Holding

The Supreme Court held that the Bombay High Court had jurisdiction because a part of the cause of action arose in its territory, and ordered the transfer of the investigation to the Mumbai Police.

Summary

Navinchandra N. Majithia entered into a share‑sale agreement that was later terminated, after which the buyer filed a false complaint in Shillong, Meghalaya. Majithia filed a writ petition in the Bombay High Court under Article 226 seeking to quash the complaint or, alternatively, to direct the Meghalaya police to transfer the investigation to Mumbai. The Bombay High Court dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the cause of action partly arose in Bombay because the transaction and most of the investigative facts were connected with Mumbai, making the writ petition maintainable. Accordingly, the Court set aside the High Court order, allowed the appeal, and directed that the investigation be transferred to the Mumbai Police.

Issues considered

The jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court under Article 226(2) to entertain a writ concerning an FIR registered in Meghalaya.
Whether a part of the cause of action arose within the territorial limits of the Bombay High Court.
Whether the investigation of the complaint can be transferred to another state police through a writ of mandamus.
The propriety of quashing a complaint on the ground of alleged lack of territorial jurisdiction.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 20
Code of Criminal Procedures. 154, s. 162, s. 177, s. 178, s. 179, s. 48, s. 482
Companies Act, 1956s. 113(2)
Constitution of Indias. Article 226(2)

Subjects

Article 226territorial jurisdictioncause of actionwrit of mandamustransfer of investigationFIRCriminal Procedure CodeHigh Court jurisdiction

Judgment

A NA VINCHANDRA N. MAJITHIA
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.

SEPTEMBER 4, 2000

B [K.T. THOMAS AND D.P. MOHAPATRA, JJ.]

Constitution of India-Article 226(2)-FIR registered in Shillong in
respect of agreement to sell shares in Mumbai-Writ Petition for quashing
C complaint filed in Mumbai-Alternate prayer to transfer investigation to
Mumbai-Writ Petition dismissed on ground of lack ofterritorial jurisdiction-
Part of case of action arising in Mumbai-Held, Writ Petition maintainable-
Jnvestigation to be transferred from Shillong to Maharashtra-Directions
issued.

D Words and Phrases-Cause of action-Meaning of

Appellant entered into an agreement for sale of shares with the
Respondent and received an earnest money. Since the Respondent committed
default in making the balance payment and thereby committed breach of the .
agreement, the said agreement was terminated and the earnest money stood
E forfeited as stipulated in the agreement. A complaint was filed by the
Respondent against the Appellant in a criminal court in Shillong. The
appellant filed the writ petition in Mumbai against the State of Maharashtra,
the State of Meghalaya, the Special Superintendent of Police, CID, Shillong
etc. to quash the complaint lodged by the Respondent company or in the
F alternative to issue a writ of mandamus directing the State of Meaghalaya to
transfer the investigation being conducted by the officers of the CID at
Shillong to the Economic Offences wing, General Branch of the CID, Mumbai
or any other investigating agency of the Mumbai Police and to issue a writ of
prohibition or any other order or direction restraining the Special S.P. Police,
CID, Shillong and/or and investigating agency of the Meghalaya Police from
G taking any further step in respect of the complaint lodged by the Respondent
company with the Police authorities at Shillong.

The Appellant contended that the Respondent company had tried to
pressurise them to reverse the transaction of sale of shares and recover the
m'lney paid in respect thereof by employing strong arm tactics, which
H ~ --

-
NA VINCHANDRA N. MAJITHIA v. STA TE OF MAHARASHTRA 83
eventually failed; that having failed to achieve the purpose by such mean., it A
has filed a false complaint against the petitioner at Shillong in the State of
Meghalaya; that the complaint is false and it has been deliberately filed at

