NEELAM GUPTA & ORS.versusRAJENDRA KUMAR GUPTA & ANR.

                 [2024] 10 S.C.R. 708 : 2024 INSC 769

                         Neelam Gupta & Ors.
                                 v.
                     Rajendra Kumar Gupta & Anr.
                  (Civil Appeal No(s). 3159-3160 of 2019)
                               14 October 2024
              [C.T. Ravikumar* and Sanjay Kumar, JJ.]

                           Issue for Consideration
       Issue arose as to whether the impugned judgment is to be sustained
       in view of the indisputable or undisputed facts; whether the suit
       schedule property is the Joint Hindu Family property; whether
       the finding of the High Court that the plaintiff is the owner of the
       suit schedule property is the correct conclusion on assimilation of
       facts and appreciation of evidence; and whether the High Court
       was right in declining to accept the appellants’ contention that
       they perfected the title over the suit land by adverse possession.

                                  Headnotes†
       Adverse possession – Title to the property – Suit for recovery
       of possession of the property by respondent no.1-plaintiff
       against the appellants-original defendants asserting that he
       purchased the suit property as per registered sale deed in 1968
       from a common cousin of himself and the original defendants;
       and that since its registration he had been enjoying peaceful
       possession of the suit property under Bhumiswami Rights
       till he was dispossessed by the defendants in 1983 – Case of
       original defendants that their father and father of the plaintiff,
       purchased the suit property in the name of their nephew
       (common cousin) in 1963; that upon the death of plaintiff’s
       father in 1967, the suit property was transferred in the name
       of the plaintiff, albeit claimed that its possession still remained
       with them; that in 1976 oral partition took place between their
       father-original defendant No.1 and plaintiff’s family whereunder
       the suit property allotted to the share of defendant’s family;
       that the property was part of Joint Hindu Family; and pleaded
       adverse possession and limitation, on the ground of being
       in possession of the suit schedule property for more than


* Author
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                              709

         Neelam Gupta & Ors. v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta & Anr.


     12 years – Trial court dismissed the suit, and the first appellate
     court upheld the same – However, the High Court decreed in
     favour of the respondent no.1-plaintiff – Interference with:
     Held: Not called for – Once the plaintiff proves his title over suit
     property it is for the defendant resisting the same claiming adverse
     possession that he perfected title through adverse possession and in
     terms of Art. 65 of the 1963 Act the starting point of limitation would
     not commence from the date when the right of ownership arises to
     the plaintiff but would commence only from the date the defendant’s
     becomes adverse – Evidence on the part of the defendants reveal
     that instead of establishing ‘animus possidendi’ under hostile colour
     of title they have tendered evidence indicating only permissive
     possession and at the same time failed to establish the time from
     which it was converted to adverse to the title of the plaintiff which
     is open and continuous for the prescriptive period – Requirements
     to co-exist to constitute adverse possession not established by the
     defendants – Reckoning of the period of limitation from the date of
     commencement of the right of ownership of the plaintiff over the
     suit land instead of looking into whether they had succeeded in
     pleading and establishing the date of commencement of adverse
     possession and satisfaction regarding the prescriptive period in
     that regard, rightly interfered with, by the High Court – High Court
     rightly held that the defendants had only permissive possession
     over the scheduled land and it was not adverse possession
     against the respondent – Suit property is not a Joint Hindu Family
     Property – High Court rightly held that the plaintiff is the owner
     of the suit property and that the plaintiff had acquired ownership
     over the property on the strength of sale deed – Plea as regards
     benami transaction also rejected – Furthermore, immovable
     property can be transferred in favour of a minor or a minor can be
     a transferee though not a transferor of immovable property – Thus,
     the cousin had no legal disability or disqualification at the time of
     purchase of suit land in 1963 in his name as also the plaintiff, as
     a transferee, at the time of execution of sale deed – No reason
     to ascribe voidness to the sale deeds or to hold that they did not
     have the effect of transfer of ownership – Alleged contempt that
     pending the instant appeal and after the passing of the order of
     status quo regarding possession, the defendants created third party
     rights in the property – Since the impugned judgment is upheld
     and the declaration that the first respondent is entitled to recovery
710                                                          [2024] 10 S.C.R.

                       Digital Supreme Court Reports


       of possession of the suit property, has become final, in terms
       thereof, contempt petition closed – Limitation Act, 1963 – Art.65 –
       Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Contract Act, 1872. [Paras 25,
       29-31, 34, 35, 37, 40, 43, 45, 47, 49, 50]

                               Case Law Cited
       Saroop Singh v. Banto and Ors. [2005] Supp. 4 SCR 253 : (2005)
       8 SCC 330; Mrs. Om Prabha Jain v. Abnash Chand & Anr. [1968]
       3 SCR 111 : AIR 1968 SC 1083 – relied on.
       Arulvelu & Anr. v. State Rep. by Public Prosecutor & Anr. [2009]
       14 SCR 1081 : (2009) 10 SCC 206; General Manager (P), Punjab
       & Sind Bank and Others v. Daya Singh [2010] 9 SCR 71 : (2010)
       11 SCC 233; Ram Sarup Gupta (dead) by Lrs. v. Bishun Narain
       Inter College and Others [1987] 2 SCR 805 : (1987) 2 SCC
       555; Kashi Nath (Dead) through Lrs. v. Jaganath [2003] Supp.
       5 SCR 202 : (2003) 8 SCC 740; Damodhar Narayan Sawale (D)
       through Lrs. v. Tejrao Bajirao Mhaske [2023] 6 SCR 175 : 2023
       SCC OnLine SC 566; R. Rajagopal Reddy (D) by Lrs. v. Padmini
       Chandrasekharan (D) by Lrs. [1995] 1 SCR 715 : AIR 1996 SC
       238; M. Durai v. Muthu and Others [2007] 1 SCR 816 : (2007) 3
       SCC 114; Prasanna & Ors. v. Mudegowda (D) by Lrs., 2023 SCC
       OnLine SC 511; Vasantha v. Rajalakshmi [2024] 2 SCR 326 :
       2024 SCC OnLine SC 132; Brij Narayan Shukla (D) through Lrs.
       v. Sudesh Kumar alias Suresh Kumar (D) through LRs. and Ors.
       [2024] 1 SCR 60 : (2024) 2 SCC 590; Ravinder Kaur Grewal and
       Ors. v. Manjit Kaur and Ors. [2019] 11 SCR 74 : (2019) 8 SCC
       729; M. Siddiq (D) through Lrs (Ram Janmabhumi Temple case) v.
       Mahant Suresh Das and Ors. [2019] 18 SCR 1 : (2020) 1 SCC 1;
       D.R. Rathna Murthy v. Ramappa [2010] 12 SCR 755 : (2011) 1
       SCC 158 – referred to.

                        Books and Periodicals Cited
       Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn. –
       referred to.

                                  List of Acts
       Benami Transactions (Prohibitions) Act, 1988; Limitation Act, 1963;
       Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Contract Act, 1872; Majority Act,
       1875; Limitation Act, 1908.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                          711

         Neelam Gupta & Ors. v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta & Anr.


