NARWINDER SINGHversusSTATE OF PUNJAB

                       [2011] 1 S.C.R. 110

A                     NARWiNDER SINGH
                               v.
                                                                  ~
                      STATE OF PUNJAB
               (Criminal Appeal No. 590 of 2005)
                       JANUARY 5, 2011.
B
       [B.SUOERSHAN REDDY AND SURINDER SINGH
                 ..  NIJJAR, JJ.]

        Penal Code, 1860:
c
       s.306 - Suicidal death of a pregnant woman in her
  matrimonial home within 4 years of her marriage - Husband
  and in-laws convicted by trial court u/s 304-B - High Court
  converting the conviction of husband u/s 306 and acquitting
D the in-laws - HELD: There was no evidence of any demand
  for dowry soon before the death - High Court concluded that
                                                                  ;.
  deceased had not committed suicide on account of demands
  for dowry but due to harassment caused by her husband and
  it had compounded the acute depression from which
  deceased was suffering after the murder cf her father - High
E
  Court was fully justified in convicting the husband u/s 306 -
  Criminal Law - Framing of charges.

         ss. 304-B and 306 - Dowry death and abetment of          .,..
    suicide - t=,xplained.
F
        Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

      ·ss. 241(1) and (2) - Framing of charge - Conviction by
  trial court uls 304-B /PC - High Court converting the
  conviction to one uls 306 /PC - HELD: Nature of offence
G punishable ulss 304·8 and 306 /PC are not of distinct/different
                                                                  ~
  categories - High Court appropriately converted· the .
  conviction from s. · 304-B to s. 306 /PC.


H                              110       . :
                                                                      •   •-
                                                                          .
_,,
                   NARWINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB                111


      .....         The wife of the appellant, who was pregnant,            A
               committed suicide in her matrimonial home within fqur
               years of her marriage with the appellant. The prosecution
               case was that the accused, namely, the appellant and his
               parents, harassed the deceased for dowry. The trial court
               held that the evidence on record indicated that demands      B
              -for dowry had been made from the deceased time and
               again and that she had been harassed and compelled to
      -+-      commit suicide. It further held that ingredients of s.304-
               B IPC were satisfied on the presumptions raised u/s 114-
               B of the Evidence Act, 1872 and, accordingly, convicted      c
               the three accused u/s 304 IPC with a sentence of 7 years
               RI each. On appeal, the High Court held that the deceased
               had not committed suicide on account of demands for
               dowry, but due to harassment caused by the husband.
               It converted the conviction of the husband from s.304-B
       .l                                                                   D
               IPC to s.306 IPC with two years RI and acquitted his
               parents.
                   In the instant appeal filed by the husband-accused,
              it was contended for the appellant that because of the
              murder of the father of the deceased by extremists, she       E
              was under acute depression as a result of which she
              committed suicide and there was no distinction between
      -~
              his case and the case of his parents who were acquitted
              by the High Court; and that the High Court committed a
              grave error in convicting him u/s 306 IPC as the nature       F
              of offence punishable u/s 304 IPC was distinct and
              different from the offence punishable u/s 306 IPC and he
              was never charged with s.306 IPC.

         ~         Dismissing the appeal, the Cot.Jrt -
                                                                            G
                   HELD:

'                 1. The High Court, on examination of the entire
              evidence, concluded that the deceased had not
                                                                            H
    112     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2011) 1 S.C.R.


A committed suicide on account of demands for dowry but
  due to harassment caused by her husband, in particular,
  demanding that she should claim one of the two houses
  left behind by her father after his murder by extremists.
  The harassment by the appellant had compounded the
B acute depression from which the deceased was suffering
  after the murder of her father. There was no evidence of
  any demand for dowry soon before her death, and there
  was no demand whatsoever that the house in question
  should be transferred to either of the accused. Under
c s.304-8 IPC, the cruelty or harassment by her husband
  or any relative of her husband "for, or in connection with,
  any demand for dowry" is a prelude to the suicidal death
  of the wife. Such suicidal death is defined as 'dowry
  death'. The High Court has recorded a firm finding that
0 the harassment was not for or in connection with any
  demands for dowry. But, at the same time, the High Court
  has concluded that the wife committed suicide due to the
  harassment of the appellant, in particular. The deceased
  had committed suicide by drinking Organo Phosphorus
E poison. In such circumstances, the High Court was,
  therefore, fully justified in convicting the appellant u/s 306
  IPC. [para 9-1 OJ [118-E-H; 119-A-D]

