Holding

The proviso to Section 9(3) of the Madhya Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam expressly exempts market‑yard premises from municipal property tax, and because the appellant did not contest its validity, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court order and dismissed the appeal.

Summary

The Municipal Corporation of Ratlam appealed against a High Court order that it could not levy property tax on a building and superstructure erected by the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti within a market yard located in the corporation's area. The dispute turned on the proviso to Section 9(3) of the Madhya Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972, which states that premises used for a market yard are not to be deemed within the limits of a municipal corporation for tax purposes. The Supreme Court examined the nature and effect of a statutory proviso, emphasizing that a proviso ordinarily creates an exception to the main provision and cannot be read to expand the enactment. Applying this principle, the Court held that the proviso expressly exempts the market‑yard premises from municipal property tax. Since the appellant never challenged the validity of the proviso, there was no ground to disturb the High Court’s decision, and the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the proviso to Section 9(3) of the Madhya Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972 exempts market‑yard premises from municipal property tax.
Whether the Municipal Corporation of Ratlam has jurisdiction to assess and recover property tax on the building constructed by the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti within the market yard.
Whether the legislature had competence to enact the proviso (though not raised by the appellant).

Legislation cited

Subjects

property taxmunicipal corporationstatutory interpretationprovisoexemptionMadhya PradeshKrishi Upaj Mandi Actlegislative competence

Judgment

[2008] 14 S.C.R. 419

NAGAR PALIKA NIGAM A
v.
KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 1921 of 2006)
OCTOBER 14, 2008
B
[DR.ARIJIT PASAYAT, P. SATHSIVAM AND AFTAB
ALAM JJ.]

-
-i-
Madhya Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972;
s. 9(3) and Proviso: c
Property tax - Levy of, in terms of s. 9 (3) of the Act -
Challenge to in terms of Proviso to s.9(3) -Allowed by Single
Judge of the High Court holding that appellant-Corporation
had no jurisdiction to claim property tax from the petitioner for
the building constructed on market yard - Correctness of - D
Held: Corporation did not challenge the proviso to s. 9(3) of
the Adhiniyam allowing exemption from levying of tax on such
property - Hence, no interference with the impugned order
called for.
Proviso to a Statute - Scope of - Discussed.
E

Interpretation of Statutes - Principles of construction -
Discussed.
'
The issue which arose for determination in this ap-
peal was as to whether the Corporation had jurisdiction F
---4.
and authority to assess and recover the property tax from
respondent No.1 for the buildings, superstructure con-
structed in the market yard within the area of Municipal
Corporation in terms of proviso to s.9(3) of the Madhya
Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972. G

t-- Appellant contended that there was no challenge to
the proviso appended to sub-section (3) of Section 9 of
the Madhya Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam; and
419 H
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A that the proviso casts out an exception to the provisions }-
under s.9(3) of the Act.
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The normal function of a proviso is to ex-
B cept something out of the enactment or to qualify some-
thing enacted therein which but for the proviso would be

c
within the purview of the enactment. (Para - 8) [426-A]
Mullins v. Treasurer of Survey 1880 (5) QBD 170; Shah
Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra
Yograj Sinha AIR (1961) SC 1596 and Calcutta Tramways Co.
Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta AIR (1965) SC 1728 - relied on.
+
.
1.2 When one finds a proviso to a section the natural
presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part
D of the section would have included the subject matter of
the proviso. (Para - 8) [426-8]
1.3 As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enact-
ment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the
+-
enactment and o·rdinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as
E stating a general rule. (Para - 8) [426-D]
A. N. Sehgal and Ors. v. Raje Ram Sheoram and Ors.
AIR (1991) SC 1406; Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli v.
Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and Ors. AIR (1991) SC 1538 and 1-
Kera/a State Housing Board and Ors. v. Ramapriya Hotels
F (P) Ltd. and Ors. (1994) 5 sec 672 - relied on.
West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Co.
)-
(1897 AC 647) (HL) - referred to.
Coke upon Littleton 1Sth Edition, 146 - referred to.
G
1.4 A proviso to a section cannot be used to import
into the enacting part something which is not there, but
where the enacting part is susceptible to several possible ·-4
meanings it may be controlled by the proviso. (Para - 13)
[427-C-D]
H
NAGAR PALIKA NIGAM v. KRISHI UPAJ MANDI 421
SAMIT! & ORS.

