Supreme Court of India
NARINDER SINGH & ORS.versusSTATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 217
- Decided
- 27 March 2014
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- K S RADHAKRISHNAN
Holding
Even for non‑compoundable offences such as attempt to murder under Section 307 IPC, a High Court may quash the proceedings under Section 482 CrPC if, after a comprehensive prima facie assessment of the injuries, evidence and circumstances—including the settlement and its impact on the likelihood of conviction—accepting the compromise serves the ends of justice and prevents abuse of process.
Summary
The Supreme Court considered a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC seeking quashment of an FIR registered under Sections 307, 324, 323 and 34 IPC after the accused and complainant settled their dispute through a village Panchayat. The High Court had refused to accept the compromise, relying solely on the seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victim. The Court examined whether a non‑compoundable offence like attempt to murder could be quashed on settlement, the relevance of the nature of injuries, the stage of investigation, and the likelihood of conviction. It held that the High Court’s power under Section 482 is distinct from compounding under Section 320 and may be exercised sparingly to secure the ends of justice or prevent abuse of process, even for non‑compoundable offences, provided a prima facie assessment shows remote chances of conviction. Applying these principles, the Court found the settlement credible, the chance of conviction remote, and therefore allowed the appeal, quashing the FIR and criminal proceedings.
Issues considered
- Whether a settlement between parties can be accepted to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC when the offence is non‑compoundable under Section 320(9) CrPC.
- Whether the seriousness of injuries and the nature of the offence (Section 307 IPC) preclude the exercise of power under Section 482.
- What guidelines should govern the High Court's exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 in accepting settlements.
- Whether the timing of settlement and the stage of investigation affect the discretion to quash the FIR.
- Whether Section 320(9) CrPC limits the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 173, s. 320, s. 482
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 307, s. 323, s. 324, s. 34
- Prevention of Corruption Act
Subjects
Section 482 CrPCsettlementcompoundingnon‑compoundable offenceSection 307 IPCquashing of FIRhigh court discretionends of justiceabuse of processcriminal procedureinjury assessmentpublic policy
Judgment
[20141 4 S.C.R. 1012
A NARINDER SINGH & ORS.
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 686 of 2014)
MARCH 27, 2014
B
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN AND A.K. SIKRI, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482 - Criminal
proceedings -Settlement between the parties - Effect -
C Guidelines laid down to be kept in mind by the High Courts
to take a view as to under what circumstances it should accept
settlement between the parties and quash the proceedings
and under what circumstances it should refrain from doing so
- General discussion made in this behalf - Matter also
o examined in the context of offences uls. 307 /PC - Penal Code,
1860 - s. 307.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482 - FIR
registered u/ss. 30713241323134, /PC - Petition filed uls. 482
E CrPC for quashing of the FIR on basis of compromise entered
into between accused-petitioners and respondent No. 2-
complainant - High Court however, refused to accept the
compr9mise and to quash the FIR and criminal proceedings
pending against the petitioners - Held: The sole reason which
weighed with the High Court in refusing to accept the
F compromise I settlement was the nature of injuries suffered
by the complainant - However, other attendant and
inseparable circumstances also require consideration - The
FIR indicates that the complainant was attacked by the
accused persons because of some previous dispute between
G the parties - But since elders of the village, including
Sarpanch, intervened in the matter and the parties have not
only buried their hatchet but have decided to live peacefully
in future, this becomes an important consideration - Further,
the evidence is yet to be led in the Court - In view of
H 1012
NARINDER $1NGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1013
ANR.
compromise between parties, there is minimal chance of the A
witnesses coming forward in support of the prosecution case
- Even though nature of injuries can still be established by
producing the doctor as witness who conducted medical
examination, it may become difficult to prove as to who
caused these injuries - The chances of conviction, therefore, B
appear to be remote - It would, therefore, be unnecessary to
drag these proceedings - Taking all these factors into
consideration cumulatively, compromise between the parties
accepted and the criminal proceedings against the petitioners
quashed - Penal Code, 1860 - ss.30713241323134. c
Petition under Section 482 CrPC was filed for
quashing of FIR registered und.er Sections 307/324/323/
34, IPC, on the basis of compromise entered into between
the accused-petitioners and respondent No.2-
complainant. The High Court refused to exercise its D
extraordinary discretion invoking the provisions of
Section 482 CrPC on the ground that four injuries were
suffered by the complainant and as per the opinion of the
Doctor, injury No.3 was serious in nature. The High Court,
thus, refused to accept the compromise entered into E
between the parties.
The question which arose for consideration, in these
circumstances, was as to whether the Court should have
accepted the compromise arrived at between the parties F
and quash the FIR as well as criminal proceedings
pending against the petitioners.
The counsel for the State supported the verdict of the
High Court arguing that since offence under Section 307
is non-compoundable, the accused could not be G
acquitted only because of the reason that there was a
compromise/settlement between the parties.
The counsel for the appellant, on the other hand,
submitted that merely because an offence is non- H
1014 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A compoundable under Section 320 CrPC would not mean
that the High Court is denuded of its power to quash the
proceedings in exercising its jurisdiction under Section
482 of the CrPC. He argued that Section 320(9) CrPC
cannot limit or affect the power of the High Court under
B Section 482 CrPC; and further that having regard to the
circumstances in the present case where the fight had
occurred on the spot in the heat of the moment inasmuch
as both sides were verbally fighting when the petitioners
had struck the victim, this assault was more of a crime
c against the individual than against the society at large.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. In the instant case, the two rival parties
have amicably settled the disputes between themselves
D and buried the hatchet. Not only this, they say that since
they are neighbours, they want to live like good
neighbours and that was the reason for restoring friendly
ties. In such a scenario, should the court give its
imprimatur to such a settlement. The answer depends on
E various incidental aspects which need serious
discourse. The Legislators has categorically recognized
that those offences which are covered by the provisions
of section 320 CrPC are concededly those not only do
not fall within the category of heinous crime but also
F which are personal between the parties. Therefore, this
provision recognizes where there is a compromise
between the parties the Court is to act at the said
compromise and quash the proceedings. However, even
in respect of such offences not covered within the four
G corners of Section 320 of the Code, High Court is given
power under Section 482 of the Code to accept the
compromise between the parties and quash the
proceedings. The guiding factor is as to whether the
ends of justice would justify such exercise of power, both
the ultimate consequences may be acquittal or dismissal
H
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1015
ANR.
of indictment. [Para 26] [1039-B-F] A
1.2. An attempt to take the life of another person has
to be treated as a heinous crime and against the society.
