Holding

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred; the lower appellate court's findings were correct and the suit was not barred by limitation.

Summary

Navaneethammal, the plaintiff, purchased land and sued Arjuna Chetty, the tenant, for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The tenant claimed he had surrendered the lease, re‑entered the land and acquired title by adverse possession, contending that the suit was barred by Article 139 of the Limitation Act. The trial court and the first appellate court held that the tenant's post‑lease possession was merely permissive, that he first asserted a hostile title on 27‑April‑1957, and that the suit filed in 1962 was within the five‑year limitation period. The Madras High Court reversed those findings, alleging the lower courts had not properly appreciated the evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC by re‑appreciating the evidence and that the lower courts' findings were well‑founded. Consequently, the suit was not barred by limitation and the plaintiff was entitled to possession.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the concurrent findings of the lower courts under Section 100 of the CPC.
Whether the suit is barred by limitation under Article 139 of the Limitation Act, 1908, in view of the tenant's alleged adverse possession.
Whether the tenant's possession after the expiry of the lease constitutes adverse possession or merely permissive tenancy.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Section 100
Limitation Act, 1908s. Article 139
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. Section 116

Subjects

limitationadverse possessiontenancySection 100 CPCArticle 139landlord-tenant disputedeclaratory suitappellate jurisdiction

Judgment

''

A NAVANEETHAMMAL
v.
ARJUNA CHETIY

SEPTEMBER 6, 1998

B . [N.P. SINGH ANDK. VENKATASWAMI, JJ.)

Limita,tion Act, 1908 : Article 139-Suit for title and posses-
sion-Property sold-Vendor and vendee giving notice to the tenant-Adverse
possession cl~imed by tenant and rejitsal to pay rent to the vendee-Suit
C decreed by Trial Cowt-Confinned i11 appeal-High Court reversing the
same-On appeal, held: limitation starts from the day tenant setting up hostile
title-Suit filed within five years thereof-Hence within limitation
, ' I
period-Tenants' possession after the lease period is only pem1issive-17zere-
f ore High Coult not justified in i11teifering with the judgments of Courts below.
"
D Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 : Section 100-Concurrent findings of
courts below-;-High Court not to i11terfere unless wa1ra11ted by compelling
reason~igh Court not expected to re-appreciate evide11ce just to replace
findings of lower courts.

E Appellant-Plaintiff tiled suit for declaration of her title to the suit
property and recovery of possession. The respondent was in possession
of the suit p~operty as a tenant under a registered lease de;d. The property
was sold and the vendor issued notice to the tenant intimating him the fact
' plaintiff. The purchaser also issued notice to the tenant
of the sale to the
to pay rent as a lessee. The tenant/respondent denied his status as lessee
F and his liability to pay rent as he has set title in himself on the suit
. ' .
property after the expiry of lease.

The Trial Court held that the plaintiff is entitled to the suit property
and directed the defendant tenant to surrender possession. The appellate
G court confirmed the decree of the trial court.

In second appeal High Court reversed the findings of the lower
courts on the ground that the courts below failed to come to correct
conclusion on.the basis of oral! and documentary evidence.

H In appeal to this court it was contended by the appellant that the
582
NAVANEETHAMMALv. ARJUNACHETfY[K VENKATASWAMI,J.] 583

High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC in revers- A
ing the concurrent findings of the courts below.

Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1. The findings rendered by the lower appellate court were
very well based on materials placed before it and the contrary conclusions B
reached by the High Court are not sustainable. [588-G]

2. Interference with the concurrent findings of the courts below, by
the High Court under Section 100 CPC must be avoided unless warranted
by compelling reasons. [586-G]
c
3.1. From the facts it is seen that an attempt was made by the
defendant-respondent that he had surrendered the suit property after the
expiry of the lease and thereafter reentered the suit land and continued in
possession in his own right. However, this was not accepted by the trial
court as well as by the appellate court for well founded reasons. That being D
the positions the possession by the defendant after the expiry of the lease
was only permissive and will not give cause for prescribing title by adverse
possession. Further for the first time while replying to the notice by the
vendor, the defendant openly set up a hostile title and the suit having been
filed within five years therefrom is not barred by limitation. Further, no E
plea contending that the suit was barred under Article 139 of the Limita-
tion Act, 1908 was taken by the defendant in the Trial Court. [592-D-E]

'CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1647 of
1980.
F
From the Judgment and Order dated 8/22.2.80 of the Madras High
Court S.A. No. 1801 of 1976.