-
Shillong with the malajide intention of exerting pressure and causing
harassment to him so as to get the transaction relating to transfer of share
reversed; that since the entire transaction upon which the complaint is B
purortedly based had taken place at Mumbai and not at any other place outside
Mumbai much less at Shillong or any other place in the State of Meghalaya,
the complaint could not/ought not to have been entertained by the Police at
Shillong; and that the jurisdiction, if any, to investigate/inquire into the
contents of the complaint is with the Police/Courts in Mumbai and the action
taken by tht Special S.P. Police, CID, Shillong in entertaining the said C
complaint and in taking up investigation on the basis of the same is clearly
oppressive, discriminatory and malafide. The Appellant also contended that
the conduct on the part of the Shillong Police in entertaining the complaint
against him and in embarking upon investigation was clearly in excess of the
jurisdiction vested in under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure;
that the Shillong Police had on their own requested the Mumbai Police (Malvani D
Polk~ Station), to carry out an extensive investigation into the alleged offence
which clearly indicates that Shillong Police authorities were very much aware
that the entire transaction upon which the complaint is purportedly based had
taken place in Mumbai, that, therefore, the subsequent conduct of the Shillong
Police in continuing with investigation of the case is clearly malafide and E
without sam;tion of law and procedure and that the allegations made against
him in the complaint do not make out any cognizable offence and that the
dispute, if any, is of civil nature. The respondent referred to a writ petition
filed by them in Gauhati High Court challenging the action of the Government
of Meghalaya refusing permission to the concerned Police Officers to go to
Mumbai on the ground of paucity of funds and opposed the writ petition. The F
single Judge of the High Court directed the complainant to deposit the
requisite amount to enable the Senior Police Inspector concerned to proceed
to Mumbai for investigation of the case. The High Court dismissed the writ
petition holding that it could not entertain the writ petition since the petitioner
had prayed for quashing of the complaint which was lodged by the complainant G
at Shillong in the State of Meghalaya. A Division Bench of the High Court
confirmed the said order taking the view that since the case has been
registered in the State of Meghalaya, it is for the police of that State to
investigate into the matter.

Allowing the Appeal, the Court H
84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2090) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A HELD: (per D.P. Mohapatra, J.)

1. The High Court failed to consider all the relevant facts necessary to
arrive at a proper decision on the question of maintainability of the writ
petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The Court based its
clecision on the sole consideration that the complainant had filed the complaint
B at Shillong in the State of Meghalaya and the petitioner had prayed for
quashing the said complaint. The High Court did not also consider the
alternative prayer made in the writ petition that a writ of mandamus be issued
to the State of Meghalaya to transfer the investigation to Mumbai Police. The
High Court also did not take note of the averments in the writ petition that
C filing of the complaint was to harass and pressurise the petitioners and to
reverse the transaction for transfer of shares. The relief sought in the writ
petition may be one of the relevant criteria for consideration of the question
but cannot be the sole consideration in the matter. On the averments made in
the writ petition it cannot be said that no part of the cause of action for filing
the writ petition arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Bombay High
D Court. [93-H; 94-A-C]

Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and Ors., [1994)
4 SCC 711; K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balon and Anr., (1999]·7
SCC 510; Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Anr, (1999) 8
SCC 728 and H. V. Jayaram v. Industrial Credit and Investment Corpn. ofIndia
E Ltd. and others, 120001 2 sec 202, referred to.

2. The complaint lodged by the respondent at Shillong which is presently
being investigated by the Special Superintendent of Police, CID, Shillong shall be .
transferred to the Mumbai, Police for further investigation through its Economic
Offences Wing, General Branch, CID, or any other branch as the competent
F authority of the :'vlumbai Police may decide in accordance with law.194-F]

(Per K. T. Thomas, J-Supplementing)

1. The power conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 could as
well be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the
G territories within which "the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises" and
it is no matter that the seat of the authority concerned is outside the territorial
limits of the jurisdiction of that High Court. The amendment to Article 226
is aimed at widening the width of the area for reaching the writs issued by
different High Courts. (97-D)

H K.S. Rashid Ahmedv. Income Tax Investigation Commission, AIR (1951)
NAVINCHANDRA N. MAJITHIA v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.) 85

Punjab 74; MK. Ranganathan v. The Madras Electric Tramways ltd. : AIR A
(1952) Mad. 659; Aswini Kumar Sinha v. Dy. Collector of Central Excise and
Land Customs, Shillong: AIR (1952) Assam 91 and Election Commission of
India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, 11953) SCR 1144, referred to.

2. The mere fact that FIR was registered in a particular State is not the
sole criterion to decide that no cause of action or even concoct one by simply B
jutting into the territorial limits of another State or by making a sojourn or
even a permanent residence therein. The place of residence of the person
moving a High Court is not the criterion to determine the contours of the
cause of action in that particular writ petition. The High Court before which
the writ petition is filed must ascertain whether any part of the cause of action C
has arisen within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction. It depends upon the
facts in each case. (99-A-B)

Mohd. Khalil Khan v. Mahbub Ali Mian: AIR (1949) PC 78; State of
Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties: (1985) 3 SCC 2171; Oil and Natural Gas
Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and Anr., (1994) 4 sec 711, referred to. D

Readv. Brown: (1889) 22 Q.B.D. 128 Lord Esner, M.R., referred to.

3. It is almost impossible to hold that even a part of the cause of action
has arisen at Bombay so as to deprive the High Court of Bombay of total
jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition filed by the Petitioner.. Even the very E
fact that major portion of the investigation of the case under the FIR has to be
conducted at Bombay itself shows that the cause of action cannot escape from
the territorial limits of the Bombay High Court. 199-EJ

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 744
of2000. F
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.3.99 of the Bombay High Court
in W.P. (Cr!.) No. 1683 of 1998.