However, at the same time the Court cannot be oblivious
to hard realities that many times whenever there is a
B
quarrel between the parties leading to physical
commotion and sustaining of injury by either or both the
parties, there is a tendency to give it a slant of an offence
under Section 307 IPC as well. Therefore, only because
FIR/Charge-sheet incorporates the provision of Section C
307 IPC would not, by itself, be a ground to reject the
petition under section 482 of the Code and refuse to
accept the settlement between the parties. While taking
a .call as to whether compromise in such cases should
be effected or not, the High Court should go by the nature
of injury sustained, the portion of the bodies where the D
injuries were inflicted (namely whether injuries are caused
at the vital/delicate parts of the body) and the nature of
weapons used etc. On that basis, if it is found that there
is a strong possibility of proving the charge under
Section 307 IPC, once the evidence to that effect is led E
and injuries proved, the Court should not accept
settlement between the parties. On the other hand, on the
basis of prima facie assessment of the aforesaid
circumstances, if the High Court forms an opinion that
provisions of Section 307 IPC were unnecessary included F
in the charge sheet, the Court can accept the plea of
compounding of the offence based on settlement
between the parties. [Paras 27, 28] [1040-C-G]
1.3. The timing of settlement would also play a crucial
G
role. If the settlement is arrived at immediately after the
alleged commission of offence when the matter is still
under investigation, the High Court may be somewhat
liberal in accepting the settlement and quashing the
proceedings/investigation. Of course, it would be after
H
1016 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A looking into the attendant circumstances. Likewise, when
challan is submitted but the charge has not been framed,
the High Court may exercise its discretionary jurisdiction.
However, at this stage, since the report of the 1.0. under
Section 173, Cr.P.C. is also placed before the Court it
B would become the bounding duty of the Court to go into
the said report and the evidence collected, particularly the
medical evidence relating to injury etc. sustained by the
victim. This aspect, however, would be examined along
with another important consideration, namely, in view of
C settlement between the parties, whether it would be unfair
or contrary to interest of justice to continue with the
criminal proceedings and whether possibility of
conviction is remote and bleak. If the Court finds the
answer to this question in affirmative, then also such a
case would be a fit case for the High Court to give its
0
stamp of approval to the compromise arrived at between
the parties, inasmuch as in such cases no useful purpose
would be served in carrying out the criminal proceedings
which in all likelihood would end in acquittal, in any case.
E [Para 29] [1040-H; 1041-A-E]
Rajendra Harakchand Bhandari vs. State of Maharashtra
(2011) 13 SCC 311; Dimpey Gujral v. Union Territory through
Administrator 2012 AIR SCW 5333; B. S. Joshi vs. State of
Haryana (2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 (2) SCR 1104; Gian Singh
F vs. State of Punjab & Anr. (2012) 10 SCC 303: 2012 (8) SCR
753; Shiji VS. Radhika & Anr. (2011) 10 sec 705: 2011 (1)
SCR 135 and State of Rajasthan vs. Shambhu Kewat & Ors.
2013 (14) SCALE 235 - referred to.
G 2. The principles by which the High Court would be
guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement
between the parties and exercising its power under
Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement
and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the
settlement with direction to continue with the criminal
H
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1017
ANR. .
proceedings, may be summed up and laid down as A
follows:
(I) Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code
is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the
Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the 8
Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High
Court has inherent power to quash the criminal
proceedings even in those cases which are not
compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter
between themselves. However, this power is to be C
exercised sparingly and with caution.
(II) When the parties have reached the settlement and
on that basis petition for quashing the criminal
proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases
would be to secure: D
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form an E
opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
(Ill) Such a power is not be exercised in those
prosecutions which involve heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, F
dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and
have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences
alleged to have been committed under special statute like
the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by Public Servants while working in that G
capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of
compromise between the victim and the offender.
(IV) On the other, those criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character,
particularly those arising out of commercial transactions H
1018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family
disputes should be quashed when the parties have
resolved their entire .disputes among themselves.
(V) While exercising its powers, the High Court is to
8 examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is
remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases
would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice
and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not
quashing the criminal cases.
(VI) Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the
C category of heinous and serious offences and therefore
is to be generally treated as crime against the society and
not against the individual alone. However, the High Court
would not rest its decision merely because there is a
mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is
D framed under this provision. It would be open to the High
Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section
307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has
collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead
to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this
E purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the
nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted
on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of
weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries
suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor.
F On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court
can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility
of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and
bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the
settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas
G in the later case it would be permissible for the High
Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based
on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage,
the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the
settlement between the parties is going to result in
H harmony between them which may improve their future
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. SlATE OF PUNJAB & 1019
ANR.
relationship. A
(VII) While deciding whether to exercise its power
under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of
settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the
settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged
B
commission of offence and the matter is still under
investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting
the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/
investigation. It is because· of the reason that at this stage
the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has
not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge C
is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence
is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show
benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after
prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material
mentioned above. On the other hand, where the D
prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the
conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of
argument, normally the High Court should refrain from
exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as
in such cases the trial court would be in a position to E
decide the case finally on merits and to come a
conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307
IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where
the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and
the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, F
mere compromise between the parties would not be a
ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the
offender who has already been convicted by the trial
court. [Para 31] (1041-H; 1042-A-H, 1043-A-H, 1044-A-F]
3.1. In the present case, FIR was registered under G
Section 307/324/323/34 IPC. Investigation was completed,
whereafter challan was presented in the court against the
petitioner herein. Charges have also been framed; the
case is at the stage of recording of evidence. At this
H
1020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
.A juncture, parties entered into compromise on the basis
of which petition under Section 482 of the Code was filed
by the petitioners namely the accused persons for
quashing of the criminal proceedings under the said FIR.
