NAND KUMAR VERMAversusSTATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS.

                          (2012] 1 S.C.R. 504


    A                   NANO KUMAR VERMA
                                  v.
                  STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS.
                   (Civil Appeal No. 1458 of 2012)

                        FEBRUARY 01, 2012
 B
               [H.L.DATTU AND ANIL R. DAVE, JJ.]

         SERVICE LAW·

 C      Successive departmental proceedings on the same set
   of charges - Held: On general principles, there can be only
   one enquiry in respect of a charge for a particular misconduct
   and that is also what the rules usually provide - When a
   completed enquiry proceedings is set aside by a competent
   forum on a technical ground or on the ground of procedural
D infirmity, fresh proceedings on the same charges is
  permissible - Jn the instant case, the High Court, having
   accepted the explanations, could not have proceeded to pass
  the order of initiating subsequent departmental proceedings
  - There is no justification for conducting a second enquiry on
E the very charges, which had been dropped earlier - Even
  though the principles of double jeopardy is not applicable, the
  Jaw permits only disciplinary proceedings and not harassment
  - Allowing such practice is not in the interest of public service
  - In the circumstances, the impugned order reverting the
F officer to the lower post cannot be sustained.
        COMPULSORY RETIREMENT:

       Order of compulsory retirement - Judicial review of - Held:
G When an order of compulsory retirement is challenged, the
  court has the right to examine whether some ground or
  material germane to the issue exists or not - However, the court
  is not to examine the sufficiency of the maten'al upon which
  the order of compulsory retirement rests - Further, formation

H                               504
NANO KUMAR VERMA v. STATE OF JHARKHAND & 505
                 ORS.
of opinion for compulsory retirement is the subjective A
satisfaction of the authority concerned, but such satisfaction
must be based on a valid material - It is permissible for courts
to ascertain whether a valid material exists or otherwise, on
which the subjective satisfaction of the administrative authority
is based - In the instant matter, the material on which the B
decision of compulsory retirement was based and material
 furnished by the Judicial Officer would reflect that totality of
 relevant materials was not considered or completely ignored
 by the High Court - Consequently, the subjective satisfaction
 of the High Court was not based on sufficient or relevant c
 material - In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the
 service record of the Officer was unsatisfactory so as to warrant
 premature retirement from service - Therefore, there was no
 justification to retire the Officer compulsorily from service.

     Judicial service - Annual confidential remarks - Held: D
Greater importance is to be given to the opinion or remarks
made by the immediate superior officer as to the functioning
of the judicial officer concerned for the purpose of his
compulsory retirement - The immediate superior is better
placed to observe, analyse, scrutinize from close quarters and E
then, to comment upon his working, overall efficiency, and
reputation - Jn the instant case, the District and Sessions
Judges had the opportunity to watch the functioning of the
Judicial Officer from close quarters, who have reported
favourably regarding his overall performance except about F
his disposal, in recent ACR for two years - High Court was not
justified in sustaining the orders passed by the Full Court of
 the said High Court.

      The Inspecting Judge of the High Court during his          G
 inspection noticed certain omissions and commissions
 in granting bail in certain cases by the appellant, who was
 working as Chief Judicial Magistrate. Further, the
 appellant granted bail to an accused charged with an
 offence punishable u/s 302 IPC (Case No.90/93). The             H
    .I
     506     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             (2012] 1 S.C.R.


A appellant furnished his explanations on 7.5.1994 for
  strictures passed by the Inspecting Judg~ and, secondly,
  on 21.12.1994 for adverse remarks made by the High
  Court in connection with the granting of bail in Case
  No.90/93. Both the explanations were duly accepted by
B the High Court.

         Subsequently, the Standing Committee of the High
    Court in its meeting dated 11.8.1995 directed initiation of
    departmental proceedings against the appellant.         The
    appellant was served 'Articles of Charge' dated
C 13.12.1995 containing two charges relating to granting of
    bail indiscriminately in Case No.90/93. The appellant in
    his reply asserted that his explanation on the said
    charges had already been accepted by t~e High Court.
   However, departmental proceedings were initiated and
D concluded against him. The Enquiry Officer submitted
   the report stating that the charges leveled against the
   appellant had been proved. The Government of Bihar
   acting on the recommendation of the High Court issued
   a formal notification dated 20.4.1998 reverting the
E appellant from the post of Civil Judge, Senior Division to
   the lower post of Munsif (Civil Judge, Junior Division). On
  bifurcation of State of Bihar, the appellant was allotted to
  the State of Jharkhand and was posted as Judicial
  Magistrate in the said State. On the recommendation of
F the Full Court of the Jharkhand High Court, the State
  Government issued notification dated 17.7.2001
  compulsorily retiring the appellant from service. The writ
  petitions challenging both the orders were dismissed by
  the High Court.
G
          In the instant appeal, it was· contended for the
    appellant that the High Court having accepted his
    explanation to the show cause notices, could not have
    initiated departmental proceedings against him.
H        Allowing the appeal, the Court
NAND KUMAR VERMA v. STATE OF JHARKHAND & 507
                 ORS.
     HELD: 1.1 Having accepted the explanations and A
having communicated the same to the appellant; the High
Court could not have proceeded to pass the order of
initiating departmental proceedings and reverting the
appellant from the post of Chief Judicial Magistrate to the
post of Munsif. On general principles, there can be only B
one enquiry in respect of a charge for a particular
misconduct and that is also what the rules usually
 provide. However, when a completed enquiry proceeding
 is set aside by a competent forum on a technical ground
 or on the ground of procedural infirmity, fresh c
 proceedings on the same charges are permissible. [Para
 27] [518-E-H]

