fall in the
imprudent category.
75. It was the repeated submission ofleamed counsel representing
the appellants, that there would be significant societal benefit, if the
G
academic pursuit of the appellants is legitimized. During the course of
hearing, learned counsel even went to the extent of suggesting, that
individual benefits, that may be drawn by the appellants, may be drastically
curtailed, and their academic pursuit be regularised, for societal benefit.
The submission is attractive. It needs a considered response. We are of H
606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A the considered view, no matter how extensive the societal gains may be,
the jurisdiction conceived of under Article 142 of the Constitution, to do
complete justice in a matter, cannot be invoked, in a situation as the one
in hand. Even the trivialist act of wrong doing, based on a singular act of
fraud, cannot be countenanced, in the name of justice. The present
case, unfolds a mass fraud. The course suggested, if accepted, would
B
not only be imprudent, but would also be irresponsible. It would encourage
others, to follow the same course. We must compliment, all the learned
counsel appearing for the appellants, in projecting the claim(s) of the
appellants, from all conceivable angles. We are ho" ever not persuaded
to accept the legitimacy of the same. Truthful conduct, must always
c remain the hallmark of the rule of law. No matter the gains, or the
losses. The jurisdiction exercisable by this Court under Article 142,
cannot ever be invoked, to salvage, and legitimize acts of fraudulent
character. Fraud, cannot be allowed to trounce, on the stratagem of
public good.
D 76. Besides, the consideration recorded by us, in the foregoing
paragraphs, we may confess, that we felt persuaded for taking the view
that we have, for a very important reason - national character. There is
a saying - when wealth is lost, nothing is lost; when health is lost,
something is lost; but when character is lost, everything is lost. This is
attributed to Billy Graham, an American clergyman, born on 7.1.1918.
E
One cannot be certain, about the above attribution, because the same
lesson has been taught in India, since time immemorial, by parents and
teachers. The issue in hand, has an infinitely vast dimension. If we
were to keep in mind immediate social or societal gains, the perspective
of consideration would be different. The submission canvassed, needs
F to be considered in the proper perspective. We shall venture to derive
home the point by an illustration. We may wel I not have won our freedom,
if freedom fighters had not languished in jails ... and if valuable lives had
not been sacrificed. Depending on the situation, even civil liberty or life
itself, may Ire too trivial a sacrifice, when national interest is involved. It
all depends on the desired goal. The preamble of the Indian Constitution
G rests on the foundation of governance, on the touchstone ofjustice. The
basic fundamental right, of equality before law and equal protection of
the laws, is extended to citizens and non-citizens alike, through Article
14 of the Constitution, on the fountainhead of fairness. The actions of
the appellants, are founded on unacceptable behaviour, and in complete
H breach of the rule oflaw. Their actions, constitute acts of deceit, invading
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 607
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!]

into a righteous social order. National character, in our considered view, A
cannot be sacrificed for benefits- individual or societal. If, we desire to
build a nation, on the touchstone of ethics and character, and if our
determined goal is to build a nation where only the rule of law prevails,
then we cannot accept the claim of the appellants, for the suggested
societal gains. Viewed in the aforesaid perspective, we have no difficulty
B
whatsoever, in concluding, in favour of the rule of law. Such being the
position, it is not possible for us to extend to the appellants, any benefit
under Article 142 of the Constitution.
77(i). We shall now, last of all, deal with a common submission,
advanced at the hands of most of the learned counsel, representing the
appellants. Actually, the instant submission, is ofno serious consequence,
c
because of the conclusions already recorded by us, in the preceding
paragraphs. But then, all submissions must be considered, and answered.
The instant last submission, was based on the judgment of this Court, in
the Priya Gupta case (supra). It is necessary to emphasise, that learned
counsel had placed reliance on the above judgment to contend, that the D
instant controversy should not be considered as the first occasion, for
this Court to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 142, to legitimise
admissions to the MBBS course. It was pointed out, that the facts of
the Priya Gupta case would disclose, that admission in the above case,
had also not been obtained by rightful means. In the Priya Gupta case,
admissions were gained by the appellants, through acts of conscious E
manipulation. And yet, this Court had sustained the same, and had
legitimized the admission of the appellants. The appellants herein, seek
a similar treatment.
(ii) In the case relied upon, the parents of the appellants were
persons wielding authority. They exercised their influence, whereby, F
their wards gained admission to the MBBS course. To achieve their
objective, intimation of the unfilled seats, was not published. Resu\tantly,
students with higher merit, came to be overlooked, as they were unaware
of the vacancies, and therefore could ,not apply for the same. Wards,
having support of officialdom, who could exercise influence, were G
successful in gaining admission, surreptitiously. It was therefore pointed
out by learned counsel, that even in the Priya Gupta case, the action of
gaining admission, was based on manipulation through fraud and
deception. And since the position of the case in hand, was similar, the
appellants herein, were also entitled to a similar relief.
H
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.

