NAWAL KISHORE SHARMAversusUNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

                  [2014) .7 S.C.R. 1027


                 NAWAL KISHORE SHARMA                                A
                                v.
               UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
               (Civil Appeal No.7414 of 2014)

                      AUGUST 7, 2014.                                B
         [RANJAN GOGOi AND M.Y. EQBAL, JJ.)

    CONSTITUTtON OF /NOIA, 1950:

      Art. 226 (2) - Territorial jurisdiction of High Court- Cause   C
of action - Appellant, a Seaman in the off-shore Department
of the Shipping Corporation of India - Subsequently found
suffering from h&art muscles disease - Received order from
Shipping Department of Government of India, Mumbai
cancelling his registration as a Seaman, at his place of stay,       o
i.e. Gaya, Bihar- Writ petition by appellant for claims filed in
Patna High Co'µrt - Maintainability of - Held: The question
whether or not cause of actiQn wholly or in part for filing a writ
petition has arisen within the territorial limit of any High Court
has to be decided in the light of the nature and character of        E
the proceedings under Art. 226 - In order to maintain a writ
petition, petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed
by him has been infringed by -respondents within territorial
limit of High Court's jurisdiction - In the instant case, a part
or fraction of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of      F
Patna High Court where appellant received a letter of refusal
disentitling him from disability compensation - Besides, when
the writ petition was filed and entertained in Patna High Court,
and, on hearing the respondents, interim relief was granted ,
they did not raise the que$tiori of jurisdiction initially - The     G
impugned order is, therefore, set aside and the matter remitted
to High Court for deciding the writ petition on merits - Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 - s. 20 (c).

     The appellant joined the off-shore Department of the
                           1027                                      H
    1028    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 7 S.C.R.

A Shipping Corporation of India in November 1988. Later
  on, he was transferred to a main fleet in the Foreign Going
  Department. However, subsequently, as per certificate
  dated 18.3.2011 issued by Corporation's Assistant
  Medical Officer, he was considered permanently unfit for
s sea service due to dilated cardiomyopathy (heart muscle :
  disease). Consequently, the Shipping Department of the
  Government of India, Mumbai issued order dated
  12.4.2011, cancelling registration of the appellant as a
  Seaman. The appellant settled at his native place Gaya,
c Bihar and sent representations from there to the
  respondents for his claims including disability
  compensation claim. By letter dated 7.10.2011,
  respondent no. 2- Corporation communicated on the
  address of his native place that the appellant was entitled
  to severance compensation of Rs. 2,75,000/- but he was
0
  not entitled to disability compensation. In the writ petition.
  filed by the appellant, the Patna High Court granted
  interim relief. Subsequently when the writ petition was
  listed for hearing, it was dismissed by the High Court. for
E lack of territorial jurisdiction.

        In the instant appeal, the question for consideration
    before the Court was: whether the Patna High Court was
    correct in taking the view that it had no jurisdictlon to
    entertain the writ petition.
F
        Allowing the appeal, the Court
       HELD: 1.1. In order to overcome undue hardship and
  inconvenience to the citizens to invoke writ jurisdiction
  Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 was amended
G in 1963 and further in 1976. On a plain reading of the
  amended provisions in Clause (2) of Art. 226, it is clear
  that the High Court can issue a writ when the person or
  the authority against whom the writ is issued is located
  outside its territorial jurisdiction, if the cause of action
H wholly or partially arises within the High Court's territorial
   NAWAL KISl'-IORE SHARMA v. UNION OF INDIA            1029


jurisdiction. Cause of action for t.he purpose of Art. 226       A
(2) of the Constitution, for alJ intent and purpose must be
assigned the same meaning as envisaged uls 20(c) of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The _expression cause of
action ha~ not been defined either in the Code of Civil
Procedure or the Constitution. Cause of action is bundle         B
of facts which is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in the
suit before he can succeed. [ppras 10 & 11]' [1036-F-H;
1037-A]

