NAGBHAI NAJBHAI KHACKARversusSTATE OF GUJARAT

                     [2010] 11 S.C.R. 414


A                 NAGBHAI NAJBHAI KHACKAR
                                  v.
                        STATE OF GUJARAT
                  (Civil Appeal No. 7519 of 2010)
                       SEPTEMBER 9, 2010
B
           [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI, K.S. PANICKER
      RADHAKRISHNAN AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.]

        Land Ceiling - Gujarat Agricultural Lar:ids Ceiling Act,
C  1960 (as amended by Act 2of1974)- ss.2(1), 2(6), 2(17) and
  5 - "Bid lands" held by the appellants claimed as uncultivable
  waste lands - Whether such "bid lands" were required to be
  taken into consideration for the purpose of land ceiling under
  the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960, as amended
D by Act 2 of 1974 - Held: The definition of "land" under the
  1960 Act was specifically amended by the Amendment Act
  2 of 1974 to include "bid lands'; without limiting the same to
  cultivable bid lands - This specific intention of the Legislature
  must be given its full meaning - Moreover, the subject lands
E survived acquisition under the 1952 Act only because they
  were "bid lands" which by definition under that Act were
  treated as lands being used by the Girasdars for grazing cattle
  - Under the Ceiling Act, s.2(1) defines the use of land for the
  purpose of grazing cattle as an agricultural purpose - Thus,
F "bid lands" fall under s.2(1) of the Ceiling Act - Saurashtra
  Estates Acquisition Act, 1952.

      In the instant appeals, the question for consideration
  before the Court was: whether the bid lands held by the
  appellants were required to be taken into considera~ion
G for the purpose of land ceiling under the Gujarat
  Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960, as amended by Act
  2 of 1974, which came into force from 1.4.1976.


H                                414
    NAGBHAI NAJBHAI KHACKAR v. STATE OF               415
                 GUJARAT
    Dismissing the appeals, the Court                         A
     HELD:1.1. The argument made by the appellants,
that the legislative intent behind enacting clause (e) of
Explanation I to Section 2(6) of the Gujarat Agricultural
Lands Ceiling Act, 1960 was to include only cultivable        8
lands in the definition of "dry crop lands" as the ultimate
object of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960
is to fix a ceiling on lands held for agricultural purpose
and consequently "bid lands" which are uncultivable
waste lands cannot be included in Explanation l(e), has
no merit. The definition of "land" under the 1960 Act was     C
specifically amended by the Gujarat Agricultural Lands
Ceiling Amendment Act 2 of 1974 to include "bid lands"
of Girasdars or Barkhalidars in Section 2(17)(ii)(c) of the
1960 Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
Amending Act also makes it clear that there was a             D
specific legislative intent of including "bid lands" of
Girasdars or Barkhalidars within the definition of "land".
This inclusion does not make any distinction between
cultivable and uncultivable bid lands. The insertion of bid
lands in Section 2(17) is without any such qualification.     E
Therefore, this specific intent of the Legislature must be
given its full meaning. [Para 9) [428-E-H; 429-A-B]

    1.2. If the argument of the appellants is to be
accepted, it would defeat the very purpose of the 1960        F
Act because in that event a holder could hold lands to
an unlimited extent by including waste lands in drought-
prone areas, hill areas and waste lands within their
holdings. Moreover, the subject lands survived
acquisition under the Saurashtra Estates Acquisition Act,     G
1952 only because they were "bid lands" which by
definition under those Acts were treated as lands being
used by the Girasdars for grazing cattle. Now, under the
present Ceiling Act, Section 2(1) defines the use of land
          •'

                                                              H
    416    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010] 11 S.C.R.