K. Rajendra Chowdary and S. Srinivasan for the Appellant.

R. Sundarvardhan, C. Balasubramanian, Y. Subba Rao, Ms. Asha G
Nair and K. Ram Kumar for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

K. VENKATASWAMI, J. The plaintiff who filed a suit on 13.6.1962
for declaration of her title to the suit property and for recovery of posses- H
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A sion is the appellant herein. The suit property is an extent of 1.13 acre out
r
of 3.39 acres in Survey No. 330/2 in Ulli Village, Gudiyatham Taluk, North
Arco! District, Tamil Nadu. It was purchased by the plaintiff under
registered sale deed dated 21.3.1957 from one Mohd. Ghouse. The respon-
dent herein who was the defendant in the suit admittedly was let in to
I
possession of the suit property along with the balance of above-mentioned
B Survey No. 330/Z as a tenant under a registered lease deed dated 1.4.1935.
The vendor of the plaintiff after the sale issued a notice to the defendant
on 16.4.1957 intimating the fact of sale to the plaintiff. The defendant in
his reply dated ~7 .4.1957 denied his status as lessee and his liability to pay
rent. He set up title in himself to the suit property. The plaintiff on his part
C issued a notice on 10.5.1957 intimating the defendant about her purchase
and calling up9n to pay rent in future as a lessee. As defendant set up title
in himself, the plaintiff was obliged to file the suit as stated above.

The suit .was resisted on the ground that after the· expiry of the
registered lease; he surrendered possession of the suit property to the then
D landlord and thereafter, since it was under nobody's occupation, he entered
possession in his own right and not as a lessee and he has not even paid
rent to anybody after the expiration of lease. Further it was alleged that he
has prescribed, title by adverse possession and the plaintiffs suit for

E
. .
recovery of possession was barred by limitation. The Trial Court framed
as many as six issues and after examining three witnesses on the side of the
plaintiff and five witnesses on the side of the defendant and after perusing
13 documents filed on the side of the plaintiff and 21 documents filed on
the side of th~ defendant, it found that the plea of surrender was not
established and defendant did not prescribed title by adverse possession.
Accepting the case of the plaintiff, the trial court decreed the suit declaring
F
that the plaintiff was entitled to the suit property and directed the defen-
dant to surrender possession \\'ithout any let or hindrance.

The defendant aggrieved by the decree against him preferred an
appeal to the learned Subordinate Judge, Tirupattur. Unfortunately, on
G account of certain lapses, the High Court was compelled to remand the
matter to the Appellate Court on three occasions. Finally the First Appel-
late Court by its detailed judgment on 9.9.1976 confirmed the decree of the
Trial Court and dismissed the appeal preferred by the defendant.

I H Still awieved, the defendant preferred second appeal No. 1801/76
NAVANEfll-IAMMALv.AlUUNACHETrY(K. VENKATASWAMI,J.] 585

in the Madras High Court. The learned Single Judge of the Madras High A
Court found that the Courts below failed to come to correct conclusion on
the basis of the evidence both oral and documentary placed before them
and in a way gone into the evidence onceover and reversed the findings
rendered by the Courts below and consequently allowed the Second Ap-
peal; dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. B

Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the present appeal has
been filed by the plaintiff-appellant by Special Leave.

Mr. K. Rajendra Chowdary, learned counsel appearing for the ap-
pellant submitted that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under C
Section 100 CPC in reversing the concurrent findings of the Courts below.
He also submitted that the High "Court went wrong in placing the onus of
proof regarding the character of possession of the suit land by the defen-
dant, on the plaintiff when admittedly the defendant was let into the
possession as a tenant under a reiistered !er se deed of the year 1935. The D
High Court, according to the learned counsel ought not to have discussed
the issue of adverse possession with reference to Article 139 of the old
Limitation Act. 1908 as no such plea was taken in the written statement
nor any issue was framed concerning that. He further invited our attention
to the well-founded reasoning and the concurrent findings supported by
evidence, of the lower Appellate Court which did not call for any inter- E
ference by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction un<l . Section
100 C.P.C.

