NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,versusSARVPRIYA SEHKARI AVAS SAMITI LTD. AND ANR.

                    [2013] 5 S.C.R. 945


NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY                      A
                             V.
  SARVPRIYA SEHKARI AVAS SAMITI LTD. AND ANR.
          (Civil Appeal No. 3265 of 2013)

                      APRIL 11, 2013
                                                                8
     [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD AND FAKKIR
        MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, JJ.]

     Urban Development - Land purchased by co-operative
housing societies - Subsequently declared as industrial C
development area under Industrial Area Development Act -
High Court held that the societies are entitled to suitable
alternative developed land on the basis of recommendations
in Khodaiji Committee Report and as per the order dated
22.10.2002 passed by the State under Urban Planning and D
Development Act - Held: Recommendations in Khodaiji
Committee Report, on facts would not enure to the benefit of
the societies - Order dated 12. 10. 2002 is also not applicable
to the appellant- Authority - Appeals allowed.
                                                                E
     Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act,
1973- s.41- Provision under- Incorporated in Uttar Pradesh
Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 by virtue of·s.12
thereof - Order passed under s.41 of 1973 Act, whether
applicable to the authorities under 1976 Act - Held: Power
exercised uls.41 shall not be applicable to the authorities     F
under 1976 Act merely because s.41 was included in 1976
Act by incorporation - The decision taken by one
administrative department, shall not apply to the authorities
within administrative control of another department, unless
conscious decision is taken to apply the same to both the       G
categories of authorities.

    Legislation - Legislation by incorporation - Effect of -
Provisions, of earlier Act incorporated in the later Act,
                            945                                 H   -
    946      SUPREME COURT R\=PORTS           [2013) 5 S.C.R.


A   become part and parcel of the later Act - the device of
    legislation by incorporation is adopted for the sake of
    convenience.

         The respondent-Co-operative housing society in
8   appeal No.3265 of 2013 purchased lands from land-
    holders in the years 1981-1985. The lay-out plan of the
    society was approved by the then competent authority
    and as per the agreement between the District Magistrate
    and the Society, the Society carried out development
C   activities. During pendency of the development activities,
    the State Government in exercise of its power u/s. 2(d) of
    U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 declared
    certain area, including the land belonging to the Society,
    as industrial development area which would form part of
    New Okhla Industrial Development Area (NOIDA). They
D   society was asked by NOIDA to stop the development
    work. The Society from time to time demanded a suitable
    altenative developed piece of plot relying on the
    recommendation of Khaoaiji Committee and also an order
    of the state Government in the Department of Housing
E   dated 22.10.2002. On the direction of the High Court
    NOIDA authorities considered the representation of the
    Society and rejected the same. Writ petition against the
    rejection order was allowed holding that the society was
    entitled to benefit of the recommendations of the Khodaiji
F   Committee Report and the Government Order dated
    22.10.2002. The Court directed NOIDA to give the benefit
    of Government Order dated 22.10.2002.
       The respondent Co-operative Housing Society in
G Civil Appal No. 3266 of 2013, had purchased the bonds
  between the years 1990-1996. In this case, High Court
  had directed the Government to consider its claim
  observing that the order dated 22.10.2002 would be
  applicable to NOIDA.

H         In appeals to this Court, the questions for
NEW OKHLA INDUS. DEVT. AUTH. v. SARVPRIYA SEHKARI        94 7
                AVAS SAMIT! LTD.

consideration were whether the cases of two respondent          A
societies are covered by Khodaiji Committee's Report and
whether NOIDA is bound by the Governm~nt Order dated
22.10.2002.

