Holding

A landlord who owns other residential premises that are available for his residence or into which he has already moved cannot maintain an eviction application under section 14A(1); he must file under clause (e) of the proviso to section 14.

Summary

The appellant, N. Khamman, was a tenant of P. K. Jain, a former government servant who had been allotted government residential accommodation. A 1975 government order required servants who owned a dwelling in Delhi to vacate such accommodation or pay market rent. The respondent vacated the government house and moved into his own premises adjoining the tenant’s flat, then filed an eviction application under section 14A(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 to recover possession of the tenant’s premises. The Rent Controller ordered eviction (execution stayed for two months) and the High Court affirmed. The Supreme Court examined whether a landlord who is not occupying the allotted government house at the time of filing, and who already resides in his own dwelling, can invoke section 14A(1). The Court held that section 14A(1) applies only when the landlord is in occupation of the allotted accommodation on the filing date and does not own other suitable residential premises; if he does, he must rely on clause (e) of the proviso to section 14. Consequently, the eviction suit was dismissed and the appeal allowed.

Issues considered

The applicability of section 14A(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 to a landlord who has already vacated government accommodation and is residing in his own dwelling.
Whether ownership of other residential premises (in the landlord’s, wife’s or dependent child’s name) bars the landlord from maintaining an eviction petition under section 14A(1).
The correct procedural ground for eviction when the landlord possesses alternative accommodation.

Legislation cited

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 14, s. 14A(1), s. 25B, s. 25C
Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1976
Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Subjects

evictionDelhi Rent Control Actsection 14Agovernment accommodationlandlord‑tenantmaintainabilitygeneral orderresidential premisesstatutory interpretation

Judgment

NARAIN KHAMMAN A
v•
.PARDUMAN KUMAR JAIN

October 19, 1984
B
[D.A. DESAI AND D.P. MADON, JJ.]
.•
Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 Section J4A(l)-Scope of.

Landlord-Government servant-Required by general order to vacate
Government accommodation on ground of owning residential accammodation-
to recover possession of residential premises under Section )4A(l) landlord c
to be in occupation of allotted accommodation on date of filing eviction petition
-If landlord owns other premises which are available for residential accommo-
dation petition under section l 4A (J) not maintainable.

The Appellant was a tenant of the Respondent. The Respondent w3s
io Central Government service and was allotted Government residential
accommodation. By a general order. the Government directed that all D
Government servants who bad their own dwelling houses at the place of
posting should vacate the Government accommodation allotted to them or
in default to pay market rent in respect thereof. The Respondent there-
fore VJ.Cated the Government accommodation allotted to him and resided
in another premise belonging to him which was adjoining the premises let
out to the Appellant.
E
The Respondent lat.er filCd ao application under section 258 of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 on the ground specified in section 14A(J)
thereof for possession of the premises occupied by the Appellant which
was contested. The Rent Controller after con&idering the accommodation
in the respective occupation of the parties held that it could not be said that
the premises occupied by the Respondent constituted reasonably suitable
residential accommodation. He further held, that section 14A(l) of the F
Act did not contain a condition that the Government servant who made
an application under section 14A(t) should not be in possession of
reasonably suitable alternative accommodation as was the case under
clause (e) or the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 and that even
3

if such a factor were to be taken into consideration it could not be said
that the Respondent was in occupation of reasonably suitable alternative
accommodation. The Rent Controller therefore passed an order of evic· G
tion against the Appellant and directed it not to be executed for a period
of two months. This order was confirmed by the High Court in the revision
petition filed by the Appellant under section 25B(8).

In the Appeal to this Court tho maintainability of the eviction petition
was impugned on behalf of the Appellant on two grounds : (!) the B.cspon.
.
H
1026 Stli'J.EltE COliB.T ilBPORts [1985] l s.c.1.t

A dent was not in occupation of the government accommodatio[) allotted to
him on the date when be filed his application, and (2) on the dcite when be
filed his application, the Respondent was already residing in premises
belonging to him.

