Holding

A High Court may not entertain a writ petition under Article 226 when it involves complex disputed questions of fact that require oral evidence; in such circumstances it must decline jurisdiction and refer the matter to the appropriate ordinary remedy.

Summary

The New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) acquired land belonging to several cooperative societies and, as per its policy, was to allot 40% of the acquired land to the societies' members. The Kendriya Karamchari Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti claimed ownership of 292 bighas, provided a member list, and NOIDA allotted plots to 1,754 persons, accepting payments. Subsequent complaints revealed many genuine members were omitted; NOIDA demanded verification documents, which the society failed to furnish, leading NOIDA to cancel the allotments. The society filed a writ petition under Article 226 challenging the cancellation; the Allahabad High Court allowed the petition, holding NOIDA acted arbitrarily. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that while a High Court may entertain writ petitions involving factual issues, it must decline when the case raises complex disputed facts requiring evidence, and therefore the High Court erred in entertaining the petition. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court order and dismissed the writ petition, allowing the appeal without costs.

Issues considered

Whether a High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 when the matter involves complex disputed questions of fact requiring evidence.
Whether the High Court should have declined jurisdiction and directed the parties to a regular suit for resolution of factual disputes.
Whether the cancellation of land allotments by NOIDA was arbitrary, illegal, or justified under the statutory scheme.
Whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel applies to the society's claim for the allotted plots.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Article 226writ petitionjurisdictiondisputed factscomplex factual issueshigh courtland acquisitioncooperative societyallotmentpromissory estoppel

Judgment

A
NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
v.
KENDRIYA KARAMCHARI SAHKARI GRIH NIRMAN SAMIT!

APRIL 24, 2006
B
. [ARIJIT PASAYA T AND TARUN CHATTERJEE, JJ.]

Constitution of India, I950:

Article 226-Writ petition--Disputed questions offact-Maintainability C
of-Jurisdiction of High Court-Held: High Court is not deprived of its
jurisdiction to entertain a petition merely because in considering the
petitioner's right to relief questions of fact may fall to be determined--
However, if the petition raises complex questions offact which may.for their
determination, require oral evidence to be taken and on that account the D
High Court is of the view that the disputed statement may not be appropriately
tried in a writ petition, the High Court should ordinarily decline to try the
petition-Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act, 1976, S. 3.

The appellant acquired the land of a number of Cooperative Societies
compulsorily and, therefore, a decision was taken by the appellant that land E
equivalent to 40% of the land holding of such societies would be made available
for allotment to the members of the societies whose land was acquired. The
respondent-society represented that it owned 292 bighas of land and on that
basis moved for allotment of land for the benefit of its members. The appellant
asked the respondent-society to send a list of its members duly verified by
F
the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies and accordingly a list was
sent. Acting on the basis of the representation made by the Society and
believing the same to be correct, the appellant proceeded to allot land equivalent
to 40% of 292 bighas. The respondent wrote a letter indicating details of
such 292 bighas. Allotment letters were issued to individual members totaling
1754. Accordingly, payments in respect of such allotments to 1754 persons G
were accepted. Complaints were received from various persons who alleged
that they were in fact members of the respondent-society, but their names
were not forwarded by the Society for allotment of plots.

205 H
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A The appellant gave thirty days' time to furnish various documents so
that allotment to the extent of 40% of the land acquired from the society in
case of its genuine members could be granted. It was clearly indicated that in
case the details were not furnished, all the allotments made to the members
of the society would be cancelled and the money deposited forfeited. Despite
grant of opportunities and the assurances made nothing concrete was placed
B by the respondent-Society to substantiate the genuine membership. In these
circumstances, the appellant cancelled the allotments. Questioning the
correctness of the cancellation, the respondent-Society filed a writ petition
before the High Court, which was allowed. Hence the appeal.

C On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that the High Court erred
in entering into disputed questions of fact.

Allowing the appeal, the Court .
HELD: I.I. High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a
O petition merely because in considering the petitioner's right to relief
questions of fact may fall to be determined. 1213-BI

Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee, AIR (1970) SC 802, relied on.

