Holding

Under the Motor Vehicles Act, a tribunal or court may award compensation exceeding the claimed amount and may permit amendment of the claim petition, provided the award is just and based on evidence, and future medical expenses must be accounted for in the final award.

Summary

Nagappa, a poor agriculturist who lost his right leg in a road accident, claimed compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Claims Tribunal awarded a modest sum, which the Karnataka High Court later enhanced and also ordered payment for an artificial leg. Nagappa then sought to amend his claim petition to increase the claimed amount to Rs.5 lakhs, arguing that future medical expenses required a larger, possibly instalment‑based award. The Supreme Court held that the Act imposes no ceiling on compensation and allows a tribunal or court to award an amount greater than that claimed, provided it is "just" and based on the evidence. It also ruled that amendment of the claim petition is permissible at the appellate stage under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules. While the Act does not permit a fresh award after a final award, the court must consider future medical expenses at the time of the final award and may order a lump‑sum investment to meet recurring costs. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal in part, granting an additional Rs.1 lakh to be deposited and invested in a fixed deposit with interest payable annually.

Issues considered

Whether a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act can be amended to increase the claimed amount at the appellate stage.
Whether a tribunal or court may award compensation exceeding the amount claimed by the claimant.
Whether future medical expenses can be met by instalments or a recurring award under the Act.
Whether a fresh award can be passed after a final compensation award has been made.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 6 Rule 17
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988s. 158(6), s. 166(4), s. 168, s. 169

Subjects

Motor Vehicles ActCompensationAmendment of claim petitionFuture medical expensesLump‑sum awardInstalment compensationClaims TribunalCPC Order 6 Rule 17Karnataka Motor Vehicles RulesPersonal injury

Judgment

NAGAPPA A
>
GU RUDA YAL SINGH AND ORS.

DECEMBER 3, 2002

[M.B. SHAH, B.P. SINGH AND H.K. SEMA, JJ.) B

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988/Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989:

Motor accident-Injury requiring recurring medical expenses-
Compensation-Payment of in instalments for future eventualities- C
Permissibility-Held, the Act does not provide for passing further award after
final award is passed-Hence while passing final award Court should consider
future eventualities and fix compensation accordingly-Future medical
expenses can be determined only on the basis offair guess work after taking
into account increase in the cost of medical treatment. D
Sections 158(6) and 166(4)/Rule 254-Award of compensation amount
exceeding claimed amount-Permissibility of-Held, in appropriate cases,
Court may permit amendment to the claim petition-Code of Civil Procedure,
1908-0rder 6, Rule 17.
E
Appellant-a poor agriculturist met with an accident suffered injuries
including injury resulting in amputation of his right foot. He was required to
change the artificial leg once in two to three years. Appellant along with other
injured persons filed claim application for a sum ofRs.l lakh. The claims
tribunal passed an award granting compensation. Against the award appellant
preferred an appeal before High Court whereby it enhanced the compensation F
and further awarded a sum for purchase of artificial leg.

In appeal to this Court, during course of hearing, appellant filed an
application seeking permission to amend the claim petition for enhancement
of the claim to Rs.5 Iakhs.
G
Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: I.I. Under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, there is
no restriction that compensation could be awarded only up to the amount
claimed by the claimant. In an appropriate case where from the evidence H
499
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A brought on record if Tribunal/Court considers that claimant is entitled to get
more compensation than claimed, the Tribunal may pass such award. Only
embarg" is-it should be 'just' compensation, that is to say, it should be neither
arbitrary, fanciful nor unjustifiable from the evidence. Claims Tribunal in
appropriate case can treat the report forwarded to it under Section 158(6) of
B Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as an application for compensation even though no
such claim is made or no specified amount is claimed. Further, in such cases
there is no question of claim becoming time barred or it cannot be contended
that by enhancing the claim there would be change of cause of action. As
provided under.Section 166(4), even report submitted to the Claims Tribunal
under Section 158(6) can be treated as an application for compensation under
C the Motor Vehicles Act. If required, in appropriate cases, Court may permit
amendment to the Claim Petition. (508-F, G)

1.2. Rule 254 ofKarnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 inter alia makes
specific provision that Order 6 Rule 17 CPC is applicable to such
proceedings. In this view of the matter, in an appropriate case, depending upon
D the facts and the evidence and in the interest of justice, Court may permit
amendment of claim petition so as to award enhanced compensation. Further,
fQr amendment of.the pleadings, unless it causes injustice to other side or it
is not necessary for the purpose of determining real issue between the parties,
Court would grant amendment, it is also to be stated ·that under the Act there
E is no time limit prescribed for claiming compensation. Therefore, there is no
question of enhanced claim being barred by limitation. (505-G, H; 506-A)