Allowing the Appeal,

B HELD : A. ( l) It is not necessary that a person in occupation of
residential premises allotted to him by the C..:atral Government or a local
authority who i; required by or in pursuance of a general or sp~cial order
made by that. Government or authority to vacate such accommodation or,
in default, to incur certain obligations, such as p1ymeat of market rent, on
the ground that he owns in the Union Territory of D~lhi a residential •.
accommodation either in his own name or in the name of his wife or depen-
c dent child should be in occupation of the accommodation allotted to him
on the date when h~ files an eviction application under section 14A(l)
of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 to recover possession of the residen·
tial premises which be so own's and which bas been let by him.
. [1038 G-H, 1039 A]

(2) If such person bas, however, othor premises which he owns either
D in his own name or in the name of bis wife or dependent child which are avail-
able to him for bis residential acoommodation or into which he has already
moved, he cannot maintain an application under section 14A(1) of
the Act. [1039 B]

(3) Even if the other premises owned by him tber in his own
na1ne or in the name of his wife or dependent child are nreasonably suit-
E able for his accommodation be cannot maintain an application under section
14A(1) but must filf'I an application on the ground specifiedin clause (e) of
the proviso to sub-section (l) of section 14 of the Act. [1039 C]

B. (1) Though the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying ,
a legislative Bill cannot be used to determine the true meaning and effect
of the substantive provisions of a statute, it is permissible to refer lo the
F Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying a Bill for the purpose of
understanding the background, the antecedent state of affairs, the surroufld·
ing circumstances in relation to the statute, and the evil which the statute
sought to remedy. (1033 H; 1034 A]

(2) The object underlying section 14A introduced by the Delhi Rent
Control (Amendment) Act 1976 is that a person who is compelled to vacate
G residential accommodation allotted to him on the ground that he owns
other residential premises in the Union Territory of Delhi either in his own
name or in the name of bis wife or dependent child should not be left
without a roof over his head or should not be made to incur heavy finan-
cial obligation by continuing to reside in the accommodation allotted to him
by paying market rent in respect thereof to the Central Government or
the local authority, as the case may be. [1035 C-D]

In the instant case, the Rent Controller was in error in considering
H the respective needs of ~be parties and the suitability of accommodation
N. KHAMMAN v. i>. K:. iAiN (Madon, J.)

occupied by the Respondent. The order of the High Court dismissing the A
revision petition is reversed and the eviction suit filed by respondent in the
Court of the Rent Controller is dismissed. (1038 F; 1039 D]

CJ;VIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 626 of
1982.
B
Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated
the 24th November, 1981 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Revision

. No. 854 of 198!.
A. Subba Rao for the Appellant.

R.K. Jain and P.K. Jain for the Respondent. c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