     State of Rajasthan and Others.vs. Mis Swaika Properties     C
and Another, 1~85 (3) SCR 598; (1985) 3 SCC 217; Oil
and Natural Gas Commission vs. :Utpal Kumar Basu and
others, 1994 (1) Suppl. SCR 252 = (1994) 4 SCC 711;
Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of India and
Another 2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 841 = (2004) 6 SCC 254;
Union of India and others vs. Adani Exports Ltd. and             D
another2001 (4 Suppl. SCR 631 = (2002) 1 SCC 567; Om
Prakash Srivastava vs. Union of India and Another 2007
(5) SCR 923 = (2006) 6 SCC 207; Rajendran Chingaravelu
vs. R.K. Mishra, Additional Commissioner of Income Tax and
Others 2009 (15) SCR 1113 = (2010) 1 SCC 457 - relied            E
on.

     Election Commission, India vs. Saka Venkata Rao 1953
SCR 1144 = AIR.1953 SC 210; K.S. Rashid and Son vs.
lnc.ome tax Investigation Commission Etc. 1954                   F
SCR 738 =AIR 1954 SC 207, Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh vs.
Union of India and another, 1961 SCR 828 = AIR 1961 SC
532 - referred to.

     1.2. There cannot be any doubt that the question
whether or not cause of action wholly or in part for filing      G
a ~rit petition has arisen within the territorial limit of any
High Court has to be decided in the light of the nature
and character of the proceedings under Art. 226 of the
Constitution. In order to maintain a writ petition, the
petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by        H
   1030    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 7 S.C.R.

A him has been infringed by the respondents within the
  territorial limit of the High Court's jurisdiction. [para 19]
  [1044-A·B]

       1.3. From the facts pleaded in the writ petition and the
  documents relied upon by the appellant, it is evident that
8
  he was declared permanently unfit for sea service due to
  dilated cardiomyopathy (heart muscles disease). As a
  result, the Shipping Department of the Government of
  India issued an order on 12.4.2011 cancelling the
  registration of the appellant as a seaman. A copy of the
C letter was sent to the appellant at his native place in Bihar
  where he was staying after he was found medically unfit.
  The appellant sent a representation from his home in the
  State of Bihar to the respondents claiming disability
  compensation. The said representation was replied by
D the respondent, which was addressed to him on his
  home address in Gaya, Bihar, rejecting his claim for
  disability compensation. Prima facie, therefore,
  considering all the facts together, a part or fraction of
  cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Patna
E High Court where he received a letter of refusal
  disentitling him from disability compensation. [para 20]
  [1044-C-F; 1045-A-B]

       1.4. Besides, from the counter affidavit of the
F respondents and the documents annexed therewith, it
  reveals that after the writ petition was filed in the Patna
  High Court, the same was entertained and notices were
  issued. Pursuant to the said notice, the respondents
  appeared and participated in the proceedings in the High
G Court. It further reveals that after hearing the counsel
  appearing for both the parties, the High Court passed an
  interim order on 18.9.2012 directing the authorities "Of
  Shipping Corporation of India to pay at least a sum of
  Rs.2.75 lakhs, which shall be subject to the result of the
  writ petition. Pursuant to the interim order, the respondent
H
   NAWAL KISHORE SHARMA v. UNION OF INDIA             1031


Shipping Corporation of India remitted Rs.2,67,270/- (after   A
deduction of income tax) to the bank account of the
appellant. However, when the writ petition was taken up
for hearing, the High Court took the view that no cause of
action, not even a fraction of cause of action, has arisen
within its territorial jurisdiction. [para 21] [1045-B-E]     B