Ashok H. Desai, Dipankar Gupta, B.N. Deshmukh, Mahendra Anand,
Nikhil M. Sakhardande, Ms. Meenakshi Sakhardande, S.R. Grover, Anil G
Srivastav, S.S. Shinde, S.V. Deshpande and Ranjan Mukherjee for ttle appearing
parties.

The Judgments of the Court were delivered by

D.P. MOHAPATRA J. Leave granted. H
86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A This appeal filed by the writ petitioner is directed against the judgment
dated 23.3.1999 of the Bombay High Court summarily dismissing W.P. No.
1683/88 Naveenchandra N. Maj ithia v. State of Maharashtra & others on the
ground of want of jurisdiction.

The appellant filed the writ petition against the State of Maharashtra,
B the State of Meghalaya, the Special Superintendent of Police, CID, Shillong
and Mr. Malerkode Subramanium Jayaram praying, inter alia, (a) to quash the
complaint lodged by Mis J.B. Holdings Ltd. or in the alternative to issue a
writ of mandamus directing the State of Meghalaya to transfer the investigation
being conducted by the officers of the CID at Shillong to the Economic
C Offences Wing, general Branch of the CID, Mumbai or any other investigating
agency of the Mumbai Police and (b) to issue a writ of prohibition 0r any
other order or direction restraining the Special S.P. Police, CID, Shillong and/
or and investigating agency of the Meghalaya Police from taking any further
step in respect of the complaint lodged by the M/s J.B. Holdings Ltd. with
the Police authorities at Shillong. For the sake of convenience the appellant
D will be referred as the petitioner while narrating the facts of the case.

The relevant facts of the case as stated in the writ petition may be
shortly stated thus: The petitioner is the Managing Director of the company,
Mis India Farmers Pvt. Ltd. (IFPL for short), registered under the Companies
Act, having its registered office at Mumbai. Out of the 2500 shares of IFPL
E the petitioner, his family members and friends together hold 2430 shares; the
balance 70 shares have remained un-allotted till date. In the year 1950 the then
Government of Bombay put IFPL in possession of 3op acres of land at Aksa,
Marve, Malvani at Malad, Bombay. Thereafter in 1956 the State Government .,
granted a lease in favour of U:PL for 114 acres out of the 300 acres for a period
p of 999 years. The agreement for the balance area of 186 acres is yet to be
executed by the Government.

On 7th July 1994 a company known as Chinar Export Ltd. entered into
an agreement with the petitioner for purchase of the entire lot of 2430 shares
of IFPL at a total price of Rs. 58 crores. A sum of Rs. 2 crores was paid by
G Mis Chinar Export Ltd. as earnest money and a further sum of Rs. 25,00,000
was paid subsequently. The balance of the purchase price was to be paid on
or before 3 i st October, 1995. However, Chinar Export Ltd. was unable to fulfil
its commitment as to payment of the balance purchase price, and therefore,
the petitioner terminated the agreement.

H Mis. Chinar Export Ltd. filed suit No. 178/95 against the petitioner in the
NAVINCHANDRA N. MAJITHIA v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.] 87

High Court of Bombay for specific perfonnance of the agreement dated 7.7.94. A
-Two share holders of Mis Chinar Export Ltd. Mr. Jayaram and Mr. Bareh, took
over the management and control of the company. Thereafter they formed
another company Mis J.B. Holdings Ltd. at Shillong. On the request of Mr.
Jayaram and Mr. Bareh who were the directors in both the companies Mis J.B.
Holdings Ltd. and Mis Chinar Expo11. Ltd. the suit was withdrawn upon the
petitioner's returning the amount paid by Mis Chinar Export Limited which B
was earlier forfeited by the petitioner. This fact was recorded in the consent
tenns filed in the suit in September, 1995.

In pursuance of the agreement Mis J.B. Holdings Ltd. paid a sum of Rs.
6, 75, 63,000 towards purchase price of 170 shares of IFPL and a sum of Rs. C
1,50,33,000 as earnest money for the purchase of the balance shares. On
13.10.95 Mis J.B. Holdings Ltd. paid the petitioner a further sum of Rs. I crore ..
On 31. I 0. 95 yet another sum of Rs. 1.24 crores was paid by Mis J B Holding
Ltd. From the amount received from Mis J.B. Holdings Ltd. the petitioner paid
a sum of Rs. 2.25 crores by way of refund of the forfeited amount to Mis
Chinar Exports Ltd. as per the terms of the settlement in Suit No. 178/95 filed D
in the Bombay High Court. Against the payment made by Mis J.B. Holdings
Ltd. the petitioner delivered 170 shares of IFPL which were duly transferred
in the name of Mis J.B. Holdings Ltd. and delivered to them at Mumbai.