Mr. R. Sundarvaradhan, Sr. Counsel appearing for the defendant-
respondent strongly supported the judgment ofthe High Court mainly on F
the basis of Article 139 of the old Limitation Act which corresponds to
Article 67 of the new Limitation Act, 1963. According to the learned Sr.
Counsel, it is an admitted fact that after the expiry of the lease in the year
1938, llie defendant never paid any rent for his continued possession in the
suit property and in the absence of any exercise of ownership by the
_. landlord for a continuous period of over twelve years, the defendant G
I prescribed title by adverse possession. He also placed reliance on the fact
-I of payment of kists (land revenue) to the suit land by the defendant. He
I
submitted that the High Court has given good reasons for interfering under
Section 100 CPC stating that the findings rendered by the Courts below
were not based on materials to sustain those findings and, therefore, it must H
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A be taken that the findings were rendered by court below based on no
evidence. According to the learned counsel on the admitted facts of this .
case, namely, that neither the lessor nor his legal representative having not
claimed any rent continuously for a period of twelve years after the expiry
of the lease, Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act would not come
to the aid of the lessor or his successors in interest when the tenant invokes
B the aid of Article 139 of the old Limitation Act. He wants the Court to
look into Article 139 of the old Limitation Act alone for counting the
period of limitation simply from the expiry of the date of the lease ignoring
the hard fact that the defendant continued after the expiry of lease either
as tenant holding over or as a tenant by sufferance.
c
Mr. Rajendra Chowdary, learned counsel for the appellant in reply
submitted that in terms of the registered lease deed, the
Jessee/defendant/respondent herein was bound to pay the kists for the suit
land and therefore, the payment of kists after the expiry of the lease will
not make any difference in the case. He also contended that the defendant
D for the first time set up hostile title in himself only on 27.4.1957 in his reply
notice. The suit filed in 1962 is well within time.

We have considered the rival submissions.

E Before discussing the merits of respective rival submissions, It IS
· necessary to bear in mind that the case set up by defendant in the Trial
Court was prescription of title by adverse possession after surrendering the
suit land and again re-entering the same. No plea contending that the suit
was barred under Article 139 of the old Limitation Act was taken by the
defendant in the trial court. Therefore, there was no necessity for framing i
F any issue or letting in oral evidence on that aspect. This aspect assumes
importance in considering the evidence.

This Court, time without number, pointed out that interference with
the concurrent findings of the courts below by the High Court under
G Section 100 CPC must be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons.
In any case, the High Court is not expected to re-appreciate the evidence
just to replace the findings of the lower courts.

L~t us see whether the High Court on the facts of this case has
exceeded its jurisdiction in revering the findings of the lower Appellate
H Court by re-appreciating the evidence.
NAVANEE1HAMMAL v. ARJUNA CHE1TY [K. VENKATASWAM!, J .] 587

Before the Trial Court, the crucial issue was regarding adverse A
possession. On that issue, the Trial Court found that as the tenant/defen-
dant came into possession of the land only in pursuance of the lease deed,
his possession was merely a permissive one. It was further found that there
was no evidence before the Trial Court to show that prior to the <late of
Exbt. A-6 (reply by defendant)·he ha<l never claimed independent title to
B
the suit property and h~d brought that animus to the notice to the
land-lord or the successors in title. The Trial Court also noticed an
important fact and observed as follows :

"In the written statement, it is stated that after the expiry of the
lease period mentioned under Exbt. A-3, he had surrendered c
possession of the land an<l that he again got the possession of the
land in his own independant right and from that <late onwards, he
has been in possession of the land continuously uninterruptedly as
the owner of the land. This claim has been given a go-by by him
in his deposition."
D
The Trial Court also found that in as much as the defendant asserted
his independant right in the land in himself only under Ext. A-6 dated
27.4.1957, his possession was not adverse to the owners of the land as the
suit came to be filed within five years thereafter.
E
The First Appellate Court framed the question for consideration on
ramand as follows :

"Whether, having regard to the evidence, oral or documentary and
the probabilities of the case, there could be an inference of implied
assent by the land-lord to the continuance in possession by the F
tenant after the termination of the term under Exbt. A-3".

