NATIONAL SPOT EXCHANGE LIMITEDversusMR. ANIL KOHLI, RESOLUTION PROFESSIONAL FOR DUNAR FOODS LIMITED

1024                      [2021]REPORTS
                SUPREME COURT   7 S.C.R. 1024                  [2021] 7 S.C.R.


 A                  NATIONAL SPOT EXCHANGE LIMITED
                                           v.
           MR. ANIL KOHLI, RESOLUTION PROFESSIONAL FOR
                      DUNAR FOODS LIMITED
 B                         (Civil Appeal No. 6187 of 2019)
                               SEPTEMBER 14, 2021
                 [M. R. SHAH AND ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.]
              Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – s.61(2) – Appeals
       and Appellate Authority – In response to the public announcement
 C
       by Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) inviting the claims from
       the creditors of the corporate debtor, the appellant submitted claim
       of Rs.673.85 crores – The IRP rejected the claim of the appellant
       on the ground that there was no privity of contract between the
       appellant and the corporate debtor and no letter of guarantee was
 D     issued by the corporate debtor in favour of the appellant – Appellant
       challenged the rejection before the National Company Law Tribunal
       (NCLT), which upheld the decision of the IRP – Aggrieved, the
       appellant preferred appeal before the National Company Law
       Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) – There was a delay of 44 days in
       preferring the said appeal – The NCLAT dismissed the appeal on
 E
       the ground that Appellate Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone
       the delay beyond 15 days from 30 days and appeal is barred by
       limitation – On appeal, held: As per s.61(2) of the IB Code, the
       appeal is required to be preferred within a period of 30 days – The
       Appellate Tribunal may allow an appeal to be filed beyond the period
 F     of 30 days, if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not
       filing the appeal, but such period shall not exceed 15 days – So,
       the appeal before the NCLAT was required to be filed within a
       maximum period of 45 days (30 days + 15 days) – However, in the
       instant case there was delay of 44 days beyond a total period of 45
       days – It is settled legal position that the law of limitation may harshly
 G
       affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour
       when the Statute so prescribes – The Court has no power to extend
       the period of limitation on equitable grounds – It cannot be said
       that the NCLAT has committed any error in dismissing the appeal
       on the ground of limitation by observing that it has no jurisdiction
 H     and/or power to condone the delay exceeding 15 days.
                                           1024
 NATIONAL SPOT EXCHANGE LTD. v. MR. ANIL KOHLI, RESOLUTION                   1025
            PROFESSIONAL FOR DUNAR FOODS LTD.


      Dismissing the appeal, the Court                                       A
       HELD: 1. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the
appellant herein has challenged the order passed by the
adjudicating authority dated 6.3.2019 affirming the decision of
the resolution professional of rejection of the claim of the appellant
before the NCLAT. The appeal preferred before the NCLAT was                  B
under Section 61(2) of the IB Code. As per Section 61(2) of the
IB Code, the appeal was required to be preferred within a period
of thirty days. Therefore, the limitation period prescribed to prefer
an appeal was 30 days. However, as per the proviso to Section
61(2) of the Code, the Appellate Tribunal may allow an appeal to
be filed after the expiry of the said period of 30 days if it is satisfied   C
that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal, but such
period shall not exceed 15 days. Therefore, the Appellate Tribunal
has no jurisdiction at all to condone the delay exceeding 15 days
from the period of 30 days, as contemplated under Section 61(2)
of the IB Code. [Para 7][1034-A-D]                                           D
       2. In the present case, even the appellant applied for the
certified copy of the order passed by the adjudicating authority
on 8.4.2019, i.e., after a delay of 34 days. Therefore, even the
certified copy of the order passed by the adjudicating authority
was applied beyond the prescribed period of limitation, i.e., beyond         E
30 days. The certified copy of the order was received by the
appellant on 11.04.2019 and the appeal before the NCLAT was
preferred on 24.06.2019, i.e., after a delay of 44 days. As the
Appellate Tribunal can condone the delay up to a period of 15
days only, the Appellate Tribunal refused to condone the delay
which was beyond 15 days from completion of 30 days, i.e., in the            F
present case delay of 44 days and consequently dismissed the
appeal. Therefore, as such, it cannot be said that the learned
Appellate Tribunal committed any error in not condoning the delay
of 44 days, which was beyond the delay of 15 days which cannot
be condoned as per Section 61(2) of the IB Code. [Para 7.1][1034-            G
F-H; 1035-A]
     3. It is true that in a given case there may arise a situation
where the applicant/appellant may not be in a position to file the
appeal even within a statutory period of limitation prescribed
under the Act and even within the extended maximum period of                 H
1026           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 7 S.C.R.