As per the copy of the settlement which was annexed
8 along with the petition, the compromise took place
between the parties when respectable members of the
Gram Panchayat held a meeting under the Chairmanship
of Sarpan~h. It is stated that on the intervention of the
said persons/Panchayat, both the parties were agreed for
C compromise and have also decided to live with peace in
future with each other. [Para 33) [1044-G-H; 1045-A-C]
3.2. It is found from the impugned order that the sole
reason which weighed with the High Court in refusing to
accept the settlement between the parties was the nature
D of injuries. If one goes by that factor alone, normally one
would tend to agree with the High Court's approach.
However, some other attendant and inseparable
circumstances also need to be kept in mind which
compels this Court to take a different view. [Para 34)
E [1045-0-E]
3.3. The FIR gives an indication that the complainant
was attacked allegedly by the accused persons because
of some previous dispute between the parties, though
nature of dispute etc. is not stated in detail. However, a
F very pertinent statement appears on ·record viz.,
"respectable persons have been trying for a compromise
up till now, which could not be finalized". This becomes
an important aspect. It appears that there have been
some disputes which led to the aforesaid purported
G attack by the accused on the complainant. In this context
when one finds that the elders of the village, including
Sarpanch, intervened in the matter and the parties have
not only buried their hatchet but have decided to live
peacefully in future, this becomes an important
H consideration. The evidence is yet to be led in the Court.
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1021
ANR.
It has not even started. In view of compromise between A
·parties, there is a minimal chance of the witnesses
coming forward in support of the prosecution case. Even
though nature of injuries can still be established by
producing the doctor as witness who conducted medical
examination, it may become difficult to prove as to who B
caused these injuries. The chances of conviction,
therefore, appear to be remote. It would, therefore, be
unnecessary to drag these proceedings. Taking all these
factors into consideration cumulatively, this Court is of
the opinion that the compromise between the parties be c
accepted and the criminal proceedings against the
petitioners be quashed. [Para 35)[1045-F-H; 1046-A-D)
Case Law Reference:
(2011) 13 sec 311 referred to Para 9 D
2012 AIR sew 5333 referred to Para 10
2003 (2) SCR 1104 referred to Para 11
2012 (8) SCR 753 referred to Para 12
E
2011 (1) SCR 135 referred to Para 22
2013 (14) SCALE 235 referred to Para 23
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 686 of 2014. F
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.10.2013 of the
High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM No.
27343 of 2013.
P.N. Puri for the Appellant. G
' Kuldip Singh for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H
1022 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A A.K. SIKRI, J. 1. The present Special Leave Petition has
been preferred against the impugned judgment/final order
dated 8.10.2013 passed by the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition
No.27343/2013. It was a petition under Section 482 of the
B Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the
"Code") for quashing of FIR No.121/14.7.2010 registered
under Sections 307/324/323/34,IPC, on the basis of
compromise dated 22.7.2013 entered into between the
petitioners (who are accused in the said FIR) and respondent
c No.2 (who is the complainant). The High Court has refused to
exercise its extraordinary discretion invoking the provisions of
Section 482 of the Code on the ground that four injuries were
suffered by the complainant and as per the opinion of the
Doctor, injury No.3 were serious in nature. The High Court, thus,
D refused to accept the compromise entered into between the
parties, the effect whereof would be that the petitioners would
face trial in the said FIR.
2. Leave granted.
E 3. We ha 119 heard counsel for the parties at length.
4. It may be stated at the outset that the petitioners herein, ·
who are three in number, have been charged under various
provisions of the IPC including for committing offence
punishable under Section 307, IPC i.e. attempt to commit
F murder. FIR No.121/14.7.2010 was registered. In the aforesaid
FIR, the allegations against the petitioners are that on 9.7.2010
at 7.00 A.M. while respondent No.2 was going on his
motorcycle to bring diesel from village Lapoke, Jasbir Singh,
Narinder Singh both sons of Baldev Singh and Baldev Singh
G son of Lakha Singh attacked him and injured him. Respondent
No.2 was admitted in Shri Guru Nanak Dev Hospital, Amritsar.
After examination the doctor found four injuries on his person.
Injury No.1 to 3 are with sharp edged weapons and injury No.4
is simple. From the statement of injured and MLR's report, an
H FIR under sections 323/324/34 IPC was registered. After X-
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1023
ANR. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
ray report relating to injury No.3, section 307 IPC was added A
in the FIR
5. After the completion of investigation, challan has been
presented in the Court against the petitioners and charges have
also been framed. Now the case is pending before the Ld.Trial
8
Court, Amritsar, for evidence.
6. During the pendency of trial proceedings, the matter has
been compromised between .the petitioners as well as tne
private respondent with the intervention of the Panchayat on
12.07 .2013. It is clear from the above that three years after the C
incident. ~he parties compromised the matter with intervention
,of the Panchayat of the village.
7. It is on the basis of this compromise, the petitioners
moved aforesaid criminal petition under section 482 of the
D
Code for quashing of the said FIR. As per the petitioners, the
parties have settled the matter, as they have decided to keep
harmony between them to enable them to live with peace and
love. The compromise records that they have no grudge against
each other and the complainant has specifically agreed that he
has no objection if the FIR in question is quashed. Further, both. E
the parties ha.ve undertaken not to indulge in any litigation
against each other and withdraw all the complaints pending
between the parties before the court. As they do not intend to
proceed with any criminal case against each other, on that basis
the submission of the petitioners before the High Court was that F
the continuance of the criminal proceedings in the aforesaid FIR
will be a futile exercise and mere wastage of precious time of
the court as well as investigating agencies.
8. The aforesaid submission, however, did not impress the G
High Court as the medical report depicts the injuries to be of
grievous nature. The question for consideration, in these
circumstances, is as to whether the court should have accepted
the compromise arrived at between the parties and quash the
FIR as well as. criminal PfOCeedings pending against the H
1024 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A petitioner.
