NAGESHversusSTATE OF KARNATAKA

                        [2012] 5 S.C.R. 872

                              NAGESH
A
                                  v.
                      STATE OF KARNATAKA
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 671 of 2005)

                            MAY 8, 2012
B
         [A.K. PATNAIK AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.]

         PENAL CODE, 1860: s.302 - Murder- Conviction based
    on circumstantial evidence - Allegation that victim-deceased
C   who was residing with accused no. 1 in Belgaum was alone in
    the house on the day of occurrence - Appellant-accused no. 2
    came there and tried to outrage her modesty and when she
    resisted such attempts, appellant assaulted her and
    administered poison to her - Witnesses saw accused no. 1
    taking the deceased in a car brought by accused no.2 -
0   Accused no. 1 told neighbours that he was taking the
    deceased to hospital as she has taken poison - Police jeep
    also came there - Deceased was put into the car and the car
    and the police jeep left the place - Instead of taking deceased
    to hospital she was taken to her parent's house next morning
E   - Her father saw the dead body of his daughter and bruises
    on her body but was forced to cremate hurriedly - FIR filed
    subsequently - Trial court convicted appellant but acquitted
    other accused- High Court upheld the decision of the trial
    court - On appeal, held: Statement of witnesses provided
F   complete chain as to how the deceased was last seen with the
    appellant whereafter she died and her body was cremated in
    the village despite protest by her parents - Appellant was last
    seen with the deceased but offered no explanation - The
    statements of witnesses established the facts which formed
G   the very basis of the case of the prosecution - Evidence was
    admissible and was appreciated in consonance with the rules
    of prudence and law - Findings of courts below were neither
    perverse nor improper - Interference with the order of
    conviction not called for merely because another view on the
H                                  872
         NAGESH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                    873


same evidence was possible - Director General of Police! A
Commissioner of Police directed to take disciplinary action
against the police officers/officials at Belgaum, who were
present at the place of occurrence when the deceased was
brought from her room downstairs where the car was parked,
but failed to take appropriate action and register a case B
despite the fact that it was openly stated that the deceased
had consumed poison - Further, disciplinary action directed
against the police officers/officials who were present when the
body of the deceased was cremated and failed to take charge
of the dead body and proceed in accordance with law, it being c
an unnatural death, and did not discharge their public duty
and mandatory obligations under the provisions of the Police
Manual and the Code of Criminal Procedure - Constitution
of India, 1950 - Article 136.

      CONSTITUTION OF IND/A, 1950: Article 136 - Scope of D
interference - Held: When the evidence is legally admissible
and has been appreciated by the courts in its correct
perspective then merely because another view is possible,
Supreme Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 136 of
the Constitution, would be very reluctant to interfere with the E
concurrent findings of the courts below.
     The prosecution case was that the victim-deceased
was daughter of PW4 and PW9 and was a college
student. Accused no.1 was close relative of the deceased       F
and was resident of Belgaum. The appellant and accused
no.2 were brothers-in~law of accused no.1. Accused no.1
had pressed upon the parents of the deceased for
sending her from their village Gokarna to Belgaum with
him. At the relevant time, she was staying with accused        G
no.1 at Belgaum. On the fateful day, at 5.00 p.m. when
accused no.1 had gone to the temple leaving the
deceased alone in the house, the appellant came to the
house of accused no.1 and tried to outrage the modesty
of the deceased and have sexual intercourse with her. But
                                                               H
    874    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 5 S.C.R.

A when she resisted such attempts, the appellant assaulted
   her and murdered her by administering poison. PW1, the
   neighbour saw .accused no.1 returning to the house at
   about 8.30 p.m. and taking the deceased along with him
  outside the house by holding her hands. On her enquiry,
s he told that the deceased was not well and was being
  taken for treatment to the doctor. PW1 also tried to
  enquire from the deceased as to what had happened to
  her but she was unable to give any reply except
  producing or making some groaning/moaning sound of
c "huhu huhu". Upon this, PW1 gave some saline water to
  her. In the meantime, accused no.2 came there in an
  Ambassador car. By then, some persons from the
  neighbourhood had also gathered there. Even a police
  jeep had come there. Thereafter, the deceased was put
  into the car and the police jeep as well as the car left the
0
  place. PW2, another neighbour who was watching
  television in his house at about 8.45 p.m., came out of his
  house upon hearing some commotion outside the house.
  He also saw the arrival of the Ambassador car and the
E deceased being put into the car by the accused persons.
  He was also told that the deceased was not well. The next
  morning, the dead body of the victim was brought to the
  house of his parents in the Ambassador car. PW9 noticed
  some marks of violence on the body of the deceased
  when she was brought inside the house. When PW9
F enquired from the accused no.1 as to how his daughter
  had died, the accused no.1 jumped into the well but was
  rescued by some persons. Despite resistance, the body
  of the deceased was cremated. Thereafter, all the
  accused immediately returned to Belgaum. PW9 lodged
G a complaint with the police. The trial court acquitted all
  the accused for all offences except the appellant who was
  convicted for the offence under Section 302 IPC and
  awarded imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.2,000/, in
  default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months.
H The High Court confirmed the judgment of the trial court.
        NAGESH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                  875


