NASIRUDDIN & ANR. ETC.versusTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH THROUGH SECRETARY & ORS

                        [2017) 12 S.C.R. 1073



                    NASIRUDDIN & ANR. ETC.                                  A
                             v.
  THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH THROUGH SECRETARY
                         & ORS.
              (Civil Appeal No. 3695 of2009)
                        DECEMBER 06, 2017                                   B
    [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND NAVIN SINHA, JJ.]
       Stamp Act, 1899 - ss. 2(12). 2(14), 2(16) and Art.35 of
Schedule I - Respondent No.3-Corporation and appellants entered
into a formal contract - Each appellant was to carry out the work
of collection of "Tehbazari" and "Parking Fees" in terms of contract        c
- Dispute arose as to the true nature of the contract and stamp duty
payable by the appellants - Corporation demanded requisite stamp
duty payable under the Stamp Act whereas as per Collector of Stamps
the appellants were liable to pay stamp duty@ Rs. 701- per thousand
on the contract amount treating the co/lfract as Lease - High Court         D
upheld the demand raised by the Collector of Stamps - Held: The
terms of the contract would show that it was meant to collect tolls
(fees) called "Tehbazari" in local parlance from squatters, vendors,
kiosks etc. and was for collecting parking fees - By awarding such
contract to the appellants. the Corporation had let their right to the
appellants to collect the fees from a class ofpersons and for carrying      E
on particular activity in the city- The contract satisfied the definition
of the expression "instrument" as defined in s.2(14) of the Act
because it created a right and liabili(v and lastly, it also satisfied
the definition of expression "executed" and "execution" as defined
in s.2(12) of the Act because it contained the signature of                 F
contracting parties - Further, it related to the right to collect the
tolls let by the Corporation to the person concerned. which square~v
attrncts s.2(16)(c) of the Act and partakes the character of a
 "Lease" - Therefore, the contract in question is a "Lease" as de.fined
in s.2(16)(c) of the Stamp Act and is accordingly chargeable to
payment of stamp duly as per the rates prescribed in Art.35 of              G
Schedule 1 of the Stamp Act as "Lease".
        Dismissing the appeals, the Court
      HELD: l.l The contract in question show that it was meant
to collect tolls (fees) called "Tehbazari" in local parlance from
                                                                            H
                               1073
1074            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2017] 12 S.C.R.


 A     squatters, vendors, kiosks etc. and was for collecting parking
       fees. Such contract is regarded as an instrument by which tolls
       of any description are let. The contract was, therefore, for
       recovery of tolls and created rights and liabilities in favour of
       contracting parties qua each other. It cannot be disputed that
       the expression "tolls of any description" in clause (c) would
 B
       include all kinds of levy, charges, fees etc. which the Corporation
       is entitled to charge under its Bye-laws (41). A/ortiori, the fees in
       question would also fall under Section 2(16)(c) of the Stamp Act.
       (Paras 16 and 211 [1080-B; 1081-EJ
          1.2 The contract in question also satisfied the definition of
 c the expression "Instrument" as defined in Section 2(14) of the
   Stamp Act because it created a right and liability and lastly, it also
   satisfied the definition of expressi!Jn "executed" and "execution"
   as defined in Section 2 (12) of the Stamp Act· because it contained
   the signature of contracting parties. The case at hand relates to
 D the right to collect the tolls let by the Corporation to the person
   concerned. It squarely attracts Section 2(16)(c) of the Stamp Act
   and partakes the character of a "Lease". Accordingly stamp duty
   is chargeable as per the rates prescribed in Article 35 of Schedule
   l of the Stamp Act as "Lease". [Paras 22, 26 and 27] (1081-F-G;
   1082-D-E)
 E
             Mohammad Ali v. Board of Revenue, U.P. AIR 1987
             Allahabad 348 - approved.
             New Bus-Stand Shop Owners Association v. Corporation
             of Kozhikode & Anr. (2009) (10) SCC 455 : (2009) 14
 F           SCR 793 - distinguished.
             Munindra Nath Upadhaya v. State of U.P. & Ors. (1995)
             2 UPLBEC 1789 - referred to.
                              Case Law Reference
 G     (1995) 2 UPLBEC 1789            referred to            Para 10
       AIR 1987 Allahabad 348          approved               Par:a 10
       (2009) 14   SCR 793             distinguished          Para 24
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3695
       of2009
 H
     NASIRUDDIN & ANR. ETC. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                               1075
              PRADESH THR. SEC. & ORS.