     1.5. Considerin_g the entire facts of the case,
including the interim order passed by the High Court, in
the considered opinion of this Court, the writ petition
ought not to have been dismissed for want of territorial
jurisdiction. At the time when the writ petition was heard    C
for the purpose of grant of interim relief, the respondents
instead of raising any objection with regard to territorial
jurisdiction opposed the prayer on the ground that the
writ petitioner-appellant was offered an amount of Rs.2.75
lakhs, but he refused to accept the. same and challenged      D
the order granting severance compensation by filing the
writ petition. The impugned order, therefore,. cannot be
sustained in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this
cas~ and, as such, is set aside and· the matter remitted
to the High Court for deciding the writ petition on merits.   E
[para 22-23] [1045-F-H; 1046-A-B]
                    Case Law Reference:
  1953 SCR1144                  referred to       P<1.ra 9
                                                              F
  1954 SCR 738                  referred to       Para 9
  1961 SCR 828                  referred to       Para 9
  1985 (3) SC~ 598              relied on         Para 13
  1994 (1) Suppl. SCR 252       relied on         Para 14     G
  2004 (1) Suppl. SCR841        relied on         Para 15
  200t (4) Suppl. SCR .631      relied on         Para 16
  2007 (5) SC~ 923              relied on         Para 17     H
    1032   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 7 S.C.R.


A     2009 (15) SCR 1113             relied on          Para 19
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    7414 of 2014.

      From the Judgment and Order dated 16.04.2013 in CWJC
B No. 3160/2012 passed by the High Court of Patna.

        Guru Krishan Kumar, Rakesh Kumar, Prabhat Kaushik,
    Deb Nandan Rajak, Maneesh Arora and Mridula Ray
    Bharadwaj for the appellant.
c        N.K. Kaul, ASG., Nagendra Rai Rashmi Malhotra Silpa
    Nair, Sanyat Lodha Aakanksha Kaul Bharti Tyagi, D.S. Mahra
    Manita Verma S. Janani and Devashish Bharuka for the
    respondents.

D       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        M.Y. EQBAL, J. 1. Leave granted.

       2. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 16.4.2013
  passed by learned Single Judge of Patna High Court
E dismissing appellant's writ petition for want of territorial
  jurisdiction, this appeal by special leave has been preferred by
  the appellant, who in November, 1988 had joined the off-shore
  Department of the Shipping Corporation of India (in short, "the
  Corporation") and after about eight years he was transferred
F from the off-shore duty to a main fleet in the Foreign Going
   Department.

      3. It is the case of the appellant that he was found
  medically fit in the medical test conducted by the Marine Medical
G Services in February, 2009 and thereafter, on 29.9.2009, an
  agreement known as the articles of agreement for employment
  of seafarers was executed for appellant's off-shore duty. On
  18.6.2010, when the appellant reported sickness i.e. cough,
  abdominal pain, swelling in leg and difficulty in breathing, he
H was sent for medical treatment ashore at Adani, Mundra Port.
    NAWAL KISHORE SHARMA v. UNION OF INDIA                     1033
                [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
The Medical Officer ashore advised him for admission in the             A
Hospital and accordingly he was signed off for further medical
treatment. Thereafter, he was considered permanently unfit for
sea service due to dilated cardiomyopathy (heart muscle
disease) as per certificate dated 18.3.2011 issued by
Corporation's Assistant Medical Officer. Consequently, the              8
Shipping Department of the Government of India, Mumbai
issued order dated 12.4.2011 cancelling registration of the
appellant as a Seaman.

     4. It is contended by the appellant that after he settled at       C
his native place Gaya, Bihar, he sent several letters/
representations from there to the respondents for his financial
claims as per statutory provisio'ns'and terms of contract. On the
disability compensation claim, Respondent no.2-Corporation
communicated vide letter dated 7.10.2011 that since the
appellant was declared unfit for sea service due to heart               D
problem (organic ailment) he will be entitled to receive
severance compensation of Rs.2,75,000/-, which was although
offered, but not accepted by the appellant. It was also informed
that he is not entitled to receive disability compensation, which
becomes payable only in case a seaman becomes                           E
incapacitated as a result of the injury.