In discussing the oral evidence, the First Appellate Court held as
follows:

"Before advertising to the arguments of counsel appear for both G
parties, I would like to refer to the oral evidence in this case,
plaintiffs vendor Mohamed Ghouse Sahib was examined as P.W.1.
He is a retired Post Master and is aged about 70 years. His definite
testimony is that after the demise of Samad Sahib, he (P.W. 1) and
Khader Sahib were collecting rents, that there were rent arrears H

J
-
588 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A to the extent of Rs. 200 or Rs. 250, that they gave notice to the
defendant and that after receipt of the notice, the defendant was
paying some amounts in instalments, he denied that after the expiry
of the lease period in Ex. A-3, the defendant surrendered posses-
sion of the property and that because the property remained
unoccupied, the defendant trespassed upon the lands. As rightly
B pointed out by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, the evidence
of P.W, 1 with regard to the collection of rents by him and Khader
Sahib and payment of some amounts by the defendant in instalment
was not challenged at all in cross-examination. In this connection.
I may point out the admission of the defendant as D.W.2 that there
c is no enmity between him and P.W. L In the absence of any motive.
I do not understand as to why P.W. 1 who is a respectable witness
should come and make false statement in Court so far as this as;:iect
of the case is concerned. I see no valid reason to disbelieve him
in this respect."
D Again in para 12, the lower Appellate Court held as follows :

"No doubt, the defendant as D.W. 2 w01Ild say that there is enmity
between him and P.W. 2. But on this ground alone,-the evidence
of P.W. 2, that he had seen P.W. 1 and Khader Sahib at the village
E when coming to collect rents (elicited during cross-examination)
cannot be rejected as false. His evidence when considered
alongwith the other circumstances in this case, appears to me quite
probable and acceptable. P.W. 3, Veeraraghava Pillai is the hus-
band of the Plaintiff and karnam of Ulli village for more than 30
years. His definite testimony is that the defendant was a tenant
F holding over of this land."

On a perusal of the lower Appellate Court judgment, we find that
the findings rendered by the lower Appellate Court were very well based
on materials placed before it and the contrary conclusion reached by the ·
G High Court is not sustainable. The lower Appellate Court in its judgment
has appreciated all relevant oral and documentary evidence and observed
as follows : ·

"On the side of the defendant, we have the evidence of D.Ws, 1
to 5. Of them D.W. 1 is the Hand Writing Expert. He was examined
H with reference to Ex. A-4. His evidence is not relevant for our
NAVANEE1HAMMALv.ARJUNACHETIY[K. VENKATASWAMI,J.] 589

present limited enquiry. D.W. 3 Ramakrishnan is a resident of Ulli A
village. D.W. 4 Mahadevan is a resident of Gopampatti, D.W. 5
Karunagaran is a contractor by profession at Gudiyatham These
three witnesses claim to own lands near the suit property. They
would say that the defendant has been in possession and enjoyment
of the suit land for the last 32 to 35 years. But they are not in a
B
position to say as to in what capacity the defendant entered into
possession of this property. Their evidence that the defendant is
in continuous possession and enjoyment of the suit lands is of no
significance because the';dmitted case of the plaintiff is that the
defendant is in possession from 1935 but as a tenant holding over.
The evidence of defendant as D.W. 2 would certainly throw some c
light in deciding the issue before us. For better appreciation I
would prefer to extract the relevant portions of his deposition
which were relied on by the plaintiff. ·

"One Sahib leased out the property to me for three years under D
I
a registered lease deed. I cultivated the land for two years. In the
third year the Sahib took me to P.W. 3's house. My father accom-
panied me. P.W. 3's father told me that the Sahih would not come
thereafter and the lease deed was cancelled and that thereafter I
coul<l enjoy the land and I need not worry since the former's son.
P.W. 3 was the the village karnam. Thereafter, I was enjoying the E
land without any interruption. The lessor, my father and P.W. 3's
father went to P.W. 3, father's house. At that time P.W. 3 was the
village karnam. I was sent for about four or five hours later. P.W.
3 was not present at the time. His father told that they had decided
that the lease period had expired and that thereafter I could enjoy F
the land as my own without paying rent to anybody and I should
pay the kists myself. At that time, including me only four persons
were present. The Sahib was then present. The incident took place
at the beginning of the third lease year. I was not asked to give
any amount in pursuance of the decision. The entire land is wet G
land. Even at that time the land was worth two thousand rupees.
I do not know whether my father gave any amount in pursuance
of the decision. I did not ask him about it. I did not give the rent
for the third year. From the date of the registered lease deed I am
in continuous possession and enjoyment of the land. Due to for-
getfulness I have not stated the above incident in my written H
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A statement and also to my counsel who gave the reply notice. I did
not tell him that I had SU/Tendered possession of the land and
thereafter the land was in nobody's possession for some time and
that I again got into possession of the land".