       From the Judgment and Order dated 22.05.2006 of the High Court           A
of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 9661 of2005
                                  WITH
      C. A. Nos. 3714, 3709, 3705, 3699, 37! i and 3702 of2009.
     Jitendra Mohan Sharma, Sr. Adv., Anupam Lal Das, Anirudh Singh,            B
Ashok Kumar Sharma, Ms. Bandana Singh, Deepak Jyoti Ghildiyal, Vikal
Mudgal, Pravcen Chaturvedi, Advs. for the Appellants.
      M. R. Shamshad, Sanjay Kumar Tyagi, Aviral Saxena, Dhawal
Uniyal Vinay Garg, Kamlendra Mishra, Vishwa Pal Singh, Ravi Prakash
Mehrotra, K. L. Janjani, Adarsh Upadhyay, P. K. Chakravarty, Gunnam             c
Venkateswara Rao, Advs. for the Respondents.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
       ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. I. These appeals arc filed
against the judgment and order dated 22.05.2006 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition Nos. 9661/        D
2005, 21327/2006, 13249/2003, 12958/2004, 26755/2004, 31238/2005,
44533/2005, 31058/2003, 22817/2006, 12957/2004 and 44532/2005
whereby the High Court dismissed the writ petitions filed by the appellants
herein.
      2. In order to appreciate the short issue arising in this bunch of        E
appeals, it is necessary to set out few relevant facts hereinbclow.
       3. Respondent No.3 is a "Nagar Nigam Mccrut" also called
"Municipal Corporation Meerut" in the State ofU.P. (hereinafter referred
to as "the Corporation"). The Corporation is constituted and governed
by the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1959 . F
(for short "the Act"). Its area of operation is in the city of Meerut.
       4. In exercise of powers conferred by Section 541 (4 I) of the
Act, the Corporation has framed Bye-laws for implementing the
provisions of the Act and for regulating various activities meant essentially
for the benefit of the residents/public ofMeerut city. Clause 41 of the         G
Bye-laws empowers the Corporation to fix any fees for grant of any
license, sanction or permission to person(s) by and under the Act.
       5. In March 2004, the Corporation issued an advertisement inviting
bids from public at large for letting out the right of collection of ( 1)
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1076            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 12 S.C.R.


 A     realization ofTehbazari Fee from squatters, vendors, kiosks and (2) for
     · collecting parking fees.
             6. So far as the connecting appeals are concerned, they pertain to
       other cities of U.P. but relate to the same aforementioned activities.
       The appellants participated in the public auction held by the Corporation.
 B     Their bids were finally accepted.
              7. The Corporation accordingly informed to the appellants
       individually about acceptance of their bids and entered into a formal
       contract with each appellant to enable them to carry out the work of
       collection of what is called as "Tehbazari" and "Parking Fees" in terms
 c     of the contract. One such contract is (Annexure P-10). The period of
       contract was up to 31.03 .2005.
           8. The execution of contract led to the disputes among the
    appellants, Corporation and the Collector of Stamps, namely, what is the
    true nature of the contract and how much stamp duty is payable by the
 D appellants on the contract under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (for short
  · "the Stamp Act").
              9. The Corporation, vidc their letter (Annexure P-8), requested
       the appellants to deposit the requisite stamp duty payable under the Stamp
       Act whereas the Collector of Stamps requested the appellants to pay
 E     stamp duty@ Rs.70/- per thousand on the contract amount treating the
       contract as Lease.
              I 0. The appellants felt aggrieved of the demand raised by the
       Collector of Stamps and filed writ petitions in the Allahabad High Court.
       The Allahabad High Court placing reliance on its previous decisions in
       Munindra Nath Upadhaya vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (W.P. No.4978
 F
       of 1994) (1995) 2 UPLBEC 1789 and Mohammad Ali vs. Board of
       Rc\'cnuc, U.P. (AIR 1987 Allahabad 348) upheld the demands raised
       by the Collector of Stamps and finding no fault therein dismissed the
       writ petitions which has given rise to filing of these appeals by special
       leave by the unsuccessful writ petitioners in this Court.
 G
              l l. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal
       of the record of the case, we find no merit in these appeals. In our
       opinion, the conclusion arrived at by the High Com1 in the case of
       Mohammad Ali vs. Board of Revenue, U.P. (supra) is just and proper
       calling for no interference for the reasons given by us hereinbelow.
 H
   NASIRUDDIN & ANR. ETC. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                             1077
PRADESH THR. SEC. & ORS. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

       12. Sections 2(12), 2(14), 2(16) and Article 35 of Schedule I to     A
the Stamp Act arc relevant for deciding the question arising in the case.
They read as under:
      "2(12) "Executed" and "execution", used with reference
      to instruments, mean "signed" and "signature".
      2(14) "Instrument" includes every document by which any               B
      right or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred,
      limited, extended, extinguished or recorded.
      2(16) "Lease" means a lease of immovable property, and
      includes also -
                                                                            c
      (a) a pattu;
      (b) a Ka/J11liyat or other undertaking in writing, not being a
      counterpart of a lease, to cultivate, occupy, or pay or deliver
      rent for, immovable property;
      (c) any instrument by which tolls of any description arc let;         D
      (d) any writing on an application for a lease intended to
      signify that the application is granted;
                       Article 35 of Schedule 1.