A for the purpose of grazing cattle as an agricultural
  purpose. Thus, "bid lands" fall under Section 2(1) of the
  Ceiling Act. This is one more reason for coming to the
  conclusion that the Ceiling Act as amended applies to
  "bid lands". Under Section 5(1) of the 1952 Act all lands
B saved from acquisition had to be "bid lands" which by
  definition under Section 2(a) of the 1952 Act were the
  lands being used by a Girasdar or a Barkhalidar for
  grazing cattle or for cutting grass. If the lands in question
  were put to any other use, they were liable to acquisition
c under Section 5(2). Because the subject lands were used
  for grazing cattle, they got saved under the 1952 Act a,nd,
  therefore, it is now not open to the appellants to contend
  that the subject lands are not capable of being used for
  agricultural purpose. [Para 9] [429-B-G]
D      1.3. The definition of the words "dry crop land" in
  Explanation l(e) has two parts, namely, (i) "land other than
  the land specified in paragraphs (a) to (c)" and (ii) "grass
  land". Thus, the first part includes all lands other than
  those specified in paragraphs (a) to (c). Therefore, once
E the subject land falls in the first part of definition of the
  word "dry crop land" which land comes under Section
  2(17) and which falls outside paragraphs (a) to (c) then
  such lands would fall within the definition of the words
  "dry crop land". Further, there are two reasons why
F "grass land" stood separately defined in Explanation l(e).
  Firstly, under the proviso to Section 5, which is also
  inserted by the Amending Act, a distinction is made
  between "grass lands" included within "dry crop land"
  and "grass lands" falling in the desert or hill areas of
G drought-prone areas for fixing the ceiling of dry crop land
  in those areas. Secondly, under clause (f) to Explanation
  I, "grass land" and not all "dry crop land" is deemed to
  be rice land in certain situations. The proviso to Section
  5 itself makes it clear that by the Amending Act of 1974
H
     NAGBHAI NAJBHAI KHACKAR v. STATE OF                   417
                  GUJARAT
the Legislature was placing a ceiling even on desert and           A
hill areas. The proviso inter alia states that the ceiling limit
with reference to "dry crop land" shall be 12 % per cent
more than that specified in the Schedule which makes it
clear that the Legislature intended to include even desert
and hills in drought-prone areas within the definition of          B
"dry crop land". Once such lands are used for grazing
of cattle, Section 2(1) of the Ceiling Act would kick in and
consequently the "bid lands" would stand covered by the
Ceiling Act. The definition of "dry crop !and" under
Section 2(6) is relevant for the purpose of ascertaining           c
the extent of ceiling limit under Schedule I. The subject
lands got saved from acquisition under the 1952 Act only
because the appellants were the holders of "bid lands"
which were put to use for grazing of cattle or cutting of
grass. It is these very lands which are now sought to be           0
covered by the 1960 Act, as amended. (Para 10] (429-H;
430-A-G]

     1.4. The argument of the appellants that the
Legislature unwittingly through over-sight left out the
word "includes" in the definition of "dry crop land" in            E
Explanation l(e) has no merit. Section 2(6) of the Pre-1974
Act which defined "class of land", covered four items,
namely, perennially irrigated land, seasonally irrigated
land, dry crop land and rice land, whereas under the Post-
1974 Act, rice land has been deleted from the "class of            F
land". Under the Pre-1974 Act, "dry crop land" was
defined by clause (e) of Explanation to mean "land other
than perennially or seasonally irrigated or dry crop land
or rice land" and it included "grass land", whereas under
the Post-1974 Act, not only the word "includes" but even           G
the words "rice land". do not find place in the definition
of "dry crop land" in clause (e) of Explanation I. Clause
(d) and clause (e) of the Post-1974 Act are drastically
different from the structure of the said clauses in the Pre-
1974 Act. [Para 11] [431-A-C-H]                                    H
    418      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010] 11 S.C.R.


A        l.R. Coelho (Dead) by Lrs. v. State of Tamil Nadu 2007
    (2) SCC 1 and Krishnadas Vithaldas Sanjanwala v. The State
    of Gujarat and Ors. (1966) 7 GLR 244, referred to.

                           Case Law Reference:
B         2001 (2) sec 1          referred to          Para 3
          (1966) 7 GLR 244        referred to          Para 11

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    7519 of 2010.
c
         From the Judgment & Order dated 17.02.2004 of the
    High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Special Civil
    Application No. 1145 of 1991.

                                WITH
D
        C.A. Nos. 7520, 7521, 7522, 7523, 7524, 7525, 7526,
    7527, 7528, 7529, 7530, 7531, 7532, 7533, 7534, 7535,
    7536, 7537, 7538, 7539, 7540 of 2010.