9. The Id. GOunsel for the State has supported the
aforesaid verdict of the High Court arguing that since offence
under Section 307 is non-compoundable, the respondents
could not have been acquitted only because of the reason that
8 there was a compromise/settlement between the parties. In
support, the learned counsel for the respondent-State has relied
upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Rajendra
Harakchand Bhandari vs. State of Maharashtra (2011) 13
SCC 311 wherein this Court held that since offence under
C Section 307 is not compoundable, even when the parties had
settled the matter, compounding of the offence was out of
question. Said settlement along with other extenuating ·
circumstances was only taken as the ground for reduction of
the sentence in the following manner:
D
"We must immediately state that the offence under
Section 307 is not compoundable in terms of Section
320(9) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and,
therefore, compounding of the offence in the present case
E is out of question. However, the circumstances.pointed out
by the learned Senior Counsel do persuade us for a lenient
view in regard to the sentence. The incident occurred on
17.5. 1991 and it is almost twenty years since then. The
appellants are agriculturists by occupation and have no
previous criminal background. There has been
F
reconciliation amongst parties; the relations between the
appellants and the victim have become cordial and prior
to the appellants' surrender, the parties have been living
peacefully in the village. The appellants have already
undergone the sentence of more than two-and-a half years.
G Having regard to those circumstances, we are satisfied
that ends of justice will be met if the substantive sentence
awarded to the appellants is reduced to the period already
undergone while maintaining the, amount of fine.
H
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1025
ANR. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
Consequently, while confirming the conviction of the A
appellants for the offences punishable under Section 307
read with Section 34, Section 332 read with Section 34
and Section 353 read with Section 34, the substantive
sentence awarded to them by the High Court is reduced
to the period already undergone. The fine amount and the B
default stipulation remain as it is."
10. The learned counsel for the appellant, on the other
hand, submitted that merely because an offence is non-
compoundable under Section 320 of the Code would not mean C
that the High Court is denuded of its power to quash the
proceedings in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of
· the Cr.P.C. He argued that Section 320(9) of the Code cannot
limit or affect the power of the High Court under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C. Such a power is recognized by the Supreme
Court in catena of judgments. He further submitted that having D
regard to the circumstances in the present case where the fight
had occurred on the spot in the heat of the moment inasmuch
as both sides were verbally fighting when the petitioners had
struck the victim, this assault was more of a crime against the
individual than against the society at large. He further submitted E
that this Court in Dimpey Gujral v. Union Territory through
Administrator 2012 AIR SCW 5333 had quashed the FIR
registered under sections 147,148,149,323,307,452 and 506
of the IPC.
F
11. We find that there are cases where the power of the
High Court under Section 482 of the Code to quash the
proceedings in those offences which are uncompoundable has
been recognized. The only difference is that under Section
320(1) of the Code, no permission is required from the Court G
in those cases which are compoundable though the Court has
discretionary power to refuse to compound the offence.
However, compounding under Section 320(1) of the Code is
permissible only in minor offences or in non-serious offences.
Likewise, when the parties reach settlement in respect of H
1026 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 4 S.C.R.
A offences enumerated in Section 320(2) of the Code,
compounding is permissible but it requires the approval of the
Court. In so far as serious offences are concerned, quashing
of criminal proceedings upon compromise is within the
discretionary powers of the High Court. In such cases, the
B power is exercised under Section 482 of the Code and
proceedings are quashed. Contours of these powers were
described by this Court in B.S.Joshi vs. State of Haryana
(2003) 4 sec 675 which has been followed and further
explained/elaborated in so many cases thereafter, which are
c taken note of in the discussion that follows hereinafter.
12. At the same time, one has to keep in mind the subtle
distinction between the power of compounding of offences
given to Court under Section 320 of the Code and quashing of
criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its
D inherent jurisdiction conferred upon it under Section 482 of the
Code. Once, it is found that compounding is permissible only
if a particular offence is covered by the provisions of Section
320 of the Code and the Court in such cases is guided solitary
and squarely by the compromise between the parties, in so far
E as power of quashing under Section 482 of the Code is
concerned, it is guided by the material on record as to whether
the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power, although
the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of
indictment. Such a distinction is lucidly explained by a three-
F Judge Bench of this Court in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab
& Anr. (2012) 10 SCC 303. Justice Lodha, speaking for the
Court, explained the difference between the two provisions in
the following manner:
"Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the
G
ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not
the same thing as compounding of offence. They are
different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the
power of compounding of offences given to a court under
Section 320 is materially dilferent from the quashing of
H
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1027
ANR. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its A
inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of
a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions
contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and
squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of
opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence B.
or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by
the material on record as to whether the ends of justice
would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate
consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.
B.S.Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji
c
do illustrate the principle that the High Court may quash
criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its
inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and Section
320 does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court
under Section 482. Can it be said that by quashing criminal D
proceedings in B.S.Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma
and Shiji this Court has compounded the non-
compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so.
There does exist the distinction between compounding of
an offence under Section 320 and quashing of a criminal E
case by the High Court in exercise of inherent power under
Section 482. The two powers are distinct and different
although the ultimate consequence may be the same viz.
acquittal of the accused or dismissal of indictment."
F
13. Apart from narrating the interplay of Section 320 and
Section 482 of the Code in the manner aforesaid, the Court
also described the extent of power under Section .482 of the
Code in quashing the criminal proceedings in those cases
where the parties had settled the matter although the offences G
are not compoundable. In the first instance it was emphasized
that the power under Sec. 482 of the Code is not to be resorted
to, if there is specific provision in the Code for redressal of the
grievance of an aggrieved party. It should be exercised very
sparingly and should not be exercised as against the express
H
1028 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. The.
Court also highlighted that in different situations, the inherent
power may be exercised in different ways to achieve its ultimate
objective. Formation of opinion by the High Court before it
exercises inherent power under Section 482 on either of the
B twin objectives, (i) to prevent abuse of the process of any court,
or (ii) to secure the ends of justice, is a sine qua non.
