Supreme Court of India
NAGABHUSHANAMMAL (D) BY LRS.versusC. CHANDIKESWARAL!NGAM
- Citation
- 2016 INSC 213
- Decided
- 26 February 2016
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- KURIAN JOSEPH
Holding
The earlier suit does not bar the partition suit as the cause of action is different, and the defendant's possession does not amount to adverse possession because no ouster with hostile animus was established.
Summary
Nagabhushanammal (deceased) filed a suit for partition of a family property in 1988. An earlier suit filed by her in 1962 for possession based on a settlement deed had been dismissed. The defendant argued that the 1988 suit was barred by res judicata and that his long possession amounted to adverse possession. The trial court dismissed the partition suit on those grounds, but the first appellate court reversed, holding the causes of action were different and there was no adverse possession. The High Court reinstated the trial court's dismissal, finding the defendant's possession to be adverse. The Supreme Court held that the earlier suit does not bar the partition suit because the causes of action differ, and that a co‑owner’s possession is presumed joint unless there is an overt ouster with hostile animus, which was not proved. Consequently, the partition suit was allowed and a settlement of 35% to the plaintiff and 65% to the defendant was ordered.
Issues considered
- Whether the 1988 partition suit is barred by the doctrine of res judicata on account of the earlier 1962 suit.
- Whether the defendant's possession of the property constitutes adverse possession or ouster against the plaintiff, a co‑owner.
- Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a share and partition of the family property.
Legislation cited
Subjects
res judicatapartition suitadverse possessionousterco‑ownershipcause of actionCivil Procedurefamily propertysettlement
Judgment
[2016] 2 S.C.R. 19
NAGABHUSHANAMMAL (D) BY LRS. A
v.
C. CHANDIKESWARAL!NGAM
(Civil Appeal Nos. 1858-1859 of20! 6)
FEBRUARY 26, 2016 B
[KURIAN JOSEPH AND ROHINTON FALi NARIMAN, JJ_J
Partition - Suit for partition - Dismissed by trial court on the
ground that it was hit by principle of res judicata in view of dismissal
of an earlier suit filed by the plaintiff in respect of the same property
and also on the ground that the defendants were in adverse
c
possession of the property - Order of trial court reversed by first
appellate court - High Court, in second appeal, restored order of
· trial court - On appeal, held: The cause of action of earlier suit
being different from the present suit, dismissal thereof would not
operate as res judicata - The defendants a/so cannot be said to be D
in adverse possession of the property - Possession of one co-owner
is presumed to be on behalf of all co-owners unless it is established
that such possession by the co-owner is in denial of title of co-
owners and the possession is in hostility to co-owners by exclusion
of them - However, lo put an end to the dispute, matter settled
E
between the parties whereby the plaintiffs shall be entitled to 35%
and defendants to 65% share.
Words and Phrases - 'Res judicata' - Meaning of - Discussed
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD : 1.1 'Res jll(/iC{lf(I' literally means a "thing F
adjudicated" or "an issue that has been definitively settled by
judicial decision;'. The principle operates as a bar to try the same
issue once over. It aims to prevent multiplicity of proceedings
and accords finality to an issue, which directly and substantially
had arisen in the former suit between. the same parties or their G
privies and was decided 'and has become final, so that the parties
are not vexed twice over; vexatious litigation is put an end to
and valuable time of the court is saved. [Para 14] [25-A-B]
Sulochanna Amma v. Narayanan Nair (1994) 2 SCC
14: 1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 520; Jaswant Singh v. H
19
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 2 S.C.R.
A Custodian of Evacuee Property (1985) 3 SCC 648:1985
(1) Suppl. SCR 331; Kunjan Nair Sivaraman Nair v.
Narayanan Nair (2004) 3 SCC 277 : 2004 (2) SCR
202 - referred to.
Black'.~ Law Dictionary. 8'h Edition, p.1337; Halsburys
B Laws of England (4'" Edition) - referred to.