The petitioner alleged that at no point of time Mis J.B. Holdings Ltd. E
offered to make the balance payment or to take delivery of the remaining
shares. As Mis J.B. Holdings Ltd. had committed default in making th~
balance payment and thereby committed breach of the agreement dated 18.9.95
the said agreement stood terminated and the earnest money stood forfeited
as stipulated in the agreement.
F
It was further alleged in the Writ Petition that after some correspondence
between the parties Mis J B Holding Ltd. had tried to pressurise the petitioner
to reverse the transaction of sale of shares and recover the money paid in
respect thereof by employing strong arm tactics, which eventually failed.
Having failed to achieve the purpose by such means, Mis J.B. Holdings Ltd. G
filed a false complaint against the petitioner at Shillong in the State of
Meghalaya. The petitioner asserted that the complaint is false and it has been
deliberately filed at Shillong with the malafide intention of exerting pressure
and causing harassment to him so as to get the transaction relating to transfer
of shares reversed. According to the petitioner since the entire transaction
upon which the complaint is purportedly based had taken place at Mumbai H
88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A and not at any other place outside Mumbai much less at Shillong or any other
place in the State of Meghalaya the complaint could not/ought not to have
been entertained by the police at Shillong. It was further averred in the Writ
Petition that t,be jurisdiction, if any, to investigate/inquire into the contents
of the complaint is with the Police/Courts in Mumbai and the action taken by
B the Special S.P. Police, CID, Shillong,~n entertaining the said complaint and
in taking up investigation on the basis of the same is clearly oppressiv\!,
discriminatory and ma/a fide. It was also stated in the writ petition that the
petitioner was approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India read with Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for the-issuance
of a writ of prohibition and mandamus quashing the complaint made by
C M/s J.B. Holdings Ltd. on the grounds stated in the said paragraph.

According to the petitioner, the conduct on the part of the Shillong
Police in entertaining the complaint against him and in embarking upon an
investigation was clearly in excess of the jurisdiction vested in under the
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Indeed the Shillong Police had
D on their own requested the Mumbai Police (Malvani Police Station), to carry
out an extensive investigation into the alleged offence which clearly indicates
that Shillong Police authorities were very much aware that the entire transaction
upon which the complaint is purportedly based had taken place in Mumbai.
In such circumstances, according to the petitioner, the subsequent conduct
E of the Shillong Police in continuing with investigation of the case is clearly
malafide and without sanction of Jaw and procedure.

In the writ petition, it was contended that in the two letters dated 14.9.98
and 16.9.98 addressed by the Assistant Police Inspector, Malvani Police
Station to the petitioner, it was stated that the complaint had been received
F in the Police Station at Malvani and the petitioner was requested to attend
the said Police Station with documents. Thereafter, on 19.9.98 the statement
of the petitioner was recorded and certain documents were received from him
at Malvani Police Station. The petitioner also contended in the writ petition
that the allegations made against him in the complaint do not make out any
G cognizable offence and the dispute, if any, is of civil nature.

Mr. Melarkode Subramanian Jayaram, who was arrayed as respondent
no. 4. in the writ petition filed a counter-affidavit generally denying the
averments made in the writ petition. The respondent referred to the writ
petition filed by the complainant M/s J.B. Holdings Ltd. in Gauhati High Court
H challenging the action of the Government of Meghalaya refusing permission
NAVJNCHANDRAN. MAJITHIAv. STATEOFMAHARASHTRA[D.P. MOHAPATRA,J.] 89

to the concerned Police officers to go to Mumbai on the ground of paucity A
of funds. A learned single Judge by order dated 17. l l.l 997 directed the
complainant to deposit the requisite amount to enable the Senior Police
inspector concerned to proceed to Mumbai for investigation of the case. In
appeal a Division Bench of the High Court confirmed the said order taking
the view that since the case has been registered in the State of Meghalaya,
it is for the police of that State to investigate into the matter. B
The High Court as noted earlier, dismissed the writ petition holding that
it could not entertain the writ petition since the petitioner has prayed for
quashing the complaint which was lodged by the complainant at Shillong in
the State of Meghalaya.
c
On the pleadings of the parties noticed in the foregoing paragraphs the
moot question that arises for consideration is whether the Bombay High
Court was right in passing the order rejecting the writ petition on the ground
that the Court could not entertain the writ petition as the .petitioner had
prayed for quashing the complaint filed against him by Mis J.B. Holdings, D
Ltd. at Shillong.
Article 226 of the Constitution of India which provides the power to
High Courts to issue certain writs reads as follows :

"226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs-( I) Notwithstanding
anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have power, throughout E
the territory in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to
any person or authority, including in appropriate cases,, any
Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs,
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition,
quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of
any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. F
(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or
writs to any Government authority or person may also be exercised
by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories
within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the G
exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such
Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within
those territories.