14. As to under what circumstances the criminal
proceedings in a non-compoundable case be quashed when
C there is a settlement between the parties, the Court provided
the following guidelines:
"Where the High Court quashes a criminal
proceeding having regard to the facts that the dispute
between the offender and the viCtim has been settled
D although the offences are not compoundable, it does so
as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will
be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands
that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and
peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the
E ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which
have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing
that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of
the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only
because he and the victim have settled the dispute
F amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation,
yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law,
with or without the permission of the court. In respect of
serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. or other
offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral
turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of
G
Corruption Act or the offences committed by public
servants while working in that capacity, the settlement
between the offender and the victim can have no legal
sanction at all. However, certain offences which
overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavor having
H
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1029
ANR. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, A
partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising
out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the
family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim
and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes
between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such B
offences have not been made compoundable, the High
Court may within the framework of its inherent power,
quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR
if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there
is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and c
by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be
casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above
list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend
on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be
prescribed." o
Thereafter, the Court summed up the legal position in the
following w0rds:
''The position that emerges from the above discussion can
be summarized thus: the power of the High Court in E
quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different
from the power given fo a criminal court for compounding
the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent
power is of wide plentitude with no statutory limitation but F
it has to be exercised in accord with the guidelines
engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of
justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse f the process of any court.
In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or
complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and G
the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case and no category can
be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power,
the High Court must have due regard to the nature and
gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of
H
1030 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.
cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or
victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute.
Such .offences are not private in nature and have a serious
impact 'on society. Similarly, any compromise between the
B victim and the offender in relation to the offences under
special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act, or
the offences committed by public servants while working
in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for
quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But
c the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and
predominatingly civil flavor stand on a different footing for
the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising
from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or
such like transactions or the offences arising out of
matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes
D
where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature
and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this
category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise
between the offender and the victim, the possibility of
E
conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the
crim'inal case would put the accused to great oppression
and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to
him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and
complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In
F other words, the High Court must consider whether it
would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to
continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the
criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal
proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law
G despite settlement and compromise between the victim
and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of
justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an
end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the
affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its
H jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1031
ANR. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
15. The Court was categorical that in respect of serious A
offences or other offences of mental depravity or offence of
merely dacoity under special statute, like the Prevention of
Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servant
while working in that capacity. The mere settlement between
the parties would not be a ground to quash the proceedings B
by the High Court and inasmuch as settlement of such heinous
crime cannot have imprimatur of the Court.
16. The question is as to whether offence under Section
307 IPC falls within the aforesaid parameters. First limb of this c
question is to reflect on the nature of the offence. The charge
against the accused in such cases is that he had attempted to
take the life of another person (victim). On this touchstone,
should we treat it a crime of serious nature so as to fall in the
category of heinous crime, is ttie poser.
D
17. Finding an answer to this question becomes imperative
as the philosophy and jurisprudence of sentencing is based
thereupon. If it is heinous crime of serious nature then it has to
be treated as a crime against the society and not against the
individual alone. Then it becomes the soJemn duty of the State E
to punish the crime doer. Even if there is a settlement/
compromise between the perpetrator of crime and the victim,
that is of no consequence. Law prohibits certain acts and/or
conduct and treats them as offences. Any person committing
those acts is subject to penal consequences which may be of F
various kind. Mostly, punishment provided for committing
offences is either imprisonment or monetary fine or ·both.
Imprisonment can be rigorous or simple in nature. Why those
persons who commit offences are subjected to such penal
consequences? There are many philosophies behind such G
sentencing justifying these penal consequences. The
philosophical/jurisprudential justification can be retribution,
incapacitation, specific deterrence, general deterrence,
rehabilitation, or restoration. Any of the above or a combination
thereof can be the goal of sentencing. Whereas in various
H
1032 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A countries, sentencing guidelines are provided, statutorily or
otherwise, which may guide Judges for awarding specific
sentence, in India we do not have any such sentencing policy
till date. The prevalence of such guidelines may not only aim
at achieving consistencies in awarding sentences in different
B cases, such guidelines normally prescribe the sentencing policy
as well namely whether the purpose of awarding punishment
in a particular case is more of a deterrence or retribution or
rehabilitation etc.
18. In the absence of such guidelines in India, Courts go
C by their own perception about the philosophy behind the
prescription of certain specified penal consequences for
particular nature of crime. For some deterrence and/or
vengeance becomes more important whereas another Judge
may be more influenced by rehabilitation or restoration as the
D goal of sentencing. Sometimes, it would be a combination of
both which would weigh in the mind of the Court in awarding a
particular sentence. However, that may be question of quantum.
What follows from the discussion behind the purpose of
sentencing is that if a particular crime is to be treated as crime
E against the society and/or heinous crime, then the deterrence
theory as a rationale for punishing the offender becomes more
relevant, to be applied in such cases. Therefore, in respect of
such offences which are treated against the society, it becomes
the duty of the State to punish the offender. Thus, even when
F there is a settlement between the offender and the victim, their
will would not prevail as in such cases the matter is in public
domain. Society demands that the individual offender should
be punished in order to deter other effectively as it amounts to
greatest good of the greatest number of persons in a society.
G It is in this context that we have to und~rstand the scheme/
philosophy behind Section 307 of the Code.
19. We would like to expand this principle in some more
detail. We find, in practice and in reality, after recording! the
conviction and while awarding the sentence/punishment the
H
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1033
ANR. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
Court is generally governed by any or all or combination of the A
aforesaid factors. Sometimes, it is the deterrence theory which
prevails in the minds of the Court, particularly in those cases
where the crimes committed are heinous in nature or depicts
depravity, or lack morality. At times it is to satisfy the element
of "emotion" in law and retribution/vengeance becomes the B
guiding factor. In any case, it cannot be denied that the purpose
of punishment by law is deterrence, constrained by
considerations of justice. What, then, is the role of mercy,
forgiveness and compassion in law? These are by no means
. comfortable questions and even the answers may not be c
comforting. There may be certain cases which are too obvious
namely cases involving heinous crime with element of
criminality against the society and not parties inter-se. In such
cases, the deterrence as purpose of punishment becomes
paramount and even if the victim or his relatives have shown D
the virtue and gentility, agreeing to forgive the culprit,
compassion of that private party would not move the court in
accepting the same as larger and more important public policy
of showing the iron hand of law to the wrongdoers, to reduce
the commission of such offences, is more important. Cases of
E
murder, rape, or other sexual offences etc. would clearly fall in
this category. After all, justice requires long term vision. On the
other hand, there may be, offences falling in the category where
"correctional" objective of criminal law would have to be given
more weightage in contrast with "deterrence" philosophy.