1.2. In a petition under Article 226, the High Court has jurisdiction to
E try issues of law and fact. Where, however, the petition raises complex
question of fact, the Court should not entertain the petition. 1213-CI

Mahanta Moti Das v. S.P. Sahid, AIR (1959) SC 942, relied on.

1.3. If disputed questions of fact arise and the High Court is of the view
F that those may not be appropriately tried in a writ petition, the High Court
has jurisdiction to refuse to try those questions and relegate the party to his
normal remedy to obtain redress in a suit. 1213-D-El

Union of India v. TR. Verma, AIR (1957) SC 882, relied on.

G 2.1. In a petition under Article 226, the High Court has jurisdiction to
try issues both of fact and law. When the petition raises complex questions of
fact which may, for their determination, require oral evidence to be taken and
on that account the High Court is of the view that the disputed statement may
not be appropriately tried in a writ petition, the High Court should ordinarily
H ..
NEW OKHLA INDUS. DEV. AUTI!. ''· KENDRIYA KARAMCHARI SAHKARJ GRJH NIRMAN SAMITI [PASAYAT. J] 207

decline to try the petition.1213-E-Fl A
2.2. Thus, a High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain
a petition under Article 226 merely because in considering the petitioner's
right, question of fact may fall to be determined. Ultimately, the question is
one of discretion which is to be exercised in conformity with judicial
principles. (213~F-GJ B
3. The High Court entertained the writ petition on the ground that the
appellant by acting wholly arbitrarily and illegally had discrimination against
the writ petitioner. These conclusions were based on no material. On the
contrary, the factual scenario goes to show that the respondent-Society was C
not entitled to maintain a writ petition. The High Court's order is, therefore,
clearly unsustainable and is set aside.1213-G-H; 214-AJ

Kendriya Karamchari Sahkari Nirman Samiti ltd. v. The New Okhla
Industrial Development Authority, AIR (1988) SC I, referred to.
D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1569 of 2004.

From the Final Judgment and Order dated 5.8.2003 of the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad in C.M.W.P. No. ~9842/2001.

Raj~ Ramachandran and Ravindra Kumar for the Appellant. E
V.A. Bobde and Lakshmi Raman Singh for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ARIJlT PASAYAT, J. Challenge in this appeal is to the legality of F
judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court allowing
the writ petition filed by the respondent.

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Appellant - New Okhla Industrial Development Authority ·(in short the G

-- 'NOIDA ') was constituted under the provisions of Section 3 .of the Uttar
Pradesh Indastrial Area Development Act, 1976 (in short the 'Act'). The main
object of the Act was planned development of an industrial development area.
For the said purpose State of Uttar Pradesh acquired lands falling in various
villages by invoking the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in H
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A short the 'LA Act') by issuing various notifications. This Court in Kendriya
Karamchari Sahkari Nirman Samiti ltd & Anr. v. The New Okhla Industrial
Development Authority & Ors.. AIR ( 1988) SC I held that lands belonging
to cooperative societies are not exempt from acquisition by the State for the
purpose of planned development of Noida area. Since the land of a number
B of Co-operative Societies were compulsorily acquired, a decision was taken
by the NOIDA that land equivalent to 40% of the land holding of such
societies would be made available for allotment to the members of the societies
whose land was acquired. The respondent - society represented vide its letter
dated 30th April 1994 that it owned 292 bighas of land and on that basis
moved for allotment of land for the benefit of its members. In response a letter
C dated 14.6.1994 was written by NOIDA that the respondent's request for
allotment of residential plots is under consideration and as soon as the
decision is taken necessary infonnation shall be given. By letter dated 8.8.1994
appellant asked the respondent - society to send a list of its members duly
verified by the District Assistant Registrar Cooperative Societies, Ghaziabad.
A list was sent purportedly verified by the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative
D Societies. Acting on the basis of representation made by the Society and
believing the same to be correct, appellant proceeded to allot land equivalent
to 40% of292 bighas. The respondent wrote a letter dated 9.9.1994 indicating
details of such 292 bighas. In February and March, 1995 allotment letters were
issued to individual members totaling 1754 for land measuring 3.23,650 sq.m.
E In paragraph 21 of the allotment letter it was stipulated as follows :