                             List of Keywords
     Joint Hindu Family property; Perfected title over land; Adverse
     possession; Suit for recovery of possession; Sale deed;
     Bhumiswami Rights; Art.65 of the Limitation Act, 1963; Starting
     point of limitation; Right of ownership; Animus possidendi;
     Permissive possession; Prescriptive period; Period of limitation;
     Immovable property; Transfer in favour of minor; Legal disability;
     Disqualification; Contempt; Status quo regarding possession; Third
     party rights; Contempt petition closed; Concurrent findings; Ground
     for confirmation; Plea.

                            Case Arising From
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 3159-3160 of
     2019
     From the Judgment and Order dated 25.07.2014 of the High Court
     of Chhatisgarh at Bilaspur in SA No. 401 of 2003
     With
     Contempt Petition (C) Nos. 517-518 of 2020 In Civil Appeal Nos.
     3159-3160 of 2019

                         Appearances for Parties
     N.K. Mody, Sr. Adv., Ms. Pratibha Jain, Divyakant Lahoti,
     Ms. Praveena Bisht, Ms. Vindhya Mehra, Kartik Lahoti, Ms. Garima
     Verma, Advs. for the Appellants.
     Puneet Jain, Ms. Christi Jain, Umang Mehta, Abhinav Gupta, Yogit
     Kamat, Manav Arora, Ms. Shruti Singh, Ms. Akriti Sharma, Harsh
     Jain, Ms. Pratibha Jain, Divyakant Lahoti, Sumeer Sodhi, Soumit
     Ganguli, Advs. for the Respondents.
                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
                                Judgment
     C.T. Ravikumar, J.
1.   The legal representatives of original defendant No. 1 viz., appellant
     Nos. 1 to 3 herein and original defendant No. 2 in Civil Suit
     No.195A/95, are in appeal against the judgment dated 11.07.2014
     passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Second
712                                                         [2024] 10 S.C.R.

                       Digital Supreme Court Reports


       Appeal No. 401/2003, reversing the concurrent judgments of the
       Courts below and the consequently, drawn decree dated 25.07.2014.
2.     The facts, in succinct, that led to the impugned judgment and decree
       are as follows:-
            “Respondent No.1 herein viz., Rajendra Kumar Gupta filed
            Civil Suit No.195A/95 (evidently, renumbered) admittedly on
            24.12.1986, against the original defendants, namely, Ashok
            Kumar Gupta and Rakesh Kumar Gupta for recovery of
            possession of suit schedule property based on title besides
            claiming damages to the tune of Rs. 10,500/- and future
            damages at the rate of Rs. 1000/- per acre and for costs. It
            was averred that he purchased the suit schedule property
            admeasuring 7.60 acres comprised in Khasra No.867/1 of
            Mowa village in Tehsil and District Raipur, as per registered
            sale deed dated 04.06.1968 from one Late Sh. Sitaram
            Gupta, who was the common cousin of himself and the
            original defendants. Furthermore, he averred that since
            its registration he had been enjoying peaceful possession
            of the suit schedule property under Bhumiswami Rights
            till he was dispossessed by the original defendants in the
            month of July, 1983.”
3.     The original defendants jointly filed a written statement on 04.04.1990
       contending that their father, Sh. Ramesh Chandra Gupta, and father
       of the plaintiff, Sh. Kailash Chandra Gupta, purchased the suit
       schedule property in the name of their nephew Late Sh. Sitaram
       Gupta, on 15.03.1963. They further contended that Ramesh Chandra
       Gupta and Kailash Chandra Gupta had also purchased another
       land admeasuring 5 acres comprised in Khasra No.924 of the same
       village. It was also contended by them that their father had installed
       electric pump and dug well besides constructing three rooms in
       the suit schedule property for dairy purpose. They averred, rather
       admitted, that upon the death of plaintiff’s father on 25.12.1967, the
       suit schedule property was transferred in the name of the plaintiff in
       the year 1968 and his name was recorded in the revenue records,
       albeit claimed that its possession still remained with them. They went
       on to contend that Ramesh Chandra Gupta and Kailash Chandra
       Gupta were members of joint family and they had joint business of
       bangles in Firozabad in the State of Uttar Pradesh and that in the
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                      713

         Neelam Gupta & Ors. v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta & Anr.


     year 1952 they started the business of bangles in Raipur by opening
     a shop in the name and style ‘Laxmi Bangles Store’. According to
     them, in the year 1973 their father had opened another shop of
     bangles at Dhamtari and on 31.03.1976 an oral partition had taken
     place between their father viz., the original defendant No.1 and
     plaintiff’s family whereunder land in Khasra No.924 admeasuring 5
     acres and the bangle shop at Dhamtari were given to the plaintiff
     and his family and the suit schedule property and the bangle shop
     at Raipur were allotted to the share of defendant’s family. They had
     also contended that till the aforementioned partition effected on
     31.03.1976, the plaintiff was a member of the Joint Hindu Family.
     In their joint written statement, they had also taken up the pleas
     of adverse possession and limitation, as special objections on the
     ground of being in possession of the suit schedule property for
     more than 12 years.
4.   Based on the rival pleadings, the Trial Court had framed 11 issues
     as hereunder:-
          “1. Did the Plaintiff by purchasing the suit land through
          registered sale deed dated 04/06/1968 get the possession
          of the suit land?
          2. Whether the Plaintiff is Bhumiswami of the suit land?
          3. Did the father of the Defendants purchased the suit
          land in the name of his nephew in 1963 and 1967, since
          then the Defendants are in possession of the suit land?
          4. Whether the Defendants within the knowledge of the
          Plaintiff have completed 12 years of continuous and
          uninterrupted possession on the suit land?
          5. Did the father of the Defendants transfer the suit land
          in the name of the Plaintiff on papers on 04/06/1968 all
          the lands of Sitaram in which suit land is also included.
          6. Whether there is income of Rs. 1000 per year from
          the suit land?
          7. Is the claim of the Plaintiff is barred by Limitation?
          8. Did the Defendants in the year 1983 forcible take
          possession of the suit land.
714                                                           [2024] 10 S.C.R.

                       Digital Supreme Court Reports


            9. Is the Plaintiff entitled to get the possession of the suit
            land from the Defendants?
            10. Is the Plaintiff entitled to get damages of Rs. 10500/-
            from the defendants/
            11. Reliefs and costs?”
5.     The Trial Court answered issue Nos.2 & 8 to 10 in the negative and
       issue Nos.6 & 7 in the affirmative. Furthermore, it was held that the
       evidence on record would reveal that prior to the year 1952, the
       father of the first respondent-plaintiff and father of original defendants
       were carrying on business in Bangles jointly and Bangle shops were
       opened in Raipur in the year 1952, and thereafter, in Dhamtari in
       the year 1973 as joint business. Joint business would create strong
       presumption of joint family. The Trial Court also held that the age of
       the aforesaid Sitaram, the vendor who was the common cousin of
       the plaintiff and the original defendants, was shown in Ext.P1/C –
       sale deed dated 04.06.1968, as 22 years and hence, at the time of
       purchase of the said suit schedule property, Sitaram must have been
       aged only 17 years. Consequently, it was held thus: -
            “Till otherwise is not proved this evidence of age shows the
            incapacity of self earning and creates strong presumption
            that the suit land was purchased by the income of joint
            family. The defendants have also stated that on the suit
            land their father had in the year 1964 installed electric
            pump, dugged well and constructed gate, fencing and
            three rooms, which statement is unrebutted and that also
            clears that the suit land was joint family property.
            By the aforesaid analysis, it is clear that the suit land
            was purchased by the joint family in the name of Sitaram
            and after purchase suit land was the Joint Hindu Family
            Property which was purchased by father of the Defendants
            in the year 1963 jointly with his brothers in the name of
            Sitaram.”
                                                     (underline supplied)
6.     After holding that the suit land was Joint Hindu Family property the
       Trial Court continued to consider the question whether by the purchase
       of the suit land under Ext.P1/C - sale deed dated 04.06.1968 the
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                         715

