Holding

The 2004 petition is barred by laches, delay, and Order II Rule 2, and Section 17 acquisition precludes the operation of Section 11’s limitation, so the High Court’s order is set aside.

Summary

The New Okhla Industrial Development Authority acquired land of several owners in 1990‑1992 using the urgency provision of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The owners challenged the acquisition in the High Court, which dismissed their writ petitions, and the Supreme Court upheld the acquisition while allowing them to make a representation under Section 48(1). Their representation was rejected by the State in 1999, and subsequent writ petitions again failed, with the Supreme Court affirming the rejection in 2003. In 2004 the owners filed a fresh writ petition contending that the award of 1996 was beyond the two‑year limitation period of Section 11, seeking fresh notifications and a new award. The Supreme Court held that the 2004 petition was barred by the doctrine of laches, the delay provisions of Order II Rule 2 of the CPC, and that Section 17 acquisition removed the applicability of Section 11’s limitation, rendering the High Court’s order untenable. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the High Court judgment set aside.

Issues considered

The 2004 petition challenging the validity of the 1996 award on limitation grounds is maintainable despite earlier challenges.
Whether the urgency provision under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act bars the operation of Section 11’s limitation period.
Whether the petition is barred by the doctrine of laches and Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order II Rule 2
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 1, s. 11, s. 17, s. 18, s. 4, s. 48, s. 6

Subjects

land acquisitionlimitation periodSection 17 urgencylachesdelayOrder II Rule 2Section 48 representationjudicial review

Judgment

[2017] I S.C.R. 572

A NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
v.
HARKISHAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 5170 of 2010)
B JANUARY 27, 2017
[A. K. SIKRI AND R. K. AGRAWAL, JJ.)
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - s. llA - Land acquisition
proceedings - Notification uls. 4 rlw. s. 17 issued in January
1991 - Declaration u/s. 6 rlw. s. 17 in January 1992 - Land-owners
c (respondents) challenged emergency provision - During pendency
of the litigation possession of the land was taken over by the State
and award (dated August 17, 1996) was passed - Finally the
acquisition was upheld by Supreme Court - However, liberty was
granted to file representation - Land-owners filed representation
D for release of Land u!.~. 48(1) which was rejected by State by order
dated December 3, 1999 - Land-owners again challenged the order
dated December 3, 1999 - This challenge also failed as the cases
were dismissed by Supreme court in the year 2003 - Thereafter, in
2004, land-lords challenged the award dated August 7, 1996 on
the ground that it was passed beyond the period of limitation as
E
prescribed u/s. llA - High Court agreed to the plea and directed to
issue fresh notifications u/ss. 4 and 6 and thereafter to make award
uls. II in order to cure the defect - On appeal, held: The land-lords
having failed to challenge the award in the 1st and llnd round of
litigation, the petition filed in the year 2004 challenging the mvard,
F is barred by the doctrine of /aches and delays as also by the
provisions under Or. JI, r. 2 CFC - Also as the urgency provision
u/s. 17 was upheld by Supreme court and possession of the land
was taken u/s. 17(1), s. JJA would not get attracted- Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 - Or. JI, r. 2 - Delay/Laches.
G Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. In the first round of litigation, when acquisition
was challenged by the respondents, they failed in their attempt.
At that time, not only declaration under Section 6 of the Act had
been passed, the writ petitions were also dismissed by the High
H Court on August 24, 1995. Thereafter, possession of the land
572
NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. 573
HARKISHAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