      1.2 In the instant case, a charge memo was issued
and served on the appellant. A reading of the charge
memo shows that it does not contain any reference to the D
proceedings of the Standing Committee at all. It is also
not found as to whether the earlier proceedings were
revived in accordance with the procedure prescribed. In
fact, after receipt of the charge memo, the appellant, in
his reply statement, brought to the notice of the enquiry E ·
officer that on the same set of charges, a notice had been
i$sued earlier and Standing Committee, after accepting
his explanation dated 21.12.1994, had dropped the entire
proceedings and the same had been communicated to
him by the Registrar General of the High Court by his F
 letter dated 02.02.1995. In spite of this, the enquiry officer
 proceeded with the enquiry proceedings and after
 completion of the same, submitted his report which was
 accepted by the disciplinary authority. Therefore, in these
 circumstances, there is no justification for conducting a G
 second enquiry on the very charges, which had been
  dropped earl~r. Even though the principle of double
 jeopardy is not applicable, the law permits only
  disciplinary proceedings and not harassment. Allowing
  such practice is not in the interest of public service. In H
     508     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012) 1 S.C.R.


 A the circumstances, the impugned order reverting the
   appellant to the lower post cannot be sustained. [Para 27]
   [518-H; 519-A-E]

        2.1 It is now well settled that the object of compulsory
   retirement from service is to weed out the dead wood in
 8
   order to maintain a high standard of efficiency and
   honesty and to keep the judicial service unpolluted. [Para
   28] [519-F-G]

       Baikuntha Nath Das v. Chief District Medical Officer 1992
C (1) SCR 836 = (1992) 2 SCC 299; Madan Mohan Choudhary
  v. State of Bihar 1999 (1) SCR 596 = (1999) 3 sec 396
  and Registrar, High Court of Madras v. R. Rajiah 1988 (1)
    Suppl. SCR 332 (1988) 3 SCC 211 - referred to.

0       2.2 The Court is conscious of the fact that there is
   very limited scope of judicial review of an order of
   prematur11. retirement from service. As observed by this
   Court in Rajiah's case, when the High Court takes the
  view that -an order of compulsory retirement should be
E made against a member of the Judicial Service, the
  adequacy or sufficiency of such materials cannot be
  questioned, unless the materials are absolutely irrelevant
  to the purpose of compulsory retirement. Further, when
  an order of compulsory retirement is challenged in a
  court of law, the court has the right to examine whether
F some ground or material germane to the issue exists or
  not. However, the court is not to examine the sufficiency
  of the material upon which the order of compulsory
  retirement rests. [Para 30] [522-D-F]

G       High Court of Punjab & Haryana v. /shwar Chand Jain
    1999 (2) SCR 834    =(1999) 4 SCC 579 - referred to.
      2.3 It is also well settled that the formation of opinion
  for compulsory retirement is based on the subjective
H satisfaction of the authority concerned but such
NANO KUMAR VERMA v. STATE OF JHARKHAND & 509
                 ORS.
satisfaction must be based on a valid material. It is A
permissible for the courts to ascertain whether a valid
material exists. or otherwise, on which the subjective
satisfaction of the administrative authority is based. In
the instant matter, the High Court has taken the decision
on the basis of selective record wh.ich includes the B
summarised ACRs. There appears to be some
discrepancy. The appellant has produced the copies of
the ACR's which were obtained by him from the High
 Court under the Right to Information Act, 2005 and a
 comparison of these two would positively indicate that c
 the High Court has not faithfully extracted the contents
 of the ACRs. The material on which the decision of
 compulsory retirement was based, as extracted by the
 High Court in the impugned judgment, and material
 furnished by the appellant would reflect that totality of
                                                                0
  relevant materials was not considered or was completely
  ignored by the High Court. This leads to only one
  conclusion that the subjective satisfaction of the High
  Court was not based on the sufficient or relevant material.
  In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the
                                                                E
  service record of the appellant was unsatisfactory which
  would warrant premature retirement from service.
  Therefore, there was no justification to retire the appellant
   compulsorily from service. [Para 32] [523-G-H; 524-A-C;
   527-A-D]
                                                                 F
        Swami Saran Saksena v. State of UP., (1980) 1 SCC 12
   - referred to

     2.4 Moreover, the District and Sessions Judges had
 the opportunity to watch the functioning of the appellant G
 from close quarters. They had reported favourably
 regarding the appe.llant's overall performance except
 about his disposal, in the ACRs for the years 1997-98 and
  1998-95. In view of this, greater importance is to be given
 to the opinion or remarks made by the immediate
                                                                 H
     510    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2012] 1 S.C.R.