 A     appeal which could be condoned owing to genuineness, viz.,
       illness, accident etc. However, under the statute, the Parliament
       has not carved out any exception of such a situation. Therefore,
       in a given case, it may cause hardship, however, unless the
       Parliament has carved out any exception by a provision of law,
       the period of limitation has to be given effect to. Such powers are
 B
       only with the Parliament and the legislature. The courts have no
       jurisdiction and/or authority to carve out any exception. If the
       courts carve out an exception, it would amount to legislate which
       would in turn might be inserting the provision to the statute,
       which is not permissible. [Para 9][1036-C-E]
 C           4. It is also required to be noted that the appellant has
       fairly conceded that considering Section 61(2) of the IB Code,
       the Appellate Tribunal has jurisdiction or power to condone the
       delay not exceeding 15 days from the completion of 30 days, the
       statutory period of limitation. However, has requested and prayed
 D     to condone the delay in exercise of powers under Article 142 of
       the Constitution of India, in the facts and circumstances of the
       case and submitted that the amount involved is a very huge amount
       and that the appellant is a public body. What cannot be done
       directly considering the statutory provisions cannot be permitted
       to be done indirectly, while exercising the powers under Article
 E     142 of the Constitution of India. [Para 11][1039-G-H; 1040-A-B]
             Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8
             SCC 470 : [2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 619; Rohitash Kumar
             v. Om Prakash Sharma, (2013) 11 SCC 451 : [2012]
             13 SCR 47; Raghunath Rai Bareja v. Punjab National
 F           Bank, (2007) 2 SCC 230 : [2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 287;
             Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Limited v. Gujarat
             Energy Transmission Corporation Limited, AIR 2017
             SC 1352 : [2017] 2 SCR 922; Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd.
             v. U.T. Chandigarh, (2004) 2 SCC 130 : [2003] 6 Suppl.
 G           SCR 1235 – relied on.
             Chitra Sharma v. Union of India, (2018) 18 SCC 575 :
             [2018] 12 SCR 1044; Jaiprakash Associates Limited v.
             IDBI Bank Limited, (2020) 3 SCC 328 : [2019] 14 SCR
             312; Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mampee
 H
 NATIONAL SPOT EXCHANGE LTD. v. MR. ANIL KOHLI, RESOLUTION             1027
            PROFESSIONAL FOR DUNAR FOODS LTD.


      Timbers and Hardwares Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 3 SCC 673;               A
      New India Assurance Company Limited v. Hilli
      Multipurpose Cold Storage Private Limited, (2020) 5
      SCC 757; CMD/Chairman, Bharat Sanchar Nigam
      Limited v. Mishri Lal, (2011) 14 SCC 739 : [2011] 5
      SCR 317; Popat Bahiru Goverdhane v. Special Land
                                                                       B
      Acquisition Officer, (2013) 10 SCC 765 : [2013] 8 SCR
      241; The Martin Burn Limited v. The Corporation of
      Calcutta, AIR 1966 SC 529 : [1966] SCR 543; J.J.
      Merchant v. Shrinath Chaturvedi, (2002) 6 SCC 635 :
      [2002] 1 Suppl. SCR 469 – referred to.
                      Case Law Reference                               C

[2018] 12 SCR 1044            referred to             Para 5.4
[2019] 14 SCR 312             referred to             Para 5.4
[2012] 13 SCR 47              relied on               Para 6.3
                                                                       D
[2011] 5 SCR 317              referred to             Para 6.3
[2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 619       relied on               Para 6.1
[2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 287      relied on               Para 6.3
[2013] 8 SCR 241              referred to             Para 6.3
                                                                       E
[1966] SCR 543                referred to             Para 6.3
[2017] 2 SCR 922              relied on               Para 6.5
[2002] 1 Suppl. SCR 469       referred to              Para 8.1
[2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 1235      relied on               Para 11.2        F
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6187
of 2019.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 05.07.2019 of the National
Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in Comp. App. (AT)
(Insolvency) No. 683 of 2019.                                          G
      Maninder Singh, Sr. Adv., Ranjan Kumar Pandey, Sandeep Bisht,
Advs. for the Appellant.
      Abhishek, M/s Mitter & Mitter Co., Pathik Choudhury, Advs. for
the Respondent.
                                                                       H
1028            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2021] 7 S.C.R.