MADON, J. This Appeal by Special Leave granted by this Court is
directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Delhi
dismissing the revision petition under section 25B (8) of the Delhi D
Rent Control Act, 1958 (Act No. 59 of 1958) (hereinafter for the sake
of brevity referred to as 'the Act'), filed by the Appellant against
an orde• of eviction passed against him by the Rent Controller,
Delhi, on an application filed by the Respondent on the gronnd
specified in section 14A (1) of the Act.
E
The Appellant was the tenant of the Respondent in respect of
premises situate at 3474, Gali Kartar Singh, Subzi Mandi, Delhi,
consisting of one room and two tin shedsata rent of Rs. 10.50 per
month excluding water, electricity and other charges. Prior to
January 1975, the RespoJdent was an employee in the Posts and
Telegraphs, Audit and Accounts Department of the Government of F
India, and in January 1975 he was sent on deputation to the Union
Public Service Commission. He retired on May 1. 1978. During
the course of his service, in October, 1972, the Respondent was
allotted Government residential accommodation at Timarpur, Delhi,
by the Directorate of Estates, Government of India. The Respon-
dent occupied the said acccommodation from November I, 1972. G
By a general order issued by the Ministry of Works and Housing
in the form of an office memorandum, namely, 0.M. No, 12031 (I)/
74-Pol. II dated September 9, 1975, and subsequently clarified by
another order, namely, O.M. No. 12031 (I)/74-Pol. II dated
December 12, 1975, the Government of India directed that all
Government servants who had· their own dwelling houses at the
place of posting within the limits of any local or adjoining muni- H
1028 StiPREMii COURT REPORTS !1985) 1s.C.fl.
A cipality should vacate the Government accommodation allotted to
them within three months from October 1, 1975, or in default to
pay market rent in respect thereof. Consequently the Respondent
was requii;ed to vacate the Government accommodation allotted to
him by December 31, 1975, or to pay the market rent ir. respect
B thereof with effect from January 1, 1976. The Respondent, therefore,
vacated the Government accommodation in his occupation on
December 27, 1975, and went to reside in other premises belonging
to him adjoining the premises let to the Appellant. Thereafter, on
May 17, 1976, the Respondent filed an application under sect10n
25B of the Act on the ground specified in section 14A (!) thereof,
.
being Suit No. E-798 of 1976. During the pendency of the said
c eviction application, by a special order dated December 24, 1975,
but signed on September 25, 1976, the Respondent was given notice
that if he failed to vacate the said Government accommodation in
his occupation by December 31, 1975, he would be charged market
rent with effect from January 1, 1976, at the rate fixed by the
D Government from time to time. After the summons had been duly
served on him, the Appellant filed an affidavit stating the grounds
on which he sought to contest the said eviction application and
obtained leave from the Rent Controller, Delhi, to contest the said
application. A number of defences were taken by the Appellant,
all of which were negatived by the Rent Controller. The Rent
E Controller considered the accommodation in the respective occupa-
tion of the parties and held that the Respondent's family consisted
of himself, his wife, his married sons al\d their wives, eight grand-
children and two married daughters With their children and that it
could not be said that the premises occupied by the Respondent
constituted reasonably suitable residential accommodation. The
F Rent Controlle; further held that section 14A (1) of the Act did
not contain a condition that the Government servant who made an
application under section 14A (I) should not be in possession of
reasonably suitable alternative accommodation as was the case
under clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section(!) of section 14 of
the Act and that even if such a factor were to be taken into
consideration, it could not be said that the Respondent ,was in
G
occupation of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation. ,
Accordingly, on August !, 1981, the Rent Controller passed an
order of eviction against the Appellant and directed it not to be
executed for a period of two months. The Rent Controller directed
the parties to bear their own costs of the said eviction application.

H The Appellant thereupon filed in the High Court of Delhi a
N. KHAMMAN v. P. K. JAIN (Madon, J.) 1029

revision petition under section 25B (8) of the Act. The said revision A
petition was dismissed on November 24, l 98!. It is against this
judgment and order of the Delhi High Court that the present Appeal
by Special Leave has been filed by the Appellant.

The first contention raised on behalf of the Appellant at the
hearing of this Appeal was that the Respondent was not entitled B
to rely upon the said special order dated December 25, 1975,
inasmuch as it was signed on September 25, 1976, and the fact that
it was signed nine months later than the date it bears clearly showed
that the Respondent had manoeuvred to obtain this order. In our
opinion, the said special order dated December 24, 1975, is irrelevant
inasmuch as the foundation of the Respondent's said eviction c
application was not the said special order but the said general order
dated September 9, 1975, as clarified by the said order dated
December 12, 1975. We may also mention here that the Government
policy as embodied in the said gen~ral order and its clarification
has been modified from time to time. We are, however, not concern-
D
ed in this Appeal with any of the subsequent modifications of the
said policy.

The next point which was urged before us and which requires
our serious consideration is that the Respondent's said eviction
application was not maintainable. The maintainability of the said
E
e~iction application was impugned on two grounds : (I) tbe Respon-
dent was not in occupation of the Government accommodation
allotted to him on the date when he filed his application, and (2) on
the date when he filed his application, the Respondent was already
residing in premises belonging to him.