 A superior officer as to the functioning of the judicial officer
   concerned for the purpose .of his compulsory retirement
   The immediate superior is better placed to observe,
   analyse, scrutinize from close quarters and then, to
   comment upon his working, overall efficiency, and
 B reputation. [Para 33] [526-B-D]

         Nawal Singh v. State of U.P., (2003) 8 SCC 117 -
    referred to.

       3. The High Court was not justified in sustaining the
C orders passed by the Full Court of the same High Court.
  Accordingly, the orders passed by the High Court are set
  aside. Since the appellant has retired from service on
  attaining the age of superannuation, he is entitled to all
  the monetary benefits from the date of his notional
D posting as C.J.M. till his notional retirement from service
  on attaining the age of superannuation, as expeditiously
  as possible. [Para 34] [526-F-G]
                         Case Law Reference
E     1992 (1) SCR 836           referred to          Para 28
      1999 (1) SCR 596           referred to          Para 29
      1988 (1) Suppl. SCR 332 referred to             Para 29
      1999 (2) SCR 834           referred to         Para 31
F
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
    1458 of 2012.
      From the Judgment & Order dated 11. 7.2006 of the High
G Court of Jharkhand in Writ Petition(s) No. 2856 of 2002 and
  1620 of 2003.
        Manish Mohan, Aditya P. Singh (for Bijan Kumar Ghosh),
  N.N. Singh, Krishnanand Pandeya, Amrendra Kr. Chaubey,
  Akshay Shukla, Ratan Kumar Choudhuri, Brahmajeet Mishra
H for the appearing parties.
NANO KUMAR VERMA v. STATE OF JHARKHAND & 511
                 ORS.
    Th.e following Order of the Court was delivered                A

                         ORDER

     1. Leave granted.

     2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order     B
passed by the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in Writ
Petition No.2856 of 2002 and Writ Petition No.1620 of 2003
dated 11.07 .2006. By the impugned judgment and order, the
High Court has sustained the order of reversion and the order
of compulsory retirement passed against the appellant.             c
     3. At the outset, we intend to observe that the Judicial
Officers are part and parcel of this institution. They should be
respected and their career should be carefully protected. But
in the present case, it appears to us, after going through the
records that the appellant, who was serving as a Judicial          0
Officer, has been treated with scant respect by the High Court.
 Be that as it may.

       4. The appellant was initially appointed as Munsif (now
  known as Civil Judge, Junior Division) in the Bihar Subordinate E
· Judicial Service in the year 1975 and his services were
  confirmed as Munsif in the year 1980. Subsequently, in the year
  1986, he was promoted to the rank of Sub-Judge (Civil Judge,
  Senior Division) and confirmed on the same rank w.e.f.
  19.01.1988. In the year 1987, the appellant was made Sub- F
  Judge-cum-Addi. Chief Judicial Magistrate. Thereafter, in
  November 1989, he was posted as Chief Judicial Magistrate
  by the Patna High Court vide Notification dated 5.11.1989.
  While he was working as a Chief Judicial Magistrate at
  Gopalganj, an inspection was made by the portfolio Judge and G
  on noticing certain omissions and commissions in granting bail
   in certain cases by the appellant, certain adverse remarks were
   made against him in the note made on 09.03.1994. Further,
   the appellant had also passed an Order dated 10.2.1994
    granting bail to one person accused of offences punishable
                                                                       H
     512      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2012] 1 S.C.R.


A· under Section 302 of the l.P.C. in Mohammadpur Police Station
    case no. 90/93. This was taken as an exception by the learned
    District Judge and also by the High Court while deciding the
   Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.11327/1994. The High
   Court of Patna vide Order dated 12.09.1994 in Cr. Misc. No.
B 11327 of 1994, whilst commenting adversely against the
   appellant, had observed that the appellant had granted bail in
   the said matter on extraneous consideration and further directed
   the matter to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of the
   High Court for taking necessary action.
c      5. In view of the abovementioned adverse comments
  passed against the appellant, he was directed to offer his
  explanation if any, by the High Court. In this regard, the appellant
  had offered his explanation, firstly, on 7.5.1994 for strictures
  passed by the Inspecting Judge and; secondly on 21.12.1994
D for adverse remarks made by the High Court dated 12.09.1994
  in Cr. Misc. No. 11327 of 1994.

       6. The explanation so offered on 7.5.1994 was placed
  before the Standing Committee of the High Court on
E 17.11.1994. In regard to this explanation, the Standing
  Committee further sought explanation from the appellant for
  using objectionable language against the Inspecting Judge and
  directed him to appear before it in its next meeting.

