Holding

The Supreme Court held that only landowners who actually filed objections under Section 5A are entitled to a hearing, that acceptance of compensation amounts to implied consent, and that the Collector substantially complied with the procedural requirements of Section 5A, so the acquisition proceedings stand affirmed.

Summary

The New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) sought to acquire 83.761 hectares of land for industrial development, issuing a Section 4 notification in 2013. Several landowners filed objections under Section 5A, claiming their lands were "abadi" and should be exempt, but the Collector dismissed the objections and issued a Section 6 declaration in 2015. The landowners challenged the acquisition, alleging non‑compliance with Section 5A because they were not properly served notice of a personal hearing and their objections were grouped together without individual consideration. The Supreme Court held that only those who actually filed objections are entitled to a hearing, that landowners who did not file objections or who accepted compensation are deemed to have acquiesced, and that the Collector had substantially complied with the procedural requirements of Section 5A, including proper service of notices and reasonable disposal of objections. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s order quashing the acquisition and dismissed the writ petitions, directing payment of compensation under the 2013 Act where not already paid.

Issues considered

Whether landowners who did not file objections under Section 5A, were not tenure‑holders at the time of the Section 4 notification, or accepted compensation, can challenge the acquisition on the ground of non‑compliance of Section 5A.
Whether the mandatory procedure prescribed by Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, including service of notice and personal hearing, was complied with in the present case.

Legislation cited

Evidence Act, 1872s. 114
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 4, s. 5A, s. 6
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013s. 24(1)

Subjects

Land acquisitionSection 5A complianceNotice of hearingObjection filingAcquiescenceEstoppelCompensation under 2013 ActPublic purposeAbadi landSubsequent purchaser

Judgment

[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1001 : 2024 INSC 508

New Okhla Industrial Development Authority
v.
Darshan Lal Bohra & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 8048 of 2019)
10 July 2024
[Surya Kant* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
(i) Whether the respondents-landowners forestalled their right
to challenge the acquisition proceeding on the ground of
non-compliance of Section 5A, Land Acquisition Act, 1894 because
they have not filed objections; or they were not tenure holders as
per the revenue records on the date of notification under Section
4 of the 1894 Act; or after submitting their objections, they have
accepted compensation without any demur; (ii) If the answer to
the aforementioned question is in negative, whether the mandatory
procedure contemplated under Section 5A has been complied with
in the instant case.

Headnotes†
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – s.5A – Compliance with –
Writ petitions were filed by the respondents-land owners
challenging the acquisition proceedings on the ground of
non-compliance of the procedure prescribed u/s.5A –
Respondents claimed being unaware of the acquisition
proceedings stating that they were not served with notices for
hearings – High Court quashed the notification issued u/s.6(1)
and annulled the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the
appellant – Correctness:
Held: The person who submits objections u/s.5A must be accorded
an opportunity of personal hearing – Such a hearing must precede
with an advance notice served upon the objector – The failure to
serve the notice would be sufficient to infer the defiance of s.5A –
However, whether or not an advance notice of hearing was served
upon an “objector” is a question of fact – Where the Collector takes
a specific stand that notices were duly served upon the persons
concerned and the record of service of such notices has been duly
maintained, the statutory presumption inscribed u/s.114, Evidence

* Author
1002 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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Act shall be drawn, wherein the Court may presume the existence
of facts, including “that judicial and official acts have been regularly
performed” – The rule of statutory presumption is a well-rooted
principle in Common Law and founded upon the dictum ‘omnia
praesumuntur rite esse acta’, namely, that the act can be presumed
to have been rightly and regularly done – The Court would presume
that the official act was done rightly and effectively and the burden
to prove contrary lies on the party who disputes the sanctity of such
act – Thus, the onus lay on the landowners to demonstrate that
the issuance or service of notices was inefficacious, which they
failed to discharge given their presence at the time of hearings,as
per the official record – Landowners were thus, duly served and
the procedure as mandated by s.5A was substantially complied
with – Impugned judgment of the High Court as well as all other
judgments following the said judgment, set aside – Writ petitions
filed by the respondents dismissed. [Paras 38-41, 56]
Maxim – ‘Omnia Consensus Tollit Errorem’ – Applicability –
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – ss.5A, 6 – “person interested”;
“objector” – Challenge to acquisition proceedings even by the
respondents-landowners who did not file objections – High
Court quashed the entire declaration issued u/s.6 and annulled
the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the appellant:
Held: s.5A(1) gives a “person interested” the right to file objections,
s.5A(2) affords only an “objector” the right to be heard – A person
cannot claim hearing as a matter of right u/s.5A(2) unless he has
filed objections – High Court erred while allowing the claim of even
those landowners who did not invoke their remedy u/s. 5A(1) – An
interested person who fails to file objections, is deemed to have
acquiesced to the acquisition – Maxim ‘Omnia Consensus Tollit
Errorem’, i.e., every assent removes error is attracted in case of
such owners – High Court could still have invalidated the acquisition
qua these landowners had there been a reason going to the very
root of the entire acquisition like the ‘public purpose’ of acquisition
being conspicuously absent, or the acquisition process being an
outcome of colorable exercise of power of eminent domain – In
such cases, all the landowners, even if they had not filed objections,
could seek annulment of the declaration issued u/s.6 – However, no
such plea was taken in the instant batch of cases except that the
procedure contemplated u/s.5A was deflated – Such objections were
personal to the landowners, as they sought individual exemption on
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1003

New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v.
Darshan Lal Bohra & Ors.