 A           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
             M. R. SHAH, J.
              1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order dated
       05.07.2019 passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal,
       New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the ‘NCLAT’) in Company Appeal
 B     (AT)(Insolvency) No. 683 of 2019, by which the NCLAT has refused to
       condone the delay of 44 days in preferring the appeal against the order
       passed by the National Company Law Tribunal (hereinafter referred to
       as the ’NCLT’), rejecting the claim of the appellant herein, the appellant
       – National Spot Exchange Limited has preferred the present appeal.
 C           2. The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are as under:
              That the State Bank of India has initiated the insolvency
       proceedings before the NCLT under Section 7 of the Insolvency and
       Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IBC’) against
       one Dunar Foods Limited (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Corporate
 D     Debtor’) on the ground that Corporate Debtor had taken credit limits by
       hypothecating the commodities kept in the warehouses of the appellant
       – National Spot Exchange Limited; that the NCLT admitted the petition
       and commenced the corporate insolvency resolution process against the
       corporate debtor under the provisions of the IBC. Interim Resolution
 E     Professional (for short, ‘IRP’) was appointed. IRP invited the claims
       from the creditors of the corporate debtor – Dunar Foods Limited on or
       before 17.01.2018; that the appellant herein submitted its claim and also
       forwarded its claim through courier to IRP as per Form ‘F’ of the IBC.
       At this stage it is required to be noted that the appellant herein earlier
       filed Money Suit against one PD Agro Processors Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter
 F     referred to as ‘PD Agro’) and the corporate debtor being Commercial
       Suit No. 11 of 2014 before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay.
       The High Court vide order dated 11.04.2014 in Notice of Motion 807 of
       2014 in CS No. 328 of 2014 injuncted PD Agro and the Corporate Debtor
       from disposing of, alienating, encumbering, parting with possession of
 G     and/or otherwise creating third party rights in respect of its movable/
       immovable properties/assets; that one FIR No. 216 of 2013 was also
       lodged against PD Agro and subsequently the same came to be
       transferred to the Economic Offence Wing, Mumbai for further
       investigation; that the provisions of Maharashtra Protection of Depositors
       Act (MPID) Act, 1999 were also invoked; that it is the case on behalf of
 H
 NATIONAL SPOT EXCHANGE LTD. v. MR. ANIL KOHLI, RESOLUTION                   1029
     PROFESSIONAL FOR DUNAR FOODS LTD. [M. R. SHAH, J.]


the appellant that the investigation report submitted by the investigating   A
agency revealed that PD Agro has siphoned off funds to the tune of
Rs.455 crores during the year 2011-12 and Rs. 289 crores during the
year 2012-13 to the Corporate Debtor; that the High Court of Bombay
passed a decree in Commercial Suit No. 11 of 2014 against PD Agro for
Rs. 633,66,98,350.40 with 9% interest from the date of accrual of the
                                                                             B
course of action/default. The aforesaid shall be dealt with hereinafter.
       2.1 That in response to the public announcement by the IRP inviting
the claims from the creditors of the Corporate Debtor (Dunar Foods
Limited) dated 6.1.2018, the appellant submitted the claim of Rs. 673.85
crores; that it was the case on behalf of the appellant that a decree has
been passed against PD Agro for an amount of Rs.633,66,98,350.40 and         C
on investigation by the Directorate of Enforcement, it is found that Rs.
744 crores have been siphoned off by PD Agro to the Corporate Debtor.
IRP rejected the claim of the appellant on 18.06.2018 on the ground that
there is no privity of contract between the appellant and the corporate
debtor and that there is no letter or guarantee issued by the corporate      D
debtor in favour of the appellant. That the rejection of the claim by IRP
came to be challenged by the appellant before NCLT being Miscellaneous
Application No. 603 of 2018 and the NCLT by order dated 6.3.2019
rejected the said application and upheld the decision of the IRP not to
include the claim of the appellant as a creditor.
                                                                             E
       3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed by the
NCLT dated 6.3.2019, the appellant herein preferred an appeal before
the NCLAT. There was a delay of 44 days in preferring the said appeal.
The appeal before the NCLAT was required to be filed within a maximum
period of 45 days (30 days + 15 days). However, there was a further
delay of 44 days beyond a total period of 45 days. Therefore, considering    F
sub-section (2) of Section 61 of the IBC which provides for powers to
the Appellate Tribunal to condone the delay of only 15 days which it can
condone over the period of 30 days, if there is a sufficient cause, by the
impugned order, the learned Appellate Tribunal has dismissed the appeal
on the ground that the Appellate Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone     G
the delay beyond 15 days and thereby the appeal is barred by limitation.
       4. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order
passed by the learned NCLAT in dismissing the appeal on the ground of
limitation and refusing to condone the delay which was beyond the period
of 15 days, which the Appellate Tribunal could have condoned, the            H
1030             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 7 S.C.R.