In order to test the correctness of these contentions, it is F
necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. As the
long title of the Act shows that it is "An Act to provide for the
control of rents and evictions and of rates of hotels and lodging
houses, and for the lease of vacant premises to Government, in
certain areas in the Union Territory of Delhi." Under section 14
(I) of the Act a landlord is disentitled from obtaining possession of G
any premises let out by him except on one of the grounds set out
in the proviso to that sub-section. The relevant provisions of the
said section 14 (!) are as follows :

"14. Protection of tenant against eviction.
H
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contain-
1030 SUPRl!MB COURT REPORTS (1985] 1 s.c.R. -
A ed in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the
recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any
court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a
tenant:

Provided that the Controller may, on an application
B made to him in the preseribed manner, make an order for
the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more
of the following grounds only, namely :-

x x x x x
c (e) that the premises let for residential purposes are
required bona fide by the . landlord fur occupation as a
residence for himself or for any member of his family dep~n
dent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person
for whose benefit the premises are held and that the land-
lord or such person has no other reasonably suitable
D residential accommodation ;

x x x x x
(6) Where a landlord has acquired any premises by
transfer, no application for the recovery of possession of
E such premises shall lie under sub-section (I) on the ground
specified in clause (e) °bf the proviso thereto, unless a
period of five years has elapsed from the date of the
acquisition.

x x x x x
F
(7) Where an order for the recovery of possession of
any premises is made on the ground specified in clause
(e) of the provise to sub-section (I), the landlord shall not

G
be entitled to obtain possession thereof before the expiration
of a period of six months from the date of the order.

The right of a 'landlord to recover possession· on the ground
-
...:

specified in clause (e) of the proviso to section 14 (!)of the Act is
thus circumscribed by three restrictions : (!) the landlord Of the
person for whose benefit the premises are held should not have
other reasonably suitable residential accommodation ; (2) if the
premises of which the landlord desires to recover possession have
ff been acquired by him by transfer, no application for the recovery
N. KHAMMAN v. P. K. JAIN Madon, J.) 1031

of such premises can be filed unless a period of five years has A
elapsed from the date of the acquisition of such premises ; and
(3) if the landlord obtains an order for the recovery of possession
of the premises, he is not entitled to obtain possession of such
premises before the expiration of a period of six months from the
date of the order or, in other words, the tenant is statutorily given
a period of six months to vacate the premises. B

Section 35 of the Act provides for appointment of Controllers
and Additional Controllers. Section 37 of the Act prescribes the
procedure to be followed by the Controller which expression, under
clause (b) of section 2, includes an Additional Controller. Under
section 37 no order which prejudically affects any person is to be c
made by the Controller without giving him a reasonable opportunity
of showing cause against the order proposed to be made and until
his objections, if any, and any evidence he may produce in support
of the same have been considered by the Controller. The Controller
is to follow as far as may be the practice and procedure of a Court
of Small Causes, including the recording of evidence, while holding D
an inquiry in any proceeding before' him. Under section 38 an
appeal lies to the Rent Control Tribunal from ev<:ry order made
by the Controller under the Act, and a second appeal from an order
made by the Tribunal lies to the High Court if the appeal involves a
substantial question of law.
E
On December 1, 1975, the President of India promulgated the
Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1975 (Ord. No. 24 of
1975). The said Ordinance was repealed and replaced by the Delhi
Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act No. 18 of 1976). The
said Amendment Act came into force with retrospective effect from
December 1, 1975, being the date of the said Ordinance. By the said F
Ordinance and the said Amendment Act which replaced it, the defini·
tion of 'tenant' in clause (1) of section 2 was substituted and a new
section, namely, section 14A, and a new Chapter IHA, were inserted
in the Act. Section 14A(l) provides as follows :-

14" Afl) Right to recover immediate possession ofpre· G
mises to accrue to certain persons.