 Description of Instrument          Proper Stamp-duty                       E

 LEASE,     including     an
 under-lease or sub-lease
 and any agreement to let or
 sub-let
                                                                            F
 (a) where by such lease the
 rent is fixed and 110
 premium      is   paid or
 delivered-                             The same duty as a Bond
     (i)     where the lease            (No.IS) for the whole
             purports to be             amount     payable   or             G
             for a term of              deliverable under such
             less than one              lease.
             year;


                                                                            H
1078          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     (2017] 12 S.C.R.


 A     (ii)   where the lease purports   The same duty as Bond (No.
              to be for a term of not    15) for the amount or value of
              less than one year but     the average annual rent
              not more than three        reserved.
              years;
                                         The same duty as a
 B.
       (iii) where the lease purports    Conveyance (No. 23) for a
             to be for a term in         consideration equal to the
             excess of three years;      amount or value of the average
                                         annual rent reserved.

 c     (iv) where the lease does not     The     same      duty as a
            purport to be for any        Conveyance (No.23) for a
            definite term;               consideration equal to the
                                         amount or value of the average
                                         annual rent which would be
                                         paid or delivered for the first
 D                                       ten years if the lease continued
                                         so long.

       (v)    where the lease purports   The      same duty as a
              to be in perpetuity.       Conveyance (No. 23) for a
                                         consideration equal to one-fifth
 E.                                      of the whole amount of rents
                                         which would be paid or
                                         deli vcrcd in respect of the first
                                         fifty years of the lease.

       (b) where the lease is granted    The     same      duty as a
 F     for a fine or premium or for      Conveyance (No. 23) for a
       money advanced and where no       consideration equal to the
       rent is reserved.                 amount or value of such fine or
                                         premium or advance as set
                                         forth in the lease.
 G
       (c) where the lease is granted    The     same      duty     as a
       for a fine or premium or for      Conveyance (No. 23) for a
       money advanced in addition to     consideration equal to the
       rent reserved.                    amount or value of such fine or
                                         premium or advance as set
                                         forth in the lease, in addition to
   NASIRUDDIN & ANR. ETC. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                           1079
PRADESH THR. SEC. & ORS. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]


                                       the duty which would have          A
                                       been payable on such lease
                                       if no fine or premium or
                                       advance had been paid or
                                       delivered:
                                       Provided that, in any case         B
                                       when an agreement to
                                       lease is stamped with the
                                       ad valorem stamp required
                                       for a lease, and a lease in
                                       pursuance        of    such
                                       agreement is subsequently          c
                                       executed, the duty on such
                                       lease shall not exceed eight
                                       annas.

           Exemptions
   (a) Lease, executed in the                                             D
   case of a cultivator and for
   the purposes of cultivation
   (including a lease of trees for
   the production of food or
   drink) without the payment
   or delivery of any fine or                                             E
   premium, when. a definite
   term is expressed and such
   term does not exceed one
   year, or when the average
   annual rent reserved does not                                          F
   exceed one hundred rupees.

      13. The expression "Lease" defined in Section 2(16) clause (c)
shows that it also includes therein "any instrument by which tolls of
any description are let".
                                                                          G
       14. Similarly the expression "executed" and "execution" with
reference to any instrument, as defined in Section 2( 12) of the Stamp
Act, means "signecf' and "signature".
        15. Likewise the expression "Instrument" defined in Section
2( 14) shows that it includes therein every document by which any right
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1080             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 12 S.C.R.


 A     or liability is, or purports to be created, transferred, limited, extended,
       extinguished or recorded.
               16. In our considered opinion, reading of the contract in question
       would show that it was meant to collect tolls (fees) called "Tehbazari"
       in local parlance from squatters, venders, kiosks etc. and was for
 B     collecting parking fees. Such contract, in our view, is regarded as an
       instrument by which tolls of any description are let. In other words, by
       awarding such contract to the appellants, the Corporation had let their
       right to the appellants to collect the fees from a class of persons and for
       carrying on particular activity in the city. .
 c·           17. The expression "Lease" under the Stamp Act has a wider
       meaning as compared to its original meaning contained in Section 105 of
       Transfer of Property Act (for short "the T.P. Act"). If "Lease" under
       Section 2(16) of the Stamp Act includes therein four specified category
       of documents set out in clauses (a) to (d), we do not find any such
       inclusion in Section l 05 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is for this
 D     reason, we are of the view that the definition of"Lease" for the purpose
       of Stamp Act is extensive in nature. It is also clear from the use of the
       expression "and includes also" in Section 2 (16) of the Stamp Act.
              18. So by fiction, "any instrument by which tolfs of any
       description are let" is considered as "Lease" for the purpose of payment
 E     of stamp duty under the Stamp Act.
              I 9. Justice G.P. Singh, the learned author in his book "Principles
       of Statutory Interpretation" in 13th edition - at pages 179 and 180 has
       dealt with this subject under the heading "Definition sections or
       interpretation clause". In its sub-heading (a) "Restrictive and
 F     extensive definition", the author has explained as to where the words
       "mean", "include", "includes", and "means and includes" arc used in
       any definition clause in the Act then how such definition should be
       interpreted. The following passage is apposite to quote.
              "(a) Restrictive and extensive definitions
 G
              The Legislature has power to define a word even artificially.
              So the definition of a word in the definition section may
              either l>e restrictive of its ordinary meaning or it may l>e
              extensive of the same. When a word is defined to 'mean'
              such and such, the definition is prima facie restrictive and
 H
   NASIRUDDIN & ANR. ETC. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                                 1081
PRADESH THR. SEC. & ORS. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