E       R.F. Nariman, J.R. Nanavati, P.V. Hathi, Anip Sachthey,
    Huzefa Ahmadi, Mohit Paul, Shagun Matta, Sherin Daniel,
    Pradhuman Govil, Avinash Thakkar for the Appellant.

         Preetesh Kapur, Hemantika Wahi, Jesal, Renuka Sahu
    for the Respondent.
F
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          S. H. KAPADIA, CJI. 1. Leave granted.

       2. A short question which arises for determination in this
G batch of cases is whether bid lands were required to be
  taken into consideration for the purpose of land ceiling under
  the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960, as amended
  vide Act 2 of 1974, which came into force from 1.4.1976.

H
    NAGBHAI NAJBHAI KHACKAR v. STATE OF                    419
         GUJARAT [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
      3. At the outset, we may state that writ petitions were     A
filed in the High Court inter alia challenging the provisions
of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Amendment Act 2
of 1974 as violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution.
We may state that Amending Act 2 of 1974 has been
included as Item No. 71 in the Ninth Schedule to the              B
Constitution of India by the Constitution Thirty-fourth
Amendment Act. That inclusion was challenged before the
Constitution Bench of this Court on the ground that Thirty-
fourth Amendment to the Constitution violated the basic
structure of the Constitution which challenge has now been        c
given up in view of the judgment of this Court in the case
of l.R. Coelho (Dead) by Lrs. v. State of Tamil Nadu
reported in 2007 (2) sec 1.

     4. As regards the question of includability of the bid
lands in the lands ceiling is concerned, the case of the          D
appellant(s) before us was, that bid lands held by the
appellant(s) being uncultivable waste lands; being rocky and
stony were not included in the definition of "land" in the 1960
Act as originally enacted; that "bid lands" held by the
appellant(s) were sought to be included in the total holding      E
of the appellant(s) to determine the ceiling under the 1960
Act only by reason of Amendment Act 2 of 1974. At this
stage, it may be noted that the said Amendment Act 2 of
1974, which came into force from 1.4.1976, was challenged
only for the reason that under Section 5(1 )(a) of Saurashtra     F
Estates Acquisition Act, 1952 ("1952 Act" for short) no bid
lands which were uncultivable waste vested in the State
Government, which bid lands are now sought to be covered
by 1960 Act on account of the impugned Amendment Act 2
of 1974. According to the appellant(s), once such "bid lands"     G
stood excluded from vesting under the 1952 Act, the same
could not be included for calculating the total holding to
determine the ceiling limit under the 1960 Act, as amended.
It was contended on behalf of the appellant(s) that bid lands
                                                                  H
    420     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 11 S.C.R.


