Holding

The amendment to Section 80P(2)(a)(iii) is constitutionally valid and may operate retrospectively.

Summary

The appellants, a group of co‑operative societies, had been claiming deductions under Section 80P(2)(a)(iii) of the Income‑Tax Act for profits earned from marketing agricultural produce of their members. After the Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in Assam Co‑operative case interpreting "of its members" as "produced by", the Court later overruled this in the 1998 Kerala Co‑operative case, interpreting the phrase as "belonging to". Subsequently, Parliament amended the provision by the Income‑Tax (Second Amendment) Act, 1999, substituting "of" with "grown by" and making the change retrospective to 1 April 1968, thereby restricting the deduction to produce actually grown by members. The societies challenged the amendment as unconstitutional, arguing it imposed a new tax burden for the past 30 years, violated Articles 19(1)(g) and 14, and amounted to legislative overruling of a Supreme Court decision without removing its statutory basis. The Supreme Court held that Parliament has the competence to amend statutes retrospectively provided the intention is clear, the retrospectivity is reasonable and not excessive, and the amendment does not seek to revive time‑barred assessments. The Court found the financial impact minimal and the amendment constitutionally valid, dismissing the appeal.

Issues considered

The constitutionality of the retrospective amendment to Section 80P(2)(a)(iii) of the Income‑Tax Act, 1961.
Whether Parliament can withdraw a tax exemption retrospectively and affect assessments already finalized.
Whether the amendment violates Articles 19(1)(g) and 14 of the Constitution.
Whether the amendment amounts to legislative overruling of a Supreme Court decision without removing its statutory basis.
Whether the amendment authorises reopening of assessments barred by limitation.

Legislation cited

Income Tax Act, 1961s. 80P(2)(a)(iii), s. 81

Subjects

Income TaxRetrospective legislationSection 80PCo‑operative societiesTax exemptionConstitutional validityLegislative powerCurative legislationJudicial overrulingLimitation period

Judgment

NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING A
FEDERATION OF INDIA LTD. AND ANR.
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

MARCH 25, 2003
B
[RUMA PAL AND B.N. SRIKRISHNA, JJ.]

Income Tax Act, 1961: Section 80 P(2)(a)(iii) with amendment in the Act
(Act No. 11 of 1999): C
Exemption-Profits and gains earned by Co-operative Societies marketing
agricultural produce-Grant of deductions thereof-Amendment-Restriction
of benefit of exemption to marketing of agricultural produce grown by its
members-Retrospective effect-Constitutionality-Challenge to-Writ petition
dismissed by High Court-On appeal, held since legislature is competent to D
amend the enacted law with retrospective effect, amendment is valid-The
degree and extent of the unforeseeable financial burden being minimal, such
amendment cannot be termed unreasonable/unconstitutional-Income Tax Act,
1922-Section 81.

Constitution of India, 1950: E
Legislative power-Curative legislation-Judicial decision final inter
parties cannot be set at naught by curative legislation.

Words and Phrases.
F
'Curative legislation' and 'Validating Act'-Meaning of

Appellant-Societies had been granted deductions on profits earned
by them from marketing of agricultural produce under Section 80
P(2)(a)(iii) of the Income Tax Act. Apex Court and High Court in various
decided cases also construed the provision of law accordingly. However, G
the view was reversed by the apex court in Assam Co-operative Marketing
Society v. CIT (Addi.), 201 ITR 338 SC; 119941 Supp. 2 SCC 96 holding
that the object of Sec.80 P was to encourage basic level societies. Therefore,
the phrase "produce of its members" must refer to agricultural produce
produced by its members. Thereafter, a larger Bench, in Kera/a Co- H
I
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 3 S.C.R.

A operative Marketing Federation Ltd. and Ors. v. CIT. 231 ITR 814; 119981 S
sec 48, overruled earlier decision holding that legislature did not intend '
to restrict the scope of exemption only to primary societies but to all
societies marketing ugricultural produce of its members. Soon after, Sec.80
P(2)(a)(iii) was amended with retrospective effect by the Income Tax
B Second Amendment Act 1999(Act No. 11 of 1999) restricting the scope of
deduction only to the profits d1~rived by Co-operative Societies engaged
in the marketing of agricultural produce grown by its members. Aggrieved
appellants challenged the constitutional validity of such amendment and
sought relief to restrict its operation with prospective effect. High Court
dismissed the writ petition, holding legislature competent to take away
C benefit by the amendment in the Act. However, it recorded the statement
of the Solicitor-General that the amendment would be applied to pending
assessments only. Hence the present appeal.

