Holding

The Special Court constituted under Section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is competent to try offences punishable under the repealed 1947 Act, by virtue of Section 30(2) and the legal fiction it creates.

Summary

The Chief Minister of Sikkim and an IAS officer were charged under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 for offences alleged in 1984. After the 1947 Act was repealed and replaced by the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, a Special Judge appointed under the 1988 Act tried the case, but later held it lacked jurisdiction because the 1952 Act, which created special courts for the 1947 offences, was never extended to Sikkim. The Sikkim High Court reversed that view, holding the 1988 Special Judge could try the offences. The Supreme Court examined the interplay of Section 3 and Section 30(2) of the 1988 Act with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, concluding that the legal fiction in Section 30(2) saved the proceedings and gave the Special Judge competence to try the 1947 offences. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court’s order that the Special Judge had jurisdiction.

Issues considered

Whether a Special Judge appointed under Section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 has jurisdiction to try offences alleged under the repealed Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 in Sikkim where the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 was not extended.
Interpretation of Section 30(2) of the 1988 Act and its effect on the continuation of proceedings after repeal of the 1947 Act.
Whether Section 26 of the 1988 Act limits the Special Judge’s jurisdiction in the present facts.

Legislation cited

Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952
General Clauses Act, 1897s. 6
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947s. 5(1)(d), s. 5(1)(e), s. 5(2)
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13(2), s. 1(e), s. 26, s. 3, s. 30(2)

Subjects

Prevention of Corruption ActSpecial Judge jurisdictionStatutory interpretationSection 30 legal fictionGeneral Clauses ActRepeal of statutesSikkimCBI investigationCriminal law

Judgment

NAR BAHADUR BHANDARI AND ANR. A
4.
• v.
STATE OF SIKKIM AND OTHERS
.....
MAY 13, 1998

[M. SRINIVASAN AND S.S. MOHAMMED QUADRI, JJ.] B

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 :

Sections 1(e), 3, 13(2), 26 and JO-Special Judge, appointed under
Section 3-0ffences registered under the provisions of the Act of 1947, c
repealed by the Act of 1988-Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 provided
for constitution of Special Courts to try the offences under the Act of 1947-
Not extended to the State of Sikkim-Charge sheet filed in the Court of
Special Judge constituted under the Act of 1988-Held, such offences could
be tried by the Special Judge appointed under the Act, of 1988-General D
Clauses Act, 1897, Section 6-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, Sections
..... _ 5(2), 5(/)(d} and 5(J}(e)-Criminal law (Amendment) Act, Section 6-
Statute law-Repeal.

Section 3-Jurisdiction ofSpecial Judge-Proper mode of interpretation
of the provision of Section 3-Held, should be read with other provisions of E
the Act and not in isolation-Interpretation ef Statutes-Particular statutes
and provisions.

Section 30(2)-legal fiction-Held, the fiction is to the effect that the
Act of I 988 had come into force when any thing done or action taken under
or in pursuance of the Act of I 947-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947- F
Statute Law-Legal Fiction.

The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, was extended to the State of
Sikkim w.e.f.1-9-1976. The Appellants were Chief Minister and an IAS
officer of the State. The CBI had registered against them a case under
Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(e) and Section 5(2) read with Section G
5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 on two different dates in
1984. However, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952, which provided
;_ for constitution of Special Courts to try the offences under.the Act of 1947
and excluded the jurisdiction of the other courts, was not extended to the
State. Therefore, no Special Court was constituted in the state to try the H
421
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) 3 S.C.R.

A offences under the Act of 1947. In 1994, the CBI filed its report in the
appellants' case before the Special Court constituted under Section 3 of the
Prevention of the Corruption Act, 1988 and charges were framed by it
against the appellants. Thereafter, the appellant raised a preliminary objection
to the competence of the Special Judge to try the aforesaid offences. The
B Special Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dropped the case against
the appellants. This order of the Special Judge was challenged before the
High Court by the State and the CBI. The High Court held that the Special
Judge appointed under Section 3 of the Act of 1988 had jurisdiction to
entertain the charge sheet filed under the provisions of the Act of 1988 with
regard to the offences committed under the Act of the 1947. Hence this
C appeal