1.2 The suit filed by the plaintiff in 1962, based on the
settlement deed executed by her husband in her favour and the
sufferance of the dismissal of the suit, will not, in any way, be a
bar for making a claim for her share, if any, of the family property,
c if otherwise permissible under law. The 1962 suit for the entire
property was based on a settlement deed and it was a suit for
possession. Whereas, the 1988 suit for partition was for plaintiff's
one-half share in the property based on her birth right. Cause of
action is entirely different. [Para 18] [26-C-D]
D 2. Ouster is a weak defense in a suit for partition of family
property and it is strong if the defendant is able to establish
consistent and open assertion of denial of title, long and
uninterrupted possession and exercise of right of exclusive
ownership openly and to the knowledge of the other co-owner.
Possession of one co-owner is presumed to be on behalf of all co-
E owners unless it is established that the possession of the co-
owner is in denial of title of co-owners and the possession is in
hostility to co-owners by exclusion of them. There has to be
open denial of title to the parties who are entitled to it by excluding
and ousting them. [Paras 20 and 21] [26-E)
F Syed Shah Ghu/am Ghouse Mohiuddin and others v.
Syed Shah Ahmed Mohiuddin Kamisu/ Quadri and Ors
(1971) 1 SCC 597; P. Lakshmi Reddy v. R. Lakshmi
Reddy AIR 1957 SC 1789; Vidya Devi v. Prem Prakash
(1995) 4 SCC 496: 1995 (1) Suppl. SCR 316 - relied
G on.
3. With a view to putting an end to five decades old disputes
between a sister and brother, to avoid any further litigation and
to get the families to reconcile and restore peace, the suggestion
of the Court for a reasonable settlement, a solution has evolved.
Accordingly, it is o~dcred that the appellants shall be entitled to
H
NAGABHUSHANAMMAL (D) BY LRS. v. C. 21
CHANDlKESWARALINGAM
35% and the respondent 65% share. Let the suit property be A
accordingly partitioned. If it is found that it is not possible to do
so by metes and bounds, let the property be sold and proceeds
shared accordingly. [Para 25] [28-E-G]
Case Law Reference
1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 520 referred to. Para 14 B
1985 (1) Suppl. SCR 331 referred to. Para 15
2004 (2) SCR202 referred to. Para 16
(1971) 1 sec 597 relied on. Para 21
AIR 1957 SC 1789 relied on. Para 22
c
1995 (1) Suppl. SCR 316 relied on. Para 23
ClVlLAPPELLATEJURlSDlCTlON: Civil Appeal Nos. 1858-
1859 of2016
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.11.2008 of the High Court D
of Judicature at Madras in S. A. No. 1792 of 1992 and C. M. P. No.
19753 of2004
K. V. Vishwanathan, Sr. Adv., B. Ragunath, Vijay Kumar, Advs.
for the Appellant.
E
V. K. Shukla, Ms. Anchal Mehrotra, K. K. Mohan, Advs. for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KURIAN, J.: I. Delay condoned. Substitution allowed. Leave
granted. · F
2. Res judicata, partition, ouster.and adverse possession are the
four principles interestingly arising in the present case.
SHORT FACTS
3. Parties are referred to as plaintiff and defendants. Appellant- G
Nagabhushanammal, since deceased and substituted by her legal heirs
(daughter of deceased Kotilingaraja and Veerammal), filed a suit for
partition, O.S. No. 2062 of 1988 before the City Civil Court, Madras.
The suit property situated at No. 4, Govindarajulyu Naidu Street, Agaram,
Madras-82 was purchased by the plaintiff's mother Veerammal from
H
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 2 S.C.R.
A her father-in-law and his two sons under a sale deed dated 16.09.1919
(Document No.1919, SRO, Sembium) from out of her own funds.