It was contended for the appellants that amendments cannot have
retrospectiv1: operation without validating provision; that Parliament
D cannot reverse the judgment of Apex Court by incorporating amendments
in the Act; that since tax had been imposed for earlier years by making
such amendment effective retrospectively, it is unconstitutional; and that
by denial of such deduction, Societies/farmers would be affected adversely.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court
E
HELD: I.I. Legislative powt'r either to introduce enactments for the
first time or to amend the enacted law with retrospective effect, is not only
subject to the question of competence but is also subject to several
judicially recognized limitations. The first is the requirement that the
F words used must expressly provide or clearly imply retrospective
operation. The second is that the retrospectivity must be reasonable and
not excessive or harsh, otherwise it runs the risk of being struck down as
unconstitutional. The third is apposite where the legislation is introduced
to overcome a judicial decision. Here the power cannot be used to subvert
the decision without removing the statutory basis of the decision.110.E, fl
G
S.S. Gadgil v. Mis. Lal & Cu. AIR (1965) SC 171; J.C. Jani, Income
Tax Officer, Circle-IV, Ward-G Ahmedabadv. lnduprasad Devshanker Bhatt,
AIR 1969 SC 778; Rai Ramkrishnu and Ors. v. The Stale of Bihar. 119641 I
SCR 897; Jawaharma/ v. State of'Rafasthan and Ors., 1196611SCR890 aml
Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association v. Union of India and Anr ..
H 119891 3 sec 488, relied on. \
J
NATIONAL AGRI. CO-OPERATl VE MKT. FED. OF !NOIA LTD. v. U.0.l. 3
1.2. There is no fixed formula for the expression of legislative intent A
to give retrospectivity to an enactment. This is done either by providing
for jurisdiction where jurisdiction had not been properly invested before
or by re-enacting retrospectively a valid and legal taxing provision and
then by fiction making the tax already collected to stand under the re-
enacted law or the Legislature gives its own meaning and interpretation B
of the law under which tax was collected and by legislative fiat makes the
new meaning binding upon courts. The Legislature may follow any one
method or all of them. A validating clause coupled with a substantive
statutory change is only one of the methods to leave actions unsustaiJJable
under the unamended statute, undisturbed. Consequently, the absence of
a validating clause would not by itself affect the retrospective operation C
of the statutory provision, if such retrospectivity is otherwise apparent.
[11-A, B[

Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills v. Broach Borough Municipality, [1969] 2 SCC
283, relied on.
D
1.3. Overruling assumes that a contrary decision is given on the same
facts or law. Where the law, as in this case, has been changed and is no
I
longer the same, there is no question of the legislature overruling this
Court. Once the circumstances are altered by Legislation, it may neutralise
the effect of the earlier decision of the Court which becomes ineffective
after the change of the law. fl 1-E, F; 12-G] E

State of Tamil Nadu v. Arroran Sugar Mills, [1997] I SCC 326,
followed .
•
Ujagar Prints v. Union of India, [198913 SCC 488; Shri Prithvi Collon
Mills v. Broach Borough Municipality, 11969] 2 SCC 283; Mis. Krishnamurthi F
& Co. v. State of Madras and Anr., [1973] 2 SCR 54 and Government of
Andhra Pradesh v. Hindustan Machine Tools, [19751 2 SCC 274, relied on.

1.4. The decision in S.R. Bhagwat* is an authority for the principle
that a judicial decision which has become final inter partes cannot be set G
at naught by legislative action, a principle that is well entrenched. This
principle, however does not in any way detract from the principle that
the Legislature may "cure" the statute so that it more correctly represents
its intention. Such curative legislation does not in fact touch the validity
of a judicial decision which may have attained finality albeit under the
pre-amended law. [14-H; 15-A, Bf H
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 3 S.C.R.

A *S.R. Bhagwat v. State of M)•sore, (1995) 6 SC 16 paras 12, 15, 18
and Re: Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, 119931 Supp. I SCC 96, relied •
on.

2.1. In the instant case, by the impugned amendment, the legislature
has substituted the word 'or which occurred in Section 80P(2)(a)(iii) of
B the Income Tax Act and which had been construed by this Court as
"belonging to" with the phrase "grown by". The clear effect of the
substitution, in keeping with general principles relating to amendments,
would be that Section 80P(2)(a)(iii) must be read as if the substituted
phrase were included from the date the section was introduced in the
C statute. ll l-DI

Ujagar Prints v. Union of India. 119891 3 SCC 488, referred to.

2.2. The main thrust of the appellant's argument has been to the
constitutionality of the amendment by pleas as to the substitution of the
D phrase "grown by" in Section 80P(2)(a)(iii) of the Act to operate from ..
1968, amounts to a new levy and an unforeseen financial burden imposed
on Apex Societies like the appellant with effect from the past 30 yeats. If
this were so doubtless the Court may have considered the amendment to
be excessively and unreasonably retrospective violating the appellants'
fundamental rights under Articles l9(1)(g) and 14 of the Constitution. But
E in fact the grievance is unfounded. 115-C, DI

Ujagar Prints v. Union of India, [ 19891 3 SCC 488, refered to.