       2.1. It cannot be said that the appellant could not
  have been convicted u/s 306 IPC in the absence of a
F charge being framed against him under the said section.
  Both the trial court and the High Court have held that the
  deceased had committed suicide. Therefore, the nature
  of the offence u/s 304-B and 306 IPC are not distinct and
  different categories. Mere omission or defect in framing
G charge would not disable the court from convicting the           _...
  accused for the offence which has been found to be
  proved on the basis of the evidence on record. In such
  circumstances,, the matter would fall within the purview                ~
  of ss. 221 (1) and (2) Cr.P.C. The High Court upon
H meticulous scrutiny of the entire evidence on record
                   NARWINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB               113


              rightly concluded that there was no evidence to indicate     A
              the commission of the offence punishable u/s 304-B IPC.
              It was also observed that the deceased had committed
              suicide due to harassment meted out to her by the
              appellant but there was no evidence on record to suggest
              that such harassment or cruelty was made in connection       B
              to any dowry demands. Thus, cruelty or harassment
              sans any dowry demands which drives the wife to
       .J_    commit suicide attracts the offence of 'abetment of
              suicide' u/s 306 IPC and not s. 304-B IPC which defines
              the offence and punishment for 'dowry death'. [para 11-      c
              t2] (119-E-F; 120-C-D; 122-D-H]

                  2.2. In the facts of the case, the High Court very
              appropriately converted the conviction from s. 304-B to
              s. 306 IPC. There has been no failure of justice in the
              conviction of the appellant u/s 306 IPC by the High Court,   D
              even though the specific charge had not been framed.
              [para 12-13] (122-H; 123-A]

                  Sangaraboina Sreenu Vs. State of A.P. 1997 (3)
                       =
              SCR 957 1997 (5) SCC 348; and Shamnsaheb M. Multtani         E
                                                        =
              Vs. State of Karnataka 2001 (1) SCR 514 2001 (2) SCC
              577 - distinguished.
                                 Case Law Reference:
                  1997 (3) SCR 957        distinguished       para 11      F
                  2001 (1) SCR 514        distinguished       para 11

                  'CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
              No. 590 of 2005.
        j._                                                                G
                  From the Judgment and Order dated 6.10.2004 of the
              High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal
              Appeal No. 406-SB of 1992.
_..'
                                                                           H
 ~·
    114        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2011) 1 S.C.R.


A         V.C._ Mahajan, Sarwa Mitter ·(for Mis. Mitter & Mitter Co,)
    for the Appellant.

         Kuldip Singh, R.K. Pandey, H.S. Sandhu and Ajay Pal for
    the Respondent.
B         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                .
          SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J. 1. This appeal has been
    filed against the judgment and order dated 6th October, 2004            -~
    of the Punjab .and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in
c   Criminal Appeal No. 406.:SB of 1992 wherein the appellant has .
    been convicted under Section 306 Indian Penal Code ('IPC' .·,
    for short)-and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years
    and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default of payment thereof :
    to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one month.
D         2. We may briefly notice the facts.

        Sukhjit Kaur, alias Rani was married to Narwinder. Singh        i
   of Village Mehdipur on 30th September, 1984. A male child
   had first been born to the couple and at the time of the incident,
E the wife was pregnant a second time. According to the in-laws '
   of the appellant, they had given sufficient dowry at the marriage
   of their daughter to the appellant. It appears that the appellant
   and his parents Daljit Singh and Joginder Kaur remained
   dissatisfied. About two months after the marriage, Sukhjit Kaur
F informed her mother Gursharan Kaur that her in-laws were
   asking her to bring valuable articles such as a scooter from her
  parents. It is also the case of the prosecution that an additional
  demand of Rs.5,000/- was made by Narwinder Singh, in the
  year 1986, which amount too was paid by his mother-in-law
G Gursharan Kaur. Unfortunately, on 25th May, 1987, Bhai ·
  Davinder Singh, father of Sukhjit Kaur was murdered by
  extremists. After the death of Bhai Davinder Singh, there was
  sea-change in the attitude of the appellant and her parents, and
                                                                                 -
  they started maltreating her. About six months prior to the fatal
H incident, there had been a quarrel between the husband and
                  NARWINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB                      115
                      [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.J
             wife, which was settled with the intervention of several relatives A
             including Kulbir Singh and Onkar Singh, PW-5. About ten days
             prior to the incident, Sukhjit Kaur went to Onkar Singh's house
             in Village Nabipur and informed him that the accused were
             demanding Rs.50,000/-. They were saying that her late father
           · had left enough money for the family and tnat she should get         s
             her share. Onkar Singh told her that he would inform Gursharan
           i Kaur, who was then living in England about the demand and