the plea that they had raised residential constructions on their land
under acquisition – Since it was a ground specific to each property,
High Court was wrong to grant the benefit en masse and quash
the entire declaration issued u/s.6 of the 1894 Act. [Paras 22, 23]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Challenge to acquisition
proceedings also by respondents-landowners who though filed
objections u/s.5A but, subsequently accepted compensation:
Held: When a landowner receives compensation volitionally
subsequent to filing of the objections u/s.5A and does not preserve
the right to pursue such objections, there is implied consent to the
acquisition – Having once acquiesced so, a landowner cannot be
permitted to do a volte-face and re-agitate the objections – Holding
otherwise, would open a Pandora’s Box where the landowners will,
on one hand, seek re-enquiry of their claims u/s.5A and, on the
other, will also draw the compensation – Thus, there would, be
no finality to the proceedings and the acquisition process would
be tainted by uncertainty and unpredictability which would further
have a chilling effect on the development projects – Therefore,
such respondents non-suited on the ground that they accepted
compensation without any protest. [Para 30]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – s.5A – Objections – If were
effectively disposed – Owing to the similarities of contents
and the fact that they pertained to the same parcel of land,
several objections were disposed of by the Collector by a
Common Order after grouping them together – High Court
held that the objections were treated as an empty formality
since the Collector disposed them by consolidating in groups:
Held: Objections were classified because of the similarity of
substance and thus, it was plausible to group them together and
dispose of by way of a Common Order – Not doing so would
lead to sheer wastage of time and energy that would be spent in
duplicating the recommendations for each individual objection –
Similar objections can be consolidated and the Collector need
not undertake the daunting and unnecessary task of disposing of
thousands of objections separately – Thus, High Court erroneously
held that the objections were disposed of cryptically merely because
they were grouped – Furthermore, some of the objections were left
out from the aforementioned groups wherein the Collector noted
that the objectors sought exemption of their land on the ground
of it being an ‘abadi’ area – This plea was rejected albeit while
1004 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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disposing of other objections observing that the lands claimed to
be ‘abadi’ merely have temporary and illegal constructions, and
no person was residing there and finally, the Collector noted that
all the objections were disposed of “in aforementioned terms” –
Also, the absence of a formal rejection order in the case of a few
objections would not per se vitiate the acquisition proceedings
as the non-consideration of such objections is inconsequential,
because even if it was an ‘abadi’ land, there is nothing in law that
bars the State Government from acquiring the same – Exemption
of such lands from the acquisition is a matter of State Policy and
depends on the government’s discretion – If the State Government
opines that the land is needed for a larger public purpose and
development projects, such land can be acquired, notwithstanding
the fact that it was a residential property – Further, also in the
instant case, admittedly the acquisition proceedings attained finality,
most landowners accepted compensation and are deemed to
have acquiesced to the acquisition process whereafter, significant
investment had been made into the development projects – Thus,
even if it is accepted that a handful of respondents did not get
a fair enquiry u/s. 5A, the same may not be a sufficient ground
to annul the acquisition process as substantial compliance had
already been made. [Paras 47-52]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – s.4 – Notification under –
Challenge to acquisition proceedings by the respondents-
landowners who were subsequent purchasers – If such
respondents had a locus:
Held: No – Notification issued u/s.4 creates an impediment
on the transfer of title in a property – Subsequent purchasers do
not acquire an unencumbered title over the property and they
deliberately run the risk of securing a defective title – Thus, the
respondents who clandestinely got sale deeds executed with or
without collusion with the Registering Authorities after the acquisition
process had commenced and/or whose names were not recorded
in the revenue records before issuance of notification u/s. 4 of the
Act, were also denuded of any cause of action u/s. 5A to object
against the acquisition proceedings – No cause of action ever
accrued in favour of the respondents in these cases to invoke writ
jurisdiction of the High Court. [Paras 26, 28]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – s.5A – Construction and
import – Discussed.
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1005

New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v.
Darshan Lal Bohra & Ors.

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – s.5A – Notices when not served
as per the procedure, acquisition proceedings if get vitiated:
Held: Even in cases where the notices were not served as per the
procedure known in law, that by itself may not vitiate the acquisition
proceedings unless it is shown that severe prejudice was caused
to the landowners – Even when there is no material to show that
the landowner was heard, it would not invalidate the acquisition
proceedings if the objections are duly considered. [Para 43]

Case Law Cited
Talson Real Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 13
SCC 186; Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment
Corpn. v. Subhash Sindhi Coop. Housing Society [2013] 4 SCR
978 : (2013) 5 SCC 427; Tej Kaur v. State of Punjab [2003] 2 SCR
707 : (2003) 4 SCC 485; Anand Singh v. State of U.P. [2010] 9
SCR 133 : (2010) 11 SCC 242 – relied on.
Sam Hiring Company v. A.R. Bhujbal [1996] 1 SCR 475 : (1996) 8
SCC 18; Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra [1977] 1
SCR 763 : (1977) 1 SCC 133; Savitri Devi v. State of U.P. [2015]
7 SCR 512 : (2015) 7 SCC 21; Babu Ram v. State of Haryana
[2009] 14 SCR 1111 : (2009) 10 SCC 115; Shri Farid Ahmed Abdul
Samad v. Municipal Corporation [1977] 1 SCR 71 : (1976) 3 SCC
719; Nareshbhai Bhaggubhai v. Union of India [2019] 10 SCR
88 : (2019) 15 SCC 1; NOIDA v. Lt. Col. J.B. Kuchhal (2020) 18
SCC 619; Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory [2005]
Supp. 5 SCR 421 : (2005) 13 SCC 477; Women’s Education Trust
v. State of Haryana (2013) 8 SCC 99; J.E.D. Ezra v. Secretary of
State for India (1902) SCC OnLine Cal 179; Hindustan Petroleum
Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai [2005] Supp. 3 SCR 388 :
(2005) 7 SCC 627; Delhi Admn. v. Gurdip Singh Uban [2000]
Supp. 2 SCR 496 : (2000) 7 SCC 296; Abhey Ram v. Union of
India [1997] 3 SCR 931 : (1997) 5 SCC 421; V. Chandrasekaran
v. Administrative Officer [2012] 10 SCR 603 : (2012) 12 SCC 133;
Meera Sahni v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [2008] 10 SCR 1012 : (2008)
9 SCC 177; Kailash N. Dwivedi v. State of U.P. (2011) 15 SCC
98; Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [1975] 1 SCR 802 : (1975) 4
SCC 285; Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana (2005) 9 SCC
164; Om Prakash v. State of U.P. [1998] 3 SCR 643 : (1998) 6
SCC 1; M.S.P.L. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [2022] 14 SCR 591 :
(2022) SCC OnLine SC 1380 – referred to.
Gajraj v. State of U.P. (2011) SCC OnLine All 1711 – referred to.
1006 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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List of Acts
Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Evidence Act, 1872; Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act, 2013; Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act, 1950.

List of Keywords
Challenge to acquisition proceedings; Land acquisition proceedings
annulled; Compliance of Section 5A of Land Acquisition Act,
1894; Objections filed under Section 5A of Land Acquisition Act,
1894; Objections rejected; “Objector”; Annulment of acquisition
process; Abadi land; Abadi area; Abadi deh; Notices to the
affected landowners; Service of notices; Subsequent purchasers;
Landowners were subsequent purchasers; Tenure holders;
“person interested”; Implied consent to the acquisition; Estoppel;
Acquiescence; Acquiesced to the acquisition; Notices for hearings
not served; Personal hearing; Advance notice of hearing;
Landowners duly served; Landowners received compensation;
Consolidation of objections; Public purpose of acquisition; Public
interest; Colorable exercise of power; Compensation accepted
without any protest/demur; Development projects; Residential
property; Omnia Consensus Tollit Errorem.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8048 of 2019
From the Judgment and Order dated 05.01.2017 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in WC No. 36231 of 2015
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 8049, 8050, 8051, 8052, 8053, 8054, 8055, 8056,
8057, 8058, 8059, 8060, 8061, 8062, 8063, 8064 and 8065 of 2019
Appearances for Parties
Ravindra Kumar, Sr. Adv., Binay Kumar Das, Vipin Kumar Saxena,
Ms. Priyanka Das, Ms. Neha Das, Shivam Saksena, Rachit Mittal,
Parish Mishra, Adarsh Srivastava, Advs. for the Appellant.
Ravindra Kumar Raizada, Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Advs., Shashank Shekhar
Singh, Abhinav Singh, Smarhar Singh, Jai Krishna Singh, Ms. Shweta
Kumari, Manoj Kumar, Vikas Chopra, Rajesh Kumar Gautam, Anant
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1007

New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v.
Darshan Lal Bohra & Ors.