Veerammal had three children, the plaintiff, the first defendant's father
named Chandrasekaran and one Neelagandammal. Veerammal, the
original owner of the suit property died in 1922 leaving behind her, the
plaintiff and her brother, late Chandrasekaran, the other daughter
B
Neelagandammal having pre-deceased her mother Yeerammal. After
the death ofVeerammal, the property vested equally on the plaintiff and
Chandrasekaran, the defendant's father. On the death ofChandrasekaran
in I 956, his half share of the suit property vested on the defendant and
his mother Saradhambal, the 11 idow of Chandrasekaran. According to
c the plaintiff, in or about 1961, the plaintiff's husband realized that
Veerammal, the owner of the property had settled the property in his
name by registered document dated 06.02.1954. He settled the property
in his wife's (the plaintiff's) name. This was resented by defendant's
mother, Saradambal. That necessitated the filing by the plaintiff of a suit
O.S. No. 404 of I 962 on the file of the VIl Ass it., City Civil Judge,
D
Madras praying for ,possession of suit property on the basis of the
settlement made by the said Veerammal and later by her husband. The
learned Judge refused to believe the genuineness of the settlement made
by Yeerammal in favour of her son-in-law, K. Subramanian, the husband
of the plaintiff and hence dismissed the suit on 24.08. I 964.
E 4. Thereafter, the p laintitf filed the present suit in 1988 for partition.
5. The defendant, in the written statement, mainly contended that
the suit for partition is not maintainable and is hit by Section I 1 of The
Code of Civil Procedure, I 908 on the principle of resjudicata. It was
his case that after the death of Kotilingaraja in I 955, the property vested
F on his son Chandrasekaran, after his death in 1956, on his son the
defendant and since then the defendant has been in exclusive possession
and enjoyment of the suit property paying the property tax, etc., with
patla in his name.
6. A specific contention was also taken that the plaintiff did not
G have any right in the property and that as to the date of the suit, the
defendant had been in exclusive possession of the suit property for more
than thirty years, and hence, the suit was liable to be dismissed on the
ground of adverse possession and limitation as well.
7. The following issues were framed by the trial court:
H
NAGABHUSHANAMMAL (D) BY LRS. v. C. 23
CHANDIKESWARALINGAM [KURIAN, J.]
"I. Whether the suit property is liable to be partitioned? A
2. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for half share in the suit
property?
3. Whether the Defendant is liable to render accounts for the
suit property?
B
4. Whether the suit is affected by res judicata?
5. To what relief the Plaintiff is entitled?"
8. The trial court held that the suit for partition was hit by the
principle.ofresjudicata in view of the dismissal of the earlier suit, O.S.
No .. 404 of 1962, referred to hereinabove. The defence of adverse c
possession also was upheld and the suit was thus dismissed by judgment
dated 14.08.1990.
9. In the first appeal, A.S. No. 271 of 1990 on the file of the City
Civil Court, Chennai, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and
the suit was decreed. According to the first appellate court, the decree D
in O.S. No. 404of1962, a suit for possession and injunctiqp based on a
settlement deed executed by the husband of the plaintiff, was not a bar
for.the plaintiff's suit for partition. It was held that the nature of the suit
was different, issues were different and the whole basis of the suit was
also different. On adverse possession, the first appellate court held that
E
the plaintiff and defendant were entitled to succeed to the extent of the
property of their mother, after the death of their father and that plaintiff
and defendant are co-owners in joint possession under law. Unless one
of the co-owners, in the present case, the plaintiff, had been ousted in
accordance with law, the plaintiff could claim the partition and there is
no question of adverse possession. F
10. The defendant took up the matter before the High Court in
second appeal in S.A. No. 1792of1992 leading to the impugned judgment
dated 17.01.2008. The second appeal was admitted on the following
substantial question of law:
"Whether the Lower Appellate Court was right in the view it took G
that the Appellant has not established prescriptive title to the
property?"
11. Later, the following additional substantial question of law was
also formulated:
1-1
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 2 S.C.R.
A "Is not the Plaintiff in the present Suit bound by her admission
made in the Plaint filed by her in 0.S. No. 40411962 regarding
dispossession from the year 1957?"
