NANDLAL WASUDEO BADWAIKversusLATA NANDLAL BADWAIK & ANR.

                         [2014] 1 S.C.R. 120

A                NANDLAL WASUDEO BADWAIK
                                   V.
                LATA NANDLAL BADWAIK & ANR.
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 24 of 2014)
                         JANUARY 06, 2014
8
              [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD AND
                JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, JJ.]

        Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.·
c
         s. 125 - Maintenance to wife and daughter - Appellant-
    husband denying paternity of the child and challenging the
    order as regards maintenance to her - Two DNA test reports
    excluding him to be the biological father of the child - Held:
0   Impugned judgment is set aside so far as it directs payment
    of maintenance to the child - However, the payments
    already made shall not be recovered from the respondents.

        Evidence Act, 1872:

E       s. 112 - Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of
  legitimacy - Rebuttal by two DNA tests - Held: DNA test is
  scientifically accurate -When there is a conflict between a
  conclusive proof envisaged under law and a proof based on
  scientific advancement accepted by the world community to
F be correct, the latter must prevail over the former -
  Husband's plea that he had no access to the wife when child
  was begotten, stands proved by DNA test report and in the
  face of it, he cannot be compelled to bear the fatherhood of
  the child, when scientific reports prove to the contrary.
G         s. 112 - Birth during marriage - Presumption as regards
    legitimacy of child - Held: s. 112 does not create a legal fiction
    but provides for presumption - Where there is evidence to
    the contrary, presumption is rebuttable and must yield to proof

H                                  120
NANDLAL WASUDEO BADWAIK v. LATA NANDLAL 121
               BADWAIK
    Medical Jurisprudence:                                    A
    DNA test - Nature and evidentiary value of - Explained.

     The instant appeal was filed by the husband
challenging the order of maintenance u/s 125 CrPC as
regards the daughter and denying the paternity of the 8
child. His case was that his wife was residing separately
and during the relevant period he had no access to her.
He applied for referring the child for DNA test and its
report excluded him from being the biological father of
the child. Respondent no. 1-wife requested for re-test and C
its report from a different institute also was to the same
effect. It was contended for the respondents that the
appellant having failed to establish that he had no access
to his wife at any time when she could have begotten
respondent no. 2, the direction for DNA test ought not to D
have been given and, as such, the result of such a test
was fit to be ignored.
    Allowing the appeal, the Court
     HELD: 1.1. This Court twice gave directions for DNA      E
test. The respondents did not oppose the prayer of DNA
test when such a prayer was being considered. It was
only after the reports of the DNA test had been received,
which was adverse to the respondents, that they
challenged it on the ground that such a test ought not to     F
have been directed. This Court, at this stage, cannot go
into the validity of the orders passed by a coordinate
Bench. It has attained finality. [para 10] [129-C-E]
     Goutam Kundu v. State of W.B., 1993 (3) SCR 917     =G
(1993) 3 SCC 418; Banarsi Dass v. Teeku Dutta 2005
            =
(3) SCR 923 (2005) 4 SCC 449; and Bhabani Prasad Jena
v. Orissa State Commission for Women, 201 O (9) SCR 457
= (2010) 8 sec 633 - held inapplicable.
                                                              H
    122       SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A      1.2. It has been recognized by this Court in the case
  of Kamti Devi that the result of a genuine DNA test is
  scientifically accurate. It is nobody's case that the result
  of the DNA test is not genuine and, therefore, it has to be
  assumed that the result of the DNA test is accurate. The
8 DNA test reports show that the appellant is not the
  biological father of the girl-child. [para 12] [131-C]

          Kamti Devi v. Poshi Ram 2001 (3) SCR 729 = (2001) 5
    sec 311- referred to.
C      1.3. From a plain reading of s.112 of the Evidence Act,
  1872, it is evident that a child born during the continuance
  of a valid marriage shall be a conclusive proof that the
  child is a legitimate child of the man to whom the lady
  giving birth is married. The provision makes the
D legitimacy of the child to be a conclusive proof, if the
  conditions are satisfied. It can be denied only if it is
  shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to
  each other at any time when the child could have been
  begotten. [para 14) [131-G-H; 132-A]
E
       1.4. The DNA test is an accurate test and on that
  basis it is clear that the appellant is not the biological
  father of the girl-child. However, at the same time, the
  condition precedent for invocation of s.112 of the
F Evidence Act has been established and no finding with
  regard to the plea of the husband that he had no access
  to his wife at the time when the child could have been
  begotten, has been recorded. [para 15] [132-D]