Gautam, Samir Mudgil, Ms. Anani Achumi, Dinesh Sharma, Ms.
Shivani Sagar, R.P. Daida, Dr. Rajeev Sharma, Prashant Sharma,
Pankaj Dubey, Pankaj Y, Dharmendra Sharma, Vipin Kumar Sharma,
Raghuvir Sharma, Raghuvir Shy, Ms. Devjani Dekka Bharali, Jasbir
Singh Malik, Sanjay Sharma, Ms. Chandni Sharma, Tej Singh Yadav,
Varun Punia, Rahul Sharma, Ms. Jyoti Dutt Sharma, Ms. Jaikriti S.
Jadeja, Adesh Choudhary, Shivang Goel, Ms. Usha Nandini V., Advs.
for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment
Surya Kant, J.
1. These appeals are preferred by New Okhla Industrial Development
Authority (NOIDA) against the main judgment dated 05.01.2017
rendered in Writ C. No. 36231/2015 (in Civil Appeal No. 8048 of
2019, titled NOIDA v. Darshan lal Bohra & Ors.), passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad (hereinafter, ‘High Court’), whereby
the land acquisition proceedings initiated at NOIDA’s behest have
been annulled by quashing the declaration dated 14.01.2015 issued
under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter,
‘1894 Act’).
A. Facts
2. Given the broad similarity in all the connected matters, the factual
matrix can be understood from the details of the lead matter, i.e.,
Civil Appeal No. 8048 of 2019, titled NOIDA v. Darshan Lal Bohra
& Ors.
3. A notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act was issued for
the acquisition of land measuring 83.761 hectares situated in
Village Badoli Banger, Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar
(hereinafter, ‘Acquired Land’). The acquisition was intended for the
“Planned Industrial Development in Gautam Budh Nagar” by NOIDA.
The notification was published in the State Gazette on 28.09.2013
and in the daily newspapers “Amar Ujala” and “Dainik Jagran” on
27.11.2013. Additionally, a public announcement (munadi) was
conducted on 18.01.2014. Through such mechanism, the persons
interested were invited and allowed to lodge their objections, if any,
against the proposed acquisition.
1008 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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4. On 09.12.2013, Darshan Lal Bohra (hereinafter, ‘Respondent No. 1’)
filed his objections under Section 5A of the 1894 Act (hereinafter,
‘Section 5A’) before the Collector-cum-Additional District Magistrate
(hereinafter, ‘Collector’), Gautam Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh. He
submitted that his land was in ‘abadi’ area and thus ought to be
excluded from the acquisition process as per policy decision(s) of
the State Government. He further stated that the land was being
used for cattle rearing and he had his farm buildings constructed.
Respondent No.1 emphasized that the acquisition would not only
jeopardize his means of livelihood but also render him homeless.
5. Most of the other land-owners also objected to the acquisition of
their lands primarily on the ground that such lands fell within ‘abadi
deh’. The objections raised by Respondent No. 1, as well as by
other landowners (respondents in connected matters), were to be
adjudicated by the Collector. The notice fixing the date of hearing was
forwarded to ‘interested persons’ through the Gram Pradhan, but the
date of hearing was deferred on multiple occasions on the ground
that only a few farmers came who also sought time to present their
case(s). As a final opportunity, the matter was posted on 03.07.2014,
when the Collector dismissed the objections and submitted a report
under Section 5A(2) recommending for acquiring the subject land.
6. Following the rejection of objections, a declaration under Section
6(1) of the 1894 Act was issued on 14.01.2015, for acquiring 81.819
hectares of land. This declaration was also published in the daily
newspapers “Amar Ujala” and “Dainik Jagran.” Subsequently, munadi
was conducted on 16.02.2015.
7. Feeling aggrieved by the said declaration, Respondent No. 1 filed
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36231/2015 before the High Court and
sought quashing of the notifications issued under Section 4(1) and
Section 6(1) of the 1894 Act.
8. During the pendency of the writ petition, the Collector passed an
award on 17.06.2016, determining the total compensation for the
acquired land to the tune of INR 2,21,79,27,378/- (INR 221.79 crores
approximately). This was followed by the possession letters issued
on 20.06.2016.
9. The High Court, vide impugned judgment, scrutinized the procedural
aspects of the proceedings conducted by the Collector in hearing
objections filed under Section 5A. It has held that though the notices
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1009

New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v.
Darshan Lal Bohra & Ors.

to the affected land-owners were purportedly issued through the
Gram Pradhan for informing the date of hearing, there was nothing
on record to show how effectively the Gram Pradhan intimated
all tenure holders. The High Court has consequently inferred that
the respondent-landowners were not properly informed of the
date of personal hearing. The High Court has also found fault
with the Collector in consolidating the objections without adequate
consideration and treating them as an empty formality. The High
Court, in light of the fact that the Collector attempted to rectify his
earlier order by issuing a corrigendum, has also raised doubts on the
fairness of the procedure. Consequently, the High Court has annulled
the notification dated 14.01.2015, issued under Section 6(1) of the
1894 Act, with a direction that a fresh opportunity be given to the
respondents and similarly situated tenure holders before proceeding
further with the land acquisition process.
10. Discontented with the quashing of notification issued under Section
6(1) of the 1894 Act, NOIDA is in appeal before us.
B. Contentions on behalf of NOIDA/State
11. Mr. Ravindra Kumar, learned senior counsel representing NOIDA and
Mr. Ravindra Kumar Raizada, learned senior counsel and Additional
Advocate General for the State of Uttar Pradesh, vehemently argued
that the High Court erred in nullifying the notification dated 14.01.2015
issued under Section 6(1) of the 1894 Act. Substantiating this, they
made the following submissions:
On maintainability of challenge against the acquisition proceedings
a) It was explained that the respondent-tenure holders fall into
four categories: (i) those who lodged objections and contested
the acquisition; (ii) those who did not lodge objections but
contested the acquisition; (iii) those who initially objected but later
accepted compensation; and (iv) the subsequent purchasers. It
was urged that the respondents falling in the second, third, and
fourth categories, namely, those who did not object, accepted
compensation, or are subsequent purchasers, do not have
locus standi and/or have waived their right to challenge the
subject acquisition.
b) NOIDA has already disbursed a compensation amount of INR
147,72,68,871 (approximately INR 147 crores) and nearly
1010 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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185 out of total 210 affected land-owners have accepted such
compensation. Additionally, INR 72,56,43,151 (approximately
INR 72 crores) have been distributed to the farmers as no
litigation bonus. Consequently, the challenge brought in by
a miniscule group of land-owners ought not to have been
entertained.
c) Moreover, post the acquisition, NOIDA has incurred a huge
expenditure of INR 202.17 crore (approximately) on subsequent
developments at the site. Hence, the annulment of acquisition
process at this juncture defeats the bona fide public purpose
and public interest.
On the effectiveness of hearing under Section 5A
d) It was then argued that the High Court fell in grave error in
holding that the landowners were deprived of the opportunity
to present evidence. Once an objector had submitted the
objection in writing, no further oral hearing was obligated to be
accorded. In this instance, affidavits were duly filed supporting
the objections presented through legal counsels and thus the
statutory requirements prescribed for an administrative enquiry
as contemplated under Section 5A have been substantially
complied with.
e) Relying upon Sam Hiring Company v. A.R. Bhujbal,1 it was
canvassed that the Land Acquisition Officer functions as an
administrative authority and not as a judicial or quasi-judicial
forum. That the Act mandates consideration of objections by
affording an opportunity of hearing, if it is so requested by the
aggrieved persons. However, in this case, no such opportunity
was sought by the landowners from the Collector.
f) Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra 2 was
pressed into aid to submit that Section 5A mandates an
expeditious enquiry, focusing on objections lodged by landowners
challenging the ‘public purpose’ behind the acquisition. The
objections that are personal to the objectors would be irrelevant
to such enquiry. In the instant case, since the objections did

