NAGOOR PICHAI @ BADUSHAversusSTATE TR. SUB-INSPECTOR OF POLICE

                        [2013] 10 S.C.R. 356


A                 NAGOOR PICHAI @ BADUSHA
                                   v.
             STATE TR. SUB-INSPECTOR OF POLICE
                     Crl. M.P. No. 853 of 2013
                                 IN
B               (Criminal Appeal No. 811 of 2011)
                       SEPTEMBER 19, 2013
           [T.S. THAKUR AND VIKRAMAJIT SEN, JJ.]

C         Tamil Nadu Borstal Schools Act, 1925 - ss. 2(1), 8 & 10
    - Petitioner convicted uls.302 /PC for murder and sentenced
    to life imprisonment~ He was over 19 years of age on the date
    of incident, and 22 years 9 months old on the date of .
    conv[ction - Plea for detention of Petitioner in a Borstal ~choo/
o . - Held: Definition of 'adolescent offender' in s.2(1) of the
    Borstal Schools Act stipulates requirement of being not less
    than 16 years.but not more than 21 years of age on the date
    of conviction - Petitioner being over 21 years on the date of
    his conviction, it would not be advisable for him to be detained
E in a Borstal School as he may detrimentally influence
    younger persons - The position would have been totally
    different had he, on the date of his conviction, been between
    ages of 16 and 21 years as then he would have been required
    to be placed in a Borstal School - Since Petitioner was over
F 19 years on the date of the occurrence or the conviction, even
    in postulation of the Juvenile Justice Act, no relief available
    even retrospectively to the Petitioner - No impediment or legal
    impropriety in his having to undergo his sentence in an
    ordinary jail - Petitioner not entitled to bail - Juvenile Justice
G (Care and Protect(on of Children) Act, 2000 - Penal Code,
    1860 - s.302.
         Tamil Nadu Borstal Schools Act, 1925 - ss.2(1) & 8 -
    Definition of 'adolescent offender' - Distinction between
    'adolescent' and Juvenile' - Discussed.
H                                356
 NAGOOR PICHAI @ BADUSHA v. STATE TR. SUB- 357
           INSPECTOR OF POLICE
     Tamil Nadu Borstal Schools Act, 1925 - Borstal School       A
- Held: Is a halfway house intended to prepare a person for
imprisonment in a regular/ordinary jail.

     Tamil Nadu Borstal Schools Act, 1925 - Provisions of -
Difference from provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act - Held:   8
The Borstal Schools Act merely concerns detention of a
convict, whereas the Juvenile Justice Act deals with detention
as also the punishment or sentence that can be imposed -
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.

     The Petitioner was convicted under Section 302 IPC          C
for the murder of his paternal uncl~ and sentenced to life
imprisonment. He was 19 years 8 months of age.on the
date of incident, and 22 years 9 months old on the date
of conviction.                                         '
                                                                 D
     The only question agitated for the Petitioner before
this Court was that the pr~visions of Tamil Nadu Borstal
Schools Act, 1925 were ignored by the Courts below. It
was contended that the Courts beJow erred in not
directing the detention of the Petitioner in a Borstal           E
School.
   Dismissing the bail application of the Petitioner, the··
Court

    HELD: 1.1. The Tamil Nadu Borstal Schools Act, 1925          F
does not contemplate the term 'juvenile' at all. However,
the definition of 'adolescent offender' is contained in
Section 2(1) of the Act. By. virtue of the statutory
definition of 'adolescent offender', on the date of the
conviction he should have been not less than 16 years            G
but not more than 21 years of age. 'Adolescent' is seldom
considered in any legal dictionary, whereas juvenile/
minor/c.hild is ubiquitously dealt with. The Borstal School
is a halfway house intended to prepare a person for
imprisonment in a regular/ordinary jail. Section 8 of the        H
    358     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2013] 10 S.C.R.