       exhaustive; whereas, where the word defined is declared A
       to 'include' such and such, the definition is prima facie
       extensive. When by an amending Act,_ the word 'includes'
       was substituted for the word 'means' in a definition section,
       it was held that the intention was to make it more
       extensive. Further, a definition may be in the form of 'means B
       and includes', where again the definition is exhaustive, on ·
       the other hand, if a word is defined 'to apply to and include',
       the definition is understood as extensive. These meanings
       of the expressions 'means', 'includes' and 'means and
       includes' have been reiterated in Delhi Development
       Authority vs. Bhola Nath Sharma, (2011) 2 SCC 54. The C
       use of word 'any' e.g. any building also connotes extension
       for 'any' is a word of very wide meaning and prima facie the
       use of it excludes limitation."
      20. In our opinion, the aforesaid rule of interpretation applies while
interpreting the definition of Lease under Section 2( 16) of the Stamp          D
Act.
        21. As mentioned above, the Corporation in these cases awarded
the contract to the appellants to recover the tolls (fees) from squatters,
vendors, kiosks etc. and for parking the vehicles in specified places.
The contract was, therefore, for recovery of tolls and created rights and       E
liabilities in favour of contracting parties qua each other. It cannot be
disputed that the expression "tolls of any description" in clause (e) would
include all kinds of levy, charges, fees etc. which the Corporation is
entitled to charge under its Bye-laws (41 ). A fortiori, the fees in question
would also fall under Section 2(16)(c) of the Stamp Act.
                                                                           F
       22. In our opinion, the contract in question also satisfied the
definition of the expression "Instrument" as defined in Section 2(14) of
the Stamp Act because it created a right and liability and lastly, it also
satisfied the definition of expression "executed" and "execution" as
defined in Section 2 (12) of the Stamp Act because it contained the
signature of contracting parties.                                          G
      23. Learned counsel for the appellants, however, placed reliance
on the decision of this Court in New Bus-Stand Shop Owners
Association vs. Corooraton of Kozhikode & Anr. [2009 (10) SCC
455] and contended that in the light of the law laid down in the case of
                                                                                H
1082            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017) 12 S.C.R.


 A     New Bus-stand Shop Owners Association (supra), the contract in
       question has characteristics of a "license" but not of a "lease" and,
       therefore, the contract would attract a stamp duty payable on a License
       Deed under the Stamp Act.
              24. In our view, the law laid down in the case of New Bus-stand
 B     Shop Owners Association (supra) is not applicable to the case at hand
       and is distinguishable on facts.
             25. In the case of New Bus-stand Shop Owners Association
       (supra), the Corporation ofKozhikode had let out their shops to several
       persons and executed agreement in their favour. The question, however,
 c     arose as to the true nature of the agreement, whether it is a "license
       agreement" or a "lease agreement". Their Lordships on construction
       of the terms of agreement held that the agreement was a license and
       accordingly chargeable to stamp duty as "License" under the Kerala
       Stamp Act.
 D            26. Such is not the case here. The case at hand relates to the
       right to collect the tolls let by the Corporation to the person concerned.
       It squarely attracts Section 2(16)(c) of the Stamp Act and partakes the
       character of a "Lease".
              27. In the light of foregoing discussion, we are of the considered
 E     opinion that the contract in question is a "Lease" as defined in Section
       2( 16)(c) of the Stamp Act and is accordingly chargeable to payment of
       stamp duty as per the rates prescribed in Article 35 of Schedule I of the
       Stamp Act as "Lease". The conclusion arrived at by the Single Judge
       in Mohammad Ali vs. Board of Revenue, U.P. (supra) is, therefore,
       correct which we support with our reasoning given supra.
 F
             28. In view of foregoing discussion, the appeals arc found to be
       devoid of any merit. They are accordingly dismissed.


     . Ankit Gyan                                                Appeals dismissed .