NATASHA SINGHversusCBI (STATE)

                   [2013) 5 S.C.R. 539


                    NATASHA SINGH                             A
                             v.
                       CBI (STATE)
            (Criminal Appeal No. 709 of 2013)
                       MAY 8, 2013
                                                              B
    [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND FAKKIR MOHAMED
              IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, JJ.]

      code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.311 -
Proceedings initiated under the /PC and Prevention of C
Corruption Act - Three accused including appellant -
Appellant, in her defence examined one witness, DW-2 and
after proving certain documents closed her defence - Trial
Court fixed date for hearing final arguments - Prior to date of
final hearing, application filed by appellant u/s.311 CrPC for D
permission to examine three witnesses - Application
dismissed by trial court on ground that examination of the
witnesses sought to be examined by the appellant was
unnecessary - High Court affirmed the order of trial court -
Propriety - Held: Not proper - Application filed uls. 311 E
Cr.P. C. must be allowed if fresh evidence is being produced
to facilitate a just decision -The trial court prejudged the
evidence of the witnesses sought to be examined by the
appellant, and thereby caused grave and material prejudice
to the appellant as regards her defence, which tantamounts F
to a flagrant violation of the principles of law governing the
production of such evidence in keeping with the provisions of
s. 311 Cr. P. C - Trial Court reached the conclusion that
production of such evidence by the defence was not essential
to facilitate a just decision of the case - Such an assumption G
was wholly misconceived, and not tenable in law as appellant
has every right to adduce evidence in rebuttal of the evidence
brought on record by the prosecution - Furthermore, instant
case not one where if application filed by the appellant had
                            539                               H
    540     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 5 S.C.R.


A been allowed, the process would have taken much time - In
  fact, disallowing the said application, has caused delay - No
  prejudice would have been caused to the prosecution, if the
  defence had been permitted to examine said three witnesses
  - Application u/s.311 Cr.P. C. filed by appellant accordingly
B allowed - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - s. 13(2) rlw
  s.13(1)(d) - /PC - s.1208 rlw ss.420, 467, 468, 471.

        Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.311 - Powers
  under- Scope and object-Held: Poweruls.311 Cr.P.C. must
  be invoked by the Court only in order to meet the ends of
C justice, for strong and valid reasons, and the same must be
  exercised with great caution and circumspection -
  Determinative factor should be, whether summoning/recalling
  of the said witness is in fact, essential to the just decision of
  the case - Adducing evidence in support of the defence is a
D valuable right - Denial of such right would amount to the
  denial of a fair trial - Under no circumstances can a person's
  right to fair trial be jeopardized - Criminal trial - Fair trial.

         In a case pertaining to allegations of inflated
E insurance claim involving a company and a public
    servant, FIR was registered under Section 1208 read with
    Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 of the IPC and Section 13(2)
  . read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption
    Act, 1988 against the appellant-Director of the company,
F another Director and the public servant concerned.
    Charges were framed by the Trial Court agaim~t all the
    three accused. In support of its case, the prosecution
    examined 52 witnesses .subsequent whereto, the
    statement of the appellant-accused was recorded. The
G appellant, in her defence examined only one witness,
    namely, DW-2 and after proving certain documents
    closed her defence. Subsequently, one other accused, A-
    3 concluded his defence after examining two defence
    witnesses. The Trial Court thereafter, fixed the date for
    hearing final arguments as 5.3.2013. The appellant
H
          NATASHA SINGH v. CBI (STATE)                  541


preferred application under Section 311 Cr.P .C. on           A
5.3.2013 for permission to examine three witnesses. The
appellant wished to examine one of the panchnama
witnesses, whom the prosecution had neither listed nor
examined in court. The second person was Company
Secretary of the company, of which the appellant was the      B
Director. The third witness was a hand-writing expert. The
Trial court dismissed the application, observing that
examination of the witnesses sought to be examined by
the appellant-accused was in fact unnecessary, and
would in no way assist in the process of arriving at a just   c
decision with respect to the case. The High Court affirmed
the order passed by the Trial Court, and therefore the
instant appeal.