    Allowing the appeals, the Court.                            B
     HELD: 1. It is evident from the relevant
recommendation in the report of Khodaiji Committee, that
the Committee made recommendation for allotment of
one plot per member to the members of sixteen specified
co-operative housing societies and, while doing so,1 it         C
further observe.d that only those members shall be
entitled to get plots who were bonafide members as on
1st of May, 1976. Both the societies in the present
appeals do not find place in the recommendation of the
Khodaiji Committee and further, it is not their case that       D
they were even existing on 1st of May, 1976. Thus, the
recommendation of Khodaiji Committee shall not enure
to the benefit of the two societies. Hence, the High Court
erred in holding that the denial of benefit of Khodaiji
Committee's Report is arbitrary and discriminatory. [Para       E
14) [956-A-C, E-F]

     2.1. Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development
Act, 1973 is an earlier Act whereas Uttar Pradesh
Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 is a later Act.
Incorporation of the provisions of the earlier Act into a       F
later Act is a legislative device adopted for the sake of
convenience and in order to avoid verbatim reproduction
of the provisions of the earlier Act into the later Act. When
such a legislation is made by incorporation, the
provisions so incorporated become part and parcel of the        G
later Act. Thus, those provisions are considered bodily
transposed into it. Its legal effect is that those sections
which have been incorporated in the later Act had been
actually written in it with pen. Therefore, Section 41 of
                                                                H


                                                                    ,
    948     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             (2013] 5 S.C.R.


A 1973 Act shall be deemed to have been incorporated in
  1976 Act with adaptation and the authority constituted
  under 1973 Act shall be deemed to be in reference to an
  authority constituted under 1976 Act and the Vice-
  Chairman of the authority under 1973 Act would be the
B Chief Executive Officer of the Authority under the 1976
  Act. [Para 17] (959-B-E]

         2.2. But the power exercised under Section 41 of 1973
    Act shall not be deemed to be an order under Section 12
    of the 1976 Act, merely on the ground that Section 41 has
C   been included in the Act by incorporation, which is a
    device adopted for the sake of convenience. The order
    dated 22nd of October, 2002 was issued by the Housing
    Department of the State Government and it has been
    addressed to Housing Commissioner, U.P. Awas Vikas
D   Parishad, Vice-Chairman of all Development Authorities
    and Managing Director of the U.P. Cooperative Awas
    Sangh but not addressed to the Industrial Development
    Authorities. The Vice-Chairman of the Development
    Authorities cannot be read to mean the Chief Executive
E   Officer of the Industrial Development Authority
    constituted under 1976 Act. Such an order can be
    passed in respect of the Industrial Development Authority
    in view of Section 12 of 1976 Act by such Departments
    of the State Government which have administrative
F   control over the Industrial Development Authority.
    However, in case such a power is exercised by such a
    Department of the State Government, it shall have no
    bearing on the Development Authorities constituted
    under the 1973 Act. The decision taken by one
G   administrative department concerned with Industrial
    Development Authority shall not apply to the
    Development Authorities within administrative control of
    another Department of the State Government or vice
    versa unless a conscious decision is taken to apply the
H   same to both the categories o( authorities in case the
 NEW OKHLA INDUS. DEVT. AUTH. v. SARVPRIYA SEHKARI 949
                 AVAS SAMIT! LTD.
rules of executive business of the State so permits.                A
Hence, the Government Order dated 22nd October, 2002
shall not be applicable to the appellant authority. [Paras
17 and 18] [959-F.-H; 960-A-F]

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.                 B
3265 of 2013.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 20.06.2008 of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in CMWP No. 41065 of 2003.

                                 WITH                               c
C.A. No. 3266 of 2013.

    L.N. Rao, AK. Ganguli, S.R. Singh, Ravindra Kumar, Dhiraj
K. Agrawal, Mridula Ray Bharadwaj, Dr. Sumant Bharadwaj,
Ram Kishor Singh Yadav, Anuvrat Sharma, Gunnam                      D
Venkateswara Rao, Jitendra Mohan Sharma, Harsh Surana,
Deepali Surana, O.P. Gaggar for the appearing parties.
                             I
    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J. 1. New Okhla                       E
Industrial Development Authority, hereinafter referred to as
"NOIDA", in these special leave petitions filed under Article 136
of the Constitution of India impugns the order dated 20th of
June, 2008 passed by the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc.
Writ Petition No. 41065 of 2003 (Sarvpriya Sahakari Avas            F
Samiti Limited v. State of U.P. through Special Secretary &
Anr.} and order dated 15th of July, 2010 passed in Civil Misc.
Writ Petition No. 67362 of 2005 (Shivalik Sahakari Avas
Samiti through Secretary v. State of U.P. through Principal
Secretary & Ors.}. By those orders NOIDA has been directed          G
to give benefit of Government Order dated 22nd of October,
2002 to each of the writ petitioners, respondent no. 1 herein
i.e. Sarvpriya Sahakari Avas Samiti Limited, hereinafter
referred to as "Sarvpriya" and Shivalik Sahakari Avas Samiti,
hereinafter referred to as "Shivalik".                              H
    950      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013) 5 S.C.R.