A which were also uncultivable waste lands cannot be included
  for computing the total holding under the 1960 Act, as
  amended, as the object of the Ceiling Act was to impose
  ceiling on lands held for cultivation or agricultural purposes.
  It was further submitted on behalf of the appellant(s) that bid
B lands cannot fall within the definition of dry crop land in
  clause (e) of Explanation I to Section 2(6) as only "grass
  lands" which abound in grass grown naturally and which are
  capable of being used for agricultural purposes could be
  included in such definition of "dry crop" land and since the
c "bid lands" did not fall in any "class of land" under Section
  2(6), such land could not be included for calculating the
  ceiling limit under Section 6 of the 1960 Act, as amended.
  In this connection, Shri R.F. Nariman, learned senior counsel
  appearing on behalf of the appellant(s), submitted that the
0 Act of 1960 (Unamended) was a useful guide in interpreting
  the definition of "dry crop land" under the Act. According to
  the learned counsel, the simple meaning of the said definition
  made it clear that "dry crop land" has been defined to include
  "grass land", that is to say, land which abounds in grass
  grown naturally and which is capable of being used for
E agricultural purposes. According to the learned counsel,
  unwittingly, the word "includes" occurring in the unamended
  definition of 'dry crop land' was left out of the amended
  definition. Such omission, according to the learned counsel,
  can always be supplied· by the Court. Since, the lands
F specified in paras (a) to (c), to wit, perennially irrigated land,
  seasonally irrigated land and superior dry crop land are all
  lands on which agricultural operations are capable of being
  performed the expression "other than the land specified in
  paras (a) to (c)" obviously refers to lands other than those
G stated in paras (a) to (c) but which are capable of being
  used for agricultural purposes. According to the learned
  counsel, the appellant(s) had specifically pleaded that their
  lands were barren, rocky and uncultivable but the Authorities
  proceeded on the basis that the said fact was irrelevant in
H
     NAGBHAI NAJBHAI KHACKAR v. STATE OF                   421
          GUJARAT [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
view of the definition of the word "land" under Section 2(17)      A
of the 1960 Act. According to the learned counsel, even as
per the revenue records, the subject lands have been
described as "Pot Kharaba" i.e. waste lands, barren lands
or uncultivable lands and, consequently, the same cannot fall
within the definition of dry crop land under Section 2(6)(iv).     B
According to the learned counsel, the said Act had to be
interpreted in the context of agricultural land ceiling and in
the context of the said 1960 Act being part of agrarian
reforms and unless lands were capable of being used for
agricultural purposes, the bid lands which were also               c
uncultivable waste lands cannot fall within the ambit of the
1960 Act. According to the learned counsel, the impugned
judgment of the High Court was erroneous as it has placed
interpretation on the proviso to Section 5( 1) and so read the
High Court has held that even desert and hilly areas where         D
no cultivation is possible can be subjected to ceiling.
According to the learned counsel, Section 5 states that lands
in deserts or hilly areas must first be dry crop lands as
defined under Explanation l(e) after which such lands falling
in a desert or hill may be accorded a larger ceiling area by
                                                                   E
the State Government. In any event, according to the learned
counsel, Section 5(1) proviso has no bearing on the definition
of dry crop land except to the extent that the dry crop land
may also fall in hilly or desert areas; example, hilly or desert
areas which abounds in grass and which are capable of
being used for agricultural purposes. Consequently, hilly or       F
desert areas which do not abound in grass or which are
incapable of being used for agricultural purposes are not
covered by the Ceiling Act, 1960. Thus, according to the
learned counsel, bid lands are excluded from the definition
of dry crop land and they do not fall within any of the            G
categories of classes of land under the Act and, therefore,
cannot be subjected to ceiling under the 1960 Act.

    5. Shri Preetesh Kapur, learned counsel appearing on
                                                                   H
   422      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 11 S.C.R.