         Neelam Gupta & Ors. v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta & Anr.


     plaintiff–first respondent herein accrued any right in the suit land
     based on Ex-P-1C. In that regard, the Trial Court held that since
     the suit schedule property was purchased in the year 1963, in
     the name of Sitaram out of the income of joint family, it became
     the joint family property and there was no evidence to show that
     Sitaram was then the head of the family. Consequently, the Trial
     Court held that Sitaram had no right to sell the suit land under Ext.
     P1/C – sale deed dated 04.06.1968 and, therefore, the execution
     of Ext.P1/C was without any authority or right and, therefore, it is
     void. That apart, the Trial Court upheld the contention of the original
     defendants that the suit was barred by limitation as the plaintiff–the
     first respondent was aware of the possession of defendant in the
     suit schedule property adverse to his interest since 1968. Based
     on such observations, conclusions and findings, the Trial Court
     dismissed the suit.
7.   Aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit, the plaintiff- first respondent
     challenged the judgment and decree of the Trial Court in Civil Appeal
     No. 17 A of 2002 before the Third Additional District Judge, Raipur.
8.   The First Appellate Court as per the judgment dated 09.04.2003
     dismissed the appeal and confirmed the dismissal of the suit.
     Nonetheless, on an analysis of the evidence on record, the First
     Appellate Court interfered with the finding of the Trial Court that the
     suit schedule property was a Joint Hindu Family property and held
     thus: -
          “The Trial Court had dismissed the suit by holding that the
          suit land was the Joint Hindu Family property and further
          that the suit was barred by time but I have after analysis
          of evidence held that the suit land was never the Joint
          Hindu Family property of the parties but have also held
          that the suit of the Plaintiff is barred by time. Under these
          circumstances, the finding recorded by the Trial Court
          against issue No. 7 for dismissing the suit is found to be
          in order. Hence, no case is made out to interfere with the
          judgment dated 13/10/1999 passed by the Trial Court.”
                                                 (underline supplied)
9.   It is feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the First
     Appellate Court dated 09.04.2003 to the extent it is adverse to him
716                                                         [2024] 10 S.C.R.

                      Digital Supreme Court Reports


       that the plaintiff-first respondent herein filed the S.A. No.401/2003
       which culminated in the impugned judgment. As noted hereinbefore,
       as per the impugned judgment the High Court reversed the concurrent
       judgment and decree of dismissal of the suit and allowed the same
       after setting them aside. After allowing the appeal under the impugned
       judgment the suit of the plaintiff-first respondent herein was decreed
       on the following terms:-
            “(A) Plaintiff is entitled for recovery of possession of the
            suit land bearing Khasra No. 867/ 1, area 7.60 acres
            situated at village Mowa, Tahsil and District Raipur from the
            defendants No. 1 and 2; and it is directed that defendants
            shall deliver the vacant and peaceful possession of the
            Schedule suit land to the plaintiff herein.”
10. A scanning of the impugned judgment of the High Court would reveal
    that the High Court virtually found that the appreciation of evidence
    by the courts below was perverse and on a proper appreciation of
    evidence on record felt that the plaintiff-first respondent herein had
    succeeded in establishing title over the suit land. Paragraphs 10
    and 11 of the impugned judgment assume relevance in the context
    of the challenge made against the sale by the appellants herein and
    they read thus: -
            “10. The Commissioner, by its order dated 29th March, 1988
            again confirmed the order of Sub Divisional Officer, Raipur
            by dismissing the appeal filed by the defendants herein
            and declined to direct mutation in name of the defendants
            in the suit land. Thus, the document Ex.P-4 clearly recites
            the admission on the part of the defendants that the suit
            land is held by the plaintiff in his bhumiswami rights and
            to whom they cultivated the suit land for two consecutive
            years i.e. 1973 and 1974, not only this, defendants have
            clearly stated in document Ex.P-4 that they have cultivated
            the suit land only for more than two years. The date of
            the said document is 27.1.1981; and the instant civil suit
            has been filed on 24.12.1986.
            11. Coming back to the sale deed (Ex.P-1) dated
            4.6.1986 by which the plaintiff has purchased the suit
            land on 4.6.1986, which clearly recites that the delivery
            of possession by erstwhile owner Sitaram Agrawal in
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                             717

         Neelam Gupta & Ors. v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta & Anr.


          favour of plaintiff coupled with the admission on the part
          of the defendants that the suit land was held by plaintiff
          only for the two consecutive years i.e. 1973 and 1974,
          they were in permissive possession of the suit land as
          Adhiyadar; therefore, it is held that the trial Court as well
          as first appellate Court have committed manifest illegality
          in holding that the plaintiff has failed to establish his title
          over the suit land. On the contrary it is held that the plaintiff
          has satisfactorily pleaded and established his title over
          the suit land and finding recorded by the two courts below
          with respect to the plaintiff’s title is liable to be set aside.”
11. The contentions of the appellants 1, 2 & 3 herein, who are legal
    representatives of original defendant No.1 as also appellant No.4
    who was the original defendant No.2 is that the alleged sale effected
    as per Ext.P1/C – sale deed dated 04.06.1968 was merely on paper
    and was bogus and sham document. According to them, Sitaram,
    the common cousin of original defendants as also the plaintiff got
    no right to transfer the suit schedule property to the plaintiff as he
    himself had not accrued any right over the suit schedule property
    based on sale deed registered in the year 1963. It is their contention
    that the said property was purchased in the name of Sitaram by
    father of original defendants along with his brothers for the joint
    family (and thus in sum-and-substance) as their benami and hence,
    he was not the real owner of the suit schedule property. That apart,
    they would contend that they have perfected the title over the suit
    schedule property by way of adverse possession since they have
    been in continuous possession of the suit schedule property since
    the year 1968. That apart, it is contended that as rightly held by the
    Trial Court as also the First Appellate Court, the suit filed by the
    plaintiff-first respondent was barred by limitation as it was not filed
    within 12 years from the date of alleged sale.
12. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent would
    contend that the High Court was perfectly justified in interfering with
    the judgments and decree of the courts below as they were outcome
    of perverse appreciation of evidence. To buttress this contention, he
    relied on Section-4 of Benami Transactions (Prohibitions) Act, 1988
    and Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the decisions rendered
    thereunder and relied on by the High Court. It is the contention that
    in Ex- P-4, the respondent – defendants categorically admitted that
718                                                         [2024] 10 S.C.R.