Dismissing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1.1. No doubt, Section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 refers only to offences punishable under the Act and the Special
D Courts constituted under Section 3 of the Act will have jurisdiction to try
the offences punishable under the Act, but Section 3 cannot be read in
isolation. It should be read alongwith other provisions of the Act to undei;stand
the scope thereof. Section 30(1) of the Act of 1988 repeals the Acts of 1947
and 1952. That does not mean that any offence which was committed under
the Act of 1947 would cease to be triable after its repeal. Normally Section
E 6 of the General Clauses Act would come into play and enable the continuation
of the proceedings including investigation as if the repealing Act had not
been passed. As per the provision of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act
the position will be as if the Act of 1947 continues to be in force for the
purpose of trying the offence within the meaning of the said Act. Section 6
F of the General Clauses Act however, makes it clear that the said position will
not obtain if a different intention appears in the repealing Act In the present y
case, the Act 1988 is the repealing Act. Section 30(2) of the Act while on
the one hand ensures that the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses
Act is not prejudiced, on the other it express different intention as
contemplated by the said Section 6. The last part of the Section 30(2)
G introduces a legal fiction whereby anything done or action taken under or
in pursuance of the Act of 1947 shall be deemed to have been done or taken
under or in pursuance of the corresponding provisions of the Act of 1988.
[427-B-D; F-G]
1.2. The Special Court constituted under Section 6 of the Act of 1988
H has the competence to try the offences under the Act of 1947. Hence, in the
N.B. BHANDARI v. STATE OF SIKKIM [SRINIVASAN, J.) 423
present case, the Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act), Sikkim is A
competent to try the offences for which the appellants stand charged.
(429-Hj
B.N. Kohli v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1966) 2 SCR 158 and Central
Bureau of Investigation v. Subodh Kumar Dutta, [1997) 10 SCC 567, relied
on.
B
State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, (1955) 1 SCR 893, distinguished.

Indra Sohanlal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, [1955] 2 SCR 1117;
Kazi Lhendup Dorji v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (1994] Supp. 2 SCC
116 and Surtees v. Ellison, (1829) 9 B&C 752, referred to.
c
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. 575-
577 of 1998 Etc.

From the Judgment and Order dated 24.9.97 of the Sikkim High Court
in Crl. R. Nos. 1, 3 and 4of1997.
D
K. Rajendra Chowdhary, K. Swami and Ms. Prabha Swami for the
.~ _ Appellants. In Crl. A. No. 575-77/98.

Ajit Kumar Sinha for the Appellant in Crl. A. No. 580-81198.

Altaf Ahmad, Additional Solicitor General, S.P. Wangd~ Gen Sikkim, B.S. E
Chahar, Ajay Kumar Jain and Ashok Mathur for the Respondents in the State
of Sikkim.

S. Wasim A. Qadri, A.D.N. Rao and P. Parrneswaran for the Union.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
SRINIVASAN, J. Leave granted.

The common question in these petitions relates to the competence of
Special Judge (P.C. Act) Sikkim to try the cases registered against the petitioners
herein under Sections 5(2) read with Section 5( 1)( e) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act. 1947 corresponding to Section 13(2) read with Section 13(l)(e) G
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The petitioner in S.L.Ps 146-148 of
1998 is the third respondent in S.L.Ps 149-150 of 1998 ansJ the petitioner in
the later petitions is the third respondent in S.L.Ps 146-148.' The petitioner in
the earlier petitions was the Chief Minister of Sikkim and the petitioner in the
later petitions was a Member of Indian Administrative Service(Sikkim cadre)
working at the relevant time as a Secretary to the Rural Development H
,.+-
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 3 S.C.R.

A Department, Government of Sikkim.