        5. By filing a writ petition, the appellant approached Patna
' High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for grant
  of various reliefs including 100% disability compensation and         F
  pecuniary damages. However, at the time of hearing,
  respondents raised the question of maintainability of the writ
  petition on the ground that no cause of action or even a fraction
  of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the
  Patna High Court and contended that the appellant was                 G
  appointed by the Corporation on the post of Seaman for off-
  shore services and he discharged his duty outside the territory
  of the State of Bihar. It is the case of the respondent that the
  order declaring the appellant permanently unfit as well as the
  letter/order dated 7.10.2011 was passed by an authority of the        H
    1034     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 7 S.C.R.

A respondent Corporation at Mumbai. Per contra, it is the case
  of the appellant that he is a permanent resident of Bihar and
  he asserted tlis rights in the State of Bihar and all
  communications with respect to rejection of his claims were
  made at his residential address in the State of Bihar.
B
       6. After hearing learned counsel appearing for the parties
  and considering entire materials on record, learned Single
  Judge of the Patna High Court dismissed the writ petition of
  the appellant holding that no cause of action, not even a fraction
C of cause of action, arose within its territorial jurisdiction. Hence,
  the present appeal by special leave.

         7. We have heard le~rned counsel appearing for the
    parties.

0      8. The short question that falls for consideration in the facts
  of the present case is that as to whether the Patna High Court
  is correct in taking the view that it has no jurisdiction to entertain
  the writ petition. For answering the said question we would like
  to consider the provision of Article 226 of the Constitution as it
E stood prior to amendment. Originally, Article 226 of the
  Constitution read as under:-

         "Art.226. Power of High Courts       to  issue certain writs.
         - (1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High
         Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation
F        to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or
         authority, including in appropriate cases any Government,
         within those territories directions, orders or writs, in.eluding
         writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus,
         prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them or
G        the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part Ill
         and for any other purpose.

         (2) The power conferred on a High Court by clause (1) shall
         not be in derogation of the power conferred on the
         Supreme Court by clause (2) of article 32".
H
   NAWAL KISHORE SHARMA v. UNION OF INDIA                    1035
               [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
      9. While interpreting the aforesaid provision the                A
Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Election
Commission, India vs. Saka Venkata Rao, AIR 1953 SC 210,
held that the writ court would not run beyond the territories
subject to its jurisdiction and that the person or the authority
affected by the writ must be amenable to court's jurisdiction          B
either by residence or location within those territories. The rule
that cause of action. attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on
statutory enactment and cannot apply to writs issued under
Article 226 of the Constitution which makes no reference to any
cause of action or where it arises but insist on the presence of       c
the person or authority within the territories in relation to which
High Court exercises jurisdiction. In another Constitution ~ench
judgment of this Court in K.S. Rashid and Son vs. Income tax
ln.vestigation Commission Etc., AIR 1954 SC 207, this Court
took the similar view and held that the writ court cannot exercise
                                                                       0
its power under Article 226 beyond its territorial jurisdiction. The
Court was of the view that the exercise of po\,Ver conferred by
Article 226 was subject to a two-fold limitation viz., firstly, the
power is to be exercised in relation to which it exercises
jurisdiction and secondly, the person or authority on whom the
High Court is empowered to issue writ must be within those             E
territories. These two Constitution Bench judgments came for
consideration before a larger Bench of seven Judges of this
 Court in the case of Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh vs. Union of India
 and another, AIR 1961 SC 532. The Bench approved the
aforementioned two Constitution Bench judgments and opined             F
that unless there are clear and compelling reasons, which
 cannot be denied, writ court cannot exercise jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution beyond its territorial jurisdiction.

      10. The interpretation given by this Court in the aforesaid      G
decisions resulted in undue hardship and inconvenience to the
citizens to invoke writ jurisdiction. As a result, Clause 1(A) was
inserted in Article 226 by the Constitution (15th) Amendment
Act, 1963 and subsequently renumbered as Clause (2) by the
                                                                       H
    1036     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 7 S.C.R.