         7. Accordingly, the appellant appeared on 1.12.1994 and
F   2.12.1994 and had promptly stated that he was apologetic for
    the impertinent language used in the explanation. The Standing
    Committee, after accepting the unconditional apology offered
    by the appellant, had condoned his lapses and had transferred
    him from Gopalganj to Samastipur.
G
        8. The case of the appellant was also considered for
    promotion from Sub-Judge to the Additional Di~trict Judge
    among 16 Sub-Judges by the Standing Committee in its
    meeting dated 3. 2.1995 and the same came to be deferred
H
NANO KUMAR VERMA v. STATE OF JHARKHAND & 513
                 ORS.
because of the pendency of the inquiry proceedings against           A
him.

      9. In the second explanation offered by the appellant dated
 21.12.1994 he had, specifically, adverted to the allegations
 made for granting bail indiscriminately even in cases of heinous    8
  crimes. The said explanation was placed before the Standing
· Committee of the High Court for its consideration in its meeting
  dated 5.1.1995 as an Additional Agenda which was duly
  accepted by the High Court. Thereafter, the same was
  communicated to the appellant by the Registrar General of the      C
  High Court vide his order dated 1.2.1995.

       10. After accepting the explanations offered, the High Court
 was still under the impression that the Judicial Officer should
  not be left in peace. Therefore, it appears to us, that the
  Standing Committee of the High Court in its meeting dated D
  11.08.1995 directed the initiation of the departmental
  proceedings against the appellant by framing the Articles of
  Charges. Accordingly, the appellant was served Articles of
  Charges dated 13.12.1995 containing two charges and was
  also asked to show cause within one month. Both the charges E
  relate to the granting of bail indiscriminately in Mohammadpur
  Police Station Case No. 90/93, by the appellant while he was
 ·discharging his functions as Chief Judicial Magistrate. Pursuant
  to the Show Cause, the appellant had replied in detail on
  16.01.1996 that his explanation on the said charges has already F
  been accepted by the High Court. However, the High Court
  through the District Judge, Samastipur had served a notice
   dated 03.04.1996 to the appellant for initiating departmental
   proceedings against him on the basis of Articles of Charges.
   The appellant had .submitted his reply statement dated G
   11.06.1996 and 22.06.1996 wherein he had specifically
   contended that on the same set of charges, he had already
   offered his explanation on 21.12.1994 and the same was
   placed before the Standing Committee consisting of Hon'ble
   the Chief Justice and also other learned Judges of the High H
      514     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2012] 1 S.C.R.


 A Court in its meeting dated 5.1.1995 and wherein they have
   accepted his explanation. But the explanation !;)O offered was
   not accepted by the Enquiry Officer, therefore, he proceeded
   with the Enquiry proceedings.

 B     11. After recording the evidence of the witnesses and the
   documents produced by them, the Enquiry Officer had
   submitted a report to the disciplinary authority, namely, the High
   Court on 19.07.1996.ln the Enquiry Report, the Enquiry Officer
   was of the view that both the charges alleged against the
 C appellant are proved beyond all reasonable doubt.

        12. Based on the report of the Enquiry Officer, the
  disciplinary authority, viz. the High Court, took a decision to
  compulsorily retire appellant from service in its administrative
  jurisdiction and acting on the recommendation made by the
D High Court, a formal notification dated 20.04.1998 came to be
  issued by the personnel department, Government of Bihar,
  reverting the appellant from the rank of Sub-Judge (Civil Judge,
  Senior Division) to the lower post of Munsif (Civil Judge, Junior
  Division).
E
         13. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant had
     approached this Court in Writ Petition (S) No.547 of 1999
     under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

          14. This Court, while admitting the petition, had issued
F    notices to the respondents therein.

        15. At this stage, one more factor which requires to be
   noticed by us is that during pendency of the said Writ Petition,
  in the month of May, 2001, due to bifurcation of the State of
G Bihar, the appellant was allotted to the State of Jharkhand and
  was posted as Judicial Magistrate (First Class) at Koderma
  vide Order dated 21.04.2001. Accordingly, the appellant had
  joined his services under new regime on 5.5.2001. While
  working as Judicial Magistrate, en the recommendation made
H by the Full Court of Jharkhand High Court, the State
NANO KUMAR VERMA v. STATE OF JHARKHAND & 515
                 ORS.
Government has issued notification dated 17 .07 .2001                A
compulsorily retiring appellant from service. The said order was
served on the appellant on 26.7.2001. This decision was taken
by the High Court on the basis of appellant's Annual Character
Roll/Annual Confidential Report (hereinafter referred to as "the
A.C.R.") pertaining to past service which includes the A.C.R.'s      B
of the selective period of the service.

      16. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of compulsory
retirement from service, the appellant had approached this
Court in Writ Petition No.5 of 2002. This Court, however,            C
dismissed the W.P. No. 5 of 2002 vide Order dated
18.01.2002 with liberty to avail alternative remedy under Article
2L6 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the appellant filed
 a Writ Petition no. 2856 of 2002 under Article 226 before the
 Jharkhand High Court.
                                                                     D
      17. The respondents herein had brought to the notice of
 this Court in Writ Petition (C) No.547 of 1999 that the appellant
 had retired from service and therefore, this Court transferred
 the pending proceedings in W.P.(C) N0.547/1999 to the
 Jharkhand High Court for its consideration and decision. On         E
 transfer, the same was registered as W.P. No. (S) 1620 of
 2003 before the High Court.