       1.5. Section 112 of the Evidence Act was enacted at
G a time when the modern scientific advancement and DNA
  test were not even in contemplation of the Legislature.
  The result of DNA test is said to be scientifically accurate.
  Although s.112 raises a presumption of conclusive proof
  on satisfaction of the conditions enumerated therein but
H the same is rebuttable. Interest of justice is best served
 NANDLAL WASUDEO BADWAIK v. LATA NANDLAL 123
                BADWAIK
by ascertaining the truth and the court should be            A
furnished with the best available science and may not be
left to bank upon presumptions, unless science has no
answer to the facts in issue. When there is a conflict
between a conclusive proof envisaged under law and a
proof based on scientific advancement accepted by the        B
world community to be correct, the latter must prevail
over the former. [para 16] [132-G-H; 133-A-B]

     1.6. Legal fiction assumes existence of a fact which
may not really exist. However presumption of a fact          C
depends on satisfaction of certain circumstances. Those
circumstances logically would lead to the fact sought to
be presumed. Section 112 of the Evidence Act does not
create a legal fiction but provides for presumption. [para
17] [133-C-D]
                                                             D
    1.7. The husband's plea that he had no access to the
wife when the child was begotten stands proved by the
DNA test report and in the face of it, he cannot be
compelled to bear the fatherhood of the child, when the
scientific reports prove to the contrary. The impugned       E
judgment is set aside so far as it directs payment of
maintenance to respondent no. 2. However, the
payments already made shall not be recovered from the
respondents. [para 18 and 20] [133-F; 134-C]
                   Case Law Reference:                       F

    1993 (3) SCR 917        held inapplicable   para 7
    2005 (3) SCR 923        held inapplicable   para 8 ·
    2010 (9) SCR 457        held inapplicable   para 9       G
    2001 (3) SCR 729        referred to         para 11
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 24 of 2014.
                                                             H
    124       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014) 1 S.C.R.

A        From the Judgment and Order dated 13.06.2008 of the
    High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench at Nagpur
    in Criminal Writ Petition No. 293 of 2008.

          Anagha S. Desai for the Appellant.

B         Manish Pitale, Wasi Haider (for Chander Shekhar Ashri)
    for the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J. 1. Petitioner
C happens to be the husband of respondent no. 1, Lata Nandlal
  Badwaik and alleged to be the father of girl child Netra alias
  Neha Nandlal Badwaik, respondent no. 2, herein. The marriage
  between them was solemnized on 30th of June, 1990 at
  Chandrapur. Wife filed an application for maintenance under
D Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but the same
  was dismissed by the learned Magistrate by order dated 10th
  December, 1993. Thereafter, the wife resorted to a fresh
  proceeding under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal
  Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code') claiming
E maintenance for herself and her daughter, inter alia, alleging
  that she started living with her husband from 20th of June, 1996
  and stayed with him for about two years and during that period
  got pregnant. She was sent for delivery at her parents' place
  where she gave birth to a girl child, the respondent no. 2 herein.
F Petitioner-husband resisted the claim and alleged that the
  assertion of the wife that she stayed with him since 20th of
  June, 1996 is false. He denied that respondent no. 2 is his
  daughter. After 1991, according to the husband, he had no
  physical relationship with his wife. The learned Magistrate
G accepted the plea of the wife and granted maintenance at the
  rate of Rs.900/- per month to the wife and at the rate of Rs.500/
  - per month to the daughter. The challenge to the said order in
  revision has failed so also a petition under Section 482 of the
  Code, challenging those orders.
H
 NANDLAL WASUDEO BADWAIK v. LATA NANDLAL 125
   BADWAIK [CHANDRAMAULI KR.PRASAD, J.]