1.3. It is for the Tribunal to determine just compensation from the
evidence which is brought on record despite the fact that claimant has not
precisely stated the amount of damages of compensation which he is entitled
F to .. If evidence on record justifies passing of such award, the claim cannot be
rejected solely on the ground that claimant has restricted his claim. Form 63
of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, which is for filing an application
for compensation, does not provide that claimant should specify ,his claim
amount. (506-D. E)

G 1.4. In case, where there is evidence on record justifying the enhanced
compensation for the medical treatment which is required because of the
injury caused to a claimant due to the accident, there is no reason why such
amendment or enhanced compensation should not be granted. In such cases,
there is no question of introducing a new or inconsistent cause of action. Cause
H of action and evidence remain the same. Only Question is-application of law
NAGAPPA v. GURUDAY AL SINGH [M.B. SHAH, J.] SOI
as it stands. A
1.5. There is no bar for the Claims Tribunal to award the compensation
in excess of what is claimed, particularly when the evidence which is broueht
on record is sufficient to pass such award. In cases where there is no evidence
on record, the Court may permit such amendment and allow to raise additional
issue and give an opportunity t.o the parties to produce relevant evidence. B
[507-D[

Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd v. Northern Indian Transport Insurance
Co., [1971) Suppl. SCR 20, relied on.

Dr. Vrmila J. Sangani v. Pragjibhai Mohan/al Luvana and Ors., AIR C
(2000) Gujarat 211; Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Anr. v.
Kisan Gangaram Hire and Ors., (1987) ACJ 311; Mui/a Md Abdul Wahib v.
Abdul Rahim and Anr., (1994) ACJ 348 and Devki Nandan Bangur and Ors.
v. State ofHaryana and Ors., (1995) ACJ 1288, referred to.
~:1·

2.1. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 does not provide for passing of further D
award after final award is passed. Therefore, in a case whether injury to a
victim requires periodical medic_31 expenses, fresh award cannot be passed or
previous award cannot be reviewed when the medical expenses are incurred
after finalisation·of the compensation proceedings. Hence, only alternative is
that at the time of passing offinal award, Tribunal/Court should consider such E
eventuality and fix compensation accordingly. No.one can suggest that it is
improper to take into account expenditure genuinely and reasonably required
to be incurred for future medical expenses. Future medical expenses required
to be incurred can be determined only on the basis of fair guess-work after
taking into account increase in the cost of medical treatment. [509-C-E]
F
2.2. Compensation to a victim of a motor vehicle accident or in case of
fatal accident to the legal representatives is awarded under two heads, namely,
special damages-which are suffered by the victim or the legal representatives
and general damages-which include compensation for pain and sufferings,
loss of amenities, earning capacit~ and prospective expenses including G
expenses for medical treatment. With regard to the first part of the damages,
that is, special damages suffered by the victim or the legal representative, it
can be easily proved on the basis of the evidence which is in possession of the
claimant. However with regard to the second part-general damages/
compensation, it would be a matter of eonjectures depending on number of
. imponderables. While calculating such damages, the Tribunal/Court is H
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20021 SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A required to have some guess work taking into account the inflation factor.
f509-H; 510-A, B, DI

Union Carbide Corporation and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., 119911
4 SCC 584; P. Satyanarayana v. I. Babu Rajendra P~·asad and Anr., (1988)
ACJ 88 A.P. and Va/iyakathodi Mohammed Koya v. Ayyappankadu
B Ramamoorthi Mohan and Ors., (1991) ACJ 140, referred to.

Lim Poh Choo v. Chamden and Islington Area Health Authority, [19791
1 All ER 332, referred to.

2.3. It cannot be held that for future medical expenses which are required
C to be incurred by a victim, fresh award could be passed. IJ?wever, for such
m,t:dical treatment, Court has to arrive at a reasonable estimate on the basis
of the evidence brought on record. In the present case, it has been pointed out
that for replacing the_artificial leg every two to three years, appellant would
be required to have some sort of operation and also change the artificial leg.
At that time, the estimated expenses for this were Rs. 18000 and the High
D Court has awarded the said amount. For change of artificial leg every two or
three years no compensation is awarded. Considering this aspect, if Rs. One
lac is awarded as an additional compensation, appellant would be in a position
to meet the said expenses from the interest of the said amount. Equally it is
true that the said amount is required to be properly invested on fong-term
E basis so that recurring medical expenses could be met. [513-C-EJ

General Manager, Kera/a State Road Transport Corporation,
Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas (Mrs.) and Ors., (1994) 2 SCC 176 and
Lilaben Udesing Gohel v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors., [1996) 3 SCC
608, relied on.
F 2.4. Additional compensation of Rs. On~e lac is awarded to the appellant.
The said amount shall be deposited by the Insurance Company with the trial
Court and the trial Court is directed to invest the said amount on long term
fixed deposit in a nearest nationalized bank in the area where the appellant is
residing with the condition that the bank will not permit any loan or advance
G and the interest on the said amount will be paid annually, directly to the
claimant till he survives. However, on an application by the appellant this
condition could be modified by the Tribunal in exceptional circumstances, if
made out by the appellant Finally after the death of appellant, the amount be
disbursed to his legal heirs on their application. [515-G, ff; 516-AJ

H CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7989 of2002.