12. The High Court was of the view that:
"16. The right of the parties was directly in issue in earlier Suit in
B O.S. No. 40411962. As discussed earlier in O.S. No. 404/1962,
Plaintiff claimed right in the entire Suit Property and sought for
declaration and possession. Saradhambal resisted the Suit claiming
possession and setting up right in herself. Having regard to the
nature of plea taken by both parties, dismissal of O.S. No. 404/
c 1962 is a strong militating circumstances against the Plaintiff and
maintainability of the Suit in O.S. No. 2062/1988. The right and
title of the parties was directly and substantially in issue in O.S.
No. 40411962. As per Sec. I I of CPC, if the matter was in issue
directly and substantially in a prior litigation and decided against a
party then the decision would be res judicata in a subsequent
D proceeding. In any event the filing of subsequent Suit 0.S. No.
206211988 is nothing but re-litigation. After putting the case in one
way, then putting the case in other way is nothing but abuse of
process of Court, which was not kept in view by the trial Court."
13. On adverse possession, despite beautifully summing up the
E legal position at paragraph-20 in the following lines,:
"20 .... To sum up, the basic distinction between adverse
possession as between strangers and ouster and exclusion of co-
owners, the law is well settled that as between co-owners, there
could be no adverse possession unless there has been a denial of
F title and an ouster to the knowledge of the other."
the High Court entered a finding that the possession of the suit property
by the defendant continuously since 1956 has become adverse to that of
plaintiff. This finding by the High court is based on the averment made
by the plaintiff in the suit that the defendant therein had trespassed into
G the suit property in 1956. In any case, according to the High Court, after
dismissal ofO.S. No. 404of1962, the possession of the property by the
defendant had become adverse to the plaintiff. Accordingly, the judgment
and decree of the first appellate court was set aside and that of the trial
court, dismissing the suit for paitition, was restored and second appeal
was allowed. Aggrieved, the present appeal.
H
NAGABHUSHANAMMAL (D) BY LRS. v. C. 25
CHANDIKESWARALINGAM [KURIAN, J.]
14. 'Resjudicata' literally means a ''thing adjudicated" or "an A
issue that has been definitively settled by judicial decision".' The principle
operates as a bar to try the same issue once over. It aims to prevent
multiplicity of proceedings and accords finality to an issue, which directly
. and substantially had arisen in the former suit between the same parties
or their privies and was decided and has become final, so that the parties
B
are not vexed twice over; vexatious litigation is put an end to and valuable
time of the court is saved. (See Sulochanna Amma v. Narayanan Nair')
15. In Jaswant Singh v. Custodian of Evacuee Property 3 , this
Court has laid down a test for determining whether a subsequent suit
is barred by res judicata:
c
" .. .Jn order that a defence of res judicata may succeed it is
necessary to show that not only the cause of action was the same
but also that the plaintiff had an opportunity of getting the relief
which he is now seeking in the former proceedings. The test is
whether the claim in the subsequent suit or proceedings is in fact
founded upon the same cause ofaction which was the foundation D
of the former suit or proceedings .... "
16. The expression 'cause of action' came to be interpreted by
this Court in Kunjan Nair Sivaraman Nair v. Narayanan Nair', at
paragraph-16. To quote:
"16. The expression "cause of action" has acquired a judicially E
settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means
the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the
immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means
the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including
not only the infraction of the right, but the infraction coupled with F
the right itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact
which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed,
in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. Every
fact which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every
piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises
in "'cause of action"." G
17. In Halsbury's Laws of England( 4'" Edition), the expression
has been defined as follows:
1
Dlack 's La\\' Dictionary. 81h Edition. p.1337
2 (1994)2SCC 14
'\1985) 3 sec 648 H
' \2004) 3 sec 277
26 SUPREME COURT REPO.RTS [2016] 2 S.C.R.
A ·"Cause of action' has been defined as meaning simply a factual situation
the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a
remedy against another person. The phrase has been held from earliest
time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the
plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a defendant would have a
B right to traverse. 'Cause of action' has also been taken to mean that
particular act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his
cause of complaint, or the subject-matter of grievance founding the action,
not merely the technical cause of action."