A behalf of the State of Gujarat, submitted that it has been the
  admitted case of the appellant(s) all through the proceedings
  that the lands in question were in fact bid lands; that, only
  argument raised before the Tribunal as well as the High
  Court, besides the constitutional challenge, was two-fold; (i)
B that the subject lands were not fit for "agriculture" and since
  the 1960 Act is an agricultural ceiling Act, the subject lands
  had to be excluded from the purview of the Act; (ii) that, the
  definition of "dry crop land" did not specifically cover bid
  lands and must be construed to cover only such bid lands
c as "abound in grass" and, therefore, the lands in question
  stood outside the Ceiling Act. According to the learned
  counsel, the definition of "land" stood specifically amended
  by the Amendment Act (No. 2 of 1974) to include "bid lands"
  of Girasdars and Barkhalidars in Section 2(17)(ii)(c).
  According to the learned counsel, the Statement of Objects
0
  and Reasons for enacting the Amending Act also made it
  clear that the Amendment Act stood enacted for including the
  bid lands of Girasdars and Barkhalidars within the definition
  of "land". Therefore, according to the learned counsel once
  the definition of "land" stood specifically amended to include
E "bid lands", without limiting the same to cultivable bid lands,
  the specific intention of the Legislature must be given its full
  meaning. By the said Amending Act No. 2 of 1974,
  according to the learned counsel, a proviso was also
  inserted after Section 5 which increased the ceiling limit in
F respect of "desert" and hilly areas by 12 Y2 per cent which
  indicates that even deserts and hilly areas have been sought
  to be brought within the ambit of the Agricultural Ceiling Act.
  Therefore, the said proviso negates the contentions of the
  appellant(s) that only such bid lands which were "capable of
G agriculture" or which abound in grass alone were meant to
  be covered under the Act. It was further submitted that the
  lands in question are in fact "agricultural" lands. They survived
  acquisition under the earlier three Acts only because they
  were "bid lands" which by definition under those Acts were
H
    NAGBHAI NAJBHAI KHACKAR v. STATE OF                    423
         GUJARAT [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
lands "being used" by Girasdars/Barkhalidars for grazing          A
cattle. That, under the Ceiling Act, Section 2(1) defines the
use of land for the purposes of grazing cattle as agricultural
purpose and thus, according to the learned counsel, by their
very definition "bid lands" are capable of being used for
agricultural purpose, namely, grazing cattle. On the question     B
of classification of lands, learned counsel submitted that
Sections 4 and 5 of the 1960 Act expressly made two-fold
division by dividing the State into local areas as well as
classes of lands. For the ceiling area in Schedule I, the land
had to fall under one of the classes, namely, perennially         c
irrigated land, seasonally irrigated land, superior dry crop
land and dry crop land which have been defined in
Explanation I to Section 2(6) of the Act. Learned counsel
submitted that there is no merit in the argument of the
appellant(s) that "bid land" is not specified in the class of
                                                                  0
lands under Section 2(6) and that even if bid lands were
included in "dry crop land" it must be only such bid lands
which "abound in grass" which would fall under the 1960 Act.
According to the learned counsel the argument of the
appellant(s) is fallacious as it overlooks the specific
legislative intent. In this connection, learned counsel           E
submitted that from a bare reading of the definition of "dry
crop lands" in Explanation l(e) it was clear that the said
definition stood in two parts, namely, (i) "land other than the
land specified in paragraphs (a) to (c) and" (ii) "grass land".
Thus, according to the learned counsel, the first part of the     F
definition included all lands other than those specified in
paragraphs (a) to (c) provided they fall under the definition
of land under Section 2(17). According to the learned
counsel, the reason why "grass land" had to be separately
defined in clause (e) was because under the proviso to            G
Section 5 a further distinction was made between grass land
included within "dry crop land" and other barren/desert/
drought-prone areas which also fell within "dry crop land".
Further, according to the learned counsel, under clause (f)
to the said Explanation under Section 2(6), "grass land" and      H
    424      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [201 O] 11 S.C.R.


A not all "dry crop lands" were deemed to be rice lands in
  certain situations which also necessitated a separate
  definition of grass lands. Finally, learned counsel submitted
  that once bid lands fall within the ambit of the Agricultural
  Ceiling Act by virtue of the specific inclusion of all bid lands
B in Section 2(17), the ambit of inclusion should not be read
  down by reference to the classification under Section 2(6)
  of the 1960 Act.

      6. For deciding this matter, we quote hereinbelow
  Section 2(6) of 1960 Act (unamended) in juxtaposition with
C the 1960 Act (as amended by the Amending Act 2 of 1974):

          "Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act. 1960

    Unamended Act (Pre -            Amended Act (Post - 1974)
D   1974)                           (Inserted by Guj. 2 of 1974)

    2. Definitions- In this Act, 2. Definitions- In this Act,
    unless the context requires unless the context requires
    otherwise-                   otherwise-

E   (6) "class of land" means (6)"c/ass of land" means any
    any of the foilowing classes of the following classes of
    of land, that is to say :-   land, that is to say:-
    (i) perennially irrigated land; (i) perennially irrigated land;
F   (ii) seasonally irrigated land; (ii) seasonally irrigated land;
    (iii) dry crop land;            (iii) superior dry crop land;
    (iv) rice land;                 (iv) dry crop land;
    Explanation-For the             Explanation I-For the purpose
    purpose of this Act-            of this Act -
G
    (d) rice land means rice land (d) "rice land" means land
    situated in a local area which is situated in a local
    where the average rainfall is area where the average
    not less than 35 inches a rainfall is not less than 89
H   year, such average being centimeters a year such
     NAGBHAI NAJBHAI KHACKAR v. STATE OF                     425
          GUJARAT [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]

calculated on the basis of average being calculated on             A
the rainfall in that area the basis of rainfall in that area
during the five years during the five years
immediately preceding the immediately preceding the
year 1959 but does not year 1959 and which is used
include perennially or for the cultivation of rice or              B
seasonally irrigated land which, in the opinion of the
used for the cultivation of State Government, is fit for
rice;                       the cultivation of rice but
                            does not include perennial or
                            seasonally irrigated land used         c
                            for the cultivation of rice;



