NEERAJ GUPTAversusPARDEEP KUMAR BANSAL & ORS.
- Citation
- 2026 INSC 660
- Decided
- 1 July 2026
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- N KOTISWAR SINGH
Holding
A magistrate is not required to record evidence under Section 244 CrPC when the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions; the High Court’s remand was erroneous.
Summary
The appellant Neeraj Gupta filed a private complaint alleging that his father died after an altercation with the respondents, leading to a criminal proceeding under sections 302 IPC. The complaint was taken up by a Judicial Magistrate First Class under Section 156(3) CrPC, and the magistrate recorded some pre‑charge evidence before committing the case to the Sessions Court, which later framed charges only against one respondent. The respondents challenged the magistrate’s taking of evidence, arguing that under Section 244 CrPC a magistrate need not record evidence when the offence is exclusively triable by the Sessions Court. The Supreme Court examined the statutory scheme, held that the magistrate’s role at the pre‑committal stage is purely administrative and that no evidence is required to be recorded for offences triable exclusively by the Sessions Court, and therefore set aside the High Court’s remand order. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the matter was directed back to the High Court for fresh consideration without the erroneous remand.
Issues considered
- Whether a Judicial Magistrate must record pre‑charge evidence under Section 244 CrPC when the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions.
- Whether the High Court erred in remanding the matter to the magistrate to comply with Section 244 CrPC.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 193, s. 200, s. 207, s. 208, s. 209, s. 227, s. 228, s. 244, s. 319
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether a Magistrate must record evidence when the offence is strictly triable by the Court of Sessions as in this case, where the allegations were inter alia u/s.302 of IPC. Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.244 – In the year 2007, a between the appellant- complainant and his father on one side, with the respondents on the other – His father in the course thereof fell down and lost consciousness – Later, he died – No FIR was registered – In the year 2008, appellant-complainant sought direction
Subjects
Judgment
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 481 : 2026 INSC 660
Neeraj Gupta
v.
Pardeep Kumar Bansal & Ors.
(Criminal Appeal No. 3092 of 2026)
01 July 2026
[Sanjay Karol* and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether a Magistrate must record evidence when the offence is
strictly triable by the Court of Sessions as in this case, where the
allegations were inter alia u/s.302 of IPC.
Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.244 – In the year 2007, a
verbal/physical altercation took place between the appellant-
complainant and his father on one side, with the respondents
on the other – His father in the course thereof fell down and lost
consciousness – Later, he died – No FIR was registered – In
the year 2008, appellant-complainant sought direction before
the Judicial Magistrate First Class u/s.156(3) CrPC which was
accepted and the process as u/s.200 CrPC was initiated –
The case came to be committed to the jurisdictional Court of
Session – Respondents sought quashing of the complaint
and summoning order – Meanwhile, the Sessions Court
framed charges, only against respondent no.2 – Aggrieved,
the complainant filed criminal revision – The High Court
remanded the matter in dispute to the Judicial Magistrate First
Class, Chandigarh to comply with the provisions of s.244 of
CrPC – Correctness:
Held: It is settled that at this pre-trial stage, the Magistrate is
required to perform acts in the nature of administrative work rather
than judicial such as ensuring compliance with ss.207 and 208
CrPC, and committing the matter if it is exclusively triable by the
Sessions Court – The Magistrate at the stage of ss.207 to 209
CrPC is forbidden, by express provision of s.319 CrPC, to apply
his mind to the merits of the case and determine as to whether
any accused needs to be added or subtracted to face trial before
* Author
482 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the Court of Session – Further, under CrPC, the only requirement
from the Magistrate is to see whether the offence is exclusively
triable by the Court of Sessions and in doing so, no evidence need
be taken – The power of Magistrate is a ‘narrow inspection hole’ –
The High Court proceeded with an erroneous reading of the law
and the impugned judgment cannot be sustained – The remand
to the Magistrate was incorrect in law. [Paras 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]
Case Law Cited
Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab [2014] 2 SCR 1 : (2014) 3
SCC 92 – followed.
Sanjay Gandhi v. Union of India [1978] 2 SCR 861 : (1978) 2
SCC 39 – relied on.