A (iii) The facts of the cited case (as canvassed, on behalf of the
appellants) reveal, that the appellants in the Priya Gupta case, had
occupied free seats, in a government institution. After their admission,
the appellants had already taken their final examination (of the MBBS
course), and had therefore, almost completed the MBBS curriculum.
By the time this Court heard the matter, the appellants were through
B
with the course. In the above background, it was contended, that th is
Court considered it just, to legitimize the admission of the appellants, to
the MBBS course. However, while doing so, the appellants were required
to reimburse the financial benefits gained by them. In this behalf, it is
necessary to record, that the appellants paid a highly subsidized fee at
c the government college, wherein they had manipulated their admission.
If they had been admitted to a private college, they would have had to
pay a much higher fee - approximately one hundred times more. It was
submitted, that the appellants were willing to pay whatever costs this
Court may impose, and also willing to suffer any additional public/social
service, as this Court would consider appropriate.
D
(iv) Based on the factual position noticed above, it was simply
contended, that the appellants having already completed the MBBS
course (or in any case - a substantial part thereof) successfully, they
should be protected in the same manner, as the appellants in the Priya
Gupta case. It was pleaded, that the course of studies, successfully
E completed by the appellants, should be legitimized.
78(i). We have given our thoughtful consideration, to the
submission advanced on behalfofthe appellants, by placing reliance on
the judgment rendered by this Court, in the Priya Gupta case (supra). In
examining the instant contention, we shall proceed on the assumption,
F thatthe admission of the appellants in the cited case, had not been obtained
by rightful means, but had been gained by conscious manipulations.
(ii) It is importantto highlight, that in the adjudication of the Priya
Gupta case (supra), this Court was conscious of the fact, that the
appellants would have, in any case, obtained admission to the same
G course, on their own merit - but in a private college. The admission of
the appellants in the cited case, to the MBBS course, was therefore
rightful. Their admission to the MBBS course, could not have been
interfered with, and was accordingly, not interfered with. The wrong
committed by their manipulation was, that they moved from a costly
seat in a private college, to a cheaper option in a government college.
H
NIDHI KAIM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA 609
PRADESH AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!]

(iii) To do complete justice between the parties, within the ambit A
ofArticle 142, this Court in the Priya Gupta case, permitted the appellants,
to complete their professional courses, in the institutions where they had
gained admission " ... subject to the condition each one of them pay a
sum of Rs. 5 lakhs to the Jagdalpur College, which amount shall be
utilized for developing the infrastructure in the Jagdalpur College ... ".
B
The instant course was adopted, because that wou Id negate the wrongful
gain acquired by the appellants (in the cited case), through their acts of
conscious manipulation. The appellants would have had to pay a much
higher fee, if they had taken admission in a private college, in terms of
their merit position. They were beneficiaries (on the basis of their
manipulations), only to the extent, that they had paid a much lower fee, c
by gaining admission to a government college.
(iv) Having had an insight to the factual position noticed above, it
is not possible forus to accept, thatthe ground on the basis of which this
Court preserved the admission of the appellants, in the Priya Gupta case
(supra), can be extended to the appellants herein. In the Priya Gupta D
case, the appellants would have got admission to the MBBS course, on
the basis oftheir own merit position, in any case. The instant distinguishing
feature, sets the two matters apart. Actually, we have by our
determination, fully adopted the position expressed in the Priya Gupta
case, inasmuch as, we have also not allowed the appellants to retain the
benefit of, whatever was obtained by their interpolations, and was not E
their legitimate due. That is exactly what this Court had done, in the
Priya Gupta case.
79. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we respectfully concur
with the judgment dated 12.5.2016, rendered by the Hon 'ble Companion
Judge (of the 'former Division Bench'). In the facts and circumstances F
of the case in hand, it would not be proper to legitimize the admission of
the appellants, to the MBBS course, in exercise of the jurisdiction vested
in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. We therefore, hereby,
decline the above prayer made, on behalf of the appellants.

Devika Gujral Appeals dis1nissed.

Note: Emphases supplied in all the quotations extracted above. are ours.