           . seek instructions from her. Unfortunately, on 30th May, 1988,
           · Onkar Singh came to know about the death of his niece Sukhjit
             Kaur (hereinafter referred to as 'the deceased'). He alongwith       c
             Gurjit Kaur, sister of the deceased, Hanwant Singh, Darshan
             Singh and Mohan Singh went to village Mehdipur and saw the
             dead body of Sukhjit Kaur alias Rani lying in the house. Blood
             was oozing from her nose. Onkar Singh, thereafter, lodged a
             FIR naming the accused as having been responsible fo.r her
                                                                                0
             death. Initially, a case under Section 306 IPC was registered ·
             against the accused but, a charge under Section 304-B of the •
             IPC was ultimately framed by the Court.

                   3. In support of its case, the prosecution relied inter-alia
              on the evidence of Kulbir Singh (PW-2) and Onkar Singh (PW-         E
              5), both uncles of the deceased, Gursharan Kaur (PW-6) the
              mother and Gurjit Kaur (PW-7). The sister of Sukhjit Kaur
· -1          stated that the demands made by the accused had been
              satisfied off and on and that the behaviour of the accused had
              compelled Sukhjit Kaur to commit suicide. The prosecution           F
              also relied upon the evidence of Dr. H.S. Bajwa (PW-3), who
            i on the basis of the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory
            'opined that she had died of Organo Phosphorus poisoning. A
           I. large number of documents including some letters allegedly
       ~   ; written by the deceased to her family members and by them to         G
              her were also produced in evidence.

                 4. The prosecution case was then put to the accused and
            their statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. They
            denied the allegations levelled against them and pleaded that         H
                                               'T



    116      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 1 $.C.R.


A as a matter of fact Sukhjit Kaur had fallen ill as she was
     pregnant and depressed after the murder of her father (to whom
     she had been deeply attached) and that she had been taken
     to Oberoi Hospital by her father-in-law on seeing her condition
     deteriorating, and that despite all efforts on the part of the
s · accused to·save her, she had died. The accused also produced
     three witnesses in defence, namely Hardev Singh (DW-1),
   · Jarnail Singh (DW-2) and Pritam Singh (DW-3), as also certain
     letters written inter-se the parties.

C       5. The trial court held that from the evidence of Kulbir Singh,
  Onkar Singh, Gursharan Kaur and Gurjit Kaur (PWs) and the
  letter Ex.P.1, it appeared that demands for dowry had been
  made by the accused from Sukhjit Kaur time and again and
  that she had been harassed and thus compelled to commit ·
  suicide. It further held that the ingredients of Section 304-B IPC
D were satisfied on the presumptions raised under Section 113-
  B of the Evidence Act with regard to dowry deaths and that the
  letters Exs. PA, PB, PC, PD and PE did not in any way show
  that the relation between the parties had been cordial. The trial
  court accordingly convicted the accused for an offence
E punishable under Section 304-B IPC, and sentenced them to
  undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to fine and
  in default ·of payment of fine to undergo further rigorous
  imprisonment for a specified period.

F      6. Aggrieved, against the aforesaid conviction and
  sentence, the appellant and his parents filed an appeal before
  the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Upon reconsideration of
  the entire evidence, the High Court concluded that the
  deceased had not committed suicide on account of demands
  for dowry but due to harassment caused by the husband, in
G particular. The appeal was, therefore, partly allowed. The High         _.
  Cour;t acquitted the parents of the appellant. However, the
  conviction of the appellant was converted from one under
  Section 304-8 IPC to Section 306 IPC. He was sentenced to
  undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine
H
         NARWINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB                      117
             [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
    of Rs.1,000/- and in default of payment, he has to undergo          A
    further rigorous imprisonment for one month. The aforesaid
    judgment is challenged in the present appeal.