A Constitution (42nd) Amendment Act, 1976. The amended
  Clause (2) now reads as under:-

        "226. Power of the High Courts to issue certain writs
        - (1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High
        Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation
B
        to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or
        authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government,
        within those territories directions, orders or writs, including
        writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus,
        prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for
c       the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part Ill
        and for any other purpose.
         (2) The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions,
         orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may
D        also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction
         in relation to the territories within which the cause of action,
         wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power,
         notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or
         authority or the residence of such person is not within those
         territories.
E
         (3) xxxxx
         (4) xxxxx"
       11. On a plain reading of the amended provisions in
F Clause (2), it is clear that now High Court can issue a writ when
  the person or the authority against whom the writ is issued is
  located outside its territorial jurisdiction, if the cause of action
  wholly or partially arises within the court's territorial jurisdiction.
  Cause of action for the purpose of Article 226 (2) of the
G Constitution, for all intent and purpose must be assigned the
  same meaning as envisaged under Section 20(c) of the Code
  of Civil Procedure. The expression cause of action has not been
  defined either in the Code of Civil Procedure or the
  Constitution. Cause of action is bundle of facts which is
H
   NAWAL KISHORE SHARMA v. UNION OF INDIA                    1037
               [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
necessary for the plaintiff to prove in the suit before he can        A
succeed.

   12. The term 'cause of action' as appearing in Clause (2)
came for consideration time and again before this Court.

       13. In the case of State of Rajasthan and Others vs. Mis       B
Swaika Properties and Another, (1985) 3 SCC 217, the fact
was that the respondent-Company having its registered office
in Calcutta owned certain land on the outskirts of Jaipur City
was served with notice for acquisition of land under Rajasthan
Urban Improvement Act, 1959. Notice was duly served on the            C
Company at its registered office at Calcutta. The Company, first
appeared before the Special Court and finally the Calcutta High
Court by filing a writ petition challenging the notification of
acquisition. The matter ultimately came before this Court to
answer a question as to whether the service of notice under           D
Section 52(2) of the Act at the registered office of the
Respondent in Calcutta was an integral part of cause of action
and was it sufficient to invest the Calcutta High Court with a
jurisdiction to entertain the petition challenging the impugned
 notification. Answering the question this Court held:-               E

     "7. Upon these facts, we are satisfied thcit the cause of
     action neither wholly nor in part arose within the territorial
     limits of the Calcutta High Court and therefore the learned
     Single Judge had no jurisdiction to issue a rule nisi on the
     petition filed by the respondents under Article 226 of th.e      F
     Constitution or to make the ad interim ex parte prohibitory
     order restraining the appellants from taking any steps to
     take possession of the land acquired. Under sub-section
     (5) of Section 52 of the Act the appellants were entitled to
     require the respondents to surrender or deliver possession       G
     of the lands acquired forthwith and upon their failure to do
     so, take immediate steps to secure such possession under
     sub-section (6) thereof.

                                                                      H
    1038   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 7 S.C.R.

A      8. The expression "cause of action" is tersely defined in
       Mu/la's Code of Civil Procedure:

       "The 'cause of action' means every fact which, if traversed,
       it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to
       support his right to a judgment of the court."
B
       In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the
       law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief
       against the defendant. The mere service of notice under
       Section 52(2) of the Act on the respondents at their
c      registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta i.e.
       within the territorial limits of the State of West Bengal,
       could not give rise to a cause of action within that territory
       unless the service of such notice was an integral part of
       the cause of action. The entire cause of action culminating
D      in the acquisition of the land under Section 52(1) of the Act
       arose within the State of Rajasthan i.e. within the territorial
       jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur
       Bench. The answer to the question whether service of
       notice is an integral part of the cause of action within the
E      meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution must depend
       upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to a
       cause of adion. The notification dated February 8, 1984
       issued by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the
       Act became effective the moment it was published in the
F      Official I Gazette as thereupon the notified land became
       vested in the State Government free from all
       encumbrances. It was not necessary for the respondents
       to plead the service of notice on them by the Special
       Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur under Section
        52(2) for the grant of an appropriate writ, direction or order
G
        under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the
        notification issued by the State Government under Section
        52(1) of the Act. If the respondents felt aggrieved by the
        acquisition of their lands situate at Jaipur and wanted to
        challenge the validity of the notification issued by the State
H
  NAWAl KISHORE SHARMA v. UNION OF INDIA                      1039
              [M.Y. EQBAl, J.]