--{ Ali M. K. & Ors. v. State of Kera/a and Ors. (2003) 4 SCALE A
197 - referred to.
Re Barker, 25 Q.B.D. 285; Forbes v. Git [1922] 1 A.C.
256; Jennings v. Kelly [1940] A.C. 206 arid R. v. Taunton, St
James, 9 B. & C. 836 - referred to.
B
2.1 It is well settled principle in law that the Court
--+ ca.nnot read anything into a statutory provision which is
plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legis-
lature. The language employed in a statute is the determi-
native factor of legislative intent. (Para - 15) [427-E] c
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Mis Price
Waterhouse and Anr. AIR (1998) SC 74 - relied on.
Jamma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah and
Ors. AIR (1962) SC 847 and The State of Gujarat and Ors. v.
D
Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel and Anr. JT (1998) 2 SC 253 - re-
_J ferred to.
Crawford v. Spooner (1846 (6) Moore PC 1 - referred
to.
2.2 Statutes should not be construed as theorems E
of Euclid but words must be construed with some imagi-
nation of the purposes which lie behind them. (Para - 17)
[428-D]
Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage 218 FR 547 - re- F
~ ferred to.
'
2.3 Two principles of construction - one relating to
casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the stat-
ute as a whole - appear to be well settled. Under the first
principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the G
. Court except in the case of clear necessity and when rea-
~ son for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself
but at the same time a casus omissus should not be
readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a stat-
ute or section must be construed together and every H
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A clause of a section should be construed with reference }--
to the context and other clauses thereof so that the con-
struction to be put on a particular provision makes it a
consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be
more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads
B to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could
not have been intended by the Legislature. (Para - 20)
(429 B-D] +
Artemiou v. Procopiou (1966) 1 QB 878 and Luke v. /RC
(1966) AC 557 - referred to.
c
2.4 The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words
is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absur-
dity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest
of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and or-
D di nary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid
that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further. (Para -
22) (430 C-D]
Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat
(2004) 6 sec 672 - referred to.
E Grey v. Pearson 6 H.L. Cas. 61 and Abley v. Dale 11,
C.B. 378 - referred to.
3. Since there was no challenge at any point of time
by the appellant to the proviso to sub-section (3) of Sec-
F tion 9 on the alleged ground of lack of legislative compe-
tence, obviously the High Court could not have dealt with )-
that issue. Till now also, no such challenge has been made
by the appellant. That being so, this Court found no scope
for interference with the order passed by the High Court.
G (Para - 24) (431 A-B]
CASE LAW REFERENCE ..
"-..+
1880 (5) QBD 170 Relied on Para - 8
AIR (1961) SC 1596 Relied on Para - 8
H AIR (1965) SC 1728 Relied on Para - 8
NAGAR PALIKA NIGAM v. KRISHI UPAJ MANDI 423
SAMITI & ORS.
----!
(1897 AC 647) (HL) Referred to Para - 8 A
AIR (1991) SC 1406 Relied on Para - 8
AIR (1991) SC 1538 Relied on Para - 8
(1994) 5 sec 672 Relied on Para - 8
(2003) 4 SCALE 197 Referred to Para - 14 B
~ 25 Q.B.D. 285 Referred to Para - 12
[1922] 1 A.C. 256 Referred to Para - 10
[1940] A.C. 206 Referred to Para - 13
9 8. & c. 836 Referred to Para - 11
c
AIR (1998) SC 74 Relied on Para - 16
AIR (1962) SC 847 Referred to Para - 16
JT (1998) 2 SC 253 Referred to Para - 16
D
(1846 (6) Moore PC 1 Referred to Para - 16
218 FR 547 Referred to Para - 17
(1966) 1 QB 878 Referred to Para - 20
(1966) AC 557 Referred to Para - 20 E
(2004) 6 sec 672 Referred to Para - 23
6 H.L. Cas. 61 Referred to Para - 22
11, C.B. 378 Referred to Para - 22
"
_,,. CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1921 F
of 2006
From the final Judgment and Order dated 29.10.1998 and
14.10.2004 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh Bench at
Indore in Writ Petition No. 251 of 1995 and LPA No. 327 of
G
1999 respectively
H.K. Puri for the Appellant.
S.K. Dubey, Nandita Dubey, Vikas Upadhyay, Yogesh
Tiwari and B.S. Banthia for the Respondents.
H
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