      18. By the impugned judgment, the High Court has rajected
 both the writ petitions filed by the appellant. That is how the
                                                                         F
 appellant is before us in this Civil Appeal.

      19. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
 order of reversion, whereby the appellant was reverted from the
 post of Chief Judicial Magistrate to that of Munsif (Civil Judge,
 Junior Division) is smacked with arbitrariness and contrary to      G
 the norms of service law jurisprudence and therefore, is bad in
 law. While elaborating his submission, the learned counsel
 would contend that the High Court, having accepted his
 explanation to the Show Cause Notice issued to explain the
 notings made by the Inspecting Judge in Criminal                        H
         516      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 1 S.C.R.

~
     A    Miscellaneous Petition No.10327 of 1994, could not have
          initiated departmental proceedings against the appellant. This,
         the learned counsel would contend, would amount to double
         jeopardy.

           20. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would
     8
      submit that the explanation was accepted by the Standing
      Committee only with regard to the impertinent language used
      by the appellant and not with regard to the allegations of
      granting of bail/provisional bail to the accused persons even
      in heinous crimes. Therefore, he submits that the High Court
    C was justified in initiating departmental inquiry proceedings
      against the appellant for the charges alleged in the charge
      memo.

               21. Learned counsel for the appellant, insofar as his
    D compulsory retirement from service is concerned, submits that
        the adverse remarks that were taken into consideration by the
        High Court while terminating the services of the appellant, were
        never communicated to him and secondly, he would submit that
        the High Court was selective in taking into consideration the
    E ACR's of the appellant from the date of his entry into service
      · till the date of his retirement. He further submits that the High.
        Court, while recording the entries made in the ACR's in the
        impugned judgment, has not made the correct reflection of the
        actual contents of the ACR's which are in the records. In support
    F of that contention, the learned counsel has invited our attention
       to the additional affidavit filed before the High Court as well in
       these proceedings.

           22. In reply to the submissions made by the learned ·
      counsel for the appellant, the learned counsel for the High Court
    G submits that in the Writ Petition, filed by the appellant, he had
      not specifically contended that the adverse remarks which were
      entered in the ACR's were not communicated to him. Even
      otherwise, learned counsel would contend that the entire service
      profile of the appellant while in service was not above
    H board and therefore, the High Court was justified in
NANO KUMAR VERMA v. STATE OF JHARKHAND & 517
                 ORS.

recommending the case of the appellant to the State                  A
Government for compulsory retirement from service.

      23. The issues that would fall for our consideration and
decision in this appeal are: Whether the High Court was
justified in passing the order dated 21.4.1998 in reverting the      B
appellant from the post of Chief Judicial Magistrate to the rank
of Munsif (Civil Judge, Junior Division); and Whether the High
Court was justified in passing the order of compulsorily retiring
the appellant from service in public interest.

     24. To answer the first issue, we may have to notice the        C
observations made by the learned Inspecting Judge in Criminal
Miscellaneous Petition No.11327 of 1994. The same is
extracted :-

    "In the present case, as stated above, the grant of bail by      o
    the Chief Judicial Magistrate itself was against the statutory
    provision contained in section 437 of the Code as the
    materials on the record clearly show that there was
    reasonable ground for believing that the petitioner has
    been guilty of an offence punishable with death or               E
    imprisonment for life. The grant of bail itself was not
    permissible in law and virtually the Chief Judicial
    Magistrate has surrendered his judicial discretion to some
    other consideration.

     25. In pursuance to certain directions issued in the            F
aforesaid Criminal Miscellaneous Petition, the High Court had
called for the explanation from the appellant. Pursuant to the
direction so issued, the appellant had offered his explanation ..
The Standing Committee of the High Court had directed the
appellant to appear before it.· Before the Standing Committee,       G
the appellant had expressed his unconditional apology and the
same was accepted by the Standing Committee and the
Standing Committee had observed in its noting that the case
has been closed against the appellant and the same was
informed to the appellant also.                                      H
    518     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 1 S.C.R.

A      26. By yet another explanation, the appellant had justified
  his action in granting bail. This explanation offered by him was
  also accepted by the High Court and the same was
  communicated to the appellant by the Registrar General of the
  High Court in which specific reference is made to the
B explanation offered by the appellant in his reply dated
    21.12.1994.

