Holding

The termination order is void for violating Article 311(2) and Articles 14 and 16, and is quashed, with the appellant reinstated.

Summary

The appellant, Nepal Singh, a temporary Sub‑Inspector of Police, was terminated from service on the ground of alleged corruption and a second marriage without government permission, based on a circular issued by the Inspector General of Police. The termination order was issued by the Deputy Inspector General under a 1953 notification without a proper inquiry, despite the earlier disciplinary proceedings being quashed for lack of jurisdiction. Singh challenged the termination before the High Court, which held the order was ex facie innocuous and not a removal, and dismissed his petition. The Supreme Court held that terminating a temporary government servant without complying with Article 311(2) of the Constitution violates Articles 14 and 16, and that the allegations were unverified and vague, requiring a proper inquiry. Consequently, the Court quashed the termination order, reinstated Singh, and allowed the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether the termination of a temporary government servant without a proper inquiry under Article 311(2) violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
Whether the order of termination constitutes a removal/dismissal requiring compliance with constitutional safeguards.
Whether unverified allegations of misconduct, such as a second marriage without permission, can justify termination.
Whether the competent authority can treat a termination as ex facie innocuous to avoid the mandate of Article 311(2).

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 16, s. Article 311(2)
Notification No. 230/Jl-B-1953
Police Acts. Section 7
U.P. Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1956s. Rule 29

Subjects

termination of servicetemporary government servantArticle 311constitutional lawprocedural fairnessmisconduct allegationsreinstatementpolice serviceequalitydiscrimination

Judgment

1

NEPALS!NGH

v.
STATE OF U. P. & ORS . B
• November 9, 1984

[R. S. PATHAK, D. P. MADON AND M. P. THAKKAR, JJ.]

• Public Service-Termination of Service of a temporary government servant c
y on the allegation ofmbconduct and corruption without following.provisiOns of
Article 311 (2) of the Constitution is void and violative of Articles 14 and 16-
Competent Authorities cannot circumvent the mandate of Article 311 (2) and re1ort
to the guise of an ex-facie innocuous termin:atlon order-U.P. Government Servants
Conduct Rules 1956, Rule 29 read with Constitution of India, Articles 14, 16 and
311 (2). D
On an allegation that the appellant, a temporary Sub-Inspestor or Police.
while posted at Pithoragarh had contracted in November 1964 a second marri-
age, while his first wife was alive, without obtaining the prior permission of the
Government and in violation of Rule 29 of the U. P. Government Servants'
Conduct Rules, 1956 the Superintendent of Po1ice, Shahjahanpur initiated in
1968 disciplinary proceedings under section 7 of the Police Act against him. E
However, after the evidence was closed in January 1970, the Superintendent
noticed that his action was without jurisdiction and pointed out the same to the
Deputy Inspector General of Police, Bareilly Range, who ordered the quashing
of the disciplinary proceedings on March 12, 1970.

About this time the Inspector General of Police, Uttar Pradesh issued a
0 .
circular letter to the Superintendent of Police throughout the State requiring F
·' them to submit a list of Sub~Inspectors who fell in any of the following three
categories :

1. Whose reputation and integrity is very low and/or

2. Who are genera11y involved in scandals, like drinking, immorality, etc.
which blackens the face of the U. P. Police and/or G

3. Everywhere they are a big problem because they encourage gambling, excise
offences, brothels, criminals, etc.

The Superintendent of Police, Shahjahanpur drew up a list pf such Sub-
Inspectors on February 5, 1970 and directed them to appear before the Deputy
Inspector General of Police, Bareilly Ran$• on February 10, 1970 durina his H
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 2 S.C.R.

inspection of the district. The list included the name of the appellant with the
note :

"A corrupt Officer, who is not straight forward. Married two wives
against Goverment Servants Conduct Rules. Does not do his duty
sincerely. Wherever he goes creates problem".
v
Thereupon, on April 27, 1970, the Deputy Inspector General of PoJice,
B Bareilly Range, made an order purporting to be under the rules published by
Notification No. 230/Jl-B-1953 dated January JO, 1953 that the appellant's
services were not required any rnore and were tern1inated with one month's pay
•
in lieu of notice.

The appellant thereupon filed a Writ Petition in the High Court against
c the order terminating his services and on November 17, 1972 a learned Single •
Judge of the Allahabad High Court dismissed the Writ Petition holding that the
order of termination was passed bonafide, that it was an order of termination 'y

simpliciter and that it did not constitute the removal of the appellant from
service. On appeal filed by the appellant that vice was endorsed by a Division
Bench of the High Court by its judgment and order dated March 13, 1973 and
the appeal was dismissed holding that the impugned order was ex.facie innoCu·
D• ous and could not be said to cast any stigma or be regarded ~as imposing the
punishment of dismissal or removal. Hence the appeal by Special Leave of the
Court.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD ; 1. It is well settled that in dealing with a government servant
F;, the State must conform to the constitutional requirements of Articles 14 and 16
of the Constitution. An arbitrary exercise of power by the State violates these
constitutional guarantees, for a fundamental implication in the guarantee of
equality and of protection against discrimination is that fair and just treatment
will be accorded tO all, whether individually or jointly as a class. When a govern..
ment servant satisfies the Court prima facie that•. an order terminating his
services violates Articles 14 and 16 the- competent authority must discharge the
F burden of showing that the power to terminate the services was exercised
honestly and in good faith, on valid considerations fairly and without
discrimination. [5-E-GJ