    Allowing the appeal, the Court
                                                              D
     HELD:1.1. Section 311 Cr.P .C. empowers the court
to summon a material witness, or to examine a person
present at "any stage" of "any enquiry", or "trial", or "any
other proceedings" under the Cr.P.C., or to summon any
person as a witness, or to recall and re-examine any E
person who has already been examined if his evidence
"4ppears to it, to be essential to the arrival of a just
decision of the case. The Cr.P .C. has conferred a very
wide discretionary power upon the court in this respect,
but such a discretion is to be exercised judiciously and F
not arbitrarily. The power of the court in this context is
very wide, and in exercise of the same, it may summon
any person as a witness at any stage of the trial, or other
proceedings. The court is competent to exercise such
power even suo motu if no such application has been G
filed by either of the parties. However, the court must
satisfy itself, that it was in fact essential to exam.ine such
a witness, or to recall him for further examination in order
to arrive at a just decision of the case. [Para 7] [548-E-H;
549-A]
                                                               H
    542      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013) 5 S.C.R.


A        1.2. The scope and object of the provision is to
    enable the Court to determine the truth and to render a
    just decision after discovering all relevant facts and
    obtaining proper proof of such facts, to arrive at a just
    decision of the case. Power must be exercised
B   judiciously and not capriciously or arbitrarily, as any
    improper or capricious exercise of such power may lead
    to undesirable results. An application under Section 311
    Cr.P.C. must not be allowed only to fill up a lacuna in the
    case of the ptosecution, or of the defence, or to the
c   disadvantage <>f the accused, or to cause serious
    prejudice to the defence of the accused, or to give an
    unfair advantage to the opposite party. Further, the
    additional evidence must not be received as a disguise
    for retrial, or to change the nature of the case against
    either of the parties. Such a power must be exercised,
0
    provided that the evidence that is likely to be tendered
    by a witness, is germane to the issue involved. An
    opportunity of rebuttal however, must be given to the
    other party. The power conferred under Section 311
    Cr.P.C. must therefore, be invoked by the Court only in
E   order to meet the ends of justice, for strong and valid
    reasons, and the same must be exercised with great
    caution and circumspection. The very use of words such
    as 'any Court', 'at any stage", or 'or any enquiry, trial or
    other proceedings', 'any person' and 'any such person'
F   clearly spells out that the provisions of this section have
    t,een expressed in the widest possible terms, and do not
    limit the discretion of the Court in any way. There is thus
    no escape if the fresh evidence to be obtained is
    essential to the just decision of the case. The
G   determinative factor should therefore be, whether the
    summoning/recalling of the said witness is in fact,
    essential to the just decision of the case. [Para 14] [552-
    E-H; 553-A-D]

H         1.3. Fair trial is the main object of criminal procedure,
          NATASHA SINGH v. CBI (STATE)                   543