was taken on November 18, 1995. Subsequently, the award was A
also passed on August 17, 1996. This Court passed the judgment
dated July 15, 1998 thereby affirming the judgment of the High
Court. No doubt, event of the passing of the award dated August
17, 1996 had taken place during pendency of the appeals in this
Court. Fact remains that this was not questioned at the time of
B
arguments advanced by the parties. The entire gamut of
controversy was gone into by the court and the only permission
which was given to the respondents was to make a suitable
representation before the appropriate State authorities under
Section 48(1) of the Act. [Para 10] [581-E-G]
2. When the respondents made the representation, it was c
dealt with and rejected by the State Government vide order dated
December 03, 1999. At tl)at time, award had been passed.
However, in the second round of writ petitions preferred by the
respondents, they chose to challenge only Office Order dated
December 03, 1999 vide which their representation under Section D
48 of the Act had been rejected and it never dawned on them to
challenge the validity of the award on the ground that the same
was not passed within the prescribed period of limitation. Tlhus,
in the second round of litigation also, the respondents· failed in ,
their attempt, inasmuch as, this Court put its imprimatur to the
rejection order dated December 03, 1999 vide its judgment dated E
March 12, 2003. At that time, even the possession of land had
been taken. If the respondents wanted to challenge the validity
of the award on the ground that it was passed beyond the period
of limitation, they should have done so immediately and, in any
case, in the second round of writ petitions filed by them. Filing F
fresh writ petition challenging the validity of the award for the
first time in the year 2004 would, therefore, not only be barred
by the provisions of Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, but would also be barred on the doctrine of
!aches and delays as well. [Para 11] (581-H; 582-A-D]
3. There is yet another serious infirmity in the impugned
judgment. In the instant case, the land was acquired by invoking
urgency clause under Section 17 of the Act and dispensing with
the requirement of filing the objections under Section SA of the
Act. This action on the part of the Government was upheld by
1-1
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 1 S.C.R.

A this Court in the first round of litigation. Once possession is
taken under ·section 17(1) of the Act, Section llA is not even
attracted and, therefore, acquisition proceedings would not lapse
on failure to make award within the period prescribed therein.
[Para 12) [582-E-F]
B Saicndra Prasad Jain & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh
& Ors. (1993) 4 SCC 369 : 1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 336;
Awadh Bihari Yadav & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors.
(1995) 6 SCC 31 : 1995 (3) Suppl. SCR 197 - relied
on.
Ved Prakash & Ors. v. Ministry of Industry, Luckno11•
c & Am: (2003) 9 SCC 542 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
f2003) 9 sec 542 referred to Para 1
1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 336 relied on Para 12
D 1995 (3) Suppl. SCR 197 relied on Para 12
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: CiviiAppeal No. 5170
of2010.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.06.2009 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 55426 of
E 2004.
Ravindra Kumar, Adv. for the Appellant.
R. P. Bhatt, Sr. Adv., Aditya Shanna, Anil Kumar Sharma,
K. S. Rana, Advs. for the Respgndents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F A. K. SIKRI, J. I. This appeal has a chequered history. Matter
pertains to the acquisition of the land of the respondents, which was
acquired way back in the year 1990. Notification under Section 4 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') proposing
to acquire the land of the respondents, as well as some other persons,
G was issued on January 05, 1991. It was followed by declaration under
Section 6 issued on January 07, 1992. Even award, thereafter, was
pronounced on August 17, 1996. The acquisition proceedings were
challenged by the responden.ts by filing writ petition in the High Court,
which was dismissed by the High Court, and the appeal there against
was dismissed by this Court also on July 15, 1998. In this first round of
H litigation, while dismissing the appeal, this Court left open a little window
NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. 575
HARKISHAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