Ajoy Kumar Ghose v. State of Jharkhand [2009] 4 SCR 515 :
(2009) 14 SCC 115; Sunil Mehta v. State of Gujarat [2013] 2
SCR 56 : (2013) 9 SCC 209; Harinarayan G. Bajaj v. State of
Maharashtra [2010] 1 SCR 171 : (2010) 11 SCC 520; Supdt. and
Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Ashutosh Ghosh (1979) 4 SCC
381; State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi [2004] Supp. 6 SCR
460 : (2005) 1 SCC 568; Rattiram v. State of M.P. [2012] 3 SCR
496 : (2012) 4 SCC 516 – referred to.
List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Code of Criminal Procedure,
1898; Penal Code, 1860.
List of Keywords
Section 244 of CrPC; Section 200 of CrPC; Section 208 of CrPC;
Section 209 of CrPC; Private complaint; Trial by Court of Session;
Committal order; Pre-charge evidence; Narrow inspection hole;
Warrant cases triable by Magistrates; Remand order; Legislative
intent.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
3092 of 2026
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.09.2019 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CRR No. 993 of 2011
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 483
Neeraj Gupta v. Pardeep Kumar Bansal & Ors.
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Amitabh Chaturvedi, Pankaj Gupta, Ankit Monga, B.L.N Sanjith,
Shankar Kumar Jha, Shubhaankar Ray, Ms. Rakhi Ray.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Ms. Tarannum Cheema, Akshay Nagarjuna, Akash Singh, Sanjay
Jain, Shreekant Neelappa Terdal.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Sanjay Karol, J.
1. Leave Granted.
2. This appeal assails the common judgment and order dated 2nd
September 2019 passed in CRR-993-2011 (O&M) passed by the
High Court of Punjab & Haryana, Chandigarh whereby the learned
Single Judge of the High Court, remanded the matter in dispute to
the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chandigarh to comply with the
provisions of Section 244 Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731.
3. The facts triggering this appeal are:
3.1 On 12th April 2007, a verbal/physical altercation took place
between the appellant-complainant and his father on one side,
with the respondents on the other. His father in the course
thereof fell down and lost consciousness. Upon being taken
to the hospital, he was declared dead. At this point, no first
information report was registered. On 16th April, the appellant
gave a complaint to the Senior Superintendent of Police,
Chandigarh seeking registration of FIR. A second complaint
was made on 19th April 2007.
3.2 On 5th February 2008, he sought direction before the Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Chandigarh under Section 156(3) CrPC
which was accepted vide order dated 19th February 2008 and
the process as under section 200 CrPC was initiated.
1 CrPC
484 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
3.3 Certain evidence was recorded on 21st April 2008 and 10th
January 2009 before summoning orders were issued on 8th
December 2009. The case came to be committed to the
jurisdictional Court of Session on 3rd May 2010. All the three
respondents went before the High Court seeking quashing
of the complaint and summoning order but in the pendency
thereof, the learned Sessions Court framed the charges vide
order dated 5th April 2011, but only against respondent no.2
namely Narinder Bansal.
3.4 Aggrieved by the discharge of respondent no.1 and 3 namely
Pardeep Kumar Bansal and Gurmail Singh, the complainant
filed a criminal revision (CRR-993-2011 (O&M)) against the
said order. It is in this revision petition that the impugned order
came to be passed. It may also be noted that the respondent
no.2, against whom charges were framed, had challenged
the order framing charge as also the summoning order and
prayed for quashing of complaint, by filing criminal revision
(CRM-M-26058 of 2011) which was also disposed of vide the
same impugned order.
4. The reasoning adopted by the High Court is that Section 244 CrPC
requires that a Magistrate hear all prosecution evidence irrespective
of whether or not the offence with which the evidence is concerned is
triable by the Magistrate or not. We may reproduce the part thereof:
“Once the Legislature has provided a specific procedure
for recording the pre-charge evidence before framing of
charges in a Magisterial trial, it does not appear to prudence
that the said requirement was not essential for an offence
triable by the Sessions Court, if the case is based upon the
complaint. It may be again added here that if the offence is
serious, there has to be sufficient material in the shape of
some evidence which is to be examined by the Magistrate
before passing the Committal Order, the same has to be
other than the pre-summoning evidence. Time and again,
this Court as well as the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held
that the Magistrate while passing the Committal Order
is not to act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but is
supposed to examine the material carefully to arrive at such
a conclusion. In cases based upon the police report, the
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 485
Neeraj Gupta v. Pardeep Kumar Bansal & Ors.
entire evidence collected by the police after investigation
is contained in Final report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C.
whereupon an opinion is formed by the Magistrate for
Commitment and likewise in the other cases, the Court
has to examine pre-charge evidence before passing the
Committal Order.”