and it is the duty of the court to ensure that such fairness    A
is not hampered or threatened in any manner. Fair trial
entails the interests of the accused, the victim and of the
society, and therefore, fair trial includes the grant of fair
and proper opportunities to the person concerned, and
the same must be ensured as this is a constitutional, as        B
well as a human right. Thus, under no circumstances can
a person's right to fair trial be jeopardized. Adducing
evidence in support of the defence is a valuable right.
Denial of such right would amount to the denial of a fair
trial. Thus, it is essential that the rules of procedure that   c
have been designed to ensure justice are scrupulously
followed, and the court must be zealous in ensuring that
there is no breach of the same. [Para 15) (553-0-G]
     Mir Mohd. Omar & Ors. v. State of West Bengal AIR 1989
SC 1785: 1989 (3) SCR 735; Mohan/al Shamji Soni v. Union D
of India & Anr. AIR 1991 SC 1346: 1991 (1) SCR 712;
Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. The State of West Bengal & Anr.
AIR 1965 SC 1887: 1966 SCR 178; Rajendra Prasad v.
Narcotic Cell through its Officer-in-Charge, Delhi AIR 1999
SC 2292 1999 (3) SCR 818; P. Sanjeeva Rao v. State of E
A.P. AIR 2012 SC 2242: 2012 (6) SCR 787; T. Nagappa v.
Y.R. Muralidhar AIR 2008 SC 2010: 2008 (6) SCR 959;
Ta/ab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar & Anr.
AIR 1958 SC 376: 1958 SCR 1226; Zahira Habibulla H.
Sheikh & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. AIR 2004 SC 3114: F
2004 (3) SCR 1050; Zahira Habibul/ah Sheikh & Anr. v. State
of Gujarat & Ors. AIR 2006 SC 1367: 2006 (2) SCR 1081;
Kalyani Baskar (Mrs.) v. M. S. Sampoomam (Mrs.), (2007) 2
SCC 258; Vijay Kumar v. State of U.P. & Anr. (2011) 8 SCC
136: 2011 (11} SCR 893 and Sudevanand v. State through G
C.B.I. (2012) 3 sec 387: 2012 (2) SCR 139 - relied on.
     2.1. An application filed under Section 311 Cr.P.C.
must be allowed if fresh evidence is being produced to
facilitate a just decision, however, in the instant case, the
Trial Court prejudged the evidence of the witness sought        H
   544     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              (2013] 5 S.C.R.


A to be examined by the appellant, and thereby cause
  grave and material prejudice to the appellant as regards
  her defence, which tantamounts to a flagrant violation of
  the principles of law governing the production of such
  evidence in keeping with the provisions of Section 31.1
B Cr.P.C. By doing so, the Trial Court reached the
  conclusion that the production of such evidence by the
  defence was not essential to facilitate a just decision of
  the case. Such an assumption is wholly misconceived,
  and is not tenable in law as the accused has every right
c to adduce evidence in rebuttal of the evidence brought
  on record by the prosecution. The court must examine
  whether such additional evidence is necessary to
  facilitate a just and proper decision of the case. The
  examination of the hand-writing expert may therefore be
  necessary to rebut the evidence of PW.40, and a request
0
  made for his examination ought not to have been
  rejected on the sole ground that the opinion of the hand-
  writing expert would not be conclusive. In such a
  situation, the only issue that ought to have been
  considered by the courts below, is whether the evidence
E proposed to be adduced was relevant or not. Identical is
  the position regarding the panchnama witness, and the
  court is justified in weighing evidence, only and only once
  the same has been laid before it and brought on record.
  The said panchnama witness, thus, may be in a position
F to depose with respect to whether the documents
  alleged to have been found, or to have been seized; were
  actually recovered or not, and therefore, from the point
  of view of the appellant, his examination might prove to
  be essential and imperative for facilitating a just decision
G of the case. [Para 18] [555-D-H; 556-A-C]
      2.2. The High Court simply quoted relevant
  paragraphs from the judgment of the Trial Court and
  approved the same without giving proper reasons,
H merely observing that the additional evidence sought to
          NATASHA SINGH v. CBI (STATE)                  545


be brought on record was not essential for the purpose         A
of arriving at a just decision. Furthermore, the same is not
a case where if the application filed by the appellant had
been allowed, the process would have taken much time.
In fact, disallowing the said application, has caused delay.
No prejudice would have been caused to the prosecution,        B
if the defence had been permitted to examine said three
witnesses. [Para 19] [556-D-E]

     2.3. The application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. filed
by the appellant is allowed. The parties are directed to
appear before the Trial Court, and the Trial Court is          c
requested to fix a date on which the appellant shall
produce the three witnesses, and the same may
thereafter be examined expeditiously 1n accordance with
law, and without causing any further delay. The
prosecution will be entitled to cross examine them. [Para      D
20] [556-F-H]
                    Case Law Reference:
    1989 (3) SCR 735         relied on            Para 8
                                                               E
    1991 (1) SCR 712         relied on            Para 9
    1966 SCR 178             relied on           Para 10
    1999 (3) SCR 818         relied on           Para 11
                                                               F
    2012 (6) SCR 787         relied on           Para 12
    2008 (6) SCR 959         relied on           Para 13
    1958 SCR 1226            relied on           Para 15
    2004 (3) SCR 1050        relied on           Para 15       G
    2006 (2) SCR 1081        relied on           Para 15
    (2001) 2 sec 258         relied on           Para 15
    2011 (11) SCR 893        relied on           Para 15       H
    546      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2013] 5 S.C.R.