for the respondents herein by permitting them to make a representation A
to the ~tale Government under Section 48( I) of the Act. The respondents,
thus, made a representation for release of the land, which was considered
by the State Government. The State Government, however rejected the
same vide orders dated December 03, 1999. Second round oflitigation
started when this rejection ·was again challenged by the respondents by
B
filing writ petitions. This time again attempts of the respondents failed
as the writ petitions were dismissed by the High Court and those orders
were affinned by this Courtvide judgment dated March 12, 2003, reported
as Ved Prakash & Ors. v. Ministry of Industry, Lucknow & Anr.'.
2. Undeterred by the aforesaid dismissals, the respondents started
third round of litigation by approaching the High Court by way ofanother c
writ petition filed in the year 2004. This time, the validity of the award
passed in the year 1996 was challenged on the ground that the said
award was not passed within the period of two years as prescribed
under Section I IA of the Act and, therefore, acquisition proceedings
lapsed. In this attempt, the respondents have succeeded before the High D
Court inasmuch as vide its judgment dated June 30, 2009, the High Court
has accepted the aforesaid contention of the respondents thereby allowing
the writ petitions and directing the Collector to issue fresh notifications
under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act and thereafter make an award under
Section 11 of the Act which, according to the High Court, will cure the
defect that has crept in on account of delay in making the award beyond E
the period prescribed under Section 11 of the Act. It is this judgment
which is assailed by the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority,
at whose behest tlieland in question was acquired.
3. Neat question of law which is raised is that the petition filed in
the year 2004, after having lost twice, was not even maintainable as it E
suffered from unexplained delays and latches and was also barred by
the provisions of Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
For proper appreciation of this submission, we recount the events in
some detail hereinafter.
4. A notification dated January 05, 199 l was issued under the G
provisions of Section 4( 1) read with Section 17 of the Act, invoking
urgency provisions, to acquire about 790 bighas (496 acres) of land in
village Chalera Banger, Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar,
including the land belonging to the respondents herein, i.e. khasra No.
1
(2003)9 sec 542 H
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 1 S.C.R.

A 279 (measuring 2-13-10 bigha) and khasra No. 280 (measuring 2-6-10
bigha). The aforesaid notification was followed by issuance of declaration
dated January 07, 1992 under Section 6 read with Section 17 of the Act.
The respondents herein filed a writ.petition before the High Court of
Jud;cature at Allahabad challenging the acquisition on the ground that
the ernergency provision, thereby depriving them of their right to file
B
objections under Section SA of the Act, was illegal. This writ petition,
along with certain other writ petitions, was dismissed by the High Court
by common judgment dated August 24, 1995. Possession of the acquired
land was taken over by the State Government and handed over to the
appellant on November 18, 1995.
c 5. Aggrieved with the judgment dated August 24, 1995, the
respondents approached this Court by filing Special Leave Petition (Civil)
No. 1874 of 1996, in which leave was granted and numbered as Civil
Appeal No. 3263of1998. While this appeal was pending, in which there
was no stay, the State Government went ahead to complete the acquisition
D process. An award dated August 17, 1996, in respect of all the acquired
land vide declaration dated January 07, 1992, was passed by the Additional
District Magistrate (Land Acquisition), Ghaziabad.
6. The aforesaid appeal came up for final hearing in the year
1998. By a common judgment dated July 15, 1998 passed in a batch of
E civil appeals, lead case being Civil Appeal No. 3261of1998 (which
batch included Civil Appeal No. 3263of1998 that was filed by respondent
Nos. 1 to 3 herein), this Court, while dismissing the appeals, granted
liberty to the respondents to file a representation under Section 48( 1) of
the Act. Thus, acquisition was upheld, but at the same time, permission
to file a representation was given. Relevant portion of the order, which
F is material for deciding this appeal, is reproduced below:
"Section 4 Notification in the present cases is dated 5'h January,
1991. It is followed by Section 6 Notification dated 7'h January,
1992. In between the appellants went to the High Court and got
status quo order since 31" March 1992. Results is that till today
G even after the expiry of 6 years and more, the land acquisition
proceedings qua the appellants' lands have remained stagnant. It
is also to be kept in view that the impugned notification under
Section 6 of"the Act was issued for the purpose of planned
development of District Ghaziabad through NOIDA and by the
H said notification, 496 acres ofland spread over hundreds of plot
NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. 577
HARKISHAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