2.3. The test of the length of time covered by the retrospective
operation cannot by itself, necessarily be a decisive test. Account must be
F taken of the surrounding facts and circumstances relating to the taxation
and the legislative background of the provision. 115-EI

Rai Ramkrishna and Ors. v. The State of Bihar, 1196411 SCR 897 and
Jawaharma/ v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., I19661 I SCR 890, relied on.

G 2.4. The first authoritative interpr1~tation of Section 80P(2)(a)(iii) was
made in 1994 in Assam Cooperatives* when the Apex Court held that the
word "of' must be construed as "produced by". Therefore, the law as it
stood since 1968 was by this decision, required to be read in precisely this
manner and presumably assessments of Apex Societies were commenced
H and conluded on this basis. The situation continued till 1998 till this Court
NATIONAL AGRI. CO-OPERATIVE MKT. FED. OF INDIA LTD. v. U.0.1. 5
reversed Assam Cooperatives in Kera/a Cooperative Marketing Federation A
ltd•. Before the assessment year was over, by the 1998 Amendment the
word "or' was substituted with "grown by" in real terms therefore there
was hardly any retrospectivity, but a continuation of the status quo ante.
The degree and extent of the unforeseen and unforeseeable financial
burden was, in the circumstances, minimal and cannot be unreasonable B
or unconstitutional. (15-F; 16-A, BJ

Assam Co-operative Marketing Society v. CIT (Addi.), 201, ITR 338 SC;
(1994) Supp. 2 SCC 96 and Kerala Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd.
and Ors. v. CIT, 231 ITR 814; ( 1998( 5 SCC 48, relied on.

3.1. In any event the 1998 amendment cannot be construed as c
authorizing the Revenue authorities to reopen assessments when the
reopening is already barred by limitation. The amendment does not seek
to touch on the periods of limitation provided in the Act, and in the absence
of any sucf> express provision or clear implication, the legislature clearly
could not be taken to intend that the amending provision authorises the D
Income-tax Officer to commence proceedings which before the new Act
came into force, had by the expiry of the period provided become barred.
(16-C, DJ

S.S. Gadgil v. Mis. Lal & Co., AIR (1965) SC 171; J.C. Jani, Income
Tax Officer, Circle-JV, Ward-G Ahmedabad v. Jnduprasad Devshanker Bhatt, E
AIR (1969) SC 778 and K.M. Sharma v. Income Tax Officer, Ward 13(7),
New Delhi, (2002] 4 SCC 339, relied on.

3.2. The plea as to the possible adverse economic impact of the
amendment on farmers and primary societies is not a consideration which
is relevant to a decision on its validity - particularly when neither the F
factual basis for such assertion is laid nor these persons appeared in the
matter. (16-F; 17-A)

CIVIL APPEL LA TE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6170 of 2001.

From the Judgment and Order dated 16.2.2001 of the Delhi High Court G
in C.W. No. 1003 of 1999.

K. Parasaran, G. Umapathy, Pradeep Ranjan Tiwary and Rakesh K.
Sharma for the Appellants.

R.P. Bhatt, K.C. Kaushik and B.V.B. Das, for the Respondents. H
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 3 S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RUMA PAL, J. The appellant No. I is aco-operative society registered
under the Multi State Co-operative Societies Act. 1984 with its registered
office in Delhi. It is the apex society of a chain of Co-operative Societies
whid1 operate at different territorial levels. The chain starts with the farmers
B who become members of village co-operative societies. the village societies
becomemembers of primary marke1ing co-operative societies (District
Societies) and District Societies become members of the State Co-operative
Societies (Apex Societies).

The issue raised by the appellants relates to the construction and
C Constitutional validity of section 80 P (2) (a) (iii) of the Income Tax Act,
I 96 I and grant of deduction of the profits made by societies by the marketing
of agricultural produce.

Under the Income Tax Act, I 922 ( hereinafter referred to as the I 922
Act) exemption was granted in respect of profits and gains of business of co-
D operative societies including societie:s engaged in the marketing of the
agricultural produce of its members. The Income Tax Act, I 96 I continued
this exemption under Section SI (I) (1~) which read: .

"8 I. Income of co-operative societies.

E Income-tax shall not be payable by a cooperative society-

(i) in respect of the profits and gains of business carried on by it, if
it is

(a) xxx xxx xxx xxx
F (b) xxx xxx xxx xxx

(c) a society engaged in the marketing of the agricultural produce of
its members".