A Borstal Schools Act stipulates that a convict cannot
  remain in a Borstal School beyond a period of five years
  or his attaining the age of 23 years. There is a distinction,
  as the relevant statutes ordain, between an 'adolescent'
  and a 'juvenile'. 'Juvenile' and its statutory synonym
B 'child' (and now even 'minor') has been defined in the
  Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
  2000 simply as a person who has not completed eighteen
  years of age. The repealed Juvenile Justice Act treated
  any person below the age of sixteen years as a juvenile
c and it is this age which is contemplated in the Borstal
  Schools Act. By virtue, therefore, of Section 8 of the
  Juvenile Justice Act, Special Homes have to be
  established for the 'reception and rehabilitation of a
  juvenile in conflict with law'. Again, it is this Act in terms
0 of Section 16, that places an embargo on the imposition
  of any sentence of death or imprisonment for life. [Paras
  2, 3] [360-G; 361-C-G; 362-A]

         1.2. Since the Petitioner was over 19 years on the
    date of occurrence of the unfortunate event or the
E   conviction, even in the postulation of the Juvenile Justice
    Act, no relief is available ·even retrospectively to the
    Petitioner. Under Section 8 of the Borstal Schools Act,
    the Court is empowered to pass a sentence of detention
    in the Borstal School when it appears to it expedient to
F   pass such a sentence for a term which shall not be less
    than two years but shall not exceed five years. The
    rationale behind these provisions is obviously to insulate
    a young person or adolescent in contradistinction to a
    juvenile, during his waning impressionable years, from
G   the pernicious influence of hardened criminals; and, on
    the other hand, to similarly insulate other persons
    sentenced to detention in Borstal Schools from the
    influence of convicts who have attained the age of 23
    years or who have been detained in a Borstal School for
H   five years. [Para 3] [362-B-E]
 NAGOOR PICHAI @ BADUSHA v. STATE TR. SUB-               359
           INSPECTOR OF POLICE
     1.3. Since on the date of his conviction the Petitioner    A
was over 21 years old, and therefore, was not a juvenile
under the erstwhile or current statutory dispensation as
per the wisdom of the Legislature, there was no
impediment or legal impropriety in his having to undergo
his sentence in an ordinary jail; on the contrary being an      B
adult it would not have been advisable for him to be
detained in a Borstal School as he may detrimentally
influence younger persons. The position would have
been totally different had he, on the date of his
conviction, been between ages of 16 and 21 years as he          c
would then have required to be placed in a Borstal
School. Even if this infraction had occurred, the
Petitioner would not be entitled to bail today solely on that
score. In any event, the entire argument is totally
academic since on the present date the Petitioner is over
                                                                0
30 years of age and on the date of his conviction for the
commission of the offence, the Petitioner was over 21
years of age. The Borstal Schools Act merely concerns
detention of a convict, whereas the Juvenile Justice Act
deals with detention as also the punishment or sentence         E
that can be imposed. [Paras 5] (364-E-H; 365-A]

     Yaduraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1976) 4 sec 310 and
C. Eluma/ai v. State of Tamil Nadu (1984) 4 SCC 539 -
distinguished.
                                                                F
                     Case Law Reference:
    (1976) 4 sec 310         distinguished        Para 4
    (1984) 4 sec 539         distinguished        Para 4
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal M.P.             G
No. 853 of 2013.

                               IN

Criminal Appeal No. 811 of 2011.
                                                                H
    360       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2013] 10 S.C.R.


A       From the Judgment and Order dated 02.12.2009 of the
    Madurai Bench of Madaras High Court in Crl. Appeal No. 1355/
    2002.

          V. Kanagaraj, Vipin Kumar Jai, Vipul Jai for the Appellant.
B      Subramonium Prasad, AAG, Rajiv Dalal, A. Santha
    Kumaran, K. Sasikala, M. Yogesh Kanna for the Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

         VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. 1. The only question agitated
C   before us by learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner is that
    the provisions of Tamil Nadu Borstal Schools Act, 1925
    (hereinafter 'Borstal Schools Act') have been ignored by the
    Courts below. It is evident from a perusal of the impugned
    judgment that the applicability of the said statute has not been
D   raised in either of the Courts below. Briefly stated, the Petitioner
    has been sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 302 of
    the Indian Penal Code for the murder of his paternal uncle on
    12.8.1999. It is not disputed before us that the Petitioner's date
    of birth is 29.11.1979 thereby making him 19 years 8 months
E   of age on the date of the commission of the murder. The
    Petitioner having been found guilty has been sentenced to life
    imprisonment vide judgment of the Trial Court pronounced on
    6.9.2002, on which date the Petitioner was 22 years 9 months
    old. It is contended before us by learned Senior Counsel that
F   the Courts below erred in not directing the detention of the
    Petitioner in a Borstal School.