A         2012 (2) SCR 139        relied on             Para 13
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
    No. 709 of 2013.

      From the Judgemnt & Order dated 8.04.2013 of the High
B Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Crl. M.C. No. 1324 of 2013.

         Uday Lalit, Hari Shankar K., Kawai Nain, Aditya Verma for
    the Appellant.

C       S.P. Singh. Syed Tanweer Ahmad, Dinesh Kothari, B.V.
    Balaram Das for the Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. Leave granted.
D       2. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned
  judgment and order dated 8.4.2013 in Criminal Misc. Case
  No.1324 of 2013, passed by the High Court of Delhi at New
  Delhi, by way of which it has affirmed the order dated
  16.3.2013, passed by the Trial Court, dismissing the
E application filed by the appellant under Section 311 of the Code
  of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the
  'Cr.P .C.'), observing that examination of the witnesses sought
  to be examined by the appellant-accused was in fact
  unnecessary, and would in no way assist in the process of
F arriving at a just decision with respect to the case.

        3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are
    as under:

       A. An FIR dated 10.8.1998 was registered under Section
G 1206 read with Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 of the Indian Penal
  Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the 'IPC') and Section
  13(2) read with Section 13(1 )(d) of the Prevention of Corruption
  Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act 1988') against the
  appellant and other accused persons. After the conclusion of
H
           NATASHA SINGH v. CBI (STATE}                        547
              [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
the investigation, a chargesheet was filed on 19.7.2001 by the        A
investigating agency, i.e., CBI against Smt. Rita Singh (A-1),
Mrs. Natasha Singh (A-2), appellant, and Mr. Y.V. Luthra (A-
3), a Public Servant.

     B. In view thereof, charges were framed by the learned           B
Trial Court on 5.5.2003 against all the three accused.

     C. In support of its case, the prosecution examined 52
witnesses in the course of over 50 hearings and subsequent
thereto, the statement of the appellant-accused was recorded
on 28-29.1.2013 and 5.2.2013. The appellant, in her defence           C
examined only one witness, namely, Sudhir Kumar (DW-2) and
after proving cer.tain documents closed her defence on
18.2.2013. The other accused, namely, Mr. Y.V. Luthra
concluded his defence on 19.2.2013, after examining two
defence witnesses, namely, Mr. A.K. Saxena and Mr. Satpal             D·
Arora. The Trial Court thereafter, fixed the date for hearing final
arguments as 5.3.2013. The appellant preferred an application
under Section 311 Cr.P.C. on 5.3.2013 for permission to
examine three witnesses. The said application was dismissed
by the Trial Court vide order dated 16.3.2013, against which          E
the Criminal Misc. petition filed by the appellant was also
dismissed by the High Court, by way of impugned order dated
8.4.2013.

     Hence, this appeal. ·
                                                                      F
      4. Shri U.U. Lalit, learned senior counsel appea~ing for the
appellant, has submitted that the FIR was lodged in 1998 and
if the prosecution has taken more than a decade to examine
52 witnesses, and that if after the appellant had closed her
defence, the other accused had laid evidence in his defence,          G
and that thereafter, without losing any time, the appellant had
-preferred an application seeking permission to examine three
witnesses in her defence, and had even given reasons for their
examination, the same should not have been dismissed. The·
Trial Court has committed an error in appreciating the evidence       H
    548      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 5 S.C.R.


A which could have been provided by the said three witnesses
  in anticipation. It has also been stated that further, there was
  no delay on the part of the appellant in moving the application.
  Had this application been allowed by the courts below, no
  prejudice would have been caused to the respondent. Thus, the
B appeal deserves to be allowed.