_,
NAGAPPA ,.. GURUDA YAL SINGH [M.B. SHAH.!.] 503

From the Judgment and Order dated 28.5.1999 of the Karnataka High A
Court in M.F.A. No. 2237of1990.

Ms. Kiran Suri. for the Appellants.

S.S. Panwar for Pradyot Kumar Chakravarty, for the Respondents.
B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SHAH, J. Leave granted.

Question involved in this appeal is whether one time payment of
compensation to a poor agriculturist would be sufficient to meet the future C
medical expenses? It is true that lump-sum compensation contemplating future
eventualities can be granted but at the same time is it permissible under the
Act to grant recurring medical expenses to such a victim? Secondly, whether
amendment to the claim petition could be granted at the appellate stage?

Before we deal with this question, we would narrate a few facts. The D
appellant, a poor agriculturist, along with some other persons was travelling
in a bullock cart on 6.2.1985 which met with an a.ccident with a truck as a result
of which he suffered injuries including the injury on right foot and right ankle
exposing soft tissues and bones which was subsequently required to be
amputated. Other persons also sustained injuries and the bullock cart }Vav E
also damaged. The appellant, alongwith other injured persons, tiled claim
application bearing MVC No. 321 of 1985 before the Claims Tribunal,
Chitradurga. The Tribunal passed an awarrl dated 26.3.1990 granting a sum
of Rs. 15,000 for injury, pain and suffering, Rs. 5000 for loss of enjoyment of
life and Rs. 5000 for loss of earnings and Rs. 5000 for medical treatment,
totaling Rs. 30,000 with interest at the rate of 9 % per annum from the date F
of application. Against that award, appellant preferred MFA No. 2237/90
before the High Court of Kamataka at Bangalore. The High Court enhanced
the compensation and awarded Rs. 82,000 towards the loss of amenities of
life, loss of future earnings, pain and sufferings. Apart from this sum, it was
ordered that the appellant shall be entitled to a further sum of Rs. 18000 for
purchase of artificial leg. It has come on record that the appellant was an G
agriculturist and that according to the medical evidence, he had suffered 80
to 85 per cent permanent disability. The medical evidence further reveals that
his right leg was amputated and he was required to change the artificial leg
once in 2 to 3 years.
H
504 SUPREME COURT'REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Before we deal with the question of compensation, we would refer to
second contention which is raised in this appeal.

Amendment to the Claim Petition claiming enhanced compensation:-

At the time of hearing of this matter, learned counsel for the appellant
B has filed an application seeking permission to amend the claim petition and
for enhancement of claim to the tune of Rs.5 lacs as compensation. Before
the trial Court, the Claim was only for a,sum of Rs. one lac .
...
The learned counsel for the Insurance company contended that the
C appellant cannot be permitted to amend the claim petition and claim enhanced
compensation. As against this, learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that under the Act there is no prohibition for amending the claim petition and
in any case Order 6 Rule 17 CPC is applicable to such claim petition under
Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules. Hence, it is the discretion of the Court to
permit amendment of the claim petition in appropriate case.
D
Firstly, unde~ the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, (hereinafter
referred to as "the MV Act") there .is no restriction that compensation could
be awarded only up to the amount claimed by the claimant. In an appropriate
case where from the evidence brought on record if Tribunal/court considers
that claimant is entitled to get more compensation than claimed, the Tribunal
E may pass such award. Only embargo is it should be 'Just' compensation, that
is to say, it should be neither arbitrary, fanciful nor unjustifiable from the
evidence. This would be clear by reference to the relevant provisions of the
M.V ..Act. Section 166 pr~vides that an application for compensation arising
out of an accident involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising
F out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party
so arising, or both, could be made (a) by t)1e person who has sustained the
injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c) where death has resulted
from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased;
or (d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of
the l~gal representatives of the deceased, as the case may b.e. Under the
G proviso to sub-section (I), all the legal representatives of the deceased who
h~ve not joined as the claimants are to be impleaded as respondents to the
application for compensation. Other important part of the said Section is sub-
section (4) which provides that "the Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of
accidents forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of Section 158 as an application
H for compensation under this Act." Hence, Claims Tribunal in appropriate case
NAGAPPA v. GURUDA YAL SINGH [M.B. SHAH, J.] 505

can treat the report forwarded to it as an application for compensation even A
though no such claim is 111ade or no specified a1nount is clai1ned.