numbers have been acquired. Out of 494.26 acres of land under A
acquisition, only the present appellants owning about 50 acres,
making a grievance about acquisition of their lands have gone to
the Court. Thus, almost 9/1 O'" of the acquired lands have stood
validly acquired under the land acquisition proceedings and only
dispute centers round I/10th of these acquired lands owned by
B
the present appellants. It is a comprehensive project for the further
planned development in the district. We are informed by learned
senior counsel Shri Mohta for NO IDA that a lot of construction
work has been done on the undisputed land under acquisition and
pipelines and other infrastructure have been put up. That the
disputed lands belonging to the appellants may have stray c
constructions spread over different pockets of his huge complex
oflands sought to be acquired. That ifnotification under Section
4(1) read with Section 17(4) is set aside qua these pockets of
lands then the entire developmentactivity in the complex will come
to a grinding halt and that would not be in the interest of anyone.
D
... That we cannot permit upsetting the entire apple cart of
acquisition of 500 acres only at the behest of 1/10th oflandowners
whose lands are sought to be acquired. We may also keep in
view the further salient fact that all the appellants have filed
references for additional compensation under Section 18 of the
Act." E

7. Respondent Nos. I to 3, pursuant to the liberty granted by this
Court, filed representation dated August 28, 1998 before the State
Government. This representation was ultimately decided vide order dated
December 03, 1999. By that order, the State Government rejected the
representation filed by respondent Nos. I to 3. F

8. The respondents, and other similarly situated persons, whose
representations had met the same fate, felt dissatisfied with the rejection.
As a result, a number of writ petitions were filed by the erstwhile land
owners challenging the order dated December 03, 1999 passed by the
State Government whereby their representations had been rejected. All G
the writ petitions were clubbed together and dismissed by a common
order passed by the High Court. Dissatisfied landowners, whose lands
were acquired, again approached this Court. A number of special leave
petitions were filed challenging the aforesaid dismissal of the writ petitions
wherein leave was granted. Civil Appeal No. 999 of 2001 was treated . H
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] I S.C.R.

A as the lead case. All the civil appeals, special leave petitions and the
contempt petitions were dismissed by this Court by a common judgment
.dated March 12, 2003.
9. A perusal of this judgment would show that focus of this Court
was on the validity of Office Order dated December 63, 1999 passed by
B the State Government vide which representations of the respondents
and others under Section 48( I) of the Act had been dismissed and 11fter
examining the matter at length, this Court concluded that there was no
infirmity in the order of the State Government rejecting the
representations on the ground that it was not feasible to release the
lands of the respondents and others from acquisition under Section 48(1)
c . of the Act. The court referred to its earlier judgment dated July 15, 1998
wherein challenge to the acquisition laid by the respondents was repelled
but an opportunity was given to the respondents to make a representation
under Section 48( I) of the Act. Extensively quoting from the earlier
judgment, the Court found that all the aspects which the State Government
D was supposed to consider, as per the directions given in the earlier
judgment, were duly dealt with and considered by the State Government
and there was no reason to interfere with the same. We would also like
to reproduce some of the dis.cussion contained in the said judgment:
"19. The 1976 Act provides for the constitution of an authority
E for the development of certain areas in the State. A notification
was published in the Gazette dated 17-4-1976 under the Act
declaring the area comprising the villages mentioned in the Schedule
called the "New Okhla Industrial Development Area". Village
Chalera Bangar is one of the villages included in the Schedule
and the lands in question are in the same village. The function of
F the authority under Section 6 of the Act is to acquire the land in
the notified area by the agreement or through the proceedings
under the Land Acquisition Act, to prepare a plan for the
development of the industrial area, to provide infrastructure for
industrial, commercial and residential purposes, to regulate the
G erection of buildings and setting up of the industries and to lay
down the purpose for which a particular site or plot of land shall
be used, namely, for industrial, commercial or residential or for
any other specified purpose in such area. Section 8 authorises the
authority to issue directions such as the alignment of buildings on
any site, the restrictions and conditions in regard to open spaces
H to be maintained in and around buildings and height and character
NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. 579
HARKISHAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