          27. After accepting his explanation, the High Court was still
    of the view that disciplinary proceedings requires to be initiated
C   against the appellant for his alleged omission and commission
    of granting bail indiscriminately even in heinous crimes. The
    Charge Memo was replied by the appellant and in that he had,
    specifically, contended that the Standing Committee of the High
    Court, after accepting the explanation, had informed him that
    his explanation is accepted and all the allegations made against
D   him are closed. This aspect of the matter, though noticed by
    the Inquiry Officer, he does not give any finding. He, however,
    has observed that the charges alleged against the appellant are
    proved. Based on this, the High Court has passed the order
    of reversion whereby the appellant was reverted from the post
E   of Chief Judicial Magistrate to that of Munsif and the same was
    notified by the State Government also. In our opinion, having
    accepted the explanations and having communicated the same
    to the appellant, the High Court could not have proceeded to
    pass the order of initiating departmental proceedings and
F   reverting the appellant from the post of Chief Judicial Magistrate
    to the post of Munsif. On General Principles, there can be only
    one enquiry in respect of a charge for a particular misconduct
    and that is also what the rules usually provide. If, for some
    technical or other good ground, procedural or otherwise, the first
G   enquiry or punishment or exoneration is found bad in law, there
    is no principle that a second enquiry cannot be initiated.
    Therefore, when a completed enquiry proceedings is set aside
    by a competent forum on a technical or on the ground of
    procedural infirmity, fresh proceedings on the same charges
H   is permissible. In the present case, a charge memo was
 NANO KUMAR VERMA v. STATE OF JHARKHAND & 519
                  ORS.
 issued and served on the appellant. A reading of the charge         A
 memo does not contain any reference to the proceedings of
 the Standing Committee at all. It is also not found as to whether
the earlier proceedings has been revived in accordance with
the procedure prescribed. In fact, after receipt of the charge
 memo, the appellant, in his reply statement, had brought to the     B
 notice of the enquiry officer that on the same set of charges, a
 notice had been issued earlier and after receipt of his
explanation dated 21.12.1994, the Standing Committee, after
accepting his explanation had dropped the entire proceedings
and the same had been communicated to him by the Registrar           c
General of the High Court by his letter dated 02.02.1995. In
spite of his explanation in the reply statement filed, the enquiry
officer has proceeded with the enquiry proceedings and after
completion of the same, has submitted his report which has
been accepted by the disciplinary authority. Therefore, in these
                                                                     0
circumstances, there is no justification for conducting a second
enquiry on the very charges, which have been dropped earlier.
Even through the principles of double jeopardy is not
applicable, the law permits only disciplinary proceedings .and
not harassment. Allowing such practice is not in the interest of
public service. In the circumstance, we cannot sustain the           E
impugned order reverting the appellant to the lower post.

     28. We now proceed to consider the second order passed
by the High Court for recommending the case of the appellant
to the State Government to accept and issue appropriate              F
notification to compulsorily retire the appellant from Judicial
Service. It is now well settled that the object of compulsory
retirement from service is to weed out the dead wood in order
to maintain a high standard of efficiency and honesty and to
keep the judicial service unpolluted. Keeping this object in view,   G
the contention of the appellant has to be appreciated on the
basis of the settled law on the subject of Compulsory retirement.
In Baikuntha Nath Das v. Chief District Medical Officer, (1992)
2 SCC 299, three Judge Bench of this Court has laid down the
                                                                     H
    520       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 1 S.C.R.

A principles regarding the Order of Compulsory retirement in
  public interest :

          34. The following principles emerge from the above
          discussion:

B              (i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a
          punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of
          misbehaviour.

                 (it) The order has to be passed by the government
          on forming the opinion th;;1t it is in the public interest to
c         retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is
          passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government.

               (iit) Principles of natura) justice have no place in the
          context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not
D         mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the
          High Court or this Court would not examine the matter
          as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are
          satisfied that the order is passed (a) ma/a fide or (b) that
          it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary -- in
E         the sense that no reasonable person would form the
          requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is
          found to be a perverse order.

                (iv) The government (or the Review Committee, as
          the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record
F
          of service before taking a decision in the matter - of
          course attaching more importance to record of and
          performance during the later years. The record to be so
          considered would naturally include, the entries in the
          confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and
G         adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher
          post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks
          lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon
          merit (selection) and not upon seniority.

H               (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to
NANO KUMAR VERMA v. STATE OF JHARKHAND & 521
                 ORS.

    be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while         A
    passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also
    taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot
    be a basis for interference.
          Interference is permissible only on the grounds
    mentioned in (iii) above. This aspect has been discussed       B
    in paras 30 to 32 above.
      29. In Madan Mohan Choudhary v. State of Bihar, (1999)
3 sec      396, this Court was considering the order of
compulsory retirement of the appellant, who was a Member of C
the Superior Judicial Service in the State of Bihar. Oo a writ
petition filed by the appellant in the High Court, challenging his
order of compulsory retirement by the Full Court of the High
Court, the High Court on the judicial side refused to interfere
and dismissed the petition. The appellant came in. appeal
before this Court. This Court found that while on various earlier D
occasions remarks were given by the High Court but there were
no entries in the character roll of the appellant for the years
 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1993-94. The entries for these years
were recorded at one time simultaneously and the appellant was
categorized as 'C' Grade officer. The date on which these E
entries were made was not indicated either in the original
 record or in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent. These
were communicated to the appellant on 29-11-1996 and were
considered by the Full Court on 30-11-1996. It was clear that
these entries were recorded at a stage when the Standing F
 Committee had already made up its mind to compulsorily retire
the appellant from service as it had directed the office cin 6-
 11-1996 to put up a note for compulsory retirement of the
 appellant. This Court held that it was a case where there was
 no material on the basis of which an opinion could have been G
 reasonably formed that it would be in the public interest to retire
 the appellant from service prematurely. This Court was of the
 opinion that the entries recorded "at one go" for three years,
 namely, 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1993-94 could hardly have
 been taken into consideration. The Court then referred to its H
    522      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 1 S.C.R.