1 [1996] 1 SCR 475 : 1996 (8) SCC 18
2 [1977] 1 SCR 763 : 1977 (1) SCC 133
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1011

New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v.
Darshan Lal Bohra & Ors.

not assail the genuineness or nature of the public purpose of
acquisition, the personal claims did not warrant any one-to-one
adjudication through the summary enquiry.
g) The objections raised by the respondent-landowners, seeking
exemption of their land owing to it being within village ‘abadi’,
are wholly misconceived. Before the issuance of Section 4
notification on 28.09.2013, a survey was conducted by the
Revenue Department to identify ‘abadi’ land. The State has not
acquired most of the land identified as ‘abadi’ in the survey,
except such parcels where unauthorized and illegal constructions
had been raised as per the Collector’s report.
C. Contentions on behalf of the Respondents
12. Per contra, respondent-landowners, represented by Mr. Dhruv Mehta,
learned senior counsel along with learned Counsels S/Shri Dr. Rajeev
Sharma, Jasbir Singh Malik, Smarhar Singh, Rahul Sharma and
Ms. Jaikriti S. Jadeja, attempted to rebuff the submissions made on
behalf of the appellant(s) in the following terms:
On maintainability of challenge against the acquisition proceedings
a) Acceptance of compensation does not preclude the respondents
from challenging the acquisition proceedings. Respondent
No. 1 asserts that the compensation was received in good
faith, based on a mutual agreement with NOIDA. Under this
settlement, Respondent No. 1 agreed to relinquish 0.5671
hectares of his land in favour of NOIDA in lieu of the release of
remainder of his ‘abadi’ land. The compensation was taken to
safeguard Respondent No. 1’s land from demolition. However,
after accepting the compensation, NOIDA failed to honor the
settlement and proceeded to acquire his remaining ‘abadi’ land
as well. Respondent No. 1 thus alleges mala fide intentions
of NOIDA authorities behind initiating the acquisition process.
b) Reference was made to the Full Bench decision of the High
Court in Gajraj v. State of U.P.,3 which was subsequently upheld
by this Court in Savitri Devi v. State of U.P.,4 emphasising

3 2011 SCC OnLine All 1711.
4 [2015] 7 SCR 512 : (2015) 7 SCC 21
1012 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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that accepting compensation does not amount to acquiescence
to the acquisition if such proceedings are otherwise wrongful
and illegal.
On the effectiveness of hearing under Section 5A
c) Citing Babu Ram v. State of Haryana,5 Mr. Dhruv Mehta,
Learned Senior Counsel, emphatically argued that Section 5A
of the 1894 Act is far more than a statutory edict, embodying
Fundamental Rights enshrined in Articles 14 and 19 of the
Indian Constitution. Hence, objections filed by the landowners
were required to be considered in a quasi-judicial manner, and
as the provision expressly confers the right to hearing, the
Collector was obligated to accord such an opportunity to the
affected landowners.
d) Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the record of
proceedings conducted by the Collector leaves no room to
doubt that: i) the respondents were not served with notices for
hearings; ii) personal hearings were not granted; and iii) there
was a complete non-application of mind in addressing Section
5A objections. The personal hearing was crucial in the present
case since the objections varied from owner to owner. The
failure to provide such hearing amounts to gross violation of
Section 5A, justifying the quashing of acquisition process. In
this regard, he relied upon Shri Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad
v. Municipal Corporation.6
e) It was also pointed out that the Collector manipulated the official
record of adjudication of the objections. The Collector claims
to have decided the objections through a corrigendum, which
was signed by such individuals who were either strangers to the
acquisition or were not the objectors. NOIDA has not disputed
the manipulation of records in relation thereto.
f) S/Shri Jasbir Singh Malik and Samarhar Singh, learned
counsels, further argued that the respondents had already
utilised a part of their lands for residential purposes – the same
being within ‘abadi’ area. They relied upon an order dated

5 [2009] 14 SCR 1111 : (2009) 10 SCC 115
6 [1977] 1 SCR 71 : (1976) 3 SCC 719
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1013

New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v.
Darshan Lal Bohra & Ors.

19.07.1992 passed by the Assistant Collector, Secunderabad
in purported exercise of powers under Section 143 of the Uttar
Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950,
whereby the subject land was classified as non-agricultural
land. They also referred to the objections which Respondent
No.1 had filed against a previous notification issued under
Section 4 of the 1894 Act on 07.11.2007. In those objections, it
was pointed out that the subject land was a part of the ‘abadi’
area of the village and hence deserved to be exempted from
acquisition. Those objections statedly found favour with the
State Government and the land was accordingly excluded
from the 2007 acquisition. It was, thus, contended that NOIDA
or the State Government cannot initiate a fresh acquisition
process as the subject land continues to be a part and parcel
of ‘abadi’ land.
g) Furthermore, most of the land adjoining their lands has been
exempted from acquisition as it already stands declared as
‘abadi’ area. Since only the respondents are sought to be
singled out, the impugned action does not satisfy the equality
test of Article 14 of the Constitution.
h) Lastly and alternatively, learned counsels for the respondents
urged that in the event of acquisition process being upheld
by this Court due to exigency or for regulated development
of the area, in that case, the land-owners be held entitled
to receive compensation at the current market value and in
accordance with the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter ‘2013 Act). In support
thereto, they have placed reliance on the decisions in (i)
Nareshbhai Bhaggubhai v. Union of India;7 (ii) NOIDA v.
Lt. Col. J.B. Kuchhal; 8 and (iii) Competent Authority v.
Barangore Jute Factory,9 wherein, this Court after taking
notice of the facts and circumstances, granted compensation
on the current market value of the land.