 A     appellant – National Spot Exchange Limited has preferred the present
       appeal.
             5. Shri Maninder Singh, learned Senior Advocate has appeared
       on behalf of the appellant and Shri Abhishek, learned Advocate has
       appeared on behalf of the IRP.
 B            5.1 Shri Maninder Singh, learned senior counsel appearing on
       behalf of the appellant has submitted that though the learned Appellate
       Tribunal may be justified in dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation
       by holding that the Appellate Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone the
       delay beyond 15 days, it is prayed to exercise the powers under Article
 C     142 of the Constitution of India, in the peculiar facts and circumstances
       of the case.
              5.2 It is submitted that on investigation by the Directorate of
       Enforcement, it is revealed that PD Agro which was the sister concern
       of the Corporate Debtor, has siphoned off Rs. 744 crores to the Corporate
 D     Debtor. It is submitted that there was a common management/Directors
       of PD Agro as well as the Corporate Debtor. It is submitted that both
       the Corporate Debtor and PD Agro are sister concerns and have the
       same management. Dunar Foods Limited is a flagship entity of PD Agro
       and is the main beneficiary of the funds received by PD Agro from the
       trades executed on the appellant’s platform. It is submitted that one Mr.
 E     Ranjeev Agarwal and Ms. Sheetal Gupta are the directors and
       shareholders of PD Agro. Shri Ranjeev Agarwal was also the CFO of
       the Corporate Debtor and Ms. Sheetal Gupta is the wife of Shri Surender
       Gupta. It is submitted that Shri Surender Gupta is the promoter and
       managing director of the corporate debtor. It is submitted that even Shri
 F     Surender Gupta in his statement given under Section 50 PMLA before
       the Enforcement Directorate has confirmed that he was managing the
       affairs of PD Agro and that PD Agro is a shareholder of Dunar Foods
       Limited, holding 8.25% shares. It is submitted that therefore management
       and directors of PD Agro and the Corporate Debtor – Dunar Foods
       Limited played a fraud.
 G
              5.3 It is submitted that even the PD Agro admittedly owes and did
       not pay INR 693 crores towards their liability despite admitting its liability
       vide letter dated 01.08.2013 and had assured to clear its outstanding in
       20 weeks in the said letter. It is submitted that during the investigation it
       is revealed that the corporate debtor used PD Agro as its front and had
 H
 NATIONAL SPOT EXCHANGE LTD. v. MR. ANIL KOHLI, RESOLUTION                    1031
     PROFESSIONAL FOR DUNAR FOODS LTD. [M. R. SHAH, J.]


siphoned off the money. It is further submitted that even there is a decree   A
passed by the Bombay High Court against PD Agro. It is submitted that
therefore when it is revealed during investigation that the PD Agro
siphoned off Rs. 744 crores to the corporate debtor, the IRP ought to
have admitted the claim of the appellant even by lifting the veil. It is
submitted that the NCLT has also not considered the aforesaid in its true
                                                                              B
perspective and has not even lifted the corporate veil which ought to
have been done in the facts and circumstances of the case.
       5.4 It is further submitted by Shri Maninder Singh, learned senior
counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that therefore in the
aforesaid peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, where a huge
amount of Rs. 693 crores is involved, which is due and payable to the         C
appellant herein, which can be said to be a public body which provided
an electronic exchange platform which commenced its operations after
the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Government of India granted it an
exemption under Section 27 of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act,
1952 to launch one-day forward contracts for buying and selling of            D
commodities and therefore it is prayed to condone the delay in preferring
the appeal before the NCLAT, in exercise of powers under Article 142
of the Constitution of India. Heavy reliance is placed on the decisions of
this Court in the cases of Chitra Sharma v. Union of India, reported
in (2018) 18 SCC 575; Jaiprakash Associates Limited v. IDBI Bank
Limited, reported in (2020) 3 SCC 328; and Reliance General                   E
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mampee Timbers and Hardwares Pvt. Ltd.,
reported in (2021) 3 SCC 673, in support of his prayer to condone the
delay beyond the time prescribed under the IBC, i.e., the delay of 44
days in preferring the appeal before the NCLAT, in exercise of powers
under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.                               F
       6. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by Shri Abhishek,
learned Advocate appearing for the IRP for corporate debtor. It is
submitted that Section 61(2) of the Code provides for power of the
Appellate Tribunal to condone the delay in the appeal. It is submitted
that the Appellate Tribunal can condone the delay of only 15 days over        G
the period of 30 days, if there is a sufficient cause. It is submitted that
beyond the period of 15 days, over the period of 30 days, the Appellate
Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone the delay. It is submitted that
therefore the learned Appellate Tribunal has rightly and correctly
dismissed the appeal on the ground that it did not have the power to
                                                                              H
1032             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 7 S.C.R.


 A     condone the delay beyond the period of 15 days, over the period of 30
       days, i.e., in the present case the delay of 44 days.
              6.1 It is submitted that as held by this Court in the case of Union
       of India v. Popular Construction Co., reported in (2001) 8 SCC
       470, where the legislature prescribed a special limitation for the purpose
 B     of the appeal and the period of limitation of 60 days was to be computed
       after taking the aid of Sections 4, 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act, the
       specific inclusion of these sections meant that to that extent only the
       provisions of the Limitation Act stood extended and the applicability of
       the other provisions, by necessary implication stood excluded.
 C            6.2 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
       behalf of the IRP that once the statute provides the period of limitation
       and to condone the delay up to a particular period and the statute
       specifically provides that beyond a particular period, the delay cannot be
       condoned, the same has to be adhered to. Heavy reliance is placed on
       the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of New India
 D     Assurance Company Limited v. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage
       Private Limited, reported in (2020) 5 SCC 757.
              6.3 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing for
       the IRP that the law made by the Parliament must be given effect to. It
       is submitted that as held by this Court in catena of decisions that hardship
 E     is no ground not to give effect to the mandate of Parliament and that law
       overrides equitable considerations. Reliance is placed on the following
       decisions of this Court, Rohitash Kumar v. Om Prakash Sharma,
       reported in (2013) 11 SCC 451 (paras 23 to 26); CMD/Chairman,
       Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Mishri Lal, reported in (2011) 14
 F     SCC 739 (para 20); Raghunath Rai Bareja v. Punjab National Bank,
       reported in (2007) 2 SCC 230 (paras 29 to 37); Popat Bahiru
       Goverdhane v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013)
       10 SCC 765 (para 16); and The Martin Burn Limited v. The
       Corporation of Calcutta, reported in AIR 1966 SC 529 (para 14).