2. Cases were registered against the petitioners by C.B.I. on 26.5.84 and
..
~

7.8.84 under Section 5(2) read with Section 5 (I)(e) and Section 5 (2) read with c
Section 5 (l)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. On 7.1.87 the State
of Sikkim issued a Notification withdrawing the consent given under Section
;.
B 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 to the C.B.I. for exercising
powers and jurisdiction in the State of Sikkim for investigations of offences
punishable under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code specified therein
as well as offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The said
Notification was challenged in a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India. This Court by its judgment dated March 29, 1994
c allowed the writ petition and declared that the Notification dated 7. I. 87
withdrawing the consent given by the Government of Sikkim earlier operated
only prospectively and the said withdrawal would not apply to cases which
were pending investigation on the date of issuance of the said Notification.
The Court observed that the Notification dated 7.1.87 did not preclude the
D C.B.I from submitting the report in the competent court under Section 173
Cr.P.C. on the basis of the investigation conducted in RC 5/84- CIU (A) and
RC 8/84 CIU (A). The judgment of this Court is reported in Kazi Lhendup
.-J
Dorji v. Central Bureau ofInvestigation and others, [1994] Supp 2 S.C.C. 116.

3. It should be mentioned here that even before the said writ petition
E was filed, the Prevention of Corruption Act, 194 7 (hereinafter referred to as
'The Act of 1947') was repealed and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
(hereinafter referred to as 'The Act of 1988') came into force. The Act of 1947
was extended to the State of Sikkim with effect from 1.9.76. The Delhi Special
Police Establishment Act 1946 had been extended to the State of Sikkim with
effect from 15.5.76. The _Act of 1988 became applicable to the State of Sikkim •
F from the date it came into force namely 9.9.88. On l~.9.1994 the following Acts y
were made applicable to the State of Sikkim.

I. Cr. P.C. 1973

2. Indian Penal Code 1860
G
3. Indian Evidence Act 1972

On the same day, the State of Sikkim issued a Notification under Section
3 of The Act of 1988 appointing Shri A. P. Subba as Special Judge for trying
_,
cases referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 3(1) of the said Act for the
H whole of the State of Sikkim.
N.B. BHANDARI v. STATE OF SIKKIM [SRINIVASAN, J.] 425

4.,,.
4. On 14.9.94 the C.B.I. filed its report before the said Special Judge as A
permitted by this Court in its judgment dated March 29, 1994. The Special
Judge passed a detailed order on 11.8.95 holding that on the basis of materials
on record he was of the view that prima facie there was ground for presuming
that the accused had committed an offence punishable under Section 5(2)
read with Section 5 ( 1)( e) of the Act of 194 7 corresponding to Section 13(2)
read with Section 13 ( 1)( e) of the Act of 1988 and accordingly charges had
B
to be framed. Thereafter the petitioners raised a preliminary objection to the
competence of the Special Judge to try the aforesaid offences. After hearing
arguments on both sides the Special Judge passed an order on 1.7.97 upholding
the preliminary objection and expressing the view that the Court not having
been constituted under Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 hereinafter c
referred to as the 'Act of 1952' lacked jurisdiction to take cognizance of and
to try the offences in the present case. Consequently, it held that further
proceedings in both the cases stood dropped and the accused be discharged
from their respective bail bonds.

5. That order of the Special Judge was challenged before the High Court D
in Criminal Revision Nos. 1,3 and 4 of 1997 by the State and the C.B.I. The
..._ learned Chief Justice of the High Court on 24.9.1997 allowed the revision
petitions and held that the Special Judge appointed under Section 3 of the
Act of 1988 had jurisdiction to entertain the chargesheet filed under the
provisions of the Act of I 988 with regard to the offences committed under
E
the Act of 1947 and directed the Special Judge to dispose of the criminal case
pending on his file in accordance with law. It is that order of the High Court
which is challenged in these S.L.Ps.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner in S.L.Ps 146-148 of 1998 has
contended as follows:- Before the passing of the Act of 1988 there were two F
---i_
enactments which dealt with the offences in question, namely, the Act of 1947
and the Act of 1952. The Act of 1952 provided for constitution of Special

- Courts to try the offences under the Act of 194 7 and excluded the jurisdiction
ofother Courts. The Act of 1952 was not extended to the State of Sikkim. No
Special Court was constituted in the State of Sikkim to try the offences under
the Act of 1947. Consequently, when the Act of 1988 was passed repealing G
both the Act of 1947 and the Act of 1952 and bringing into force a consolidated
and amalgamated Legislation providing not only for the ingredients of the
>j.
offences but also for the constitution of Special Courts to try the same, the
Special Court c.onstituted under Section 3 of the Act of 1988 has jurisdiction
only to try the offences punishable under the said Act. Such a Court cannot H
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998) 3 S.C.R.