Sub-section (6) of Section 158 reads thus:

·' 158. Producfion uf certain certificales, licence and per111lt in certain
cases . . B
(6) As soon as any information regarding any accident involving
death or bodily injury to any person is recorded or report under this
section is completed by a police officer, the officer incharge of the
police sJation shall forward a copy of the same within thirty days
from the date of recording of information or, as the case may be, on C
completion of such report to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction
and a copy thereof to the concerned insurer, and where a copy is
made available to the owner, .he shal) also within thirty days of
receipt of such report,forward the same to such Claims Tribunal and
Insurer."
D
It appears that due importance is not given to sub-section (4) of Section
-1
166 which provides that the Tribunal shall treat any report of the accidents
forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of Section 158, as an application for
compensation under this Act.

Thereafter, Section 168 empowers the Claims Tribunal to "make an
E

- award determining the amount· of compensation which appears to it to be
just". Therefore, only requirement for determining the compensation is that
·it must be 'just'. There is no other limitation or restriction on its power for
awarding just compensation.
F
... Secondly, under Section 169, the Claims Tribun.al in holding any inquiry
under Section 168 is required to follow the rules that are made in this behalf
and follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. In the present case, it has
been pointed out that Rule 253 of Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, I 989
empowers the Claims Tribunal to exercise all or any of the powers vested in
a Civil Court under the. provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Rule 254 G
·inter alia makes specific provision that Order 6 Rule 17 CPC is applicable to
such proceedings. In this view of the matter, in an appropriate case, depending
upon the facts and the evidence which has been brought on record and in
the interest of justice, Court may permit amendment of claim petition so as
to award enhanced compensation. Further, for amendment of the pleadings, H
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A it is settled. law that unless it causes injustice to other side or it is not
necessary for the purpose of determining real' issue between the parties, Court
would grant amendment. It is also to be stated that under the M. V. Act there
is no time limit prescribed for claiming compensation. Therefore, there is no
question of enhanced claim being barred by limitation.

B This Court in Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd v. Northern Indian
Transport Insurance Co., [1971] Suppl. SCR 20 observed as under: -

" ................the pecuniary loss to the aggrieved party would depend
upon data which cannot be ascertained accurately but must necessarily
be an estimate or even partly a conjecture
c
The determination of the question of compensation depends on
several imponderables. In the assessment of tho~e imponderables,
there is likely to be a margin of error ............ "

Hence, as stated earlier, it is for the Tribunal to determine just
D compensation from the evidence which is brought on record despite the fact
that claimant has not precisely stated the amount of damages of compensation
which he is entitled to. If evidence on record justifies passing of such award,
the claim cannot be rejected solely on the gtound that claimant has restricted
his claim. Form 63 of the Kamataka Motor Vehicles Rules, l 9S9, 'which is for
E filing an application for compensation, does not provide that claimant should
specify his claim amount. It inter alia provides that he should mention his
monthly income as well as the nature of injury sustained and medical
certificates.

In case, where there is evidence on record justifying the enhanced
F compensation for the medical treatment which is required because of the
injury caused to a claimant due to the accident, there is no reason why such
amendment or enhanced compensation should not be granted. In such cases,
there is no question of introducing a new or inconsistent cause of action.
Cause of action and evidence remain the same. Only Question i$ application
of law as it stands.
G
Mr. P.K. Chakravarty, learned counsel appearing for the Insurance
Company, in support of his contention that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction
to award higher amount of compensation than what is claimed even though
it is not likely to cause prejudice to the Insurance Company, heavily relied
H upon the decision rendered by the Full Bench of the High Court of Gujarat
NAGAPPA v. GURUDA YAL SINGH [M.B. SHAH, J.] 507

in Dr. Urmila J. Sangani v. Pragjibhai Mohan/a/ luvana and Ors., AIR A
(2000) Gujarat 2 I I]. In that case. the High Court after considering relevant
decisions on the subject observed thus:

" ............. We may mention that when the claimant feels that he is
entitled to more compensation than what is claimed in the petition, it
is always open to him/her to amend the claim petition and ifthe same B
is in consonance with the equity, justice and good conscience, there
is no reason why the Claims Tribunal should not grant amendment.
Before compensation more than claimed is awarded, the opposite
parties should be put to notice, the requisite additional issue/issues
should be raised and the parties should be permitted to adduce their C
evidence on the additional issues, but if no such opportunity is given,
the procedure would obviously suffer from material irregularity
affecting the decision."

From the aforesaid observations it cannot be held that there is a bar for
the Claims Tribunal to award the compensation in excess of what is claimed, D
particularly when the evidence which is brought on record is sufficient to
pass such award. In cases where there is no evidence on record, the Court
may permit such amendment and allow to raise additional issue and give an
opportunity to the parties to produce relevant evidence.

