NARENDER KUMARversusSTATE (NCT) OF DELHI

                           [2012] 6 S.C.R. 148


A                         NARENDER KUMAR
                                     v.
                       STATE (NCT) OF DELHI
               (Criminal Appeal Nos. 2066-67 of 2009)
                              MAY 25, 2012
B
          [DR. 8.S. CHAUHAN AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]

          Penal Code, 1860 - s. 376 - Commission of offence
    under - Conviction and sentence by the courts below on basis
C   of the testimony of the prosecutrix - On appeal, held: When
    the court finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix
    on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or
    substantial, which may lend assurance to her testimony - On
    facts, it cannot be said that the prosecutrix was not knowing
o   the appellant prior to the incident - Facts and circumstances,
    make it crystal clear that if the evidence of the prosecutrix is
    read and considered in totality of the circumstances alongwith
    the other evidence on record, in which the offence is alleged
    to have been committed, her deposition does not inspire
E   confidence - Prosecution did not disclose the true genesis
    of the crime - Thus, appellant entitled to the benefit of doubt
    - Judgment and order passed by the courts below convicting
    the appellant u/s. 376 set aside.

      According to the prosecution case, appellant
F committed rape on PW 1. FIR was lodged. PW 1-
  prosecutrix was medically examined. Her statement was
  recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate.
  The trial court convicted the appellant under Section 376
  IPC and imposed rigorous imprisonment for a period of
G seven years. The High Court upheld the order of the trial
  court. Therefore, the appellant filed the instant appeals.

         Allowing the appeals, the Court

H                                   148
   NARENDER KUMAR v. STATE (NCT) OF DELHI               149


     HELD: 1.1. Once the statement of prosecutrix              A
inspires confidence and is accepted by the court as such,
conviction can be based only on the solitary evidence of
the prosecutrix and no corroboration would be required
unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate
the court for corroboration of her statement.                  B
Corroboration of testimony of the prosecutrix as a
condition for judicial reliance is not a requirement of law
but a guidance of prudence under the given facts and
circumstances. Minor contradictions or insignificant
discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing out          c
an otherwise reliable prosecution case. A prosecutrix
complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape
 is not an accomplice after the crime. Her testimony has
 to be appreciated on the principle of probabilities just as
the testimony of any other witness; a high degree of           0
 probability having been shown to exist in view of the
subject matter being a criminal charge. However, if the
court finds it difficult to accept the version of the
prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence,
 direct or substantial, which may lend assurance to her
                                                               E
testimony. [Para 16] [160-D-H]

     Vima/ Suresh Kamb le v. Chaluverapinake Apa/ S. P. and
Anr. AIR 2003 SC 818; Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra AIR
2006 SC 508: 2005 (5) Suppl. SCR 474 - relied on.
                                                               F
     1.2. Where evidence of the prosecutrix is found
suffering from serious infirmities and inconsistencies
with other material, prosecutrix making .deliberate
improvements on material point with a view to rule out
consent on her part and there being no injury on her           G
person even though her version may be otherwise, no
reliance can be placed upon her evidence. [Para 17] [161-
B]

    Suresh N. Bhusare & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra (1999)
1 SCC 220; Jai Krishna Manda/ & Anr. v. State of Jharkhand     H
    150     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A (2010) 14 SCC 534; Rajoo & Ors. v. State of Madhya
  Pradesh AIR 2009 SC 858: 2008 (16) SCR 1078;
  Tameezuddin @ Tammu v. State (NCT of Delhi (2009) 5 SCC
  566: 2009 (14) SCR 80 - relied on.

8      1.3. Even in cases where there is some material to
  show that the victim was habituated to sexual
  intercourse, no inference of the victim being a woman of
  "easy virtues" or a women of "loose moral character"
  can be drawn. Such a woman has a right to protect her
C dignity and cannot be subjected to rape only for that
  reason. She has a right to refuse to submit herself to
  sexual intercourse to anyone and everyone because she
  is not a vulnerable object or prey for being sexually
  assaulted by anyone and everyone. Merely because a
  woman is of easy virtue, her evidence cannot be
D discarded on that ground alone rather it is to be
  cautiously appreciated. (Para 21) (162-C-E]

      State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Madhukar Narayan
  Mardikar AIR 1991 SC 207: State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh
E & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 1393; State of UP. v. Pappu@ Yunus
  & Anr. AIR 2005 SC 1248: 2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 585 - relied
  on.

       1.4. In view of the provisions of Sections 53 and 54
  of the Evidence Act, 1872, unless the character of the
F prosecutrix itself is in issue, her character is not a
  relevant factor to be taken into consideration at all. [Para
  22) (162-F]

       1.5. The courts while trying an accused on the
G charge of rape, must deal with the case with utmost
  sensitivity, examining the broader probabilities of a case
  and not get swayed by minor contradictions or
  insignificant discrepancies in the evidence of witnesses
  which are not of a substantial character. However, even
H in a case of rape, the onus is always on the prosecution
  NARENDER KUMAR v. STATE (NCT) OF DELHI               151


to prove, affirmatively each ingredient of the offence it     A
seeks to establish and such onus never shifts. It is no
part of the duty of the defence to explain as to how and
why in a rape case the victim and other witness have
falsely implicated the accused. Prosecution case has to
stand on its own legs and cannot take support from the        B
weakness of the case of defence. However great the
suspicion against the accused and however, strong the
moral belief and conviction of the court, unless the
offence of the accused is established beyond reasonable
doubt on the basis of legal evidence and material on the      c
record, he cannot be convicted for an offence. There is
an initial presumption of innocence of the accused and
the prosecution has to bring home the offence against
the accused by reliable evidence. The accused is entitled
to the benefit of every reasonable doubt. [Paras 23] [162-
                                                              0
G-H; 163-A-D] ·

    Tukaram & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra AIR 1979
SC 185: 1979 (1) SCR 810; Uday v. State of Karnataka AIR
2003 SC 1639: 2003(2) CR 231 - ·relied on.
                                                              E
     1.6. Prosecution has to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt and cannot take support from the
weakness of the case of defence. There must be proper
legal evidenc~ and material on record to record the
conviction of the accused. Conviction can be based on         F
sole testimony of the prosecutrix provided it lends
assurance of her testimony. However, in case the court
has reason not to accept the version of prosecutrix on
its face value, it may look for corroboration. In case the
evidence is read in its totality and the story projected by   G
the prosecutrix is found to be improbable, the prosecutrix
case becomes liable to be rejected. The court must act
with sensitivity and appreciate the evidence in totality of
the background of the entire case and not in the isolation.
Even if the prosecutrix is of easy virtue/unchaste woman
                                                              H
                                 1
    152      SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A that itself cannot be a determinative factor and the court
  is required to adjudicate whether the accused committed
  rape on the victim on the occasion complained of. [Para
  24) [163-E-H]

       1.7. By any stretch of imagination it cannot be held
8
  that the prosecutrix was not knowing the appellant prior
  to the incident. The given facts and circumstances, make
  it crystal clear that if the evidence of the prosecutrix is
  read and considered in totality of the circumstances
  alongwith the other evidence on record, in which the
C offence is alleged to have been committed, her
  deposition does not inspire confidence. The prosecution
  has not disclosed the true genesis of the crime. In such
  a fact-situation, the appellant becomes entitled to the
  benefit of doubt. The judgment and order passed by the
D High Court of D~lhi in Criminal Appeal and that of the trial
  court are set aside. [Para 25) [164-8-E)
                           Case Law Reference:
          AIR 2003 SC 818            Relied on.     Para 16
E
          2005 (5) Suppl. SCR 474    Relied on.     Para 16
          (1999) 1 sec 220           Relied on.     Para 17
          (2010) 14 sec 534          Referred to.   Para 18
F         2008 (16) SCR 1078         Referred to    Para 19
          2009 (14) SCR 80           Referred to.   Para 20
          AIR 1991 SC 207            Relied on.     Para 21
G         AIR 1996 SC 1393           Relied on.     Para 21
          2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 585    Relied on.     Para 21
          1979 (1) SCR 810           Relied on.     Para 23
          2003(2) CR 231             Relied on.     Para 23
H
   NARENDER KUMAR v. STATE (NCT) OF DELHI                  153


    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal               A
No. 2066-2067 of 2009.

    From th~ Judgment & Order dated 25.3.2009 of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 2000
and Criminal Misc. Application No. 6749 of 2008.                   B
    A. Yakesh Anand, Nimit Mathur (Amicus), Atul Jha,
Dharmendra Kumar Sinha for the Appellant.

    Rekha Pandey, Gargi Khanna, Anil Katiyar for the
Respondent.                                                        C

        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. These appeals have been
preferred against the impugned judgment and order dated
25.3.2009 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in        D
Criminal Appeal No.53 of 2000, by which it has affirmed the
judgment and order of the trial Court dated 7.12.1999 passed
in Sessions Case No. 77/99, convicting the appellant under
 Section 376 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called
 'IPC') and awarded the punishment of rigorous imprisonment        E
for a period of 7 years vide order dated 8.12.1999 and
imposed a fine of Rs.2000/- .

        2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are
that:
                                                                   F
      A. Smt. Indira PW.1 (prosecutrix) filed an FIR No.886/98
dated 16.9.1998 to the effect thaf when she was going from
village Khirki to Chirag Delhi on that day at about 8 p.m., the
appellant met her near Ganda Nala, he caught hold of her hand
and dragged her towards the bushes on the edge of the road         G
and committed rape on her. She could not raise the noise due
to fear. After commission of the offence, the appellant left her
there and ran away. The prosecutrix went to her husband at his
working place and from there went to the police station
alongwith her husband to lodge the FIR.                            H
    154       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A       B. The prosecutrix was medically examined. Appellant
  was arrested on 1.11.1998. Statement of the prosecutrix was
  recorded under Section 164 of Code of Criminal Procedure,
  1973 (hereinafter called 'Cr.P.C.') on 20.11.1998 before the
  Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi. After completion of
B investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellant
  under Section 376 IPC on 21.4.1999. Prosecution examined
  11 witnesses in support of its case. The appellant, in addition
  to his own statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., also examined
  2 witnesses in defence.
c        C. On conclusion of the trial, the learned Sessions Court
    vide judgment and order dated 7/8.12.1999 convicted the
    appellant for the offences under Section 376 IPC and imposed
    the sentence as referred to hereinabove.

D        D. Aggrieved, the appellant preferred Criminal Appeal
    No.53 of 2000 before the High Court which has been dismissed
    vide impugned judgment and order dated 25.3.2009.

          Hence, these appeals.

E       3. Shri Yakesh Anand, learned Amicus Curiae, has
  submitted that Indira, prosecutrix (PW.1) cannot be relied upon
  because there have been material contradictions in her
  deposition. She had been confronted on large number of
  issues/facts with her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
F Embellishments/improvements had been of such a large
  magnitude that her statement itself became unreliable. The
  prosecutrix was an unchaste woman, having illicit relationship
  with many young persons. The courts below erred in not
  appreciating properly the evidence of the defence witnesses
G examined by the appellant. The medical evidence, in a case
  like this where the prosecutrix was married and 25 years of age,
  is inconsequential. Thus, the appeals 9eserve to be allowed.

      4. Per contra, Smt. Rekha Pandey, learned counsel
H appearing for the respondent-State has opposed the appeal
   NARENDER KUMAR v. STATE (NCT) OF DELHI                    155
           [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
vehemently contending that the appellant has rightly been           A
convicted on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and both the
courts below have appreciated the facts in correct perspective.
The findings so recorded by the courts below do not warrant
any interference. Thus, the appeals are liable to be dismissed.
                                                                    B
     5. We have considered the rival submissions made by
learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

     6. The Trial Court as well as the High Court recorded
conviction of the appellant merely placing a very heavy reliance
on the deposition of the prosecutrix and considering the            c
deposition of Dr. Nisha (PW.9). Admittedly, the defence version
taken by the appellant in his statement under Section 313
Cr.P.G. and the deposition of two defence witnesses to the
extent that the prosecutrix had developed intimacy with the
appellant and some other young persons and Sahib Rao                D
(PW.3) her husband, had raised the grievance in this regard,
have not even been referred to by either of the courts below,
though the law required the court to appreciate the defence
version and decide its veracity in accordance with law.

     7. In order to test the veracity of the deposition of Smt.     E
Indira -Prosecutrix (PW.1), it may be relevant to make
reference to the same. In her examination-in-chief she stated
as under:

     "The accused was not personally known to me prior to the       F
     day of incident, except that he had teased me prior to the
     incident and I lodged the complaint with the parents of the
     accused and with the police. I have not given any copy of
     the complaint to the police in this case. It is incorrect to
     say that the accused had been living in my house about         G
     one year prior to the day of the incident."

     In cross-examination she could not point out as which part
of her Salwar had been torn. Prosecutrix, when in the dock was

                                                                    H
    156        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A confronted on various points with her statement under Section
  161 Cr.P.C. and the said contradiction read as under:

          (i) I had also told the police in my statement that I had raised
          alarm at the time of rape.

B         (ii) The accused was not personally known to me prior to
          the date of the incident except that he had teased me prior
          to the incident and I lodged the complaint with the parents
          of the accused and with the police.

C       So far as the "injury on her person" is concerned, she
    deposed as under:

          "I did not receive any injury except scratches on my throat
          and I had told the doctor about the incident."

D      8. Sahib Rao (PW.3), husband of the prosecutrix in his
  cross-examination admitted that he knew the appellant very well
  as both of them had been the residents of the same village.
  He further admitted that there used to be quarrel between him
  and his wife. Sahib Rao (PW.3), was also confronted with his
E statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. on various narrations.

          9. Dr. Nisha (PW.9) deposed as under:

          "There were nail marks on her breast and from that I say
          that she might have been raped. The nail marks which
F         were found on the breast of the victim could have been
          se/f-inflicted .... On internal examination of the victim, it
          could not be found that she was raped except seeing her
          condition that her clothes were torn and there were nail
          marks on her breast."
G
                                                    (Emphasis added)

        10. SI, Lekh Raj (PW.6) who was posted at P.S. Malviya
    Nagar, New Delhi was examined and he deposed as under:

H         "On the night intervening 30.10.1998 and 1.11.1998 ,
   NARENDER KUMAR v. STATE (NCT) OF DELHI                            157
           [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
    complainant Indira came to the P.S. at about 11.45 p.m.                  A
    She told me that the person who had committed rape oh
    her is sitting on a stop of Khirki. Thereafter, I alongwith
    complainant and Constable Jagat Singh went there and
    accused present in court was arrested on the pointing out
    of Indira by me ..... The arrest memo of accused Ex.PW.1/                B
    F was also prepared .....

    . . . . . . . . . . . . No public person from the area was called from
    where the accused was arrested. I did not prepare the site
    plan of the place from where the accused was arrested.                   C
    The prosecutrix Indira had come to me on that night in the
    police station alone. The distance between the house of
    the prosecutrix and police station is 3 Kms."

     11. R.N. Chowdhary (PW.11), Investigating Officer
deposed that there was fencing just near the road and there                  D
was electricity pole installed at the divider of the road and the
electricity was on. The residential houses were at some
distance and the road was situated at a distance of about 20
paces from the place of occurrence.
                                                                             E
     12. The appellant in his statement under Section 313
Cr.P.C. stated as under:

     "I was having good relations with family of the prosecutrix
     and we were staying in the same village. The prosecutrix
     desired to keep me in her house, to which I refused and                 F
     for that reason, the false case has been planted on me. I
     am innocent and I have been falsely implicated in this case
   · by police at the instance of the prosecutrix and her
     husband as I did not accept the proposal of the prosecutrix
     to live in her house. Her husband has also given severe                 G
     beatings to the prosecutrix on tl}at account." (Emphasis
     added)

     13. Chandan Singh (DW.1) was examined by the appellant
in defence who deposed that he knew Indira (Prosecutrix) and
                                                                             H
    158        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (2012] 6 S.C.R.


A   her husband being their neighbour. The prosecutrix was having
    intimacy with the appellant for the last 3 years. His house is at
    a distance of 40 yards from the house of the prosecutrix. There
    remained quarrel between prosecutrix and her husband. Her
    husband Sahib Rao (PW.3) did not like the entry of appellant
B   in his house.

         14. Surendra Kumar (DW.2) supported the defence
    version stating as under:

          "I know Sahib Rao and his wife Indira. Sahib Rao had
C         been working in my ration shop for last 7 years. Sahib Rao
          used to tell me that one boy whose name I do not know
          used to visit the house of Sahib Rao which was not liked
          by him and for that reason the husband and wife had been
          quarreling. The said boy, who is present in the court had
D         come to my shop also alongwith Indra."

        15. If the evidence on record referred to hereinabove is
    appreciated, the following picture emerges:

          (i) Prosecutrix and appellant were known to each other for
E         a long time and there had been some relationship/intimacy
          between them.

          (ii) Sahib Rao (PW.3), husband of the prosecutrix did not
          like the said relationship.
F
          (iii) There has been some incident two-three days prior to
          the actual incident on 16.9.1998 as lndira-prosecutrix had
          lodged some complaint against the appellant in the pQlice
          as well as with the parents of the appellant.

G         (iv) The complaint lodged by the prosecutrix two-three days
          prior to 16.9.1998 with the police had never been placed
          on record.

          (v) The alleged incident dated 16.9.1998 had occurred on
H         the side of the main road which remains busy and had
NARENDER KUMAR v. STATE (NCT) OF DELHI                     159
        [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
 sufficient light and in spite of the fact that the prosecutrix   A
 raised hue and cry, nobody came to help her.

 (vi) There are contradictions on the issue as to whether the
 prosecutrix went to the working place of her husband and
 from there she proceeded to police station with him as
                                                                  B
 evidence on record is also to the contrary i.e she
 straightaway went to the police station and one Constable
 had gone and called her husband.

 (vii) Medical evidence does not positively support the
 case of the prosecution as Dr. Nisha (PW.9) deposed that         C
 seeing her condition and torn clothes it could be said that
 the prosecutrix might had been raped.

 (viii) Admittedly, there is a most material contradiction in
 the medical evidence and ocular evidence. Dr. Nisha              D
 (PW.9) had categorically recorded in the report and
 deposed in the court that the prosecutrix was having nail
 marks on her breast though the case of lndira-prosecutrix
 had been that she was having nail marks on her throat.

  (ix) Deposition of Lekh Raj (PW.6), S.I., about the arrest      E
 ·of the appellant between intervening night of 30.10.1998
  and 1.11.1998 at about 11.45 p.m., seems to be
  improbable. According to him, the prosecutrix walked from
  her house to the police station at a distance of 3 Kms. at
  midnight to inform the police that the appellant was sitting    F
  on the stop of Khirki, Press Enclave. The witness reached
  there with prosecutrix and police constables. He found the
  appellant sitting at the said stop and from there he was
  arrested. The witness did not prepare the arrest memo with
  the help of any independent witness. If the appellant was       G
  sitting at the bus stop at midnight some other persons
  could have been also there.

 (x) The defence version taken by the appellant and
 depositions of Chandan Singh (DW.1) and Surendra
                                                                  H
    160       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A         Kumar (DW.2) in support thereof, have not only been
          ignored/brushed aside by the courts below rather no
          reference has been made to the same.

          (xi) The contradictions referred to hereinabove and
          particularly in respect of the nail marks on her body could
B         not be said only to be minor contradictions which did not
          go to the root of the matter. Some of the contradictions/
          embellishments/improvements are of greater magnitude
          and had serious impact on the case.

c         (xii) The F.S.L. report dated 6.5.1999 reveal that the blood
          stains/semen on the prosecutrix kurta/ salwar belonged to
          the AB blood group though the blood group of the appellant
          is "O"(+) and thus, the FSL report does not support the
          case of the prosecution.
D
        16. It is a settled legal proposition that once the statement
   of prosecutrix inspires confidence and is accepted by the court
   as such, conviction can be based only on the solitary evidence
   of the prosecutrix and no corroboration would be required
   unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate the
E court for corroboration of her statement. Corroboration of
   testimony of the prosecutrix as a condition for judicial reliance
   is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under
   the given facts and circumstances. Minor contradictions or
   insignificant discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing
F out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. A prosecutrix
   complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is
   not an accomplice after the crime. Her testimony has to be
   appreciated on the principle of probabilities just as the
   testimony of any other witness; a high degree of probability
G having been shown to exist in view of the subject matter being
   a criminal charge. However, if the court finds it difficult to
   accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may
 . search for evidence, direct or substantial, which may lend
   assurance to her testimony. (Vide: Vimal Suresh Kamble v.
H
    NARENDER KUMAR v. STATE (NCT) OF DELHI                     161
            [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
 Chaluverapinake Apa/ S.P. & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 818; and               A
 Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2006 SC 508).

        17. Where evidence of the prosecutrix is found suffering
  from serious infirmities and inconsistencies with other material,
  prosecutrix making deliberate improvements on material point        B
. with a view to rule out consent on her part and there being no
  injury on her person even though her version may be otherwise,
  no reliance can be placed upon her evidence. (Vide: Suresh
  N. Bhusare & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 1 SCC
  220)
                                                                      c
     18. In Jai Krishna Manda/ & Anr. v. State of Jharkhand,
 (2010) 14 SCC 534, this Court while dealing with the issue held:

      "The only evidence of rape was the statement of the
      prosecutrix herself and when this evidence was read in its      o
      totality, the story projected by the prosecutrix was so
      improbable that it could not be believed."

     19. In Rajoo & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2009
 SC 858, this Court held that ordinarily the evidence of a
 prosecutrix should not be suspected and should be believed,          E
 more so as her statement has to be evaluated on par with that
 of an injured witness and if the evidence is reliable, no
 corroboration is necessary. The court however, further
 observed:
                                                                      F
      " ....... It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the
      greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the
      same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal
      distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well.
      The accused must also be protected against the possibility      G
      of false implication ..... there is no presumption or any
      basis for assuming that the statement of such a witness
      is always correct or without any embellishment or
      exaggeration."
                                                                      H
    162       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A       20. In Tameezuddin @ Tammu v. State (NCT of Delhi),
    (2009) 15 SCC 566, this Court held has under:

          "It is true that in a case of rape the evidence of the
          prosecutrix must be given predominant consideration, but
8         to hold that this evidence has to be accepted even if the
          story is improbable and belies logic, would be doing
          violence to the very principles which govern the
          appreciation of evidence in a criminal matter."

        21. Even in cases where there is some material to show
C that the victim was habituated to sexual intercourse, no inference
  of the victim being a woman of "easy virtues" or a women of
  "loose moral character" can be drawn. Such a woman has a
  right to protect her dignity and cannot be subjected to rape only
  for that reason. She has a right to refuse to submit herself to
D sexual intercourse to anyone and everyone because she is not
  a vulnerable object or prey for being sexually assaulted by
  anyone and everyone. Merely because a woman is of easy
  virtue, her evidence cannot be discarded on that ground alone
  rather it is to be cautiously appreciated. (Vide: State of
E Maharashtra & Anr. v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar, AIR 1991
  SG 207; State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh & Ors., AIR 1996
  SC 1393; and State of UP. v. Pappu@ Yunus & Anr., AIR
  2005 SC 1248).

         22. In view of the provisions of Sections 53 and 54 of the
F   Evidence Act, 1872, unless the character of the prosecutrix itself
    is in issue, her character is not a relevant factor to be taken
    into consideration at all.

       23. The courts while trying an accused on the charge of
G rape, must deal with the case with utmost sensitivity, examining
  the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor
  contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the evidence of
  witnesses which are not of a substantial character.

          However, even in a case of rape, the onus is always on
H
  NARENDER KUMAR v. STATE (NCT) OF DELHI                      163
          [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
the prosecution to prove, affirmatively each ingredient of the        A
offence it seeks to establish and such onus never shifts. It is
no part of the duty of the defence to explain as to how and why
in a rape case the victim and other witness have falsely
implicated the accused. Prosecution case has to stand on its
own legs and cannot take support from the weakness of the             B
case of defence. However great the suspicion against the
accused and however strong the moral belief and conviction
 of the court, unless the offence of the accused is established
 beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of legal evidence and
 material on the record, he cannot be convicted for an offence.       c
There is an initial presumption of innocence of the accused and
 the prosecution has to bring home the offence against the
 accused by reliable evidence. The accused is entitled to the
 benefit of every reasonable doubt. (Vide: Tukaram & Anr. v.
 The State of Maharashtra,, AIR 1979 SC 185; and Uday v.              D
 State of Kamataka, AIR 2003 SC 1639).

      24. Prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt and cannot take support from the weakness of the case
of defence. There must be proper legal evidence and material
on record to record the conviction of the accused. Conviction         E
can be based on sole testimony of the prosecutrix provided it
lends assurance of her testimony. However, in case the court
has reason not to accept the version of prosecutrix on its face
value, it may look for corroboration. In case the evidence is read
in its totality and the story projected by the prosecutrix is found   F
to be improbable, the prosecutrix case becomes liable to be
rejected.

     The court must act with sensitivity and appreciate the
evidence in totality of the background of the entire case and         G
not in the isolation. Even if the prosecutrix is of easy virtue/
unchaste woman that itself cannot be a determinative factor and
the court is required to adjudicate whether the accused
committed rape on the victim on the occasion complained of.

                                                                      H
    164      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A        25. The instant case is required to be decided in the light
    of the aforesaid settled legal propositions.

       We have appreciated the evidence on record and reached
  the conclusions mentioned hereinabove. Even by any stretch
8 of imagination it cannot be held that the prosecutrix was not
  knowing the appellant prior to the incident. The given facts and
  circumstances, make it crystal clear that if the evidence of the
  prosecutrix is read and considered in totality of the
  circumstances alongwith the other evidence on record, in which
  the offence is alleged to have been committed, we are of the
C view that her deposition does not inspire confidence. The
  prosecution has not disclosed the true genesis of the crime. In
  such a fact-situation, the appellant becomes entitled to the
  benefit of doubt.

D        In view of above, the appeals succeed and are allowed.
    The judgment and order dated 25.3.2009 passed by the High
    Court of Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 2000 and that of
    the trial court dated 7 .12 .1999 are hereby set aside. The
    appellant is on bail, his bail bond stands discharged.
E
         Before parting with the case, we would like to record our
    appreciation to Mr. Yakesh Anand, learned Amicus Curiae for
    rendering commendable assistance to the court. Mr. Anand
    shall be entitled to Rs. 7,000/- as his fees payable by the State
    Government.
F
    N.J.                                          Appeals allowed.