of buildings and the number of residential buildings that may be A
erected on any site. Section 9 imposes a ban on erection of building>
in contravention ofregulations. As is evident from this section, no
person could erect or occupy any building in the industrial
development area in contravention of any building regulation made
under the Act Regulation 4 of the Building Regulations shows
B
that no person shall erect any building without obtaining a prior
building permit thereof from the Chief Executive Officer in the
manner provided.
20. There is no material to show that the constructions and
structures said to be existing in the abadi area were existing prior
to the notification issued on 17-4-1976 as no village map or other c
documents show the same in the large area of abadi claimed by
the appellants. Certain provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act
are already extracted above. Looking to the said provisions, it is
clear that field-books, maps, record-of-rights and annual register
had to be maintained. There could be resurvey and revision of D
map and records. The argument was advanced on behalf of the
appellants that abadi existing long back could not continue to be
the same; over the years when families grew, population increased,
necessarily corresponding abadi area also increased; new
constructions and structures came up. If that be so then the same
thing could have been reflected in the records and the map E
maintained under the 1901 Act. Similarly, it is not shown that such
structures or constructions were put up with the permission as
required under the provisions of the Act and the Regulations.
Section I 0 of the Act even provides for ordering proper
maintenance of site or building if it appears to the authority that F
the condition or use ofany site or building is prejudicially affecting
or is likely to affect the proper planning or the maintenance in any
part of the industrial development area or the interest of the general
public thereto requires that the authority could directthe transferee
or occupier of the site or building to take steps within the period
specified to maintain a site or building in such manner as may be G
specified. When the large area of about 496 acres of land was
acquired for planned development of industrial area called the
New Okhla Industrial Development Area and the object and
purpos.e of the Act is sought to be achieved as provided in the
Act, the authority has power to acquire the lands and to give
H
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] I S.C.R.

A necessary direction or tak.e steps to maintain and regulate the
sites and buildings in the area. The State authority having
elaborately considered the evidence available on record found
that the claim of the appellants as to abadi is spread over in a
scattered manner in a large area apart from being whether that
was an abadi or not and whether it was existing prior to the issue
B
ofnotification in 1976. Having regard to all aspects, the.authority
found that it was not feasible to release the lands of the appellants
from acquisition under-Section 48(1) of the Act. As is evident
even from the survey report that boongas, bitooras, thatched
huts, thatched sheds etc. occupied a small area but were spread
c over a long distance. The photographs show that large area is
open land even in the so-called abadi area, so an individual
assuming could claim some area as abadi that cou Id be a small .
area appurtenant to his residential house or a farm house or any
cattle-shed etc. but the appellants claim for large area covering
few acres of land as abadi, is untenable. All the more so, when it
D
could not be legitimately claimed or asserted that they were
regularly living in those structures of very kachatype. The nature
of the construction, their age from its appearance etc. give an
impression that they were hurriedly planted at later dates only to
circumvent the land acquisition proceedings.
E 21. As already stated above, the competent authority in compliance
with the directions given by this Court in Om Prakash case in the
light of observations made therein having considered the evidence
placed on record and after hearing the parties, recorded.findings
and held that it was not feasible to release the lands of the appellants
F from acquisition. From the impugned judgment of the High Court
it is clear that the High Court kept in view the scope and judicial
review in dealing with the impugned order dated 3-12-1999, passed
by the competent authority. In CIT v. !v[qhindra and Mahindra
Ltd. [( 1983) 4 SCC 392] this Court, while stating that by now, the
parameters of the Court's power ofjudicial review of administrative
G or executive action or decision and the grounds on which the Court
can interfere with the same are well settled, proceeded to say
further in para 11, thus: (SCC p. 402)
"11.. .. Indisputably, it is a settled position that if the action or
decision is perverse or is such that no reasonable body of
H persons, properly informed, could come to or has been arrived
\
NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. 581
HARKISHAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