By the Finance Act ( No. II ) I 967, Section 8 I was omitted and its
G provisions re-enacted as Section SOP of the I 961 Act. The relevant extract of
Section SOP is :

"SO-P (I) Where, in the case of an assessee being a co-operative
society, the gross total income includes any income referred to in
sub-section (2), there shall be deducted, in accordance with and subject
H to the provisions of this section, the sums specified in sub-section (2),
NATIONAL AGRI. co-orERATIVE MKT. FED. OF INDIA LTD. v. U.0.1. [RUMA rAL,J.] 7
in computing the total income of the assessee. A
(2) The sums referred to in sub-section (i) shall be the following
namely:-

(a) in the case of a co-operative society engaged in

(i) xxx xxx xxx B
(ii) xxx xxx xxx

(iii) the marketing of the agricultural produce of its members, or

(iv) xxx xxx xxx c
(v) xxx xxx xxx

(vi) xxx xxx xxx

(vii) the whole of the amount of profits and gains of business
attributable to any one or more of such activities". D
(emphasis supplied)

According to the appellant, prior to 1994 several High Courts as well
as this Court had construed Section 8l(l)(c) and Section 80 P (2)(a)(iii) and
held that the benefit of exemption was available to all the co-operative societies E
from the village to the Apex Level. This was also the view taken by the
Kerala High Court as expressed in C/Tv. Kera/a State Cooperative Marketing
Federation. 1 The view was reversed by a Bench of this Court in Assam
_, Cooperative Apex Marketing Society v. CIT (Additional)' when it held that
the object of Section 81 was to encourage basic level societies and that
therefore, the phrase ''produce of its members" must refer to agricultural F
produce actually "produced by its members". It was held that unless this
interpretation were given, co-operative societies of traders would also become
entitled to exemption which could not have been the intention of Parliament.

According to the appellant, as a result of the decision in the Assam Co-
operatives case, the appellant No. I, who had enjoyed the dedt1ction under G
Section 80 P till then, was reassessed to tax on its profits and the assessments
in respect of the assessment year from 1986-87 to 1994-95 were re-opened.

I. 193 JTR 624
2. 201!TR338 SC: [1994] Supp. 2 sec 96 H
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) 3 S.C.R.

A Following the decision of this Court in Assam Co-operatives case (supra),
the Kerala High Court reversed its earlier view while deciding the issue
raised by the Kerala Co-operative: Marketing Federation in respect of a
subsequent year and denied the Kerala Federation the deduction under S.SO
P. The Kerala Federation impugnetl the decision of the High Court under
B Article 136. In these circumstances the view expressed in Assam Cooperatives
came to be re-considered by a larger Bench in I 99S. This Court by its decision
in Kera/a Cooperative Marketing Federation ltd. and Ors. v. Commissioner
of Income 'fax 3 overruled Assam Cooperatives and held that the word 'of' in
Section SOP (2) (a) (iii) had been too restrictively construed in Assam
Cooperatives. On an interpretation of the provisions of Section SOF' and
C having regard to the object with which the provisions had been introduced,
it was held that the legislature did not intend to limit the scope of exemption
only to primary societies and that the phrase 'produce of its members' must
be construed as including any society engaged in marketing agricultural
produce 'belonging to' its members. It said:

D "........ The language adopted in Section SO-P(2)(a)(iii) with which we
are concerned will admit the interpretation that the society engaged
in marketing of agricultural produce of its members as agricultural
produce "belonging to" its members which is not necessarily raised
by such member. Thus, when the provisiom of Section SO-P of the
Act admit of a wider exemption there is no reason to cut down the
E scope of the provision as indicated in Assam Coop. Apex Marketing
Society Case".

This decision was given in December 199S. Immediately thereafter,
Section SOP(2)(a)(iii) was sought to be amended by the Income Tax Act (2nd
p Amendment) Bin No. 169 of I 99S. Clause S of the Bill which is relevant for
our purposes, reads:

"Amendment of section BOP. Jn section SOP of the Income-tax Act,
in sub-section (2), in clause (a), for sub-clause (iii), the following
sub-clause shall be substituted, and shall be deemed to have been
G substituted with effect from the 1st day of April, l 96S, namely: -

(iii) the marketing of agriculi:ural produce grown by its members."