(!) Where a landlord who, being a person in occupa-
tion of any residential premises allotted to him by the
Central Government or any local authority is required, by,
or in pcrsuance of, any general or special order made by
· that Government or authority, to vacate such re~idential H
1032 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985) 1 s.c.a.
A accommodation, or in default, to incur certain obligations,
on the ground that he owns, in the Union Territory of
Delhi, a residential accommodation either in his own name
or in the name of his wife or dependent child, there shall
I
accrue, on and from the date of such order, to such land-
lord, notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this
B
Act or in any other law for the time being in force or in
~
any contract (whether express or implied), custom or usage
-t~
,,,
__ -,

to the contrary, a right to recover immediately possession
of any premises let out by him : ,

Provided that nothing in this section shall be construed
c as conferring a right on a landlord owning, in the Union
territory . of Delhi, two or more dwelling houses, whether
in his own name or in the name of his wife · or dependent t-

child, to recover the possession of more than one dwel-
ling house and it shall be lawful for such landlord to
D indicate the dwelling house, possession of which he
intends to recover."

Chapter IIIA is entitled 'Summary Trial of Certain Appli-
cations'. It consists of three sections, namely sections 25A, 25B
and 25C. Section 25 A provides that the provisions of Chapter
E ITTA or any rule made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding
anything inconsistent therewith contained elsewhere in the Act or
in any other law for the time beint,1 in force. Section 25B prescribes,
as its marginal heading shows, a special procedure for the disposal
of applications for eviction on the ground of b~na fide requirement'.
Under section 25B every applica,tion by a landlord for the recovery
of possession of and premises on the ground specified in clause
F (e) of the proviso to section 14(1), or under section 14A, is to be
dealt with in accordance with the special procedure prescribed by
that section. The special procedure which has been prescribed for
these cases is that on an application being filed on either of these
two grounds, the Controller is to issue a summons in the form speci-
fied in the Third Schedule to the Act. This summons is to call
G upon the tenant to appear before the Controller within fifteen days
of the service of the summons and to obtain leave of the Controller
to contest the application for eviction, and it intimates to him that
in default of his doing so the applicant would be entitkd after
expiry of the said period of fifteen days to obtain an order for his
eviction. Leave to appear and to contest the application is to be
B ob(<!ined by the tem1nt on an application made to the Co11troller
N. KHAMMAN v. P. K. JAiN (Madon, J.) 1033

supported by an affidavit. This dffidavit is to disclose such facts A
as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the
recovery of possession of the premises on the ground specified in
clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) or under section 14A.
When leave is granted, to the tenant t~ contest the application,
the Controller is to commence the hearing of the application as
early as practicable. In holding such an inquiry, the Controller is 8
·to follow the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes,
including the recording of evidence. No appeal or second appeal
is to lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any
premises made by the Controller in ~ccordance with this special
· procedure. The High Court is, however, given the right to call
for the records of the case for the purpose of satisfying itself that ::>
an order made by the Controller under this section is according to
law and to pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit.

Section 25C provides as follows :-

"25C. Act to have effect in a modified form in relation
to certain persons :- D

(I) Nothing contained in sub-section (6) of section
J 4 shall apply to a landlord who, being a person in occupa-
tion of any residential premises allotted to him by the
Central Government or any local authority is required by,
or in pursuance of, an order made by that Government E
or authority to vacate such residential accommodation, or,
in default, to incur certain obligations, on the ground that
he owns a residential accommodation either in his own
name or in the name of his wife or dependent child in the
Union Territory of Delhi.

(2) In the case of a landlord who, being a person of F
the category specified in sub-section (1), has obtained, on
the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to
sub-section (!) of section _14, or under section 14A,
an order for the eviction of a tenant from any premi-
ses, the provisions of sub-section (7) of section 14 shall G
have affect as if for the words "six months," occurring
therein, the words "two months" were substituted."

It is now well settled that though the Statement oLObjects and
Reasons accompanying a legislative Bill cannot be used to deter-
mine the true meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of H
1034 SUPRllMll COURT llBPOllTS [1985] 1 s.c.R.