                       Digital Supreme Court Reports


       they were placed in possession of a suit land in 1973 and continued
       in possession up to 1974 as Adhiyadar (lessee) and hence, their
       possession could be termed only as permissive possession and it
       could never be said to be adverse possession except by proving
       that their possession is adverse to the title of the property to the
       knowledge of the true owner viz. the plaintiff for a period of 12 years
       or more. He would further contend that by no stretch of imagination
       possession of defendants as Adhiyadar (lessee) could be said to be
       adverse and it could only be permissive possession.
13. A careful analysis of the impugned judgment would reveal that while
    reversing the concurrent judgment of dismissal of the suit, the High
    Court found various perversities in the manner of appreciation of
    evidence. The High Court found that the defendants had never
    challenged the Ex- P- 1C sale deed dated 04.06.1968. Consequently,
    it was found that possession was transferred to the plaintiff in 1968
    pursuant to the sale deed and Ex-P-2 and P-3, Khasra entries for
    the period of year 1971-1972 to 1977 and 1978 would further reveal
    the ownership and possession of the plaintiff over the suit schedule
    property. It was further found that though the defendants had
    contended that there occurred an oral partition of the properties in
    the year 1976 between the family of the plaintiff and the defendants
    whereunder, the defendants received the suit schedule property
    and shop at Raipur and the plaintiff received shop at Dhamtari
    and land in Khasra No. 924, the First Appellate Court held that the
    said oral partition was not proved by the defendants/the appellants
    herein and the said finding of the First Appellate Court had become
    final. The High Court had also taken note of the fact that earlier the
    defendants filed Ex- P-4 application dated 27.01.1981 (produced as
    Annexure P-13 in these proceedings) before Tahsildar, Raipur stating
    that they had been or they had cultivated the suit land for two years
    i.e. 1973 and 1974 as Adhiyadar (lessee) and thereby acquired the
    rights of occupancy tenants and their names be recorded in revenue
    records. It was found that in the said application they had again
    admitted the ownership of plaintiff over the suit schedule property.
    Ex- P-4 application was rejected by the Tahsildar as per order dated
    22.06.1985 and the same was upheld by the Sub-Divisional Officer
    and later by the Commissioner as per orders dated 29.10.1986 and
    29.03.1988 respectively. The High Court also found that the contents
    of Ex-P-4 application dated 27.01.1981 filed before Tahsildar, Raipur
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                          719

           Neelam Gupta & Ors. v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta & Anr.


     was admitted by defendant No. 1 while being cross-examined
     ultimately to arrive at the conclusion that such permissive possession
     could not be converted as adverse possession except by proving
     their possession adverse to the title of the plaintiff for a continuous
     period of 12 years or more. Obviously, the High Court found that
     the contentions raised to claim the occupancy tenancy before the
     Tahsildar and the contentions qua adverse possession before the
     Civil Court are contradictory in nature. The High Court relied on the
     decision of this court in Indira v. Arumugam and Anr.1 to hold that
     when the suit is one for possession based on title and when once
     title is established on the basis of relevant documents and other
     evidence brought on record in such suit unless the defendant could
     prove adverse possession for the prescriptive period, the suit of
     the plaintiff could not be dismissed. Relying on the decision of this
     court in Saroop Singh v. Banto and Ors.,2 the High Court held
     that in the light of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, the starting point
     of limitation would not commence from the date when the right of
     ownership arises to the plaintiff but would commence from the date
     the defendant’s possession became adverse. Furthermore, it was
     held that when plaintiff’s title and possession over the suit schedule
     property within twelve years from the date of institution of the suit is
     proved, it is for the defendants to prove title by adverse possession
     and in that regard, the starting point of limitation in terms of Article 65
     of the Limitation Act would commence from the date of defendant’s
     possession becoming adverse and not from the date when the right
     of ownership is acquired by the plaintiff. Suffice it to say, that the
     concurrent judgment of dismissal of the suit by the Trial Court and
     the First Appellate Court on the ground that the suit was barred
     by limitation was set aside by the High Court under the impugned
     judgment assigning such reasons.
14. While considering the rival contentions raised before us to challenge/
    sustain the impugned judgment indisputable facts based on evidence
    on record and certain well settled position qua the laws involved on
    the factual matrix involved in the case on hand require to be borne
    in mind. The Trial Court dismissed the suit mainly on two counts,
    firstly, holding that the suit schedule property is a Joint Hindu Family


1   AIR 1999 SC 1549
2   [2005] Supp. 4 SCR 253 : (2005) 8 SCC 330
720                                                          [2024] 10 S.C.R.

                       Digital Supreme Court Reports


       property and therefore, the common cousin Sitaram had no right to
       sell the property as per Ext.P1/C dated 04.06.1968 to the plaintiff
       (First respondent herein) and secondly, that the suit was barred
       by limitation. The judgment dated 09.04.2003 passed by the First
       Appellate Court in Civil Appeal No. 17 A / 2002 would reveal that
       after appreciating the evidence the First Appellate Court set aside
       the finding of the Trial Court that the suit schedule property is a Joint
       Hindu Family property. As a matter of fact, even after interfering
       with the said finding and holding it otherwise the First Appellate
       Court sustained the judgment of dismissal of the suit concurring
       with the finding of the Trial Court that the suit filed by the plaintiff
       was barred by limitation. Thus, it is evident that though, the Trial
       Court and the First Appellate Court are ad idem on the issue on
       limitation they were at issues upon the finding as to whether the suit
       schedule property is the Joint Hindu Family property. Despite the
       reversal of the finding of the Trial Court the defendants, who were
       respondents before the First Appellate Court, had not chosen to file
       appeal and had allowed the finding that the suit schedule property
       is not a Joint Hindu Family property to become final, for reasons
       best known to them. The First Appellate Court, inter alia, considered,
       rather, re-appreciated the oral testimony of the original defendant
       No.1-Shri Ashok Kumar Gupta who was examined as DW-1 and
       also documentary evidence. On such appreciation, it was held that
       the suit schedule property is not a Joint Hindu Family property of
       the four sons of late Mangal Sen Gupta, viz., plaintiff’s father late
       Shri Ramesh Chand Gupta, defendant’s father Late Shri Ramesh
       Chand Gupta, Late Ram Prasad and Beniram Gupta. It is despite
       all such conclusions and finding that the respondents before the
       first appellate court viz., the appellants herein did not file cross-
       appeal or cross-objection to challenge the adverse finding that the
       suit schedule property is not a Joint Hindu Family property before
       the High Court. Suffice it to say that in the said circumstances the
       appellants cannot be permitted to canvass that suit schedule property
       is a Joint Hindu Family Property.
15. That apart, a scanning of the impugned judgment would reveal that
    the High Court has picked up certain crucial perversities that infected
    the judgments of the courts below. In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary
    of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn., the expression ‘perverse’ has been
    defined thus: -
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                          721

           Neelam Gupta & Ors. v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta & Anr.