The instant appeal was filed challenging the order of the   A
High Court.
    Dismissing the appeal, the Court
     HELD: 1. Every case has to be appreciated on its own
facts and in light of the evidence led by the parties. It is B
for the Court to examine the cumulative effect of the
evidence in order to determine whether the prosecution
has been able to establish its case beyond reasonable
doubt or that the accused is entitled to the benefit of
doubt. In the instant case, there was no eye-witness to c
the actual scene of crime that resulted in the death of the
deceased. To that limited extent, it was a case of
circumstantial evidence. Certain enough, the statement
of the parents of the deceased, PW4 and PW9, the
neighbours, PW1 and PW2 and the Investigating Officer, 0
PW15 clearly establishes the case of the prosecution.
PW1 has stated that the accused no.1 had gone to the
temple and the deceased was in the room along with the
appellant. At 8.30 p.m., accused no.1 came and he
brought the deceased by holding her hand and, upon E
enquiry from PW1, she was told that the deceased was
not feeling well. Seeing her condition and the moaning
sound made by the deceased, PW1 gave her saline
water. Then, accused no.2 also came there in the
Ambassador car. Even other people gathered by that
time. The Police also came at the spot and the deceased F
was taken to the hospital in the Ambassador car. Later,
it was learnt that the police had come to the spot and
informed that the deceased had died. Similarly, PW2 is the
other neighbour who had been watching TV at about 8.45
p.m. on that day but after hearing the commotion, had G
come out of his house saw that the deceased was being
taken away in the Ambassador car and he was told by
the accused that they were taking her to a doctor as she
was not well. PW4 is the mother of the deceased while
PW9 is the father of the deceased. Both of them have H
    876     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 5 S.C.R.

A stated that accused no.1 had pressurized them to send
  their daughter to Belgaum with him. On 8th October,
  1993, the accused brought her dead body in the car and
  at that time her nose was bleeding and there were blood
  clotting on the cheeks as well. Accused no.1 and the
B appellant had informed the parents that she died as a
  result of consuming poison. They did not give any further
  information. Further, the father of the deceased, PW9, had
  objected that her body be not cremated but despite his
  protest, the dead body was cremated in the village. PW11
c who was running a tea shop at Belgaum, stated that he
  had seen the accused persons in the Ambassador car
  and he even knew the driver. He was standing near the
  taxi stand when the driver brought the three accused
  persons in the car and there was a girl sleeping in the car.
  The statement of these witnesses examined in light of the
0
  statement of the Investigating Officer, PW15, provides a
  complete chain as to how the deceased was brought to
  Belgaum and was last seen with the appellant whereafter
  she died and her body was cremated in the village
E despite protest by her parents. All the three accused had
  put the deceased into the car and never took her to the
  doctor but instead they went to the village Gokarna where
  they reached next morning and handed over the dead
  body of the deceased to the parents. [Paras 13-15) [886-
  A-H; 887-A-D]
F
       Kali Ram v. State of H.P. (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1974 (1)
  SCR 722; Amarsingh Munnasingh Suryawanshi v. State of
  Maharashtraa (2007) 15 SCC 455: 2007 (11) SCR 1;
  Birendar Poddar v. State of Bihar (2011) 6 SCC 350: 2011
                                                                 --
G (6) SCR 873; Sucha Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab (2003)
    7 sec 64S: 2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 35 - relied on.
         2. There is no major discrepancy or even an iota of
    real doubt in the case of the prosecution and secondly,
    despite clear irresponsible attitude on the part of the
H
        NAGESH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                   877


Police officials who were present at the residence of the     A
accused persons when the deceased was brought to the
car on the pretext of taking her to a doctor for treatment
but her body was taken away, still the prosecution has
been able to establish the complete chain of events
pointing undoubtedly towards the guilt of the appellant.      B
Another very important aspect of this case is that the
accused in their statement under Section 313, Cr.P.C.
took up the stand of complete denial of their involvement
in the crime and offered no explanation before the Court.
The law required the appellant in particular to provide       c
some explanation as he was last seen in the room with
the deceased. Rather than providing some explanation
of the circumstances under which the deceased died, the
appellant offered complete denial. But strangely when
PW4, the mother of the deceased, was cross-examined
                                                              0
by the defence, they put the suggestion to her that the
deceased was having a love affair with a student from her
college and her parents had sent her to Belgaum to
ensure that the said love affair failed. The deceased had
become desperate at Belgaum and had taken poison and
died. If this be the stand of the accused, then there was     E
no occasion for the accused to deny every material piece
of evidence as well as not to give any explanation when
the accused were specifically asked for. The purpose of
a statement under Section 313 Cr.PC is to put to the
accused the material evidence appearing in the case           F
against him as well as to provide him an opportunity to
explain his conduct or his version of the case. [Para 17]
(888-G-H; 889-A-F]