"21. CONSEQUENCES OF MIS-REPRESENTATION

If the allotment/lease of the plot is obtained by any
misrepresentation, suppression of material fact, mis-statement of fraud,
F allotment/lease may be cancelled/detennined and the possession of
the plot and building thereon (if exists) may be resumed by the Chief
Executive Officer or his duly authorized representative and the allottee/
lessee will not be entitled to any compensation. Entire money deposited
will also be forfeited in favour of the authority. Besides, Authority will
be at liberty to initiate legal action against such allottee/lessee."
G
Accordingly, payments in respect of such allotments to 1754 persons
were accepted. Complaints were received from various persons who alleged
that they were in fact members of the respondent-society, but their names
-
were not forwarded by the Society for allotment of plots. In view of these
H complaints and with a view and intent to check correctness of the membership
NEW OKHLA INDUS. DEV:AUlll. '· KENDRIYA KARAMCHARI SAHKARl GRIH NIRMAN SAMIT! [PASAYAT, J.] 209

list, appellant requested Secretary of the respondent-Society on 1.5.1996 to A
give the following details :

I. Year-wise detailed infonnation of members enrolled by the society;

2. Year-wise membership fees deposited by the members to obtain
membership of the society and fm1her year-wise details regarding B
deposit of such an amount by the society.

3. Year-wise details of pass book containing entries deposit of
membership fees.

4. Details of cash book, balance sheet etc. from the inception of the C
society till 1988.

On 15.5.1996 President of the respondent-Society Sh. Balbir Singh
infonned the appellant that he had asked the Secretary to place relevant
records before him. But no documents were forwarded. Letter dated 1.5.1996
was followed by another letter dated 21.6.1996 reiterating that if documents D
asked for were not furnished, allotments would be cancelled. Public notice
was given on 22.6.1996 and 25.6.1996 as no documents were furnished. On
26. 7.1996 the President of the respondent-Society requested grant of further
15 days' time to furnish the documents. On 4.10.1996 a letter was received
from the office of the Governor, Uttar Pradesh along with complaints from E
various persons who claimed to be members of the respondent-Society and
whose names were not forwarded by the respondent-society for allotment of
plots. A list of membership of the respondent-society duly authenticated by
the Registrar, Uttar Pradesh Housing and Development .Board, Lucknow
indicated that only 546 members were enrolled by the Society upto 27.4.1987.
F
Name of many persons mentioned in this list and those who had sent
complaints regarding exclusion were not found in the list purported to have
been verified by Sh. Balbir Singh, president of the respondent-Society, who
had earlier claimed to have verified the membership as Assistant Registrar-
Cooperative societies. In these circumstances an enquiry was conducted by.
the Deputy Chief Executive officer of the appellant. In this enquiry on the . G
basis of the infonnation collected, award given by the Additional District
Magistrate on 17.8.1996 and the repo1i or'the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad
dated 24. I. 1997 it was revealed that the Society had made gross
misrepresentation that 292 bighas of land had been acquired and a false claim
for allotment of 40% of the said areas was set up. It was further revealed that H
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A Society had received compensation for land acquisition in respect of only 34
bighas of land. Interestingly 65 bighas of land recorded in the name of the
Society had vested in the State Government in terms of Section 154 of the
Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. More curiously, in
respect of 118 bighas of land from the remaining 192 bighas of land
B compensation had been taken by the farmers and not by the respondent-
Society. Therefore, a show cause notice was issued on 8.7.1997 requiring the
respondent specifically to furnish the following documents:

I. Year-wise details of payments made for purchase of land and
concerned sale deeds.
c 2. Year-wise details of receipt of compensation for the land.

3. Year-wise detailed information of members enrolled by the society
with their full particulars name, age, parentage and address.

4. Year-wise membership fees deposited by the members to obtain
D membership of the society and further yearwise details regarding
deposit of such an amount by the society.