The reason for this amendment has been stated in Clause 6 of the

H 3. 231 ITR 814: [19981ssec4&
NATIONALAGRI CO-OPERATIVE MKT FED. OF INDIA LTD. v. U.0.1. [RUMA PAL. J.] 9
Statement of Objects and Reasons as: A
"6 Clause S seeks to amend section SOP of the Income-tax Act. Under
the existing provision, profits derived by a cooperative society engaged
in the marketing of agricultural produce of its members are fully
deductible in computing the taxable income under Section
SOP(2)(a)(iii) of the Income-tax Act. The deduction was intended for B
primary cooperative societies marketing the agricultural produce of
their farmer members. In the case of Kera/a State Cooperative
Marketing Federation v. Commissioner of Income-tax, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that the use of words "of its members" in the
relevant clause would mean the agricultural produce belonging to the C
members and not necessarily grown by them. The interpretation given
to the use of the words in the provision is not in accordance with the
legislative intent of the existing provision. In respect of income arising
\. from transactions with non-members, the cooperatives are not different
\ from other assessees, and such cooperatives are required to be taxed
in the same manner as companies or other assessees engaged in D
marketing of agricultural produce. If an amendment in section
80P(2)(a)(iii) is not made, it is likely to have serious impact <in
revenues. The proposed amendment, therefore, replaces the words
"of its members" by the words "grown by its members". The
amendment seeks to restrict the deduction to the profits derived by a E
cooperative society engaged in the marketing of agricultural produce
\ grown by its members".
The Bill was passed after obtaining the assent of the President and
became the Income Tax (2nd An1endment) Act, 1999 ( Act No. 11 of 1999).

The appellants impugned this amendment before the Delhi High Court · F
under Article 226. They prayed for a declaration that the 1999 Amendment
Act in so far as it seeks to retrospectively amend Section SOP (2)(a)(iii) of
the Income Tax Act, 1961 was unconstitutional, and for an order to restrain
the respondents from seeking to assess or re-assess the appellant society in
respect of any previous year prior to the date of the enactment of the G
Amendment Act.

The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that the
amendment was valid and that the legislature was competent to retrospectively
take away a benefit granted earlier by an amendment of the law. However,
the Court recorded the statement of the Solicitor General appearing on behalf H
10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) 3 S.C.R.

A of the respondent authorities that the amendment would apply only to
assessment$ which were yet to be finalised.

That the Legislature can enact laws retroactively is not in dispute. Nor
is it disputed that the amendment is intended to be retrospective and that
amendment would at least prospectively exclude all cooperative socit
B except the primary society from the benefit of Section 80 P(2)(a)(iii) of 1e
Income Tnx Act. According to the appellants, the amendment cannot be
considered to have retrospective operation in the absence of a validating
·provision nor could Parliament reverse the judgment of this Court by such
statutory overruling. If the amendment is construed as having retrospective
C operation, then, it is submitted, the amendment is unconstitutional because it
seeks to impose a tax on apex societies for the last 31 years. It was contended
that by denying the deduction to the apex societies, the farmers and the
primary societies would be vitally affected as it would be reflected in the
returns obtained by them. This would be contrary to the legislative intent I
which was to benefit all societie's which market agricultural produce.
D
It is unnecessary to record the submissions of the respondents separately
as they form part of our reasons for dismissing the appeal.

The Legislative power either to introduce enactments for the first time
..
or to amend the enacted law with retrospective effect, is not only subject to
E the question of competence bu~ is also subject to several judicially recognized
limitations with some of which we are at present concerned. The first is the (
requirement that the words used must expressly provide or clearly imply
retrospective operation.' The second is that the retrospectivity must be
reasonable and not excessive or harsh, otherwise it runs the risk of being
p struck down as unconstitutional.' The third is apposite where the legislation
is introduced to overcome a judicial decision. Here the power cannot be used
to subvert the decision without removing the statutory basis of the decision.'

4. S.S. Gadgi/v. Mis. la/ & Co.: AIR( 1965) SC 171, 177: J.C. Jani, Income TaxOjjicer,Circ/e-
IJ~ Ward-G Ahmedabad v.lnduprasad Devshanker Bhatt. AIR ( 19690 SC 778. 781.

G 5. Rai Ramkrishna and Ors. v. The State of Bihaf. (1964] I SCR 897. 915: Jawaharmal v.
State of Rajasthan and Ors.. (196&) I SCR 890, 905: Supreme Court Employees Welfare
Association v. Union of India and Anr., [1989) 3 SCC 488, 517.

6. Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills ltd v. Broach Borough Municipality and Ors., (1969] 2 SCC
283; lalitaben v. Gordhanblrat and Anr.. (1987] Supp. SCC 750 para 15: .lanapada Sabha
Clrhindwara v. Tire Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd. (1970] I SCC 509: Indian Aluminium
H Co. and Ors. v. State of Kera/a and Ors.. ( 1996] 7 sec 637.
NATIONAL AGRI. CO-OPERATIVE MKT. FED. OF INDIA LTD. v. U.0.1. [RUMA PAL,l] 11
There is no fixed formula for the expression of legislative intent to give A
retrospectivity to an enactment. "Sometimes this is done by providing for
jurisdiction where jurisdiction had not been properly invested
before.Sometimes this is done by re-enacting retrospectively a valid and legal
taxing provision and then by fiction making the tax already collected to stand
under the re-enacted law. Sometimes the Legislature gives its own meaning
and interpretation of the law under which tax was collected and by legislative B
fiat makes the new meaning binding upon courts. The Legislature may follow
any one method or all of them".'