A a statute; it is permissible to refer to the Statement of Objecis and
Reasons accompanying a Bill for the purpose of understanding th!
background, the aJJtecedent state of affairs, the surrounding circum-
stances in relation to the statute, and the evil which the statute
sought to remedy. It will, therefore, be convenient to reproduce
B at this stage the Statement of Objects and reasons accompanying
Bill No. XII of 1976(') which when enacted became the Delhi
Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1976. The said Statement of
Objects and Reasons is as follows :-

"There has been a persistent demand for amendments
c to the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 with a view to confer-
ring a right of tenancy on certain heirs/ successors of a decea-
sed statutory tenant so that they may be protected from
eviction by landlords and also for simplifymg the proce-
dure for eviction of tenants in case the landlord requires
the premises bona fide for his personal occupation. Further,
D
Government decided on the 9th September, 1975 that a
person who owns his own house in his place of work
should vacate the Government accommodation allotted to
him before the 31st December, 1975. Government consi-
dered that in the circumstances, tho Act required to be
E amended urgently.

2. As the Parliament was not in session, the Delhi
Rent Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1975 was promul-
gated on tho-1st December, 1975. The Bill seeks to replace
the said Ordinance."
F The aforesaid general order of the Government was issued
on September 9, 1975. The said Ordinance was promulgated on
December I, 1975. This proximity of dates and the provisions of
section 14A(l) make it clear that a new ground of eviction was pro-
vided by section 14A(l) in order to enable a person who has to
vacate the <Jovernment accommodation allotted to him by December
G 31, 1975, to recover possession of premises let by him. The fact
that section !4A was inserted in view of the said Government order
dated September 9, 1975, has also been ~xpressly stated in the
Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the said Bill No.
XII of 1976. This object is further brought out by the provisions

(1) Gazette of India Extraordinary, Part II, section 2 dated January
H 19, 1976; 410.
N. KHAMMAN v. P. K. 1AiN (Madon, J.) 1035

of section 25B which was inserted in the Act by the said Ordinance A
and re-enacted by the said Amendment Act. As mentioned earlier,
by section 25B a special procedure has been prescribed for appli·
cations made on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso
to section 14(1) or under section 14A. By the special procedure
provided in section 25B the delay normally involved in following
the procedure under section 37 of the Act, is sought to be cut down B
and the tenant is made to apply and obtain leave to contest the evic·
ti on application. Further, the tenant's right of appeal and second
appeal have been taken away and the only remedy left to him
against an order of eviction passesd by the Controller under section
25B is to approach the High Court in revision. Thus, the object
underlying section 14A is that a person who is compelled to vacate
c
residential accommodation allotted to him on the ground that he
owns other residential premises in the Union Territory of Delhi
either in his own name or in the name of wife or dependent child
should not be left without a roof over his or should not be made
to incur heavy financial obligation by continuing to reside in the D
accommodation allotted to him by paying market rent in respect
thereof to the Central Government or the local authority, as the
case may be.