}-
A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. A Bench of two learned
Judges being of the view that one of the questions which is
interlinked with the interpretation of Section 9(3) of Madhya
Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972 (in short the
B 'Adhiniyam') would be whether having regard to the provisions
contained in Part IXA of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short +
the 'Constitution') the Legislature of the State of M.P. had the
requisite legislative competence therefor. Respondent No.1 filed
a writ petition before the Madhya Pradesh High Court under
c Article 226 of the Constitution with basically two prayers. They
are as under:
"(1) The respondent No.1-Municipal Corporation, Ratlam
has no jurisdiction or right to claim the property tax from
the petitioner for the building and the superstructure
D
constructed in the Market Yard within the area of Municipal
Corporation, Ratlam.
(2) That the amount of Rs.70,000/- which has been
deposited by the petitioner with respondent No.1 pursuant
E to the notice and auction proceedings initiated against
the petitioner should be directed to be refunded to the
petitioner. Interest on the said amount is also being
claimed."
2. With reference to Section 9(3) of the Adhiniyam it was
F submitted that exemption had been provided on the property )_.
/
on which no property tax could be levied even if the same falls
within the area of Municipal Corporation, Municipal Council,
Notified Area, Gram Panchayat or a Special Area Development
Authority. Learned Single Judge accepted the first prayer, but
G permitted the respondent-writ petitioner to avail such remedy
as is available by filing a civil suit in respect of second prayer.
"-+
3. Review petition was filed by the present appellant which
was dismissed. A Letters Patent Appeal was also filed, which
was dismissed on the ground that the same was not maintain-
H
NAGAR PALIKA NIGAM v. KRISHI UPAJ MANDI 425
SAMITI & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

·---{ able against an order passed in the review petition. The appeal A
was also without merit.
4. The basic stand in the appeal was whether the Corpo-
ration had jurisdiction and authority to assess and recover the
property tax from respondent No.1 for the buildings, superstruc-
tu re constructed in the market yard within the area of Municipal 8
Corporation, Ratlam.
·--t;-

-
5. During the course of hearing of the appeal, learned coun-
sel for the appellant fairly accepted that there was no challenge
to the proviso appended to sub-section (3) of Section 9 of the c
Adhiniyam. It is also fairly accepted that the proviso casts out
an exception.
6. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand
submitted that in the absence of a challenge to the legality of
the proviso, there is no question of adjudicating the issue which D
the reference Bench has considered to be of importance.
-+ 7. Section 9(3) of the Adhiniyam so far as relevant reads
as under:
"(3) Nothing contained in the Madhya Pradesh Land E
Revenue Code, 1959 (No.20 of 1959), and rules made
thereunder in so far as they relate to diversion of land,
revision of land revenue consequent on the change in the
use of land from agriculture to any other purpose and other
matters incidental thereto shall apply to land acquired by F
~\ the market committee under sub-section (1) or acquired
by transfer, purchase gift or otherwise and use for the
purpose of establishment of a market yard or a sub-market
yard:
Provided that the premises used for market yard, sub- G
market yard or for the purpose of the Board shall not be
-~ deemed to be included in the limits of the Municipal
Corporation, Municipal Council, Notified Area, Gram
Panchayat or a Special Area Development Authority, as
the case may be." H

_.
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 14 S.C.R.