Punishment, whatever else may be, must be fair and conducive F
to good rather than further evil. If in a particular case the Court
is of the opinion that the settlement between the parties would
lead to more good; better relations between them; would
prevent further occurrence of such encounters between the
parties, it may hold settlement to be on a better pedestal. It is G
a delicate balance between the two inflicting interests which is
to be achieved by the Court after examining all these
parameters and then deciding as to which course of action it
should take in a particular case.
H
1034 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 4 S.C.R.
A 20. We may comment, at this stage, that in so far as the
judgment in the case of Bhandari (supra) is concerned,
undoubtedly this Court observed that since offence under
Section 307 is not compoundable in terms of Section 320(9)
of the Cr.P .C., compounding of the offence was out of question.
B However, apart from this observation, this aspect is not
discussed in detail. Moreover, on reading para 12 of the said
judgment, it is clear that one finds that counsel for the appellant
in that case had not contested the conviction of the appellant
for the offence under Section 307 IPC, but had mainly pleaded
c for reduction of sentence by projecting mitigating circumstances.
21. However, we have some other cases decided by this
Court commenting upon the nature of offence under Section
307 of IPC. In Dimpey Gujral case (supra), FIR was lodged
under sections 147,148,149,323,307,552 and 506 of the IPC.
D The matter was investigated and final report was presented to
the Court under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. The trial court had
even framed the charges. At that stage, settlement was arrived
at between parties. The court accepted the settlement and
quashed the proceedings, relying upon the earlier judgment of
E this Court in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab & Anr. 2012 AIR
sew 5333 wherein the court had observed that inherent powers
under section 482 of the Code are of wide plentitude with no
statutory limitation and the guiding factors are: (1) to secure the
needs of justice, or (2) to prevent abuse of process of the court.
F While doing so, commenting upon the offences stated in the
FIR, the court observed:
"Since the offences involved in this case are of a
personal nature and are not offences against the society.
we had enquired with learned counsel appearing for the
G
parties whether there is any possibility of a settlement. We
are happy to note that due to efforts made by learned
counsel, parties have seen reason and have entered into
a compromise."
H This Court, thus, treated such offences including one under
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1035
ANR. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
section 307, IPC were of a personal nature and not offences A
against the society.
22. On the other hand, we have few judgments wherein this
Court refused to quash the proceedings in FIR registered under
section 307 IPC etc. on the ground that offence under section 8
307 was of serious nature and would fall in the category of
heinous crime. In the case of Shiji vs. Radhika & Anr. (2011)
10 SCC 705 the Court quashed the proceedings relating to an
offence under section 354 IPC with the following observations:
"We have heard learned counsel for the parties and C
perused the impugned order. Section 320 of the Cr.P.C.
enlists offences that are compoundable with the
permission of the Court before whom the prosecution is
pending and those that can be compounded even without
such permission. An offence punishable under Section D
354 of the IPC is in terms of Section 320(2) of the Code
compoundable at the instance of the woman against whom
the offence is committed. To that extent, therefore, there
is no difficulty in either quashing the proceedings or
compounding the offence under Section 354, of which the E
appellants are accused, having regard to the fact that the
alleged victim of the offence has settled the matter with the
alleged assailants. An offence punishable under Section
394 IPC is not, however, compoundable with or without the
permission of the Court concerned. The question is F
whether the High Court could and ought to have exercised
· its power under section 482 the said provision in the light
of the compromise that the parties have arrived at."
23. In a recent judgment in the case of State of Rajasthan
vs. Shambhu Kewat & Ors. 2013 (14) SCALE 235, this very G
Bench of the Court was faced with the situation where the High
Court had accepted the settlement between the parties in an
offence under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC and set
the accused at large by acquitting them. The settlement was
arrived at during the pendency of appeal before the High Court H
1036 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
..... A
against the order of conviction and sentence of the Sessions
Judge holding the accused persons guilty of the offence under
Section307/34 IPC. Some earlier cases of compounding of
offence under Section 307 IPC were taken note of, noticing
under certain circumstances, the Court had approved the
B compounding whereas in certain other cases such a course of
action was not accepted. In that case, this Court took the view
that High Court was not justified in accepting the compromise
and setting aside the conviction. While doing so, following
discussion ensued:
c "We find, in this case, such a situation does not arise. In
the instant case, the incident had occurred on 30.10.2008.
The trial court held that the accused persons, with common
intention, went to the shop of the injured Abdul Rashid on
that day armed with iron rod and a strip of iron and, in
D furtherance of their common intention, had caused serious
injuries on the body of Abdul Rashid, of which injury number
4 was on his head, which was of a serious nature.
Dr.Rakesh Sharma, PW5, had stated that out of the
E injuries caused to Abdul Rashid, injury No.4 was an injury
on the head and that injury was "grievous and fatal for life".
PW8, Dr. Uday Bhomik, also opined that a grievous injury
was caused on the head of Abdul Rashid. DR. Uday
conducted the operation on injuries of Abdul Rashid as a
F Neuro Surgeon and fully supported the opinion expressed
by PW5 Dr. Rakesh Sharma that injury No.4 was "grievous
and fatal for life".
We notice that the gravity of the injuries was taken
note of by the Sessions Court and it had awarded the
G sentence of 10 years rigorous imprisonment for the offence
punishable under Section 307 IPC, but not by the High
Court. The High Court has completely overlooked the
various principles laid down by this Court in Gian Singh
(Supra), and has committed a mistake in taking the view
H that, the injuries were caused on the body of Abdul Rashid
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1037
ANR. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
in a fight occurred at the spur and the heat of the moment. A
It has been categorically held by this Court in Gian Singh
(supra) that the Court, while exercising the power under
Section 482, must have "due regard to the nature and
gravity of the crime" and "the social impact''. Both these
aspects were completely overlooked by the High Court. B
The High Court in a cursory manner, without application
of mind, blindly accepted the statement of the parties that
they had settled their disputes and differences and took
the view that it was a crime against "an individual", rather
than against "the society at large". c
We are not prepared to say that the crime alleged
to have been committed by the accused persons was a
crime against an individual, on the other hand it was a
crime against the society at large. Criminal law is designed
as a mechanism for achieving social control and its D
purpose is the regulation of conduct and activities within
the society. Why Section 307 IPC is held to be non-
compoundable, because the Code has identified which
conduct should be brought within the ambit of non-
compoundable offences. Such provisions are not meant, E.
just to protect the individual, but the society as a whole.