7 [2019] 10 SCR 88 : (2019) 15 SCC 1
8 (2020) 18 SCC 619
9 [2005] Supp. 5 SCR 421 : (2005) 13 SCC 477
1014 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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D. Analysis
13. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions at
length, we find that primarily the following two issues arise for
consideration of this Court:
a) Whether the respondents have forestalled their right to challenge
the acquisition proceeding on the ground of non-compliance of
Section 5A because:
i) they have not filed objections; or
ii) they were not tenure holders as per the revenue records on
the date of notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act; or
iii) after submitting their objections, they have accepted
compensation without any demur?
b) If the answer to the aforementioned question is in negative,
whether the mandatory procedure contemplated under Section
5A has been complied with in the instant case?
14. Before delving into these specific issues, it would be worthwhile
to briefly discuss the construction and import of Section 5A of the
1894 Act.
15. The 1894 Act embodies the State’s power of eminent domain,
bestowing the sovereign right to appropriate private property for the
public good. However, since the Right to Property is a significant
Constitutional Right under Article 300A and losing one’s land has
grave repercussions for a landowner, the 1894 Act also contains
various provisions to compress the State’s power of expropriation
from becoming a source of exploitation. One of such salient features
is Section 5A, which inter alia provides thus:
“5-A. Hearing of objections.—(1) Any person interested in
any land which has been notified under Section 4, sub-
section (1), as being needed or likely to be needed for a
public purpose or for a Company may, within thirty days
from the date of the publication of the notification, object
to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality,
as the case may be.
(2) Every objection under sub-section (1) shall be made
to the Collector in writing, and the Collector shall give the
objector an opportunity of being heard in person or by any
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1015

New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v.
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person authorised by him in this behalf or by pleader and
shall, after hearing all such objections and after making
such further inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, either
make a report in respect of the land which has been notified
under Section 4, sub-section (1), or make different reports in
respect of different parcels of such land, to the appropriate
Government, containing his recommendations on the
objections, together with the record of the proceedings
held by him, for the decision of that Government. The
decision of the appropriate Government on the objections
shall be final.
(3) For the purposes of this section, a person shall he
deemed to be interested in land who would be entitled to
claim an interest in compensation if the land were acquired
under this Act.”
16. It may be seen from the plain language of Section 5A that it manifests
the cardinal principle of audi alteram partem, and obligates the
Collector to hear the person whose land is being compulsorily
acquired by the State. This provision serves as a crucial safeguard,
enabling the landowners to challenge the arbitrary acquisition and
demonstrate the absence of ‘public purpose’ or presence of mala
fide motive. Considering its vital importance, there are a string of
decisions by this Court affirming that Section 5A is a mandatory
provision with the flavour of fundamental rights.10
17. Section 5A was not originally a part of the 1894 Act. It was introduced
later by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1923, to rectify the
defect pointed out in case of J.E.D. Ezra v. Secretary of State for
India.11 The Calcutta High Court in that case expressed its inability to
grant relief to the person whose property was being acquired, noting
that the 1894 Act did not allow the landowners to raise objections
against the acquisition. Consequently, the legislature thought it
appropriate to amend the 1894 Act and insert a provision mandating
that no declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act shall be issued
unless time has been allowed to the ‘persons interested’ in the land
to put in their objections.

10 Women’s Education Trust v. State of Haryana, (2013) 8 SCC 99, para 1.
11 1902 SCC OnLine Cal 179.
1016 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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18. The landowners thus became entitled to lodge their objections
within thirty days of the notification published under Section 4
of the 1894 Act. The Collector is thereafter expected to give an
opportunity of hearing to the objectors and make recommendations
to the Appropriate Government after thorough consideration of
their objections. Importantly, the hearing under Section 5A must be
an effective opportunity and not an empty formality. If necessary,
the Collector shall also make further enquiries and give final
recommendations based on due application of mind.12 If it is found
that there has been total and utter non-compliance with Section 5A,
thereby causing severe prejudice to the landowner, the Court shall
give such affected person an appropriate remedy and, if feasible,
even vitiate the acquisition proceedings.
19. Having understood the nuances of Section 5A, we shall now proceed
to analyse each issue separately.
D.1. Maintainability of the respondents’ challenge
D.1.1. Respondents who have not filed objections
20. The High Court has vitiated the acquisition proceedings on the premise
that the hearing accorded under Section 5A was ineffective. NOIDA’s
grievance is that the High Court has jumped to such a conclusion
without taking notice of the fact that some of the writ petitioners had
never lodged their objections. Having failed to avail the remedy under
Section 5A, such landowners cannot be heard to say that they were
deprived of personal hearing or that their objections were disposed
of without any application of mind.
21. We find merit in NOIDA’s contention. We say so for this reason
that while Section 5A(1) gives a “person interested” the right to file
objections, Section 5A(2) affords only an “objector” the right to be
heard. Given this conscious departure in the use of the terminology,
a person cannot claim hearing as a matter of right under Section
5A(2) unless he has filed objections. This is what has been precisely
held by this Court in Talson Real Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra,13 observing that:

12 Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai, (2005) 7 SCC 627, para 9.
13 Talson Real Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 13 SCC 186, para 15
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1017

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“15. […] In the present case, as noticed above, the
respondents have wholly complied with the requirements
of the provisions of law. The appellant Company has not
brought on record any iota of evidence to show that the
abovenamed newspapers are not widely circulated in the
locality where the land, in question, was situated. The
High Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the
provisions of Section 45 of the Act will not be attracted
in cases where there is no obligation cast upon the
authorities to issue notice to the persons interested once
it is clear that neither Section 4 nor Section 5-A of the
Act contemplates any personal notice to the person
interested other than the objectors for the purpose
of conducting inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act.
Therefore, the question of applicability of Section 45 in the
case of the appellant Company would not arise at all as
the appellant Company had not filed any objection under
Section 5-A to the acquisition proceedings consequent to
the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act.”
[emphasis supplied]
22. There is no gainsaying that a “person interested” under Section 5A(1),
can seek annulment of the acquisition process if no opportunity to file
objections, is accorded. However, such person cannot seek hearing
as a statutory right unless has lodged the objections. Notably, the
respondents’ case is not that the objections were improperly invited.
Rather, their grievance is that the notices of hearing were clumsily
issued and the objections were mechanically rejected. It seems
to us that even if their contention is factually correct, such a plea
can be availed by those landowners only who had filed objections
under Section 5A. An interested person who fails to file objections,
is deemed to have acquiesced to the acquisition. The maxim ‘Omnia
Consensus Tollit Errorem’, i.e., every assent removes error, will
thus be squarely attracted for such owners. Similarly, it is also not
permissible for a landowner to contend that the Collector failed to
apply his mind to objections, which were never filed before him in
the first place.14

14 Delhi Admn. v. Gurdip Singh Uban (2000) 7 SCC 296, para 30
1018 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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23. In our considered opinion, the High Court fell in error while allowing
the claim of even those landowners who did not invoke their remedy
under Section 5A(1) of the 1894 Act. We may, however, hasten to
add that the High Court could still have invalidated the acquisition qua
these landowners also had it found a reason going to the very root
of the entire acquisition. For instance, where the ‘public purpose’ of
acquisition is conspicuously absent, or the acquisition process is an
outcome of colorable exercise of power of eminent domain, all the
landowners, even if they had not filed objections, can seek annulment
of the declaration issued under Section 6 of the 1894 Act. However,
no such plea was taken in the instant batch of cases except that
the procedure contemplated under Section 5A was deflated. Such
objections were surely personal to the landowners, as they sought
individual exemption on the plea that they have raised residential
constructions on their land under acquisition. Since it is a ground
specific to each property, the High Court was wrong to grant the
benefit en masse and quash the entire declaration issued under
Section 6 of the 1894 Act.15
24. It may be noted at this stage that the respondents in Civil Appeals No.
8055, 8056, 8058, 8059, 8060, and 8062 of 2019 have not been able
to demonstrate that they ever filed objections under Section 5A of the
Act. In most instances, the objections have not been produced, and the
respondents have mentioned inconsistent dates of their filing. Further,
while objections have been produced in Civil Appeal No. 8058 and
8059 of 2019, they precede the date of publication of the notification
under Section 4 of the 1894 Act. Since these respondents could not
show as to how they became aware of the acquisition proceedings,
more so when NOIDA has cogently contested the veracity of such
objections, we find it difficult to accept the respondents’ stance with
reference to the issue discussed hereinabove.
D.1.2. Locus of the Respondents who are subsequent purchasers
25. The second sub-issue regarding maintainability of the respondents’
claim stems from the fact that a few of them are stated to have
purchased their lands after the notification under Section 4 of the
1894 Act was issued. The short question that falls for consideration