In support of her contention, the learned counsel for the appellant Mrs. E
Kiran Suri referred to the decision of Bombay High Court in Municipal

- Corporation of Greater Bombay and Anr v. Kisan Gangaram Hire and Ors.,
(1987) ACJ 311 wherein the Court dealt with similar contention and observed
thus:

"8. What is further necessary to note is that what gives a cause F
of action for preferring an application for claim for compensation is
the accident by motor vehicle or vehicles and not a particular monetary
loss occasioned by such accident. While the compensation in all no
fault claim cases is fixed and uniform, in fault claim cases the losses
may vary from case to case. The particular losses are merely the G
consequence of the accident which is the cause of action. This being
so, the amounts of compensation claimed are nothing but the
particulars of the claim made. By its very nature, further the amount
of compensation claimed cannot always be calculated precisely. In
many cases it can at best be a fair estimate ... "
H
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
r-·
A The High Court observed that in all such cases, it is necessary to keep
the doors open for the claimant to make the claims, on grounds not stated
earlier or for more amounts under heads already specified in the application.

The aforesaid decision of the Bombay High Court was relied upon and
referred to by the Orissa High Court in Mui/a Md Abdul Wahib v. Abdul
B Rahim and Anr., (1994) ACJ 348 and G.B. Pattnaik, J. (as he then was)
observed that the expression "just compensation" would obviously mean
what is fair, moderate and reasonable and awardable in the proved circumstances
of a particular case and the expression "which appears to it to be just" vests
a wide discretion in the Tribunal in the matter of determining of compensation.
C Thereafter, the Court referred to the decision in Sheikhupura Transport Co.
Ltd. (supra) and held that the pecuniary loss to the aggrieved party would
depend upon data which cannot be ascertained accurately but must necessarily
be an estimate or even partly a conjecture, and if this is so, then it will be
unreasonable to expect the party to state precisely the amount of damages
or compensation that it would be entitled to. The Court also held that there
D are no fetters on the power of the Tribunal to award compensation in excess
of the amount which is claimed in the application.

Similarly, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Devki Nandan
Bangur and Ors. v. State ofHaryana and Ors., (I 995) ACJ 1288 observed that
the grant of just and fair compensation is statutory responsibility of the Court
E and if, on the facts, the Court finds that the claimant is entitled to higher
compensation, the Court should allow the claimant to amend his prayer and
allow proper compensation.

For the reasons discussed above, in our view, under the M.V. Act, there
F is no restriction that Tribunal/Court cannot award compensation amount
exceeding the claimed amount. The function of the Tribunal/Court is to award
'Just' compensation which is reasonable on the basis of evidence produced
on record. Further, in such cases there is no question of claim becoming time
barred or it cannot be contended that by enhancing the claim there would be
change of cause of action. It is also to be stated that; as pr.ovided under sub-
G
' .
sectio!1 (4) to Section 166, even report submitted to the Claims Tribunal under
sub-section (6) of Section 158 can be treated as an application for compensation
under the M.V. Act. If required, in appropriate cases, Court inay permit
amendment to the Claim Petition.

H Is it permissible under the Act to award compensation by instalments or.
NAGAPPA v. GURUDAYAL SINGH [M.B. SHAH . .I.] 509
recurring compensation to meet the future medical expenses of the A
victim?

To an agriculturist, loss of leg vitally affects not only his working
capacity but also his livelihood. In this context, Lord Denning M.R. in Lim
Poh Choo v. Camden and Islington Area Health Authority, (1979) I All ER
332 quoted with approval the observations of Parke B, which are as under: B
'Scarcely any sum could compensate a labouring man for the loss
of a limb, yet you do not in such a case give him enough to maintain
him for life You are not to consider the value of existence as if you
were bargaining with an annuity office I advise you to take a reasonable
view of the case and give what you consider fair compensation.' C
However, it is to be clearly understood that M.V. Act does not provide
for passing of further award after final award is passed. Therefore, in a case
where injury to a victim requires periodical medical expenses, fresh award
cannot be passed or previous award cannot be reviewed when the medical D
expenses are incurred after finalisation of the compensation proceedings.
Hence, only alternative is that at the time of passing of final award, Tribunal/
!
Court should consider such eventuality and fix compensation accordingly. No
one can suggest that it is improper to take into account expenditure genuinely
and reasonably required to be incurred for future medical expenses. Future
medical expenses required to be incurred can be determined only on the basis E
of fair guess-work after taking into account increase in the cost of medical
treatment.