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
6. The issue, simply put is whether a Magistrate must record evidence
when the offence is strictly triable by the Court of Sessions as in
this case, where the allegations were inter alia under section 302
Indian Penal Code, 18602.
7. The relevant provisions are reproduced below for ready reference:
7.1 Section 200 CrPC is found in chapter XV titled ‘Complaints to
Magistrates’, it reads as under:
“200. Examination of complainant.—A Magistrate
taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall
examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses
present, if any, and the substance of such examination
shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by
the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the
Magistrate:
Provided that, when the complaint is made in
writing, the Magistrate need not examine the
complainant and the witnesses—
(a) if a public servant acting or purporting to act
in the discharge of his official duties or a Court
has made the complaint; or
(b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for
inquiry or trial to another Magistrate under
section 192:
Provided further that if the Magistrate makes
over the case to another Magistrate under
section 192 after examining the complainant
2 IPC
486 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
and the witnesses, the latter Magistrate need
not re-examine them.”
7.2 Chapter XVI titled ‘Commencement of proceedings before
Magistrates’ houses Section 209 which provides for commitment
of case when offence is exclusively triable by court of
session.
“209. Commitment of case to Court of Session when
offence is triable exclusively by it.—When in a case
instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused
appears or is brought before the Magistrate and it
appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable
exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall—
(a) commit, after complying with the provisions
of section 207 or section 208, as the case
may be, the case to the Court of Session, and
subject to the provisions of this Code relating to
bail, remand the accused to custody until such
commitment has been made;
(b) subject to the provisions of this Code relating
to bail, remand the accused to custody during,
and until the conclusion of, the trial;
(c) send to that Court the record of the case
and the documents and articles, if any, which
are to be produced in evidence;
(d) notify the Public Prosecutor of the commitment
of the case to the Court of Session.”
7.3 Chapter XIX provides for a procedure to be adopted by a
Magistrate in warrant cases. There are two categories therein –
(i) cases instituted on a police report; and (ii) cases instituted
otherwise than on police report. Section 244 finds its place in
the latter half and spells out as follows:
“B.—Cases instituted otherwise than on police report
244. Evidence for prosecution.—(1) When, in any
warrant-case instituted otherwise than on a police
report, the accused appears or is brought before a
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 487
Neeraj Gupta v. Pardeep Kumar Bansal & Ors.
Magistrate, the Magistrate shall proceed to hear the
prosecution and take all such evidence as may be
produced in support of the prosecution.
(2) The Magistrate may, on the application of the
prosecution, issue a summons to any of its witnesses
directing him to attend or to produce any document
or other thing.”
8. Having understood the application of these provisions, let us now
examine the reasoning of the High Court. In holding as it did, reliance
was placed on primarily three judgments, Ajoy Kumar Ghose v. State
of Jharkhand,3; Sunil Mehta v. State of Gujarat4; Harinarayan G.
Bajaj v. State of Maharashtra5
8.1 In Ajoy Kumar Ghose (supra) the question that concerned the
coordinate Bench was the difference between the procedures
mentioned in 238 and 239 CrPC on one side and 244 and 245
on the other, in a case arising out of Sections 177, 181, 468,
471 IPC etc. The finding made in this case that it is incumbent
upon the Magistrate to record evidence under 244 CrPC is
made in the context of offences that are triable by Magistrate
as is obvious, in the present case, they are not.
8.2 In Harinarayan G. Bajaj supra, the interpretation of Section 319
CrPC was the question which engaged the attention of the
Court. It was held therein that once additional accused are called
before the Court under this Section, they too would have the
right to cross-examine witnesses before the framing of charge.
The word ‘proceedings’ as used in Section 319 would cover
not only trial but also inquiry beginning with Section 244 CrPC
and ending in Section 246 CrPC. In the present case, however
there is no question regarding the right of cross examination
and neither does anything turn on the understanding of the
word ‘proceedings’. Reliance therefore on this judgment appears
misplaced.
3 (2009) 14 SCC 115
4 (2013) 9 SCC 209
5 (2010) 11 SCC 520.
488 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
8.3 In Sunil Mehta supra, the question was whether the evidence
of the complainant recorded under Section 202 CrPC prior to
taking cognizance, would constitute evidence to frame charge
under Part B of Chapter XIX of the CrPC. It was concluded that
it would not count as evidence. It is important to note that the
sections involved in this case were 406 read with 114 IPC. The
distinguishing factor with the present case is that ambit of the
case was squarely within the powers granted to the Magistrate
by the CrPC unlike the present one.