(3) xxxx xxx xxx
(4) xxx xxx xxx H
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A From the provision in clause (2) of Article 226, it is clear that the
maintainability or otherwise of the writ petition in the High Court depends on
whether the cause of action for filing the same arose, wholly or in part, within
the territorial jurisdiction of that Court.

In legal parlance the expression 'cause of action' is generally understood
B to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action
in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more
bases for suing; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy
in court from another person (Black's Law Dictionary)

C In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary a 'cause of action' is stated to be the
entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises
every fact, which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in orde~ to obtain
judgment. .,,-

In 'Words and Phrases' (fourth edition) the meaning attributed to the
D phrase 'cause of action' in common legal parlance is existence of those facts
which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf.

A Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in the case of Oil and
Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and Ors., [1994] 4 SCC 711,
considered at length the question of territorial juris~iction under Article 226
E (2) of the Constitution of India. Some of the relevant observation made in the
Judgment are extracted hereunder:

Clause (l) of Article 226 begins with a non obstante clause-
notwithstanding anything in article 32 and provides that every High
Court shall have power "throughout the territories in relation to which
F it exercises jurisdiction", to issue to any person or authority, including
in appropriate cases, any Government, "within those territories"
directions, orders or writs, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. Under clause (2) of
Article 226, the High Court may exercise its power conferred by clause
(l) if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the
G territory over which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the
seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person
is not within those territories. On a plain reading of the aforesaid two
clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear that a
High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or
H writs for the enforcement of any of the fandamental rights conferred
NAVINCHANDRA N. MAJITHIA v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.] 91

by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause A
of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in
relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the
seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person
against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the
said territories. In order to confer jurisdiction on the High Court of B
Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least a part of the cause of action
had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. That is at
best its case in the writ petition.

It is well settled that the expression "cause of action" means that
bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle C
him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. In Chand Kour v.
Pariah Singh Lords Watson said:
" .... the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence
which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon
the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers D
entirely to the ground set forth in the plaint as the cause of
action, or,)n other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff
asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour."

Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial
jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of E
the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking
upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts.
Jn other words the question whether a High Court has territorial
jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the
basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise
whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of F
territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the
petition. Therefore, the question whether in the instant case the
Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ
petition in question even on the facts alleged must depend upon
whether the averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are
sufficient in law to establish that a part of the cause of action had G
arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court."
(Emphasis suppliep)

So far as the question of territorial jurisdiction with reference to a
criminal offence is concerned the main factor to be considered is the place H
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A where the alleged offence was committed.

This Court in case of K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Ba/an and
Anr., [ 1999] 7 SCC 510, considered the question of territorial jurisdiction of the
Courts relating to the offence under section 138 of the Negotial;>Je Instruments
Act. In that case on 29.1.93 the respondent, S, presented a cheque for the
B amount of Rs. I lakh bearing the signature of the appellant, B, at the
Kayamkulam (Kerala) Branch of the Syndicate Bank for encashment. The
cheque was returned by the bank unpaid, because of the insufficiency of
funds in the account of B S issued a notice by registered post on 2 .2 .1993.
·The notice was returned to S on 15.2.93 with the endorsements "Addressee
C absent" for three dates and "Intimation served on addressee's house" for
6.3.1993. The postal article remained unclaimed till 15.2.1993 and was then
returned to the sender, S, with the endorsement "unclaimed". S, filed a
complaint on 4.3.1993 before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Adoor (District Pathanamthitta) against B under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 188 I. B denied that the court had t~rritorial jurisdiction on
D the basis that the cheque had been dishonoured in Kayamkulam District.

This Court held that under section 177 of the Criminal Procedure Code
"every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried in a court within
whose jurisdiction it was committed". The locality where the bank (which
E dishonoured the cheque) is situated cannot be regarded as the sole criterion
to detennine the place of offence. The offence under Section 138 of the N.I.
Act would not be completed with the dishonour of the cheque. It attains
completion only with the failure of the drawer of the cheque to pay the
cheque amount within the expiry of 15 days mentioned in clause (c) of the
proviso to Section 138 of the Act. It is nonnally difficult to fix up a particular
F locality as the place of failure to pay the among covered by the cheque. A
place, for that purpose, would depend upon a variety of factors. It can either
be at the place where the drawer resides or at the place where the payee
resides or at the place where either of them carries on business. This Court
further held that section 178 of the Criminal Procedure Code suggests that if
G their is uncertainty as to where, among different localities, the offence would
have been committed the trial can be had in a court having jurisdiction over
any of those localities. ·The provision has further widened the scope by
stating that in case where the offence was committed partly in one local area
and partly in another local area the court in either of the localities can exercise
jurisdiction to try the case. Further again, Section 179 of the Code stretches
H its scope to a still wider horizon.
NAVINCHANDRA N. MAJITHIA v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.] 93