A validating clause coupled with a substantive statutory change is
therefore only one of the methods to leave actions unsustainable under the C
unamended statute, undisturbed. Consequently, the absence of a validating
clause would not by itself affect the retrospective operation of the statutory
provision, if such retrospectivity is otherwise apparent.

By the impugned amendment, the legislature has substituted the word
'of which occurred in Section SOP (2)(a)(iii) and which had been construed D
by this Court in 1998 as "belonging to" , with the phrase "grown by". The
clear effect of the substitution, in keeping with general principles relating to
amendments, would be that Section 80P(2)(a)(iii) must be read as if the
substituted phrase were included from the date that the section was introduced
in the statute viz. I st April, J 968.
E
In making this change, the Legislature does not "statutorily overrule"
this Courts decision in Kerala Cooperative Marketing Federation ltd 8 as has
been contended by the appellant. Overruing assumes that a contrary decision
is given on the same facts or law. Where the law, as in this case, has been
changed and is no longer the same, there is no question of the Legislatur~ p
overruling this Court. As has been held in Ujagar Prints v. Union of India,'

"A competent legislature can always validate a law which has been
declared by courts to be invalid, provided the infirmities and vitiating
infactors noticed in the declaratory judgment are removed or cured.
Such a validating law can also be made retrospective.If in the light G

7. Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills v. Broach Borough Municipality, (1969] 2 SCC 283.

8. Supra.

9. (1989]3 sec 488 at 517. H
12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2C'03] 3 S.C.R.
A of such validating and curative exercise made by the legislature
granting legislative competencethe earlier judgment becomes irrelevant
and unenforceable, that cannot be called an impermissible legislative
overruling of the judicial decision.All that the legislature does is to
usher in a valid law with retrospective effect in the light of which the
earlier judgment becomes irrelevant".
B
A somewhat similar situation arose in connection with Section 73 of
the Bombay Municipality Boroughs Act. 1925 which allowed the municipality
to levy ;'a rate on building or lands or both situated within the municipal
Borough". Rule 350A made under that Act provided for the rate on land at
C a percentage evaluation based upon capital. The Rule was held to be ultra-
vires in Patel Gordhandas Hargovindas v. Municipal Commissioner,
Ahmedabad1" on the ground that the word 'rate' as was understood in the
legislative practice of India and used in Section 73 did not allow for an
impost as provided under Rule 350A. A Validation Act was passed subsequent
to the decision in Patel Gordhandas Hargovindas redefining the v.ord 'rate'
D in Section 73 itself. The constitutionality of the Validation Act was challenged.
In dismissing the challenge, this Court in, Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd v.
Broach Borough Municipality" held that the legislature could exercise its
undoubted powers of redefining the word 'rate' in Section 73 to validate the
assessments earlier made under Rule 350A. The Court held that when a
E Legislature sets out to validate a tax declared by a Court to be illegally'
collected under an ineffective or an invalid law, the cause for ineffectiveness
or invalidity must be removed before validation can be said to take place
effectively.

"It is not sufficient to declare merely that the decision of the Court
p shall not bind for that is tantamount to reversing the decision in
exercise of Judicial power which the Legislature does not possess or
exercise. A court's decision must always bind unless the conditions
on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that the decision
could not have been given in the altered circumstances".

G Once the circumstances are altered by Legislation, it may neutralise the
effect.of the earlier decision of the Court which becomes ineffective after the
change of the law.
IO. (1964) 2 SCR 608.

11. Supra .
H
NA TI ON AL AGRI. CO-OPERATIVE MKT FED. OF INDJA LTD v. U.0.1. [RUMA PAL, J.) 13
Similarly in Mis. Krishnamurthi & Co. v. State of Madras and Anr., 12 A
the Madras General Sales Tax 1959 Act (as it stood) pfQVided under Entry
47 for taxon "lubricating oils, all kinds of mineral oils (not otherwise provided
for in this Act) quenching oil and greases w.e.f. 1.4.1964". The question was
whetherthis entry covered furnace oil. The Madras High Court construed the
phrase and came to the conclusion that it did not. The Legislature then enacted B
an Amendment Act in 1967. Entry 47 was amended so as to expressly provide
that furnace oil would be subjected to tax. The Act was made effective from
1964. The Act was challenged as being unreason11ble ~ince it retrospectively
made the dealers liable for sale~ ta)\ which they had not passed on to others.
The challenge was negatived and it was s11id that