2. Where the services of a government servant on temporary appointment
are terminated on the ground that his reputation for corruption n1akes him •
unsuitable for retention in the service, the reputation for corrupt behaviour
G
must be based on something more than a mere al/egatiQo. The State. and for
that n1atter any statutory employer n1ust take great care when proceeding to
terminate a career on the ground of unsuitability, to ensure that its order is
found in definable material, objectively assessed and relevant to the ground on
which the termination is effected. (6-C-EJ

In the instant case, the Superintendent of Police did not apply his mind to
H the requirements of the case. The Sup<!riotencl<!Qt of Police h<ls noted that tile
NEPAL SINGH v. U.P. STATB (Pathak, J.) 3
f appellant created problems wherever he went, but it is not disclosed in the A
affidavits what those problems were and that the problems were of the nature
specifically indicated by the circular issued by the Inspector General of Police.
The other grounds mentioned in the report of the Superintendent of Police are
equally vague and unspecific. [6A-B]

3. Where allegation~ of misconduct are levelled against a Government B
Servant, and it is a case where the provisions of Article 31 l (2) of the Constitu·
tion should be applied, it is not open to the competent authority to take the view
that holding the enquiry contemplated by the dause would be a bother or a
nuisance and that therefore it is entitled to avoid the mandate of that provision
and resort to the guise of an ex~facie innocuous t~rmination order. The Court
will view with great disfavour any attempt to circumvent the constitutional
c
provision of Article 311 (2) in a case where that provision comes into play .
• [6-G-H, 7A-Bl

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 621 of 1975

Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 0
the 13th March, 1973 of the Allahabad High Court in Special
Appeal No.9 of 1973.

R.K. Garg and M. Qamaruddin for-the Appellant.

Prithvi Raj and Mr.•. Shobha Dikshit for the Respondent. E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

PATHAK, J This appeal by special leave is directed against
the judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court diimissing
the appellant's writ petition against an order terminating his
F
services.

0 ' The appellant, Nepal Singh, was employed in a temporary
capacity a~ Sub-Inspector of Police. He was serving at Shahjahan-
pur in 1968 when the Superintendent of Police, Shahjahanpur
initiated disciplinary proceedings under s.7 of the Police Act G
• against him on the charge that while posted at Pithoragarh he had,
in November, 1964, contracted a second marriage while his first wife
was alive, and as this was done without obtaining the prior permission
of the Government the ·appellant had violated Rule 29 of the U.P.
Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1956. The appellant filed
a reply and denied the charge. The oral testimony of about twelve
witnesses for the prosecution and an almost equal number for the
q :f : i : e was recor<\ed. But in January, 1970 t)le Superintendent
"
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 2 s.c.R.

A of Police, Shahjahanpur wrote to the Deputy Inspector General of k
Police, Bareilly Range that as the act alleged against the appellant
related to the district of Pithoragarh the disciplinary proceedings
taken by him would be without jurisdiction unless there was an
existing order transferring the proceedings from Pithoragarh to
Shahjahanpur. Accordingly, on March 12,1970, the Deputy '-
B Inspector General of Police, Bareilly Range ordered the quashing
of the disciplinary proceedings. It appears that no further action
was taken and the proceedings were dropped.

About this time the Inspector General of Police, Uttar
Pradesh issued a circular letter to the Superintendents of Police
c throughout the State requiring them to submit a list of Sub. •
Inspectors who fell in any of the following three categories :

"l. Whose reputation and integrity is very low and/or

2. Who are generally involved in scandals, like -drinking,
D immorality etc. which blackens the face of the U .P.
Police' and/or.

3. Everywhere they are a big problem because they
encourage gambling, excise offences, brothels, criminals,
etc.
E
The Superintendent of Police, Shahjahanpur drew up a list
of such Sub-Inspectors on February 5, 1970 and directed them to
appear before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Bareilly Range
on February 10, 1970 during his inspection of the district. The list
included the name of the appellant with the note ;
F
"A corrupt Officer, who is not straight forward.
Married two wives against Government Servants Conduct
Rules. Does not do his duty sincerely. Wherever he goes
creates problem."
G
Thereupon, on April 27, 1970 the Deputy Inspector General
of Police, Bareilly Range, made an order purporting to be under the
rules published by Notification No. 230/II·B·l953 dated January 30,
1953 that the appellant's services were not required any more and
were terminated with one month's pay in lieu of notice.
ff The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court a.gainst
NEPAt SiNGH v. tJ.I>. STATE (Pathak, 1,) s
the order terminating his services and on November 17, 1972 a learned A
} Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court dismissed the writ petition
holding that the order of termination was passed bonafide that it
was an order of termination simpliciter, and that it did not constitute
the removal of the appellant from service. That view was endorsed,
on appeal filed by the appellant, by a Division Bench of the High
" Court by its judgment and order dated March 13,1973. The learned B
judges have taken the view that the case i~ respect of the appe·
llant was covered by the first and third of the three categories
enumerated earlier, that is to say, his integrity was low and he was
a problem officer "who encouraged gambling, excise offences,
brothels, criminals, etc." The allegation that he had married two
wives against tne Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956, the c
• learned Judges said, did not bring him within any of the three
., categories as, in their view, the second marriage without prior
permission of the Government gave rise merely to a technical
charge. In view of the opinion that the impugned order was
ex facie innocuous and could not be said to cast any stigma or be D
regarded as imposing the punishment of dismissal or remov.tl, the
learned Judges dismissed the appeal.