A  earlier decision in Registrar, High Court of Madras v. R.
   Rajiah, (1988) 3 SCC 211, where this Court said that the High
   Court in its administrative jurisdiction has the power to
   recommend compulsory retirement of the Member of the judicial
  service in accordance with the rules framed in that regard but
B ii cannot act arbitrarily and there has to be material to come to
  a decision to compulsorily retire the officer. In that case it was
  also pointed out that the High Court while exercising its power
  of control over the subordinate judiciary is under a constitutional
  obligation to guide and protect judicial officers from being
c harassed or annoyed by trifling complaints relating to judicial
  orders so that the officers may discharge their duties honestly
  and independently; unconcerned by ihe ill-conceived or
  motivated complaints made by unscrupulous lawyers and
  litigants.
D      30. We are conscious of the fact that there is very limited
  scope of judicial review of an order of premature retirement
  from service. As observed by this Court in Rajiah's case
  (supra) that when the High Court takes the view that an order
  of compulsory retirement should be made against a member
E of the Judicial Service, the adequacy or sufficiency of such
  materials cannot be questioned, unless the materials are
  absolutely irrelevant to the purpose of compulsory retirement.
  We also add that when an order of compulsory retirement is
  challenged in a court of law, the Court has the right to examine
F whether some ground or material germane to the issue exists
  or not. Although, the Court is not interested in the sufficiency of
  the material upon which the order of compulsory retirement
  rests.
      31. This Court in High Court of Punjab & Haryana v.
G lshwar Chand Jain, (1999) 4 SCC 579, has discussed the
  purpose, importance and effect of the remarks made during
  inspection which ultimately become the part of the ACR of the
  concerned Judicial officer. This Court has observed thus:
        32. ~ince late this Court ls watching the spectre of either
H       judicial officers or the High Courts coming to this Court·
NANO KUMAR VERMA v. STATE OF JHARKHAND & 523
                 ORS.
     when there is an order prematurely retiring a judicial officer. A
     Under Article 235 of the Constitution the High Court
     exercises complete control over subordinate courts which
     include District Courts. Inspection of the subordinate courts
     is one of the most important functions which the High Court
     performs for control over the subordinate courts. The object B
     of such inspection is for the purpose of assessment of the
     work performed by the Subordinate Judge, his capability,
     integrity and competency. Since Judges are human beings
     and also prone to all the human failings inspection provides
     an opportunity for pointing out mistakes so that they are       c
     avoided in future and deficiencies, if any, in the working
     of the subordinate court, remedied. Inspection should act
      as a catalyst in inspiring Subordinate Judges to give the
      best results. They should feel a sense of achievement. They
      need encouragement. They work under great stress and
                                                                       0
      man the courts while working under great discomfort and
      hardship. A satisfactory judicial system depends largely on
      the satisfactory functioning of courts at the grass-roots level.
      Remarks recorded by the Inspecting Judge are normally
      endorsed by the Full Court and become part of the annual
      confidential reports and are foundations on which the E
      career of a judicial officer is made or marred. Inspection
      of a subordinate court is thus of vital importance. It has to
      be both effective and productive. ltcan be so only if it is
      well regulated and is workman-like. Inspection of
      subordinate courts is not a one-day or an hour or a few F
      minutes' affair. It has to go on all the year round by
       monitoring the work of the court by the Inspecting Judge.
      A casual inspection can hardly be beneficial to a judicial
       system. It does more harm than good.
                                                                       G
       32. It is also well settled that the formation of opinion for
compulsory retirement is based on the subjective satisfaction
of the concerned authority but such satisfaction must be based
on a valid material. It is permissible for the Courts to ascertain
whether a valid material exists or otherwise, on which the
                                                                      H
    524      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 1 S.C.R.