-- "The object of such an enactment ls to remove and rectify the defect
in phraseology or lacuna of other nature and also to validate the
c
proceedings, including realisation of tax, which have taken place in
pursuance of the earlier enactment which has been found by the court
to be vitiated by an infirmity, Such an amending and validating Act
in the very nature of things has a retrospective operation. Its aim is D
to effectuate and carry out the object for which the earlier principal
Act had been enacted. Such an amending and validating Act to make
"small repairs" is a p~rmissible mode of legislation and is frequently
resorted to in fiscal enactments".

Again when the question arose whether factory and other buildings E
were 'houses' for the purpose of levy of house tax, the High Court held that
the word 'house' could not be construed to include factories and other
buildings. Pending the aPPll<il from the High Court's decision before this
Court, the word 'house' w&s legislatively redefined to include factorids and
other buildings with retrospective effect.This Court in Govt. ofAndhra Pradesh p
v. Hindusthan Machine Tools" rejected the challenge to the amendment
holding that this was a pennissible legislative exercise. It was held that the
Legislature had not overruled or set aside the judgment of the High Court but
had removed the basis of the decision rendered by the High Court so that the ·
decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances. This
· enunciation of the law has been noted with approval by the Constitution G
Bench in State of Tamil Nadu v. Arroran Sugar Mills. 14

12. [1973) 2 SCR 54.

u .. [197512 sec 274.
14. [1997] I sec 326 para 16.
H
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] 3 S.C.R.

A The appellant has relied on this Court's decision in Madan Mohan
Pathak v. Union of India, 11 to contend that what the legislature had done in
the present case was to statutorily overrule the decision of this Court in
Kera/a Marketing. In Madan Mohan Pathak a settlement had been arrived
between the Life Insurance Corporation and its employees, inter-alia with
B regard to bonus payable to its class III and IV employees. Subsequent to the
settlement, the Payment of Bonus Act, 1976 came into force which
considerably curtailed rights of employees to bonus in industrial establishments.
Although the Payment of Bonus Act was not applicable to the Life Insurance
Corporation, the Central Government issued a directive to the LIC that it
should not make payment of bonus to its employees without getting the same
C cleared by the Central Government. The LIC issued a circular stopping the
payment of bonus. The employees' association challenged this by way of a
petition under Article 226 and prayed for a writ directing the LIC to act in
terms of the settlement. The writ petition was allowed. While the appeal was
pending before the Division Bench, Parliament enacted the Life Insurance
D Corporation Modification of Settlement, 1976. By the Act, the settlement
deprived the class III and class IV employees of the annual cash bonus to
which they were otherwise entitled under the settlement in respect of certain
years.However, despite this statutory interpretation, the Division Bench did
not interfere w11th the order of the Single Judge and dismissed the appeal.
After this, somewhat unnecessarily, the employees of LIC assailed the
E constitutional validity of the 1976 Act under Article 32 before this Court.
One of the grounds taken was that the impugned Act deprived the class IJI
and IV employees of their vested rights under the settlement and was in
violation of Article 19( I )(t) of the Constitution. This Court allowed the writ
application holding that since the LIC hadnot pressed its appeal before the
Division Bench despite the 1976 Act, it could not be absolved from its
F obligation from carrying out the writ of mandamus issued by the Single
Judge of the High Court. It also held that the judgment of the High Court was
not based upon any defect in any statutory provision, which could have been
removed by the legislature as was the case in Prithvi Cotton Mills (supra). In
other words as long as the judgmt:nt stood it could not be disregarded or
G ignored by LIC.
The decision is an authority for the principle that a judicial decision
which has become final inter partes, cannot be set at naught by legislative

15. [1978] 2 sec 50.

H
NATIONAL AGRI. CO-OPERATIVE MKT. FED. OF INDIA q1-i, v. U.0.1. [RUMA PAL, J.) 15

action, a principle that is well entrenched. 16 Therefor\\, If, 11s has been contended A
by the appellant, the High Court in 1981 had In proceedings between the
appellant and the Revenue held that the appelhmt was entitled to the benefit
of the deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(iii) of the Act, and the Revenue has
not impugned the High Court's decisioq, th<1t decision binds the parties for
the assessment years in question and cimnot be reopened because of the 1998
amendment. This principle, however, !,\Qes. qot in any way detract from B
theprinciple that the Legislature may \'cure" the statute so that it more correctly
represents its intention. Such qirative legisl11tion does not in fact touch the
validity of a judicial decision which may hav@ attained finality albeit under
the pre-amended law.