5. Year-wise details of pass book containing entries depot of
membership fees.

E 6. Details of cash book, balance sheet etc. from the inception of the
society till 1988.

7. Copies of proceedings of the Annual General Meeting for the
each year since inception.

F 8. List of original members, if any, submitted at the time of registration
to the housing commissioner/Registrar.

9. Annual audit report for each year of the society from the
beginning.

G Thirty days' time was given to furnish the document so that allotment
to the extent of 40% of the land acquired from the society in case of its
genuine members could be granted. It was clearly indicated that in case the
details were not furnished, all the allotments made to the members of the
society would be cancelled and money deposited forfeited. Legal proceedings
wc:re contemplated against office bearers of the society for playing fraud.
H
.NEW OKHLA INDUS. DEV. AUlll. v. KENDRIYA KARAMCHARJ SAHKARI GRIH NIRMAN SAMITI [PASA YAT,!.] 2J )

In response, the re~pondent-Society furnished a list of members enrolled A
between 1.4.1987 to 31.5.1987 and stated that the remaining documents would
be sent soon. On 4.10.1997 the respondent-Society sent another letter
alongwith which another list of members enrolled between 1.6.1987 to
31.10.1987 was annexed. Again time was asked for and assurance was given
to furnish other documents. Despite grant of opportunities and the assurances B
made, nothing concrete was placed by the respondent-Society to substantiate
the genuine membership. In these circumstances cancellation letter was issued
on 5.5.1998 indicating that in view of non-submission of relevant documents
and the malpractice adopted, the allotments were cancelled. Although
according to the appellant, it was entitled to forfeit the amount in deposit yet
a decision was taken to refund the same to the members who had earlier been C
allotted plots.

Questioning correctness of the cancellation, certain members of the
respondent-society filed a petition before the MRTP Commission. The
Association was titled as "Noida Sector 43 Allottees Welfare Association".
Initially by order dated 15.5.1988 MRTP Commission granted an order of D
status quo. Subsequently another petition was filed before the MRTP
Commission. Counter Affidavit was filed by present appellant before the
Commission indicating as to how massive fraud have been practiced by the
respondent. A rejoinder was filed by the appellant. During pendency of the
matter before the Commission, a Writ Petition was filed on 19.11.200 l before E
the Allahabad High Court questioning the decision dated 5.5.1998. On 15.l.2002
the petition before the Commission was withdrawn by the respondent. In the
writ petition counter affidavit was filed. Attention was drawn to order dated
7.3.2003 passed by this Court in I.A. No. 18 of2002 in Civil Appeal No. 5502
of 1983. This court directed the NOIDA to comply with the direction dated
4.4.1991 and to develop and bring before this court a housing scheme for 242 F
members of the U.P. Residents Society. Rejafoder was filed on 20.7.2003.
Though appell~nt requested for time to file further affidavit and documents
prayer was not granted. The High Court reserved judgment on that date and
by order dated 5.8.2003 the writ petition was allowed. The judgment is under
!
challenge in this Appeal.\ " G
Learned counsel for the appellant inter alia submitted that the High
Court entered into disputed questions of fact. It was specifically brought to
the notice of the High Court that dispute relating to 64 bighas of land was
pending before the Board: of Revenue and that in respect of 118 bighas of
land compensation had been taken by the farmers and the factual scenario H
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A clearly indicated as to how fraud was practiced by the respondent-Society.
The H ,gh Court not only nullified the effect of the proceedings before the
Board of Revenue, but also gave findings to the effect that fraud was committed
by the fanners and also directed payment of interest. According to learned
counsel principles of Promissory Estoppel had no application to the facts of
B the case, though the High Court founded its conclusions on those principles.

In reply, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there was
no dispute regarding membership which could be adjudicated by the appellant.
It was a matter for the Co-operative Societies Authorities. Even if it is accepted
that some matters were pending before the Board of Revenue that area can
C be at the most excluded. But denying entitlement of 40% on that ground is
not proper. Even if the farmers had taken the compensation, it is a matter
between the society and the farmers and that had no relevance so far as the
present dispute is concerned. The report of the Tehsildar clearly indicated
that 292 bighas of land had been acquired from the society.