i         7. Mr. Vikram Mahajan, learned senior counsel appearing
1
    for the appellant submitted that there is no distinction between    B
    the case of the appellant and that of his· parents, who have been
    acquitted. The High Court having acquitted the parents, the
    appellant also could not have been convicted. He further
    submitted that this was a plain and simple case of suicide due
    to the mental state of the deceased. He submits that since the      C
    murder of her father by extremists, the deceased had been
    under acute depression and she, therefore, had suicidal
    tendencies. Learned senior counsel further submitted that there
    is no evidence on the record to show that the victim had died
    an unnatural death. Lastly, it is submitted that the High Court
    committed a grave error in convicting the appellant under           D
    Section 306 IPC. It is submitted by Mr. Mahajan that the nature
    of offence under Section 304-B IPC is distinct and different
    from the offence under Section 306 IPC. The basic constituent
    of an offence under Section 304-B IPC is homicidal death
    (dowry death) and those of Section 306 IPC is suicidal death        E
    and abetment thereof. Furthermore, according to the learned
    senior counsel, the nature of evidahce required under both the
    categories of offences are totally different. The appellant was
    never charged under Section 306 IPC, nor is there any evidence
    on the record to sustain the conviction under Section 306 IPC.      F
        8. Mr. Kuldip Singh, learned counsel, appearing for the
   State of Punjab submits that the appellant is in fact fortunate
   being convicted only under Section 306 IPC. There is
   overwhelming evidence to prove that the appellant and his            G
   parents had been harassinr the deceased to bring more dowry.
   He submits that there is evidence that the wife had been
.'"subjected to harassment on account of dowry immediately after
\ the marriage. The death occurred within seven years of
   marriage, therefore, by virtue of Section 113-B of the Evidence
                                                                        H
    118       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 1 S.C.R.

A Act, the trial court had rightly presumed that the appellant and
  his parents had committed the offence under Section 304-B
  IPC.

         9. We have considered the submissions made by the
8   learned counsel. The High Court, upon close scrutiny of the
    evidence, concluded that there was evidence of a quarrel ,
    between the husband and wife about six months prior to the
    occurrence, which had been settled with the intervention of the ·
    eldest. There were complaints that the deceased did not know
    how to do any household work. The in-laws had also complained :
C   that she was not well mannered. Their ill-treatment of the wife
    escalated after the murder of her father by extremists. It was at •
    that stage the husband had started demanding that the
    deceased should claim one of the two houses left behind by
    her father in Village Nabipur. About ten months prior to her .
D   death, she was actually sent by the appellants to demand '
    possession of the house. The appellant and his parents were
    suspecting that the sister of the deceased, Gurjit Kaur had taken
    everything after the death of the father of the deceased. The
    appellant and his parents were insisting that the house be
E   legally conveyed in the nam~ ofthe deceased. However, mother
    of the deceased left for England after the first death anniversary
    of her husband in May, 1988. The High Court, on examination
    of the entire evidence, concluded that the deceased had not
    committed suicide on account of demands for dowry but due
F   to harassment caused by her husband, in particular. The
    deceased had committed suicide by drinking Organo
    Phosphorus poison. In view of the findings recorded, the High
    Court converted the conviction of the appellant from one under
    Section 304-B IPC to one under Section 306 IPC.
G
       10. We do not find much substance in the submission of
  Mr. Mahajan that the High Court could not have convicted the
  appellant under Section 306 IPC as the charge had been
  framed under Section 304-B IPC. On scrutiny of the entire
H evidence, the High Court has come to the conclusion that the
       NARWINDER S!NGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB                       119
           [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
deceased had not committed suicide on account of demands               A
for dowry but due to harassment caused by her husband, in
particular. The harassment by the appellant had compounded
the acute depression from which the dec~ased was suffering
after tt1d murder of her father. There was ·no evidence of any
demand for dowry soon before the death, and there was no               B
demand whatsoever that the house in question should be
transferred to either of the accused. Under Section 304-B IPC,
the cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her
husband "for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry" is
a prelude to the suicidal death of the wife. Such suicidal death       c
is defined as 'dowry death'. The High Court has recorded a firm
finding that the harassment was not for or in connection with
any demand.s for dowry. But, at the same time, the High Court
has concluded that the wife committed suicide due to the
harassment of the appellant, in particular. In such circumstances,     0
the High Court was, therefore, fully justified in convicting the
appellant under Section 306 IPC.
      11. We also do not find any substance in the submission
of Mr. Mahajan that the appellant cou!d not have been convicted
under Section 306 IPC in the absence of a charge being framed          E
against him under the aforesaid section. The learned counsel
had relied upon the judgments of this court in the case of
Sangaraboina Sreenu Vs. State of A.P. 1 and Shamnsaheb M.
Multtani Vs. State of Karnataka 2• We are of the opinion that
the '1foresaid judgments are of no assistance to the appellant,        F
in the facts and circumstances of the present case. We may,
however, notice the observations made therein. In the case of
Sangaraboina Sreenu (supra), it was observed as follows:

       ..... his appeal must succeed for the simple reason that        G
       havil .(! acquitted the appellant of the charge under Section
       302 IPC - - which was the only charge framed against him
     . -. the High Court could not have convicted him of the
1.   (1997) 5 sec 348.
2.   (2001) 2 sec 577.                                                 H
    120        SUPREME COURT REPORT~                [2011] 1 S.C.R.

A         offence under Section 306 IPC. It is true that Section 222
          CrPC entitles , court to convict a person of an offence
          which is minor in comparison to the one for which he is
          tried but Section 306 IPC cannot be said to be a minor
          offence in relation to an offence under Section 302 IPC
B         within the meaning of Section 222 CrPC for the two
          offences are of distinct and different categories. While the
          basic constituent of an offence under Section 302 IPC is
          homicidal death, those of Section 306 IPC are suicidal
          death and abetment thereof."
c        In the present case, both the trial court and the High Court
    have held that the deceased had committed suicide. Therefore,
    the nature of the offence under Sections 304-B and 306 IPC
    are not distinct and different categories.

D       Again in the case of Shamnsaheb M. Multtani (supra), this
    court observed:
          "18. So when a person is charged with an offence under
          Sections 302 and 498-A IPC on the allegation that he
          caused the death of a bride after subjecting her to
E
          harassment with a demand for dowry, within a period of 7
          years of marriage, a situation may arise, as in this case,
          that the offence of murder is not established as against the
          accused. Nonetheless, all other ingredients necessary for
          the offence under Section 304-B IPC would stand
F         established. Can the accused be convicted in such a case
          for the offence under Section 304-B IPC without the said
          offence forming part of the charge?
          19. A two-Judge Bench of this Court (K. Jayachandra
G         Reddy and G.N. Ray, JJ.) has held in Lakhjit Singh v. State
          of Punjabi that if a prosecution failed to establish the
          offence under Section 302 IPC, which alone was included
          in the charge, but if the offence under Section 306 IPC was
          made out in the evidence it is permissible for the court to
H         convict the accused•of the latter offence.
       NARWINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB                           121
           [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
       20. But without reference to the above decision, another             A
       two-Judge Bench of this Court (M.K. Mukherjee and, S.P.
       Kurdukar, JJ.) has held in Sangaraboina Sreenu v. State
       of AP. that it is impermissible to do so. The rationale
       advanced by the Bench for the above position is this:(SCC
       p.348, para 2)                                                       B
              "It is true that Section 222 CrPC entitles a court to
              convict a person of an offence which is minor in
              comparison to the one for which he is tried but
              Section 306 IPC cannot be said to be a minor
              offence in relation to an offence under Section 302
                                                                       c
              IPC within the meaning of Section 222 CrPC for the
              two offences are of distinct and different categories ..
              While the basic constituent of an offence under
              Section 302 IPC is homicidal death, those of
              Section 306 IPC are suicidal death and abetment D
,;,,          thereof."
       21. The crux of the matter is this: Would there be occasion
       for a failure of justice by adopting such a course as to
       convict an accused of the offence under Section 304-B IPC            E
       when all the ingredients necessary for the said offence
       have come out in evidence, although he was not charged
       with the said offence? In this context a reference to Section
       464(1) of the Code is apposite:
                                                                            F
              "464. (1) No finding, sentence or order by a court
              of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid
              merely on the ground that no charge was framed
              or on the ground of any error, omission or
              irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of
              charges, unless, in the opinion of the· court of              G
              i::\f'"""lal, confirmation-or revision, a failure ofjustice
              has in fact been occasioned thereby". (emphasis
              supplied)

       22. In other words, a conviction wo• ·'"' be valid even if there     H
                   NARWINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB                  123
                       [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
                 13. In our opinion, there has been no failure of justice In   A
            the conviction of the appellant under Section 306 IPC by the
            High Court, even though the specific charge had not been
            framed.
                14. Therefore, we see no reason to interfere with the ·B
            judgment of the High Court. The appeal is accordingly
            dismissed .
      .;_   R.P.                                        Appeal dismissed.




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