The main thrust of the @ppe!lant' s argument has been to the
c
constitutionality of the amendment, The substitution in 1998 of the phrase
"grown by" in Section 80P(2)(a)(iii) of the Act to operate from 1968, it is
argued, amounts to a new levy 1md im unforeseen financial burden imposed
on Apex Societies like the !!ppellant with effect from the past 30 years. If this
were so doubtless the Court mlly have considered the amendment to be D
excessively and unreason@b!y retrospective violating the appellants
fundamental rights µn\ler Articles 19(\)(g) and 14 of the Constitution. 17 But
in fact the grievance js unfo1tnded.

The test of the length of time covered by the retrospective operation
cannot by itself, nece~sarily be !I dc;icisive test." Account must be taken ofthe E
surrounding facts and circurnstimcesrelating to the taxation and the legislative
background of the provision. 1• To rec11pitulate the legislative background of
the particular statutory provisjoq in question before us • the first authoritative
interpretation of Section 80P (2)(a)(iii) was made in 1994 in Assam
Cooperatives20 when it held that the word "of' must be construed as "produced p
by". Therefore, the law as It &toad from 1968 was, by this decision, required
to be read in preci~i'lY this manner and presumably assessments of Apex

16. S.R. Bhagwat v. State oflo{yswe. [1995) 6 sec 16 paras 12, IS, 18; Re: Cauvery Water G
Disputes Tribunal, [1993) Supp. I SCC 96 (II) Para 76.

17. Mis. Cljagar f'rints and Ors, v. Union of India and Ors., [1989) 3 SCC 488, 517.

- 18. RaiRamkrishnaandOr.q. TheSrateo/Blhar. (1964) I SCR897at915.

19. Jawaharmalv. State ofRaJasthan. (1966) I SCR 890, 905.

20. Supra. H
16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) 3 S.C.R.

A Societies were commenced and concluded on this basis. The situation
continued till 1998 till this Court reversed Assam Cooperativesin Kera/a
Cooperaiive Marketing Federation Ltd. 21 Before the assessment year was
over, by the 1998 Amendment the word "of' was substituted with " grown
by". In real terms therefore there was hardly any retrospectivity, but a
B continuation of the status quo ante. The degree and extent of the unforeseen
and unforeseeable financial burden was, in the circumstances, minimal and
cannot be said to be unreasonable or unconstitutional.

It is hardly likely on the given facts, that assessments had been concluded
on the basis of the decision in Kera/a Marketing and the period for reopening
C such assessments had become time barred. In any event the 1998 amendment
cannot be construed as authorizing the Revenue authorities to reopen
assessments when the reopening is already barred by limitation. The
amendment does not seek to touch on the periods of limitation provided in
the Act, and in the absence of any such express provision or clear implication,
the legislature clearly could not be taken to intend that theamending provision
D authorises the Income-tax Officer to commence proceedings which before
the new Act came into force, had, by the expiry of the period provided
become barred. 22 Different considerations would arise if, by the amendment
even final assessments were unambiguously sought to be opened. 23 That is
not the case here. The concession of the Solicitor General on behalf of the
E Revenue that the amendment would apply only to assessments which were
yet to be finalised could not of course be a relevant consideration in upholding
the amendment if it were found to be constitutionally infirm." But it was an
unnecessary concession, since having regard to the limited operation of the
amendment, it could only apply to pending assessments in the sense that it
could not revive a power lost. by efflux of time.
F
The final submission of the appellant as to the possible adverse economic
impact of the amendment on farmers and primary societies is not a

21. Supra.

G 22. S.S. Gadgl/ v. Lal & Co.. AIR 1965 SC 171, p.177 : See also J.P. Jani v. lnduprasad
Devshankar Bhatt.· AIR (1969) SC 778, 781; K..V. Sharma v. Income Tax Officer. Ward
13(7). New Delhi, [2002] 4 SCC 339.

-
23. Commercial Tux Officer v. Biswanath Jh1mjhunwalla and Anr.. [1996] 5 SCC 626.

24. The collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathe/la Sampathu Cheuy and Anr., [1962] 3 SCR
786, 825; Sanjecv Coke Manufacturing Co. v. Mis. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. andAnr.; J1983]
H 1 sec 147, paragraph 25.
NATIONAL AGRI. CO-OPERATIVE MKT. FED OF INDIA LTD. v. U.0.1. [RUMA PAL, J.] 17
consideration which is relevant to a decision on its validity particularly when A
neither the factual basis for such assertion is laid nor the persons on behalf
of whom the appellant seeks to take up cudgels, are before us.

We therefore dismiss the appeal Without any order as to costs.

S.K.S. Appeal dismissed. B