at by the authority misdirecting itself by adopting a wrong A ·,
approach or has been influenced by irrelevant or extraneous
matters the Court would be justified in interfering with the
same."
In the same decisionit is also stated that in examining the validity
of an order in such matters the test is to see whether there is any B
infirmity in the decision"making process and not the decision itself.
From this decision it is also clear that when choices are open to
the authority it is for that authority to decide upon the choice and
not for the court to substitute its view. The High Court keeping in
view the scope of judicial review in such matters considered the
respective contentions raised before it. On finding that the authority c
passed the impugned order dated 3-12-1999 on proper
consideration of the evidence placed before it and after hearing
the parties in the light of the directions given and observations
made by this Court in the case of Om Prakash did not consider it
appropriate to interfere with the impugned order. We do not find D
any good or valid reason so as to interfere with the impugned
judgment of the High Court affirming the order passed by the
authority."
10. It becomes clear from the above that in the first round of
litigation, when acquisition was challenged by the respondents, they failed
E
in their attempt. At that time, not only declaration under Section 6 of the
Act had been passed, the writ petitions were also dismissed by the High
Court on August 24, 1995. Thereafter, possession of the land was taken
on November 18, 1995. Subsequently, the award was also passed on
August 17, 1996; This Court passed the judgment dated July 15, 1998
thereby affirming the judgment of the High Court. No doubt, event of F
the passing of the award dated August 17, 1996 had taken place during
pendency of the appeals in this Court. Fact remains that this was not
questioned at th~ time of arguments advanced by the parties. Even for a
moment it is accepted that the subject matter of the civil appeals in the
first round oflitigation in this Court was validity of notifications issued
G
under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, what is to be borne in mind is that the
entire gamut of controversy was gone into and the only permission which
was given to the respondents was to make a suitable representation
before the appropriate State authorities under Section 48( I) of the Act.
11. More importantly, when the respondents made the
H
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20 I 7] I S.C.R.

A representation, it was dealt with and rejected by the State Government
vide order dated December 03, 1999. At that time, award had been
passed. However, in the second round of writ petitions preferred by the
respondents, they chose to challenge only Office Order dated December
03, 1999 vide which their representation under Section 48 of the Act had
been rejected and it never dawned on them to challenge the validity of
B
the award on the ground that the same was not passed within the
prescribed period oflimitation. As noted above, in the second round of
litigation also, the respondents failed in their attempt, inasmuch as, this
Court put its imprimatur to the rejection order dated December 03, I 999
vi de its judgment dated March 12, 2003. At that time, even the possession
c of land had been taken. If the respondents ~anted to challenge the.
validity of the award on the ground that it was passed beyond the period
oflimitation, they should have done so immediately and, in any case, in
the second round of writ petitions filed by them. Filing fresh writ petition
challenging the validity of the award for the first time in the year 2004
would, therefore, not only be barred by the provisions of Order II Rule 2
D
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but would also be barred on the
doctrine of !aches and delays as well.
12. There is yet another serious infirmity in the impugned judgment.
In the instant case, the land was acquired by invoking urgency clause
under Section I 7 of the Act and dispensing with the requirement of filing
E the objections under Section SA of the Act. This action on the part of the
Government was upheld by this Court in the first round of litigation.
Once possession is taken under Section 17(1) of the Act, Section I IA is
not even attracted and, therefore, acquisition proceedings would not lapse
on failure to make award within the period prescribed therein. This is so
F held in Satendra Prasad Jain & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesll &
Ors.', which view is affirmed in A.wadll Billari Y{l(fav & Ors. v. State
of Biliar & Ors.'
13. For all these reasons, we find fault with the approach of the
High Court in entertaining the writ petitions, which were clearly barred
G in law, and allowing the same. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed setting
aside the judgment of the High Court.
No costs.
Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal allowed.
2
(1993)4SCC369
H ' ( 1995) 6 sec 31