(e) "dry crop land" means (e) "dry crop land" means land
land other than perennially or other than the land specified in    D
seasonally irrigated or rice paragraphs (a) to (c) and
land and includes grass grass land, that is to say,
land, that is to say, land land which abounds in grass
which abounds in grass grown naturally and which is
grown naturally and which is capable of being used for             E
capable of being used for agricultural purposes;
agricultural purposes;

(f) grass land referred to in (f) "grass land" referred to in
paragraph        (e)      shall, paragraph         (e)    shall,
                                                                   F
notwithstanding anything         notwithstanding       anything
contained in that paragraph, contained in that paragraph,
be deemed to be rice land, be deemed to be rice land if
if, is it situated in a local it is situated in a local area
area referred to in clause (d) referred to in paragraph (d)        G
and in the opinion of the and in the opinion of the State
State Government it is fit for Government it is fit for the
the cultivation of rice."        cultivation of rice;"


                                                                   H
    426      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 11 S.C.R.

A
          7. We also quote hereinbelow the relevant provisions of
    Section 2(17) of the 1960 Act (Post-1974) which reads as
    follows:

          "2(17) "land" means-
B
          (i) in relation to any period prior to the specified date,
          land which is used or capable of being used fur
          agricultural purpose and includes the sites of farm
          buildings appurtenant to such land;
c         (ii) in relation to any other period, land which is used
          or capable of being used for agricultural purposes, and
          includes -

          (b) the lands on which grass grows naturally;
D
          (c) the bid lands held by the Girasdars or Barkhalidars
          under the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951 (Sau. Act
          XXV of 1951), the Sau~ashtra Barkhali Abolition Act,
          1951 (Sau. Act XXVI of 1951), or the Saurashtra
          Estates Acquisition Act, 1952 (Sau. Act Ill of 1952), as
E         the case may be."

        8. We also quote hereinbelow Section 5 of the 1960 Act
    (Post-1974) with the proviso which was not there prior to the
    amendment:
F
          "5. - Ceiling areas

          (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3),
          in relation to each class of local area as specified in
          Schedule I, the ceiling area with reference to each class
G         of land shall be as specified in the said schedule
          against the respective class of local area;

                Provided that in areas which in the opinion of the
          State Government are desert or hill areas of drought-
H         prone areas and which are specified by the State
NAGBHAI NAJBHAI KHACKAR v. STATE OF                        427
     GUJARAT [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
Government from time to time, by notification in the               A
Official Gazette, as such areas, the ceiling area with
reference to dry crop land shall be such area as is
twelve and a half percent more than the ceiling area as
specified with reference to dry crops land against the
class of local area in which the said areas fall, provided         B
however that such ceiling area shall in no case exceed
an area of 21.85 hectares (54 acres), and for the
purpose of determining whether any area is a desert or
hill area or a drought-prone area, regard shall be had
to the soil classification of the land, the climate and            c
rainfall of the area, the extent of irrigation facilities in the
area, the average yield of crop and the agricultural
resources of the area, the general economic conditions
prevalent therein and such other factors.

(2) Where a person holds land consisting of different              D
classes in the same class of local area, then for
determining the question whether the total land held by
him is less than, equal to, or more than, the ceiling area,
the acreage of each class of land held by such person
shall be converted into the acreage of dry crop land on            E
the basis of the proportion which the ceiling area for the
class of land to be so converted bears to the ceiling
area for dry crop land.

(3) Where a person holds, lands, whether consisting of             F
different classes of land or not, in different classes of
local areas, the question whether the total land held by
him is less than, equal to, or more than, the ceiling area,
shall be determined as follows, that is to say-

(i) the acreage of each class of land held by the person           G
in each class of local area shall be first converted into
the acreage of dry crop land in that local area in
accordance with sub-section· (2) and the total acreage
so arrived at shall be expressed in terms of a multiple
                                                                   H
    428       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 11 S.C.R.