 G            6.4 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaid
       decisions and the relevant provisions of the statute, namely, Sub-section
       (2) of Section 61 of the Code, it is submitted that as such no error has
       been committed by the learned Appellate Tribunal in not condoning the
       delay beyond the period of 15 days, over the period of 30 days. It is
       submitted that as such the learned Appellate Tribunal has acted just in
 H
 NATIONAL SPOT EXCHANGE LTD. v. MR. ANIL KOHLI, RESOLUTION                        1033
     PROFESSIONAL FOR DUNAR FOODS LTD. [M. R. SHAH, J.]


consonance with the provisions of the statute and has followed the                A
statutory provisions strictly.
       6.5 Now so far as the prayer on behalf of the appellant to condone
the delay beyond the period prescribed under the statute, in exercise of
powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India is concerned, it is
submitted that as observed and held by this Court in the case of Oil &            B
Natural Gas Corporation Limited v. Gujarat Energy Transmission
Corporation Limited, reported in AIR 2017 SC 1352 where the statute
commands that the court shall not condone the delay beyond a particular
days, in other words, can condone delay only up to a particular days and
not beyond that, it would come within the ambit and sweep of the
provisions and policy of legislation and therefore it is un-condonable and        C
it cannot be condoned even taking recourse to Article 142 of the
Constitution of India. It is submitted that what cannot be done directly
under the statute as per the statutory provisions cannot be permitted to
be done indirectly, in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India.                                                            D
       6.6 It is further submitted that even otherwise and on meris also,
the appellant cannot be said to be a creditor of the corporate debtor –
Dunar Foods Limited. It is submitted that it is pertinent to note that if
Form ‘F’ dated 17.01.2018 filed by the appellant and the supporting
documents are perused, it is evident that the claim filed to the extent of        E
Rs. 673.85 crores is a claim against PD Agro. It is submitted that the
appellant has filed its claim against the corporate debtor on the ground
that fraud/scam has been done by PD Agro in connivance with various
entities including the corporate debtor and therefore an amount of
Rs. 673.85 crores alleged to be payable by the PD Agro should be paid
by the corporate debtor. It is submitted that even the decree passed in           F
Commercial Suit No. 11 of 2014 has been passed only against PD Agro
and not the corporate debtor. It is submitted therefore even otherwise
the appellant is not a creditor of the corporate debtor and therefore IRP
has rightly not entertained the claim of the appellant. It is further submitted
that even thereafter the resolution plan has been approved by the NCLT            G
– the adjudicating authority and the appellant has already assailed the
approved resolution plan in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 424
of 2020 before the NCLAT.
      6.7 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaid
decisions, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeal.                            H
1034             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 7 S.C.R.


 A            7. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties
       at length.
               At the outset, it is required to be noted that the appellant herein
       has challenged the order passed by the adjudicating authority dated
       6.3.2019 affirming the decision of the resolution professional of rejection
 B     of the claim of the appellant before the NCLAT. The appeal preferred
       before the NCLAT was under Section 61(2) of the IB Code. As per
       Section 61(2) of the IB Code, the appeal was required to be preferred
       within a period of thirty days. Therefore, the limitation period prescribed
       to prefer an appeal was 30 days. However, as per the proviso to Section
       61(2) of the Code, the Appellate Tribunal may allow an appeal to be filed
 C     after the expiry of the said period of 30 days if it is satisfied that there
       was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal, but such period shall not
       exceed 15 days. Therefore, the Appellate Tribunal has no jurisdiction
       at all to condone the delay exceeding 15 days from the period of 30
       days, as contemplated under Section 61(2) of the IB Code. Section 61(2)
 D     of the IB Code reads as under:
             “Section 61(2) – Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed
             within thirty days before the National Company Law Appellate
             Tribunal:
             Provided that the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal may
 E           allow an appeal to be filed after the expiry of the said period of
             thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not
             filing the appeal, but such period shall not exceed fifteen days.”
              7.1 In the present case, even the appellant applied for the certified
       copy of the order passed by the adjudicating authority on 8.4.2019, i.e.,
 F     after a delay of 34 days. Therefore, even the certified copy of the order
       passed by the adjudicating authority was applied beyond the prescribed
       period of limitation, i.e., beyond 30 days. The certified copy of the order
       was received by the appellant on 11.04.2019 and the appeal before the
       NCLAT was preferred on 24.06.2019, i.e., after a delay of 44 days. As
 G     the Appellate Tribunal can condone the delay up to a period of 15 days
       only, the Appellate Tribunal refused to condone the delay which was
       beyond 15 days from completion of 30 days, i.e., in the present case
       delay of 44 days and consequently dismissed the appeal. Therefore, as
       such, it cannot be said that the learned Appellate Tribunal committed
       any error in not condoning the delay of 44 days, which was beyond the
 H
 NATIONAL SPOT EXCHANGE LTD. v. MR. ANIL KOHLI, RESOLUTION                      1035
     PROFESSIONAL FOR DUNAR FOODS LTD. [M. R. SHAH, J.]


