NARENDRA KANTEversusANURADHA KANTE & ORS.

                    [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R'. 491


                          NARENDRA KANTE                                 A
                                  v.
                    ANURADHA KANTE & ORS.
                   (Civil Appeal No. 8290 of 2009)

                         DECEMBER 15, 2009
                                                                         B
         [ALTAMAS KABIR AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, JJ.]
         Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:

"         Or. 39, r. 1 - Temporary injunction - Suit for declaration
     and permanent injunction claiming suit property as ancestral
     property- Application for temporary injunction rejected by trial
                                                                         c
     court holding that suit properties had already been partitioned
     and a deed of family settlement had been executed - High
     Court declining to interfere - Reliance upon deed of family
     settlement though not signed by one of the co-sharers -
    HELD: Factum of partition being a question of fact, prima            D
    facie view taken by courts below, for purposes of interim order,
     that oral partition had been effected, not interfered with - Deed
    of family settlement cannot be relied upon unless signed by
    all co-sharers - However, plaintiff, acting upon the said
    settlement, having executed sale deeds, it would not be open         E
    to him to question the deed of settlement - Keeping in view
    the balance of convenience and irreparable loss, the High
    Court while declining to grant temporary injunction has
    protected the interests of plaintiff by restraining the purchaser
    from alienating or transferring the property or from creating        F
    any third party rights therein during pendency of suit - Order
    of High Court not interfered. with - Trial court would dispose
    of the suit expeditiously- Till then co-sharers would not create
    any third party right in respect of their shares in the suit
    property - Deeds and documents - Deed of family settlement           G
    - Evidentiary value of
       The appellant filed a suit for declaration and
    permanent injunction as also mandatory injunC:tion in
                                   491                                   H
   492    SUPREME·COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A respect of the suit property claiming it to be ancestral
  property of his father. It was the case of the plaintiff that
  though a partition deed was executed on 8.2.1967, but it
  was only with the intention of giving a separate share to
  his step-brother, and rest of the properties remained joint
B as there was no partition by metes and bounds; that
  defendants 1 and 2 had no right to execute the
  agreement and Special Powers of Attorney dated
  27.11.2004 in respect of the suit property in favour of
  defendants 8 and 9 nor did defendants 8 and 9 have any           •
C right to execute the sale deed dated 31.3.2006 in favour
  of defendant no. 10. The plaintiff-appellant prayed for a
  decree of permanent injunction against the defendants
  not to deal with the property without a partition having
  been effected and also prayed for a mandatory injunction
  on the defendants to remove the wall which had been
0
  erected in the suit property. An application for interim
  injunction was also filed, which was rejected by the trial
  court holding that a partition had been effected between
  the legal heirs concerned and their names were recorded
  in the municipal records and a deed of family settlement
E dated 8.2.1967 was executed. The dee~ of family
  settlement dated 8.2.1967 and the partition had been
  upheld in an earlier litigation arising out of a suit filed by
  the plaintiff-appellant
               \
                          which suit was decreed partly in his
  favour. In the miscellaneous appeal filed by the plaintiff-
F appellant against the order of the trial court rejecting the
  application for interim injunction, the High Court declined
  to interfere.
       In the instant appeal filed by the plaintiff, the
G questions for consideration before the Court were: (i)
  whether reliance could be placed on the family
  settlement dated 8.2.1967 since the same was not
  registered, thought it sought to apportion the shares of
  the respective co-sharers; and (ii) whether the family
H settlement could at all be relied upon since all the co-
            NARENDRA KANTE v. ANURADHA KANTE & ORS. 493

           sharers were not signatories thereto.                          A
               Dismissing the appeal, the Court
                HELD: 1.1. As far as factum of partition is concerned,
           the same being a question of fact, this Court is not
           inclined to interfere with the prima facie view taken by the   B
           courts below, for the purpose of interim order, that an
           oral partition had been effected which had been
           subsequently reduced into writing as a Memorandum and
       4
           not as an actual Deed of Partition. [Para 21] (503-B-C]
                1.2. As regards the placing of reliance on the Deed       c
           of Family Settlement seeking to partition joint family
           properties, the same cannot be relied upon unless
           signed by all the co-sharers. Admittedly, respondent No.
           8 was not a signatory to the Deed of Settlement dated 8th
           February, 1967, although she i~ the daughter of the            D
           family. Under the Hindu Law if a fami~ arrangement is not
           accepted unanimously, it fails to become a binding
           precedent on the co-sharers. However, acting upon the
           said settlement, the appellants had also executed sale
           deeds in respect of the suit property. Having done so, it      E
           would not be open to the appellant to now contend that
           the Deed of Family Settlement was invalid. [Para 22] (503-
           D-G]
                1.3. So far as the question of balance of convenience
           and inconvenience and irreparable loss and injury is F
-!"'

           concerned, it has to be kept in mind that respondent No.
           10 has already acquired rights in respect of the share of
           respondent Nos. 8 and 9 to the suit property and in the
           event an interim order is passed preventing development
           of the portion of the property acquired by it, it would G
           suffer irreparable loss and injury since it would not be
           able to utilize the property till the suit is disposed of,
           which could take several yeare at the original stage, and,
           thereafter, several more years at the appellate stages. The
           appellant has been sufficiently protected by the order of H
    494 SUPREME 'COURT REPORTS [2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A the High Court. While respondent No. 10 has been
  permitted to carry out construction activities over the
  disputed land, it has been restrained from alienating or
  transferring the property or from creating any third party
  right therein during the pendency of the suit. [Para 23]
B [503-H; 504-A-C]
      1.4. There is yet another question which goes against
  the case made out by the appellant, as after the Deed of
  Family Settlement, he also executed conveyances in
  respect of portions of the suit property, thereby
C supporting the case of the respondents that the Deed of
  Family Settlement dated 8th February, 1976, had not only
  been accepted by the parties, but had also been acted
  upon. [Para 24] [504-D]
D      1.5. In the circumstances, the Court is not inclined to
  interfere with the order· passed by the High Court, but the
  Court is also concerned that the suit should not be
  delayed on one pretext or the other, once such interim
  order is granted. The trial court would dispose of the suit
  within a year from the date of communication of the
E judgment. In the meantime, the co-sharers to the suit
  property shall not create any third party rights or
  encumber or transfer their respective shares in the suit
  property in any manner whatsoever and all transactions
  undertaken in respect thereof shall be subject to the final
F decision in the suit. [Para 25 and 26] [504-E-G]               ..,..__
       M.N. Aryamurthy vs. M.D. Subbaraya Setty (dead)
  through Lrs. (1972) 4 SCC 1; Kale vs. Dy. Director of
  Consolidation 1976 (2) SCR 202 = (1976) 3 SCC 119;             -
G Mandali Ranganna vs. T. Ramachandra 2008 (7) SCR 264
   = (2008) 11 SCC 1; Kishorsinh Ratansinh Jadeja vs. Maruti
  Corpn. & Ors. (2009) 5 Scale 229 cited.
                       Case Law Reference:
       1976 (2) SCR 202        cited                para 17
H
  NARENDRA KANTE v. ANURADHA KANTE & ORS. 495


      2008 (7) SCR 264          cited                  para 19       A
      (2009) 5 Scale 229        cited                  para 19
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
 8290 of 2009.
                                                                     B
     From the Judgment & Order dated 13.10.2008 of the High
 Court of Madhya Pradesh Bench at Gwalior in Misc. Appeal
 No. 478 of 2007.

     Vivek Kumar Tankha, Neeraj Shekhar, Sanjay Shukla,
 Ratna Kaul for the Appellant.                                       C

     Ranjit Kumar, V.K. Bhardwaj, Nagendra Rai, Anoop G.
Choudhary, Nisha Bagchi, Raja Sharma, Rakhi Ray, Anupam
Srivasatava, Prashant Shukla, Shantanu Sagar, Smarhar Singh,
Santosh Kumar Tripathi, Prabhat Kumar Rai for the                    D
Respondents.

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
     ALTAMAS KABIR, J. 1. Leave granted.
                                                                     E
      2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order
dated 13th October, 2008, passed by the Gwalior Bench of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissing Miscellaneous Appeal
No.478 of 2007 filed by the appellant herein. The said
Miscellaneous Appeal had been preferred by the appellant             F
against the order dated 14th February, 2007, passed by 5th
Additional District Judge, Gwalior, in Civil Suit No.OBA of 2006
filed by the appellant rejecting the appellant's application under
Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
      3. The appellant herein had filed the above- mentioned suit    G
for declaration and permanent injunction and also mandatory
injunction in respect of the suit property situated at Nadigate
Jayendra Ganj, Lashkar, Gwalior, bearing Survey No.37/903 on
the ground that the suit property was the ancestral property of
his father, Bapu Saheb Kante, who had died intestate on 13th         H
    496   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL) S.C.R.


A May, 1976. The application for ad-interim injunction had been
  filed in the suit which was rejected by the Trial Court on the
  ground that a partition had been effected between the legal
  heirs of Bapu Saheb Kante. It was also held that a Family
  Settlement had been effected between the heirs of Bapu Saheb
B Kante, whereby Smt. Putli Bai and Surendra Kante, the widow
  and son of Bapu Saheb Kante, acquired a 50% share of House
  No.95/21. The Respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein are the widow
  and daughter of late Surendra Kante, and after his death their
  names were recorded in the Municipal records.
c      4. At this juncture it may be pertinent to mention that Bapu
  Saheb Kante is said to have had two wives, Smt. Putli Bai and
  the mother of Jai Singh Rao. The appellant herein is one cf the
  sons of Bapu Saheb Kante through his wife, Smt. Putli Bai.
  When, after the death of Bapu Saheb Kante a son by his
D second wife, Jai Singh Rao, came to claim a share in his
  estate, a family settlement was arrived at by which the
  properties of Bapu Saheb Kante were divided amongst the
  heirs by a Family Arrangement dated 8th February, 1967, by
  metes and bounds. Under the said arrangement, Jai Singh Rao
E was allowed to retain possession of plot No.25/528 and after
  his death on 15th June, 1971, his wife and children were
  allowed to live in the said premises. However, since the
  concession granted to them was misused, Surendra Kante filed
  a suit against them for possession in respect of the property
F in dispute and the same was partly decreed on 14th
  September, 1993.

        5. First Appeal No. 76 of 1993 was filed by the legal heirs
  of Jai Singh Rao, wherein it was sought to be asserted that no
G partition had at all been effected in respect of the properties
  of late Bapu Saheb Kante and that the alleged document of
  partition could not be acted upon since the same had not been
  registered and was not, therefore, admissible in evidence. In
  the First Appeal it was held that there was a previous oral
  partition which was reduced into writing later on, on 8th
H


                                                                      -
 NARENDRA KANTE v. ANURADHA KANTE & ORS.                    497
            [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]
February, 1967, which could in fact be said to be a                 A
Memorandum of Partition in the eyes of law. It was observed
that while a document of partition does require registration, the
Memorandum of Partition subsequently executed after an oral
partition entered into on the basis of a mutual agreement could
not be said to be inadmissible on account of non-registration,      B
since the same did not require registration within the meaning
of Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908.

     6. The High Court accepted the r;ontention that a partition
 had been effected between the heirs of Bapu Saheb Kante and        C
that a document had been executed in that regard on 8th
February, 1967, and that it was not open to the defendants, as
well as to the predecessor-in-title of Jai Singh Rao, to wriggle
out of the said agreement which had been admitted by the
defendants. The First Appeal filed by Surendra Kante was
allowed and the other appeal filed by the predecessor-in-           D
interest of Jai Singh Rao was dismissed. A Letters Patent
Appeal was filed by Jai Singh Rao questioning the judgment
and decree passed by the Trial Court, which was also
dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court upon holding
that the partition deed dated 8th February, 1967, is a              E
Memorandum of Partition pertaining to a previous oral partition.

      7. In the present suit filed by the appellant herein an
 attempt has been made to make out a case that the alleged
partition deed of 8th February, 1967, was executed only with        F
the intention of giving a separate share to Jai Singh Rao and
the rest of the properties remained joint as there was no
partition by metes and bounds. Accordingly, the Respondents
Nos.1 and 2 had no right to execute an agreement and Special
Powers of Attorney in respect of the suit property in favour of     G
the Defendant Nos.8 and 9 on 27th November, 2004, nor did
the Defendant Nos.8 and 9 have any right to execute a sale
deed in favour of Defendant No.10 on 31st March, 2006. The
appellant herein prayed for a decree of permanent injunction
against the defendants not to deal with the property without a      H
partition having been effected and also prayed for a mandatory
    498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A injunction on the defendants to remove the wall which had been
  erected in the disputed property. The appellant herein also
  prayed for a grant of temporary injunction which was rejected
  by the Trial Court on 14th February, 2007, upon holding that a
  partition had been effected between the legal heirs of Bapu          ...
B Saheb Kante and that the Family Settlement had been reduced
  into writing on 8th February, 1967.

        8. Before the High Court proof of partition and the Family
  Settlement, which was also accepted by the appellant herein
  without any objection, were produced, as was the decision of
c the High Court in First Appeal No.9 of 19941in which the learned
  Single Judge had held that the documents of 8th February,
   1967, had been held to be a Family Settlement for which no
  registration was required under Section 17 of the Registration
  Act, 1908. It was also urged that since the disputed property
D had come to the share of Surendra Kante, and, thereafter, to
  the Respondents Nos.1 and 2, they had the right to transfer their
  share in favour of the transferees and that the defendant No.10
  was a bona fide purchaser for value. It was also pointed out
  that the decision of the learned Single Judge had been upheld
E by the Division Bench.

       9. The High Court in the Miscellaneous Appeal observed
  that the matter of grant of temporary injunction had been
  considered in detail by the Trial Court which had exercised its      _,'
F jurisdiction in refusing to grant temporary injunction to the
  appellants. It also observed that in case injunction was granted,
  it would be the defendants who would suffer irreparable loss
  and injury. It was observed that the defendant No.10, the
  transferee from Respondents/defendant Nos.1 and 2, had
  acquired a right to the suit property. He was, therefore, allowed
G
  to carry out construction activities over the disputed land, but
  was restrained from alienating or transferring the property in
  question or from creating any third party rights during the
  pendency of the civil suit. The Trial Court was, however, directed
  to decide the suit expeditiously and to dispose of the same
H
           NARENDRA KANTE v. ANURADHA KANTE & ORS. 499
                      [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]
          within six months from the date of appearance of the parties         A
          before the Trial Court.

                10. Questioning the aforesaid decision of the High Court,
          Mr. Vivek Kumar Tankha, learned Senior Advocate, submitted
          that the High Court had erred in accepting the stand taken on
                                                                               B
          behalf of the defendants/respondents herein that a valid partition
          had taken place by metes and bounds, on account whereof the
          Respondents/defendant Nos.1 and 2, as the heirs of Surendra
      •   Kante, had acquired title to his share in the suit property and
          were, therefore, competent to dispose of the same in favour of
          Defendant No.10. Mr. Tankha urged that a partition of joint family
                                                                               c
          property could be effected only by metes and bounds and by
          delivery of actual possession. In the absence of the same, it
          could not be contended that a partition had, in fact, been
          effected between the co-sharers. Mr. Tankha urged that both
          the Trial Court, as well as the High Court, had erred in pre-        D
      f   supposing a partition between the parties simply on the basis
·-·       of the Deed of Family Settlement executed on 8th February,
          1967. It was submitted that in the absence of evidence of
          partition by metes and bounds, the learned Courts below had
          erred in refusing to grant ad-interim injunction as prayed for by    E
          the appellant since once the portion of the property allegedly
          transferred in favour of Respondent No.9 was permitted to be
          developed, the very object of the suit would stand frustrated.

-     ~         11. Apart from the above, Mr. Tankha urged that the
          learned Courts below had erred in acting upon the Deed of
                                                                               F

          Family Settlement executed on 8th February, 1967, which, in
          fact, was a Deed of Partition and could not have been acted
          upon without being executed by all the co-sharers and without
          being registered as provided for under Section 17 of the
                                                                               G
          Registration Act, 1908. Mr. Tankha submitted that if the Deed
          of Family Settlement was to be acted upon, as has been done
      ,
          by the Courts below, it must also be held that partition had been
          effected thereby and, therefore, the same required registration.
          In the absence thereof, the Courts had wrongly placed reliance
                                                                               H
    500     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A on the same in refusing to allow the appellant's prayer for grant
  of temporary injunction pending the hearing of the suit. In
  support of his aforesaid submissions, Mr. Tankha referred to
  and relied upon the decision of this Court in M.N. Aryamurthy
  vs. M.D. Subbaraya Setty (dead) through LRs. ((1972) 4 SCC
B 1], wherein in the facts of the case it was held by this Court that
  under the Hindu Law if a family arrangement is not accepted
  unanimously, the Family Settlement has to fail as a binding
  agreement.
                                                                          •
          12. Mr. Tankha urged that there could be little doubt that
c in the facts of this case, the balance of convenience and
    inconvenience lay in favour of grant of temporary injunction
    during the pendency of the suit, as prayed for by the appellant
    herein as other...vise the appellants would suffer irreparable loss
    and injury.
D
        13. Mr. Anoop G. Chaudhary, learned Senior Advocate,
  appearing for the Respondent No.6, while supporting Mr.                 '   ,:

  Tankha's submissions, reiterated that the Deed of Family
  Settlement had not been acted upon as would be evident from
E the Deed of Settlement itself. It would be clear themfrom that
  one of the co-sharers, Sau. Pratibha, who was shown as the
  eighth executant of the Deed of Settlement dated 8th February,
  1967, had, in fact, not signed the said document. She was not
  also made a party in the First Appeal, although, admittedly she
F was one of the daughters of Bapu Saheb Kante through his first
  wife.
                                                                              -
        14. On the other hand, Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior
  Advocate, appearing for the Respondent Nos.1, 2, 8, 9 and 10,
  reiterated that the family settlement of 8th February, 1967, had
G been duly acted upon, as would be evident from the sale deeds
  executed by Narendra Kante, which have been exhibited by
  Narendra Kante in the suit pertaining to the suit property. Mr.
  Ranjit Kumar also referred to a copy of the agreement made
  Annexure P-1 to the Special Leave Petition, which is an
H agreement alleged to have been executed by Udai Kante,
--~
        NARENDRA KANTE v. ANURADHA KANTE & ORS. 501
                   [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]
       Narendra Kante and Surendra Kante in favour of one Ram                  A
       Bharose Lal Aggarwal regarding Municipal House No.15/642,
       known as "Kante Saheb Ka Bara". Reference was also made
       to a suit, being Case No.32A of 1991, filed by Ram Bharose
       Lal Aggarwal in the Court of Third Additional District Judge,
       Gwalior, for specific performance of the agreement dated 8th            B
       February, 1967.

....        15. Similarly, several other documents were also referred
       to by Mr. Ranjit Kumar, which were also executed during the
       hearing of the suit, in order to establish the fact that the parties,
       including the present appellant, had acted in terms of the said
                                                                               c
       Deed of Settlement and had dealt with the properties which
       had fallen to their respective shares.

             16. Mr. Ranjit Kuma~'Submitted that as far as the second
       question raised on behalf of the appellant was concerned, it            D
       was well-settled that a Deed of Family Settlement which was
       reduced into writing was not required to be registered ~nder
       Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. Learned counsel
       submitted that when an oral settlement had been arrived at and
       acted upon and a subsequent document was prepared only for              E
       the purposeI of recording such settlement, the provisions of
       Section 17 of the Registration Act were not attracted, since
       except for recording a settlement, no actual transfer takes place
       by virtue of such document.
                                                                               F
             17. In support of his aforesaid submission, Mr. Ranjit
       Kumar firstly relied on the decision of the Three Judge Bench
       in Kale vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation [(1976 (3) SCC 119]
       in which the question of registration of a family arrangement
       had fallen for consideration. Their Lordships held that a family
                                                                               G

-
       arrangement may be even oral in which case no registration is
       necessary. Registration would be necessary only if the terms
 .
       of the family arrangement are reduced into writing but there also
       a· distinction should be made between a document containing
       the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the
       document and a mere Memorandum prepared after the family                H
    502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.                     ,,.

A arrangement had already been made, either for the purpose               ---
  of recording or for information of the Court for making
  necessary mutation. In such a case, the Memorandum itself
  does not create or extinguish any right in the immovable
  properties and, therefore, neither does it fall within the mischief
B of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act nor is it compulsorily
  registrable. Their Lordships went on further to conclude that a
  document, which was no more than a memorandum of what
  had been agreed to, did not require registration.

         18. While holding as above, Their Lordships also indicated
c that even if a Family Arrangement, which required registration
    was not registered, it would operate as a complete estoppel
    against the parties, which had taken advantage thereof.

        19. Learned counsel urged that as had been held by this
D Court  in Mandali Ranganna vs. T. Ramachandra [(2008) 11
  SCC 1), while considering an application for grant of injunction,
  the Court has not only to take into consideration the basic
  elements regarding existence of a prima face case, balance
  of convenience and irreparable injury, it has also to take into
E consideration  the conduct of the parties since grant of injunction
  is an equitable relief. It was observed that a person who had
  kept quiet for a long time and allowed another to deal with the
  property exclusively, ordinarily would not be entitled to an order
  of injunction. Mr. Ranjit Kumar also referred to the recent
F decision of this Court in Kishorsinh Ratansinh Jadeja vs.
  Maruti Corpn. & Ors. ((2009) 5 Scale 229), in which the
  observation made in Manda/i Ranganna's case (supra) was
  referred to with approval.
        20. From the submissions made on behalf of the
G respective   parties and the materials on record, we have to see
  whether the Courts below, including the High Court, were              Ill:;;;;;
  justified in refusing the appellant's prayer for grant of interim     ----
  orders pending the hearing of the suit. Though the Deed of"
  Family Settlement has been heavily relied upon by the Courts
H below   and the Respondents herein, ii will have to be considered
-              NARENDRA Ki\NTE v. ANURADHA KANTE & ORS. 503
                           [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]
- ·<
              whether reliance could have been placed on the same since              A
              the same was not registered, though it sought to apportion the
              shares of the respective co-sharers. It has also to be seen
              whether the document could at all be relied upon since all the
              co-sharers were not signatories thereto.
                   21. As far as the first point is concerned, since the same        B
              is a question of fact and has, on a prima facie basis, been
              accepted by the Courts below, we are not inclined to interfere
              with the prima facie view taken that an oral partition had been
              effected which had been subsequently reduced into writing as
              a Memorandum and not as an actual Deed of Partition. Of                c
              course, these observations are made only for the purpose of
              disposal of the Special Leave Petition and not for disposal of
              the suit itself.
                    22. As far as the second question is concerned, a Deed
               of Family Settlement seeking to partition joint family properties     D
        "     -cannot be relied upon unless signed by all the co-sharers. In
              the instant case, admittedly, the Respondent No.8, Sau.
              Pratibha, was not a signatory to the Deed of Settlement dated
              8th February, 1967, although, she is the daughter of Bapu
              Saheb Kante by his first wife. As was held in the case of M.N.         E
              Aryamurthy (supra), under the Hindu Law if a Family
              Arrangement is not accepted unanimously, it fails to become
              a binding precedent on the co-sharers. Both Mr. Vivek Tankha
              and Mr. Anoop G. Chaudhary, learned Senior Advocates,
              brought this point to our notice to indicate that all the co-sharers   F
              had not consented to the Deed of Family Settlement which
              could not, therefore, be relied upon. The argument would have
              had force had it not been for the fact that acting upon the said
              Settlement, the appellants had also executed sale deeds in
              respect of the suit property. Having done so, it would not be
                                                                                     G
              open to the appellants to now contend that the Deed of Family
            · Settlement was invalid.
                 23. Now, coming to the question of balance of convenience
             and inconvenience and irreparable loss and injury, it has to be
             kept in mind that the Respondent No.10 has already acquired             H
    t
    '
     504   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
                                                                             -
A rights in respect of the share of the Respondent Nos.8 and 9
  to the suit property and in the event an interim order is passed
  preventing development of the portion of the property acquired
  by it, it would suffer irreparable loss and injury since it would
  not be able to utilize the property till the suit is disposed of,
B which    could take several years at the original stage, and,
  thereafter, several more years at the appellate stages. The
  appellant herein has been sufficiently protected by the order of
  the High Court impugned in this appeal. While the Respondent
  No.10 has been permitted to carry out construction activities
  over the disputed land, it has been restrained from alienating
c or transferring the property or from creating any third party right
  therein during the pendency of the suit.
       24. As mentioned hereinabove, there is yet another
  question which goes against the case made out by the
D appellant, viz., that after the Deed of Family Settlement, even
  the appellant has executed Conveyances in respect of portions
  of the suit property, thereby supporting the case of the
  respondent that the Deed of Family Settlement dated 8th
  February, 1976, had not only been accepted by the parties, but
  had also been acted upon.
E
         25. In such circumstances, we are not inclined to interfere
    with the order passed by the High Court, but we are also
    concerned that the suit should not be delayed on one pretext
    or the other, once such interim order is granted.                    ,
F      26. We, accordingly, dispose of the appeal by directing
  the Trial Court to dispose of the pending suit within a year from
  the date of communication of this judgment. In the meantime,
  the co-sharers to the suit property shall not create any third party
  rights or encumber or transfer their respective shares in the suit
G property in any manner whatsoever and all transactions
  undertaken in respect thereof shall be subject to the final
  decision in the suit.
         27. There will be no order as to costs.
    R.P.                                       Appeal dismissed.
H