A         2. Leave granted.

         3. As direction given in both the appeals is identical and
    facts are similar, both have been heard together and are being
    disposed of by this common judgment.

B      4. For the purpose of these appeals we have taken the
  facts frpm the appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition No.
  1343 of 2009, Sarvpriya is a registered Housing Cooperative
  Society and its claim is that most of its members are from the
  Indian Army, Border Security Force, Air Force, Central Reserve
c Police Force, Delhi Police and other Government Departments.
  The object of the Sarvpriya is to provide residential
  accommodation to its members. It was registered in the year
  1981. Sarvpriya purchased land from the land holders during
  the period 1981 to 1985 in the Village Wazidpur within Tehsil
D Dadri in the District of Ghaziabad from the funds contributed
  by its members. During that period neither Ghaziabad
  Development Authority nor NOIDA were in existence an_d, as
  such, the layout plan prepared by Sarvpriya wa!:)~@proved,on
  3rd of December, 1982 by the Chief Town and Country Planner.
E Later, an agreement was entered into between Sarvpriya and
  the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad, whereby Sarvpriya was
  allowed to carry out the development activities as per the layout
  plan within a period'of two years.

        5. While the aforesaid development activities were going
F on, the State Government, in exercise of its power under Clause
  (d) of Section 2 of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act,
  1976 declared an area of 748 acres of land in Village Wazidpur
  as industrial development area, which was to form part of the
  New Okhla Industrial Development Area. It included land
G belonging to Sarvpriya. But, it seems.that despite the aforesaid
  area having been declared as an industrial development area,
  Sarvpriya continued to carry on the activities of colonization and
  illegal plotting. Accordingly, by notice dated 21st of September,
  1994, NOIDA called upon Sarvpriya to remove the unauthorized
H construction within a stipulated time. Sarvpriya replied to the
                                                                       .   I
 NEWOKHLAINDUS. DEVf.AUTH. v. SARVPRIYASEHKARI                 951
   AVAS SAMITI LTD. [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
aforesaid notice inter alia stating that it had developed the land A
and asserted its right for further development on the basis of
the sanction order and terms of agreement between it and the
District Magistrate. Sarvpriya also chose to challenge the
aforesaid notice in a writ petition. filed before the High Court
but the challenge has ultimately failed.                           B

      6. Sarvpriya thereafter wrote to the State Government to
either permit it to develop residential plots or to allot a suitable
developed plot. Sarvpriya also resorted to a proceeding before
the Monopoly Restrictive Trade Practices Commission but the            C
same was dismissed. While the request of Sarvpriya for
allotment of a suitable developed plot was pending, in response
to a notice dated 24th of July, 1999, Sarvpriya by its
representation dated 28th of July, 1999 requested to settle the
dispute outside the court by either allowing it to retain t~e
present site or to allot a suitable alternative developed piece        0
of land to enable its members to raise housing colony for their
residence. It seems that thereafter Sarvpriya wrote to NOIDA,
from time to time, for allotment of a suitable alternative
developed piece of plot relying on the recommendation of a
Committee known as Khodaiji Committee as also the order of             E
the State Government in the Department of Housing dated 22nd
of October, 2002. When all these did not yield any result, it filed
CMWP No.45613 of 2002 (Sarvpriya Sahakari Avas Samiti
Ltd. v. Chairman, NOIDA Authority) and the High Court by its
order dated 25th of October, 2002 directed NOIDA to dispose            F
of its representation within a stipulated time. The NOIDA by its
order dated 4th of July, 2003 rejected Sarvpriya's
representation and, while doing so, observed that it had
purchased the land in the year 1981-1982 and on the
recommendation of Khodaiji Committee lands were allotted to            G
societies which were in existence till the year 1976 in the area
and, accordingly, it was observed that the recommendation
made by the Khodaiji Committee shall not be applicable to
Sarvpriya.
                                                                       H
    952       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2013] 5 S.C.R.