This position is made clear in Union Carbide Corporation and Ors. v.
Union of India and Ors., [ 1991] 4 SCC 584 para 131] where this Court
observed as under: - F
.. ".... In an action for negligence, damages must be and are assessed
once and for all at the trial of such an issue. Even if it is found later
that the damage suffered was much greater than was originally
supposed, no further action could be brought. It is well settled rule
of law that damages resulting from one and the same cause of action G
must be assessed and recovered once and for all. Two actions,
therefore, will not lie against the same defendant for personal injury
sustained in the same accident"

Further, compensation to a victim of a motor vehicle accident or in case H
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A of a fatal accident to the legal representatives is awarded under two heads,
namely, Special damages which are suffered by the victim or the legal
representatives and General damages which include compensation for pain
and sufferings, loss of amenities, earning capacity and prospective expenses
including expenses for medicai treatment. With regard to the first part of the
damages, that is, special damages suffered by the victim or the legal
B representative, it can be easily proved on the basis of the""evidence which is
in possession of the claimant. However with regard to the second part general
damages/compensation, it would be a matter of conjectures depending on
number of imponderables. In Lim ·Poh Choo case (supra), ~ord Denning
observed as under: -
c " ..... The practice is now established and cannot be gainsaid that,
in personal injury cases, the award of damages is assessed under four
main heads: first, special damages in t,he shape of money actually
_expended; second, cost of future nursing and attendance and. medical
"'expenses; third, pain and suffering and loss of amenities; fourth, loss
D ', of future earnings."

While calculating such damages, the Tribunal/Court is required to·have \.
some guess work taking into account the inflation factor. This aspect is well
discussed by M.J. Rao, J. (as he then was)] in P. Satyanarayana v. I. Babu
Rajendra Prasad and Anr., [1988] ACJ 88 (A.P.). The learned Judge has given
E a Classification of Injuries : A'Useful Guide and has observed thus:

"24. If a collection of cases on the quantum of damages is to be
useful, it must necessarily be classified in such a way that comparable
cases can be grouped together. No doubt, no two cases are alike but
still, it is possible to make a broad classification which enables one
F to bring comparable awards together. Such eiassifications have been
made by Bingham iri his Motor Claims Cases, Munkman in his
Employer's Liability and Kemp & Kemp in their Quantum of Damages.
(Munkman p.181 ).

26. Cases relating to injuries have been classified into four
G categories, i.e.: (a) total wrecks; (b) partial wrecks and (c) where limbs
and eyes and other specific parts of the body are lost, which can be
sub-grouped according to the type of limb lost and (d) smaller injuries
which cannot be specifically grouped but for which compensation can
be assessed by comparison with injuries ofloss oflimbs, e.g., comparing
H pe,rmanent 'wrist injuries' with 'loss of hand', or comparing a temporary
NAGAPPA v. GURUDA Y AL SINGH [M.B. SHAH.!.] 511

broken arm with the loss of the arm etc. Such comparisons are often A
1nade by judges. Munkn1a11 points out that in America. Mr. Melvin M.
Belli, an eminent lawyer, classified injuries into 11 categories as (I)
Back; (2) Traumatic amputation of leg; (3) Paralysis; (4) Hand or arm
off; (5) Death; (6) Multiple fractures; (7) Burns; (8) Personality change;
(9) Blindness; (10) Brain injury and (11) Occupation diseases. By 1967, B
awards (say) for blindness had risen to 930,000 dollars (Munkman
pp.181-182). Today after 20 years, these awards must have gone up
further. The 'total wreck' category comprises of cases of complete
incapacity for work and virtually no enjoyment of life, e.g., paralysis,
severe brain injury causing insanity, multiple injuries leaving the victim
a total cripple. The 'partial wreck' cases are also cases where the C
entire ~ody is affected and not one set of limbs alone as in the third
category. Cases of brain injuries resulting in a personality change and
multiple injuries with grave disfigurement fall in this second category.
The third category does not present much difficulty for sub-
classification. The fourth category deals with minor injuries in a limb
which be compared with major injuries in the same limb. D
Past Innation-Relevancy of Date of Acc'ident:

27. The dates of accident resulting in similar injuries have great
relevancy. For example, if a particular conventional sum of (say) Rs.
I 0,000 was awarded towards the non-pecuniary damages of loss of E
expectation of life, loss or amenities and pain and suffering all put
together in a case of amputation of a leg consequent to an accident
in 1970, the award to be made for an identical loss today would have
to be upgraded from the 1970 value to its value in 1987, having regard
to the erosion of the value of the rupee. This can be done by comparing F
the cost of living index in 1970 with that in 1987. Charlesworth on
Negligence, 6th Edn., 1977, para 14, says, the 'conventional figures'
must keep 'pace with the times in which we live'. He says that this
can be well illustrated by considering the class of injury resulting
(say) in the loss of sight in one eye and the conventional sum lay
around £2000 about a quarter of a century ago but today in 1977 it G
will probably exceed £5000 or it ought to do. Kemp & Kemp on
Damages, 1982, Chapter 7, para 7001, say: If a court is seeking to make
a comparison with some earlier award (for non-pecuniary losses) and
if by the date of the comparison, the currency in which the earlier
award was made has declined by, say, 50 per cent, one must surely H
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A double the earlier award in order to make a valid comparison, The
authors have compiled two tables (at paras 7007 and 7008), one
showing the current level of general damages for 'pain and suffering'
and' loss of amenities' in cases of severe injury and the other showing
similar earlier years, and have compared whether courts ate or are not
keeping pace with inflation. The authors ask, why tort-feasors alone,
B as a class should be excused from paying the value-based price? In
Walker v. John Mclean & Sons Ltd., (1980) ACJ 429 (CA, England),
the court found that while the value of the pound fell by 50% between
1957 and 1972 (over a period of 15 years), there was a steeper fall
between 1973 to 1978 (within 5 years) when it again fell by·50% (vide
c Kemp & Kemp's Tables). 'Conventional' figures, if they do not keep
pace with inflation, might indeed become 'contemptible'. Kemp &
Kemp point out that an award of £ 16000 in 1879 would be about
£500,000 in 1982. After Walker's case (supra), courts in England are·
carefully adjusting awards for 'pain and suffering' and 'loss of
amenities' to keep pace with inflation."
D
Further, the Division Bench of the High Court ofKerala in Valiyakathodi
Mohammed Koya v. Ayyappankadu Ramamoorthi Mohan an..,d Ors., [1991]
ACJ 140 considered the principles of assessment of compensation for
deprivation of amenities of life in a case where an injured b~y aged 12 years
E suffered brain damage because of the accident and has rightly pointed out
that in personal injury cases there are three categories of general damages:
consolatory damages, compensatory damages and damages for loss of
expectation of life and explained it by illustrating thus:

a
"The amputation of a hand preventing plaintiff from playing
cricket would merit consolatory damages; the same loss preventing a
F
man from carrying on his employment would merit compensatory
damages. Consolatory and compensatory damages represent different
elements in an award f~r general damages for personal injuries and are
exhaustive except for the third head of damages for loss of expectation
of life which is sui gerieris."
G
Thereafter, the Court observed thus:

" .... The award is final. There is no procedure prescribed to review
the award in future which would enable a substitution of r~al fact
for estimate. Mankind is denied the privilege of knowledge . of the
H future with certainty. The result is so much of the award as is attributed
NAGAPPA v. GURUDAYAL SINGH (M.ll. SHAH. J.] 513

to the future loss and suffering will almost surely be liable to erT. In A
Li111 Poh ('hoo v. Ca111den and /s/;ngton Area Health Authority,
( 1979) ACJ 362 (CA, England). considering the insuperable complexities
of the problem. Lord Denning, MR, said that the decision should not
be considered as final and it should be considered as an interin1 a\vard
liable to be reviewed. The House of Lords in Lim ?oh Choo v.
Camden and Islington Area Health Authority, (1980) ACJ 486 (HL, B
England), speaking. through Lord Scarman said:

'It is an attractive, ingenious suggestion, but, in my judgm·~nt
unsound. For so radical a reform can be made neither by judges
nor by modification of rules of court'."
c
In this view of the matter, in our view, it would be difficult to hold that
for future medical expenses which are required to be incurred by a victim,
fresh award could be passed. However, for such medical treatment, Court has
to arrive at a reasonable estimate on the basis of the evidence brought on
record. In the present case, it has been pointed out that for replacing the D
artificial leg every two to three years, appellant would be required to have
some sort of operation and also change the artificial leg. At that time, the
estimated expenses for this were Rs. 18000 and the High Court has awarded
the said amount. For change of artificial leg every two or three years no
compensation is aw'l:rded. Considering this aspect, if Rs. one lac is awarded
as an additional compensation, appellant would be in a position to meet the E
said expenses from the interest of the said amount. Equally it is true !hat the
said amount is required to be properly invested on long-term basis so that
recurring 1nedica! expenses C•JU!d be met. This principle is established in
General Manager, Kera/a State Road Transport Corporation, Triva11dru111 v.
Susamma Thomas (Mrs.) and Ors., [ 1994] 2 SCC 176 and this Court held (in
para 23) thus: F

