Holding

A transfer made by a widow before the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, where she had relinquished possession, does not attract Section 14(1); it falls under Section 14(2), giving the transferee only a restricted right that reverts to the reversioners.

Summary

The appellant, Naresh Kumari, bought a house from Kesri, the widow of Radhakishan, in 1954. The respondents, reversioners of Radhakishan, argued that the widow had only a limited right in the property before the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and could sell only for legal necessity, rendering the sale void. The trial court declared the sale void; the appeal was dismissed, and the Hindu Succession Act came into force before the widow's death in 1957. In a subsequent suit for possession, the trial court again ruled for the respondents, but the appellate courts gave conflicting decisions. The Supreme Court examined whether Section 14(1) of the 1956 Act made the appellant a full owner or whether the transfer fell under Section 14(2). It held that the widow had transferred all her limited right before the Act, was not possessed of the property at the relevant date, and therefore Section 14(1) did not apply; the transfer is governed by Section 14(2), giving the appellant only a restricted right that reverts to the reversioners. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether a transfer of a widow's estate made before the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, can confer full ownership on the transferee under Section 14(1) of the Act.
Whether such a transfer falls within the proviso of Section 14(2) and thus creates only a restricted estate that reverts to the reversioners.
Interpretation of the terms 'possessed by' and 'restricted estate' in Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Legislation cited

Hindu Succession Act, 1956s. 14(1), s. 14(2)

Subjects

Hindu Succession ActSection 14widow's estatelimited rightalienationlegal necessityreversionerspossessionrestricted estatestatutory interpretationproperty law

Judgment

· NARESH KUMAR! (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ANOTHER -~
A -lo
v.
·' SHAKSHI LAL (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ANOTHER "'
FEBRUARY 5, 1999

B (K. VENKATASWAMI AND A.P. MISRA, JJ.]
~
>
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 :.

Widow's estate-Alienation of Widow's estate prior to coming into force
c of 1956 Act-Alienation without legal necessity-Rights of alienee vis. a vis.
Rights of reversioner-Held, not a valid transfer of title and alienee would
only get a transitory limited right to enjoy the property during the lifetime of
the widow and after the widow's death such property from the alienee would
revert back to the reversioners of her husband.
D Alienation of widow's estate infavour of Female Hindu prior to coming
into force of Hindu Succession Act, 1956-Effect of coming into force of
Hindu Succession Act, 1956-S. 14(1) & (2)-Scope of-Held, widow cannot
get the benefit of S. 14(1) as she has relinquished all her rights in the property
by the transfer and cannot be said to be possessed of the property before the
E coming into force of the 1956 Act.

Female Hindu-Applicability of benefit under Section 14(1)-Held,
when fem ale Hindu acquires and possesses the property in recognition of her
pre-existing right, she would become full owner of the property.
F
Female Hindu-Applicability of S. 14(2)-Held, when she gets the right
for the first time under an instrument or order without any pre-existing right '""
and such instrument or order must prescribe a restrictive estate in the property.

Words & Phrases-'Possessed by'----Meaning of in the context of Hindu
G Succession Act, 1956.

Interpretation of Statutes-Social and Beneficial Legislation-Held, in- .... )
terpretation should not be restrictive but liberal in nature and legislation which
restricts the scope of social and beneficial legislation should be given restric-
H tive interpretation.
438
NARESH KUMAR! v. SHAKSHI LAL 439
.... ,, The appellant, a female Hindu had purchased a house from one K, A
widow of R, vide sale deed dated 29th January, 1954. The respondents who
are Reversioners of R challenged the said sale and sought declaration of
the title over the said house by filing a suit for declaration on the ground
that the sale was void as the widow had only a limited interest in the
property and thus, she had no right to sell the property without legal
B
necessity. The suit was decreed by the trial court. Against the judgment of
..j_ the trial court, the appellant filed appeal before the first appellate court.
During the pendency of the appeal, the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came
into force on 17th June, 1956. The widow died on 22nd May, 1957 i.e., after
coming into force of the 1956 Act. The appeal filed by the appellant was
dismissed which became final.
c
After conclusion of the first round of litigation, the respondent -
reversioners filed second suit for possession of the house in dispute on the
basis of the decree obtained in the first round of litigation. The appellants
were the defendants in the suit and contested the suit on the ground that D
. "
the widow had died after becoming the full owner of the property in dispute
on the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the
appellant being the transferee from the said widow and being in possession
of the property had become its full owner. The trial court decreed the suit
in favour of the plaintiff - respondents. The appeal preferred by the
appellant against the o"rder of the trial court was allowed by the First E
Appellate Court. Aggrieved by the order of the first appellate court, the
respondents filed Second Appeal before the High Court. The High Court
allowed the Second Appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree of the
first appellate court and restoring the decree of the trial court. Against the
ju-lgment of the High Court, the appellants have filed the present appeal. F

The contention on behalf of the appellant was that the transfer in
her favour by sale deed made by the widow did not contain any restriction
for the enjoyment of the property and since there was no restriction under G
the said document, sub- section (2) would not apply to her and only
sub-section (1) of Section 14 would apply to her, thus making her full
owner of the property.

The contention of the respondents was that the transfer by sale deed
was made by the widow before the 1956 Act had come into operation when H
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 1 S.C.R.
A she had only a limited right in the house and had no right to sell the house
in question except for legal necessity and that there was a finding in the
first round of litigation between the same parties that the sale was without
legal necessity and it had become final; therefore, the appellants could not
be conferred a full right in the disputed property. The transfer would only
B confer a limited right on the appellants to enjoy the property during the
life - time of the widow.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1. It is not in dispute that any female Hindu could only
C alienate her limited right in an estate prior to coming into force of the 1956
Act, which is in her possession, only for a legal necessity. If alienation is
without any legal necessity or is contrary to law the alienee would only get
a transitory limited right to enjoy the property, during the life time of the
widow which is the only residuary right she possessed which could be
deemed to have been transferred. Thus, after the widow's death such
D property even from alienee would revert back to the reversioners of her
husband. [451-C]

Kalishanker Das and Another v. Dhirendra Nath Patra and Others,
[1955] 1 SCR 467; Kalawatibai v. Soiryabai and Others, [1991] 3 SCC 410,
relied on.
E
2. The Legislature keeping in mind the difficulties faced by widows
in receiving and enjoying the limited right in the estate of her husband and
with an Intention to eliminate the ordeal faced by widows enacted the 1956
Act. By sub-section (1) of Section 14 their limited right matured into full
p right and the concept of limitation to the ownership right of a widow in
the estate of her husband stood dissolved. However, the periphery of such
wo01en's absolute right under sub-section (1) is shrunk to a limited extent
to what is contained under sub-section (2). So what is covered under
sub-section (2) would not fall within the sphere of sub-section (1). Thus,
it becomes necessary, while interpreting sub-sections (1) and (2) to keep
G in mind that this being a social and beneficial legislation, for a female
Hindu, its interpretation should not be such which curtails the benefit
conferred under it. Thus, interpretation to sub-section (1) should not be
restrictive but liberal in nature. On the other hand, sub-section (2) which
curtails the sphere of sub-section (1) has to be given restrictive intrpreta·
H tion so as not to erode the sphere of widow's right conferred under
NARESH KUMARI v. SHAKSHI LAL 441

sub-section (1). [446-E·H] A
V. Tulsamma & Ors. v. V. Sesha Reddi (dead) by L.Rs., [1977] 3 SCR
261, relied on.

Himi v. Hira Devi, [1996] 10 SCC 642, referred to.
B
.. 3.1. Sub-section (1) makes a widow, who had a limited interest, to be a
full owner regardless of whether acquisition was prior to or after the coming
into force of the 1956 Act. The language in sub-section (1) makes it clear that
all that has to be shown by a female Hindu, is that she had a right in the
property in question and she is possessed of that property. The possession
may be physical, constructive or formal in a legal sense on the date of the C
coming into operation of the Act. But this is not the sine qua non for the
acquisition of full ownership in the property. Under this sub-section when a
female Hindu is put in possession of any property pursuant to her right to
maintenance, her limited right or interest in the property thus far, by virtue
of Section 14(1), blossoms into full ownership. In other words, sub-section D
(1) will apply where a female Hindu acquires and possesses the property in
recognition of her pre-existing right. [446-H; 447-AB]

V. Tulsamma & Ors. v. V. Sesha Reddi (dead) by L.Rs., [1977] 3 SCR
261; C. Masilamani Mudalair and Others v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami
Tihirukoil and Others, [1996] 8 SCC 525, relied on. E
Himi v. Hira Devi, [1996] 10 SCC 642, referred to.

3.2. There could be no doubt before a benefit of sub- section (1) of
Section 14 could be conferred, the widow has to show that she is possessed
of this property in dispute in lieu of her limited right of maintenance~ F
Admittedly the widow had transferred all her right to the appellants
through the said sale deed before the 1956 Act came into force. Thus, she
could not be said to be possessed of this propertY. Thus, by her own
conduct she herself relinquished all her rights and even lost possession
thereof through the said transfer. Thus, she would not be said to be
possessed of this property before coming into force of the 1956 Act and G
cannot get the benefit of sub-section (1) of Section 14. On the other hand,
in the absence of any valid transfer. by the widow, the reversioner •
respondents would get the right in the said property after her death and
alienee would have no right over it thereafter. Thus, the submission on
behalf of the appellants that as the sale deed does not restrict the enjoy· H
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] 1 S.C.R.

A ment of the estate, it would fall outside the purview of sub-section (2) and
fall under sub-section (1) of Section 14 is misconceived and cannot be
-4
-
accepted. Alienee could have matured her right in the property, if transfer
by widow would have been after she had become full owner under Section
14 (1), after coming into force of that Act. [450-G-H; 452-E]

B Kalawatibai v. Soiryabai and Others, [1991] 3 SCC 410, relied on. ,.
>
4.1. Sub-section (2) of section 14 is in the nature of exception or
proviso to sub-section (1). ~uh-section (2) excludes a woman's right from
the field of sub-section (1) and under it, where property is acquired by a
c female Hindu, it will not mature into full right in the property. The
ingredients of this Sub- section are, (a) property must have been acquired
by way of gift, will or an instrument, decree or order of a civil court or an
award; (b) that such document, order or decree must prescribe a restric-
tive right in such property and (c) such instrument, document or order
must confer a new right or interest in snch female Hindu not by way ilf
D recognition of or by way of giving effect to any pre-existing right which she
already possessed. But where there is no such restriction in such property
received by the transferee or beneficiary under such document or decree,
it would not fall into the field of sub-section (2) but would fall under
sub-section (1). [447-C-D]
E
V. Tulsamma & Ors. v. V. Sesha Reddi (tiead) by L.Rs., [1977] 3 SCR
261, C. Masilamani Mudaliar and others v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami
Tihirukoil and Others, [1996] 8 SCC 525, relied on.

F Himi v. Hira Devi, [1996] 10 SCC 642, referred to.

4.2. The claim of the alienee - appellants is only through the sale
deed executed by the widow when she had only limited right. On the
contrary, the order and decree in the first suit results into giving on alienee
a restricted right. Thus, the said transfer would be circumscribed and
G restricted by the order passed in the first suit. Thus, even on this ground
it could not be said that the alienee - appellants had unrestricted right. It
is also not in dispute that the appellants received the property not in lieu
of any pre-existing right, but received right in the property for the first
~
[
time through the sale deed. In view of this, the appellant's case would fall
H under sub-section (2). [452-G-H]
NARESH KUMARI v. SHAKSHI LAL [MISRA, J.] 443
,;
:>
. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1798 of A
1980.

From the Judgment and Order dated 2.7.80 of the Himachal Pradesh
High Court in R.S.A. No. 30 of 1970.

Bhaskar Gupta and P.K. Chakraborty for the Appellants. B
.
-4 A.K. Bakshi, Ms. Sandhya Goswami and Chaman Lal Itorara for the
Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

MISRA, J. The question in issue is, whether a female Hindu buying
c
a house from a widow, a widow's estate prior to the coming into force of
the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1956 Act'),
would become full owner of such house by virtue of Section 14(1) of the
Act? In other words, it raises the question of interpretation of Section 14(1)
and (2), as to, whether the transferee of such widow's estate, on the facts D
of this case, would fall under sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 14? In case
it falls under Sub-section (2), it would not mature her right in such property
and thus it would revert back to the reversioners of the husband of the
widow but if it falls under sub-section (1) she would become full owner of
such property. E
It is necessary to give some of the basic bare facts to appreciate and
adjudicate the controversies of this case.

One Smt. Kesri, widow of Radhakishan, sold the house in dispute to
Smt. Naresh Kumari, the appellant No. 1, on 29th January, 1954 for Rs. F
3,000. Sakshi Lal and Ashwani Kumari, the respondents, are reversioners
of Radhakishan. Earlier, the said reversioners challenged the said sale and
sought declaration of the title c.iver the said house, by filing a suit for
declaration, challenging the claim of the appellants. Their case was that
Smt. Kesri had only a limited interest in the property and thus she had no
right to sell the property without any legal necessity. On 13th June, 1955, G
this suit was decreed by the Trial Court holding that the transfer, by virtue
-· of the said sale made by the widow was without any legal necessity and
hence void against the reversioners interest. Aggrieved by this, Smt. Nirmal
Kumari appealed before the first appellate court. During its pendency, on
17th June, 1956 the aforesaid Hindu Succession Act came into force and H
444 SUPREME COURT F..EPORTS (1999] 1 S.C.R.
A on 22nd May, 1957 Smt. Kesri died. Finally, on 11th June, 1958, the appeal
was also dismissed. After conclusion of the first leg oflitigation, thereafter
on 10th June, 1959, the reversioners of Radhakishan, the respo~dents
before us, filed another suit for possession of the house in dispute on the
basis of the decree as aforesaid. The defendants, the appellants before us,
B have contested the .suit on the ground that on the date Smt. Kesri died,
namely, 22nd May 1957, since Hin<lu Succession Act came into force, Smt.
Kesri became full owner of the said property and hence she being trans-
feree from her and being in possession of this property .became full owner.
For such transfer she, in fact, invested Rs. 3,000. The Trial Court decreed
the suit i~ favour of the plaintiff-respondents. The appeal was allowed by
C the Additional District Judge, Kangra Division, thus the suit of the plaintiff
was dismissed. The second appeal' by the plaintiff was allowed by the High
Court by setting aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate court
and restoring the decree of the trial court. Aggrieved by this order, the
present appellants•Smt. Naresh Kumari & Ors. have filed this appeal.

D The relevant provision is Section 14 of the Act. Section 14 of the Act
is quoted hereunder : "

''14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property. -
(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired
before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by
E
her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.

fa-planation. - In this sub-section, 'property' includes both
movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by
inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance
F or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a
relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill
or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other
manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as
stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.

G (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any
property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other
instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under
an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument
o~ the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in
H such property.
NARESH KUMAR! v. SHAKSHI LAL [MISRA, J.] 445
_,. Thus Section 14(1) enshrines long awaited, cherished and socially' A
~
desirable protective right to a Hindu widow when her limited right in the .
estate of her husband, in lieu of her maintenance flowered into full right.
She is conferred as full owner in such estate. The right to the maintenance
of wife by a husband is recognised from the very inception, recognised even
in the ancient vedic scriptures. This obligation was cast on the husband
even were he had no property. However, when such benevolent principle
B
was not followed; the law created on equitable charge on the estate ofthe
"' husband, whether self acquired or a share in the ancestral property, for her
limited right of maintenance. This charge was to place an obligation on the
person inheriting such property of her husband to maintain the widow even
where such property goes in their hands. Even before this 1956 Act, to c
secure justice to such widows; The Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act,
1937 and The Hindu Married Women's Act to Separate Maintenance and
Residence Act, 1946 were made. Each of these Acts did not give any new
right to the widows but gave recognition of their pre-existing rights. This
made. explicit for a widow to claim her maintenance out of the estate or
D
share in a estate of her husband. In Kalishanker Das and Another v. ··-
Dhirendra Nath Patra and Others, (1955] 1 SCR 467, this Court recorded
that what is the widow's right in widow's estate, including the right of
reversioners iii such estate under the Hindu Law what existed prior to th!)
1956 Act:
E
"It is a well settled doctrine of Hindu law that nobody has a
vested right so long as the widow is alive and the eventual rever-
sioner does not claim through any one who went before him.

The interest of a Hindu widow in the properties inqerited by F
• her bears no analogy or resemblance to what may be described as
an equitable estate in English law and which cannot be followed
in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. A
Hindu widow has got only qualified proprietorship in her estate
which she can alienate only when there is justifying necessity and
the restrictions on her powers of alienation are inseparable from G
her estate. For legal necessity she can convey to another an
• absolute title to the property vested in her. If there is no legal
necessity the transferee gets only the widow's estate which is· not
even an indefeasible life estate for it can come to an end not merely
on her death but on the happening of other contingencies like re- H
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 1 S.C.R.

A marriage adoption, etc. If an alienee from a Hindu widow succeeds
in establishing that there was legal necessity for transfer, he is
.. ,
completely protected and it is immaterial that the necessity was '
brought about by the mismanagement of the limited owner herself.
Even if there is no necessity in fact, but it is proved that there was
representation of necessity and the alienee after making bona fide
B enquiries satisfied hirnself as best as he could that such necessity
existed, the actual existence of a legal necessity is not a condition ~
precedent to the validity of the sale. Therefore, if there is no
necessity in fact or if the alienee could not prove that he made
bona fide enquiries and was satisfied about its existence, the
c transfer is not void but the transferee would get only the widow's
estate in the property which_ does not in any way affect the interest
of the reversioner."

It seems legitimately, wisdom of legislature thought that widows'
D limited right to maintenance though being recognised right from very
inception under the Hindu Law, followed by recognition through legisla-
tions, yet widows in receiving such limited right, faced difficulties in the
hands of reversioners thus enacted the 1956 Act. Under it their limited
right matured into full right. By sub-section (1) of Section 14, right in any
property, possessed by a female Hindu, whether such property was ac-
E quired before or after coming into force of the 1956 Act, is recognised
to be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Thus,
under it, the concept of limitation to the ownership right of a widow in
such property dissolved. This was with an intention to eliminate the ordeal
faced by widows for a long period of time. However, the periphery of such
F women's absolute right under Sub-section (1) is shrunk to a limited extent ~

to what is contained under Sub-section (2). So what is covered under sub-
section (2) would not fall within the sphere of sub-section (1). Thus, it "
becomes necessary, while interpreting, sub-sections (1) and (2) to keep in
mind that this being a social and beneficial legislation for a female Hindu,
its interpretation should not be such which curtails the benefit conferred
G under it. Thus, interpretation to sub-section (1) should not be restrictive
but liberal in nature. On the other hand, sub-section (2) which curtails the
sphere of sub-section (1) has to be given restrictive interpretation so as not
to erode the sphere of widow's right conferred under sub-section (1). The
language in sub-section (1) makes it clear that all what has to be shown by
a female Hindu is that she had a right in the property in question and she
,.
c
H
NARESH KUMAR! v. SHAKSHI LAL (MISRA, J.] 447

---
-· > is possessed of that property. The possession may be physical, constructive
or formal in a legal sense on the date of the coming into operation of the
Act. But this is not the since qua 11011 for the acquisition of full ownership
A

in the property. Under this sub-section when a female Hindu is put in
possession of any property pursuant ·to her right to maintenance, her
limited right or interest in the property thus fo·, by virtue of Section 14(1),
B
,.. blossoms into full ownership. On the other ha· ; sub- section (2) of Section
14 is in the nature of exception or proviso tL sub-section (1). Sub-section
...
(1) makes a widow, who had a limited interest, to be a full owner regardless
whether acquisition was prior to or after the coming into force of the 1956
Act. We find, on the other hand that sub- section (2) excludes a woman's
right from the field of sub-section (1), under this, where property is c
acquired by a female Hindu by way of gift or under a Will or any other
instrument or under an order or decree of a civil court or under an award
and where there is a term in such gift, will or instrument including the order
or decree or an award prescribing a restricted enjoyment in such property,
it will not mature any full right in such property. But where there is no
D
such restriction in such property received by the transferee or beneficiary
.... under such document or decree, it would not fall into the field of sub-sec-
tion (2) but would fall under sub-section (1).

The main contention for the respondents in the present case is that
since the transfer by a sale deed by the widow, Smt. Kesri, of the house, E
in which at that time, when the 1956 Act has yet not come, she had only a
limited right, she had no right to sell the house in question except for the
legal necessity, which stood rejected in the first leg of legal proceedings
between the same parties, hence .the appellants could not be conferred a
full right in the disputed property. The said transfer at the best could F
..,, confer on her a limited right to enjoy, that too during the life time of Smt.
Kesri, On the other hand, contention on behalf of the appellant-Smt.
Naresh Kumari is that the transfer by a sale deed made by Smt. Kesri in
her favour does not contain any restriction for the enjoyment of the estate,
hence there being no restriction under the said document, it would not fall
under sub- section (2) but would fall under sub-section (1) thus she became G

. full owner thereof. Let us see the field of sub-section (2). The ingredients
of this sub-section are, (a) property must have been acquired by way of
gift, will or an instrument, decree or order of a civil court or an award; (b)
that such document, order or decree. must prescribe a restrictive right in
such property and (c) such instrument, document or order must confer a H
A
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] 1 S.C.R.

new right or interest in such Hindu female not by way of recognition of or
by way of giving effect to any pre-existing right which she already pos-
sessed.
l
The question of interpretation of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section
14 has been in focus by decisions of this Court in the past.
B .
~-

V. Tulsamma & Ors. v. V. Sesha Reddi (Dead) by L.Rs., [1977) 3 SCR
P. 261, th,is decision exhaustively with precision has dealt with the history
and the law on the subject preceding the enactment of the 1956 Act and
has also interpreted. these two sub-sections, the relevant portions are
quoted hereunder :

"(1) The Hindu female's right to maintenance is not an empty
formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of
grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against property
which flows from the spiritual relationship between the hus-
D band and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure.
Shastric Hindu Law and has been strongly stressed even by
the· earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu.
Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a right
against property and the husband has a personal obligation
to maintain his wife and if he or the family has property, the
E female has the legal right to be maintained therefrom. If a
charge is created for the maintenance of a female the said
right becomes a legally enforceable one. At any rate, even
without a charge the claim for maintenance is doubtless a
pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring or recognising
F such a right does not confer any new title but merely endorses
or confers the pre-existing rights.

(2) Section 14(1) and the explanation thereto have been couched
in the widest possible terms and must be liberally construed
in favour of the females so as to advance the object of the
G 1956 Act and promote the socio-economic en'ds sought to be
achieved by this long needed legislation.

(3) Sub-section (2) of S. i4 is in the nature of a proviso and has
field of its own without interfering with the operation of S.
H 14(1) materially. The proviso should not be construed in a
r-
NARESH KUMAR! v. SHAKSHI LAL [MISRA, J.] 449

r manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision or A
....... the protection granted by S. 14(1) of in a way so as to become
totally inconsistent with the main provision.

(4) Sub-section (2) of S. 14 applies to instruments, decrees,
awards, gifts etc. which create independent and new titles in
B
-. favour of the females for the first time and has no application
where the instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm,
endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights. In such
cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally
permissible and S. 14(1) will not operate in this sphere.
Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognises c
a pre- existing right, such as a claim to maintenance or
partition or share to which the female is entitled, the sub-sec-
tion has absolutely no application and the female's limited
interest would automatically be enlarged into an absolute one
by force of S. 14(1) and the restrictions places, if any, under
the document would have to be ignored. Thus, where a
D
property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of
maintenance or a share at partition, the instrument is taken
out of the ambit of sub-s. (2) and would be governed by S
14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the'
transferee. E

(5) The use of express terms like 'property acquired by a female
Hindu at a partition', 'or in lieu of maintenance' 'or arrears
of maintenance' etc. In the Explanation S. 14(1) clearly makes
Sub-s. (2) inapplicable to these categories which have been
F
.,, expressly excepted from the operation of sub-s. (2) .

(6) The words 'possessed by' used by the Legislature in S. 14(1)
are of the widest possible amplitude and include the state of
owning a property even though the owner is not in actual or
physical possession of the same. Thus, where a widow gets a G
share in the property under a preliminary decree before or
at the time when the 1956 Act had been passed but had not
been given actual possession under a final decree, the proper-
ty would be deemed to be possessed by her and by force of
S. 14(1) she would get absolute interest in the property. It is H
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) lS.C.R.

A equally well settled that the possession of the widow however,
must be under some vestige of a claim, right or title, because
the section does not contemplate the possession of any rank
· trespasser without any right or title.

(7) That the words 'restrict estate' used in S. 14(2) are wider than
B limited interest as indicated in S. 14(1) and they include not
only limited interest, but also any other kind of limitation that
may be placed on the transferee."

In Himi (Smt.) D!O Lachhmu (Smt.) and Another v. Hira Devi (Smt.)
C widow of Budhu Ram and Others, [1996] 10 SCC P. 642, this Court followed
the aforesaid V. Tulsamma case (supra).

In C. Masilamani Mudaliar and Others v. Idol of Sri Swaminathas-
-
wami Tihirnkoil and Others, [1996) 8 SCC P. 525, this Court while inter-
preting sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 14 held that in case where a
D Hindu female acquires and possesses the property in recognition of her
pre-existing right, sub-section (1) will apply and in case where she gets the
right for the first time under an instrument or order without any pre-exist-
ing right, sub-section (2) will apply.

E Within the sphere of this legal principle, now we revert to the facts
of the present case. It is not in dispute that in the first leg of litigation
between the parties, when Smt. Kesri, widow of Radhakrishan was alive
and was a party, the respondents, reversioners of Radhakrishan, succeeded
in their suit by getting declaration of this disputed house, that the sale deed
by Smt. Kesri to Smt. Naresh Kumari was without legal necessity hence
F void. The appeal filedby the appellant was dismissed which became final.
The present issue has arisen when the respondents reversioners filed their
second suit for possession over the same property about which they got the
decree as aforesaid. The question on these f*cts is, whether still appellants
can claim t~ fall under sub-section (1) of Section 14? There could be no
G doubt before a benefit of sub-section (1) of Section 14, even by the widow
(Smt. Kesri), could be conferred, she has to show that she is possessed of
this property in dispute in lieu of her limited right of maintenance. The
question is .whether she was possessed of this property, to claim full right
under sub- section (1) which she acquired before the 1956 Act came into
H force? The admitted fact is, she transferred all her right to the appellants
NARESH KUMAR! v. SHAKSHI LAL (MISRA, J.) 451
...... }- through the said sale deed before the 1956 Act came into force. Thus, she A
~- could not be said to be possessed of this property. Thus, by her own
conduct she herself relinquished all her right and even lost possession in
it through the said transfer. Thus, she would not be said to be possessed
of this property before coming into force the 1956 Act. Then how can she
get benefit of sub-section (1) of Section 14? It may be examined from
B
-. another angle. It is not in dispute that any female Hindu could only alienate
her limited right in an estate prior to coming into force of the 1956 Act,
which is in her possession, only for a legal necessity, If alienation is without
any legal necessity or is contrary to law the alienee would only get a
transitory limited right to enjoy the property, during the life time of the
widow which is the only residuary right she possessed which could be c
deemed to have been transferred. Thus, after the widow's death such
property even from alienee would revert back to the reversioners of her
husband. InKalawatibai v. Soiryabai and Others, (1991] 3 SCC P. 410, this
Court held:
D
'"( "A Hindu widow prior to 1956 held the property fully with right
to enjoy or even destroy or dispose it of or alienate it but such
destruction or alienation should have been impressed with legal
necessity or for religious or charitable purposes or for spiritual
welfare of the husband, Necessary consequences that flowed from E
an alienation for legal necessity was that the property vested in the
transferee or alienee, and the reversioners were produced from
assailing its validity.

But if prior to 1956 any alienation was made by a Hindu widow F
of widow's estate prohibited by law or being beyond permissible
limits, it stripped the widow of her rights and she could not acquire
any rights under Section 14. And so far as alienees were concerned
it could utmost create temporary and transitory ownership
precarious in nature and vulnerable in character open to challenge G
if any attempt was made to cloud reversioner's interest. The
.,.. alienee's possession may be good against the world, his right in
property may not be impeachable by the widow but his interest
qua the reversioner was to continue in possession at the maximum
till the life time of his donor or transferor. It was life interest, H
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 1 S.C.R.

A loosely, as the duration of interest created under invalid transfer J.
came to an end not on death of donee or transferee but donor or
transferor."

This authority completely demolishes the case of the appellants.
B After having lost the battle in the first suit where it was held that Smt. Kesri
sold the property to appellants without any legal necessity. After transfer
of the property through the sale, as aforesaid, she could not be said to have
..
continued in possession of such property. The sale was prior to the coming
into force of the 1956 Act. So, prior to coming into force of the 1956 Act,
she could not be said to be possessed of this property under sub-section
C (1) of Section 14. On the other hand, in the absence of any valid transfer ..
by Smt. Kesri the reversioners would get the right in the said property after
her death. and alienee would have no right over it thereafter. Thus, the
submission on behalf of the appellants that as the sale deed dated 29th
January, 1954 does not restrict the enjoyment of the estate, hence it would
D fall outside the purview of sub-section (2) and would fall under sub- section
(1) of Section 14 is misconceived and cannot be accepted. Alienee could
have matured her right in the property, if transfer by Smt. Kesri would have
have been after she had become full owner under Section 14(1), after
coming into force of that Act. It is only in cases of valid transfers the
E question of examining whether such deed or document of transfer confers
the transferee a restrictive right or not, arises.

In the present case, this does not arise, as transfer already held to
be void in the earlier suit. A possible argument, though not argued, that in
case the transfer was bad as void, the property would be deemed to have
F reverted back to Smt. Kesri and on coming into force of the 1956 Act she
became full owner. Even if that be, alienee could only succeed if there be
any transfer to her after this date. There is more in the present case, her
claim is only through the sale deed executed when she had only limited
right. On the contrary, we find that the order and decree in the first suit
G results into giving an alienee a restricted right. Thus, the said transfer
would be circumscribed and restricted by the order passed in the first suit.
Thus, even on this ground it could not be said that the alienee-appellants ·
had unrestricted right. It is also not in dispute that the appellants received
the property not in lieu of her any pre-existing right, but received right in
H the property for the first time through the sale deed. In view of this, the
NARESH KUMAR! v. SHAKSI-11 LAL [MISRA, J.) 453'

appellants' case would fall under sub-section (2). Thus, the appellants' right A
- in the said property could not be upheld.

In view of our aforesaid findings, none of the submissions on behalf
of the appellants could be accepted. The appeal is devoid of any merit and
thus fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. Cost on the parties.
B
A.T. Appeal dismissed.