A try the offences punishable under the Act of 1947 unless the proceeding in
relation to such offences had commenced before a Special Judge appointed ..,.
under the Act of 1952. In the absence of such Special Judge under the Act
of 1952 in the State of Sikkim, Section 26 of the Act of 1988 is not applicable
and the present proceeding will not be governed thereby. Section 30 of the
Act of 1988 is not applicable to .the facts of the case in as much as the repeal
B under Sub-sec. (1) of Section 30 is a joint repeal of both the Acts, namely,
the Act of 1947 and the Act of 1952. Sub-sec. (2) of Section 30 will come
into play only if sub-sec. (I) is applicable. In the State of Sikkim the Act of
""'
1952 was not in force so as to be repealed by sub-sec (I) of Section 30 and t
consequently sub-section 2 will not apply. It is also contended that Section
c 6 of the General Clauses Act will not help the prosecution in the present case
in as much as the provisions of the Act of 1988 indicate a different intention
as contemplated by the first part of the said Section 6. According to the
learned counsel ifthe provisions of the Act of 1988 are perused, it will be seen
that the legislative intention is not to make Section 6 of the General Clauses
Act applicable to the repeal of Act of 1947. In this connection reliance is
D placed on the judgment of this Court in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh,
[1955) I S.C.R. 893.
~

7. Learned counsel for the petitioners in S.L.Ps 149-150 of 1998 has
contended that Section 30(2) of the Act of 1988 can apply only if a proceeding
had been initiated before the said Act came into force so that it could be
E continued and in the present case the proceeding was instituted only after
the said Act came into force and consequently the Special Court had no
jurisdiction. It is also contended by him that the prosecution had conceded
before the High Court that the alleged offence is punishable under Section
5( I) (d) and 5 (2) of the Act of 194 7 and not under the Act of 1988 and
F therefore the special court has no jurisdiction. y
8. Per contra, learned Additional Solicitor General has contended that
Section 3 of the Act of 1988 has to be read along with Section 30(2) of the
said Act and that it will be clear therefrom that the Special Court is competent
to try the offences tinder the Act of 194 7 as well as the Act of 1988.
G According to him a legal fiction is created by Section 30(2) by which the Act
of 1.988 is deemed to have been in force at the time when the offences were
committed and the investigation done. Reliance is placed by him on the
judgment of this Court in B.N. Kohli and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
others, (1966) 2 S.C.R. 158. Our attention is also drawn to the judgment of this
H Court in C.B.J v. Subodh Kumar Dutta and another, (1997) I 0 S.C.C. 567 and
N.B. BHANDARI v. STATE OF SIKKIM [SRINIVASAN, J.] 427

~,.
it is contended that the matter is concluded by the judgment in that case. A
9. The contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners are based on a
wrong understanding of provisions of the Act of 1988. No doubt, Section 3
of the said Act refers only to offences punishable under the Act and the
Special Courts constituted under Section 3 will have jurisdiction to try the
offences punishable under the Act but Section 3 cannot be read in isolation. B
It should be read along with other provisions of the Act to understand the
scope thereof. Section 30(1) of the Act of 1988 repeals the Acts of 1947 and
1952. That does not mean that any offence which was committed under the
Act of 1947 would cease to be triable after the repeal of the said Act. Normally
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would come into play and enable the
continuation of the proceedings including investigation as if the repealing
c
Act had not been passed. As per the provisons of Section 6 of the General
Clauses Act the position will be as if the Act of 194 7 continues to be in force
for the purpose of trying the offence within the meaning of the said Act.
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act however makes it clear that the said
position will not obtain if a different intention appears in the repealing Act. D
In the present case, the Act of 1988 is the repealing Act. Sub-sec. (2) of
... Section 30 reads as follows:

"(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, but without prejudice to the
application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act 1897 (10of1897),
anything done or any action taken or purported to have been done E
or taken under or in pursuance of the Acts so repealed shall, in so
far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed
to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the corresponding
provision of this Act."