D Though it is claimed by the respondent that there was no dispute that
292 bighas of land had been acquired by the Society, on verification of
records the position appears to be entirely different. It has been all through
the stand of appellant that the Society had misrepresented to be the owner
of 292 bighas of land. This is a disputed question of title which was to be
E established in an appropriate court of law and the writ petition was not the
proper remedy. Further as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the
appellant, the High Court's order practically renders the proceedings before
the Board of Revenue redundant. Findings recorded about the merits of the
proceedings before the Board of Revenue when the State was not a party in
the writ petition is an impermissible course adopted by the High Court. Even
F otherwise, the finding that farmers have practiced fraud is without any
foundation since farmers were not parties in the writ petition. The appellant's
effort was to verify genuineness of the members who were claimed by the
Society to be its genuine members. Interestingly at the initial stage the list
was verified by Sh. Balbir Singh who undisputedly was President of the
G respondent-Society. In spite of several opportunities the details regarding
membership were not furnished. Obviously it cannot be said that the appellant
was bound to allot land, even if the membership was not established and it
was established that large number of people were not genuine members.
Allotment in the manner desired by the respondent-Society would be against
the very purpose of allotment flowing from the scheme in question. In any
H event highly disputed questions of fact were involved. The High Court did
NEW OKHLA INDUS. DEV. AUIB. " KENDRIY A KARAMCHARl SAHKARI GRIH MRMAN SAMIT! [PASA YAT,J.] 21 J

not examine that issue in its proper perspective. It only referred to some A
decisions which noted that the High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction
to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, merely because
in considering the petitioner's right to relief, questions of fact may fall to be
determined. These judgments have been read out of context. It is fairly well
settled that disputed questions of fact should not be gone into by the Higlo. B
Court in writ proceedings.

A High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition
merely because in considering petitioner's right to relief question of fact may
fall to be determined as pointed out in Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee,
AIR (1970) SC 802. In a petition under Article 226, the High Court has C
jurisdiction to try issues of law and fact. Where, however, the petition raises
complex question of fact, the Court should not entertain the petition. In
Mahanta Moti Das v. SP. Sahid, AIR (1959) SC 942 the High Court refused
to go into the question as to whether Trusts were public or private trusts as
the question had involved investigation of complicated facts and recording
of evidence. The view was upheld. Thus, ifthere is a question on which there D
is a serious dispute which cannot be satisfactorily decided without taking
evidence, it should not be decided in a writ proceeding (See Union of India
v. T.R. Verma, AIR ( 1957) SC 882). If disputed questions of fact arise and the
High Court is of the view that those may not be appropriately tried in a writ
petition, the High Court has jurisdiction to refuse to try those questions and E
relegate the party to his normal remedy to obtain redress in a suit.

In a petition under Article 226, the High Court has jurisdiction to try
issues both of fact and law. When the petition raises complex questions of
fact which may, for their determination, require oral evidence to be taken and
on that account the High Court is of the view that the disputed statement may F
not be appropriately tried in a writ petition, the High Court should ordinarily
decline to try the petition.

Thus, a High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a
petition under Article 226 merely because in considering the petitioner's right,
question of fact may fall to be determined. Ultimately, the question is one of G
discretion which is to be exercised in conformity with judicial principles.

The High Court entertained the writ petition on the ground that the
present appellant by acting wholly arbitrarily and illegally had discrimination
against the writ petitioner. These conclusions were based on no material. On H
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A the contrary, the factual scenario as described above goes to show that the
respondent-Society was not entitled to maintain a writ petition. Further there
was no claim for interest made in the writ petition but the High Court granted
interest. Looked at any angle the High Court's order is clearly unsustainable
and is set aside. The Writ Petition (Civil) No. 39842 of 2001 filed before the
B High Court is dismissed.

The appeal is allowed but in the circumstances without any order as to
costs.

V.S.S. Appeal allowed.