    Government of Rajasthan under &ection 52(1) of the Act             A
    by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the.
    remedy of the respondents for the grant of such relief had
    to be sought b}' filing such a petition before the Rajasthan
    High Court, Jaipur Bench, where the cause of action wholly
    or in part arose."                                                 B

     14. This provision was again considered by this Court in
the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar
Basu and others, (1994) 4 SCC 711. In this case the petitioner
Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) thro~gh its consultant           c
Engineers India Limited (Ell) issued an advertisement in the
newspaper inviting tenders for setting up of Kerosene Recovery
Processing Unit in Gujarat mentioning that the tenders
containing offers were to be communicated to Ell, New Delhi.
After the final decision was taken by the Steering Committee
at New Delhi, the respondent NICCO moved the Calcutta High             D
Court pr.aying that qNGC be restrained from awarding the
contract to any other party. It was pleaded in the petition that
NICCO came to know of the tender from the publication in the
"Times of India" within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.
This Court by setting aside the order passed by the Calcutta           E
High Court came to the following conclusion :-

     "6. Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of
     territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts
     pleaded in support of the cause of action into                    F
     consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as
     to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other
     words the question whether a High Court has territorial
     jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered
     on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the           G
     truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it
     differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be
     decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the
     question whether in the instant case the Calcutta High
     Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ           H
    1040    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 7 S.C.R.


A       petition in question even on the facts alleged must depend
        upon whether the averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18,
        22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to establish that a part
        of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of
        the Calcutta High Court."
B
      15. In Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of India and
  Another, (2004) 6 SCC 254, this Court elaborately discussed
  Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly the
  meaning of the word 'cause of action' with reference to Section
C 20(c) and Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
  observed:-
        "9. Although in view of Section 141 of the Code of Civil
        Procedure the provisions thereof would not apply to writ
        proceedings, the phraseology used in Section 20(c) of the
D       Code of Civil Procedure and clause (2) of Article 226,
        being in pari materia, the decisions of this Court rendered
        on interpretation of Section 20(c) CPC shall apply to the
        writ proceedings also. Before proceeding to discuss the
        matter further it may be pointed out that the entire bundle
E       of facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of action as
        what is necessary to be proved before the petitioner can
        obtain a decree is the material facts. The expression
        material facts is also known as integral facts.

        10. Keeping in view the expressions used in clause (2) of
F       Article 226 of the Constitution of India, indisputably even
        if a small fraction of cause of action accrues within the
        jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in
        the matter."

G       Their Lordships further observed as under:-
        "29. In view of clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution
        of India, now if a part of cause of action arises outside the
        jurisdiction of the High Court, it would have jurisdiction to
H
   NAWAL KISHORE SHARMA...v. UN.ION OF INDIA                   1041
               [M.Y. ~QBAL, J.]
    issue a writ. The decision in Khajoor Singh has, thus, no           A
    application.

    30. We must, however, remind ourselves that even if a small
    part of cause of action arises within the territorial
    jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not          8
    be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the
    High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate
    cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary
    jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens."