       2. The Borstal Schools Act does not contemplate the term
  'juvenile' at all. However, the definition of 'adolescent offender'
G is contained in Section 2(1) of the said Act and reads thus :
          " 'Adolescent offender' means any person who has been
          convicted of any offence punishable with imprisonment or
          who having been· ordered to give security under section
          118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has failed to do
H
     NAGOOR PICHA! @ BADUSHA v. STATE TR. SUB- 361
      INSPECTOR OF POLICE [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
        so and who at the time of such conviction or failure to give   A
        security is not less than 16 in the case of a boy and not
        less than 18 in the case of a girl, but not more than 21
        years of age in either case."

    We should clarify that Section 118 corresponds to Section 110 B
    of the current 1973 Cr.P.C. The age of a juvenile prior to the
    present Act was 16 years and a legal anachronism palpably
    exists requiring an amendment to the Borstal Schools Act
    substituting the age of 16 years by 18 years for a boy.
    'Adolescent' is seldom considered in any legal dictionary,
    whereas juvenile/minor/child is ubiquitously dealt with. C
    Adolescence is the penumbra! period (presently between 18
    years and 23 years) when, for good reason, a person is not
    perceived and treated as an adult for the purposes of
    incarceration. The Borstal School is a halfway house intended
    to prepare a person for imprisonment in a regular/ordinary jail. D
    Section 8 of the Borstal Schools Act stipulates that a convict
    cannot remain in a Borstal School beyond a period of five years
    or his attaining the age of 23 years. We should immediately
    note the distinction, as the relevant statutes ordain, between an
    'adolescent' and a 'juvenile'. 'Juvenile' and its statutory synonym E
    'child' (and now even 'minor') has been defined in the Juvenile
    Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 [for short,
    'Juvenile Justice Act'] simply as a person who has not ·
    completed eighteen years of age. The repealed Juvenile
    Justice Act treated any person below the age of sixteen years F
    as a juvenile and it is this age which is contemplated in the
    Borstal Schools Act. By virtue, therefore, of Section 8 of the
    Juvenile Justice Act, Special Homes have to be established
    for the 'reception and rehabilitation of a juvenile in conflict with
    law'. Again, it is this Act in terms of Section 16, that places an G
    embargo on the imposition of any sentence of death or
    imprisonment for life.

         3. In the context of the arguments addressed before us it
1   is important to emphasise that it is the date of conviction that   H
    362     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 10 S.C.R.


A assumes singular significance. By virtue of the statutory
  definition of 'adolescent offender', on the date of the conviction
  he should have been not less than 16 years bu\ not more than
  21 years of age. Although this question does not arise directly
  before us, the date of juvenility was less than 16 years of age
B and, therefore, a plea on this ground had not been raised since
  the Petitioner was over 19 years on the date of occurrence of
  the unfortunate event or the conviction. Even in the postulation
  of the Juvenile Justice Act, no relief is available even
  retrospectively to the Petitioner. Under Section 8 of the Borstal
c Schools Act, the Court is empowered to pass a sentence of
  detention in the Borstal School when it appears to it expedient
  to pass such a sentence for a term which shall not be less than
  two years but shall not exceed five years. The rationale behind
  these provisions is obviously to insulate a young person or
  adolescent in contradistinction to a juvenile, during his waning
0
  impressionable years, from the pernicious influence of
  hardened criminals; and, on the other hand, to similarly insulate
  other persons sentenced to detention in Borstal Schools from
  the influence of convicts who have attained the age of 23 years
E or who have been detained in a Borstal School for five years.