High Court was not right in thinking that it was only an injury
to the person and since the accused persons had received
the monetary compensation and settled the matter, the
crime as against them was wiped off. Criminal justice F
system has a larger objective to achieve, that is safety and
protection of the people at large and it would be a lesson
not only to the offender, but to the individuals at large so
that such crimes would not be committed by any one and
money would not be a substitute for the crime committed G
against the society. Taking a lenient view on a serious
offence like the present, will leave a wrong impression
about the criminal justice system and will encourage further
criminal acts, which will endanger the peaceful co-
existence and welfare of the society at large." H
1038 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A 24. Thus, we find that in certain circumstances, this Court
has approved the quashing of proceedings under section
307,IPC whereas in some other cases, it is held that as the
offence is of serious nature such proceedings cannot be
quashed. Though in each of the aforesaid cases the view taken
B by this Court may be justified on its own facts, at the same time
this Court owes an explanation as to why two different
approaches are adopted in various cases. The law declared
by this Court in the form of judgments becomes binding
precedent for the High Courts and the subordinate courts, to
c follow under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Stare
Decisis is the fundamental principle of judicial decision making
which requires 'certainty' too in law so that in a given set of facts
the course of action which law shall take is discernable and
predictable. Unless that is achieved, the very doctrine of stare
decisis will lose its significance. The related objective of the
0
doctrine of stare decisis is to put a curb on the personal
preferences and priors of individual Judges. In a way, it
achieves equality of treatment as well, inasmuch as two different
persons faced with similar circumstances would be given
E identical treatment at the hands of law. It has, therefore, support
from the human sense of justice as well. The force of precedent
in the law is heightened, in the words of Karl Llewellyn, by "that
curious, almost universal sense of justice which urges that all
men are to be treated alike in like circumstances".
F 25. As there is a close relation between the equality and
justice, it should be clearly discernible as to how the two
prosecutions under Section 307 IPC are different in nature and
therefore are given different treatment. With this ideal objective
in mind, we are proceeding to discuss the subject at length. It
G is for this reason we deem it appropriate to lay down some
distinct, definite and clear guidelines which can be kept in mind
by the High Courts to take a view as to under what
circumstances it should accept the settlement between the
parties and quash the proceedings and under what
H circumstances it should refrain from doing so. We make it clear
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1039
ANR. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
that though there would be a general discussion in this behalf A
as well, the matter is examined in the context of offences under
Section 307 IPC.
26. The two rival parties have amicably settled the
disputes between themselves and buried the hatchet. Not only B
this, they say that since they are neighbours, they want to live
like good neighbours and that was the reason for restoring
friendly ties. In such a scenario, should the court give its
imprimatur to such a settlement. The answer depends on
various incidental aspects which need serious discourse.
c
The Legislators has categorically recognized that those
offences which are covered by the provisions of section
320 of the Co\:le are concededly those not only do not fall
within the category of heinous crime but also which are
personal between the parties. Therefore, this provision D
recognizes whereas there is a compromise between the
parties the Court is to act at the said compromise and
quash the proceedings. However, even in respect of such
offences not covered within the four corners of Section 320
of the Code, High Court is given power under Section 482 E
of the Code to accept the compromise between the parties
and quash the proceedings. The guiding factor is as to
whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of
power, both the ultimate consequences may be acquittal
or dismissal of indictment. This is so recognized in various F
judgments taken note of above.
27. In the case of Dimpey Gujral (supra}, observations of
this Court to the effect that offences involved in that case were
not offences against the society. It included charge under
Section 307 IPC as well. However, apart from stating so, there G
is no detained discussion on this aspect. Moreover, it is the
other factors which prevailed with the Court" to accept the
settlement and compound he offence, as noted above while··
discussing this case. On the other hand, in Shambhu Kewat
(supra), after referring to some other earlier judgments, this H
1040 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A c6.urt opined that commission of offence under Section 307
IPC would be crime against the society at large, and not a crime
against an individual only. We find that in most of the cases,
this view is taken. Even on first principle, we find that an
attempt to take the life of another person has to be treated as
B a heinous crime and against the society.
28. Having said so, we would hasten to add that though it
is a serious offence as the accused person(s) attempted to
take the life of another person/victim, at the same time the court
C cannot be oblivious to hard realities that many times whenever
there is a quarrel between the parties leading to physical
commotion and sustaining of injury by either or both the parties,
there is a tendency to give it a slant of an offence under Section
307 IPC as well. Therefore, only because FIR/Charge-sheet
incorporates the provision of Section 307 IPC would not, by
D itself, be a ground to reject the petition under section 482 of
the Code and refuse to accept the settlement between the
parties. We are, therefore, of the opinion that while taking a call
as to whether compromise in such cases should be effected
or not, the High Court should go by the nature of injury
E sustained, the portion of the bodies where the injuries were
inflicted (namely whether injuries are caused at the vital/delicate
parts of the body) and the nature of weapons used etc. On that
basis, if it is found that there is a strong possibility of proving
the charge under Section 307 IPC, once the evidence to that
F effect is led and injuries proved, the Court should not accept
settlement between the parties. On the other hand, on the basis
of prima facie assessment of the aforesaid circumstances, if
the High Court forms an opinion that provisions of Section 307
IPC were unnecessary included in the charge sheet, the Court
G can accept the plea of compounding of the offence based on
settlement between the parties.