In the case of Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and A
another, [ 1999] 8 SCC 728 the question of quashing of FIR on the ground of
lack of territorial jurisdiction of the police to investigate the offence came up

... for consideration. Construing the provision of sections 154, 162, 177 and 178
of the Criminal Procedure Code this Court held that if Investigating Officer
finds that the crime was not committed within his territorial jurisdiction he can
B
forward the FIR to the police station concerned, but this would not mean that
in a case which requires investigation the Police Officer can refuse to record
the FIR and/or investigate it. Disapproving the order of the Delhi High Court
quashing the FIR at the investigation stag"! on the ground of lack of territorial
jurisdiction this Court observed:
c
Further, the legal position is well settled that if an offence is disclosed
the court will not normally interfere with an investigation into the case
and will permit investigation into the offence alleged to be completed.
i..
If the FIR, prima facie, discloses the commission of an offence, the
court does not normally stop the investigation, for, to do so would
be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into D
cognizable offences. It is also settled by a long course of decisions
of this Court that for the purpose of exercising its power under
Section 482 Cr.PC to quash an FIR or a complaint, the High Court
... would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made
in the complaint or the documents accompanying in the same per se; E
it has no jurisdiction to exa~ine the correctness or otherwise of the
allegations."

In case of H V. Jayaram v. Industrial Credit & Imiestment Corpn. of
India ltd. and others, .[2000] 2 SCC 202, this Court considered the question
where the offence under section 113(2) of the Companies Act, 1956 is F
completed. Taking note of section 113 and section 207 of the said Act this
Court held, inter alia, that the cause of action for default of not sending the
share certificates within the stipulated time would arise at the place where the
registered office of the company is situated as from that place the share
certificates can be posted and are usually posted.
G
.... Tested in the light of the principles laid down in the cases noted above
the Judgment of the High Court under challenge is unsustainable. The High
Court failed to consider all the relevant facts necessary to arrive at a proper
decision on the question of maintainability of the writ petition on the ground
A
of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The Court based its decision on the sole H
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A consideration that the complainant had filed the complaint at Shillong in the
State of Meghalaya and the petitioner had prayed for quashing the said
complaint. The High Court did not also consider the alternative prayer made
in the writ petition that a writ of mandamus be issued to the State ofMeghalaya
to transfer the investigation to Mumbai Police. The High Court also did not
B take note of the averments in the writ petition that filing of the complaint at
Shillong was a mala fide move on the part of the complainant to harass and
pressurise the petitioners to reverse the transaction for transfer of shares. The
relief sougilt in the writ petition may be one of the relevant criteria for
consideration of the question but cannot be the sole consideration in the
matter. On the averments made in the writ petition gist of which has been
C noted earlier it cannot be said that no part of the cause of action for filing
the writ petition arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Bombay High Court.
I

The next question for consideration is regarding proper order to be
passed in the case.

D Considering the peculiar fact situation of the case we are of the view
that setting aside the impugned judgment and remitting the case to the High
Court for fresh disposal will cause further delay in investigation of the matter
and may create other complicatiof1S. Instead, it will be apt and proper to direct
that further investigation relating to complaint filed by Mis J B Holding Ltd.
E should be made by the Mumbai Police.

Accordingly, we allow the appeal, set aside the Judgment under challenge
and dispose of the writ petition with the direction that the complaint lodged
by Mis J.B. Holdings Ltd. at Shillong which is presently being investigated
by the Special Superintendent of Police, CID, Shillong shall be transferred to
F the Mumbai Police for further investigation through its Economic Offences
Wing, General Branch, CID, or any another branch as the competent authority
of the Mumbai Police may decide in accordance with law.

THOMAS, J. I respectfully agree with the Judgment prepared by my
G learned brother Mohapatra, J. In view of the importance of the legal issue
highlighted before us-regarding the extent of jurisdiction of a High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution oflndia- I am tempted to add a few lines
of my own for a further support to the conclusion reached by my learned
brother.