15 Delhi Admn. v. Gurdip Singh Uban (2000) 7 SCC 296, para 53 and 54; Abhey Ram v. Union of India
(1997) 5 SCC 421, para 13; V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer (2012) 12 SCC 133, para 24
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1019

New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v.
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is whether such landowners have locus standi to seek abrogation
of the acquisition proceedings.
26. This issue is no longer res-integra. This Court has, in a wide range
of judicial pronouncements, held that the notification issued under
Section 4 of the 1894 Act creates an impediment on the transfer of
title in a property.16 The subsequent purchasers do not acquire an
unencumbered title over the property and they deliberately run the
risk of securing a defective title. The axiom that ‘a public right cannot
be altered by the agreement of private persons’, will thus clog their
right to raise objection against the acquisition.
27. We may usefully cite Rajasthan State Industrial Development &
Investment Corpn. v. Subhash Sindhi Coop. Housing Society,17
in this context which summed up the past precedents observing that:
“13. There can be no quarrel with respect to the settled
legal proposition that a purchaser, subsequent to the
issuance of a Section 4 notification in respect of the
land, cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings,
and can only claim compensation as the sale transaction
in such a situation is void qua the Government. Any such
encumbrance created by the owner, or any transfer of the
land in question, that is made after the issuance of such
a notification, would be deemed to be void and would
not be binding on the Government. (Vide Gian Chand
v. Gopala [(1995) 2 SCC 528] , Yadu Nandan Garg v.
State of Rajasthan [(1996) 1 SCC 334 : AIR 1996 SC
520], Jaipur Development Authority v. Mahavir Housing
Coop. Society [(1996) 11 SCC 229], Jaipur Development
Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain [(1997) 1 SCC 35], Meera
Sahniv. Lt. Governor of Delhi [(2008) 9 SCC 177], Har
Narain v. Mam Chand [(2010) 13 SCC 128 : (2010) 4
SCC (Civ) 793] and V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative
Officer [(2012) 12 SCC 133 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 136: JT
(2012) 12 SC 260].)”
[emphasis supplied]

16 Meera Sahni v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (2008) 9 SCC 177
17 [2013] 4 SCR 978 : (2013) 5 SCC 427, para 13
1020 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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28. Those respondents who clandestinely got executed sale deeds
with or without collusion with the Registering Authorities after the
acquisition process had commenced and/or whose names were
not recorded in the revenue records before issuance of notification
under Section 4 of the Act, are thus denuded of any cause of action
under Section 5A to object against the acquisition proceedings. In
the present batch, NOIDA has taken a categorical and unrebutted
stand that respondents in Civil Appeals Nos. 8057, 8062, and 8064
of 2019 fall under this category. That being so, no cause of action
ever accrued in favour of the respondents in these cases to invoke
writ jurisdiction of the High Court.
D.1.3. Respondents who have accepted the compensation
29. In addition to the plea that several landowners did not file objections
and/or are subsequent purchasers, NOIDA/State have contended
that some of the respondents had filed objections, but subsequently,
they accepted compensation without any demur. Indeed, it is largely
undisputed that Respondent No. 1 in the lead case was paid INR
1.54 cr. on 28.11.2016, and the balance amount of INR 2.61 cr. was
deposited with District Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar under Section
31 of the Act on 05.12.2016. Similarly, in Civil Appeal 8050 of 2019,
the landowner was paid INR 5.81 cr. on 04.07.2016. On this plank,
it was strenuously urged on behalf of NOIDA/State that such of
the landowners who have accepted compensation, partly or fully,
without any protest, are estopped by their act and conduct from
pursuing their objections under Section 5A. Secondly, possession of
the acquired properties having been taken through the possession
letters dated 20.06.2016, and the acquisition process being complete
in all respect, the issue of procedural lapses under Section 5A has
been rendered infructuous.
30. As regard to the question whether the landowners can still pursue
their claims under Section 5A, we are of the considered opinion that
NOIDA or the State can draw no milage out of the fact that possession
of the acquired land had since been taken. We say so for the reason
that the landowners cannot forcibly resist the delivery of possession
to the beneficiary, namely, NOIDA. Such a state action cannot
impinge upon their legal right to challenge the acquisition for non-
compliance of the procedure prescribed under Section 5A. However,
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1021

New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v.
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if a landowner receives compensation volitionally subsequent to
filing of the objections under Section 5A and does not preserve the
right to pursue such objections, it may constitute a valid ground to
implied consent to the acquisition. Having once acquiesced so, a
landowner cannot be permitted to do a volte-face and re-agitate the
objections.18 If we were to hold otherwise, it would open a Pandora’s
Box where the landowners will, on one hand, seek re-enquiry of
their claims under Section 5A and, on the other, will also draw the
compensation. There would, thus, be no finality to the proceedings,
and the acquisition process would be tainted by uncertainty and
unpredictability. This would further have a chilling effect on the
development projects, since the looming threat of potential litigation
and exemptions from acquisitions would discourage the State from
investing huge amounts and incurring development costs.
31. The respondents in Civil Appeals Nos. 8048 and 8050 of 2019
are, therefore, liable to be non-suited on the ground that they have
accepted compensation without any protest.
32. We may in all fairness also deal with the contention of the respondents
in Civil Appeal No. 8048 of 2019, who admittedly received the
compensation but claim that it was part of a settlement wherein
NOIDA purportedly agreed to exempt the land from acquisition. It was
argued that since this settlement was not honoured by NOIDA, the
acceptance of compensation cannot be fatal to their case. However,
no such settlement has been produced on record by the respondents.
Their claim is not substantiated by any document on record, hence
their explanation is devoid of any merit.
33. Similarly, the respondents in Civil Appeal 8050 of 2019 have also
not disputed the receipt of compensation, but they are said to have
not been paid the full amount. In contrast, NOIDA has furnished
detailed information, including the calculation chart and payment
record. Be that as it may, there lies an independent remedy in law
to recover the balance amount of compensation, if any. Once these
respondents have received a substantial part of the compensation
amount, their cause to pursue objection has eclipsed.