    It is against these orders, the petitioner has preferred this     A
special leave petition.

     2. Leave granted.

     3. Taking note of the challenge to the paternity of the child,
this Court by order dated 10th of January, 2011 passed the            B
following order:

     "............ However, the petitioner-husband had challenged
     the paternity of the child and had claimed that no
     maintenance ought to have been awarded to the child. The         C
     petitioner had also applied for referring the child for DNA
     test, which was refused. It is against the said order of
     refusal that the present Special Leave was filed and the
     same prayer for conducting the DNA test was made before
     us. On 8th November, 2010 we had accordingly, directed           D
     the petitioner-husband to deposit all dues, both arrear and
     current, in respect of the maintenance awarded to the wife
     and child to enable us to consider the prayer for holding
     of such DNA test. Such deposit having been made on 3rd
     January, 2011, we had agreed to allow the petitioner's           E
     prayer for conducting DNA test for ascertaining the
     paternity of the child.

           We have since been informed by counsel for the
     parties that a Forensic Science Laboratory in Nagpur
     conducts the very same test, as has been asked for, by           F
     the Petitioner. Accordingly, we direct the petitioner-Nandlal
     Wasudeo Badwaik and the respondent No. 1-Ms. Lata
     Nandlal Badwaik to make a joint application to the
     Forensic Science Laboratory, Nagpur, situated at Jail
     Road, Dhantoli, for conducting such test. The petitioner, as     G
     well as the respondent No. 1, shall present themselves at
     the Laboratory with respondent No. 2 for the said purpose
     on the date to be fixed by the laboratory, and, thereafter,
     the laboratory is directed to send the result of such test to
     this Court within four weeks thereafter. The expenses for        H
    126       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A         the test to be conducted shall be borne by the petitioner-
          husband."

       4. In the light of the aforesaid order, the Regional Forensic
  Science Laboratory, Nagpur has submitted the result of DNA
  testing and opined that appellant "Nandlal Vasudev Badwaik
8
  is excluded to be the biological father of Netra alias Neha
  Nandlal Badwaik", respondent no. 2 herein.

       5. Respondents, not being satisfied with the aforesaid
  report, made a request for re-test. The said prayer of the
C respondents was accepted and this Court by order dated 22nd
  of July, 2011 gave the following direction:

          "Despite the fact that the report of the DNA Test conducted
          at the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, State of
D         Maharashtra, Nagpur-12, indicates that the petitioner is not
          the biological father of the respondent No. 2, on the prayer
          made on behalf of the respondents for a re-test, we are of
          the view that such a prayer may be allowed having regard
          to the serious consequences of the Report which has been
          filed.
E
          Accordingly, we direct that a further DNA Test be
          conducted at the Central Forensic Laboratory, Ministry of
          Home Affairs, Government of India at Hyderabad and for
          the said purpose the parties are directed to appear before
F         the Laboratory on 24th August, 2011 at 11.00 a.m."

       6. As directed, the Central Forensic Science Laboratory,
  Hyderabad submitted its report and on that basis opined that
  the appellant, "Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik can be excluded from
G being the biological father of Miss Neha Nandlal Badwaik",
  respondent no. 2 herein.
       7. At the outset, Mr. Manish Pitale appearing for the
  respondents submits that the appellant having failed to establish
  that he had no access to his wife at any time when she could
H have begotten respondent no. 2, the direction for DNA test ought
   /•   .


 NANDLAL WASUDEO BADWAIK v. LATA NANDLAL 127
   BADWAIK [CHANDRAMAUU KR.PRASAD, J.]
not to have been given. In view of the aforesaid he submits that         A
the result of such a test is fit to be ignored. In support of the
submission he has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court
in Goutam Kundu v. State of WB., (1993) 3 SCC 418, relevant
portions whereof read as under:
                                                                         B
        "24. This section requires the party disputing the paternity
        to prove non-access in order to dispel the presumption.
        "Access" and "non-access" mean the existence or non-
        existence of opportunities for sexual intercourse; it does
        not mean actual "cohabitation".
                                                                         c
        26. From the above discussion it emerges-

        (1) That courts in India cannot order blood test as a matter
        of course;
                                                                         D
        (2) wherever applications are made for such prayers in·
        order to have roving inquiry, the prayer for blood test cannot
        be entertained.