A          7. Being unsuccessful in persuading the NOIDA to provide
    it alternative suitable plot, it filed a writ petition, which has given
    rise to the impugned order, for quashing the order dated 4th
    of July, 2003 and further for the issuance of a writ in the nature
    of mandamus commanding NOIDA to allot 40% of the land
B   acquired from Sarvpriya to it in Sector Nos. 134-135 or in any
    nearby sector of NOIDA.

         8. NOIDA contested the claim of Sarvpriya inter alia stating
    that the benefit of Government Order dated 22nd of October,
    2002 applies to Avas Vikas Parishad and Development
C   Authority constituted under the provisions of U.P. Urban
    Planning and Development Act, 1973. It was further pointed out
    that the NOIDA tias been constituted under the provisions of
    U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 and, hence the
    Government Order referred to above shall not enure to the
D   benefit of Sarvpriya. The submission of NOIDA did not find
    favour and the High Court by the impugned order in the case
    of Sarvpriya quashed the order dated 4th of July, 2003 and
    remitted the matter back to NOIDA with direction to give the
    benefit of the Government Order dated 22nd of October, 2002
E   to Sarvpriya within a stipulated time. While doing so, the High
    Court observed as follows:

          " ....... The further explanation of the respondents are that
          Khodaiji Committee, which is constituted for the purpose,
F         submitted the report that the benefit of re-allotment or fresh
          allotment of the land to such societies will be available to
          the societies which were registered before 1976. The
          argument is that benefit of Khodaiji Committee report,
          which is otherwise available to the Co-operative Housing
          Societies, cannot be given to the petitioner-society only
G
          because the petitioner-society is not registered before
          1976. We have gone through the report of Khodaiji
          Committee and we do not find any such observation as is
          attributed by the respondent to the aforesaid report. The
          report simply talks about the Co-operative Housing
H
 NEW OKHLA INDUS. DEVT. AUTH. v. SARVPRIYA SEHKARI 953
   AVAS SAMIT! LTD. [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]

    Societies irrespective of the year of registration. The        A
    petitioner's society is definitely a registered Housing Co-
    operative Society. Therefore, the denial of benefit of
    Khodaiji Cdmmittee report to the petitioner is wholly
    arbitrary and discriminatory in as much as the benefit of
    this report have been extended by the respondent to other      B
    Housing Co-operative Societies ...... "

     9. Shivalik claims to have been registered as Housing
Cooperative Society on 24th March, 1982. It asserts that it had
purchased the land by registered sale deeds between the years
1990 to 1996 in Village Chhajarsi within Tehsil Dadri in the       C
District Of Gautam Budh Nagar.

    10. In the case of Shivalik, the High Court directed to
consider its claim observing that-the Government Order dated
22nd of October, 2002 shall be applicable to NOIDA. While          D
doing so, it observed as follows:

           "A perusal of Section 12 aforesaid shows that
    Section 41 has been adopted in toto and adoption of
    Section is by incorporation. Clause (c) of Section 12          E
    clarifies that in a reference to the Vice-Chairman of the
    authority shall be deemed to be a reference to the Chief
    Executive officer of the authority (created under the U.P.
    Area Development Act). The impugned Government Order
    dated 22.10.2002 has been issued after the enforcement
    of both the above Acts. The Government Order has been
                                                                   F
    addressed to the Vice-Chairman of the Development
    Authorities U.P. That will mean that the reference is itself
    also addressed to the Chief Executive Officer of the New
    Okhla Industrial Development Authority by virtue of clause
    (c) of Section 12 of U.P. Industrial Area Development Act,     G
    1976. Thus it is beyond doubt that the Government Order
    is applicable to the New Okhla Industrial Development
    Authority. The Government Order in which various reasons
    have been given for holding that the Government Order is
    not applicable to New Okhla Industrial Development             H
    954       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013] 5 S.C.R.