        5. On the contrary, Shri S.P. Singh, learned senior counsel
  appearing for the respondent, has opposed the appeal
  contending that the courts below have recorded a finding of fact
  to the extent that the said evidence was not necessary to arrive
C a just decision, and that it was left to the discretion of the court
  whether to allow such an application or not. This Court should
  not interfere with the manner in which such a discretion has been
  exercised by the courts below. The courts below have
  considered the case in correct perspective and thus, no
D interference is called for. The appeal lacks merit and is liable
  to be dismissed.

         6. We have considered the rival submissions made by
    learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
E
       7. Section 311 Cr.P.C. empowers the court to summon a
  material witness, or to examine a person present at "any stage"
  of "any enquiry", or "trial", or "any other proceedings" under the
  Cr.P .C., or to su'mmon any person as a witness, or to recall and
F re-examine any person who has already been examined if his
  evidence appears to it, to be essential to the arrival of a
  just decision of the case. Undoubtedly, the Cr.P.C. has
  conferred a very wide discretionary power upon the court in this
  respect, but such a discretion is to be exercised judiciously and
  not arbitrarily. The power of the court in this context is very wide,
G and in exercise of the same, it may summon any person as a
  witness at any stage of the trial, or other proceedings. The court
  is competent to exercise such power even suo motu if no such
  application has been filed by either of the parties. However, the
  court must satisfy itself, that it was in fact essential to examine
H
           NATASHA SINGH v. CBI (STATE)                        549
              [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
such a witness, or to recall him for further examination in order      A
to arrive at a just decision of the case.

      8. In Mir Mohd. Omar & Ors. v. State of West Bengal, AIR
1989 SC 1785, this Court examined an issue wherein, after the
statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. had been            8
recorded, the prosecution had filed an application to further
examine a witness and the High Court had allowed the same.
This Court then held, that once the accused has been examined
under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in the event that liberty is given to
the prosecution to recall a witness, the same may amount to
filling up a lacuna existing in the case of the prosecution and        C
therefore, that such an order was uncalled for.

     9. In Mohan/al Shamji Soni v. Union of India & Anr., AIR
1991 SC 1346, this Court examined the scope of Section 311
Cr.P.C., and held that it is a cardinal rule of the law of evidence,   D
that the best available evidence must be brought before the
court to prove a fact, or a point in issue. However, the court is
under an obligation to discharge its statutory functions, whether
discretionary or obligatory, according to law and hence ensure
that justice is done. The court has a duty to determine the truth,     E
and to render a just decision. The same is also the object of
Section 311 Cr.P.C., wherein the court may exercise its
discretionary authority at any stage of the enquiry, trial or other
proceedings, to summon any person as a witness though not
yet summoned as a witness, or to recall or re-examine any              F
person, though not yet summoned as a witness, who are
expected to be able to throw light upon the matter in
dispute, because if the judgments happen to be rendered on
an inchoate, inconclusive and speculative presentation of facts,
the ends of justice would be defeated.
                                                                       G
    10. In Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. The State of West Bengal
& Anr., AIR 1965 SC 1887, this Court dealt with the ample
power and jurisdiction vested in the court, with respect to taking
additional evidence, and observed, that it may not be possible
for the legislature to foresee all situations and possibilities and    H
    550      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 5 S.C.R.


A therefore, the court must examine the facts and circumstances
  of each case before it, and if it comes to the conclusion that
  additional evidence is necessary, not because it would be
  impossible to pronounce the judgment without it, but because
  there would be a failure of justice without such evidence being
B considered, and if such an action on its part is justified, then
  the court must exercise such power. The Court further held as
  under:-

          •..... the Criminal Court has ample power to summon any
          person as a witness or recall and re-examine any such
c         person even if the evidence on both sides is closed
          and the jurisdiction of the Court must obviously be
          dictated by exigency of the situation, and fair play and
          good sense appear to be the only safe guides and that
          only the requirements of justice command the
D         examination of any person which would depend on the
          facts and circumstances of each case." (Emphasis added)

       11. In Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell through its Officer-
  in-Charge, Delhi, AIR 1999 SC 2292, this Court considered a
E similar issue and held as under:-