     3. It is also possible and permissible that an accused   G
may remain silent but in that circumstance and with
reference to the facts and circumstances of a given case,
the Court may be justified in drawing an adverse
inference against the accused. PW5 was another vital
witness who had seen the deceased when she was                H
   878     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A brought to the Ambassador car and, according to her,
  lips of the deceased were blackish and her neck had
  black marks on two sides and when she enquired about
  her from the accused, she was told that the deceased had
  taken poison. The statements of PW1, PW4 and PW9 read
B with the statement of this witness, establish the facts
  which form the very basis of the case of the prosecution
  and they have been proved in accordance with law. The
  trend of cross-examination on behalf of the accused
  implies admission of the death of the deceased having
c taken place in the premises in question by taking poison,
  however, the accused have failed to offer any explanation
  therefor which was least expected of him. When the
  evidence is legally admissible and has been appreciated
  by the Courts in its correct perspective then merely
  because another view is possible, this Court, in exercise
0
  of its powers under Article 136 of the Constitution, would
  be very reluctant to interfere with the concurrent findings
  of the Courts below. Of course, there are exceptions but
  they are very limited ones. Where upon careful
E appreciation of evidence, this Court finds that the courts
  below have departed from the rule of prudence while
  appreciating the evidence in a case or the findings are
  palpably erroneous and are opposed to law or the settled
  judicial dictums, then the Court may interfere with the
  concurrent findings. Still, it is not possible to exhaustively
F state the principles or the kind of cases in which the
  Court would be justified in disturbing the concurrent
  findings. It will always depend upon the facts and
  circumstances of a given case. It was primarily for the
  reason that the courts had departed from the Rule of
G Prudence in appreciation of evidence. In the present
  case, the evidence is admissible evidence and has been
  appreciated in consonance with the rules of prudence
  and law. These findings can neither be termed as perverse
  or so improper that no person of common prudence can
H arrive at that conclusion. In light of the above noted
         NAGESH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA               879


principles of appreciation of evidence, we would not       A
interfere merely because it is possible to take another
view on the same evidence. [Paras 19, 21, 23] [892-B-E;
G-H; 893-A-B-H; 894-A-B]

     Asraf Ali v. State of Assam (2008) 16 SCC 328: 2008   B
(10) SCR 1115; Ma nu Sao v. State of Bihar (2010) 12 SCC
310: 2010 (8) SCR 811; Mousam Singha Roy & Ors. v. State
of WB. (2003) 12 sec 377 - relied on.

     4. The Director General of Police/Commissioner of
Police, Karnataka is directed to take disciplinary action C
against the police officers/officials at Belgaum, whether
in service or not, who were present at the place of
occurrence when the deceased was brought from her
room downstairs where the car was parked, and failed to
take appropriate action and register the case despite the D
fact that it was openly stated that the deceased had
consumed poison. Further, disciplinary action is directed
against the police officers/officials, whether in service or
not, at village Gokarna who were present when the body
of the deceased was cremated and they failed to take E
charge of the dead body and proceed in accordance with
law, it being an unnatural death. They did not discharge
their public duty and mandatory obligations under the
provisions of the Police Manual and the Code of Criminal
Procedures. The Director General of Police is directed to F
view the matter seriously and ensure completion of the
disciplinary proceedings within six months from the date
of this order. [Para 24] [894-C-F]
                   Case Law Reference:
                                                           G
    1974 (1) SCR 722         relied on        Para 11
    2007 (11) SCR 1          relied on        Para 12
    2011 (6) SCR 873         relied on        Para 12
                                                           H
    880       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012) 5 S.C.R.


A         2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 35 relied on              Para 16
          2008 (10) SCR 1115         relied on          Para 17
          2010 (8) SCR 811           relied on          Para 18
          (2003) 12 sec 377          relied on          Para 22
B
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
    No. 671 of 2005.

        From the Judgment & Order dated 19.12.2003 of the High
c   Court of Karnataka in Criminal Appeal No. 150 of 2000.

          Seeraj Bagga (A.C.) for the Appellant.