A         Authority is contrary to the provisions of clause (c) of
          Section 12 of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act,
          1976. Therefore, the order dated 14/8/2005 is quashed.
          The Government Order dated 22.10.2002 is held to be
          applicable on the New Okhla Industrial Development
B         Authority. created under the U.P. Industrial Area
          Development Act if it is subsisting ........"

                                                 (underlining ours)

        11. As regards claim of Sarvpriya and Shivalik that
C Government Order dated 22nd of October, 2002 shall also
  govern their case, the plea of the State Government is that there
  are two kinds of authorities which are constituted under two
  different enactments, namely, the U.P. Urban Planning and
  Development Act, 1973 and the U.P. Industrial Area
D Development Act, 1976. According to the State Government,
  the authorities constituted under U.P. Urban Planning and
  Development Act function under the overall administrative
  control of the Department of Housing and. Urban Planning
  whereas the Industrial Development Authorities like NOIDA are
E constituted under the U.P. Industrial Area Development and it
  is not within administrative control of the Department of Housing
  and Urban Development. In fact, the Industrial Development
  Department of the State Government is its administrative
  department.
F      12. Mr. L.N. Rao, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf
  of the appellant submits that neither Khodaiji Committee's
  recommendation nor the order of the State Goverr,iriient dated
  22nd of October, 2002 govern the case of Sarvpriya and
  Shivalik and, therefore, the order passed by the High Court is
G vulnerable. Mr. A.K. Ganguli, Senior Advocate, Mr. Jitendra
  Mohan Sharma, Advocate representing Sarvpriya and Shivalik
  respectively, however, contend that the functions of the
  Development Authority and the Industrial Developmen Authority
  being the same, the notification of the State GovernmE!'flt in the
H Department of Housing dated 22nd of October, 2002 shall also
 NEW OKHLA INDUS. DEVT. AUTH. v. SARVPRIYA SEHKARI 955
   AVAS SAMITI LTD. [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]

apply to NOIDA and the High Court did not commit any illegality A
by directing for consideration of their case in the light of the
aforesaid order. They also submit that there is no justification
to deny the benefit of Khodaiji Committee's recommendation
to both the societies. Mr. S.R. Singh, Senior Advocate
appearing on behalf of the State of U.P. is emphatic that B
neither Khodaiji Committee's recommendation nor the
Government Order dated 22nd of October, 2002 issued by the
Housing Department shall have any bearing for deciding the
claim of both the societies.

     13. In view of the rival submissions, the first question falling C
for our determination is as to whether the Khodaiji Committee's
Report covers the case of the two societies herein. It seems
that various cooperative housing societies which had
purchased land falling in the industrial development area of
NOIDA represented for allotment of land. NOIDA in its 15th D
Meeting held on 19th June, 1977 resolved to constitute a sub-
committee to negotiate with the representatives of the various
cooperative housing societies. Mr. B.J. Khodaiji, the then
Commissioner and Secretary, Housing and Urban
Development Department of the State Government besides E
other officers constituted the said Committee. The report of the
Khodaiji Committee has been placed before us. From the
report, it,appears that sub-Committee held several meetings
and made various recommendations including the following,
with which we are concerned in the present appeals. The F
recommendations so made read as follows:

     "2. Only one plot per member should be given to members
     of these sixteen Cooperative Housing Societies.

     3. Only those members of Cooperative Housing Societies G
     will be entitled to get plots in NOIDA who were bonafide
     members as on 1.5.1976 which shall be duly certified by
     a competent Authority in this respect i.e. Dy. Registrar,
     Co-operative Housing Societies, Meerut Division."
                                                                     H
    956      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2013] 5 S.C.R.