          "Lacuna in the prosecution must be understood as the
          inherent weakness or a latent wedge in the matrix of the
          prosecution case. The advantage of it should normally
          go to the accused in the trial of the case, but an over sight
F         in the management of the prosecution cannot be treated
          as irreparable lacuna. No party in a trial can be
          foreclosed from correcting, errors. If proper evidence
          was not adduced or a relevant material was not
          brought on record due to any inadvertence, the Court
G         should be magnanimous in permitting such mistakes
          to be rectified. After all, function of the criminal Court is
          administration of criminal justice and not to count errors
          committed by the parties or to find out and declare who
          among the parties performed better.• (Emphasis added)
H
           NATASHA SINGH v. CBI (STATE)                     551
              [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
    12. Similarly, in P. Sanjeeva Rao v. State of A.P., AIR        A
2012 SC 2242, this Court examined the scope of the provisions
of Section 311 Cr.P.C. and held as under:-

    "Grant of fairest opportunity to the accused to prove his
    innocence was the object of every fair trial, observed this
                                                                   B
    Court in Hoffman Andreas v. Inspector of Customs,
    Amritsar, (2000) 10 SCC 430. The following passage is
    in this regard apposite:

          'In such circumstances, if the new Counsel thought
    to have the material witnesses further examined, the           C
    Court could adopt latitude and a liberal view in the
    interest of justice, particularly when the Court has
    unbridled powers in the matter as enshrined in Section
    311 of the Code. After all the trial is basically for the
    prisoners and courts should afford the opportunity to them     D
    in the fairest manner possible.'

    xxx   xxx                    xxx               xxx
          We are conscious of the fact that recall of the
    witnesses is being directed nearly four years after they       E
    were examined in chief about an incident that is nearly
    seven years old ..... we are of the opinion that on a parity
    of reasoning and looking to the consequences of denial
    of opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, we would
    prefer to err in favour of the appellant getting an            F
    opportunity rather than protecting the prosecution against
    a possible prejudice at his cost. Fairness of the trial is a
    virtue that is sacrosanct in our judicial system and no
    price is too heavy to protect that virtue. A possible
    prejudice to prosecution is not even a price, leave alone      G
    one that would justify denial of a fair opportunity to the
    accused to defend himself."
     13. In T. Nagappa v. Y.R. Muralidhar, AIR 2008 SC 2010,
this Court held, that while considering such an application, the
                                                                   H
    552       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 5 S.C.R.