    16. In the case of Union of India and others vs. Adani              C
Exports Ltd. and another, (2002) 1 SCC 567, this Court held
that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain
a writ petition it must disclose that the integral facts pleaded in
support of the cause of action do constitute a cause so as to
empower the court to decide the dispute and the entire or a             D
part of it arose within its jurisdiction. Each and every fact
pleaded by the respondents in their application does not ipso
facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause
of action within the Court's territorial jurisdiction unless those
facts are such which have a nexus or relevance with the /is i.e.        E
irwolved in the case. This Court observed:

     "17. It is seen from the above that in order to confer
     jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition or a
     special civil application as in this case, the High Court
                                                                        F
     must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support
     of the cause of action that those facts do constitute a
     cause so as to empower the court to decide a dispute
     which has, at least in part, arisen within its jurisdiction. It
     is clear from the above judgment that each and every fact
     pleaded by the respondents in their application does not           G
     ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise
     to a cause of action within the court's territorial jurisdiction
     unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus
      or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts
      which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved        H
    1042     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2014] 7 S.C.R.

A       in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to
       ·confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned. If we
        apply this principle then we see that none of the facts
        pleaded in para 16 of the petition, in our opinion, falls into
        the category of bundle of facts which would constitute a
B       cause of action giving rise to a dispute which could confer
        territorial jurisdiction on the courts at Ahmedabad."

       17. In Om Prakash Srivastava vs. Union of India and
  Another (2006) 6 sec 207, answering a -similar question this
  Court observed that on a plain reading of Clause(2) of Article
C 226 it is manifestly clear that the High Court can exercise power
  to issue direction, order or writs for the enforcement of any of
  the fundamental rights or for any other purpose if the cause of
  action in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction
  notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or
D the residence of the person against whom the direction, order
  or writ is issued is not within the said territory. In para 7 this
  Court observed:-

         "7. The question whether or not cause of action wholly or
E        in part for filing a writ petition has arisen within the territorial
         limits of any High Court has to be decided in the light of
         the nature and character of the proceedings under Article
         226 of the Constitution. In order to maintain a writ petition,
         a writ petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed
F        by him has prima facie either been infringed or is
         threatened to be infringed by the respondent within the
         territorial limits of the Court's jurisdiction and such
         infringement may take place by causing him actual injury
         or threat thereof."
G       18. In the case of Rajendran Chingaravelu vs. R.K.
    Mishra, Additional Commissioner of Income Tax and Others,
    (2010) 1 sec 457, this Court while considering the scope of
    Article 226(2) of the Constitution, particularly the cause of action
    in maintaining a writ petition, held as under:
H
NAWAL KISHORE SHARMA v. UNION OF INDIA                  1043
            [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]

 "9. The first question that arises for consideration is         A
 whether the Andhra Pradesh High Court was justified in
 holding that as the seizure took place at Chennai (Tamil
 Nadu), the appellant could not maintain the writ petition
 before it. The High Court did not examine whether any part
 of cause of action arose in Andhra Pradesh. Clause (2)          B
 of Article 226 makes it clear that the High Court exercisins
 jurisdiction in relation to ·the territories within which the
 cause of action arises wholly or in part, will have
 jurisdiction. This would mean that even if a small fraction
 of the cause of action (that bundle of facts which gives a      c
 petitioner, a right to sue) accrued within the territories of
 Andhra Pradesh,· the High Court of that State will have
 jurisdiction.

 xxxxxx
                                                                 D
 11. Normally, we would have set asipe the orper and
 remitted the matter to the High Court fo( decision on
 merits .. But from the persuasive submissions of the
 appellant, who appeared in person on various dates of
 hearing, two things stood out. Firstly, it was clear that the E
 main object of the petition was to ensure that at least in
 future, passengers like him are not pat to unnecessary
 harassment or undue hardship at the airports. He wants a
 direction for issuance of clear guidelines and instructions
 tc:i the inspecting officers, and introduction of definite and F
 efficient verification/investigation proce9ures. He wants
 changes in the present protocol where the officers are
 uncertain of what to do and seek instructions and
 indefinitely wait for clearances from higher-ups for each
 and every routine step, resulting Jn the detention of G
 passengers for hours and hours. In short, he wants the
 enquiries, v~rifications and investigations to be efficient,
 passenger-friendly and courteous. Secondly, he wants the
 Department/officers 'concerned to acknowledge that he_
 was 1.mnecessarily harassed."
                                                                H
    1044     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 7 S.C.R.


