NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.versusKESHAV BAHADUR AND ORS.

                   NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.                                   A
                                      V.
                     KESHA V BA HAD UR AND ORS.

                           JANUARY 20, 2004

          (DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.]                              B


      Motor Vehicles Act, 1939:

       Section 95-Third party risk-liability of insurer to pay compensation-
Extent of-Held: liability of insurer is limited-However, in view of specific C
clause in the insurance policy making insurer's liability higher than the statutory
liability and proof of payment of additional higher premium, liability of the
insurer can be higher than the statuto1y liability-On facts, insurance policy
indicating limit of liability in respect of one claim or series of claims as
Rs.50,000-lnsured not paying any additional premium for any enhanced D
liability-Hence, liability limited to Rs. 50,000.

      Section llOCC (corresponding to Section 171 of the 1988 Act)-
Stipulation of higher rate of interest in case of default-Justification of-
Held: Once the discretion conferred by Section 11 OCC on Tribunal to award
interest on the compensation amount at a particular rate is exercised there is   E
no scope for retrospective enhancement of interest for default in payment.

     Admini.•trative Law-Action-Discretion-Manner of exercise a/-
Discussed.

       H died in a road accident and his sons filed a claim petition under F
Motor Vehicles Act. In the insurance policy, limit of insurer's liability in
respect of any one claim or series of claims arising out of one event was
Rs.50,000/- and premium was paid as third party insurance premium.
Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs. 72,000 with interest at the rate of
12% per annum 'to be paid within 60 days by the insurer and in default
the rate of interest was to be 18% per annum. Appellant-insurer contended G
that its liability was limited to Rs. 50,000 and there could be no stipulation
for default rate. High Court upheld the order regarding the compensation
amount and also reduced the interest rate from 12'Yo to 9%. However, it
recorded no finding regar(ling legality of default rate. Hence the present
                                     861                                         II
    862                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2004) I S.C.R.

A appeal.
           Appellant-insurer contended that the liability statutorily lixed in
    respect of third party risk was at the relevant point of time Rs. 50,000 for
    which Rs. 240 was paid as premium; that when extra premium was not
    paid for any enhanced liability, nothing beyond the statutorily fixed
B   liability of Rs.50,000/- which was the maximum could have been awarded;
    that pursuant to the order insurer deposited Rs. 50,000; that neither the
    Tribunal nor the High Court could have stipulated any penal interest as
    there is no provision therefor; and that the only provision relating to
    interest is Section ll 0 CC of the Act.

c         Allowing the appeal, the Court

           HELD: I. The liability of the insurer is limited as indicated in Section
    95 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 1939. However, it is open to the insured to
    make payment of additional higher premium and for insurer to accept
D   higher risk covered in respect of third party also for which there should
    be presence of such clause in the insurance policy and proof of payment
    of additional premium, otherwise the liability of the insurer cannot be
    unlimited in respect of third party and it is limited only to the statutory
    liability. Furthermore, in case insurer-appellant does not take any higher
    liability by accepting higher premium for payment of compensation to
E   third party, the liability is neither unlimited nor higher than the statutory
    liability lixed under Section 95(2) of the Act. Therefore, in the instant case,
    the liability of the appellant-insurer is limited to Rs. 50,000.
                                                          1865-D, E, H; 866-A-DI

          New India Assurance Company Limited v. Shanti Bai, 119951 2 SCC
F   539; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jugal Kishore, [19881 1 SCC 626 and
    New India Assurance Co. ltd v. C.M Jaya and Ors., 120021 2 SCC 278,
    referred to.

          2.1. The grant of higher rate of interest under Section llOCC of
G Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 corresponding to Section 171 of the 1988 Act is
    discretionary and cannot be bound by rules. It is meant to be exercised in
    cases where the claimant can claim the same as a matter of right. The
    purpose for award of interest is to put pressure on the relevant person
    not to delay in making the payment; and to compensate the victim or his
    dependents at least to some extent for such delay as may occur, by way of
H   interest. Even though the expression 'may' is used, a duty is laid on the
         NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. KESHAV BAHADUR [ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.)   863
       Tribunal to consider the question of interesfseparately with due regard      A
       to the facts and circumstances of the case. [866-E-GJ