        (3) there must be a strong prima facie case in that the
        husband must establish non-access in order to dispel the         E
        presumption arising under Section 112 of the Evidence
        Act.

   · (4) the court must carefully examine as to what would be
     the consequence of ordering the blood test; whether it will
                                                                         F
     have the effect of branding a child as a bastard and the
     mother as an unchaste woman.
        (5) no one can be compelled to give sample of blood for
        analysis.
                                                                         G
        27. Examined in the light of the above, we find no difficulty
        in upholding the impugned order of the High Court,
        confirming the order of the Additional Chief Judicial
        Magistrate, Alipore in rejecting the application for blood
        test ................ "   ·                                      H
    128       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A        8. Yet another decision on which reliance has been placed
    is the decision of this Court in the case of Banarsi Dass v.
    Teeku Dutta, (2005) 4 SCC 449, paragraph 13, which is
    relevant for the purpose is quoted below:

          "13. We may remember that Section 112 of the Evidence
B
          Act was enacted at a time when the modern scientific
          advancements with deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) as well
          as ribonucleic acid (RNA) tests were not even in
          contemplation of the legislature. The result of a genuine
          DNA test is said to be scientifically accurate. But even that
c         is not enough to escape from the conclusiveness of
          Section 112 of the Evidence Act e.g. if a husband and wife
          were living together during the time of conception but the
          DNA test revealed that the child was not born to the
          husband, the conclusiveness in law would remain
D         irrebuttable. This may look hard from the point of view of
          the husband who would be compelled to bear the
          fatherhood of a child of which he may be innocent. But even
          in such a case the law leans in favour of the innocent child
          from being bastardised if his mother and her spouse were
E         living together during the time of conception. Hence the
          question regarding the degree of proof of non-access for
           rebutting the conclusiveness must be answered in the light
           of what is meant by access or non-access as delineated
           above. (See Kamti Devi v. Poshi Ram, 2001 (5) SCC
F          311.)"

      9. Reliance has also been placed on a decision of this
  Court in the case of Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Orissa State
  Commission for Women, (2010) 8 SCC 633, in which it has
G been held as follows:

          "22. In our view, when there is apparent conflict between
          the right to privacy of a person not to submit himself forcibly
          to medical examination and duty of the court to reach the
          truth, the court must exercise its discretion only after
H         balan·cing the interests of the parties and on due
 NANDLAL WASUDEO BADWAIK v. LATA NANDLAL 129
   BADWAIK [CHANDRAMAULI KR.PRASAD, J.]
    consideration whether for a just decision in the matter,        A
    DNA test is eminently needed. DNA test in a matter relating
    to paternity of a child should not be directed by the court
    as a matter of course or in a routine manner, whenever
    such a request is made. The court has to consider diverse
    aspects including presumption under Section 112 of the          B
    Evidence Act; pros and cons of such order and the test of
    "eminent need" whether it is not possible for the court to
    reach the truth without use of such test."

      10. Miss Anagha s~ Desai appearing on behalf of the           C
appellant submits that this Court twice ordered for DNA test
and, hence, the question as to whether this was a fit case in
which DNA profiling should or should not have been ordered
is academic. We find substance in the submission of Ms.
Desai. Fact of the matter is that this Court not only once, but
twice gave directions for DNA test. The respondents, in fact,       D
had not opposed the prayer of DNA test when such a prayer
was being considered. It is only after the reports of the DNA
test had been received, which was adverse to the respondents,
that they are challenging it on the ground that such a test ought
not to have been directed. We cannot go into the validity of the    E
orders passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court at this stage.
It has attained finality. Hence, we do not find any merit in the
submission of the learned counsel for the respondents. As
regards the decision of this Court in the cases of Goutam
Kundu (supra), Banarsi Dass  I
                                   (supra) and Bhabani Prasad       F
Jena (supra), the same have no bearing in the facts and
circumstances of the case. In all these cases, the court was
considering as to whether facts of those cases justify passing
of an order for DNA test. When the order for DNA test has
already been passed, at this stage, we are not concerned with       G
this issue and we have to proceed on an assumption that a
valid direction for DNA test was given.