9. If the reasoning of the High Court is accepted, a number of witnesses
would be required to depose about the same set of facts and
circumstances, at least twice. This may not be of any particular use,
nor mandate of law.
10. The Constitution Bench in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab6
while dealing with section 319 made following observations which
are relevant for our discussion:
“47. .. At this pre-trial stage, the Magistrate is required to
perform acts in the nature of administrative work rather
than judicial such as ensuring compliance with Sections
207 and 208 CrPC, and committing the matter if it is
exclusively triable by the Sessions Court. Therefore, it
would be legitimate for us to conclude that the Magistrate
at the stage of Sections 207 to 209 CrPC is forbidden, by
express provision of Section 319 CrPC, to apply his mind
to the merits of the case and determine as to whether any
accused needs to be added or subtracted to face trial
before the Court of Session.”
11. In Supdt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Ashutosh Ghosh7
it was held that under CrPC, the only requirement from the Magistrate
is to see whether the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of
Sessions and in doing so, no evidence need be taken.
12. The following two judgments relevant portion thereof extracted
herein later, both rendered by a Bench of three judges analysed the
difference between the CrPC and its predecessor from the year 1898,
6 (2014) 3 SCC 92
7 (1979) 4 SCC 381
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 489
Neeraj Gupta v. Pardeep Kumar Bansal & Ors.
to observe that the Legislature has consciously built in this difference
of doing away with the hearing and evidence at pre-committal stage.
This is what V.R. Krishna Iyer J. in Sanjay Gandhi v. Union of
India8, observed to be frustrating the purpose of the Legislature if
the Magistrate goes into the merits of the matter. The power of the
Magistrate has been described to be a ‘narrow inspection hole’.
12.1 State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi9:
“8. What is the meaning of the expression “the record
of the case” as used in Section 227 of the Code.
Though the word “case” is not defined in the Code
but Section 209 throws light on the interpretation
to be placed on the said word. Section 209 which
deals with the commitment of case to the Court of
Session when offence is triable exclusively by it, inter
alia, provides that when it appears to the Magistrate
that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court
of Session, he shall commit “the case” to the Court
of Session and send to that court “the record of the
case” and the document and articles, if any, which
are to be produced in evidence and notify the Public
Prosecutor of the commitment of the case to the Court
of Session. It is evident that the record of the case
and documents submitted therewith as postulated in
Section 227 relate to the case and the documents
referred in Section 209. That is the plain meaning
of Section 227 read with Section 209 of the Code.
No provision in the Code grants to the accused any
right to file any material or document at the stage of
framing of charge. That right is granted only at the
stage of the trial.
9. Further, the scheme of the Code when examined
in the light of the provisions of the old Code of 1898,
makes the position more clear. In the old Code, there
was no provision similar to Section 227. Section 227
was incorporated in the Code with a view to save
8 (1978) 2 SCC 39
9 (2005) 1 SCC 568
490 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the accused from prolonged harassment which is a
necessary concomitant of a protracted criminal trial.
It is calculated to eliminate harassment to accused
persons when the evidential materials gathered after
investigation fall short of minimum legal requirements.
If the evidence even if fully accepted cannot show
that the accused committed the offence, the accused
deserves to be discharged. In the old Code, the
procedure as contained in Sections 207 and 207-A
was fairly lengthy. Section 207, inter alia, provided
that the Magistrate, where the case is exclusively
triable by a Court of Session in any proceedings
instituted on a police report, shall follow the procedure
specified in Section 207-A. Under Section 207-A
in any proceeding instituted on a police report the
Magistrate was required to hold inquiry in terms
provided under sub-section (1), to take evidence as
provided in sub-section (4), the accused could cross-
examine and the prosecution could re-examine the
witnesses as provided in sub-section (5), discharge
the accused if in the opinion of the Magistrate the
evidence and documents disclosed no grounds for
committing him for trial, as provided in sub-section
(6) and to commit the accused for trial after framing
of charge as provided in sub-section (7), summon the
witnesses of the accused to appear before the court
to which he has been committed as provided in sub-
section (11) and send the record of the inquiry and
any weapon or other thing which is to be produced
in evidence, to the Court of Session as provided in
sub-section (14). The aforesaid Sections 207 and
207-A have been omitted from the Code and a new
Section 209 enacted on the recommendation of
the Law Commission contained in its 41st Report.