H As the facts of the case have been succinctly narrated by Mohapatra,
NA VJNCHANDRA N. MAJITHIA v. STA TE OF MAHARASHTRA [D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.] 95

J., I shall set out only the main issue involved. Whether the High Court of A
Bombay has jurisdiction to issue a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution
in respect of any step taken or to be taken pursuant to the FIR registered by

- the Shillong police in the State of Meghalaya. The Division Bench of the High
Court of Bombay dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants solely on
the ground of want of jurisdiction. The Division Bench has observed thus: B
"Petitioner cannot content that a part of the cause of action arose
within the limits of this Court as Bombay Police sought to interrogate
him. The investigation is not the cause of action. The investigation
is only the consc.quence of the FIR filed by the 4th respondent before
the Police authorities in Meghalaya. The Petitioner challenges in this C
Writ Petition the said FIR where an investigation is extending to
Bombay or any other State on the basis of the FIR filed in a different
J State. One cannot say that the part of cause of action has arisen
wherever police goes for the purpose of investigation."

The Division Bench extracted the definition of High Court under Section D
2(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'the Code') and stated that
by the said definition the Code has clearly laid down that "every High Court
has to exercise the jurisdiction under the provisions of the Code only within
the territory of the State unless it is extended by any law. The High Court is
defined in the Code as the High Court for that State. Learned Judges then
made the following observations: E
"Merely for the reason that the High Court can exercise the power
under Article 226, also to quash an FIR where no offence is disclosed,
cannot be construed to have jurisdiction to be exercised outside the
territory where no FIR is lodged. To hold so would be farfetched. The
instance that has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the F
petitioner that the petitioner is being questioned by Bombay Police is
only as a part of investigation. Police of a particular State can very
well seek the assistance of police of another State in the course of the
investigation of a crime. lt is permissible under Sec. 48 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure that any police officer may, for the purpose of G
arresting without warrant any person whom he is authorised to arrest,
pursue such person into any place in India. Exercising this power, the
Assam Police might have come to Bombay also and sought aid of
Bombay Police. Thus that by itself cannot be said that the part of
cause of action has arisen in Maharashtra. If that be so, then no
.~ . investigation by any police in India can be successfully carried out H
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A because any absconding accused can go to any corner of India and
challenge the prosecution where he was staying. This concept is
quite contrary to the scheme envisaged by the Code ·of Criminal
Procedure with regard to the investigation of an offence."

When the Constitution was framed, Article 226, as it originally stood
B therein provided that "every High Court shall have power throughout the
territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, .to issue to any person
or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those
territories directions, order or writs ......... " some of the decisions rendered by
different High Courts during the earlier years of the post-Constitution period
C have given a wider perspective regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court
and pointed out that a High Court can exercise powers under Article 226 even
in respect of Tribunals or Authorities situated outside the territorial limits of
its jurisdiction if such Tribunal or Authority exercises powers in such a
(
manner as to affect the fundamental rights of persons residing or carrying on
business within the jurisdiction of such High Court vide KS. Rashid Ahmed
D v. Income Tax Investigation Commission, AIR (1951) Punjab 74; MK.
Ranganathan v. The Madras Electric Tramways Ltd., AIR (1952) Madras 659
and Aswini Kumar Sinha v. By. Collector ofCentral Excise and Land Customs,
Shillong, AIR (I 952) Assam 91. It was Subba Rao, J (as the learned Chief
Justice then was) who observed in MK. Ranganathan 's case (supra) that "if
a tribunal or authority exercises jurisdiction within the territories affecting
E such rights it may reasonably be construed that the authority or the tribunal
functioned within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court and, therefore,
is amenable to its jurisdiction".

But a Constitution Bench of this Court has held in Election Commission,
F India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, [1953] SCR I 144, thus "The power of the
High Court to issue writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is subject to
the two-fold limitation that such writs cannot run beyond the territories
subject to its jurisdiction and the persori or authority to whom the High Court
is empowered to issue writs must be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High
Court either by residence or location within the territories subject to its
G jurisdiction."

It was the said decision of the Constitution Bench which necessitated
the Parliament to bring the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution by which
clause (IA) was added to Article 226. Tha( clause was subsequently
renumbered as clause (2) by the Constitution Forty Second Amendment.
H Now clause (2) of Article 226 reads thus:
.. -
NA VJNCHANDRA N. MAJITHIA v. STA TE OF MAHARASHTRA (D.P. MO HAP ATRA, J .] 97

"The power conferred by clause (I) to issue directions, orders or writs A
to any government authority or person may also be exercised by any
High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within
which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of
such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or
authority or the residence of such person is not within those B
territories."