    11. Ms. Desai submits that in view of the opinions, based
on DNA profiling that appellant is not the biological father, he
                                                                    H_
    130        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A cannot be fastened with the liability to pay maintenance to the
  girl-child born to the wife. Mr. Pitale, however, submits that the
  marriage between the parties has not been dissolved, and the
  birth of the child having taken place during the subsistence of
  a valid marriage and the husband having access to the wife,
B conclusively prove that the girl-child is the legitimate daughter
  of the appellant. According to him, the DNA test cannot rebut
  the conclusive presumption envisaged under Section 112 of the
  Evidence Act. According to him, respondent no. 2, therefore,
  has to be held to be the appellant's legitimate daughter. In
c support of the submission, reliance has been placed on a
  decision of this Court in the case of Kamti Devi v. Poshi Ram,
  (2001) 5 sec 311, and reference has been made to paragraph
  10 of the judgment, which reads as follows:

          "10 .......... The result of a genuine DNA test is said to be
D         scientifically accurate. But even that is not enough to
          escape from the conclusiveness of Section 112 of the Act
          e.g. if a husband and wife were living together during the
          time of conception but the DNA test revealed that the child
          was not born to the husband, .the conclusiveness in law
E         would remain irrebuttable. This may look hard from the
          point of view of the husband who would be compelled to
          bear the fatherhood of a child of which he may be innocent.
          But even in such a case the law leans in favour of the
          innocent child from being bastardised if his mother and her
F         spouse were living together during the time of
          conception .......... "

       12. Before we proceed to consider the rival submissions,
  we deem it necessary to understand what exactly DNA test is
G and ultimately its accuracy. All living beings are composed of
  cells which are the smallest and basic unit of life. An average
  human body has trillion of cells of different sizes. DNA
  (Deoxyribonucleic Acid), which is found in the chromosomes
  of the cells of living beings, is the blueprint of an individual.
  Human cells contain 46 chromosomes and those 46
H
 NANDLAL WASUDEO BADWAIK v. LATA NANDLAL 131
   BADWAIK [CHANDRAMAULI KR.PRASAD, J.]
chromosomes contain a total of six billion base pair in 46              A
duplex threads of DNA. DNA consists of four nitrogenous bases
- adenine, thymine, cytosine, guanine and phosphoric acid
arranged in a regular structure. When two unrelated people
possessing the same DNA pattern have been compared, the
chances of complete similarity are 1 in 30 billion to 300 billion.      B
Given that the Earth's population is about 5 billion, this test shall
have accurate result. It has been recognized by this Court in
the case of Kamti Devi (supra) that the result of a genuine DNA
test is scientifically accurate. It is nobody's case that the result
of the DNA test is not genuine and, therefore, we have to               c
proceed on an assumption that the result of the DNA test is
accurate. The DNA test reports show that the appellant is not
the biological father of the girl-child.

     13. Now we have to consider as to whether the DNA test
would be sufficient to hold that the appellant is not the biological    D
father of respondent no. 2, in the face of what has been
provided under Section 112 of the Evidence Act, which reads
as follows:

     "112. Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of                   E
     legitimacy.- The fact that any person was born during the
     continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and
     any man, or within two hundred and eighty days after its
     dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, shall be
     conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man,        F
     unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had
     no access to each other at any time when he could have
     been begotten."