A subjective satisfaction of the administrative authority is based.
    In the present matter, what we see is that the High Court, while
   holding that the track record and service record of the appellant
   was unsatisfactory, has selectively taken into consideration the
   service record for certain years only while making extracts of
s  those contents O! the ACR's. There appears to be some
   discrepancy. We say so for the reason that the appellant has
   produced the copies of the ACR's which were obtained by him
   from the High Court under the Right to Information Act, 2005
   and a comparison of these two would positively indicate that
c  the High Court has not faithfully extracted the contents of the
   ACRs. The High Court has taken the decision on the basis of
   selective service record which includes the summarized ACR's,
   as quoted in the impugned judgment, for the selected years.
   The ACR for the initial years: 1975-76 and 1976-77 remarks
   him as capable of improvement against quality of work, the
D ACR's for the years: 1982-83, 1983-84 points that his work is
   unsatisfactory, the ACR's for the year: 1984-85, 1987-88
   remark his work performance as unsatisfactory with bad
   reputation and quarrelsome attitude, and the ACR for the later
  years: 1993-94 & 1994-95 refers to some private complaints
E and remark that his powers were divested by the High Court
  and the ACR's for the recent years: 1997-98 & 1998-99 points
  that no defect in judicial work but disposal of cases is poor.
  Whereas, the appellant furnished certain Service records which
  includes: the ACR recorded by inspecting Judge in the year
F 1985 which evaluate the appellant as '8'-Satisfactory against
  the entry "Net result'', further the ACR prepared by the District
  and Sessions Judge, Samastipur for the year 1997-98
  assessed him as an officer of average merit, maintaining good
  relationship with bar, staffs and colleagues but poor disposal,
G and the ACR prepared by the District and Sessions Judge,
  Muzaffarpur for the year 1998-99 assessed him as a good
  officer but poor disposal. However, his poor disposal during this
  period is justified up to certain extent in the background of his
  involvement in the continuous and unnecessary disciplinary
H proceedings wnich was based on the charges of granting of
NANO KUMAR VERMA v. STATE OF JHARKHAND & 525
                 ORS.
bail indiscriminately, even after, the fact that he had been A
exonerated of these charges long back in the year 1995 by the
High Court at Patna. The material on which tile decision of the
Compulsory retirement was based, as extracted by the High
Court in the impugned judgment; and material furnished by the
appellant would reflect that totality of relevant materials were B
not considered or completely ignored by the High Court. This
leads to only one conclusion that the subjective satisfaction of
the High Court was not based on the sufficient or relevant
material. In this view of the matter, we cannot say that the
service record of the appellant was unsatisfactory which would           c
warrant premature retirement from service. Therefore, there
was no justification to retire the appellant compulsorily from
service. In Swami Saran Saksena v. State of U.P., (1980) 1
 SCC 12, this Court has quashed the order of Compulsory
 retirement of the appellant, therein, in the public interest, which
                                                                     0
 was found to be in sharp contradiction with his recent service
 performance and record. This Court observed:
     3. Ordinarily, the Court does not interfere with the judgment
     of the relevant authority on the point whether it is in the
     public interest to compulsorily retire a government servant.        E
     And we have been even more reluctant to reach the
     conclusion we have, when the impugned order of
     compulsory retirement was made on the recommendation
     of the High Court itself. But on the material before us we
     are unable to reconcile the apparent contradiction that             F
     although for the purpose of crossing the second efficiency
     bar the appellant was considered to have worked with
     distinct ability and with integrity beyond q1,1estion, yet within
     a few months thereafter he was found so unfit as to
     deserve compulsory retirement. The entries in between in            G
     the records pertaining to the appellant need to be
     examined and appraised in that colltext. There is no
     evidence ~o s'.1ow that suddenly there was· such
      deterioration i.n "~-c quality of the appellant's work or
      integrity that he .ieserved to be compulsorily retired. For        H
      526       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012) 1 S.C.R.


A ·       all these reasons, we are of opinion that the order of
          compulsory retirement should be quashed. The appellant
          will be deemed to have continued in service on the date
        · of the impugned order.
        33. Moreover, the District and Sessions Judge have the
B opportunity to watch the functioning of the appellant from close
  quarters, who have reported favourably regarding the
  appellant's overall performance except about his disposal, in
  the appellant's recE)nt ACR for the year 1997-9~ and 1998-99.
  In view of this, the greater importance is to be given to the
C opinion or remarks made by the immediate superior officer as
  to the functioning of the concerned judicial officer for the
  purpose of his compulsory retirement. The immediate superior
  is better placed to observe, analyse, scrutinize from close
  quarters and then, to comment upon his working, ov~rall
D efficiency, and reputation. In Nawa/ Singh v. State of UP.,
  (2003) 8 SCC 117, this Court has observed thus:
            12 .... In the present-day system, reliance is required to
            be placed on the opinion of the higher officer who had the
            opportunity to watch the performance of the officer
E           concerned from close quarters and formation of his opinion
            with regard to the overall reputation enjoyed by the officer
            concerned would be the basis.
       34. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion
F that the High Court was not justified in sustaining the orders
  passed by the Full Court of the same High Court. Accordingly,
  we allow this appeal, set aside the orders passed by the High
  Court. Since the appellant has retired from service on attaining
  the age of superannuation, he is entitled to all the monetary
G benefits from the date of his notional posting as C.J.M. till his
  notional retirement from service on attaining the age of
  superannuation, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within
  four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
        Ordered accordingly.
H RP.                                                 Appeal allowed.