            “Perverse. – A perverse verdict may probably be defined
            as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but
            is altogether against the evidence.
            In the decision in Arulvelu & Anr. v. State Rep. by Public
            Prosecutor & Anr.3 this Court held that ‘perverse finding’
            would mean a finding which is not only against the weight
            of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself.
            In the decision in General Manager (P), Punjab & Sind
            Bank and Others v. Daya Singh,4 this Court held perverse
            finding as one which is based on no evidence or one that
            no reasonable person would arrive at. Furthermore, it was
            held that unless it is found that some relevant evidence had
            not been considered or that certain inadmissible material
            had been taken into consideration the finding could not
            be said to be perverse.”
16. Bearing the aforesaid position as to perverse finding we will proceed
    to consider whether the impugned judgment is to be sustained in
    view of the indisputable or undisputed facts and the decisions of
    precedential value applicable to such situations and circumstances
    revealed from the evidence on record. Before proceeding to
    undertake such a consideration it is not inappropriate to refer to the
    settled positions of law with respect to pleadings in civil proceedings
    before a civil court.
17. The ordinary rule of law is that evidence can be permitted to be
    given only on a plea properly raised and not in contradiction of the
    plea (see the decision in Mrs. Om Prabha Jain v. Abnash Chand
    & Anr.5).
18. In the decision in Ram Sarup Gupta (dead) by LRs v. Bishun
    Narain Inter College and Others,6 this Court held: -
            “….It is well settled that in the absence of pleading,
            evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be


3   [2009] 14 SCR 1081 : (2009) 10 SCC 206
4   [2010] 9 SCR 71 : (2010) 11 SCC 233
5   [1968] 3 SCR 111 : AIR 1968 SC 1083
6   [1987] 2 SCR 805 : (1987) 2 SCC 555
722                                                           [2024] 10 S.C.R.

                           Digital Supreme Court Reports


            considered. It is also equally settled that no party should
            be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all
            necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the
            party in support of the case set up by it.”
19. In Kashi Nath (Dead) through LRs. v. Jaganath,7 this Court held
    that where the evidence is not in line with the pleadings and is at
    variance with it, the said evidence could not be looked into or relied
    on. In Damodhar Narayan Sawale (D) through LRs. v. Tejrao
    Bajirao Mhaske,8 this Court held:-
            “……the well neigh settled position of law is that one
            could be permitted to let in evidence only in tune with his
            pleadings. We shall not also be oblivious of the basic rule
            of law of pleadings, founded on the principle of secundum
            allegata et probate, that a party is not allowed to succeed
            where he has not set up the case which he wants to
            substantiate.”
20. Now, for undertaking a consideration as mentioned above, we will
    firstly refer to the pleadings of the defendants in their jointly filed
    written statement. In paragraph 1-a, thereof it was averred thus: -
            “1-a… True and correct position is that plaintiff’s father late
            Kailash Chand; defendants’ father late Ramesh Chandra;
            late Ram Prasad Gupta; and Beni Ram Gupta, all sons
            of Mangal Sen Gupta, were members of Hindu Undivided
            Family and all of them were doing their business of
            manufacturing glass bangles in Firozabad (Uttar Pradesh)
            in the name and style of Ganesh Glass Bangles. In the
            year 1952, the father of the defendants and father of
            plaintiff opened a shop in Raipur City in the name of
            Lakshmi Bangle Stores. Thereafter Defendants’ Father
            Late Ramesh Chandra and Plaintiff’s father purchased
            suit lands on 15.03.1963 in the name of their nephew
            late Sitaram for a total price of Rs. 8,950/. Because late
            Sitaram was a member of the Joint Family…”



7   [2003] Supp. 5 SCR 202 : (2003) 8 SCC 740
8   [2023] 6 SCR 175 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 566
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                            723

         Neelam Gupta & Ors. v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta & Anr.


          “… In the year 1968, late Ram Prasad who was the brother
          of Defendant’s father requested Defendants’ father to
          transfer the suit lands and other lands which are in the
          name of his (Ram Prasad’s) son Sitaram in favour of any
          other member. Because Sitaram’s condition is not sound
          and he can ruin and fritter away suit lands under influence
          from anyone. Thereafter Defendants’ father transferred
          suit lands and other lands which were in the name of Sita
          Ram, in favour of the plaintiff on 4.6.1968 at an estimated
          price, although those lands were purchased for Rs. 16,000/-
          and suitable amendments were made in the records also.
          But suit lands were always maintained and occupied by
          the defendants herein and their father. In the year 1973,
          brothers of Defendants’ father opened a bangle shop in
          Dhamtari and plaintiff and his brother Surinder used to
          sit in this shop. Later on, an oral partition was arrived at
          in between the Defendants’ father and Plaintiff’s family
          according to which the shop in Dhamtari and agricultural
          lands of khasra no. 924 measuring 5.00 acres situated
          in Village Mowa were given to plaintiff and his family.
          Whereas suit lands herein and the shop in Raipur fell to
          the share of defendants.”
21. In paragraph 1-b, thereof it was averred as under:-
          “1-b. In fact suit lands were always and even today also
          are in possession of defendants and their father and after
          the aforesaid partition, defendants and their father and after
          the aforesaid partition, defendants and their father became
          absolute and exclusive owners of the suit lands and plaintiff
          has absolutely no right or interest in the suit lands.”
22. It is true that in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the written statement special
    objections were taken as under: -
          “9. Even if it is presumed that defendants are not the
          owners of the suit lands described in paragraph 1 above,
          then also defendants have become owner of the suit lands
          due to their constant and uninterrupted possession thereof
          since last more than 12 years and which was within the
          full knowledge of the plaintiff. Therefore suit of the plaintiff
          is liable to dismissed on this ground alone.”
724                                                         [2024] 10 S.C.R.

                      Digital Supreme Court Reports


           “10. THAT Suit is beyond the prescribed limitation and as
           such is liable to be dismissed with costs.”
23. Now, having noted the aforementioned specific averments in the
    written statement and the positions of law regarding pleadings referred
    above, we will refer to the oral evidence of original defendant No.1,
    who was examined as DW-1. The chief examination of DW-1 would
    reveal that in contradiction to the averment that the defendants’ father
    late Ramesh Chandra and plaintiffs’ father purchased suit lands on
    15.03.1963, Ashok Kumar Gupta deposed that the disputed land were
    purchased in jointness by his father and his three brothers, namely,
    Beni Ram Gupta, late Ram Prashad Gupta and late Kailash Gupta
    and hence, it was a joint family. He would also depose that it was
    so purchased in the name of Sita Ram Gupta in the year 1963. It
    is to be noted that while being cross examined, he would depose: -
           “disputed lands were purchased by my father in the name
           of Sita Ram. But neither the original nor the copy of that
           sale deed has been filed. We did not give any application
           for mutation of our names on the disputed lands in the
           year 1976 after partition had been arrived at.”
24. We have referred to the pleadings and the evidence adduced by
    the defendants not for the purpose of re-visiting the findings of the
    First Appellate Court that the suit schedule property is not a joint
    family property. We will reveal the raison d’etre therefor, a little later.
25. In view of the non-availability of the contention for the appellants that
    the suit schedule property is a Joint Hindu Family property. The next
    question is whether the finding of the High Court that the plaintiff
    is the owner of the suit schedule property is the correct conclusion
    on assimilation of facts and appreciation of evidence. We have
    no hesitation to answer it in the affirmative. The sale deed dated
    04.06.1968 (Ext.P1/C) is a registered sale deed whereunder the
    plaintiff had purchased the suit land from late Shri Sita Ram Aggarwal.
26. It is a fact that the Trial Court held Ext.P1/C-sale deed dated
    04.06.1968 as void on twin grounds. As a matter of fact, the Trial
    Court held that in Ext.P1/C the age of Sh. Sitaram was shown as 22
    years and hence, when the suit land was purchased in the name of
    Sitaram on 15.03.1963, Sh. Sitaram must have been aged 17 years.
    Further, it was held:-
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                           725

         Neelam Gupta & Ors. v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta & Anr.