delay of 15 days which cannot be condoned as per Section 61(2) of the           A
IB Code.
       8. An identical question came to be considered by this Court in
the case of Popular Construction Co. (supra). While considering
Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which provided
that an application for setting aside of the award cannot be made after         B
three months and it further provided that if the court is satisfied that the
applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making an application
within the said period of three months, it may entertain the application
within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter, after considering
Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act and after observing that “Arbitration
& Conciliation Act, 1996 is a special law” and that Section 34 of the           C
Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 provides for a period of limitation
different from that prescribed under the Limitation Act, ultimately this
Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall not be applicable as
the legislature has prescribed a special limitation for the purpose of the
appeal as provided under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation           D
Act, 1996. In paragraphs 11 & 12, it is observed and held as under:
      “11. Thus, where the legislature prescribed a special limitation for
      the purpose of the appeal and the period of limitation of 60 days
      was to be computed after taking the aid of Sections 4, 5 and 12 of
      the Limitation Act, the specific inclusion of these sections meant        E
      that to that extent only the provisions of the Limitation Act stood
      extended and the applicability of the other provisions, by necessary
      implication stood excluded.
      12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is
      concerned, the crucial words are “but not thereafter” used in the         F
      proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount
      to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of
      the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of
      Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To
      hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the
      award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render          G
      the phrase “but not thereafter” wholly otiose. No principle of
      interpretation would justify such a result.”
     8.1 An identical question came to be considered by a Constitution
Bench of this Court in the case of Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage
                                                                                H
1036             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 7 S.C.R.


 A     Private Limited (supra). The question before the Constitution Bench
       was, whether the District Forum has the power to extend the time for
       filing of response to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days, in addition
       to 30 days, as envisaged under Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer
       Protection Act? After approving the decision of this Court in the case of
       J.J. Merchant v. Shrinath Chaturvedi, reported in (2002) 6 SCC
 B
       635 and after considering the various decisions of this Court on the
       point, the Constitution Bench has ultimately concluded that “the District
       Forum has no jurisdiction and/or power to extend the time for filing of
       response to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days, in addition to 30
       days, as envisaged under Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection
 C     Act.
              9. It is true that in a given case there may arise a situation where
       the applicant/appellant may not be in a position to file the appeal even
       within a statutory period of limitation prescribed under the Act and even
       within the extended maximum period of appeal which could be condoned
 D     owing to genuineness, viz., illness, accident etc. However, under the
       statute, the Parliament has not carved out any exception of such a
       situation. Therefore, in a given case, it may cause hardship, however,
       unless the Parliament has carved out any exception by a provision of
       law, the period of limitation has to be given effect to. Such powers are
       only with the Parliament and the legislature. The courts have no jurisdiction
 E     and/or authority to carve out any exception. If the courts carve out an
       exception, it would amount to legislate which would in turn might be
       inserting the provision to the statute, which is not permissible.
             10. In the case of Rohitash Kumar (supra), this court observed
       and held as under:-
 F
             “23. There may be a statutory provision, which causes great
             hardship or inconvenience to either the party concerned, or to an
             individual, but the Court has no choice but to enforce it in full
             rigor. It is a well settled principle of interpretation that hardship or
             inconvenience caused, cannot be used as a basis to alter the
 G           meaning of the language employed by the legislature, if such
             meaning is clear upon a bare perusal of the Statute. If the language
             is plain and hence allows only one meaning, the same has to be
             given effect to, even if it causes hardship or possible injustice.
             (Vide: Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax, West Bengal v.
 H
 NATIONAL SPOT EXCHANGE LTD. v. MR. ANIL KOHLI, RESOLUTION                       1037
     PROFESSIONAL FOR DUNAR FOODS LTD. [M. R. SHAH, J.]