        V.N. Raghupathy, Azeen A. Kalebudde for the
    Respondent.
D
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
        SWATANTER KUMAR, J. 1. A Bench of the High Court
  of Karnataka at Bangalore vide its judgment dated 19th
  December, 2003 while rejecting all the contentions raised by
E the accused Nagesh, confirmed the judgment of conviction and
  order of sentence passed by the trial court vide its judgment
  dated 18th January, 2000 convicting the accused for an offence
  under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and
  sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life and pay a fine
F of Rs.2000/- in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment.
  for six months. Aggrieved from the judgment of the High Court,
  the accused has preferred the present appeal.
       2. We may, at the very outset, briefly refer to the facts as
  per the case of the prosecution. The deceased, Smt.
G Nagaratna, was a student of second year Pre-University
  College (PUC) at the relevant time. Her parents, namely Smt.
  Sumitra, PW4 and Shivarai Shetti, PW9, had six daughters.
  PW9 was running a small tea shop at Gokarna. The deceased
  was earlier staying with her parents. The accused No.1, Anant,
H was a close relative of Nagaratna and was unmarried at the
         NAGESH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                      881
             [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

relevant time. Accused No.1 also was the resident of Gokarna      A
but at that time was residing at Belgaum. The other two
accused, namely, Venketesh, Accused No.1 and Nagesh,
Accused No.3, were brothers-in-law of Anant. All of them were
residents of village Gokarna. Anant had pressed upon the
parents of Nagaratna for sending her to Belgaum with him.         s
During the Ganapathi festival, she had visited her parents at
Gokarna and was very reluctant to go back to Belgaum.
However, Anant again persuaded her parents to send her to
Belgaum promising them to secure her a good job at Belgaum.
Her parents, thus, had sent her back with him to Belgaum.         c
Hence, at the relevant time, she was staying with Anant at
Belgaum.
     3. PW1, Smt. Roopa, is the owner of the building called
'Sai Prasad', bearing No.304/31 and CCB No. 18 situated at
Shastri Nagar, Goodshed Road, Belgaum comprising of three         D
blocks. She herself was staying in one of the blocks with her
husband and children while Anant was staying in the second
block along with the deceased, Nagaratna. Chotubhai, PW2,
was also residing in the upstairs portion of the same block. In
other words, PW1 and PW2, both were the immediate                 E
neighbours of Anant.
     4. On 7th October, 1993 at about 5.00 p.m. in the evening,
Anant had gone to the temple leaving Nagaratna alone in the
house. The accused Nagesh, appellant herein, came to the
house of Anant and tried to outrage the modesty of the            F
deceased and have sexual intercourse with her. But when she
resisted such attempts then Nagesh assaulted her and is stated
to have murdered her by administering poison.
    5. Smt. Roopa, PW1, saw Anant returning to the house at       G
about 8.30 p.m. and taking the deceased Nagaratna along with
him outside the house by holding her hands. On her enquiry,
she was told by Anant that Nagaratna was not well and was
being taken for treatment to the doctor. PW1 also tried to
enquire from Nagaratna as to what had happened to her but         H
    882     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 5 S.C.R.

A shE!was unable to give any reply except that she was producing
  or making some groaning/moaning sound of "huhu huhu". Upon
  this, PW1 gave some saline water to Nagaratna. In the
  meantime, Venketesh came there with an Ambassador car. By
  then, some persons from the neighbourhood had also gathered
B there. Even a police jeep had come there. Thereafter, the
  deceased was put into the car and the police jeep as well as
  the car left from the place.
       6. It is stated that Chotubhai, PW2 who was watching
  television in his house at about 8.45 p.m., came out of his house
C upon hearing some commotion outside the house. He saw the
  arrival of the Ambassador car and the deceased being put into
  the car by the accused persons. He was also told that
  Nagaratna was not well. Later, it was learnt that Nagaratna had
  expired.
D
        7. On 8th October, 1993, at about 7.30 a.m. in the morning,
  the deceased Nagaratna was brought to the house of PW9 in
  the Ambassador car. By that time, she is stated to have already
  died. Her father, PW9, noticed some marks of violence on the
E body of the deceased when she was brought inside the house.
  It is stated that on seeing the dead body of Nagaratna, PW9
  fainted and when he regained consciousness, he enquired from
  the accused Anant, as to how his daughter died. Thereon the
  accused Anant jumped into the well but was rescued by some
  persons. Despite resistance, the body of the deceased was
F cremated. Thereafter, the accused including Nagesh did not
  stay in the village and they immediately returned to Belgaum.
  The father of the deceased, PW9, lodged a complaint with the
  police, Ex.P6 on the basis of which the First Information Report
  (Fl R) Exhibit P10 was registered and the investigative
G machinery was set into motion. The Investigating Officer, upon
  completing the investigation, filed charge-sheet stating that the
  five accused, namely, Anant Ramanna Kudatalkar, Venkatesh
  Shesha Revankar, Nagesh Shriniwas Raikar, Prabhakar
  Ramnath Raikar, and Veerbhadra Purshottam Shetty had
H
          NAGESH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                         883
              [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