A        14. From the aforesaid it is evident that the Committee
    made recommendation for allotment of one plot per member
    to the members of sixteen specified cooperative housing
    societies and, while doing so, it further observed that only those
    members shall be entitled to get plots who were bonafide
B   members as on 1st of May, 1976. Both the societies with which
    we are concerned in the present appeals do not find place in
    the recommendation of the Khodaiji Committee and further, it
    is not their case that they were even existing on 1st of May,
    1976. It seems that the attention of the High Court was not drawn
c   to the aforesaid paragraphs of the Report of the Khodaiji
    Committee and, therefore, the High Court fell into error in
    observing that the "report simply talks about the Cooperative
    Housing Societies irrespective of the year of registration". The
    passage from Khodaiji Committee Report quoted above
D   makes it abundantly clear that "only those members of
    Cooperative Housing Societies will be entitled to get plots in
    NOIDA who were bonafide members as on 1.5.1976". If the
    society did not exist on that date there is no question of their
    being members of the society on the date specified. In that view
    of the matter, there is no escape from the conclusion that the
E   recommendation of Khodaiji Committee shall not enu~to the
    benefit of the two societies. Hence, we are of the opinion-tb_at
    the High Court erred in holding that the denial of benefit of
    Khodaiji Committee's Report to Sarvpriya is arbitrary and
    discriminatory. We, thus, have no option but to disapprove this
F   line of reasoning of the High Court.

         15. Now we proceed to consider the second question
    required to be answered in these appeals i.e. whether NOIDA
    is bound by the 'Government Order dated 22nd of October, ,
G   2002. To answer this question it shall be appropriate to examine i
    the scheme of Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development
    Act, 1973 (President's Act No. 11 of 1973) and Uttar Pradesh
    Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 (U.P. Act No. 6 of
    1976): NOIDA is an industrial development authority constituted
H   by the State Government of Uttar Pradesh in exercise of its
 NEWOKHLAINDUS. DEVT.AUTH. v. SARVPRIYASEHKARI 957
   AVAS SAMITI LTD. [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]

powers under Section 3 of U.P. Act No. 6 of 1976. Authority          A
under this Act can be constituted for any industrial development
area and such areas would be those which have been declared
as such by notification by the State Government. The object of
the industrial development authority, as is evident from Section
6 of the Act, is to secure planned development of the industrial     B
development areas. Its functions include providing infrastructure
for industrial, commercial or residential purposes as also to
allocate and transfer either by way of sale or lease or otherwise,
plots of land for the aforesaid purposes. President's Act No.
11 of 1973 is another Act aimed to provide for the planned           c
development of certain areas of the State and Section 3 and
4 thereof confer power on the State Government to declare an
area to be developed as a development area and constitute
development authority for that area. Section 41 of this Act vests
power on the State Government to issue direction for "efficient
                                                                     0
administration of the Act'' and casts duty upon the development
authority, its Chairman or the Vice-Chairman to carry out such
direction. It reads as follows:

     "41. Control by State Government.-(1) The Authority, the
     Chairman or the Vice-Chairman shall carry out such              E
     directions as may be issued to it from time to time by the
     State Government for the efficient administration of this
     Act.

     (2) If in, or in connection with, the exercise of its powers    F
     and discharge of its functions by the Authority, the
     Chairman or the Vice-Chairman under this Act any dispute
     arises between the Authority, the Chairman or the Vice-
     Chairman and the State Government, the decision of the
     State Government on such dispute shall be.final.                G

     (3) The State Government may, at any time, either on its
     own motion or on application made to it in this behalf, call
     for the records of any case disposed of or order passed
     by the Authority or Chairman for the purpose of satisfying
     itself as to.the legality or propriety of any order passed or   H
    958       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 5 S.C.R.


A         direction issued and may pass such order or issue such
          direction in relation thereto as it may think fit:

               Provided that the State Government shall not pass
          an order prejudicial to any person without affording such
B         person a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

          (4) Every order of the State Government made in exercise
          of the powers conferred by this Act shall be final and shall
          not be called in question in any court."

c        16. Section 12 of U.P. Act No. 6 of 1976 provides for
    application of certain provisions of President's Act No. 11 of
    1973, including Section 41 and same reads as follows:

          "12.Applications of certain yrovisions of President's
D         Act XI of 1973.- The provision of Chapter VII and Sections
          30, 32, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, SQ, 51, 53 and
          58 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and. Development
          Act, 1973 as re-enacted and modified by the Uttar
          Pradesh President's Act (Re-enactment with
          Modifications) Act, 1974, shall mutatis mutandis apply to
E
          the Authority with adaptation that-

          (a) any reference to the aforesaid Act shall be deemed to
          be a reference to this Act;

F         (b) any reference to the Authority con tituted under the
          aforesaid Act shall be deemed to be a reference to the
          Authority constituted under this Act; and

          (c) any reference to the Vice-Chairman of the Authority
          shall be deemed to be a reference to the Chief Executive
G         Officer of the Authority."