      Keshab Chandra Mandal, AIR 1950 SC 265; and D. D. Joshi &                  A
      Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1983) 2 SCC 235).
      24. In Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR
      1955 SC 661 it was observed by a Constitution Bench of this
      Court that, if there is any hardship, it is for the legislature to amend
      the law, and that the Court cannot be called upon, to discard the          B
      cardinal rule of interpretation for the purpose of mitigating such
      hardship. If the language of an Act is sufficiently clear, the Court
      has to give effect to it, however, inequitable or unjust the result
      may be. The words, ‘dura lex sed lex’ which mean “the law is
      hard but it is the law.” may be used to sum up the situation.
      Therefore, even if a statutory provision causes hardship to some           C
      people, it is not for the Court to amend the law. A legal enactment
      must be interpreted in its plain and literal sense, as that is the first
      principle of interpretation.
      25. In Mysore State Electricity Board v. Bangalore Woolen, Cotton
      & Silk Mills Ltd. & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1128, a Constitution Bench           D
      of this Court held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to
      be considered while interpreting a statute. In Martin Burn Ltd. v.
      The Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1966 SC 529, this Court, while
      dealing with the same issue observed as under:–
         “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A        E
         Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it
         considers a distress resulting from its operation. A statute must
         of course be given effect to whether a Court likes the result or
         not.” (See also: The Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal
         I, Calcutta v. M/s Vegetables Products Ltd., (1973) 1 SCC               F
         442; and Tata Power Company Ltd. v. Reliance Energy Limited
         & Ors., (2009) 16 SCC 659).
      26. Therefore, it is evident that the hardship caused to an individual,
      cannot be a ground for not giving effective and grammatical
      meaning to every word of the provision, if the language used               G
      therein, is unequivocal.”
       10.1 In the case of Mishri Lal & Others (supra), it is observed
that the law prevails over equity if there is a conflict. It is observed
further that equity can only supplement the law and not supplant it.
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1038            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 7 S.C.R.


 A            10.2 In the case of Raghunath Rai Bareja (supra), in paras 30
       to 37, this Court observed and held as under :-
             30. Thus, in Madamanchi Ramappa & Anr. vs. Muthaluru Bojjappa,
             AIR 1963 SC 1633 (vide para 12) this Court observed:
                “[W] what is administered in Courts is justice according to
 B              law, and considerations of fair play and equity however
                important they may be, must yield to clear and express
                provisions of the law”
             31. In Council for Indian School Certificate Examination vs. Isha
             Mittal & Anr., 2000 (7) SCC 521 (vide para 4) this Court observed:
 C
                “Considerations of equity cannot prevail and do not permit a
                High Court to pass an order contrary to the law.”
             32. Similarly in P.M. Latha & Anr. vs. State of Kerala & Ors.
             2003(3) SCC 541 (vide para 13) this Court observed:
 D              “13. Equity and law are twin brothers and law should be applied
                and interpreted equitably, but equity cannot override written or
                settled law.” (Emphasis supplied)
             33. In Laxminarayan R. Bhattad & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra
             & Anr. 2003(5) SCC 413 (vide para 73) this Court observed:
 E              “73. It is now well settled that when there is a conflict between
                law and equity the former shall prevail.”
             34. Similarly in Nasiruddin & Ors. vs. Sita Ram Agarwal, 2003(2)
             SCC 577 (vide para 35) this Court observed:

 F              “35. In a case where the statutory provision is plain and
                unambiguous, the court shall not interpret the same in a different
                manner, only because of harsh consequences arising
                therefrom.”
             35. Similarly in E. Palanisamy vs. Palanisamy (Dead) by Lrs. &
 G           Ors., 2003(1) SCC 123 (vide para 5) this Court observed:
                “Equitable considerations have no place where the statute
                contained express provisions”.
             36. In India House vs. Kishan N. Lalwani, 2003(9) SCC 393 (vide
             para 7) this Court held that:
 H
 NATIONAL SPOT EXCHANGE LTD. v. MR. ANIL KOHLI, RESOLUTION                      1039
     PROFESSIONAL FOR DUNAR FOODS LTD. [M. R. SHAH, J.]


          “The period of limitation statutorily prescribed has to be strictly   A
          adhered to and cannot be relaxed or departed from by equitable
          considerations.” (Emphasis supplied)
      37. In the present case, while equity is in favour of the respondent-
      Bank, the law is in favour of the appellant, since we are of the
      opinion that the impugned order of the High Court is clearly in           B
      violation of Section 31 of the RDB Act, and moreover the claim is
      time-barred in view of Article 136 of the Limitation Act read with
      Section 24 of the RDB Act. We cannot but comment that it is the
      Bank itself which is to blame because after its first Execution
      Petition was dismissed on 23.8.1990 it should have immediately
      thereafter filed a second Execution Petition, but instead it filed        C
      the second Execution Petition only in 1994 which was dismissed
      on 18.8.1994. Thereafter, again, the Bank waited for 5 years and
      it was only on 1.4.1999 that it filed its third Execution Petition. We
      fail to understand why the Bank waited from 1990 to 1994 and
      again from 1994 to 1999 in filing its Execution Petitions. Hence, it      D
      is the Bank which is responsible for not getting the decree executed
      well in time.”
      In the case before this Court, the claim made by the Bank was
      found to be time barred and to that this Court observed that while
      the equity is in favour of the Bank, the law is not in favour of the      E
      borrower, however, since the claim is time barred, as the execution
      petition was barred by the limitation, this court set-aside as such
      the execution petition.
        10.3 In the case of Popat Bahiru Govardhane & Others
(supra), this Court has observed and held that it is a settled legal position   F
that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has
to be applied with all its rigour when the Statute so prescribes. The
Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
It is further observed that the statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to
enforce it by giving full effect to the same.                                   G
       11. It is also required to be noted that even Shri Maninder Singh,
learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has, as such,
fairly conceded that considering Section 61(2) of the IBCode, the
Appellate Tribunal has jurisdiction or power to condone the delay not
                                                                                H
1040            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 7 S.C.R.