A court must not imagine or assume what the deposition of the
  witness would be, in the event that an application under Section
  311 Cr.P .C. is allowed and appreciate in its entirety, the said
  anticipated evidence. The Court held as under:
          "What should be the nature of evidence is not a matter
          which should be left only to the discretion of the court. It
          is the accused who knows how to prove his defence. It is
          true that the court being the master of the proceedings
          must determine as to whether the application filed by the
          accused in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 243 of the
c         Code is bona fide or not or whether thereby he intends
          to bring on record a relevant material. But ordinarily an
          accused should be allowed to approach the court for
          obtaining its assistance with regard to summoning of
          witnesses, etc. If permitted to do so, steps therefor,
D         however, must be taken within a limited time. There
          cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the accused should
          not be allowed to unnecessarily protract the trial or
          summon witnesses whose evidence would not be at all
          relevant."
E
       14. The scope and object of the provision is to enable the
  Court to determine the truth and to render a just decision after
  discovering all relevant facts and obtaining proper proof of such
  facts, to arrive at a just decision of the case. Power must be
  exercised judiciously and not capriciously or arbitrarily, as any
F improper or capricious exercise of such power may lead to
  undesirable results. An application under Section 311 Cr.P.C.
  must not be allowed only to fill up a lacuna in the case of the
  prosecution, or of the defence, or to the disadvantage of the
  accused, or to cause serious prejudice to the defence of the
G accused, or to give an unfair advantage to the opposite
  party. Further, the additional evidence must not be received
  as a disguise for retrial, or to change the nature of the case
  against either of the parties. Such· a power must be exercised,
  provided that the evidence that is likely to be tendered by a
H
           NATASHA SINGH v. CBI (STATE)                       553
              [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
witness, is germane to the issue involved. An opportunity of         A
rebuttal however, must be given to the other party.
     The power conferred under Section 311 Cr.P.C. must
therefore, be invoked by the Court only in order to meet the ends
of justice, for strong and valid reasons, and the same must be
exercised with great caution and circumspection.                     B
     The very use of words such as 'any Court', 'at any stage",
or 'or any enquiry, trial or other proceedings', 'any person' and
'any such person' clearly spells out that the provisions of this
section have been expressed in the widest possible terms, and
do not limit the discretion of the Court in any way. There is thus   C
no escape if the fresh evidence to be obtained is essential to
the just decision of the case. The determinative factor should
therefore be, whether the summoning/recalling of the said
witness is in fact, essential to the just decision of the case.
                                                                     D
     15. Fair trial is the main object of criminal procedure, and
it is the duty of the court to ensure that such fairness is not
hampered or threatened in any manner. Fair trial entails the
interests of the accused, the victim and of the society, and
therefore, fair trial includes the grant of fair and proper          ~
opportunities to the person concerned, and the same must be
ensured as this is a constitutional, as well as a human right.
Thus, under no circumstances can a person's right to fair trial
be jeopardized. Adducing evidence in support of the defence
is a valuable right. Denial of such right would amount to the
denial of a fair trial. Thus, it is essential that the rules of      F
procedure that have been designed to ensure justice are
scrupulously followed, and the court must be zealous. in
ensuring that there is no breach of the same. (Vide: Ta/ab Haji
Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar & Anr., AIR 1958
SC 376; Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh & Anr. v. State of Gujarat        G
& Ors., AIR 2004 SC 3114; Zahira Habibullah Sheikh & Anr.
v. State of Gujarat & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 1367; Ka/yani Baskar
(Mrs.) v. M. S. Sampoomam (Mrs.), (2007) 2 SCC 258; Vijay
Kumar v. State of U.P. & Anr., (2011) 8 SCC 136; and
Sudevanand v. State through C.B.I., (2012) 3 SCC 387)                H
    554      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2013] 5 S.C.R.