Again in paragraph 18, the learned subordinate Judge held as fol-
B
lows:

"As' already stated, in the reply notice Ex. A-6 the defendant is
silent about his induction into possession of the suit property at
c any time as a lessee, any alleged surrender or his occupation
finding the property l)~ng unoccupied. In his written statement his
specific case is that at the end of term under Ex. A-3, he sur-
rendered possession of the suit property and that, thereafter he
was in possession of the property in his own right. A third case
was put forward during the trial through the mouth of the defen-
D
dant as D.W. 2, I have already adverted to his evidence in this
respect. That would show that even at the end of the second year
i.e. in the year 1937 and before the commencement of the third
year, he was taken to p.w. 3's father's house by some Sahib, that
his father was also present and that he was informed that the lease
E was cancelled and that he could enjoy the land as he liked. It has
1

to be noted that even according to D.W. 2 this property was worth
Rs. 2000 at that time. It is highly unlikely that no prudent man
would have given up his right in such a valuable property in favour
of another person without any consideration. It is not the case of
F the,defendant that he had done some services to the family of the
original owners of this property or that he paid some consideration
towards the value of this property and that because of such con-
sideration, he was orally asked by the Sahib to enjoy the land as
his own. When in the year 1935, the defedant and Samad Sahib
G have taken the precaution of getting lease deed registered, it is
unlikely that the defendant would have failed to obtain something
in writing when, as alleged by him (D.W. 2), the Sahib asked him
to enjoy the land as he liked saying that the lease was cancelled.
As already stated the case set out by the defendant in his reply
H notice is that the property remained unoccupied and that so he
,
!
I
NAVANEETHAMMALv. AlUUNACHETTY[K VENKATASWAMl,J.] 591

entered into possession and occupied it. Having regard to these A
facts an,.: having regard to the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 with regard
to the collection of rents and the defendant continuing in posses-
sion of the property as a tenant and also having regard to the
probabilities and circumstances of this case, I find no diffirnlty in
coming to the conclusion that there should have been an implied B
assent by the landlord to the continuance in possession by the
defendant after tennination of the tenn under Ex. A-3".

In the light of these findings of the courts below, the High Court on
re-appreciation of evidence founds as follows :
c
"Thus there is nothing as and by way of evidence which can be
taken to support the contention of the respondent that there was
a tenancy after the expiry of the original tenancy in the year 1938".

xxx xxx xxx D
"I have discussed the facts to show that there are no materials to
support the findings of the lower Appellate Court that there was
a continuation of tenancy after the expiry of the original lease." ·

xxx xxx xxx E

"That there must be some act which evidence the lessor being
agreeable to the tenant being in possession of the property leased
so as to infer as assent. In the absence of such a conduct in the
present, it is not possible to draw the inference that there was any F
assent on the part of the plaintiff to the defendant continuing in
possession of the property".

In our considered view the lower Appellate Court has fairly ap-
preciated the evidence in the above background has reached the conclusion G
that the suit was not barred by Limitation. Even assuming that another view
is possible on a re-appreciation of the same evidence, that should not have
been done by the High Court as it cannot be said that the view taken by
the First Appellate Court was based on no material.

Article 139 of the old Limitation Act reads as follows : H
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A A1ticle 139 : ,
Period of Time from which period
Description of suit
limitation begins to run
By a landlord to recover Twelve years When a tenancy 1s
possessfon from a tenant determined.
B
The date on which the tenancy is determined will be the date from
which the period of limitation would begin to run for the purpose of Article
139 of the old Limitation Act.

One ihode of determining tenancy under Transfer of Property Act is
C by way of surrender by the tenant.

We have seen on facts that an attempt was made by the defendant-
respondent '.that he had surrendered the suit property after the expiry of
the lease and thereafter re-entered the suit land and continued in posses-
sion in his own right. However, this case was not accepted by the trial court
D as well as by the appellate court for well-founded reasons as noticed above.
That being the position the possession by the defendant on the facts as
found by the First Appellate Court, in this case, after the expiry of the lease
further continuance was only permissive and will not give cause for
· prescribing title by adverse possession. Further, for the first time, while
replying to the notice by the vendor of the plaintiff, the defendant openly
E
set up a hostile title and the suit having been filed within five years
therefrom is not barred by limitation.

In the' circumstances, we are satisfied that the High Court was not
justified in interfering with the judgments of the courts below. Consequent-
F ly, the appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.

S.V.K.I. Appeal allowed.