committed the offence. Accused No.3 Nagesh was charged                A
with an offence under Section 302 IPC while all others were
stated to have committed an offence punishable under Sections
201 and 202 read with Section 34 IPC. All the accused stood
the trial and vide judgment dated 18th January, 2000, the Trial
Court acquitted all the accused for all offences except Nagesh,       B
accused No.3 who was convicted for the offence under Section
302 IPC and, as already noticed, awarded imprisonment for
life and a fine of Rs.2,000/, in default, to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for six months. As already noticed, the High Court
has confirmed the judgment of the Trial Court, giving rise to the     c
present appeal.
     8. The learned counsel appearing for the sole appellant-
accused No.3 argued with some vehemence that this is a case
of circumstantial evidence and the prosecution has failed to
establish the complete chain of events pointing towards the guilt     D
of the appellant. As in the peculiar circumstances of the case
two views are possible, the Court should take a view which is
favourable to the accused.
      9. It is further contended that the story of the prosecution
is based upon conjectures and surmises. There are serious and         E
patent discrepancies in the case of the prosecution. The
conduct of the appellant is such that absolves him of any liability
under the criminal law because he had throughout participated
in taking the deceased to the hospital, attended her funeral and
never ran away. If the appellant had committed the offence, the       F
first thing he would have done was to disappear. The
statements of the witnesses do not establish the offence under
Section 302 against the appellant.
     10. In response to this submission, the counsel appearing        G
for the State argued that the prosecution has been able to
establish its case beyond any reasonable doubt, not only by
circumstantial evidence but also by the statement of the
witnesses who saw the deceased and the accused immediately
prior and after the occurrence in question.
                                                                      H
    884       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2012] 5 S.C.R.