A        16. The instant case is required to be examined in light of
    the aforesaid settled legal propositions. The relevant part of the
    chargesheet dated 19.7.2001 states, that the insurance claim
    filed by the appellant was inflated and that therefore, the
    collusion of a Public Servant in this respect attracted the
8   provisions of Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 13 of the Act
    1988. The chargesheet further revealed that:
          "Investigation has revealed that in order to obtain
          insurance claim, accused Rita Singh (A-1) in her capacity
          as Director, Mideast India Ltd. accused Natasha Singh
c         (A-2) in her capacity as Director, approached IFCI and
          in view of the aforesaid necessity for obtaining NOC from
          Financial Institutions/Banks, Sh. S.S. Batra, Company
          Secretary, MIL vide letter dated 1.3.96 requested IFC/,
          New Delhi for issuing a NOC for releasing a sum of
D         Rs.3. 75 crores as interim on account payment. Sh. 8.8.
          Hurla the then Chief General Manager, IFCI recorded a
          note on this Jetter for issuing NOC subject to payment of
          over dues aggregating to Rs. 58 lacs. Despite the fact
          that there were over dues to the tune of Rs.58,92, 1971-
          against Mideast (India) Limited, accused Y. V.Luthra
E
          dishonestly and fraudulently issued NOC dated 1.3.96 for
          release of Rs.3. 75 crores by the insurance Company in
          respect of property at 8-12/A Phase.II, Naida and he on
          2.3.96 recorded a note in the office copy of the letter
          dated 1.3.96 that NOC was issued as there were no over
F         dues as confirmed from Accounts Department. This
          NOC dated 1.3.96 was handed over to the representative
          of Mideast (India) Limited, which was presented to Delhi
          Regional Office of UllCL and on the strength of the said
          false NOC the Insurance Company's Head Office at
G         Chennai released a payment of Rs.3.60 crores to
          Mideast (India) Limited vide cheque No.454431 dated
          8. 3. 96 which was credited to the account of Mideast
          (India) Limited. A sum of Rs.15 lacs was retained out of
          the approved amount of Rs.3. 75 crores towards payment
H         to PNB Capital Finance."
             NATASHA SINGH v. CBI (STATE)                        555
                [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
        17. The Trial Court, while entertaining the application filed   A
   under Section 311 Cr.P.C., had asked the appellant to provide
  a brief sum·mary of the nature of evidence that would be
   provided by the defence witnesses mentioned in the application,
.. an_d in keeping with this, the appellant had furnished an
   application stating that the appellant wished to examine one Shri    B
   B.B. Sharma who was one of the panchnama witnesses, and
   who the prosecution had neither listed nor examined in court.
   Therefore, the appellant wished to examine him in defence. The
   second person was Shri S.S. Batra; Company Secretary of the
   appellant, as he was the best person to provide greater details      c
   of the company of which the appellant is the Director. The third
   witness was a hand-writing expert, and it was necessary for the
   defence to examine him regarding the correctness of the
   signatures of the appellant and others, particularly with respect
   to the signatures of the appellant.                                  D
      18. Undoubtedly, an application filed under Section 311
 Cr.P.C. must be allowed if fresh evidence is being produced
 to facilitate a just decision, however, in the instant case, the
 learned Trial Court prejudged the evidence of the witness
 sought to be examined by the appellant, and thereby cause E
 grave and material prejudice to the appellant as regards her
 defence, which tantamounts to a flagrant violation of the
 principles of law governing the production of such evidence in
 keeping with the provisions of Section 311 Cr.P.C. By doing
 so, the Trial Court reached the conclusion that the production F
 of such evidence by the defence was not essential to facilitate
 a just decision of the case. Such an assumption is wholly
 misconceived, and is not tenable in law as the accused has
 every right to adduce evidence in rebuttal of the evidence
 brought on record by the prosecution. The court must examine G
 whether such additional evidence is necessary to facilitate a
 just and proper decision of the case. The examination of the
 hand-writing expert may therefore be necessary to rebut the
 evidence of Rabi Lal Thapa (PW.40), and a request made for
 his examination ought not to have been rejected on the sole
 ground that the opinion of the hand-writing expert would not be H
    556      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2013) 5 S.C.R.


A conclusive. In such a situation, the only issue that ought to have
  been considered by the courts below, is whether the evidence
  proposed to be adduced was relevant or not. Identical is the
  position regarding the panchnama witness, and the court is
  justified in weighing evidence, only and only once the same has
B been laid before it and brought on record. Mr. B.B. Sharma,
  thus, may be in a position to depose with respect to whether
  the documents alleged to have been found, or to have been
  seized, were actually recovered or not, and therefore, from the
  point of view of the appellant, his examination might prove to
c be essential and imperative for facilitating a just decision of the
  case.
       19. The High Court has simply quoted relevant paragraphs
  from the judgment of the Trial Court and has approved the same
  without giving proper reasons, merely observing that the
D additional evidence sought to be brought on record was not
  essential for the purpose of arriving at a just decision.
       Furthermore, the same is not a case where if the
  application filed by the appellant had been allowed, the process
  would have taken much time. In fact, disallowing the said
E application, has caused delay. No prejudice would have been
  caused to the prosecution, if the defence had been permitted
  to examine said three witnesses.
          20. In view of above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed.
F The judgment and order of the Trial Court, as well as of the High
    Court impugned before us, are set aside. The application under
    Section 311 Cr.P.C. filed by the appellant is allowed. The
    parties are directed to appear before the learned Trial Court
    on the 17th of May, 2013, and the learned Trial Court is
    requested to fix a date on which the appellant shall produce the
G · three witnesses, and the same may thereafter be examined
    expeditiously in accordance with law, and without causing any
    further delay. Needless to say that the prosecution will be
    entitled to cross examine them.

H B.B.B.                                           Appeal allowed.