18 Kailash N. Dwivedi v. State of U.P. (2011) 15 SCC 98, para 14.
1022 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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34. The respondents have relied upon Gajraj v. State of U.P.,19 in which
a Full Bench of the High Court held that accepting the compensation
would not amount to acquiescence. Since the cited decision
was affirmed by this Court in Savitri Devi v. State of U.P.,20 the
respondents have argued that acceptance of compensation by some
of them, does not attract principles like estoppel or acquiescence.
A closer examination of the Savitri Devi (supra), however, unfolds
that this Court has affirmed our foregoing analysis:
“42. We have to keep in mind that in all these cases, after
the land was acquired, which was of very large quantity
and in big chunks, further steps were taken by passing
the award, taking possession and paying compensation.
In many cases, actual possession was taken and in rest of
the cases, paper possession was taken where because of
the land under abadi, actual possession could not be taken
on spot immediately. Fact remains that in many such
cases where possession was taken, these landowners/
appellants even received compensation. All these
petitions have been filed only thereafter which may
not be maintainable stricto sensu having regard to the
law laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court
in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [(1975) 4 SCC 285:
AIR 1974 SC 2077] and the dictum of this judgment is
followed consistently by this Court in various cases
(see Murari v. Union of India [(1997) 1 SCC 15], Ravi
Khullar v. Union of India [(2007) 5 SCC 231] and Anand
Singh v. State of U.P. [(2010) 11 SCC 242 : (2010) 4 SCC
(Civ) 423]).”
[emphasis supplied]
35. In Savitri Devi (supra), this Court considering the peculiar
circumstances and the intent of the High Court’s order to provide
increased compensation, seconded the grant of that relief in the larger
public interest.21 This is explicitly observed by this Court noting that:

19 W.P. No. 37443/2011.
20 [2015] 7 SCR 512 : (2015) 7 SCC 21
21 Ibid, para 43 and 46.
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1023

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“50. Keeping in view all these peculiar circumstances, we
are of the opinion that these are not the cases where this
Court should interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution.
However, we make it clear that directions of the High
Court are given in the aforesaid unique and peculiar/
specific background and, therefore, it would not form
precedent for future cases.”
[emphasis supplied]
36. Having held so, we further find that there are several respondents in
this batch of appeals who had raised the objection; did not accept
any compensation; and their names were duly recorded in the land
records when the notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act was
published. Since each one of them has an indefeasible right to seek
compliance of the procedure engrafted under Section 5A, we shall
now proceed to analyse whether the Collector faithfully complied
with the said provision in these cases.
D.2. Compliance with Section 5A of the 1894 Act
37. It may be recapitulated that according to the High Court, the
Collector failed to adhere to the mandate of Section 5A as no record
of authenticity as to how effectively the Gram Pradhan intimated
all tenure holders, was produced. This was sufficient to infer that
the respondent-landowners were not properly informed the date of
personal hearing; their objections were treated as an empty formality
since the Collector disposed them by consolidating in groups; and
there are doubts about the procedural fairness as the Collector
attempted to rectify an earlier order by issuing a corrigendum. To
ascertain whether the High Court rightly attained these conclusions,
we shall deal with each of these issues separately.
D.2.1. Presumption regarding notices not being served
38. It is timeworn law that the person who submits objections under
Section 5A must be accorded an opportunity of personal hearing.
Such a hearing must precede with an advance notice served upon
the objector. As a necessary corollary, the failure to serve the notice
would be sufficient to infer the defiance of Section 5A of the 1894
Act. Consequently, the acquisition process would be liable to be
hammered.
1024 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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39. However, it is essentially a question fact as to whether or not an
advance notice of hearing has been served upon an “objector”.
Where the Collector has taken a specific stand that notices were
duly served upon the persons concerned and the record of service
of such notices has been duly maintained, the statutory presumption
inscribed under Section 114 of the Evidence Act shall be drawn,
which inter alia provides that the Court may presume the existence
of facts, including “that judicial and official acts have been regularly
performed”.
40. The rule of statutory presumption is a well-rooted principle in Common
Law and founded upon the dictum ‘omnia praesumuntur rite esse
acta’, namely, that the act can be presumed to have been rightly and
regularly done. The Court would presume that the official act was
done rightly and effectively and the burden to prove contrary lies
on the party who disputes the sanctity of such act. The High Court
unfortunately misconstrued this legal proposition while observing that
there should be a presumption regarding notices not being served
on the respondents.
41. The onus thus lay on the landowners to demonstrate that the issuance
or service of notices was inefficacious. The official record suggests
that several landowners were present at the hearings on 25.04.2014
and 05.06.2014, and the proceedings were further postponed at
their request. Had the notices not been served, these landowners
could not have been aware of the date of hearing or attended such
proceedings. Given their presence at the time of hearings, it can
be safely inferred that they were duly served. The burden to prove
otherwise on the respondents, which they have failed to discharge.
42. In the absence of any allegation of mala fide exercise of power, the
vague and overly broad claim of being unaware of the acquisition
proceedings taken by the respondents during the course of hearing
cannot be countenanced. This is especially noteworthy that only a
small fraction of landowners have contested the acquisition, with
nearly 90% not objecting to the proceedings. We are thus satisfied
that the proceedings carried out under Section 5A ought not to have
been set at nought on this ground.
43. We may also hasten to add that even where the notices were not
served as per the procedure known in law, that by itself may not
vitiate the acquisition proceedings unless it is shown that severe
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1025

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Darshan Lal Bohra & Ors.

prejudice was caused to the landowners. This Court, in Tej Kaur v.
State of Punjab,22 viewed that even when there was no material
to show that the landowner was heard, it would not invalidate the
acquisition proceedings because the objections were duly considered:
“6. It is true that Section 5-A inquiry is an important stage
in the acquisition proceedings and a person who is aware
of Section 4(1) notification can raise objection to the effect
that his property is not required for acquisition and he is
also at liberty to raise the contention that the property is
not required for any public purpose. It is also true, that the
objector must also be given a reasonable opportunity of
being heard and any violation of the procedure prescribed
under Section 5-A would seriously prejudice the rights of the
owner of the property whose land is sought to be acquired.
In the instant case, however, it is pertinent to note
that the Collector had, in fact, conducted the Section
5-A inquiry, though there is no material on record to
show that the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 66 of 1998
were heard in person. The facts and circumstances
of Civil Appeal No. 66 of 1998 clearly show that the
objection raised by the appellants was considered
and partly allowed by the Collector. About eight acres
of land was sought to be acquired from the appellants as
per the notification, but out of that, an extent of six acres
was excluded from acquisition and only one-and-a-half
acres of land was actually acquired by the authorities.
This would clearly show that the objection filed by the
appellants was considered by the Collector.”
[emphasis supplied]
44. Although Taj Kaur (supra) does support the NOIDA/State with
reference to the issue of compliance of Section 5A in its letter and
spirit, we need not dependent on the said reasoning in the instant
case in view of overwhelming material on record which shows that
the procedure as mandated by Section 5A has been substantially
complied with. We shall now accordingly, analyse whether the
Collector had disposed of the objections fairly and effectively?