A        11. This Court in the case of Kali Ram v. State of H.P.
    [(1973) 2 sec 808], held as under:
          "25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of
          the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two
          views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case,
8         one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to
           his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused
          should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance
           in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be
          established by circumstantial evidence. Rule has
c         accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence
          adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis
          of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of
          his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a
          finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule
D         that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt
          regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have
          the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding
          the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the
          doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is
E         incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that is
          is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural
          consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also
          does not warrant acquittal of the accused by report to
          surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As
F         mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v.
          Jagir Singh a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein
          one is free to give flight to one's imagination and phantasy.
          It concerns itself with the question as to whether the
          accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with
          which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is
G
          the product of interplay of different human emotions. In
          arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused
          charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to
          judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its
          intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in
H
         NAGESH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                        885
             [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
    the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts.     A
    Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be
    given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same
    time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on
    grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures."
      12. The Court also cautioned that wrongful acquittals are     8
undesirable and shake the confidence of the people in the
judicial system much worse, however, is the wrongful conviction
of an innocent person. In the case of Amarsingh Munnasingh
 Suryawanshi v. State of Maharashtraa ((2007) 15 SCC 455),
this Court, while dealing with a situation where the accused-       C
husband was absconding and the husband and wife were living
together and at the time of death they were alone in the room,
observed that it was for the accused-husband to explain as to
how the deceased met her death. Again, while dealing with a
case based upon circumstantial evidence, this Court, in a           D
recent judgment in the case of Birendar Poddar v. State of
Bihar ((2011) 6 SCC 350), held as under:
    "7. It is obviously true that this case rests solely on
    circumstantial evidence. It is true that in cases where death
    takes place within the matrimonial home, it is very difficult   E
    to find direct evidence. But for appreciating circumstantial
    evidence, the court has to be cautious and find out whether
    the chain of circumstances led by the prosecution is
    complete and the chain must be so complete and
    conclusive as to unmistakably point to the guilt of the         F
    accused. It is well settled that if any hypothesis or
    possibility arises from the evidence which is incompatible
    with the guilt of the accused, in such case, the conviction
    of the accused which is based solely on circumstantial
    evidence is difficult to be sustained. {See Hanumant            G
    Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P. [AIR 1952 SC 343),
    Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab [AIR 1954 SC 621)and
    Eradu v. State of Hyderabad [AIR 1956 SC 316]}"
     13. It is neither possible nor prudent to state a ·straight-   H
    886      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A   jacket formula or principle which would apply to all cases without
    variance. Every case has to be appreciated on its own facts
    and in light of the the evidence led by the parties. It is.for the
    Court to examine the cumulative effect of the evidence in order
    to determine whether the prosecution has been able to
B   establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the accused
    is entitled to the benefit of doubt.
        14. In the present case, there is no eye-witness to the actual
  scene of crime that resulted in the death of the deceased. To
  that limited extent, it is a case of circumstantial evidence.
C Certain enough, the statement of the parents of the deceased,
  PW4 and PW9, the neighbours, PW1 and PW2 and the
  Investigating Officer, PW15 clearly establishes the case of the
  prosecution. PW1 has stated that the accused Anant had gone
  to the temple and the deceased was in the room along with the
D appellant. At 8.30 p.m., Anant came and he brought the
  deceased by holding her hand and, upon enquiry from PW1,
  she was told that the deceased was not feeling well. Seeing
  her condition and the moaning sound made by the deceased,
  PW1 gave her saline water. Then, the accused Venkatesh also
E came there in the Ambassador car. Even other people gathered
  by that time. The Police also came at the spot and the
  deceased was taken to the hospital in the Ambassador car.
  Later, it was learnt that the police had come to the spot and
  informed that Nagaratna had died. Similarly, PW2 is the other
F neighbour who had been watching TV at about 8.45 p.m. on
  that day but after hearing the commotion, had come out of his
  house saw that Nagaratna was being taken away in the
  Ambassador car and he was told by the accused that they were
  taking her to a doctor as she was not well. PW4 is the mother
G of the deceased while PW9 is the father of the deceased. Both
  of them have stated that Anant had pressurized them to send
  their daughter to Belgaum with him. On 8th October, 1993, the
  accused brought her dead body in the car and at that time her
  nose was bleeding and there were blood clottings on the
H cheeks as well. Anant and Nagesh had informed the parents
         NAGESH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                       887
             [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
that she died as a result of consuming poison. They did not give    A
any further information. Further, the father of the deceased,
PW9, had objected that her body be not cremated but despite
his protest, the dead body was cremated in the village. PW11,
Praveen, who was running a tea shop at Belgaum, stated that
he had seen the accused persons in the Ambassador car and           B
he even knew the driver. He was standing near the taxi stand
when the driver brought the three accused persons in the car
and there was a girl sleeping in the car. The statement of these
witnesses examined in light of the statement of the Investigating
Officer, PW15, provides a complete chain as to how the              c
deceased was brought to Belgaum and was last seen with
accused Nagesh, whereafter she died and her body was
cremated in the village despite protest by her parents.
     15. All the three accused had put the deceased into the
car and never took her to the doctor but instead they went to       D
the village Gokarna where they reached next morning and
handed over the dead body of the deceased to the parents.
      16. A contention has also been raised to argue that the
First Information Report (FIR), Exhibit P10, is an afterthought
as it was lodged after deliberation and planning, that too, after   E
a considerable time. The Court cannot ignore the fact that young
daughter of PW4 and PW9 had died allegedly by consuming
poison. No other details were brought to their notice, they had
other daughters present in the house and the dead body of the
deceased was cremated against their wish. After the                 F
cremation, the FIR was lodged. The delay, if any, in the
circumstances of the case, thus, stands properly explained. The
Court has to examine the evidence in its entirety, particularly,
in the case of circumstantial evidence, the Court cannot just
take one aspect of the entire evidence led in the case like delay   G
in lodging the FIR in isolation of the other evidence placed on
record and give undue advantage to the theory of benefit of
doubt in favour of the accused. This Court, in the case of Sucha
Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab [(2003) 7 SCC 643] has
stated:                                                             H
    888       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A         "20. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt
          must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and
          thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made
          sterile on the plea that it is better to let hundred guilty
          escape thatn punish an innocent. Letting guilty escape is
B         not doing justice according to law. (See Gurbachan Singh
          v. Satpal Singh & Ors. (AIR 1990 SC 209). Prosecution
          is not required to meet any and every hypothesis put
          forward by the accused (See State of U.P. v. Ashok
          Kumar Srivastava (AIR 1992 SC 840). A reasonable
c         doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or merely possible doubt,
          but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense.
          It must grow out of the evidence in the case. If a case is
          proved perfectly, it is argued that it is artificial; if a case
          has some flaws inevitable because human beings are
          prone to err, it is argued that it is too imperfect. One
D
          wonders whether in the meticulous hypersensitivity to
          eliminate a rare innocent from being punished, many guilty
          persons must be allowed to escape. Proof beyond
          reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish. (See lnder
          Singh and another v. State (Delhi Admn.) (AIR 1978 SC
E         1091. Vague hunches cannot take place of judicial
          evaluation. 'A Judge does not preside over a criminal trial,
          merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A Judge
          also presides to see that a guilty man, does not escape.
          Both are public duties.' (Per Viscount Simen in Stirland
F         v. Director of Public Prosecutor 91944 AC (PC 315)
          quoted in State of U.P. v. Anil Singh (AIR 1988 SC 1998).
          Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a
          zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any
          favourite other than truth."
G
       17. Firstly, we are unable to find any major discrepancy
  or even an iota of real doubt in the case of the prosecution and
  secondly, despite clear irresponsible attitude on the part of the
  Police officials who were present at the residence of the
H accused persons when the deceased was brought to the car
          NAGESH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                       889
              [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
on the pretext of taking her to a doctor for treatment but her      A
body was taken away, still the prosecution has been able to
establish the complete chain of events pointing undoubtedly
towards the guilt of the appellant. Another very important aspect
of this case is that the accused in their statement under Section
313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.PC) took up         B
the stand of complete denial of their involvement in the crime
and offered no explanation before the Court. As noticed above,
the law required the accused Nagesh in particular to provide
some explanation as he was last seen in the room with the
deceased. Rather than providing some explanation of the
circumstances under which the deceased died, the appellant
                                                                    c
offered complete denial. But strangely when PW4, the mother
of the deceased, was cross-examined by the defence, they put
the suggestion to her that the deceased was having a love affair
with a student from her college and her parents had sent her
to Belgaum to ensure that the said love affair failed. The          D
deceased had become desperate at Belgaum and had taken
poison and died. If this be the stand of the accused, then there
was no occasion for the accused to deny every material piece
of evidence as well as not to give any explanation when the
accused were specifically asked for. The purpose of a               E
statement under Section 313 Cr.PC is to put to the accused
the material evidence appearing in the case against him as well
as to provide him an opportunity to explain his conduct or his
version of the case. This Court in the case of Asraf Ali v. State
of Assam [(2008) 16 SCC 328] has observed as follows :              F
           "21. Section 313 of the Code casts a duty on the
    court to put in an enquiry or trial questions to the accused
    for the purpose of enabling him to explain any of the
    circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. It
                                                                    G
    follows as a necessary corollary therefrom that each
    material circumstance appearing in the evidence against
    the accused is required to be put to him specifically,
    distinctly and separately and failure to do so amounts to a
    serious irregularity vitiating trial, if it is shown that the
    accused was prejudiced.                                         H
    890      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A                 22. The object of Section 313 of the Code is to
          establish a direct dialogue between the court and the
          accused. If a point in the evidence is important against the
          accused, and the conviction is intended to be based upon
          it, it is right and proper that the accused should be
8         questioned about the matter and be given an opportunity
          of explaining it. Where no specific question has been put
          by the trial court on an inculpatory material in the
          prosecution evidence, it would vitiate the trial. Of course,
          all these are subject to rider whether they have caused
c         miscarriage of justice or prejudice. This Court also
          expressed a similar view in S. Harnam Singh v. State
          (Delhi Admn.) while dealing with Section 342 of the
          Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (corresponding to Section
          313 of the Code). Non-indication of inculpatory material in
          its relevant facts by the trial court to the accused adds to
D
          the vulnerability of the prosecution case. Recording of a
          statement of the accused under Section 313 is not a
          purposeless exercise."
       18. Again, in its recent judgment in Manu Sao v. State of
E Bihar [(2010) 12 SCC 31 O], a Bench of this Court to which one
  of us, Swatanter Kumar, J., was a member, has reiterated the
  above-stated view as under :
          "12. Let us examine the essential features of this Section
          313 CrPC and the principles of law as enunciated by
F         judgments, which are the guiding factors for proper
          application and consequences which shall flow from the
          provisions of Section 313 of the Code.
          13. As already noticed, the object of recording the
          statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code
G
          is to put all incriminating evidence against the accused so
          as to provide him an opportunity to explain such
          incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the
          evidence· of the prosecution. At the same time, also to
          permit him to put forward his own version or reasons, if
H
          he so chooses, in relation to his involvement or otherwise
     NAGESH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                          891
         [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
 in the crime. The court has been empowered to examine             A
the accused but only after the prosecution evidence has
 been concluded. It is a mandatory obligation upon the court
and besides ensuring the compliance therewith the court
 has to keep in mind that the accused gets a fair chance
to explain his conduct. The option lies with the accused to        8
maintain silence coupled with simpliciter denial or in the
alternative to explain his version and reasons for his
alleged involvement in the commission of crime. This is
the statement which the accused makes without fear or
right of the other party to cross-examine him. However, if         c
the statements made are false, the court is entitled to draw
adverse inferences and pass consequential orders, as
may be called for, in accordance with law. The primary
purpose is to establish a direct dialogue between the court
and the accused and to put to the accused every important
                                                                   0
incriminating piece of evidence and grant him an
opportunity to answer and explain. Once such a statement
is recorded, the next question that has to be considered
by the court is to what extent and consequences such
statement can be used during the enquiry and the trial. Over       E
the period of time, the courts have explained this concept
and now it has attained, more or less, certainty in the field
of criminal jurisprudence.
14. The statement of the accused can be used to test the
veracity of the exculpatory nature of the admission, if any,       F
made by the accused. It can be taken into consideration
in any enquiry or trial but still it is not strictly evidence in
the case. The provisions of Section 313(4) explicitly
provides that the answers given by the accused may be
taken into consideration in such enquiry or trial and put in       G
evidence against the accused in any other enquiry or trial
for any other offence for which such answers may tend to
show he has committed. In other words, the use is
permissible as per the provisions of the Code but has its
own limitations. The courts may rely on a portion of the
                                                                   H
    892       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2012] 5 S.C.R.