       17. It is relevant here to state that in order to come to the
  conclusion that the order of the State Government in the
  Housing Department dated 22nd of October, 2002 would apply
H to the NOIDA, it has been observed that such an order has
  NEW OKHLA INDUS. DEVf. AUTH. v. SARVPRIYA SEHKARI 959
    AVAS SAMIT! LTD. [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]

 been passed by the Housing Department in exercise of the A
  power under Section 41 of the President's Act No. 11 of 1973
  and in view.of its adaption by section 12 of U.P. Act No. 6 of
  1976, the Government Order shall apply to NOIDA. President's
  Act No. 11 of 1973 is an earlier Act whereas U.P. Act No. 6 of
  1976 is a later Act. As is well known, incorporation of the E
  provisions of the earlier Act into a later Act is a legislative
  device adopted for the sake of convenience and in order to
  avoid verbatim reproduction of the provisions of the earlier Act
  into the later Act. When such a legislation is made by
  incorporation, the provisions so incorporated become part and c
  parcel ofthe later Act. In other words, those provisions are
. considered bodily transposed into it. Its legal effectis ttiat those
  sections which have been incorporated in the later Act had been
  actually written in it with pen. In view of the aforesaid, Section
  41 of President's Act No. 11 of 1973 shall be deemed to have D
  been incorporated in U.P. Act No. 6 of 1976 with adaptation
  and the authority constituted under President's Act No. 11 of
  1973 shall be deemed to be in reference to an authority
  constituted under U.P. Act No. 6 of 1976 and the Vice-
  Chairman of the authority under President's Act No. 11 of 1973 E
  would be the Chief Executive Officer of the Authority under the
  U.P. Act No. 6of1976. But will that mean that the order of the
   State Government in exercise of the power under Section 41
   of President's Act No. 11 of 1973 shall apply to the Industrial
   Development Authorities constituted under Section 6 of U.P.
   Act No. 6of1976? In our opinion, the power exercised under F
   Section 41 of President's Act No. 11 of 1973 shall not be
   deemed to be an order under Section 12 of the U.P. Act No. 6
   of 1976 merely on the ground that Section 41 has been included
   in the Act by incorporation which, as observed earlier, is a
   device adopted for the sake of convenience. The order dated G
   22nd of October, 2002 has been issued by the Housing
   Department of 'the State Government and it has been
  addressed to Housing Commissioner, U.P. Awas Vikas
  Parishad, Vice-Chairman of all Development Authorities and
                                                                       H
    960      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (2013) 5 S.C.R.


A Managing Director of the U.P. Cooperative Awas Sangh but
  not addressed to the Industrial Development Authorities. The
  Vice-Chairman of the Development Authorities cannot be read
  to mean the Chief Executive Officer of the Industrial
  Development Authority constituted under U.P. Act No. 6 of
s 1976. It needs no emphasis that such an order can be passed
  in respect of the Industrial Development Authority in view of
  Section 12 of U.P. Act No. 6 of 1976 by such Departments of
  the State Government which have administrative control over
  the Industrial Development Authority. However, we hasten to
c add that in case such a power is exercised by such a
  Department of the State Government it shall have no bearing
  on the Development Authorities constituted under the
  President's Act No. 11 of 1973. The decision taken by one
  administrative department concerned with Industrial
  Development Authority shall not apply to the Development
D Authorities within administrative control of another Department
  of the State Government or vice versa unless a conscious
  decision is taken to apply the same to both the categories of
  authorities in case the rules of executive business of the State
  so permits.
E
       18. In view of what we have observed above there is no
  doubt in our mind that the Government Order referred to above
  shall not be applicable to the appellant authority.

F        19. Both the grounds given by the High Court while issuing
    the impugned direction, in our opinion, being unsustainable in
    law, same can not be allowed to stand.

      20. In the result, we allow these appeals, set aside the
  impugned judgments and orders of the High Court and dismiss
G the writ petitions, but without any order as to costs.

    K.K.T.                                      Appeals allowed.