           “Till otherwise is not proved this evidence of age shows the
           incapacity of self-earning and creates strong presumption
           that suit land was purchased by the income of joint family.”
27. The Trial Court further held in paragraphs 16 and 17 of its judgment
    thus:-
           “16. Now the analysis of the point that did the Plaintiff
           purchases the suit land through Exhibit P-1 sale deed or
           whether any right on the suit land accrues to the Plaintiff
           on the basis of document Exhibit P-1 C. According to
           previous paragraph the burden to prove the illegality of
           Exhibit P-1C is on the Defendants and to prove Exhibit
           P-1 illegal Defendants have failed and in the previous
           concluded issue it is held that the suit land after being
           purchased in the name of Sitaram was the property of joint
           family. There is no evidence that shows that Sitaram was
           the head of the family therefore, it is held that Sitaram had
           no right to sell the suit land by the sale deed Exhibit P-1
           C executed without any authority or right is void.
           17. Another ground for concluding that Exhibit P-1 C is
           void is that when it is proved that the Plaintiff on the date
           of sale i.e. 04/06/1968 was one of the member of joint
           family and was minor at that time then what was the need
           for which one member of the joint family to sell the Suit
           land to another member of the same joint family. On the
           date of sale the Plaintiff being the purchaser was minor
           and had no capacity of earning money on his own. The
           business of Plaintiff’s father was joint business. It appears
           that the intention of the joint family behind that action was
           to keep the suit land and other properties of sitaram in
           the name of the Plaintiff. But it is pertinent to mention that
           even after such intention Exhibit P-1 C is not transfer on
           papers only and therefore Exhibit P-1 does not bear any
           legal weightage.”
28. It is to be noted that though the First Appellate Court reversed
    the finding of the Trial Court that suit land is a Joint Hindu Family
    property, it did not consider in detail and arrive at any positive finding
    as to the correctness or otherwise of the declaration of the Trial
726                                                           [2024] 10 S.C.R.

                       Digital Supreme Court Reports


       Court of Ext.P1/C as void. At any rate, the First Appellate Court did
       not set it aside. At the same time, it may be possible to infer from
       the following recital from paragraph 17 of the judgment of the First
       Appellate Court that it held the finding of the Trial Court that sale of
       suit land by Sitaram in favour of the plaintiff did not confer any title
       to the plaintiff as not one in accordance with law: -
            “……But the Trial Court had treated the suit property as
            Joint Hindu Family property and has further held that sale
            of the suit land by the Sitaram in favour of the plaintiff does
            not confer any title on the plaintiff which finding is not in
            accordance with law.”
29. In the contextual situation, especially with reference to the
    observation and finding of the Trial Court on the ground of minority
    at the time of purchase of suit land, be it that of Sitaram or plaintiff,
    we think it only appropriate to observe and hold thus, in the fitness
    of things: -
       Section 6(h) of the Transfer of Property Act provides inter alia, that
       no transfer can be made “to a person legally disqualified to be a
       transferee.” Section 7 of the Transfer of Property Act deals with
       persons competent to transfer. It provides that every person competent
       to contract is competent to transfer property to the extent and in
       the manner allowed and prescribed by any law for the time being
       in force. Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, provides as to
       who are competent to contract and it provides that every person is
       competent to contract who is of the age of majority according to the
       law to which he is subject (of course the reference is to the Indian
       Majority Act, 1875) and who is of sound mind and is not disqualified
       from contracting by any law to which he is subject.
30. Though an agreement to sell is a contract of sale, going by its definition
    under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, a sale cannot be
    said to be a contract. Sale, going by the definition thereunder, is a
    transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or
    part-paid and part-promised. The conjoint reading of all the aforesaid
    relevant provisions would undoubtedly go to show that they would not
    come in the way of transfer of an immovable property in favour of a
    minor or in other words, they would invariably suggest that a minor
    can be a transferee though not a transferor of immovable property.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                         727

          Neelam Gupta & Ors. v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta & Anr.


     In such circumstances, it can only be said that Sh. Sitaram had no
     legal disability or disqualification at the time of purchase of suit land
     on 15.03.1963 in his name as also the plaintiff, as a transferee, at
     the time of execution of Ext.P1/C - sale deed on 04.06.1968. It is
     nobody’s case that at the time of execution of Ext.P1/C Sitaram had
     not attained majority.
31. Owing to the oscillative stand of the defendants/the appellants over
    the sale deed dated 15.03.1963 and 04.06.1968, and on account
    of the disentitlement of the defendants to resurrect the contention
    that the suit land is a Joint Hindu family property coupled with the
    indisputable position obtained from the materials on record that
    admittedly suit land was purchased in the name of Sh. Sita Ram, we
    find absolutely no reason to ascribe voidness to the said sale deed
    dated 15.03.1963 as also Ext.P1/C sale deed dated 04.06.1968 or
    to hold that they did not have the effect of transfer of ownership.
    Though, the defendants did not raise a contention specifically on
    the ground that Sh. Sita Ram was a benami, the said question
    whether such a contention is available and can be sustained by
    the defendants to invalidate the said sale deeds have been gone
    into by the High Court taking note of the contention that though it
    was purchased in his name in the year 1963 he did not have right
    to transfer the suit land to the plaintiff as per Ext.P1/C-sale deed.
    In that regard, Section 4 of the Benami Transaction Act, 1988 was
    referred to by the High Court. After referring to Sub-sections 4 (1)
    and (2) thereof, the High Court held that no suit, claim or action to
    enforce a right in respect of any property held benami shall lie against
    the person in whose name the property is held or against any other
    person shall lie by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real
    owner of such property because of the prohibitory nature therefor.
    Relying on the decision of this Court in R. Rajagopal Reddy (D)
    by LRs. v. Padmini Chandrasekharan (D) by LRs.9 and in view
    of the prohibition contained in the aforesaid provisions, the High
    Court virtually held such a contention that Sh. Sita Ram was not the
    owner of the property with right to alienate, (of course, on attaining
    majority) as also the challenge against the right acquired by the
    plaintiffs pursuant to the purchase of the suit land under Ext.P1/C


9   [1995] 1 SCR 715 : AIR 1996 SC 238
728                                                        [2024] 10 S.C.R.