Turning now to the merits of the present Appeal, it is not
disputed that the premises let to the Appellant and the premises
E
belonging to the Respondent which the Respondent occupied after
giving up the Government accommodation allotted to him are
separate premises and that each constitutes a dwelling house under
the proviso to secti_on 14A(l). It is also not disputed that the
Central Government issued the said general order dated September
9, 1975, and subsequently clarified it by another order dated
December 12, 1975. It is equally not in dispute that on the date F
when the respondent filed his said eviction application he was
residing in premises belonging to him. It is in the light of these
admitted facts and the statutory provisions referred to above that
we must now consider the question of maintainability of the eviction
application filed by the Respondent.
G
The ·first ground of challenge to the maintainability of the said
eviction application is that a landlord who is not in occupation of
the residential accommodation allotted to him either by the Central
Government or a local authority on the date when he files an
application under section 14A (!) is not entitled to maintain it. It
was submitted on behalf of the Appellant that though such a H
1036. SUPREMI! COURT REPORTS (1985] 1 S.C.R.
A condition was not expressly provided in section 14A, it should be
read into.that section as being implicit in it. We find no merit in this
submission. Admittedly, the section does not contain any such
condition. The object of section 14A (I) is to provide an additional
ground or eviction to a landlord who had been allotted residential
accommodation by the Central Government or a local authority and
8. who is required by a general or special order of that Government or
authority to vacate that accommodation or in default, to incur certain
· obligations, for example, payment of market rent, on the ground that
he owns in.the Union 'Ierritory of Delhi a residential accommodation
either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent
c child. Being asked to vacate on the ground that he owns his
own - residential accommodation, he must be in a position to .
move into such accommodation. It is for this reason that the
section expressly states that 'There shall accrue, on and from the
date of such order, to such landlord ... a right to recover immediately
possession of any premises let out by him". To accept the contention
D· of the.Appellant would be to postpone the accrual of the right
given by section 14A to the date of the filing of the application.
In order to recover posse~sion of ~esidential accommodation let out
by him, a landlord to . whom residential accommodation had been
allotted by the Central Government or any local authority cannot
be obliged to continue to .reside in such accommodation by paying
E market rent in respect thereof. On the passing of a general or
special order of the nature specified in section l4A (I) the landlord
may vacate the accommodation allotted to him and find accommoda.
tion for himself elsewhere, either by renting premises or in a hostel,
hotel, lodging house, boarding house or with a relative. .He is not
thereby debarred from filing an application under section 14A(I}.
F
M· .Does"~the same position, however, prevail when on the passing
'ii
of such general or special order the landlord vacates the - accommo·
dation allotted to him and moves into other premises owned by
him either in his own name or in the name .JJf his wife or dependent
child? The consideration of this question brings us to the second
ground of challenge to the maintainability of the Respondent's said
G eviction application. This is a more formidable challenge and in
; our opinion, .it must succeed. It was urged by Mr. R.K. Jain on
behalf of the Respondent that there was no such restriction provided
in section 14A (1). We are unable to acce!'t this submission. The
object underlying the Act and the subsequent enactment of section
14A would be defeated, if this contention were to ,be accepted.
H The Act; like other Rent Acts, has been passed to secure tenants
N. KHAMMAN v. i>. IC. JAIN (Madon, J.) 10~7
A
in their accommodation at a reasonable rent. This is apparent from
the long title and the provisions of the Act. Various States ~ad
en,.cted Rent Acts in order to prevent landlords from profiteermg
from the situation brought ~b0ut as a result of increase in population
and shortage of accommodation. By these Rent Acts, the right
which a landlord has under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to B
recover possession of the property let by him to a tenant on the
expiry of the lease or on determination of the .tenancy has been la~en
away and the 18.ndlord can recover possession of such premises
only on one of the grounds provided by the particular Rent Act.
To permit an allottee of residential accommodation belonging to
the Central Government or a local authority who owns a residential c
accommodation either in his own name or"in the name of his wife
or dependent child to file an application to evict a tenant from
other premises belonging to him which he has let out would be to
permit him to move into one of the premises owned by him and
to let out the other premises and thus to profiteer from the general
or special order mentioned in section 14A (!). That he cannot do
so is clear from the proviso to section 14A (I). Under the said D
proviso, if an allottee of such accommodation owns in the Union
Territory of Delhi two or more dwelling houses, either in his own
name or in the name of his wife or dependent child, which he· has
let out, he cannot recover possession of more than one of these
dwelling houses but he has to select one of them and file an
application under section 14A (I) in respect thereof only. If such E
a landlord cannot file an application under section 14A O) when

-· he owns two dwelling houses which have been Jet out by him, io
recover possession of both these dwelling houses but can do so only
in respect of one of them, he equally cannot file an application
under section 14A(l) when he has let out one of such dwelling houses
F
and the other dwelling house is available to him for his residence
or when he has already moved into the other dwelling house.