A       19. Regard being had to the discussion made
  hereinabove, there cannot be any doubt that the question
  whether or not cause of action wholly or in part for filing a writ
  petition has arisen within the territorial limit of any High Court
  has to be decided in the light of the nature and character of
B the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In order
  to maintain a writ petition, the petitioner has to establish that a
  legal right claimed by him has been infringed by the
  respondents within the territorial limit of the Court's jurisdiction.

C        20. We have perused the facts pleaded in the writ petition
    and the documents relied upon by the appellant. Indisputably,
    the appellant reported sickness on account of various ailments
    including difficulty in breathing. He was referred to hospital.
    Consequently, he was signed off for further medical treatment.
D   Finally, the respondent permanently declared the appellant unfit
    for sea service due to dilated cardiomyopathy (heart muscles
    disease). As a result, the Shipping Department of the
    Government of India issued an order on 12.4.2011 cancelling
    the registration of the appellant as a seaman. A copy of the letter
    was sent to the appellant at his native place in Bihar where he
E   was staying after he was found medically unfit. It further appears
    that the appellant sent a representation from his home in the
    State of Bihar to the respondent claiming disability
    compensation. The said representation was replied by the
    respondent, which was addressed to him on his home address
F   in Gaya, Bihar rejecting his claim for disability compensation.
    It is further evident that when the appellant was signed off and
    declared medically unfit, he returned back to his home in the
     District of Gaya, Bihar and, thereafter, he made all claims and
    filed representation from his home address at Gaya and those
G    letters and representations were entertained by the
     respondents and replied and a decision on those
     representations were communicated to him on his home
     address in Bihar. Admittedly, appellant was suffering from
    serious heart muscles disease (Dilated Cardiomyopathy) and
H    breathing problem which forced him to stay in native place,
   NAWAL KISHORE SHARMA v. UNION OF INDIA                    1045
               [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
wherefrom he had been making all correspondence with                  A
regard to his disability compensation. Prima facie, therefore,
considering all the facts together, a part or fraction of cause of
action arose within the jurisdiction of the Patna High Court
where he received a letter of refusal disentitling him from
disability compensation.                                              B

     21. Apart from that, from the counter affidavit of the
respondents and the documents annexed therewith, it reveals
that after the writ petition was filed in the Patna High Court, the
same was entertained and notices were issued. Pursuant to
the said notice, the respondents appeared and participated in         C
the proceedings in the High Court. It further reveals that after
hearing the counsel appearing for both the parties, the High
Court passed an interim order on 18.9.2012 directing the
authorities of Shipping Corporation of India to pay at least a
sum of Rs.2. 75 lakhs, which shall be subject to the result of the    D
writ petition. Pursuant to the interim order, the respondent
Shipping Corporation of India remitted Rs.2,67,270/- (after
deduction of income tax) to the bank account of the appellant.
However, when the writ petition was taken up for hearing, the
High Court took the view that no cause of action, not even a          E
fraction of cause of action, has arisen within its territorial
jurisdiction.

     22. Considering the entire facts of the case narrated
hereinbefore including the interim order passed by the High           F
Court, in our considered opinion, the writ petition ought not to
have been dismissed for want of territorial jurisdiction. As
noticed above, at the time when the writ petition was heard for
the purpose of grant of interim relief, the respondents instead
of raising any objection with regard to territorial jurisdiction      G
opposed the prayer on tfie ground that the writ petitioner-
appellant was offered an amount of Rs.2. 75 lakhs, but he
refused to accept the same and challenged the order granting
severance compensation by filing the writ petition. The

                                                                      H
   1046     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014) 7 S.C.R.

A impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained in the peculiar
  facts and circumstances of this case.

      23. In the aforesaid, the appeal is allowed and the
  impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside and the·
  matter is remitted to the High Court for deciding the writ petition
8
  on merits.

   Rajendra Prasad                                     Appeal Allowed