A         or, as the case may be, fraction of such ceiling area;

          (ii) the multiple or fraction so expressed in the case of
          each of the local areas shall be added together:

          (iii) the person shall be deemed to hold land less than
B         equal to, or more than, the ceiling area according as the
          sum total of the multiples and fractions under clause (ii)
          is less than equal to, or more than one"

                                              (emphasis supplied)
c         9. The short question which is inborn in this batch of
    cases concerns applicability of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands
    Ceiling Amendment Act, 1972 which came into force w.e.f.
    1.4.1976 to the "bid lands". It is the case of the appellants
    before us that the "bid lands" of the appellants do not fall
D   within the definition of "dry crop land" under Explanation l(e)
    to Section 2(6) of the 1960 Act principally because the said
    definition under the unamended Act included grass lands, that
    is to say, lands which "abounds in grass grown naturally and
    which is capable of being used for agricultural purposes".
E   According to the appellants, in the amended Act, through
    over-sight, the word "includes" in Explanation l(e), which
    defines "dry crop land" stood omitted and, therefore, this
    Court could always fill in the omission by reading the word
    "includes" in the said clause. According to the appellants, the
F   legislative intent behind enacting clause (e) of Explanation I
    was to include only cultivable lands in the definition of "dry
    crop lands" as the ultimate object of the 1960 Act is to fix
    a ceiling on lands held for agricultural purpose and
    consequently "bid lands" which are uncultivable waste lands
G   cannot be included in Explanation l(e). We find no merit in
    this argument. The definition of "land" is specifically amended
    by the Amendment Act 2 of 1974 to include "bid lands" of
    Girasdars or Barkhalidars in Section 2(17)(ii)(c). The
    Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amending Act
H   also makes it clear that there was a specific legislative intent
      NAGBHAI NAJBHAI KHACKAR v. STATE OF                   429
           GUJARAT [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
of including "bid lands" of Girasdars or Barkhalidars within        A
the definition of "land". This inclusion does not make any
distinction between cultivable and uncultivable bid lands. The
insertion of bid lands in Section 2(17) is without any such
qualification. Therefore, this specific intent of the Legislature
must be given its full meaning. If the argument of the              B
appellants is to be accepted, it would. defeat the very
purpose of the 1960 Act because in that event a holder
could hold lands to an unlimited extent by including waste
lands in drought-prone areas, hill areas and waste lands
within their holdings. There is one more reason for not             c
accepting the argument of the appellants. The subject lands
survived acquisition under the 1952 Act only because they
were "bid lands" which by definition under those Acts were
treated as lands being used by the Girasdars for grazing
cattle (see Section 2(a) of the 1952 Act). Now, under the           0
present Ceiling Act, Section 2(1) defines the use of land for
the purpose of grazing cattle as an agricultural purpose.
Thus, "bid lands" fall under Section 2(1) of the Ceiling Act.
This is one more reason for coming to the conclusion that
the Ceiling Act as amended applies to "bid lands". It is also
                                                                    E
important to note that under Section 5(1) of the 1952 Act all
lands saved from acquisition had to be "bid lands" which by
definition under Section 2(a) of the 1952 Act were the lands
being used by a Girasdar or a Barkhalidar for grazing cattle
or for cutting grass. If the lands in question were put to any
other use, they were liable to acquisition under Section 5(2).      F
Because the subject lands were used for grazing cattle, they
got saved under the 1952 Act and, therefore, it is now not
open to the appellants to contend that the subject lands are
not capable of being used for agricultural purpose.
                                                                    G
     10. Now, coming to the question of interpretation of the
definition of the words "dry crop land" in Explanation l(e), one
finds that the definition has two parts, namely, (i) "land other
than the land specified in paragraphs (a) to (c)" and (ii)
                                                                    H
    430     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 11 S.C.R.