"23, In a case of compensation for death it is appropriate that the
Tribunals do keep in mind the principles enunciated by this Court in
Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India, [1991] 4 SCC 584 in the
matter of appropriate investments to safeguard the feed from being G
frittered away by the beneficiaries owing to ignorance, illiteracy and
susceptibility ·to exploitation. In that case approving the judgment of
the Gujarat High Court in Muljibhai Ajarambhai Harijan v. United
India Insurance Co. Ltd, (1982) I Guj. LR 756, this Court offered the
following guidelines:-
H
514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A (i) The Claims Tribunal should, in the case of minors, invariably
order the amount of compensation awarded to the minor be
invested in long term fixed deposits at least till the date of the
minor attaining majority. The expenses incurred by the guardian
or next friend may, however, be allowed to be withdrawn;

B (ii) In the case of illiterate claimants also the Claims Tribunal should
follow the procedure set out in (i) above, but if lump sum payment
is required for effecting purchases of any movable or immovable
property such as, agricultural implements, rickshaw, etc., to earn
a living, the Tribunal may consider such a request after making
sure that the amount is actually spent for the purpose and the
c demand is not a ruse to withdraw money;
(iiI) In the case of semi-literate persons the Tribunal should ordinarily
resort to the procedure set out at (i) above unless it is satisfied,
for reasons to be stated in writing, that the whole or part of the
amount is required for expanding and existing business or for
D purchasing some property as mentioned in (ii) above for earning
his livelihood, in which case the Tribunal will ensure that the·
amount is in.vested for the purpose for which it is demanded and
paid;
(iv) In the case of literate persons also the Tribunal may resort to the
E procedure indicated in (i) above, subject to the relaxation set out
in (ii) and (iii) above, if having regard to the age, fiscal background
and strata of society to which the claimant belongs and such /

other considerations, the Tribunal irt the larger interest of the
claimant and with a view to ensuring the safety of the
compensation awarded to him thinks it necessary to do order;
F
(v) In the case of widows the Claims Tribunal should invariably
follow the procedure set out in (i) above;
(vi) In personal injury cases if further treatment is necessary the
Claims Tribunal on being satisfied about the same, which shall
G be recorded in writing, permit withdrawal of such amount as is
necessary for incurring the expenses for such treatment;
(vii) ln all cases in which investment in· long term fixed deposits is
made it should be on condition that the Bank will not permit any
loan or ad.vance on the fixed deposit and interest on the amount
H invested is paid monthly directly to the claimant or his guardian,
NAGAPPA v. GURUDAYAL SINGH [M.B. SHAH. J.] 515

as the case 1nay be; A
. (viii) In all cases Tribunal should grant to the claimants liberty to
apply for \Vithdra\val in case of an e1nergency. To 1neet \Vith such
a contingency, if the a111ount awarded is substantial, the Clai1ns
Tribunal may invest it in more than one Fixed Deposit so that if
need be one such F.D.R. can be liquidated." B
Further. in Lilaben Udesing Gohel v. Oriental Insurance Co. ltd. and
Ors., (1996] 3 SCC 608 the Court relied upon the said directions and further
held that in Union Carbide Corporation's case (supra), this Court did not
include the clause regarding literate persons' compensation and directed that
it should be given the same treatment in case the Court found it necessary C
to do so to protect the compensation awarded to them. The Court further
added one guideline as under:-

"We must add one further guideline to the effect that when the
amount is invested in a fixed deposit, the bank should invariably be
directed to affix a note on the fixed deposit receipt that no loan or D
advance should be granted on the strength of the said FDR without
the express permission of the Court/Tribunal which ordered the deposit.
This will eliminate the practice of taking loans which may be up to
· 80% of the amount invested and thereby defeating the very purpose
of the order. We do hope that the Courts/Tribunal in the country will E
not succumb to the temptation of permitting huge withdrawals in the
hope of disposing of the claim. We are sure that the Courts/Tribunals
will realise their duty towards the victims of the accident so that a
large part of the compensation amount is not lost to them. The very
purpose of laying down the guidelines was to ensure the safety of the
amount so that the claimants do not become victims of unscrupulous F
persons and unethical agreements or arrangements. We do hope our
anxiety to protect the claimants from exploitation by such elements
will be equally shared by the Courts/Tribunals."

In ·the result, we allow this appeal partly and award additional
compensation of Rs. One lac to the appellant. The said amount shall be G
deposited by the Insurance Company with the trial Court and the trial Court
is directed to invest the said amount on long term fixed deposit in a nearest
nationalised bank, in the area where the appellant is residing, with the condition
that the bank will not permit any loan or advance and the interest on the said
amount will be paid annually, directly to the claimant till he survives. However, H
516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A on an application by the appellant this condition could be modified by the
Tribunal in exceptional circumstai1ces, if made out by the appellant. Finally,
after the death of appellant, the aiiiouht be disbursed to his legal heirs on their
application.

The aforesaid conditio11 is imposed so as to see that appellant does not
B find it difficult to meet periodical medical expenses as required by him.
Appeal is allowed accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.

K.K.T. Appeal allowed.