 A     exceeding 15 days from the completion of 30 days, the statutory period
       of limitation. However, has requested and prayed to condone the delay
       in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, in
       the facts and circumstances of the case and submitted that the amount
       involved is a very huge amount and that the appellant is a public body.
       We are afraid what cannot be done directly considering the statutory
 B
       provisions cannot be permitted to be done indirectly, while exercising the
       powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
                11.1 At this stage, decision of this Court in the case of Oil &
       Natural Gas Corporation Limited (supra) is required to be referred
       to. Before this Court, the question was with respect to delay beyond
 C     120 days in preferring the appeal under Section 125 of the Electricity
       Act and the question arose whether the delay beyond 120 days in
       preferring the appeal is condonable or not. After considering various
       earlier decisions of this Court on the point and considering the language
       used in Section 125 [2] of the Electricity Act which provided that delay
 D     beyond 120 days is not condonable, this Court has observed and held
       that it is not condonable and it cannot be condoned, even taking recourse
       to Article 142 of the Constitution. While observing and holding so in
       para-16, this Court has observed and held as under:-
             “16. From the aforesaid decisions, it is clear as crystal that the
 E           Constitution Bench inSupreme Court Bar Association [AIR 1988
             SC 1895] [Supra] has ruled that there is no conflict of opinion in
             Antulay’s case [AIR 1988 SC 1531] or in Union Carbide
             Corporation’s case with the principle set-down in Prem Chand
             Garg & Anr. v. Excise Commissioner, AIR 1963 SC 996. Be it
             noted, when there is a statutory command by the legislation as
 F           regards limitation and there is the postulate that delay can be
             condoned for a further period not exceeding sixty days, needless
             to say, it is based on certain underlined, fundamental, general issues
             of public policy as has been held in Union Carbide Corporation’s
             case. As the pronouncement om Chhattisgarh State Electricity
 G           Board [AIR 2010 SC 2061] (Supra) lays down quite clearly that
             the policy behind the Act emphasizing on the constitution of a
             special adjudicatory forum, is meant to expeditiously decide the
             grievances of a person who may be aggrieved by an order of the
             adjudicatory officer or by an appropriate Commission. The Act is
             a special legislation within the meaning of Section 29 (2) of the
 H
 NATIONAL SPOT EXCHANGE LTD. v. MR. ANIL KOHLI, RESOLUTION                      1041
     PROFESSIONAL FOR DUNAR FOODS LTD. [M. R. SHAH, J.]


      Limitation Act and, therefore, the prescription with regard to the        A
      limitation has to be the binding effect and the same has to be
      followed regard being had to its mandatory nature. To put it in a
      different way, the prescription of limitation in a case of present
      nature, when the statute commands that this Court may condone
      the further delay not beyond 60 days, it would come within the
                                                                                B
      ambit and sweep of the provisions and policy of legislation. It is
      equivalent to Section 3 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, it is
      uncondonable and it cannot be condoned taking recourse to Article
      142 of the Constitution.”
       11.2 In the case of Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. U.T. Chandigarh,
reported in (2004) 2 SCC 130, in paragraphs 36 & 37, it is observed as          C
under:
      “36. We have no doubt in our mind that sympathy or sentiment by
      itself cannot be a ground for passing an order in relation whereto
      the appellants miserably fail to establish a legal right. It is further
      trite that despite an extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction           D
      contained in Article 142 of the Constitution of India, this Court
      ordinarily would not pass an order which would be contravention
      of a statutory provision.
      37. As early as in 1911, Farwell, L.J. In Latham v. Richard
      Johnson & Nephew Ltd. (1911-12) All ER Rep 117 observed:                  E
      (All ER p. 123E)
          “We must be very careful not to allow our sympathy with
          the infant plaintiff to affect our judgment. Sentiment is a
          dangerous will o’ the wisp to take as a guide in the search
          for legal principles”                                                 F
      Thus, considering the statutory provisions which provide that delay
beyond 15 days in preferring the appeal is uncondonable, the same cannot
be condoned even in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the
Constitution.
                                                                                G
       12. In view of the afore-stated settled proposition of law and even
considering the fact that even the certified copy of the order passed by
the adjudicating authority was applied beyond the period of 30 days and
as observed hereinabove there was a delay of 44 days in preferring the
appeal which was beyond the period of 15 days which maximum could
have been condoned and in view of specific statutory provision contained        H
1042                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 7 S.C.R.


 A     in Section 61(2) of the IB Code, it cannot be said that the NCLAT has
       committed any error in dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation
       by observing that it has no jurisdiction and/or power to condone the
       delay exceeding 15 days.
              13. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, no
 B     interference of this Court is called for. The present appeal fails and
       deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. However, in the
       facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.


       Ankit Gyan                                                Appeal dismissed.
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