        4. Learned Senior Counsel has drawn our attention to
  Yaduraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1976} 4 SCC 310 and C.
  Elumalai v. State of Tamil Nadu (1984} 4 SCC 539 both of
  which have no relevance to the issue raised before us, that too
F for the first time. In Yaduraj Singh this Court had emphasised
  that the plea under the Probation of Offenders Act had not been
  raised in any of the Courts below and whilst it could
  nevertheless be pressed, such a course invariably presents
  difficulties in comprehensively considering the plea because of
G the absence of any credible evidence to determine the juvenility
  of the person concerned. We hasten to clarify that we have not
  declined to entertain the plea on the ground that it has not been
  raised in any of the Courts below, therefore rendering Yaduraj
  Singh of no assistance to the Petitioner. The ratio of Elumalai
H follows upon a bare reading of Sections 8 and 10 of the Borstal
NAGOOR PICHA! @ BADUSHA v. STATE TR. SUB- 363
 INSPECTOR OF POLICE [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
Schools Act which we shall reproduce so as to make our                 A
judgment holistic and self contained :

    "8. Power of Court to pass sentence of detention in
    Borstal School. (1) Where it appears to a Court having
    jurisdiction under this Act that an adolescent offender            B
    should, by reason of his criminal habits or tendencies, or
    association with the persons of bad character, be subject
    to detention for such term and under such instruction and
    discipline as appears most conducive to his reformation
    arfd the repression of crime, it shall be lawful for the Court,    C
    in lieu of passing a sentence of imprisonment, to pass a
    sentence of detention in a Borstal school for a term which
    shall not be less than two years and shall not exceed five
    years but in no case extending beyond the date on which
    the adolescent offender will, in the opinion of the Court,
    attain the age of twenty-three years.                              D

         (2) Before passing a sentence of detention in a
    Borstal School u_nder sub-section (1), the Court

           (a) shall call for a report from the Probation Officer      E
    of the area in which the offender permanently resided at
    the time when he committed the offence and shall consider
    such report,

         (b) shall consider any other report or representation
    which may be made to it, and                                       F

           (c) may make such further inquiry as it may think fit,
   . as to suitability of the case for treatment in a Borstal school
     and shall be satisfied that the character, state of health and
     mental condition of the offender and the other                    G
     circumstances of the case are such that the offender is
     likely to profit by such instruction and discipline as
     aforesaid.


                                                                       H
    364       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 10 S.C.R.

A              (3) The report of a Probation Officer referred to in
          sub-section (2) shall be treated as confidential.
               Provided that the Court may, if it so thinks fit,
          communicate the substance thereof to the offender and
          may give him an opportunity of producing such evidence
B
          as may be relevant to the matter stated in the report.
                10. Power of Inspector-General to transfer
          prisoners to Borstal Schools.-The Inspector General
          may, subject to rules made by the State Government, if
c         satisfied that any adolescent offender undergoing
          imprisonment in consequence of a sentence passed either
          before or after the passing of this Act might with advantage
          be detained in a Borstal school, there to serve the whole
          or any part of the unexpired residue of his sentence. The
D         provisions of this Act shall thereupon apply to such person
          as if he had been originally sentenced to detention in a
          Borstal school."
        5. So far as the facts in the present Appeal are concerned,
E since on the date of his conviction the Petitioner was-0ver 21
  years old, and therefore, was not a juvenile under the erstwhile
  Qf current statutory dispensation as per the wisdom of the
  Legislature, there was no impediment or legal impropriety in
  his having to undergo his sentence in an ordinary jail;· on the
  contrary being an adult it would not have been advisable for him
F to be detained in a Borstal School as he may detrimentally
  influence younger persons. The position would have been totally
  different had he, on the date of his conviction, been between
  ages of 16 and 21 years as he would then have required to be
  placed in a Borstal School. Even if this infraction had occurred,
G the Petitioner would not be entitled to bail today solely on that
  score. In any event, the entire argument is totally academic since
  on the present date the Petitioner is over 30 years of age and
  on the date of his conviction for the commission of the offence,
  the Petitioner was over 21 years of age. The Borstal Schools
H
 NAGOOR PICHAI @ BADUSHA v. STATE TR. SUB- 365
  INSPECTOR OF POLICE [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
Act merely concerns detention of a convict, whereas the            A
Juvenile Justice Act deals with detention as also the puni$hment
or sentence that can be imposed.

    6. Accordingly the Application for bail, on the grounds
pressed before us, is devoid of merit and is dismissed.            B

B.B.B.                            Bail Application dismissed.