Can such a person, however, file an application under ·section
14A (I) on the ground that a dwelling house owned by him either
In his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child
and available for his residence is not reasonably suitable for his G
residential accommodation? The answer to this question m t
also be in the negative. Section 14A does not contain a. conditi~~
that .a person who~ has or had to vacate tho accommodation alJotted
to him by the Cent.ral G overnm~nt or any local authority by reason
of a general or special order ment10ned in section J4A (1) ha "
other reasonably suitable residential acccommodation" as ~la:~
H
ib38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ll985j l S.C.R.
A (e) of the proviso to section 14 0) does. Under section J4A (I)
such allottee should have no other dwelling house which he owns
either in ~is own name or in the name of his wife or dependent
child for him to move into. If such dwelling house is not adequate
or suitable for his residence, he must proceed under clause (e) of
the proviso to section 14 (I). That this is the only remedy open
B
to him is clear from the provisions of section 25C. As we have
seen, a landlord who desires to recover possession of premises on
the ground specified in the said clause (e), which premises have
been acquired by him by· transfer, he cannot under clause (6) of
section 14 file an applioation under the said clause (e) for a period
of five years from the date of the acquisition of those premises
by him. Further, such· an applicant if he succeeds in getting an
order of eviction is not entitled to obtain possession of the premises
for a period of six months from the date of the eviction order. In
the case of a landlord referred to in section 14A (I) these two
conditions have been relaxed by sxtion 25C. Under section 25C(l)
D even though the premises which have been let out by such landlord
have been acquired by him by transfer, clause (6) of section 14
does not apply to him and he does not have to wait for a period
of five years or for any length of time before filing an application
for the recovery of possession of such premises. Further, the
period of six months during which the order of eviction cannot
E be executed under sub-section (7) of section 14 is reduced by section
25C (2) in the case of such a landlord to two months. These pro-
visions clearly show that if a landlord referred to in section 14A(l)
has other residential accommodation of his own either in his own
name or in the name of his wife or dependent child which accommo-
dation is not reasonably suitable for his residence cannot proceed
F under section 14A (I) but must file an application on the ground
specified in clause (e) of the proviso to section 14 (! ). The Rent
Controller was, therefore, in error in considering the respective needs
of the parties and the suitability of accommodation occupied by
the Respondent.
G
To summarize our conclusions :
(I) It is not necessary that a person in occupation of residen·
tial premises allotted to him by the Central Government or a local
authority who is required by or in pursuance of a genera\ or special
order made by that by that Government or authority to vacate
. such accomodation or, in default, to incur certain obligations, such
H as payment of market rent, on the ground that he owns in the
N. KHAMMAN v. P. K!. JAIN (Madon, J.) 103!1

Union Territory of Dell1i a residential accommodation ·either in his A
own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child should
be in occupation of the accommodation allotted to him on the date
when he files an eviction application under section 14A 0) of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, to recover possession of the residen-
tial premises which he so own and which has been let by him. B
(2) If such person has, however, other premises which he
owns either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent
child which are available to him for his residential accommodation

- or into which he has already moved, he cannot maintain an applica-
tion under section 14A (I) of the Act.

(3) Even if the other premises owned by him either in his
c

own name or in the name of his wife or dep>ndent child are not
reasonably suitable for his accommodation. he cannot manintain an
application under section 14A (!)but must file an applieation on the
ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (I) of D
section 14 of the Act.

In the result, this Appeal must succeed. We accordingly allow
this Appeal and reverse the ordeF of the Delhi High Court dismissing
Civil Revision Petition No. 854 of 1981 filed ·by the Appellant
and allow the said revision petition and dismiss the Eviction Suit E
No. E 798 of 1976 filed by the Respondent in the Court of the Rent
Controller, Delhi.

The Respondent will pay to the Appellant the costs of this
Appeal which we quantify at Rs. 800.
F

N.V.K. Appeal allowed.

. .