29. At this juncture, we would like also to add that the
timing of settlement would also play a crucial role. If the
settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged
. H
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1041
ANR. [A..K. SIKRI, J.]
commission of offence when the matter is still under A
investigation, the High Court may be somewhat liberal in
accepting the settleme.1t and quashing the proceedings/
investigation. Of course, it would be after looking into the
attendant circumstances as narrated in the previous para.
Likewise, when challan is submitted but the charge has not B
been framed, the High Court may exercise its discretionary
jurisdiction. However, at this stage, as mentioned above, since
the report of the 1.0. under Section 173,Cr.P.C. is also placed
before the Court it would become the bounding duty of the Court
to go into the said report and the evidence collected, particularly c
. the medical evidence relating to injury etc. sustained by the
victim. This aspect, however, would be examined along with
another important consideration, namely, in view of settlement
between the parties, whether it would be unfair or contrary to
interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings and 0
whether possibility of conviction is remote and bleak. If the
Court finds the answer to this question in affirmative, then also
such a case would be a fit case for the High Court to give its
stamp of approval to the compromise arrived at between the
parties, inasmuch as in such cases no useful purpose would
E
be served in carrying out the criminal proceedings ,which in all
likelihood would end in acquittal, in any case.
30. We have found that in certain cases, the High Courts
have accepted the compromise between the parties when the
matter in appeal was pending before the High Court against F
the conviction recorded by the trial court. Obviously, such cases
are those where the accused persons have been found guilty
by the trial court, which means the serious charge of Section
307 IPC has been proved beyond reasonable doubt at the level
of the trial court. There would not be any question of accepting G
compromise and acquitting the accused persons simply
because the private parties have buried the hatchet.
31. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay
down the following principles by which the High Court would be
1-:
1042 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 4 S.C.R.
A guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between
the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the
Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the
proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction
to continue with the criminal proceedings:
B
(I) Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to
be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to
compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No
doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has
C inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those
cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have
settled the matter betwee.n themselves. However, this power is
to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
(ll)When the parties have reached the settlement and on
D that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed,
the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.
E
While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion
on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
(II I) Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions
F which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity
or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are
not private in nature and have a serious impact on society.
Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under
special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the
offences committed by Public Servants while working in that
G capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of
compromise between the victim and the offender.
(IV) On the other, those criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character, particularly
H those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1043
ANR. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed A
when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among
themselves.
(V) While exercising its powers, the High Court is to
examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote 8
and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the
accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme
injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal
cases.
(VI) Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the C
category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to
be generally treated as crime against the society and not
against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not
rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section
307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. D
It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether
incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or
the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if
proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307
IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to E
go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is
inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of
weapons used etc. Medical report in. respect of injuries suffered
by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis
of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to F
whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances
of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can
refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal
proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible
for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence G
based on complete settlement between the parties. At this
stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the
settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony
between them which may improve their future relationship.
H
1044 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A (VII) While deciding whether to exercise its power under
Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a
crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at
immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the
matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal
B in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/
investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the
investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been
filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the
evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage,
c the High Court can show benevolence in exerci~ing its powers
favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the
circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand,
where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the
conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of
0 argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising
its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the
trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on
merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence
under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those
E cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court
and the matter is atthe appellate stage before the High Court,
mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground
to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who
has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is
proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already
F recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question
of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.
32. After having clarified the legal position in the manner
aforesaid, we proceed to discuss the case at hand.
G
33. In the present case, FIR No.121dated14.7.2010 was
registered under Section 307/324/323/34 IPC. Investigation
was completed, whereafter challan was presented in the court
against the petitioner herein. Charges have also been framed;
H the case is at the stage of recording of evidence. At this juncture,
NARINDER SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 1045
ANR. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
parties entered into compromise on the basis of which petition A
under Section 482 of the Code was filed by the petitioners
namely the accused persons for quashing of the criminal
proceedings under the said FIR. As per the copy of the
settlement which was annexed along with the petition, the
compromise took place between the parties on 12. 7 .2013 B
when respectable members of the Gram Panchayat held a
meeting under the Chairmanship of Sarpanch. It is stated that
on the intervention of the said persons/Panchayat, both the
parties were agreed for compromise and have also decided
to live with peace in future with each other. It was argued that c
since the parties have decided to keep harmony between the
parties so that in future they are able to live with peace and
love and they are the residents of the same village, the High
Court should have accepted the said compromise and quash
the proceedings.
D
34. We find from the impugned order that the sole reason
which weighed with the High Court in refusing. to accept the
settlement between the parties was the nature of injuries. If we
go by that factor alone, normally we would tend to agree with
the High Court's approach. However, as pointed out hereinafter, E
some other attendant and inseparable circumstances alco
need to be kept in mind which compel us to take a different
view.
35. We have gone through the FIR as well which was F
recorded on the basis of statement of the complainant/victim.
It gives an indication that the complainant was attacked
allegedly by the accused persons because of some previous
dispute between the parties, though nature of dispute etc. is
not stated in detail. However, a very pertinent statement G
appears on record viz .. "respectable persons have been trying
for a compromise up till now, which could riot be finalized". This
becomes an important aspect. It appears that there have been
some disputes which led to the aforesaid purported attack by
the accused on the complainant. In this context when we find
H
1046 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 4 S.C.R.
A that the elders of the village, including Sarpanch, intervened in
the matter and the parties have not only buried their hatchet but
have decided to live peacefully in future, this becomes an
important consideration. The evidence is yet to be ·led in the
Court. It has not even started. In view of compromise between
B parties, there is a minimal chance of the witnesses coming
forward in support of the prosecution case. Even though nature
of injuries can still be established by producing the doctor as
witness who conducted medical examination, it may become
difficult to prove as to who caused these injuries. The chances
c of conviction, therefore, appear to be remote. It would,
therefore, be unnecessary to drag these proceedings. We,
taking all these factors into consideration cumulatively, are of
the opinion that the compromise between the parties be
accepted and the criminal proceedings arising out of FIR
No.121 dated 14. 7.2010 registered with Police Station
0
LOPOKE, District Amritsar Rural be quashed. We order
accordingly.
36. Appeal is allowed. No costs.
E Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Appeal allowed.
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