A         statement of the accused and find him guilty in
          consideration of the other evidence against him led by the
          prosecution, however, such statements made under this
          section should not be considered in isolation but in
          conjunction with evidence adduced by the prosecution."
B       19. It is also possible and permissible that an accused may
  remain silent but in that circumstance and with reference to the
  facts and circumstances of a given case, the Court may be
  justified in drawing an adverse inference against the accused.
  PWS, Smt. Pushpa, is another vital witness who had seen the
C deceased when she was brought to the Ambassador car and,
  according to her, lips of the deceased were blackish and her
  neck had black marks on two sides and when she enquired
  about her from the accused, she was told that the deceased
  had taken poison. The statements of PW1, PW4 and PW9
D read with the statement of this witness, establish the facts which
  form the very basis of the case of the prosecution and they have
  been proved in accordance with law. The trend of cross-
  examination on behalf of the accused implies admission of the
   death of the deceased having taken place in the premise~ in
E question by taking poison, however, the accused have failed
   to offer any explanation therefor which was least expected of
   him.
      20. Lastly, we may also notice the contention of the
  appellant that learned courts below have not appreciated the
F evidence in its proper perspective and in accordance with law.
  The findings are based upon surmises and conjectures.
  Resultantly, the findings are incorrect in law and unsustainable.
       21. When the evidence is legally admissible and has been
G appreciated by the Courts in its correct perspective then merely
  because another view is possible, this Court, in exercise of its
  powers under Article 136 of the Constitution, would be very
  reluctant to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts
  below. Of course, there are excpetions but they are very limited
H ones. Where upon careful appreciation of evidence, this Court
          NAGESH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                          893
              [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