22 [2003] 2 SCR 707 : (2003) 4 SCC 485, para 6.
1026 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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D.2.2. Effectiveness of disposal of objections
45. In this regard, the High Court has held that the Collector disposed of
the objections improperly by a Common Order after grouping them,
instead of evaluating merit of each claim separately.
46. The Collector undoubtedly decided 47 objections by clubbing them
into five groups. However, such grouping was done keeping in view
the similarities of contents and the fact that they pertained to the
same parcel of land. For instance, Objection Nos 1, 17, 30, and 31
were grouped because they pertained to the same land, i.e., Gata
No. 448 and 449, and had a common concern regarding existing
construction on that land. Wherever the objections were distinct in
nature, such as Objection No. 25 (which was regarding the quantum
of compensation), the same was considered and decided separately.
47. Since the objections were classified because of the similarity of
substance, it was plausible to group them together and dispose of by
way of a Common Order.23 If we were to endorse the High Court’s view
on this point, it would lead to sheer wastage of time and energy that
would be spent in duplicating the recommendations for each individual
objection. Moreover, this might be nearly impossible in some cases,
such as the one mentioned in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi,24
where more than 6000 objections were filed under Section 5A. It
will be preposterous to say that objections cannot be consolidated
even when they are similar or that the Collector must undertake the
daunting—and at the same time unnecessary—task of disposing
of thousands of objections separately. Let us appreciate that it will
serve no public purpose.
48. The High Court has thus erroneously held that the objections were
disposed of cryptically merely because they were grouped. Had the
respondents substantiated that the consolidation was done arbitrarily,
impairing the fairness in adjudication, then only it could be said that
each objection ought to have been dealt with separately.
49. We, however, find from the record that some of the objections have
ostensibly been left out from the aforementioned five groups. For
instance, the objection filed by the respondent in Civil Appeal No.

23 Women’s Education Trust v. State of Haryana, (2013) 8 SCC 99, para 33.
24 Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1975) 4 SCC 285, para 13.
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1027

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8053 of 2019 was summarised as Objection No. 22, but have not
been included in any of the groups per se while disposing it off.
Similar is the case with the objections in Civil Appeals Nos. 8054
and 8061 of 2019, which were mentioned as Objection No. 23 and
8, respectively, in the Collector’s report but were not included in any
of the groups.
50. This would nevertheless lead to no legal implications. We say so for
the reason that the Collector first summarized each of these objections
separately, and noted that the objectors have sought exemption
of their land on the ground of it being an ‘abadi’ area. Thereafter,
the Collector went on to reject this plea, albeit while disposing of
other objections. He specifically observed that the lands claimed
to be ‘abadi’ merely have temporary and illegal constructions, and
no person is residing there. Finally, the Collector noted that all the
objections are disposed of “in aforementioned terms”. The objections
that were left out from the groups are also squarely covered by the
above-cited reasoning.
51. In addition to what has been found on facts, it seems to us that the
absence of a formal rejection order in the case of a few objections
would not per se vitiate the acquisition proceedings for two reasons.
Firstly, the non-consideration of such objections is inconsequential,
because even if it was an ‘abadi’ land, there is nothing in law that
bars the State Government from acquiring the same. Instead, the
exemption of such lands from the acquisition is a matter of State
Policy and depends on the government’s discretion.25 If the State
Government opines that the land is needed for a larger public purpose
and development projects, such land can be acquired, notwithstanding
the fact that it was a residential property.
52. Secondly, it is an admitted position that the acquisition proceedings
in the instant case have nearly attained finality. Most landowners
(i.e., 185 out of 210) have accepted compensation and, as discussed
previously in Section D.1.3. (supra), are deemed to have acquiesced
to the acquisition process. Subsequently, significant investment has
been made into the development projects conceptualised there.
Accepting the respondents’ claim would require turning back the
clock, which would adversely impact the larger public interest. In

25 Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2005) 9 SCC 164, para 13.
1028 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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some cases, reversal of small pockets of land might be impossible
also since they may lie in the middle of large development projects.
In such peculiar circumstances, even if we accept that a handful of
respondents did not get a fair enquiry under Section 5A, the same
may not be a sufficient ground to annul the acquisition process as
substantial compliance has already been made.
53. In Anand Singh v. State of U.P.,26 this Court held that:
“56. In the written submissions of the GDA, it is stated
that subsequent to the declaration made under Section
6 of the Act in the month of December 2004, award
has been made and out of the 400 landowners more
than 370 have already received compensation. It is
also stated that out of the total cost of Rs. 8,85,14,000
for development of the acquired land, an amount of Rs.
5,28,00,000 has already been spent by the GDA and more
than 60% of work has been completed. It, thus, seems
that barring the appellants and few others all other tenure-
holders/landowners have accepted the “takings” of their
land. It is too late in the day to undo what has already
been done. We are of the opinion, therefore, that in
the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,
the appellants are not entitled to any relief although
dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A was not
justified.”
[emphasis supplied]
Somewhat similar view has been taken by this Court in Om Prakash
v. State of U.P.27 and M.S.P.L. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka.28
D.2.3. Issuance of the corrigendum
54. Lastly, the High Court has held that the Collector wrongly issued a
corrigendum to its previous order on 03.07.2014, which had raised
suspicion on the fairness of the proceedings. A perusal of the
corrigendum, however, suggests that it was largely insignificant as it
merely contained the record of proceedings held before the hearing

26 [2010] 9 SCR 133 : (2010) 11 SCC 242, para 56.
27 [1998] 3 SCR 643 : (1998) 6 SCC 1, para 30.
28 [2022] 14 SCR 591 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1380, para 48.
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1029

New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v.
Darshan Lal Bohra & Ors.

on 03.07.2014. The corrigendum mentioned that the proceedings were
postponed on 10.02.2014 since the decision on the implementation
of the 2013 Act was awaited. Subsequently, after the proceedings
were adjourned on multiple dates, the matter was finally posted for
hearing on 03.07.2014.
55. It appears that the only purpose of the corrigendum was to bring
further clarity into the ongoing process and not to tinker with the
merits of the objections. There is nothing in the contents of the
corrigendum to draw adverse inference or doubt the fairness of the
procedure followed for deciding the objections.
E. Conclusion and Directions
56. For the afore-stated reasons:
(a) the appeals are allowed; the impugned main judgment dated
05.01.2017 of the High Court as well as all other judgments
following the said judgment, which are under challenge in this
batch of appeals, are hereby set aside;
(b) consequently, the writ petitions filed by the respondents on the
ground that there is non-compliance of the procedure mandated
by Section 5A of the 1894 Act are hereby dismissed without
any order as to costs;
(c) the compensation amount, if already not paid, fully or partly, as
per the award of the Collector, shall be paid to the respondents
and other land-owners along with interest at the statutory rate
within 4 weeks;
(d) the payment or receipt of compensation by the respondents shall
be without prejudice to their right to seek further enhancement
in compensation in accordance with provisions of the 2013 Act;
(e) with a view to remove any ambiguity and to prevent avoidable
future litigation, it is clarified that since the 2013 Act came into
force while the land acquisition process was still pending, the
respondents and other land-owners/tenure holders are entitled
to be paid compensation in accordance with Section 24(1) read
with other relevant provisions of the 2013 Act; and
(f) since the respondents have been pursuing their objections
filed under Section 5A of the 1894 Act in a bona-fide manner,
1030 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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they shall be entitled to seek reference, if already not filed,
for further enhancement of compensation and the limitation
period for filing such reference shall commence from the date
of pronouncement of this order.
57. All the matters stand disposed of in the aforementioned terms.

Result of the case: Appeals allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey