NARAIN PANDEYversusPANNALAL PANDEY

                        [2012] 11 S.C.R. 752


A                         NARAIN PANDEY
                                  v.
                         PANNALAL PANDEY
                  (Civil Appeal No. 6363 of 2004)
                       DECEMBER 10, 2012
B
             [R.M. LODHA AND ANIL R. DAVE, JJ.]

        Advocates:

c       Professional misconduct -Punishment - Adyocate filing
   Vakalatnamas without any authority and subsequently filing
  fictitious compromises - A/so reprimanded previously by
  Disciplinary Committee of BC/ - Disciplinary Committee of
  State Bar Council holding the charges proved and debarring
D the advocate from practice for 7 years - DC, BC/, modifying
  the punishment by reprimand and costs of Rs.10001- - Held:
  In view of the specific finding recorded by Disciplinary
  Committee of State Bar Council, the professional misconduct
  committed by the advocate is extremely grave and serious -
  He deserves punishment commensurate with degree of
E miscon.duct that meets the twin objectives; i.e. deterrence and
  correction - Advocate debarred from practice for 3 years from
  date - Administration of justice - Practice and Procedure.

        Practice and Procedure:
F
       Misconduct of advocate - Disciplinary Committee of
  State Bar Council, on the basis of oral and documentary
  evidence, holding the charges proved - Disciplinary
  Committee of BC/, accepting the oral submission and
G affidavit of advocate, reversing the finding of Disciplinary
  Committee of State Bar Council - Held: The Disciplinary
  Committee, BC/ accepted the oral submission of the advocate
  without realizing that he even did not offer himself for cross-
  examination in respect of the affidavit that he filed in support
H                               752
     NARAIN PANDEY v. PANNALAL PANDEY                   753

of his reply - As a matter of fact, the advocate did not tender A
any evidence whatsoever in rebuttal - Mere oral submission
unsupported by oral or documentary evidence on behalf of
the advocate did not justify reversal of thorough and we/1-
considered finding by the Disciplinary Committee of State Bar
Council on analysis of the oral and documentary evidence B
let in by the complainant in support of the complaint- Findings
of Disciplinary Committee of State Bar Council restored -
Evidence.

     On a complaint filed by the appellant against the C
respondent-advocate, the Disciplinary Committee of the
State Bar Council held that the respondent was involved
in a very serious professional misconduct by filing
vakalatnamas without any authority and later on filing
fictitious compromises which adversely affected the
interests of the parties concerned. It also noticed the D
previous conduct of the respondent with regard to which
the Bar Council of India (BCI) had affirmed the raprimand
order and had also imposed a fine of Rs.1000/- on him.
In the circumstances, the Disciplinary Committee of the
Stae Bar Council passed the order dated 28.5.2002 E
debarring the respondent from practice for a period of
seven years. On appeal, the Disciplinary Committee, BCI
did not agree with the said finding and modified the order
of punishment. It reprimanded the advocate and also
 imposed a cost of Rs.1000/- to be paid by him to BCI. F
 Aggrieved, the complainant filed the appeal.

     Allowing the appeal in part, the Court

     HELD: 1.1. The consideration of the matter by the
 Disciplinary Committee, BCI is clearly flawed. It G
 overlooked the most vital aspect that seven witnesses
 tendered in evidence by the complainant had stated
 clearly and unequivocally that the respondent-advocate
 had filed forged and fabricated vakalatnamas on their
 behalf and they had not filed any compromise in H
    754     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A Consolidation Court. The respondent-advocate had not
   at all cross-examined these witnesses on the said
   aspect. There was ample documentary evidence as well
   which proved the allegations made in the complaint. The
   Disciplinary Committee, BCI accepted the oral
B submission of the respondent-advocate without realizing
  that he even did not offer himself for cross-examination
  in respect of the affidavit that he filed in support of his
  reply. As a matter of fact, the respondent-advocate did not
  tender any evidence whatsoever in rebuttal. Mere oral
c submission unsupported by oral or documentary
  evidence on behalf of the respondent-advocate did not
  justify reversal of thorough and well-considered finding
  by the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council
  on analysis of the oral and documentary evidence let in
  by the complainant in support of the complaint. The
0
  finding recorded by the Disciplinary Committee, BCI
  cannot be sustained. [para 9-10) [758-G-H; 759-A-D-F-G]

        1.2. On careful consideration of the entire material
  placed on record, this Court is of the considered view that
E the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Committee of
  the State Bar Council that the respondent-advocate was
  involved in a very serious professional misconduct by
  filing vakalatnamas without any authority and later on
  filing fictitious compromises which adversely affected the
F interest of the parties concerned is restored. [para 11)
  [759-G-H; 760-A]

       2.1. Awarding of punishment for a professional
  misconduct is a delicate and sensitive exercise.       The
G professional misconduct committed by the respondent is
  extremely grave and serious and deserves punishment
  commensurate with the degree of misconduct that meets
  the twin objectives - deterrence and correction.
  Fraudulent conduct of a lawyer cannot be viewed
  leniently lest the interest of the administration of justice
H and the highest traditions of the Bar may become
      NARAIN PANDEY v. PANNALAL PANDEY                     755


casualty. Any compromise with the purity, dignity and              A
nobility of the legal profession is surely bound to affect
the faith and respect of the people in the rule of law.
Moreover, the respondent-advocate had been previously
found to be involved in a professional misconduct and
he was reprimanded. [para 13 and 18] [760-D; 766-A-D]              B

    Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabho/kar and others
                   =
1976 (1) SCR 306 1975 (2) sec 702; v.c. Rangadurai v.
D. Gopalan and Others 1979 (1) SCR 1054 1979 (1)   =
SCC 308; M. Veerabhadra Rao v. Tek Chand 1985
SCR 1003    = 1984 Suppl. SCC 571; Dhanraj Singh                   C
Choudhary v. Nathula/ Vishwakarrna 2011 (16) SCR 240           =
2012 (1) sec 741 - referred to.

    2.2. Having regard to all the aspects, it would be just
and proper if the respondent-advocate is suspended                 D
from practice for a period of three years from date. The
order passed by the Disciplinary Committee, BCI is
modified and the respondent-advocate is awarded
punishment accordingly for his professional misconduct.
[para 18-19] [766-E-F]                                             E
                       Case Law Reference:
     1976 (1) SCR 306          referred to           para 14
     1979 (1) SCR 1054         referred to           para 15
                                                                   F
     1985 SCR 1003             referred to           para 16
     2011 (16) SCR 240         referred to           para 17
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
 6363 of 2004.                                                     G

      From the Judgment & Order dated 20.6.2004 of the
 Disciplinary Committee of Bar CounC'.il of India in D.C. Appeal
 No. 67 of 2002.
                                                                   H
     756      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 11 S.C.R.

 A         Anantha Narayana M.G., R.D. Upadhyay for the Appellant.

           Dinesh Kumar Garg for the Respondent.
           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
 B        R.M. LODHA, J. 1. The complainant is in appeal under
     Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 (for short, '1961 Act')
     aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 20.6.2004 passed
     by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India.

 C       2. The appellant filed a complaint against the respondent,
    an advocate practicing in Tehsil Gyanpur, District Sant
    Rabidass Nagar, Bhadohi under Section 35 of the 1961 Act
    before the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh (for short, 'BCUP')
   alleging that he is involved in number of false cases by forging
   and fabricating documents including settlement documents
D without the knowledge of the parties in the Consolidation Court.
   The complainant alleged that besides the cases of other people,
   in the case of the complainant also without his knowledge and
   other co-khatedars, the respondent filed a compromise deed
   by forging and fabricating their signatures and obtained orders
E from the Consolidation Court. The complainant gave the details
   of four cases in this regard. The complainant also stated in the
  complaint that respondent has been earlier held guilty of
  professional misconduct and, in this regard, referred to the
  judgment in the matter of Diwakar Prasad Shukla v. Panna Lal
F Pandey. The complainant prayed that the respondent be
  proceeded with the professional misconduct and be punished
  by cancelling his license to practice.
       3. The complaint was referred to its Disciplinary
G Committee by BCUP. The respondent filed written statement
  to the complaint and denied the allegations made in the
  complaint. In his reply, the respondent denied that he has forged
  signatures or created any fictitious compromise documents. He
  set up the plea that the complaint has been filed against him
H due to enmity.
      NARAIN PANDEY v. PANNALAL PANDEY                       757
                [R.M. LODHA, J.]
     4. The complainant filed his affidavit in support of the A
complaint and in the course of enquiry examined seven
witnesses. The complainant also produced documentary
evidence. On the other hand, although the respondent filed his
affidavit in support of the reply but neither he offered himself
for cross-examination nor he let in any evidence in opposition B
to the complaint and in support of his reply.

    5. The Disciplinary Committee, BCUP considered the
evidence tendered by the complainant at quite some length and
observed that all the witnesses produced by the complainant C
had supported the allegations made in the complaint; the
witnesses had stated that compromises which were filed by the
respondent-advocate were not signed by them and they had
never engaged the respondent as their advocate to conduct
their cases in the Consolidation Court. The Disciplinary
Committee, BCUP also observed that the respondent-advocate D
did not cross-examine the witnesses of the complainant on this
point. On careful analysis of the evidence, the Disciplinary
Committee, BCUP concluded as follows :

     "From the above discussion and from the perusal of               E
     documents it is clear that accused Advocate is involved
     in a very serious professional misconduct by filing
     vakalatnamas without any authority and later on filing
     fictitious compromise which adversely affect the interest
     of the parties concerned ......._."                              F

     6. Insofar as ·respondent's past conduct was concerned,
 the Disciplinary Committee, BCUP noted thus :-

     "From the perusal of judgment passed by State Bar
     Council and Bar Council of India, it is established that State   G
     Bar Council had taken lenient view by reprimanding the
     accused Advocate which was modified by Bar Council of
     India who affirmed the reprimand order and also imposed
     Rs. 1000/- as cost, failing which accused Advocate will be
     suspended for the period of six months. The matter involve       H
     758       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 11 S.C.R.


 A         in the said case is that accused Advocate had filed a
           fictitious compromise in the Court of Consolidation Officer.
           Present complaint is also about farzy vakalatnama and
           fictitious compromise.

        7. The Disciplinary Committee, BCUP having regard to
 8
  the respondent's previous professional misconduct and the
  finding that he was involved in a very serious professional
  misconduct by filing vakalatnamas without any authority and later
  on filing fictitious compromises, passed an order dated
C 28.5.2002 debarring him from practice for a period of seven
  years from the date of the judgment.

        8. The respondent-advocate, challenged the order of the
   Disciplinary Committee, BCUP in appeal under Section 37 of
   the 1961 Act before the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar
D Council of India (BCI). The Disciplinary Committee, BCI heard
  the parties and held that respondent herein (appellant therein)
   had acted negligently in the matters before the Chakbandi
  Officer. However, the Disciplinary Committee, BCI did not
  agree with the finding of the Disciplinary Committee, BCUP that
E the advocate had forged the signatures. The Disciplinary
  Committee, BCI, accordingly, modified the order of punishment
  and reprimanded him and also imposed a cost of Rs. 1,000/-
  to be paid by him to the BCI towards the Advocates Welfare
  Fund and if the amount was not paid within one month from the
F date of the receipt of the order he would be suspended from
  practicing for a period of six months. The order passed by the
  Disciplinary Committee, BCI on 20.6.2004 is the subject matter
  of appeal.

      9. The consideration of the matter by the Disciplinary
G Committee, BCI is clearly flawed. It overlooked the most vital
  aspect that seven witnesses tendered in evidence by the
  complainant had stated clearly and unequivocally that the
  respondent-advocate had filed forged and fabricated
  vakalatnamas on their behalf and they had not filed any
H compromise in Consolidation Court. The respondent-advocate
       NARAIN PANDEY v. PANNALAL PANDEY                       759
                [R.M. LODHA, J.)
had not at all cross-examined these witnesses on the above A
aspect although they were cross-examined on other aspects.
There was ample documentary evidence as well which proved
the allegations made in the complaint that the respondent-
advocate had filed forged and fabricated vakalatnamas as well
as compromises in diverse proceedings before the B
Consolidation Court. The Disciplinary Committee, BCI
accepted the oral submission of the respondent-advocate
(appellant therein) without realizing that the respondent even
did not offer himself for cross-examination in respect of the
 affidavit that he filed in support of his reply. As a matter of fact, c
the respondent-advocate did not tender any evidence
 whatsoever in rebuttal. Mere oral submission unsupported by
 oral or documentary evidence on behalf of the respondent-
 advocate did not justify reversal of thorough and well-considered
 finding by the Disciplinary Committee, BCUP on analysis of the D
 oral and documentary evidence let in by the complainant in
 support of the complaint. It is true that the complainant and the
 respondent-advocate are uncle and nephew and some dispute
 regarding the property amongst the family members of the
 appellant and the respondent was going on but on that basis E
 the well-reasoned and carefully written finding recorded by the
 Disciplinary Committee, BCUP was not liable to be reversed
 by the Disciplinary Committee, BCI.

     10. The finding recorded by the Disciplinary Committee,
BCI, "this Committee on perusal of the allegations made in the        F
complaint does not agree with the findings of appearing on
behalf of both the sides and forging the signatures arrived at
by the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council of Uttar
Pradesh and the order wherein the appellant is debarred from
practice for seven years" cannot be sustained.                        G

     11. On careful consideration of the entire material placed
 on record, we are of the considered view that the findings
 recorded by the Disciplinary Committee, BCUP that the
 respondent-advocate was involved in a very serious                   H
    760     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A   professional misconduct by filing vakalatnamas without any
    authority and later on filing fictitious compromises which
    adversely affected the interest of the parties concerned deserve
    to be restored and we order accordingly.

B      12. The question now is of award of just and proper
  punishment. As noted above, the Disciplinary Committee,
  BCUP debarred the respondent from practice for a period of
  seven years. The Disciplinary Committee, BCI in the impugned
  order while holding that the respondent should have been
C careful in dealing with the matters before the Chakbandi Officer
  and that he had acted negligently modified the order of
  punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Committee, BCUP and
  reprimanded the respondent-advocate (appellant therein) and
  also imposed ·cost and default punishment, as noted above.

D      13. The award of punishment for a professional misconduct
  is a delicate and sensitive exercise. The Bar Council of India
  Rules, as amended from time to time, have been made by the
  BCI in exercise of its rule making powers under the 1961 Act.
  Chapter II, Part VI deals with standards of professional conduct
E and etiquette. Its preamble reads as under :

        "An advocate shall, at all times, comport himself in a
        manner befitting his status as an officer of the Court, a
        privileged member of the community, and a gentleman,
        bearing in mind that what may be lawful and moral for a
F       person who is not a member of the Bar, or for a member
       of the Bar in his non-professional capacity may still be
       improper for an Advocate. Without prejudice to the
       generality of the foregoing obligation, an Advocate shall
       fearlessly uphold the interests of his client, and in his
G      conduct conform to the rules hereinafter mentioned both
       in letter and in spirit. The rules hereinafter mentioned
       contain canons of conduct and etiquette adopted as
       general guides; yet the specific mention thereof shall not
       be construed as a denial of the existence of other equally
H      imperative though not specifically mentioned."
                           •

       NARAIN PANDEY v. PANNALAL PANDEY                       761
                 [R.M. LODHA, J.]
     14. The matters relating to professional misconduct of A
advocates under the 1961 Act have reached this Court from
time to time. It is not necessary to deal with all such cases;
reference to some of the cases shall suffice. In Bar Council of
Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar and others, 1 a seven-Judge
Bench of this Court was concerned with an appeal filed under         B
Section 38 of the 1961 Act by the Bar Council of Maharashtra
and the main controversy therein centered around the meaning
of the expression "person aggrieved". While dealing with the
said controversy, V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. in his concurring opinion
 made the following weighty observations with regard to the Bar      c
 and its members:

    "52. The Bar is not a private guild, like that of 'barbers,
    butchers and candlestick-makers' but, by bold contrast, a
    public institution committed to public justice and pro bono
    publico service. The grant of a monopoly licence to D
    practice law is based on three assumptions: (1) There is
    a socially useful function for the lawyer to perform, (2) The
    lawyer is a professional person who will perform that
    function, and (3) His performance as a professional person
    is regulated by himself not more formally, by the profession E
    as a whole. The central function that the legal profession
    must perform is nothing less than the administration of
    justice (The Practice of Law is a Public Utility' - 'The
    Lawyer, The Public and Professional Responsibility' by
    F. Raymond Marks et al - Chicago American Bar F
     Foundation, 1972, p. 288-289). A glance at the functions
    of the Bar Council, and it will be apparent that a rainbow
    of public utility duties, including legal aid to the poor, is cast
    on these bodies in the national hope that the members of
    this monopoly will serve society and keep to canons of G
     ethics befitting an honourable order. If pathological cases
    of member misbehaviour occur, the reputation and
     credibility of the Bar suffer a mayhem and who, but the Bar
     Council, is more concerned with and sensitive to this
1. (1975) 2 sec 702.                                                   H
    762       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A         potential disrepute the few black sheep bring about? The
          official heads of the Bar i.e. the Attorney-General and the
          Advocates-General too are distressed if a lawyer "stoops
          to conquer" by resort to soliciting, touting and other corrupt
          practices."
B
          15. In V.C. Rangadurai v. D. Gopalan and Others2, a
    majority judgment in an appeal filed under Section 38 of the
    1961 Act speaking through V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. observed as
    follows:
c         "4. Law is a noble profession, true; but it is also an elitist
          profession. Its ethics, in practice, (not in theory, though)
          leave much to be desired, if viewed as a profession for
          the people. When the Constitution under Article 19 enables
          professional expertise to enjoy a privilege and the
D         Advocates Act confers a monopoly, the goal is not assured
          income but commitment to the people - the common
          people whose hunger, privation and hamstrung human
          rights need the advocacy of the profession to change the
          existing order into a Human Tomorrow.. This desideratum
E         gives the clue to the direction of the penance of a deviant
          geared to correction. Serve the people free and expiate
          your sin, is the hint.

          5. Law's nobility as a profession lasts only so long as the
          members maintain their commitment to integrity and
F         service to the community. Indeed, the monopoly conferred
          on the legal profession by Parliament is coupled with a
          responsibility - a responsibility towards the people,
          especially the poor. Viewed from this angle, every
          delinquent who deceives his common client deserves to
G         be frowned upon. This approach makes it a reproach to
          reduce the punishment, as pleaded by learned counsel for
          the appellant.


H 2. (1979) 1 sec 3oa.
   NARAIN PANDEY v. PANNALAL PANDEY                       763
             [R.M. LODHA, J.)
6. But, as we have explained at the start, every punishment, A
however has a functional duality - deterrence and
correction. Punishment for professional misconduct is no
exception to this "social justice" test. In the present case,
therefore, from the punitive angle, the deterrent component
persuades us not to interfere with the suspension from B
practice reduced "benignly" at the appellate level to one
year. From the correctional angle, a gesture from the Court
may encourage the appellant to turn a new page. He is not
too old to mend his ways. He has suffered a litigative
ordeal, but more importantly he has a career ahead. To c
give him an opportunity to rehabilitate himself by changing
 his ways, resisting temptations and atoning for the serious
 delinquency, by a more zealous devotion to people's
 causes like legal aid to the poor, may be a step in the
 correctional direction.
                                                              D
)()()(   )()()(               )()()(


11. Wide as the power may be, the order must be germane
to the Act and its purposes, and latitude cannot transcend
those limits. Judicial 'Legisputation' to borrow a telling        E
phrase of J. Cohen [Dickerson : The Interpretation and
Application of Statutes, p. 238), is not legislation but
application of a given legislation to new or unforeseen
needs and situations broadly falling within the statutory
provision. In that sense, 'interpretation is inescapably a kind   F
of legislation'. This is not legislation stricto sensu but
application, and is within the court's province.
12. We have therefore sought to adapt the punishment of
suspension to serve two purposes - injury and expiation.
We think the ends of justice will be served best in this case     G
by directing suspension plus a provision for reduction on
an undertaking to this court to serve the poor for a year.
Both are orders within this Court's power."

                                                                  H
    764       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2012] 11 S.C.R.

A      16. In M. Veerabhadra Rao v. Tek ChancP, a three-Judge
  Bench of this Court considered the relevant provisions
  contained in Bar Council of India Rules with reference to
  standards of professional conduct and etiquette and also sub-
  section (3) of Section 35 of 1961 Act. In paragraph 28 (Pg. 586)
B of the Report, this Court observed thus:

          "28. Adjudging the adequate punishment is a ticklish job
          and it has become all the more ticklish in view of the
          miserable failure of the peers of the appellant on whom
          jurisdiction was conferred to adequately punish a derelict
c         member. To perform this task may be an unpalatable and
          onerous duty. We, however, do not propose to abdicate
          our function howsoever disturbing it may be."

        16.1. Then in paragraph 30 (Pg. 587), this Court observed
D that the legal profession was monopolistic in character and this
  monopoly itself inheres certain high traditions which its
  members are expected to upkeep and uphold. The Court then
  referred to the decision of this Court in M. V. Dabholkar1 and
  observed as follows:
E
       "If these are the high expectations of what is described as
       a noble profession, its members must set an example of
       conduct worthy of emulation. If any of them falls from that
       high expectation, the punishment has to be commensurate
       with the degree and gravity of the misconduct.. ...... ".
F
         16.2. Then in paragraph 31 of the Report (Pgs. 588-589)
    this Court held as under:
          "31. Having given the matter our anxious consideration,
G
          looking to the gravity of the misconduct and keeping in
          view the motto that the punishment must be commensurate
          with the gravity of the misconduct, we direct that the
          appellant M. Veerabhadra Rao shall be suspended from
          practice for a period of five years that is up to and inclusive
H 3. 1984 (Supp) sec 571.
       NARAIN PANDEY v. PANNALAL PANDEY                       765
                 [R.M. LODHA, J.]
     of October 31, 1989. To that extent we vary the order both       A
     of the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council as
     well as the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of
     India."

     17. In a recent decision of this Court in Dhanraj Singh          B
Choudhary v. Nathu/a/ Vishwakarma 4, this Court speaking
through one of us (R.M. Lodha, J.) in paragraph 23 of the
Report (Pg. 747) observed as follows:

     "23. The legal profession is a noble profession. It is not a
     business or a trade. A person practising law has to              C
     practise in the spirit of honesty and not in the spirit of
     mischief-making or money-getting. An advocate's attitude
     towards and dealings with his client have to be
     scrupulously honest aild fair."
                                                                      D
      17.1. In paragraph 24 (Pg. 747), the observations made
in V.C. Rangadurai2 were quoted and then in paragraph 25 of
the Report (Pg. 747), the Court held as under:
      "25. Any compromise with the law's nobility as a profession
      is bound to affect the faith of the people in the rule of law   E
      and, therefore, unprofessional conduct by an advocate has
      to be viewed seriously. A person practising law has an
      obligation to maintain probity and high standard of
      professional ethics and morality."
                                                                      F
    17.2. The Court in para 32 (Pg. 748) observed that the
punishment for professional misconduct has twin objectives -
deterrence and correction.
     18. In light of the above legal position, we now consider G
the question of punishment. We have restored the finding of the
Disciplinary Committee, BCUP viz., that the respondent-
advocate was involved in a very serious professional
misconduct by filing vakalatnamas without any authority and later
4.   (2012) 1 sec 741.                                                H
    766      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2012] 11 S.C.R.


A on filing fictitious compromises. The professional misconduct
   committed by the respondent is extremely grave and serious.
   He has indulged in mischief-making. An advocate found guilty
   of having filed vakalatnamas without authority and then filing
  fictitious compromises without any authority deserves
B punishment commensurate with the degree of misconduct that
  meets the twin objectives - deterrence and correction.
   Fraudulent conduct of a lawyer cannot be viewed leniently lest
  the interest of the administration of justice and the highest
  traditions of the Bar may become casualty. By showing undue
c sympathy and leniency in a matter such as this where the
  advocate has been found guilty of grave and serious
  professional misconduct, the purity and dignity of the legal
  profession will be compromised. Any compromise with the
  purity, dignity and nobility of the legal profession is surely bound
  to affect the faith and respect of the people in the rule of law.
0
  Moreover, the respondent-advocate had been previously found
  to be involved in a professional misconduct and he was
  reprimanded. Having regard to all these aspects, in our view,
  it would be just and proper if the respondent-advocate is
E suspended from practice for a period of three years from today.
  We order accordingly.

        19. The order passed by the Disciplinary Committee, BCI
  is modified and the respondent-advocate is awarded
  punishment for his professional misconduct, as indicated above.
F Civil Appeal is allowed to that extent with no order as to costs.

       20. The Registrar shall send copies of the order to the
   Secretary, State Bar Council, Uttar Pradesh and the Secretary,
   Bar Council of India immediately.
G R.P.                                       Appeal partly allowed.