The object of the amendment by inserting clause (2) in the Article was
to supersede the decision of the Supreme Court in Election Commission v.
Saka Venkata Subba Rao (supra) and to restore the view held by the High
Courts in the decisions cited above. Thus the power conferred on the High C
Courts under Article 226 could as well be exercised by any High Court
exercising jurisdil:tion in relation to the territories within which "the cause of
action, wholly or in part, arises" and it is no matter that the seat of the
authority concerned is outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of that
High Court. The amendment is thus aimed at widening the width of the area
for reaching the writs issued by different High Courts. D
"Cause of action' is a phenomenon weil understood in legal parlance.
Mohapatra, J. has well delineated the import of the said expression by
referring to the celebrated lexicographies. The collocation of the words
"cause of action wholly or in part arises" seems to have been lifted
from Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which section also E
deals with the jurisdictional aspect of the courts. As per that section
the suit could be instituted in a court within the legal limits of whose
Jurisdiction the "cause of action wholly or in part arises". Judicial
pronouncements have accorded almost a uniform interpretation to the
said compendious expression even prior to the Fifteenth Amendment F
of the Constitution as to mean "the bundle of facts which it would
be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support
his right to the judgment of the court."

In Read v. Brown, (1889) 22 Q.B.D. 128 Lord Esher M.R., adopted the
definition of the phrase "cause of action" that it meant "every fact which it G
would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support
his right to the judgment of the Court. It does not comprise every piece of
evidence which is necessary to prove each. fact, but every fact which is
necessary to be proved."

The Privy Council has noted in Mohd. Khalil Khan v. Mahbub 'Ali H
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Mian, AIR ( 1949) PC 78, that the aforesaid definition adopted by Lord Esher •
M.R. had been followed in India. Even thereafter the courts in India have
consistently followed the said interpretation without exception for
understanding the scope of the expression "cause of action."

Even in the context of Article 226(2) of the Constitution this Court
B adopted the same interpretation to the expression "cause of action wholly or
in part arises" vide State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties, [1985] 3 SCC
2171. A three Judge Bench of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission
v. Utpal Kumar Basu and Anr., [1994] 4 SCC 711, observed that it is well
settled that the expression 'cause of action' means that bundle of facts which
C the petitioner must prove, if traversed to entitle him to a judgment in his
fav~ur. Having given such a wide interpretation to the expression Ahmadi, J.
(as the learned Chief Justice then was) speaking for M.N. Venkatachalliah, CJ,
and B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J., utilised the opportunity to caution the High Courts
against transgressing into the jurisdiction of the other High Courts merely on
the ground of some insignificant event connected with the cause of action
D taking place within the territorial limits of the High Court to which the litigant
approaches at his own choice or convenience. The following are such
observations:

"If an impression gains ground that even in cases which fall outside
E the territorial jurisdiction of the court, certain members of the court
would be willing to exerC:ise jurisdiction on the plea that some event,
however trivial and unconnected with the cause of action had occurred
within the jurisdiction of the said court, litigants would seek to abuse
the process by carrying the cause before such members giving rise
to avoidable suspicion. That would lower the dignity of the institution
F and put the entire system to ridicule. We are greatly pained to say so
but if we do not strongly deprecate the growing tendency we will, we
are afraid, be failing in our duty to the institution and the system of
administration of justice. We do hope that we will not have another
occasion to deal with such a situation."
G The above observations are sufficient to take care of the apprehension
expressed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the impugned
judgment that "if that be so, then nc investigation by any police officer in
India can be successfully carried out because ar1y absconding accused can
go to any corner of India and challenge the prosecution where he was
H staying."
NAVINCHANDRA N. MAJITHIA v. STA TE OF MAHARASHTRA [D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.) 99

... We make it clear that the mere fact that FIR was registered in a A
particular State is not the sole criterion to decide that no cause of action has
arisen even partly within the territorial limits of jurisdiction of another State,
Nor are we to be understood that any person can create a fake cause of action
or even concoct one by simply jutting into the territorial limits of another
State or by making a sojourn or even a permanent residence therein. The place B
of residence of the person moving a High Court is not the criterion to
determine the contours of the cause of action in that particular writ petition.
The High Court before which the writ petition is filed must ascertain whether
any part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial limits of its
jurisdiction. It depends upon the facts in each case.

In the present case, a large number of events have taken place at
c
Bombay in respect of the allegations contained in the FIR registered at
Shillong. If the averments in the writ petition are correct then the major
portion of the facts which led to the registering of the FIR have taken place
at Bombay. It is unnecessary to repeat those events over again as Mohapatra,
J. has adverted to them with precision and the needed details. D
In the aforesaid situation it is almost impossible to hold that not even
a part of the cause of action has arisen at Bombay so as to deprive the High
Court of Bombay of total jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition filed by the
petitioner. Even the very fact that major portion of the investigation of the
case under the FIR has to be conducted at Bombay itself shows that the E
cause of action cannot escape from the territorial limits of the Bombay High
Court.

Hence I too agree that this appeal should be allowed in the manner
mentioned in the judgment prepared by Mohapatra, J.
F
VM Appeal allowed.