      14. From a plain reading of the aforesaid, it is evident that
a child born during the cor.tinuance of a valid marriage shall          G
be a conclusive proof that the child is a legitimate child of the
man to whom the lady giving birth is married. The provision
makes the legitimacy of the child to be a conclusive proof, if
the conditions aforesaid are satisfied. It can be denied only if
it is shown that the parties to the marriage have no access to          H
    132      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A each other at any time when the child could have been begotten.
  Here, in the present case, the wife had pleaded that the
  husband had access to her and, in fact, the child was born in
  the said wedlock, but the husband had specifically pleaded that
  after hi,s wife left the matrimonial home, she did not return and
B thereafter, he had no access to her. The wife has admitted that
  she had left the matrimonial home but again joined her husband.
  Unfortl.lnately, none of the courts below have given any finding
  with regard to this plea of the husband that he had or had not
  any access to his wife at the time when the child could have
c been begotten.
       15. As stated earlier, the DNA test is an accurate test and
  on that basis it is clear that the appellant is not the biological
  father of the girl-child. However, at the same time, the condition
  precedent for invocation of Section 112 of the Evidence Act
D has been established and no finding with regard to the plea of
  the husband that he had no access to his wife at the time when
  the chi.Id could have been begotten has been recorded.
  Admittedly, the child has been born during the continuance of
  a valid marriage. Therefore, the provisions of Section 112 of
E the Evidence Act conclusively prove that respondent No. 2 is
  the daughter of the appellant. At the same time, the DNA test
  reports, based on scientific analysis, in no uncertain terms
  suggest that the appellant is not the biological father. In such
  circumstance, which would give way to the other is a complex
F question posed before us.

         16. We may remember that Section 112 of the Evidence
   Act was enacted at a time when the modern scientific
   advancement and DNA test were not even in contemplation of
G ·the Legislature. The result of DNA test is said to be scientifically
   accurate. Although Section 112 raises a presumption of
   conclusive proof on satisfaction of the conditions enumerated
   therein but the same is rebuttable. The presumption may afford
   legitimate means of arriving at an affirmative legal conclusion.
   While the truth or fact is known, in our opinion, there is no need
H
 NANDLAL WASUDEO BADWAIK v. LATA NANDLAL 133
   BADWAIK [CHANDRAMAULI KR.PRASAD, J.]

or room for any presumption. Where there is evidence to the          A
contrary, the presumption is rebuttable and must yield to proof.
Interest of justice is best served by ascertaining the truth and
the court should be furnished with the best available science
and may not be left to bank upon presumptions, unless science
has no answer to the facts in issue. In our opinion, when there      B
is a conflict between a conclusive proof envisaged under law
and a proof based on scientific advancement accepted by the
world community to be correct, the latter must prevail over the
former.

      17. We must understand the distinction between a legal
                                                                     c
fiction and the presumption of a fact. Legal fiction assumes
existence of a fact which may not really exist. However
presumption of a fact depends on satisfaction of certain
Circumstances. Those circumstances logically would lead to the
fact sought to be presumed. Section 112 of the Evidence Act          D
does not create a legal fiction but provides for presumption.

     18. The husband's plea that he had no access to the wife
when the child was begotten stands proved by the DNA test
report and in the face of it, we cannot compel the appellant to      E
bear the fatherhood of a child, when the scientific reports prove
to the contrary. We are conscious that an innocent child may
not be bastardized as the marriage between her mother and
father was subsisting at the time of her birth, but in view of the
DNA test reports and what we have observed above, we cannot          F
forestall the consequence. It is denying the truth. "Truth must
triumph" is the hallmark of justice.

     19. As regards the authority of this Court i·n the case of
Kamti Devi (Supra), this Court on appreciation of evidence
came to the conclusion that the husband had no opportunity           G
whatsoever to have liaison with the wife. There was no DNA
test held in the case. In the said background i.e. non-access
of the husband with the wife, this Court held that the result of
DNA test "is not enough to escape from the conclusiveness of
Section 112 of the Act". The judgment has to be understood in        H
    134      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014) 1 S.C.R.


A the factual scenario of the said case. The said judgment has
  not held that DNA test is to be ignored. In fact, this Court has
  taken note of the fact that DNA test is scientifically accurate.
  We hasten to add that in none of the cases referred to above,
  this Court was confronted with a situation in which DNA test
B report, in fact, was available and was in conflict with the
  presumption of conclusive proof of legitimacy of the child under
  Section 112 of the Evidence Act. In view of what we have
  observed above, these judgments in no way advance the case
  of the respondents.
c        20. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the
    impugned judgment so far as it directs payment of maintenance
    to respondent no. 2. However, we direct that the payments
    already made shall not be recovered from the respondents.

    R.P.                                         Appeal allowed.