The said sub-section while on the one hand ensures that the application F
of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is not prejudiced, on the other it
expresses a different intention as contemplated by the said Section 6. The last
part of the above sub-section introduces a legal fiction whereby anything
done or action taken under or in pursuance of the Act of 1947 shall be deemed
to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of corresponding provisions G
of the Act of 1988. That is, the fiction is to the effect that the Act of 1988

.
,J
had come into force when such thing was done or action was taken .

I 0. This aspect of the matter was clearly elucidated by the Constitution
Bench in B. N. Koh/i's case (supra). In that case Ordinance 27/49 repealed
Ordinance 12/49. The relevant provision in the repealing Ordinance was sub- H
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 3 S.C.R.

A sec.(3) of Section 58. That read as follows:

"The repeal by this Act of the Administration of Evacuee Property
Ordinance, 1949 or the Hyderabad Administration of Evacuee Property
Regulation or of any corresponding law shall not affect the previous
operation of that Ordinance, Regulation or corresponding law, and
B subject thereto, anything done or any action taken in the exercise of
any power conferred by or under that Ordinance, Regulation or
corresponding law, shall be deemed to have been done or taken in the
exercise of the powers conferred by or under this Act as if this Act
were in force on the day on which such thing was done or action was
taken."
c
11. While construing the said sub-section, the Court observed as
follows:

" ... By the first part of S.58(3) repeal of the statutes mentioned therein
did not operate to vacate things done or action taken under those
D statutes. This provision appears to have been enacted with a view to
avoid the possible application of the rule of interpretation that where ..i
statute expires or is repealed, in the absence of a provision to the
contrary, it is regarded as having never existed except as to matters
and transactions past and closed: (see Surtees v. Ellison, (1829) 9 B
E & C 752). This rule was altered by an omnibus provision in General
Clauses Act, 1897, relating to the effect of repeal of statutes by any
Central Act or Regulation. By S. 6 of the General Clauses Act, it is
provided, in so far as it is material, that any Central Act or Regufation
made after the commencement of the General Clauses Act or repeals
any enactment, the repeal shall not affect the previous operation of
F any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered
thereunder, or affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired,
occurred or incurred under any enactment so repealed or affect any
investigation legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right,
privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as
aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy
G may be instituted, continued or enforced, any such penalty, forfeiture
or punishment may be imposed, as ifthe Repealing Act or Regulation
had not been passed. But the rule contained in Section 6 applies only
if a different intention does not appear, and by enacting Section 58(3)
the Parliament has expressed a different intention, for whereas the
H General Clauses Act keeps alive the previous operation of the enactment
N.B. BHANDARI v. STATE OF SIKKIM [SRINIVASAN, J.] 429

repealed, and things done and duly suffered, the rights, privileges, A
obligations or liabilities acquired or incurred, and authorisies the
investigation, legal proceeding and remedies in respect of rights,
privileges, obligations, liabilities, penalties, forfeitures and punishment
and if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed, Section
58 (3) of Act 31 of 1950 directs that things done or actions taken in B
exercise of power conferred by the repealed statutes shall be deemed
to be done or taken under the repealing Act as if that latter Act were
in force on the day on which such thing was done or action was
taken. The rule so enunciated makes a clear departure from the rules
enunciated in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. By the first
part of Section 58(3) which is in terms negative, the previous operation C
of the repealed statutes survives the repeal. Thereby matters and
transactions past and closed remain operative; so does the previous
operation of the repealed statute. B'tt as pointed out by this Court in
Indira Sohanla/'s case, [ 1955) 2 SCR 1117 at P.1133, the saving of the
previous operation of the repealed law is not to be read, as saving the
future operation of the previous law. The previous law stands repealed, D
and it has not for the future the partial operation as it is prescribed
by Section 6 of General Clauses Act. All things done and actions
taken under the repealed statute are deemed to be done or taken in
exercise of powers conferred by or under the repealing Act, as if that
Act were in force on the day on which that thing was done or action E
was taken. It was clearly the intention of the parliament that matters
and transactions past and closed were not to be deemed vacated by
the repeal of the statute under which they were done. The previous
operation of the statute repealed was also affirmed expressly but
things done or actions taken under the repealed statute are to be
deemed by fiction to have been done or taken under the repealing F
Act."