                      Digital Supreme Court Reports


       as meritless. Suffice it to say that in view of the reasons assigned
       by the High Court and given by us supra, there can be no doubt
       with respect to the transfer of the ownership of the suit land from
       Sh. Sita Ram to the plaintiff on the strength of Ext.P1/C sale deed.
32. The question that survives further consideration is whether the High
    Court was right in declining to accept the appellants’ contention that
    they perfected the title over the suit land by adverse possession.
    While being cross examined as DW-1, the original defendant No.1
    would depose thus: -
            “An application was given by me and my brother in the
            Court of Tehsildar for mutation of our names on the disputed
            lands on the ground of lease and our possession of the
            lands. Ext. P4 is that application and it bears my signature
            and portion A-A and signature of my brother at B-B.”
33. During further cross examination, he would depose: -
            “Our name was not legally mutated on the disputed lands
            in the revenue court under Application Ext. P4.”
34. We have already found that the High Court was perfectly correct in
    holding that the plaintiff had acquired ownership over the property
    on the strength of Ext.P1/C sale deed. In such circumstances, the
    claim put forth as relates perfecting the title by adverse possession
    as also the suit being barred by limitation have to be considered
    with reference to the oral testimony of DW-1 as extracted above and
    the other allied evidences and also the various decisions referred
    to and relied on by the High Court to negate the said claim based
    on adverse possession. The deposition of DW-1 himself would go
    to show that the original defendants applied for getting occupancy
    right over the said property and in that regard filed Ext.P4 and
    at the same time sought for entering their names in place of the
    plaintiff in respect of the suit land in revenue records. However,
    such a mutation had never happened. In fact, the evidence would
    reveal that the defendants made an application on 27.01.1981
    (Ext.P4) before the Tehsildar, Raipur, stating that they have taken
    the suit land on lease as a Adhiyadar from plaintiff in 1973-1974
    and cultivated the same for more than two years and thereby they
    became the absolute owners of the property in question. In the
    said application in paragraph (1) they stated specifically that they
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                      729

         Neelam Gupta & Ors. v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta & Anr.


     took agricultural lands on lease (patta) from the plaintiff Rajendra
     Kumar under his ownership. It is a fact borne out from the records
     that the said application was rejected by the Tehsildar vide order
     dated 22.06.1985 and the appeal against the same was dismissed
     by Sub-Divisional Officer, Raipur on 29.10.1986. Though, the matter
     was further taken up before the Commissioner, he confirmed the
     order of the SDO as per order dated 29.03.1988. These evidence
     available on record were duly taken note of and dealt with by the
     High Court. The factum of submission of Ext.P4 application and the
     passing of orders thereon, as above, are indisputable and undisputed
     and hence, in the teeth of evidence, as above, the defendants/the
     appellants cannot claim adverse possession against the respondent/
     the plaintiff. In view of the above indisputable and undisputed facts
     as also the rejection of the contention of voidness of the sale deeds
     referred above, the defendants would not be justified in claiming
     that they had perfected the title by adverse possession and at the
     same time the aforesaid position would reveal that their possession
     was permissive in nature. The conclusion so arrived by the High
     Court based on proper appreciation of the evidence, in detail, as is
     discernible from the impugned judgment is nothing but the outcome
     of correct appreciation of the materials on record.
35. It is also a fact that the defendants earlier took up a contention that
    there occurred an oral partition of the properties between the family
    of plaintiff and defendants in the year 1976 whereunder they received
    the suit land and the bangle shop at Raipur. The First Appellate
    Court after considering the said case declined to accept the claim
    regarding oral partition and held the oral partition as not proved and
    that finding of the First Appellate Court was also permitted to become
    final by the appellants herein.
36. Now, we will revert back to the claim of adverse possession raised
    by the appellants. In this context, it is also relevant to refer to
    the decisions of this Court relied on by the High Court to reject
    their claim of the adverse possession. In Indira’s case (supra),
    whereunder this Court held that once the plaintiff proved his title,
    the defendant in order to claim ownership had to establish on the
    basis of relevant documents and other evidence to prove the plea
    of adverse possession for the prescriptive period and unless it is so
    proved, the plaintiff could not be non-suited.
730                                                          [2024] 10 S.C.R.

                            Digital Supreme Court Reports


37. We have already taken note of the fact that the High Court had duly
    taken note of Ext.P4 application submitted by the defendants, and
    also the evidence of DW-1, while being cross examined which were
    not given due weight by the Courts below. We have also found that
    the High Court has rightly reached the conclusion that the appellants
    herein had only permissive possession over the scheduled land
    and it was not adverse possession. In the contextual situation the
    following decisions including the one in Saroop Singh v. Banto,10
    relied on by the High Court, assume much relevance. Paragraphs 28,
    29 and 30 of Saroop Singh’s decision read thus: -
             “28. The statutory provisions of the Limitation Act have
             undergone a change when compared to the terms of
             Articles 142 and 144 of the Schedule appended to the
             Limitation Act, 1908, in terms whereof it was imperative
             upon the plaintiff not only to prove his title but also to
             prove his possession within twelve years, preceding the
             date of institution of the suit. However, a change in legal
             position has been effected in view of Articles 64 and 65 of
             the Limitation Act, 1963. In the instant case, the plaintiff-
             respondents have proved their title and, thus, it was for
             the first defendant to prove acquisition of title by adverse
             possession. As noticed hereinbefore, the first defendant-
             appellant did not raise any plea of adverse possession. In
             that view of the matter the suit was not barred.
             29. In terms of Article 65 the starting point of limitation
             does not commence from the date when the right of
             ownership arises to the plaintiff but commences from the
             date the defendant’s possession becomes adverse. (See
             Vasantiben Prahladji Nayak v. Somnath Muljibhai Nayak
             [(2004) 3 SCC 376].)
             30. “Animus possidendi” is one of the ingredients of
             adverse possession. Unless the person possessing the
             land has a requisite animus the period for prescription
             does not commence. As in the instant case, the appellant
             categorically states that his possession is not adverse
             as that of true owner, the logical corollary is that he did


10   [2005] Supp. 4 SCR 253 : (2005) 8 SCC 330
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                           731

            Neelam Gupta & Ors. v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta & Anr.


             not have the requisite animus. (See Mohd. Mohd. Ali v.
             Jagadish Kalita [(2004) 1 SCC 271])”
38. The decision of this Court in M. Durai v. Muthu and Others,11
    reiterated the law laid down, as above in Saroop Singh’s case,
    and further held thus: -
             “7. The change in the position in law as regards the
             burden of proof as was obtaining in the Limitation
             Act, 1908 vis-à-vis the Limitation Act, 1963 is evident.
             Whereas in terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the old
             Limitation Act, the plaintiff was bound to prove his title
             as also possession within twelve years preceding the
             date of institution of the suit under the Limitation Act,
             1963, once the plaintiff proves his title, the burden shifts
             to the defendant to establish that he has perfected his
             title by adverse possession.”
39. The law laid down in Saroop Singh’s case was again reiterated by
    this Court in the decision in Prasanna & Ors. v. Mudegowda (D)
    by LRs12 and Vasantha v. Rajalakshmi.13
40. In the light of Saroop Singh’s case there can be no doubt that once
    the plaintiff proves his title over suit property it is for the defendant
    resisting the same claiming adverse possession that he perfected
    title through adverse possession and in that regard, in terms of
    Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 the starting point of limitation
    would not commence from the date when the right of ownership
    arises to the plaintiff but would commence only from the date the
    defendant’s becomes adverse.
41. In the decision in Brij Narayan Shukla (D) through LRs. v. Sudesh
    Kumar alias Suresh Kumar (D) through LRs. and Ors.,14 this
    Court while considering the question whether tenants of original
    owner could claim adverse possession against transferee of land
    lord held that tenants or lessees could not claim adverse possession


11   [2007] 1 SCR 816 : (2007) 3 SCC 114
12   2023 SCC OnLine SC 511
13   [2024] 2 SCR 326 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 132
14   (2024) 2 SCC 590
732                                                             [2024] 10 S.C.R.