It was realised that the commitment inquiry under
the old Code was resulting in inordinate delay and
served no useful purpose. That inquiry has, therefore,
been dispensed with in the Code with the object of
expeditious disposal of cases. Instead of the committal
Magistrate framing the charge, it is now to be framed
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 491
Neeraj Gupta v. Pardeep Kumar Bansal & Ors.
by the Court of Session under Section 228 in case
the accused is not discharged under Section 227.
This change brought out in the Code is also required
to be kept in view while determining the question.
Under the Code, the evidence can be taken only
after framing of charge.”
12.2 Rattiram v. State of M.P.10:
“56. Evidently, there is a sea of difference in the
proceeding for commitment to the Court of Session
under the old Code and under the existing Code.
There is nothing in Section 209 of the Code to even
remotely suggest that any of the protections as
provided under the old Code has been telescoped
to the existing one.
57. It is worth noting that under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898, a full-fledged Magisterial enquiry
was postulated in the committal proceeding and the
prosecution was then required to examine all the
witnesses at this stage itself. In 1955, Parliament
by Act 26 of 1955 curtailed the said procedure and
brought in Section 207-A to the old Code. Later on,
the Law Commission of India in its 41st Report,
recommended thus:
“18.19. Abolition of committal
proceedings recommended.—After
a careful consideration we are of the
unanimous opinion that committal
proceedings are largely a waste of time
and effort and do not contribute appreciably
to the efficiency of the trial before the Court
of Session. While they are obviously time-
consuming, they do not serve any essential
purpose. There can be no doubt or dispute
as to the desirability of every trial, and more
particularly of the trial for a grave offence,
10 (2012) 4 SCC 516 (three-judge bench)
492 [2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
beginning as soon as practicable after the
completion of investigation. Committal
proceedings which only serve to delay
this step, do not advance the cause of
justice. The primary object of protecting
the innocent accused from the ordeal of
a sessions trial has not been achieved
in practice; and the other main object of
apprising the accused in sufficient detail of
the case he has to meet at the trial could
be achieved by other methods without
going through a very partial and ineffective
trial rehearsal before a Magistrate. We
recommend that committal proceedings
should be abolished.”
We have reproduced the same to accentuate the
change that has taken place in the existing Code.
True it is, the committal proceedings have not been
totally abolished but in the present incarnation, it
has really been metamorphosed and the role of the
Magistrate has been absolutely constricted.
58. In our considered opinion, because of the
restricted role assigned to the Magistrate at the
stage of commitment under the new Code, the
non-compliance with the same and raising of any
objection in that regard after conviction attracts the
applicability of the principle of “failure of justice” and
the convict appellant becomes obliged in law to satisfy
the appellate court that he has been prejudiced and
deprived of a fair trial or there has been miscarriage
of justice. The concept of fair trial and the conception
of miscarriage of justice are not in the realm of
abstraction. They do not operate in a vacuum. They
are to be concretely established on the bedrock of
facts and not to be deduced from procedural lapse
or an interdict like commitment as enshrined under
Section 193 of the Code for taking cognizance under
the Act. It should be a manifestation of reflectible
and visible reality but not a routine matter which
[2026] 7 S.C.R. 493
Neeraj Gupta v. Pardeep Kumar Bansal & Ors.
has roots in appearance sans any reality. Tested
on the aforesaid premised reasons, it is well-nigh
impossible to conceive of any failure of justice or
causation of prejudice or miscarriage of justice on
such non-compliance. It would be totally inapposite
and inappropriate to hold that such non-compliance
vitiates the trial.”
13. Consequent upon the above discussion, we have no hesitation in
holding that the High Court proceeded with an erroneous reading
of the law and the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is
required to be set aside. Ordered accordingly.
14. The main prayer of the appellant before the High Court was that the
Court of Sessions that seized the matter had erred in not framing
charges against the other two accused persons. In our view, holding
that the remand to the Magistrate was incorrect in law, we now ask
the High Court to hear the petition of the appellant as well as the one
filed by respondent no.2, afresh and decide the same independently.
Since the charges against one of the respondents were far framed
back in 2011, we request that both the petitions be decided as
expeditiously as possible, and not later than nine months. Parties
to appear before the High Court on 16th July 2026.
15. Appeal is allowed. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
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