12. On the basis of the above reasoning the Court held that the
Custodian- General had jurisdiction to entertain a revision against an order
passed by the Deputy Custodian of the Evacuee Property under Section 6 of G
Ordinance 12/49 which was repealed by Ordinance 27/49.

13. Applying the said ratio of the Constitution Bench, we arrive at the
conclusion that the Special Court constituted under Section 3 of the Act of
1988 has competence to try the offences under the Act of 194 7.

14. The judgment in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, (supra) relied on H
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998]3 S.C.R.

A by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not help him in any manner.
The Court has only held in that case that in order to ascertain the different
intention within the meaning of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act the
Court has to read the provisions of repealing enactment.

15. In our view, the matter has been set at rest by the judgment of this
B Court in CB.I. v. Subodh Kumar Dutta and another, (supra). That was an
appeal by the C.B.I. from the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta allowing
a criminal revision filed by the respondent therein quashing the proceedings
of the Special Court constituted under the West Bengal Special Courts Act,
1950 for trying the offences under the Act of 1947. A case was registered in
C November 1987 by the C.B.I. before the Special Court and cognizance of the
offence was taken by the Special Judge on 9.7.88. When the Act of 1988 came
into force on 9.9.88 an objection was taken to the competence of a Special
Court to continue with the case. A.Criminal Revision Petition was filed by the
accused before the High Court seeking to quash the proceeding before the
Special Judge. The High Court accepted the contention of the accused and
D opined that Section 26 of the Act ofd988 saved only proceedings before the
Special Courts constituted under the Act of 1952 and not other Special
Courts. Consequently the proceeding was quashed.

16. Reversing that judgment of the High Court this Court, held that by
E virtue of the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of Section 30 the proceeding initiated
under the Act of 194 7 shall be deemed to have been taken under the
corresponding provisions of the Act of 1988 and consequently the Court had
jurisdiction to continue the Same. The relevant passage in the judgment reads
as follows:

F "A bare look at the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of Section 30 shows
that anything done or any action taken or purported to have been
taken under or in pursuance of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 194 7
shall be deemed to have been taken under or in pursuance of the
corresponding provison of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988. In
view of this specific provision, cognizance of the offence taken by the
G Special Court stood saved. It appears that the attention of the learned
Single Judge of the High Court was not invited to Section 30 (supra)
or had it been so invited, we have no doubt that the proceedings
which were saved by the 1988 Act would not have been quashed. The
learned Single Judge has only referred to Section 26 of the 1988 Act
H and we agree that under that Section, the cognizance taken by the
N.B. BHANDARI v. STATE OF SIKKIM [SRINIVASAN, J.] 431
Special Court was not saved. Section 26 of the 1988 Act has no A
~
.. application to this case. The order of the High Court in view of the
..F clear provisions of Section 30 (supra) cannot be sustained and we,
therefore, accept this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court
impugned before us. Since the High Court did not express any opinion
on the other points raised in the revision petition, we deem it
appropriate to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the
B
Criminal revision petition, filed by Respondent No. I, afresh on merits
after hearing the parties in the light of the observations made by us
above ..... "

17. The present one is an afortiori case. when a Special Court constituted
c
under an enactment other than the Act of 1952 can continue the proceedings
by vh1ue of Section 30(2) of the Act of 1988, it goes without saying that the

- Special Court constituted under the Act of 1988 can take cognizance of the
report filed before it and try the offences particularly when this Court had in
its judgment dated March 29, 1994 held that the filing of such report was not
D
precluded (vide 1994 Supp. (2) S.C.C. 116).

)I._
18. We have no hesitation to hold that the special Judge (P.C. Act)
Sikkim is competent to try the offences for which the appellants stand charged.
Hence these appeals are dismissed.

R.K.S. Appeals dismissed. E