A 8. The normal function of a proviso is to exceptsomething )._--
out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein
which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the en-
actment. As was stated in Mullins v. Treasurer of Survey [1880
(5) QBD 170], (referred to in Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills
B and Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha (AIR
1961 SC 1596) and Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd. v. Corpora-
tion of Calcutta (AIR 1965 SC 1728); when one finds a proviso
to a section the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, +-
the enacting part of the section would have included the subject
~
c matter of the proviso. The proper function of a proviso is to ex-
cept and to deal with a case which would otherwise fall within
the general language of the main enactment and its effect is
confined to that case. It is a qualification of the preceding en- I
T
actment which is expressed in terms too general to be quite
accurate. As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment
D
to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment and
ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule.
"If the language of the enacting part of the statute does not con- -t--
tain the provisions which are said to occur in it you cannot de-
rive these provisions by implication from a proviso." Said Lord
E Watson in West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life. Assurance
Co. (1897 AC 647)(HL). Normally, a proviso does not travel
beyond the provision to which it is a proviso. It carves out an
exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as
a proviso and to no other. (See A.N. Sehgal and Ors. v. Raje
F Ram Sheoram and Ors. (AIR 1991 SC 1406), Tribhovandas
Haribhai Tamboli v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and Ors. (AIR /-
1991 SC 1538) and Kera/a State Housing Board and Ors. v.
Ramapriya Hotels (P)Ltd. and Ors. (1994 (5) SCC 672).
9. "This word (proviso) hath divers operations. Sometime
G
it worketh a qualification or limitation; sometime a condition;
and sometime a covenant" (Coke upon Littleton 18th Edition,
146) ·-1-

10. "If in a deed an earlier clause is followed by a later
H clause which destroys altogether the obligation created by the
NAGAR PALIKA NIGAM v. KRISHI UPAJ MANDI 427
SAMITI & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

~ earlier clause, the later clause is to be rejected as repugnant, A
and the earlier clause prevails .... But if the later clause does not
destroy but only qualifies the earlier, then the two are to be read
together and effect is to be given to the intention of the parties
as disclosed by the deed as a whole" (per Lord Wrenbury in
Forbes v. Git [1922] 1 A.C. 256). B
11. A statutory proviso "is something engrafted on a pre-
.-+ ceding enactment" (R. v. Taunton, St James, 9 B. & C. 836).

12. "The ordinary and proper function of a proviso coming
after a general enactment is to limit that general enactment in c
certain instances" (per Lord Esher in Re Barker, 25 Q.B.D. 285).
13. A proviso to a section cannot be used to import into
the enacting part something which is not there, but where the
enacting part is susceptible to several possible meanings it may
be controlled by the proviso (See Jennings v. Kelly [1940] A.C. D
206).
14. The above position was noted in Ali M.K. & Ors. v.
State of Kera/a and Ors~ (2003 (4) SCALE 197).
15. It is well settled principle in law that the Court cannot E
read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and un-
ambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The lan-
guage employed in a statute is the determinative factor of leg-
islative intent.

__J 16. Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental F
, references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to
ascertain the intention of the Legislature enacting it. (See Insti-
tute of Chartered Accountants of/ndia v. Mis Price Waterhouse
and Anr. (AIR 1998 SC 74)) The intention of the Legislature is
primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means G
that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to
J..; what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which
requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which
results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided.
As observed in Crawford v. Spooner (1846 (6) Moore PC 1), H
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

Courts, cannot aid the Legislatures' defective phrasing of an
)..-
A
~
Act, we cannot add or mend, and by construction make up de-
ficiencies which are left there. (See The State of Gujarat and
Ors. v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel and Anr (JT 1998 (2) SC
253)). It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into
B an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. (See Stock v.
Frank Jones (Tiptan) Ltd. (1978 1 All ER 948 (HL). Rules of
interpretation do not permit Courts to do so, unless the provi- +- ~
sion as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. Courts
are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless ' ~,

c clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the
Act itself. (Per Lord Loreburn L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim
Ltd. v. Evans (1910) AC 445 (HL), quoted in Jamma Masjid, .....
Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah and Ors. (Al R 1962 SC
847).
D 17. The question is not what may be supposed and has
been intended but what has been said. "Statutes should be con-
strued not as theorems of Euclid". Judge· Learned Hand said, t--
"but words must be construed with some imagination of the
purposes which lie behind them". (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co.
E v. Yensavage 218 FR 547). The view was re-iterated in Union
of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De
Gama (AIR 1990 SC 981).
I
18. In Dr R. Venkatchalam and Ors. etc. v. Dy Transport \