             2.2. It is to be judged whether a stipulation for higher rate of interest
       in case of default can be imposed by the Tribunal. Once the discretion
       has been exercised by the Tribunal to award simple interest on the amount
       of compensation to be awarded at a particular rate and from a particular B
       date, there is no scope for retrospective enhancement for default in
       payment of compensation. No express or implied power in this regard can
       be culled out from Section llOCC of 1939 Act or Section 171 of the 1988
       Act. Such a direction in the award for retrospective enhancement of
       int~rest for default in payment of the compensation together with interest C
       payable thereon virtually amounts to imposition of penalty which is not
       statutorily envisaged and prescribed. Therefore, it is directed that the rate
       of interest as awarded by the High Court shall alone be applicable till
--;"
       payment, without the stipulation for higher rate of interest being enforced,
       in the manner directed by the Tribunal. (868-E-HJ
                                                                                    D
             Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR (1952) SC 16; S.P.
       Gupta and Ors. v. President of India and Ors.. AIR (1982) SC 149 and S.G.
       Jaisinghani v. Union of India and Ors., AIR (1967) SC 1427, relied on.

            Julius v. Bishop of Oxford, (1880) 5 AC 214; Hindson and Kersey,
       (16801 8 How, St Tr. 57; Lee v. Budge Railway Co., (1871( LR 6 CP 576        E
       and Morgan v. Morgan, 11869(, LR 1 P & M 644 and Sharp v. Wakefield,
       (18911 Appeal Cases 173, referred to.

               Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. I referred to.

               CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION ·: Civil Appeal No. 399 of              F
       2004.

            From the Judgment and Order dated 1.2.2000 of the Jharkhand High
       Court at Ranchi in A.0.0. No. 127 of 1977.

               M.K. Dua for the Appellant.                                          G
               The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

               ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. Leave granted.

               National Insurance Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as 'the H
    864                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     (2004] I S.C.R.

A insurer') questions legality of the judgment of a Division Bench of the
    Jharkhand High Court holding that the insurer has to pay the compensation
    of Rs. 72,000 awarded to the legal representatives of one Hasta Bahadur
    (hereinafter referred to as 'the deceased') who lost his life in a vehicular
    accident on 5.6.1987. The deceased was working as a Chowkidar of Hyde!
    Project, Sikidri. A claim petition was filed by his sons under Section I JOA
B   of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 (in short 'the Act'). The Motor Vehicle
    Accidents Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') awarded
    compensation of Rs. 72,000 along with interest @ 12% per annum. The
    amount was directed to be paid within 60 days. It was further directed that          ).
    in case of failure to pay within 60 days, the rate of interest would be 18%.
C   The insurer questioned the legality of the direction that the whole amount of
    compensation was to be paid by the insurer; and the direction regarding
    default rate of interest. According to it, the liability was limited to Rs.50,000/
    - In terms of Section 95(2)(b)(i) of the Act; and there was no legal basis for
    the default rate. Though these points were specifically urged before the
    Tribunal, no definite finding was recorded. Similar was the situation so far
D   as the High Court is concerned. Though it dealt with the question of interest
    and reduced the rate from 12%, as awarded by the Tribunal, to 9% per
    annum, no finding was recorded regarding legality of default rate.

           Learned counsel for the appellant-insurer submitted that the liability
E   statutorily fixed in respect of third party risk was at the relevant point of time
    Rs.50,000/-. With reference to copy of the policy of insurance, which was
    produced before the Tribunal and the High Court it is pointed out that a sum
    of Rs. 240 was paid as the third party insurance premium. The limits of
    liability were also indicated in the following terms:

F         "limits of Liability:

           (a) Limit of the amount of the Company's liability under Section II-
               I (i) in respect of any one accident.
                Such amount as is necessary to meet the requirements of the
                Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
G
           (b) Limit of Amount of the Company's Liability under Section 11-
               l((ii) in respect of any one claim or series of claims arising out
               of the one event: Rs. 50,000.

          In the Schedule of premium under the heading B. "LIABILITY TO
H PUBLIC RISK" it was indicated to be Rs. 240. The stand in essence, therefore,
           NATIONAL INSURANCE CO.LTD. v. KESHA V BAHADUR [ARIJIT PASAYA T, .I.]    865
        is that when extra premium, if'any, is not paid, for any enhanced liability, the A
        statutorily fixed liability of Rs. 50,000 was the maximum that could have
        been awarded and nothing beyond it. It is also submitted that the High Court
        had directed payment of the amount within a particular time with the default
        stipulation of higher penal interest @ 18% p.a. It took note of the fact that
        pursuant to the order dated 23.2.1998 insurer deposited Rs.50,000/- on
        6.3.1998. It was pointed out that neither the Tribunal nor the High Court B
        could have stipulated any penal interest as was done. The High Court directed
        payment of the balance amount of compensation with interest and had
        stipulated that in case insurer does not pay the balance amount with interest
        at the rate indicated in the judgment penal interest@ 18% was to be paid.
        It was submitted that there is no provision for any penal interest. The only C
        provision relating to interest !s Section I IOCC of the Act.