It seems to us that the High Court has failed to consider the
true content of the case set up by the appellant. The entire thrust
of the appellant's case is that in terminating the appellant's Services
E
the competent authority treated him unfairly and arbitrarily.
It is well settled that in dealing with a Government servant the state
must conform to the constitutional requirements of Arts. 14 and 16
of the Constitution. An arbitrary exercise of power by the State
violates those constitutional guarantees, for a fundamental implica-
tion in the guraantee of equality and of of protection against F
discrimination is that fair and just treatment will be accorded to _all,
whether individually or jointly as a class. When a Government
servant satisfies the Court prima facie that an order terminating
his services violates Arts. 14 and 16, the competent authority must
discharge the burden of showing that the power to terminate the
• services was exercised honestly and in good faith, on valid considera- G
tions fairly and without discrimination.

The High Court has observed that within the framework of
the three categories defined in the Inspector General's circular the
allegation of a second marriage by the appellant was of no signi-
ficance, and that the principal intent in terminating the> appellant'~ II
6 SUPREMll COURT REPORTS (1985] 2 s.c.11

A services was to rid the State of an unsuitable officer. The Superin· -\:
tendent of Police has noted that the appellant created problems
wherever he went, but it is not disclosed in the affidavits what were
those "problems". It is not shown that the problems were of the
nature specifically indicated by the circular issued by the Inspector
General of Police. We are unable to conclude from the material
B before us that the Superintendent of Police applied his mind to the
requirements of the case.

The Superintendent of Police has also commented that the
appellant was a corrupt officer who was not straightforward (what-
ever that might mean). On that we have this to say. Where the
a services of a Government servant on temporary appointment are
terminated on the ground that his reputation for corruption makes
him unsuitable for retention in the service, the reputation for
corrupt behaviour must be based on something more than a mere
allegation. The other grounds mentioned in the report of the
Superintendent of Police, which impressed the High Court, appear
0
to us to be equally vague and unspecific. The State, and for that
matter any statutory employer, must take great care when proceeding
to terminate a career on the ground of unsuitability, to ensure that its
order is founded in definable material, objectively assessed and
rele%nt to the ground on which the termination is effected.
Proceeding from there, we may advert to a further aspect of
the case. It would seem that the dominating factor which influenced
the mind of the Deputy Inspector General of Police was the
allegation that the appellant had married a second wife against the
Government Servants' Conduct Rules. It is clear that a full-fledged
enquiry was instituted into the matter, evidence was recorded but
F before any findings could be rendered the enquiry was dropped for
want of jurisdiction. No attempt was made thereafter to institute •
a proper enquiry by the appropriate authority. In the circums-
tances, it was not open to the Superintendent of Police to mention
in his report, as a statement of fact, that the appellant had married
G a second time against the Government Servants' Conduct Rules.
With the dropping of tbe enquiry the allegation remained unverified.
We may observe that where allegations of misconduct are levelled
against a Government servant, and it is a case where the provisions
of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution should be applied, it is not open
to the competent authority to take the view that holding the enquiry
contemplated by that clause would be a bother or a nuisance and
NEPAL SiNGH v. U.P. STATB (Pathak, i.)

that therefore it is entitled to avoid the mandate of that provision
A
and resort to the guise of an ex facie innocuous termination order.
)
The Court will view with great disfavour any attempt to circumvent
the constitutional provision of Art. 311 (2) in a case where that
provision comes into play.
For all the aforesaid reasons, we arc unable to uphold the
judgment and order of the High Court, and in the result the appeal B
must be allowed.
The appeal is allowed and the order dated April 27, 1970 of
the Deputy Inspector General of Police, U.P. Bareilly Circle is
quashed. The appellant is entitled to be treated as continuing in
service without interruption. It will be open to the authorities to c
take fresh proceedings against the appellant in accordance with law.
lt will also be open to them to determine whether the appellant was
gainfully employed for the purpose of considering the extent of
relief, if any, to which he may be entitled pursuant to our present
order quashing the impugned order. In the circumstances, there
is no order as to costs.
D

S.R Appeal allowed.

•