Commissioner and Ors. etc. (AIR 1977 SC 842), it was ob-
F served that Courts must avoid the danger of a priori determina- l._
/
tion of the meaning of a provision based on their own pre-con-
ceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which
the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not
entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of inter-
G pretation.
19. While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets .......~

the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused
and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legis-
lature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See
H

_l
NAGAR PALIKA NIGAM v. KRISHI UPAJ MANDI 429
SAMITI & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
--.....( Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P v. Popular Trading Com- A
pany, U1/ain (2000 (5) sec 515). The legislative casus omis-
sus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process.
20. Two principles of construction - one relating to casus
omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole
- appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus B
omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of
--f'
clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four cor-
..... ners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus
should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts
of a statute or section must be construed together and every c
clause of a section should be construed with reference to the
context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be
put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of
the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction
of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous D
results which could not have been intended by the Legislature.
-Jor "An intention to produce an unreasonable result", said
_,
Danackwerts, L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou (1966 1 QB 878),
"is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construe-
tion available". Where to apply words literally would "defeat the E
obvious intention of the legislature and produce a wholly unrea-
sonable result" we must "do some violence to the words" and
so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational con-
struction. (Per Lord Reid in Luke v. !RC (1966 AC 557) where
,, at p. 577 he also observed: "this is not a new problem, though F
_) our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges".
21 . It is then true that, "when the words of a law extend not
to an inconvenience rarely happening, but due to those which
often happen, it is good reason not to strain the words further
than they reach, by saying it is casus omissus, and that the law G
intended quae frequentius accidunt." "But," on the other hand,
j_, "it is no reason, when the words of a law do enough extend to
an inconvenience seldom happening, that they should not ex-
tend to it as well as if it happened more frequently, because it
happens but seldom" (See Fenton v. Hampton 11 Moore, P.C. H
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.
L
A 345). A casus omissus ought not to be created by interpreta- ).._.-.

tion, save in some case of strong necessity. Where, however, a
casus omissus does really occur, either through the inadvert-
ence of the legislature, or on the principle quod semel aut bis
existit proetereunt legislators, the rule is that the particular case,
B thus left unprovided for, must be disposed of according to the
law as it existed before such statute - Casus omissus et oblivioni
datus dispositioni communis juris relinquitur; "a casus omissus," ,..,..,..
observed Buller, J. in Jones v. Smart (1 T.R. 52), "can in no
case be supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make \..

c laws."

22. The golden rule for construing wills, statutes, and, in
fact, all written instruments has been thus stated: "The gram- r-
matical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to
•
unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance I
D or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case ~
the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modi-
_,...
tied, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no fur-
ther" (See Grey v. Pearson 6 H.L. Cas. 61). The latter part of
this "golden rule" must, however, be applied with much caution.
E "if," remarked Jervis, C.J., "the precise words used are plain
and unambiguous in our judgment, we are bound to construe
them in their ordinary sense, even though it lead, in our view of
the case, to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be
modified or varied where their import is doubtful or obscure.
F But we assume the functions of legislators when we depart from
the ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely be-
cause w.e see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injus-
/,;l -
tice from an adherence to their literal meaning" (See Abley v.
Dale 11, C.B. 378).
G 23. At this juncture, it would be necessary to take note of a
,,.
maxim "Ad ea quae frequentius accidunt jura adaptantur'' (The
\
laws are adapted to those cases which more frequently occur). i .... ·.•

The above position was highlighted in Maulavi Hussein
Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat (2004 (6) SCC 672).
H
NAGAR PALIKA NIGAM v. KRISHI UPAJ MANDI 431
SAMITI & ORS. [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

24. Since there was no challenge at any point of time by A
the appellant to the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 9 on
the alleged ground of lack of legislative competence, obviously
the High Court could not have dealt with that issue. Till now also,
no such challenge has been made by the appellant. That being
so, we find no scope for interference with the order passed by B
the High Court. In the circumstances indicated above, there is
no need to answer the reference made. If and when challenge
is made to the legislative competence to enact proviso to sub-
section (3) of Section 9, it goes without saying, the same shall
be considered in its proper perspective and in accordance with c
law.

25. The appeal is disposed of without any order as to
costs.
S.K.S. Appeal disposed of.
0