              There is no response by the respondents in spite of the service of
        notice.

                The liability of the insurer is limited as indicated in Section 95 of the D
        Act. But it is open to the insured to make payment of additional higher
        premium and for insurer to accept higher risk covered in respect of third
        party also. But in the absence of any such clause in the insurance policy, and
        proof of payment of additional premium the liability of the insurer cannot be
        unlimited in respect of third party and it is limited only to the statutory
        liability. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in New India Assurance Company E
        limited v. Shanti Bai, [1995] 2 SCC 539 held as follows:

                "(i) a comprehensive policy which has been issued on the basis of the
                estimated value of the vehicle does not automatically result in covering
                the liability with regard to third-party risk for an amount higher than    F
.....           the statutory limit,

               (ii) that even though it is not permissible to use a vehicle unless it is
               covered at least under an "Act only" policy, it is not obligatory for
               the owner of a vehicle to get it comprehensively insured, and

               (iii) that the limit of liability with regard to third-party risk does not G
               become unlimited or higher than the statutory liability in the absence
               of specific agreement to make the insurer's liability unlimited or
               higher than the statutory liability."

              In case insurer-appellant not taking any higher liability by accepting
        higher premium, the liability is neither unlimited nor higher than the statutory H
    866                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2004] I S.C.R.

A liability fixed under Section 95(2) of the Act. Even if a vehicle is the subject
  matter of comprehensive insurance and a higher premium is paid on that
  score, limits of the liability with regard to third party risk does not become
  unlimited or higher beyond the statutory liability fixed. For this purpose, a
  specific agreement has to be arrived at between the insured and the insurer
  and separate premium has to be paid in respect of additional amount of
B liability undertaken by the insurer in that regard. This position was highlighted
  by this Court in National Insurance Co. ltd. v. Jugal Kishore, [1988] I SCC
  626. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd v. C.M. Jaya and Ors., [2002] 2 SCC
  278 a Constitution Bench approved the view taken in Shanti Bai (supra) and
  Jugal Kishore (supra). It was held that in case of insurer not taking any
C higher liability by accepting higher premium for payment of compensation to
  third party, the insurer would be liable to the extent limited under Section
  95(2) of the Act and would not be liable to pay the entire amount of
  compensation awarded.

          The inevitable conclusion on the factual backgrounds is that the liability
D of the insurer-appellant is limited to Rs. 50,000. The residual question is
  whether there could be any stipulation of penal rate of interest as done by the
  Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court. So far as the higher rate of interest
  stipulation is concerned, it is to be noted that grant of interest under Section
   l IOCC of the Act (corresponding to Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
E 1988) (in short the 'new Act') is discretionary. The purpose for award of
  interest is to put pressure on the relevant person not to delay in making the
  payment; and, to compensate the victim or his dependents at least to some
  extent for such delay as may occur, by way of interest. In determining the
  quantum of interest awardable under the relevant Section, the Tribunal acting
  under Section 110 of the Act corresponding to Section 166 of the new Act
F can derive direct guidance from Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  1908 (in short the 'CPC'). In fact, the provisions require payment of interest
  in addition to compensation already determined. Even though the expression
  'may' is used, a duty is laid on the Tribunal to consider the question of
  interest separately with due regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.
G The provision is discretionary and is not and cannot be bound by rules. In the
  words of Lord Cairns, L.C. in Julius v. Bishop of Oxford, (1880) 5 AC 214,
  "But there may be something in the nature of the thing empowered to be
  done, something in the object for which it is to be done, something in the
  conditions under which it is to be done, something in the title of person or
  persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised, which may couple the
H power with a duty, and make it the duty of the person in whom· the power
   NATIONAL INSURANCE CO.LTD. v. KESHA V BAHADUR [ARIJIT PASA YAT, J.)   867
is reposed to exercise that power when called upon to do so". This classic A
observation has been quoted with approval by this Court in several cases.
(See Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR (1952) SC 16 and
S.P. Gupta and Ors. v. President of India and Ors., AIR (1982) SC 149. In
Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol.I, it has been observed:-

      Para 28: Duty and discretion.                                             B
      xxx           xxx                xxx