finds that the courts below have departed from the rule of             A
prudence while appreciating the evidence in a case or the
findings are palpably erroneous and are opposed to law or the
settled judicial dictums, then the Court may interfere with the
concurrent findings. Still, it is not possible to exhaustively state
the principles or the kind of cases in which the Court would be        B
justified in disturbing the concurrent findings. It will always
depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case.
     22. While noticing the caution expressed by Baron
Alderson with regard to the possibility of our minds getting
swayed by the tragic facts of the case and our assessment of           C
the case being influenced by the preconceived notions, the
Court in the case of Mousam Singha Roy & Ors. v. State of
WB. [(2003) 12 SCC 377 held as under:
     "Appropos what was observed by this Court in the case             0
     of Hanumant Govind (supra), it will be useful to note the
     warning addressed by Baron Alderson to the jury in Reg.
     V. Hodge 1838 2 Lewin 227 which is also quoted with
     approval by this Court in the case of Hanumant Govind
     (supra) :
                                                                       E
            'The mind was apt to take a pleasure in adapting
            circumstances to one another, and even in straining
            them a little, if need be, to force them to form parts
            of one connected whole; and the more ingenious
            the mind of the individual, the more likely was it         F
            considering such matters, to overreach and mislead
            itself, to supply some little link that is wanting, to
            take for granted some fact consistent with its
            previous theories and necessary to render them
            complete."                                                 G
      23. In view of the above factual matrix and upon
appreciation of evidence, the Court found itself unable to concur
with the findings recorded by the courts below. It was primarily
for the reason that the courts had departed from the Rule of
Prudence in appreciation of evidence. In the present case, the         H
    894       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012) 5 S.C.R.

A evidence is admissible evidence and has been appreciated in
  consonance with the rules of prudence and law. These findings
  can neither be termed a3 perverse or so improper that no
  person of common prudence can arrive at that conclusion. In
  light of the above noted principles of appreciation of evidence,
B we would not interfere merely because it is possible to take
  another vie on the same evidence.
          24. Before we close our judgment, we will be failing in our
    duty if we do not direct the Director General of Police/
    Commissioner of Police, Karnataka to take disciplinary action
C   against the police officers/officials at Belgaum, whether in
    service or not, who were present at the place of occurrence
    when Ms. Nagaratna was brought from her room downstairs
    where the car was parked, and failed to take appropriate action
    and register the case despite the fact that it was openly stated
D   that Ms. Nagratna had consumed poison. Further, we direct
    disciplinary action to be taken against the police officers/
    officials, whether in service or not, at village Gokarna who were
    present when the body of the deceased was cremated and they
    failed to take charge of the dead body and proceed in
E   accordance with law, it being an unnatural death. They did not
    discharge their public duty and mandatory obligations under the
    provisions of the Police Manual and the Code of Criminal
    Procedures. We further direct that the Director General of
    Police shall view the matter seriously and ensure completion
F   of the disciplinary proceedings within six months from the date
    of this order.
         25. In view of the above discussion we find no substance
    in the submissions made on behalf of the accused-appellant.
    They merit rejection and are hereby rejected accordingly.
G
           26. We find no merit in the present appeal, the same is
    dismissed accordingly.

    D.G.                                         Appeal dismissed.

H