                            Digital Supreme Court Reports


       against their landlord/lessor, as the nature of their possession is
       permissive in nature.
42. In the contextual situation, especially in view of the nature of the
    evidence adduced by the defendants in setting up and supporting
    the claim of adverse possession, the decisions of this Court in
    Ravinder Kaur Grewal and Ors. v. Manjit Kaur and Ors.15 and
    the decision of a Constitution Bench in M. Siddiq (D) through LRs
    (Ram Janmabhumi Temple case) v. Mahant Suresh Das and
    Ors.16 require reference. Paragraph 60 of the decision in Ravinder
    Kaur Grewal’s case, in so far as it is relevant, reads thus: -
              “60. The adverse possession requires all the three classic
              requirements to co-exist at the same time, namely, nec vi
              i.e. adequate in continuity, nec clam i.e. adequate in publicity
              and nec precario i.e. adverse to a competitor, in denial of
              title and his knowledge. Visible, notorious and peaceful
              so that if the owner does not take care to know notorious
              facts, knowledge is attributed to him on the basis that but for
              due diligence he would have known it. Adverse possession
              cannot be decreed on a title which is not pleaded. Animus
              possidendi under hostile colour of title is required…...”
43. In the case on hand, the evidence on the part of the defendants/
    appellants herein would reveal that instead of establishing ‘animus
    possidendi’ under hostile colour of title they have tendered evidence
    indicating only permissive possession and at the same time failed to
    establish the time from which it was converted to adverse to the title of
    the plaintiff which is open and continuous for the prescriptive period.
44. In M. Siddiq’s case (supra) paragraphs 1142 and 1143 assume
    relevance and they, in so far as relevant to this case, run as under: -
              “1142. A plea of adverse possession is founded on the
              acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another
              against whom the claimant asserts a possession adverse
              to the title of the other. Possession is adverse in the sense
              that it is contrary to the acknowledged title in the other
              person against whom it is claimed. Evidently, therefore,


15   [2019] 11 SCR 74 : (2019) 8 SCC 729
16   [2019] 18 SCR 1 : (2020) 1 SCC 1
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                            733

            Neelam Gupta & Ors. v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta & Anr.


             the plaintiffs in Suit 4 ought to be cognizant of the fact
             that any claim of adverse possession against the Hindus
             or the temple would amount to an acceptance of a title
             in the latter. Dr Dhavan has submitted that this plea is a
             subsidiary or alternate plea upon which it is not necessary
             for the plaintiffs to stand in the event that their main plea
             on title is held to be established on evidence. It becomes
             then necessary to assess as to whether the claim of
             adverse possession has been established.
             1143. A person who sets up a plea of adverse possession
             must establish both possession which is peaceful, open
             and continuous possession which meets the requirement of
             being nec vi nec claim and nec precario. To substantiate a
             plea of adverse possession, the character of the possession
             must be adequate in continuity and in the public because
             the possession has to be to the knowledge of the true
             owner in order for it to be adverse. These requirements
             have to be duly established first by adequate pleadings
             and second by leading sufficient evidence. Evidence, it is
             well settled, can only be adduced with reference to matters
             which are pleaded in a civil suit and in the absence of an
             adequate pleading, evidence by itself cannot supply the
             deficiency of a pleaded case.”
45. Upon considering the evidence on the part of the appellants herein
    (the defendants), we have no hesitation to hold that the requirements
    to co-exist to constitute adverse possession are not established by
    them. So also, it can only be held that the reckoning of the period of
    limitation from the date of commencement of the right of ownership of
    the plaintiff over the suit land instead of looking into whether they had
    succeeded in pleading and establishing the date of commencement
    of adverse possession and satisfaction regarding the prescriptive
    period in that regard, was rightly interfered with, by the High Court.
46. There can be no doubt that being concurrent cannot be a ground
    for confirmation and as held by this Court in D.R. Rathna Murthy
    v. Ramappa,17 concurrent findings could be set aside if perversity
    is found with the impugned decision.


17   [2010] 12 SCR 755 : (2011) 1 SCC 158
734                                                       [2024] 10 S.C.R.

                      Digital Supreme Court Reports


47. The upshot of the discussion as above is that the well-merited decision
    of the High Court in the impugned judgment invite no interference
    in exercise of appellate jurisdiction and the appeals are liable to be
    dismissed. Hence, the captioned appeals are dismissed. No order
    as to costs.
                 Contempt Petition (C) Nos. 517-518 of 2020
                                        IN
                     Civil Appeal Nos. 3159-3160 of 2019
48. The Contempt Petition arises out of an order passed on 27.03.2015
    in Civil Appeal Nos. 3159-3160 of 2019 when it was remaining only
    as SLP Nos. 6995-6996 of 2015. This court, while issuing notice
    ordered thus: -
            “Status quo regarding possession, as it exists today, shall
            be maintained by the parties, till further orders.”
       On 27.10.2020 this court passed another order, wherein, inter-alia,
       it was ordered:
            “It is made clear that on the next occasion, the contempt
            petition as well as CA Nos. 3159-3160/2019 shall be
            disposed of finally.”
49. The alleged contempt is that pending the Civil Appeal and after
    the passing of the order of status quo regarding possession, the
    respondents in the contempt petition viz., the appellants created
    third party rights in the property. Obviously, with the dismissal of
    the civil appeals the impugned judgment and decree of the High
    Court got confirmed and the declaration that the first respondent in
    the appeal – plaintiff is entitled to recovery of possession of the suit
    property mentioned specifically therein has become final. Therefore,
    indisputably, in terms of the judgment and decree the appellants
    herein are bound to deliver vacant and possession of the scheduled
    suit land to the plaintiff viz., the first respondent.
50. Since the same is executable we do not propose to go into the
    contentions in the contempt petition and are inclined only to close
    the contempt petition in view of the judgment in Civil Appeal Nos.
    3159-3160 of 2019 and to discharge the notice issued to alleged
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                  735

            Neelam Gupta & Ors. v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta & Anr.


     contemnors and to leave the first respondent in the Civil Appeals
     viz., the plaintiff to execute the decree, in accordance with law.
51. Accordingly, the contempt petition is closed as above.

     Result of the Case: A
                          ppeals dismissed.
                         Contempt petition closed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain