NARENDRA CHAMPAKLAL TRIVEDIversusSTATE OF GUJARAT

                    [2012] 6 S.C.R. 165


           NARENDRA CHAMPAKLAL TRIVEDI                          A
                           v.
                  STATE OF GUJARAT
            (Criminal Appeal No. 97 of 2012)
                       MAY 29, 2012
                                                                B
     [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]

      Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: s. 7 - Conviction
under - Recovery of tainted money - Held: Mere recovery of
the tainted money is not suffiCient to record a convictiQn C
unless there is evidence that bribe had been demanded or
money was paid voluntarily as a bribe - However, th.ere is a
statutory presumption u/s. 20 of the Act which can be
dislodged by the accused by bringing on record some
evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that money was D
accepted by other than the motive or reward as stipulated u/
s. 7 of the Act - - In the case at hand, the money was recovered
from the pockets of the accused-appellants - A presumption
u/s.20 of the Act became obligatory- There was no evidence
on the basis of which it could be said that the presumption E
was rebutted - There was nothing to doubt the presence of
the shadow witness - All the witnesses supported the case of
the prosecution - Therefore, the conviction recorded by the
tn·a1 court which was affirmed by the High Court did not warrant
any interference.                                                F
      Constitution of India, 1950: Article 142 - Scope of
interference with the sentence- Held: The power u!Article 142
of the Constitution is a constitutional power and hence, not
restricted by statutory enactments - This power cannot be
used to supplant the law applicable to the case - This means G
that acting under Article 142, the Supreme Court cannot pass
an order or grant relief which is totally inconsistent or goes
against the substantive or statutory enactments pertaining to
the case - In view of that where the minimum sentence is
                               165                             H
    166       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A provided, it would not be at all appropriate to exercise
  jurisdiction u/Article 142 of the Constitution of India to reduce
   the sentence on the ground of the so-called mitigating factors
   as that would tantamount to supplanting statutory mandate -
   The amount may be small but to curb and repress this kind
B of proclivity the legislature has prescribed the minimum
  sentence - Corruption at any level does not deserve either
  sympathy or leniency - In fact, reduction of the sentence
   would be adding a premium - The law does not so
  countenance and, rightly so, because corruption corrodes the
c spine of a nation and in the ultimate eventuality makes the
  economy sterile - Sentence/Sentencing.

       The allegation against the appellants was that they
  demanded bribe from the complainant for supplying
  copies of survey report. The trial court and High Court
D held the appellants guilty for committing offence
  punishable under Section 7 of the Prevention of
  Corruption Act, 1988 and sentenced them to undergo
  rigorous imprisonment of six months with fine of Rs.5,000/
  - each and in default of payment of fine, to suffer simple
E imprisonment for a period of one month and further
  convicted them under Section 13(2) of the Act and
  sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a
  period of one year with a fine of Rs.5,000/- each and in
  default, to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of one
F month with the stipulation that both the sentences would
  be concurrent. The instant appeals were filed challenging
  the order of the High Court.
          Dismissing the appeals, the Court
G      HELD: 1.1. It is the settled principle of law that mere
  recovery of the tainted money fs not sufficient to record
  a conviction unless there is evidence that bribe had been
  demanded or money was paid voluntarily as a bribe. In
  the absence of any evidence of demand and acceptance
H of the amount as illegal gratification, recovery would not
 NARENDRA CHAMPAKLAL TRIVEDI v. STATE OF                167
               GUJARAT
alone be a ground to convict the accused. It is also           A
settled in law that there is a statutory presumption under
Section 20 of the Act which can be dislodged by the
accused by bringing on record some evidence, either
direct or circumstantial, that money was accepted by
other than the motive or reward as stipulated under            B
Section 7 of the Act. It is obligatory on the part of the
court to consider the explanation offered by the accused
under Section 20 of the Act and the consideration of the
explanation has to be on the anvii of preponderance of
probability. It is not to be proven beyond all reasonable      c
doubt. It is necessary to state that the prosecution is
bound to establish that there was an illegal offer of bribe
and acceptance thereof. The same has to be founded on
facts. [Paras 12, 13] [175-G-H; 176-A-D]

     T. Subramanian v. The State of Tamil Nadu AIR 2006        D
SC 836: 2006 (1) SCR 180; M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P.
(2001) 1 SCC 691: 2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 584; Madhukar
Bhaskarrao Joshi v. State of Maharashtra (2000) 8 SCC 571:
2000 (4) Suppl. SCR 475; Raj Rajendra Singh Seth v. State
of Jharkhand & Anr. AIR 2008 SC 3217: 2008 (11) SCR 66;        E
State of Maharashtra v. Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao
Wankhede (2009) 15 SCC 200: 2009 (11) SCR 513; C. M.
Girish Babu v. C.8.1., Cochin, High Court of Kera/a AIR 2009
SC 2022: 2009 (2) SCR 1021 - relied on.
                                                               F
     1.2. In the case at hand, the money was recovered
from the pockets of the accused-appellants. A
presumption under Section 20 of the Act becomes
obligatory. It is a presumption of law and casts an
obligation on the court to apply it in every case brought      G
under Section 7 of the Act. The said presumption is a
rebuttable one. In the instant case, the explanation
offered by the accused-appellants was not accepted and
rightly so. There was no evidence on the base of which
it could be said that the presumption was rebutted. There
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    168     SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A was nothing to doubt the presence of the shadow
  witness. He had given the signal after which the trapping
  party arrived at the scene and did the needful. All the
  witnesses supported the case of the prosecution. The
  currency notes were recovered from the possession of
B the appellants. In the lengthy cross-examination, nothing
  was really elicited to doubt their presence and veracity
  of the testimony. The appellants in their statement under
  Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure made an
  adroit effort to explain their stand "but they miserably
C failed to dislodge the presumption. PW-2 categorically
  stated that the complainant took out Rs.50/- from his
  pocket and gave it to the accused appellant as directed.
  Thus, there was no doubt that the accused-appellants
  had demanded the bribe and accepted the same to
  provide the survey report. Therefore, the conviction
0
  recorded by the trial court which was affirmed by the High
  Court did not warrant any interference. [Paras 17, 18]
  [178-C-D; 178-F-H; 179-A-C]

        2.As regards the invocation of Article 142 of the
E Constitution of India, it was held in *Laxmidas Morarji that
  the power under Article 142 of the Constitution is a
  constitutional power and hence, not restricted by
  statutory enactments. Though the Supreme Court would
  not pass any order under Article 142 which would amount
F to supplanting substantive law applicable or ignoring
  express statutory provisions dealing with the subject, at
  the same time these constitutional powers cannot in any
  way, be controlled by any statutory provisions. However,
  it is to be made clear that this power cannot be used to
G supplant the law applicable to the case. This means that
  acting under Article 142, the Supreme Court cannot pass
  an order or grant relief which is totally inconsistent or
  goes against the substantive or statutory enactments
  pertaining to the case. In view of that where the minimum
H sentence is provided, it would not be at all appropriate
  NARENDRA CHAMPAKLAL TRIVEDI v. STATE OF            169
                GUJARAT
to exercise jurisdiction under Article 142 of the           A
Constitution of India to reduce the sentence on the
ground of the so-called mitigating factors as that would
tantamount to supplanting statutory mandate and further
it would amount to ignoring the substantive statutory
provision that prescribes minimum sentence for a            B
criminal act relating to demand and acceptance of bribe.
The amount may be small but to curb and repress this
kind of proclivity the legislature has prescribed the
minimum sentence. It should be paramountly borne in
mind that corruption at any level does not deserve either   c
sympathy or leniency. In fact, reduction of the sentence
would be adding a premium. The law does not so
countenance and, rightly so, because corruption
corrodes the spine of a nation and in the ultimate
eventuality makes the economy sterile. [Paras 22- 23]       0
 [180-G; 181-A-G]

     Vishweshwaraiah Iron and Steel Ltd. v.Abdul Gani and
Ors. AIR 1998 SC 1895; Keshabhai Malabhai Vankarv. State
of Gujarat 1995 Supp (3) SCC 704; *Laxmidas Morarji
(Dead) by LRS. v. Behrose Darab Madan (2009) 10 SCC         E
425: 2009 (14) SCR 777 - relied on.
                    Case Law Reference:
    2006 (1) SCR 180            relied on      Para 12
                                                            F
    2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 584     relied on      Para 13
    2000 (4) Suppl. SCR 475     relied on      Para 13
    2008 (11) SCR 66            relied on      Para 14
    2009 (11) SCR 513           relied on      Para 15      G

    2009 (2) SCR 1021           relied on      Para 16
    AIR 1998 SC 1895            relied on      Para 20
    1995 Supp (3) sec 704       relied on       Para 21     H
    170        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2012] 6 S.C.R.


A         2009 (14) SCR 777             relied on         Para 22
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
    No. 97 of 2012.

      From the Judgment & Order dated 14.10.2011 of the High
B Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Criminal Appeal No. 31 of
  1999.

                                 WITH

C Criminal Appeal No. 98 of 2002.

          K.L. Dave, Rashmikumar Manila! Vithlani for the Appellant.

          Jesal, Hemantika Wahi for the Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D
        DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. The present appeals are directed
  against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
  14.10.2011 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High
  Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Criminal Appeal No. 31 of
E 1999 whereby the appellate court has confirmed the judgment
  and order of conviction and sentence dated 1st of December,
  1998 passed by the learned Additional Special Judge,
  Bhavnagar in Special Case No. 6 of 1994, wherein the learned
  Additional Special Judge had convicted the appellants for the
F offence punishable under Section 7 of the Prevention of
  Corruption Act, 1988 (for brevity 'the Act') and sentenced them
  to undergo rigorous imprisonment of six months with fine of
  Rs.5,000/- each, in default of payment of fine, to suffer simple
  imprisonment for a period of one month and further convicted
G them under Section 13(2) of the Act and sentenced them to
  undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year with a
  fine of Rs.5,000/- each, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment
  for a period of one month with the stipulation that both the
  sentences would be concurrent.
H
 NARENDRA CHAMPAKLAL TRIVEDI v. STATE OF                  171
        GUJARAT [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
      2. The broad essential facts of the prosecution case are A
that the complainant, Gajendra Jagatsinh Jadeja, was residing
in Plot No. 1 in Virbhadranagar Society. As in the City Surve·y
Office record, the name of his grandfather stood recorded in
respect of the premises in question, the complainant in order
to obtain the property card and the sketch of the same, went B
to the office of the City Survey Office, Bhavnagar on 11th March,
1994, to submit an application for the aforesaid purpose and
he was asked by Mr. Jagani, Clerk in the said office to come
on 15th of March, 1994. On the said date, the complainant at
about 1.30 p.m. went to the City Survey Office and gave the c
application to Mr. Jagani, who asked him to hand over the
application to Narendra Chainpaklal Trivedi, the appellant in
Criminal Appeal No. 97 of 2012, sitting in the opposite room
who told him that it would take a week's time to prepare the
said copies. The complainant made a request to Shri Jagani 0
to expedite the matter as he had to go to meet his father with
the copies and Mr. Jagani replied that it would cost him Rs.50/
- to get the copies immediately. As the complainant had no
money at that time he was asked by Jagani to meet Trivedi and
Harjibhai Devjibhai Chauhan, the appellant in Criminal Appeal E
No. 98/2012 who told him that the copies would be given to
him on payment and he could receive the copies between 4.30
to 4.50 p.m. As the appellant had no intention to make the
payment, he approached the office of the Anti Corruption
Bureau which was situate on the ground floor of his premises
and gave a complaint to the Police Inspector. The concerned F
inspector sought assistance of two panch witnesses who were
made to understand the case and thereafter experiment of U.V.
Lamp was carried out with the help of anthrecene powder.
Thereafter, the complainant produced the currency notes and
necessary instructions were given to the complainant as well G
as to the witnesses. A preliminary part of the panchnama was
drawn and signatures of the panchas were taken and thereafter,
the complainant, the panchas and the members of the raiding
party proceeded to the City Survey Office.
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    172      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A         3. As the narration of the prosecution case proceeds,
    Jagani asked the complainant to meet said Chauhan and pay
    ttie money. Being instructed, they went to the room of said
    Chauhan and he was directed to pay Rs. 7.10 paise as fees
    to said Trivedi and obtain the property card and sketch.
B   Thereafter, said Chauhan demanded money from the complaint
    as decided and on being asked whom to hand over the
    amount, Chauhan said to give it to Trivedi and Trivedi was
    asked to accept the amount. Thereafter, the complainant took
    out the money from his left pocket of the shirt and handed over
c   to Trivedi which was accepted by Trivedi by his right hand. He
    counted the money by both hands and put the same in the left
    side pocket of his shirt. As pre-decided, the signal was given
    to the raiding party which rushed to the place of the incident.
    Thereafter, the experiment of U.V. Lamp was carried out on the
0   fingers of both the hands and palms of Trivedi and pocket also
    and thereon light blue fluorescent marks were found. Panch
    witness No. 1 took out the currency notes from Trivedi. There
    were two ten rupee notes and one five rupee note. On those
    currency notes, light blue fluorescent marks were found with the
E   numbers mentioned on the first part of the panchnama. On
    being asked about the rest of the money, Trivedi had said that
    he had given it to Chauhan. Experiment of U.V. Lamp was
    made on the hands and pockets of Trivedi and Chauhan and
    light blue fluorescent marks of anthrecene powder was found.
F   The currency notes were tallied with the numbers mentioned on
    the first part of the panchnama. From both the accused-
    appellants, currency notes were recovered, marks of
    anthrecene powder were found and the second part of the
    panchnama was prepared. The Investigating Officer carried out
    further investigation, recorded the panchnama and after
G   obtaining requisite sanction, he laid the chargesheet before the
    Competent Court on 25th of August 1994.

      4. The learned trial Judge framed charges in respect of
  the offences that have been mentioned hereinbefore. The
H appellants pleaded not guilty and sought to be tried.
 NARENDRA CHAMPAKLAL TRIVEDI v. STATE OF                     1.73
        GUJARAT [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
    5. In order to bring home the charges levelled against the       A
appellants, the prosecution examined number of witnesses and
produced documentary evidence in support of the case.

     6. The accused-appellants in their statements under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure disputed the           B
charges that they had demanded the amount towards illegal
gratification but did not want to adduce any evidence in their
defence.

      7. The learned trial Judge, appreciating the oral as well as
the documenlary evidence and taking into consideration the           c
submissions advanced by the parties, found the appellants
guilty and convicted them as has been stated hereinabove.

      8. The appellants preferred a singular appeal before the
High Court. It was contended before the High Court that the D
learned trial Judge had failed to take into consideration the plea
of the defence and the inadequacy of the material brought on
record from which it would be graphically clear that the
prosecution had miserably failed to prove its case that there
was demand of bribe and acceptance thereof and hence, the
                                                                   E
ingredients of Sections 7 and 13 of the Act had not been
established. It was argued that neither the FIR nor the testimony
of the complainant remotely establish that there was a demand
for bribe and once the said core fact was not proven, the
charges levelled against them were bound to collapse like a
                                                                   F
pack of, cards. It was urged that as the office of the Anti
Corruption Bureau had been leased out by the complainant, he
was able to rope the accused-appellants in a bogus trap and
falsely implicate them. It was further contended that the
complainant and Panch witness No. 1 had stated in the cross-
examination that Trivedi had not made any demand of Rs.50/- G
from the complainant and the recovery of the trapped amount .
had also not been proven inasmuch as the panchas are not
independent witnesses and their evidence did not merit any
acceptance. It was proponed that the learned trial Judge had
failed to consider the fact that Jagani who was the main culprit H
    174       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A was not booked under law and, therefore, the prosecution had
  deliberately severed the link to rope in the appellants and
  hence, it was a malafide prosecution. It was also submitted that
  there were other witnesses in the room but the prosecution
  chose to examine only the interested witnesses and in essence,
B the judgment of conviction suffered from perversity of approach
  and deserved to be axed.

          9. The learned counsel for the State urged before the High
    Court that the emphasis laid on Jagani not being arrayed as
C   an accused was totally inconsequential as he had never made
    any demand from the complainant. He referred to various
    documents on record and the testimony of the witnesses that
    the charges levelled against the accused persons had been
    proven to the hilt and there was nothing on record which would
    remotely suggest that they had been falsely implicated. The
D   relationship between the complainant and the ACS officer could
    not be taken into consideration to come to a conclusion that
    the complaint was false, malafide and the accused persons had
    been deliberately roped in. It was canvassed by him that the
    amount had been recovered from the pocket of Trivedi and the
E   demand had been made by the accused Chauhan to handover
    the amount of illegal gratification to Trivedi. The offence was
    committed with the consent of both and the same had been
    established by the oral and documentary evidence. The learned
    counsel for the State gave immense emphasis on the version
F   of the Panch witnesses, the scientific proof and the testimony
    of the trapping officer. The principle of presumption was
    pressed into service and the said contention was edificed by
    putting forth the stance that the cumulative effect of the evidence
    on record clearly satisfied the ingredients of Sections 7 and
G   13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Act to bring home the
    charges levelled against the accused persons.

         10. The learned single Judge took note of the facts as
    regards the presence of the accused appellants in the room,
    the demand made by the appellant No. 2, Chauhan, in the
H
 NARENDRA CHAMPAKLAL TRIVEDI v. STATE OF                      175
        GUJARAT [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
presence of the Panch witness No. 1, the direction by Chauhan        A
to hand it over to Trivedi which established the consent, the
deposition of PW-2 about the involvement and complicity of the
appellants in the crime, the absence of enmity between the
complainant and the accused persons, the unreproachable
aspect of the evidence of the witnesses who stood embedded           B
in their stand, the acceptance and recovery that inspired total
credence about the demand and acceptance, and the principle
of presumption being attracted, all of which would go a long way
to show that the prosecution had proven the case beyond
reasonable doubt and further considered the inability of the         c
accused-appellants to rebut the presumption as envisaged
under Section 20 of the Act, the unacceptability and
farfetchedness of the theory of existence of obligation between
the informant and the investigating officer to implicate the
accused-appellants in the crime, the failure of the appellants       D
to explain how the amount in question was found from their
 possession and how anthrecene powder was found on their
 hands and eventcJally opined that the cumulative aspect of all
the facts and circumstances clearly establish the charges
 framed against the appellants. Being of this view, the High Court
                                                                     E
 affirmed the judgment of conviction.

     11. We have heard the learned counsel of both the parties
at length and carefully perused the record.

     12. At the outset, we may state that the recovery part has      F
gone .totally unchallenged. Though a feeble attempt was made
before the High Court and also before us, yet a perusal of the
evidence and the test carried out go a long way to show that
the amount was recovered from the possession of the accused-
appellants. It is the settled principle of law that mere recovery    G
of the tainted money is not sufficient to record a conviction
unless there is evidence that bribe had been demanded or
money was paid voluntarily as a bribe. Thus, the only issue that
remains to be addressed is whether there was demand of bribe
and acceptance of the same. Be it noted, in the absence of           H
    176        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A   any evidence of demand and acceptance of the amount as
    illegal gratification, recovery would not alone be a ground to
    convict the accused. This has been so stated in T.
    Subramanian v. The State of Tamil Nadu 1•

B         13. The demand and acceptance of the amount as illegal
    gratification is the sine qua non for constituting an offence under
    the Act. It is also settled in law that there is a statutory
    presumption under Section 20 of the Act which can be
    dislodged by the accused by bringing on record some
C   evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that money was
    accepted other than the motive or reward as stipulated under
    Section 7 of the Act. It is obligatory on the part of the court to
    consider the explanation offered by the accused under Section
    20 of the Act and the consideration of the explanation has to
    be on the anvil of preponderance of probability. It is not to be
D   proven beyond all reasonable doubt. It is necessary to state
    here that the prosecution is bound to establish that there was
    an illegal offer of bribe and acceptance thereof. The same has
    to be founded on facts. In this context, we may refer with profit
    to the decision in M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P. 2 wherein a
E   three-Judge Bench referred to Section 20 of the Act and stated
    that the only condition for drawing the legal presumption under
    Section 20 is that during trial it should be proved that the
    accused has accepted or agreed to accept any gratification.
    The section does not say that the said condition should be
F   satisfied through direct evidence. Its only requirement is that it
    must be proved that the accused has accepted or agreed to
    accept the gratification. Thereafter, the Bench produced a
    passage from Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi v. State of
    Maharashtra 3 with approval. It reads as follows: -
G
               "The premise to be established on the facts for
          drawing the presumption is that there was payment or

    1.   AIR 2006 SC 836.
    2.   (2001) 1 sec 691.
H 3.     (2000) a sec 571.
     NARENDRA CHAMPAKLAL TRIVEDI v. STATE OF                 177
            GUJARAT [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
      acceptance of gratification. Once the said premise is         A
      established the inference to be drawn is that the said
      gratification was accepted 'as motive or reward' for doing
      or forbearing to do any official act. So the word
      'gratification' need not be stretched to mean reward
      because reward is the outcome of the presumption which        B
      the court has to draw on the factual premise that there was
      payment of gratification. This will again be fortified by
      looking at the collocation of two expressions adjacent to
      each other like 'gratification or any valuable thing'. If
      acceptance of any valuable thing can help to draw the         c
      presumption that it was accepted as motive or reward for
      doing or forbearing to do an official act, the word.
      'gratification' must be treated in the context to mean any
      payment for giving satisfaction to the public servant who
      received it."                                                 D
      14. In Raj Rajendra Singh Seth v. State of Jharkhand &
Anr. 4 the principle laid down in Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi
(supra) was reiterated.

     15. In State of Maharashtra v. Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao          E
Wankhede, 5 it has been held that to arrive at the conclusion
that there had been a demand of illegal gratification, it is the
duty of the court to take into consideration the facts and
circumstances brought on record in their entirety and for the
said purpose, undisputedly, the presumptive evidence as laid        F
down in Section 20 of the Act must also be taken into
consideration.

    16. In C.M. Girish Babu v. C.B./., Cochin, High Court of
Kerala, 6 after referring to the decisions in M.Narsinga Rao
(supra) and Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi (supra), this Court           G
has held thus: -

4.    AIR 2008 SC 3217.
5.    (2009) 15 sec 200.
6.    AIR 2009 SC 2022.                                             H
    178        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A         "19. It is well settled that the presumption to be drawn
          under Section 20 is not an inviolable one. The accused
          charged with the offence could rebut it either through the
          cross-examination of the witnesses cited against him or
          by adducing reliable evidence. If the accused fails to
B         disprove the presumption the same would stick and then
          it can be held by the Court that the prosecution has proved
          that the accused received the amount towards
          gratification."

        17. In the case at hand, the money was recovered from
C the pockets of the accused-appellants. A presumption under
  Section 20 of the Act becomes obligatory. It is a presumption
  of law and casts an obligation on the court to apply it in every
  case brought under Section 7 of the Act. The said presumption
  is a rebuttable one. In the present case, the explanation offered
D by the accused-appellants has not been accepted and rightly
  so. There is no evidence on the base of which it can be said
  that the presumption has been rebutted.

       18. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted
E with immense force that admittedly there has been no demand
  or acceptance. To bolster the said aspect, he has drawn
  inspiration from the statement of the complainant in
  examination-in-chief. The said statement, in our considered
  opinion, is not to be read out of context. He has clarified as
F regards the demand and acceptance at various places in his
  examination and the cross-examination. The shadow witness
  has clearly stated that there was demand of bribe and giving
  of the same. Nothing has been brought on record to doubt the
  presence of the shadow witness. He had given the signal after
G which the trapping party arrived at the scene and did the
  needful. All the witnesses have supported the case of the
  prosecution. The currency notes were recovered from the
  possession of the appellants. In the lengthy cross-examination
  nothing has really been elicited to doubt their presence and
  veracity of the testimony. The appellants in their statement under
H
     NARENDRA CHAMPAKLAL TRIVEDI v. STATE OF                 179
            GUJARAT [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have made an          A
adroit effort to explain their stand but we have no hesitation in
stating that they miserably failed to dislodge the presumption.
PW-2 has categorically stated that the complainant took out
Rs.50/- from his pocket and gave it to the accused appellant
as directed. Thus analysed and understood, there remains no         B
shadow of doubt that the accused-appellants had demanded
the bribe and accepted the same to provide the survey report.
Therefore, the conviction recorded by the learned trial Judge
which has been affirmed by the learned single Judge of the High
Court, does not warrantany interference.                            c
     19. The learned counsel for the appellants had, in the
course of arguing the appeal, submitted that the appellants have
suffered enough as they have lost their jobs and the amount is
petty, the said aspects should be considered as mitigating
factors for reduction of the sentence. Sympathy has also been       D
sought to be drawn on the foundation that the occurrence had
taken place almost 18 years back and the amount.is paltry. On
a perusal of Section 7(1) of the Act, it is perceptible that when
an offence is proved under the said section, the public servant
shall be punished with imprisonment which shall not be less         E
than six months but which may extend to five years and shall
also be liable to fine. Section 13(2) of the Act postulates that
any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall         F
also be liable to fine. As is demonstrable from the impugned
judgment, the learned trial court has imposed the minimum
sentence and the High Court has affirmed the same.

    20. The submission of the learned counsel for the G
appellants, if we correctly understand, in essence, is that power .
under Article 142 of the Constitution should be invoked. In this
context, we may refer with profit to the decision of this Court in
Vishweshwaraiah Iron and Steel Ltd. V. Abdul Gani and Ors7 .

7.    AIR 1998 SC 1895.                                             H
    180        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A   wherein it has been held that the constitutional powers under
    Article 142 of the Constitution cannot, in any way, be controlled
    by any statutory provision but at the same time, these powers
    are not meant to be exercised when their exercise may come
    directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in
B   any statute dealing expressly with the subject. It was also made
    clear in the said decision that this Court cannot altogether
    ignore the substantive provisions of a statute.

         21. In Keshabhai Malabhai Vankar v. State of Gujarat, 8
    it has been held as follows: -
c
          "6. It is next contended that this Court in exercise of power
          under Article 142 of the Constitution has plenary power to
          reduce the sentence. We are afraid that we cannot ignore
          the statutory object and reduce the minimum sentence
D         prescribed under the Act. Undoubtedly under Article 142
          the Supreme Court has the power untrammelled by any
          statutory limits but when penal offences have been
          prescribed for violation of statutory regulations for
          production, equitable supply and distribution of essential
E         commodities at fair prices, it was done in the social
          interest which this Court would keep in mind while
          exercising power under Article 142 and respect the
          legislative policy to impose minimum sentence.
          Amendment to the Act was made to stamp out the
          statutory violations with impunity. Thus we find that it is not
F
          a fit case warranting interference. The appeal is
          accordingly dismissed."

       22. In Laxmidas Morarji (Dead) by LRS. v. Behrose Darab
    Madan, 9 it has been ruled thus: -
G
          "Article 142 being in the nature of a residuary power based
          on equitable principles, the Courts have thought it
          advisable to leave the powers under the article undefined.
    a.   1995 Supp (3) sec 704.
H   9.   (2009) 10 sec 425.
  NARENDRA CHAMPAKLAL TRIVEDI v. STATE OF                       181
         GUJARAT [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
       The power under Article 142 of the Constitution is a            A
       constitutional power and hence, not restricted by statutory
       enactments. Though the Supreme Court would not pass
       any order under Article 142 of the Constitution which would
       amount to supplanting substantive law applicable or
       ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with the          B
       subject, at the same time these constitutional powers
       cannot in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions.
       However, it is to be made clear that this power cannot be
       used to supplant the law applicable to the case. This
       means that acting under Article 142, the Supreme Court          c
       cannot pass an order or grant relief which is totally
       inconsistent or goes against the substantive or statutory
       enactments pertaining to the case."

     23. In view of the aforesaid pronouncement of law, where
the minimum sentence is provided, we think it would not be at D
all appropriate to exercise jurisdiction under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India to reduce the sentence on the ground of
the so-called mitigating factors as that would tantamount to
supplanting statutory mandate and further it would amount to
ignoring the substantive statutory provision that prescribes E
minimum sentence for a criminal act relating to demand and
acceptance of bribe. The amount may be small but to curb and
repress this kind of proclivity the legislature has prescribed the
minimum sentence. It should be paramountly borne in mind that
corruption at any level does not deserve either sympathy or F
leniency. In fact, reduction of the sentence would be adding a
premium. The law does not so countenance and, rightly so,
because corruption corrodes the spine of a nation and in the.
ultimate eventuality makes the economy sterile.
                                                                   G
     24. The appeals, being sans substratum, stand
dismissed.

D.G.                                         Appeals dismissed.