           "A statutory discretion is not, however, necessarily or, indeed,
       usually absolute; it may be qualified by express and implied legal
       duties to comply with substantive and procedural requirements before C
       a decision is taken whether to act and how to act. Moreover, there
       may be a discretion whether to exercise a power, but no discretion as
       to the mode of its exercise; or a duty to act when certain conditions
       are present, but a discretion how to act. Discretion may thus be coupled
       with duties".
                                                                                D
      Discretion, in general, is the discernment of what is right and proper.
It denotes knowledge and prudence, that discernment which enables a person
to judge critically of what is correct and proper united with caution; nice
discernment, and judgment directed by circumspection; deliberate judgment;
soundness of judgment; a science or understanding to discern between falsity E
and truth, between wrong and right, between shadow and substance, between
equity and colorable glosses and pretences, and not to do according to the
will and private affections of persons. When it is said that something is to be
done within the discretion of the authorities, that something is to be done
according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion;
according to law and not humour. It is to be not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, F
but legal and regular. And it must be exercised within the limit, to which an
honest man, competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself
(Per Lord Halsbury, L.C., in Sharp v. Wakefield, (1891) Appeal Cases 173).
Also (See S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India and Ors., AIR (1967) SC 1427.

       The word "discretion" standing single and unsupported by circumstances G
signifies exercise of judgment, skill or wisdom as distinguished from folly,
unthinking or haste; evidently therefore a discretion cannot be arbitrary but
must be a result of judicial thinking. The word in itself implies vigilant
circumspection and care; therefore where the legislature concedes discretion
it also imposes a heavy responsibility.                                       H
    868                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2004] I S.C.R.

A          "The discretion of a Judge is the 'Jaw of tyrants; it is always unknown.      >·
    It is different in different men. It is casual, and depends upon constitution,
    temper, passion. In the best it is often times caprice; in the worst it is every
    vice, folly, and passion to which human nature is liable," said (Lord Camden,
    L.C.J., in Hind~;on and Kersey (1680) 8 How, St. Tr.57.)

B         If a certain latitude or liberty accorded by statute or rules to a judge as
    distinguished from a ministerial or administrative official, in adjudicating on
    matters brought before him, it is judicial discretion. It limits and regulates the
    exercise of the discretion, and prevents it from being wholly absolute,
    capricious, or exempt from review.
c          Such discretion is usually given on matters of procedure or punishment,
    or costs of administration rather than with reference to vested substantive
    rights. The matters which should regulate the exercise of discretion have
    been stated by eminent judges in somewhat different forms of words but with
    substantial identity. When a statute gives a judge a discretion, what is meant
D   is a judicial discretion, regulated according to the known rules of law, and
    not the mere whim or caprice of the person to whom it is given on the
    assumption that he is discreet (Per Willes J. in Lee v. Budge Railway Co.,
    (1871) LR 6 CP 576, and in Morgan v. Morgan, (!869), LR I P & M 644.

          Though Section I IOCC of the Act (corresponding to Section 171 of the
E New Act) confei·s a discretion on the Tribunal to award interest, the same is
    meant to be exercised in cases where the claimant can claim the same as a
    matter ofright. In the above background, it is to be judged whether a stipulation
    for higher rate of interest in case of default can be imposed by the Tribunal.
    Once the discretion has been exercised by the Tribunal to award simple
F   interest on the amount of compensation to be awarded at a particular rate and
    from a particular date, there is no scope for retrospective enhancement for
    default in payment of compensation. No express or implied power in this
    regard can be culled out from Section I IOCC of the Act or Section 171 of
    the new Act. Such a direction in the award for retrospective enhancement of
    interest for default in payment of the compensation together with interest
G   payable thereon virtually amounts to imposition of penalty which is not
    statutorily envisaged and prescribed. It is, therefore directed that the rate of
    interest as awarded by the High Court shall alone be ,applicable till payment,
    without the stipulation for higher rate of interest being enforced, in the manner
    directed by the Tribunal.

H         The insurer cannot withhold the awarded amount indefinitely. In the
  NATIONAL INSURANCE CO.LTD.''· KESHAV BA HA DUR [ARIJIT PASA YAT, J.]   869
circumstances, we direct that interest@ 9% per annum on the sum of Rs,50,000 A
which is the liability of the insurer; from the date of claim till 63,] 998, be
paid within a period of three months from today, if not already paid or
deposited before the Tribunal/High Court The appeal is allowed to the extent
indicated, without any order as to costs,

NJ,                                                        Appeal allowed,     B