A "grass land". Thus, the first part includes all lands other than
  those specified in paragraphs (a) to (c). Therefore, once the
  subject land falls in the first part of definition of the word "dry
  crop land" which land comes under Section 2(17) and which
  falls outside paragraphs (a) to (c) then such lands would fall
B within the definition of the words "dry crop land". Further,
  there are two reasons why "grass land" stood separately
  defined in Explanation l(e). Firstly, under the proviso to
  Section 5, which is also inserted by the Amending Act, a
  distinction is made between "grass lands" included within
c "dry crop land" and "grass lands" falling in the desert or hill
  areas of drought-prone areas for fixing the ceiling of dry crop
  land in those areas. Secondly, under clause (f) to Explanation
  I, "grass land" and not all "dry crop land" is deemed to be
  rice land in certain situations. The proviso to Section 5 itself
  makes it clear that by the Amending Act of 1974 the
0
  Legislature was placing a ceiling even on desert and hill
  areas. The proviso inter alia states that the ceiling limit with
  reference to "dry crop land" shall be 12 % per cent more
  than that specified in the Schedule which makes it clear that
  the Legislature intended to include even desert and hills in
E drought-prone areas within the definition of "dry crop land".
  Once such lands are used for grazing of cattle, Section 2(1)
  of the Ceiling Act would kick in and consequently the "bid
  lands" would stand covered by the Ceiling Act. The definition
  of "dry crop land" under Section 2(6) is relevant for the
F purpose of ascertaining the extent of ceiling limit under
  Schedule I. It is important to note that the subject lands got
  saved from acquisition under the 1952 Act only because the
  appellants were the holders of "bid lands" which were put to
  use for grazing of cattle or cutting of grass. It is these very
G lands which are now sought to be covered by the 1960 Act,
  as amended.

        11. We also do not find any merit in the argument
    advanced on behalf of the appellants that the Legislature
H
     NAGBHAI NAJBHAI KHACKAR v. STATE OF                    431
          GUJARAT [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
unwittingly through over-sight left out the word "includes" in      A
the definition of "dry crop land" in Explanation l(e). If one
 looks at the Pre-1974 Act under Section 2(6) which defined
 "class of land", it covered four items, namely, perennially
 irrigated land, seasonally irrigated land, dry crop land and
 rice land, whereas under the Post-1974 Act, rice land has          B
 been deleted from the "class of land". Under the Pre-1974
 Act, "dry crop land" was defined by clause (e) of Explanation
 to mean "land other than perennially or seasonally irrigated
 or dry crop land or rice land" and it included "grass land",
 whereas under Post-1974 Act, not only the word "includes"          c
 but even the words "rice land" do not find place in the
definition of "dry crop land" in clause (e) of Explanation I. One
of the reasons for this structural change is indicated by the
judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Krishnadas
 Vitha/das Sanjanwala v. The State of Gujarat and Ors.
                                                                    0
[(1966) 7 GLR 244] in which it has been laid down that
ordinarily "grass lands" would be "dry crop lands" within the
meaning of clause (e) of Explanation to Section 2(6) of Pre-
1974 Act as the definition of "dry crop land" included "grass
land", however, in a given case the Tribunal could promote
the grass land by declaring it to be a rice land falling under      E
 Section 2(6)(iv) (see Explanation l(f) to Section 2(6) of the
 Pre-1974 Act). According to the said decision, which has
 been consistently followed thereafter, "grass land" of the kind
 mentioned in clause (e) could be promoted to the category
of rice land if the Tribunal found that such grass land was         F
situated in a local area referred to in clause (d) and if in the
opinion of the State Government such land was found fit for
 cultivation of rice. Therefore, the promotion of the grass land
to the category of rice land, according to the said decision
 of the High Court, was dependent upon an objective fact            G
which was justiciable and the determination of a subjective
 fact by the State Government. Consequently, clause (d) and
 clause (e) of the Post-1974 Act are drastically different from
 the structure of the said clauses in the Pre-1974 Act. There
 is no merit, therefore, in the contention advanced on behalf       H
    432      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             · [2010] 11 S.C.R.


A   of the appellants that the Legislature had through over-sight
    omitted the word "includes" from Explanation l(e).

        12. For the afore-stated reasons, we find no merit in this
    batch of cases. Accordingly, the same are dismissed with
    no order as to costs.
8
    B.B.B.                                    Appeal dismissed.