18. The suit filed by the plaintiff in 1962, based on the settlement
deed executed by her husband in her favour and the sufferance of the
C dismissal of the suit, will not, in any way, be a bar for making a claim for
her share, if any, of the family property, if otherwise permissible under
law. As succinctly addressed by the first appellate court, the 1962 suit
for the entire property was based on a settlement deed and it was a suit
for possession. Whereas, the 1988 suit for partition was for plaintiff's
D one-half share in the property based on her birth right. Cause of action is
entirely different.
19. Thus, the High Court in our opinion is not right on the point of
res judicata.
20. The other main defense in the suit is ouster and limitation.
E Ouster is a weak defense in a suit for partition of family property and it
is strong if the defendant is able to establish consistent and open assertion
of denial of title, long and uninterrupted possession and exercise ofright
of·exclusive ownership openly and to the knowledge of the other co-
owner
21. This court in Syed Shah Ghulam Ghouse Mohiuddin and others
F v. Syed Shah Ahmed Mohiuddin Kamisul Ouadri and Ors; held that
possession of one co-owner is presumed to be on behalf of all co-owners
unless it is established thatthe possession of the co-owner is in denial of
title of co-owners and the possession is in hostility to co-owners by
exclusion of them. It was further held thatthere has to be open denial of
G title to the parties who are entitled to it by excluding and ousting them.
22. A three judge bench of this com1 in P.Lakshmi Reddy v.
R.Lakshmi Reddy', while examining the necessary conditions for
applicability of doctrine of ouster to the shares of co-owners, held as
follows:
' ( 1911 l 1 sec 597
H 'AIR 1957 SC 1789
NAGABHUSHANAMMAL (D) BY LRS. v. C. 27
CHANDIKESWARALINGAM [KURIAN, J.]
"4. Now, the ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession A
is that it should be nee vi nee clam nee precario. (See Secretmy
of State for India v. Debendra Lal Khan [ ( 1933) LR 61 IA 78,
82] ). The possession required must be adequate in continuity, in
publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the
competitor. (See Radhamoni Debi v. Collector of Khulna [
B
(I 900) LR 27 IA 136, 140] ). But it is well-settled that in order to
establish adverse possession of one co-heir as against another it
is not enough to show that one out of them is in sole possession
and enjoyment of the profits of the properties. Ouster of the non-
possessing co-heir by the co-heir in possession who claims his
possession to be adverse, should be made out. The possession of c
one co-heir is considered, in law, as possession of all the co-heirs.
When one co-heir is found to be in possession of the properties it
is presumed to be on the basis ofjoint title. The co-heir in possession
cannot render his possession adverse to the other co-heir not in
possession merely by any secret hostile animus on his own part in
D
derogation of the other co-heir's title. (See Cores v. Appuhamy
[( 1912) AC 230)). It is a settled rule of law that as between co-
heirs there must be evidence of open assertion of hostile title,
coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them
to the knowledge of the other so as to constitute ouster. This does
not necessarily mean that there must be an express demand by E
one and denial by the other."
23. This Court in Vidya Devi v. Prem Prakash' held that:
"28. 'Ouster' docs not mean actual driving out of the co-sharer
from the property. It will, however, not be complete unless it is
coupled with all other ingredients required to constitute adverse F
possession. Broadly speaking, three elements are necessary for
establishing the plea of ouster in the case of co-owner. They are
(i) declaration of hostile animus, (ii) long and uninterrupted
possession of the person pleading ouster, and (iii) exercise of
right of exclusive ownership openly and to the knowledge ofother G
co-owner. Thus, a co-owner, can under law, claim title by adverse
possession against another co-owner who can, of course, file
appropriate suit including suit for joint possession within time
rescribed by law."
'l t 995) 4 sec 496 H
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 2 S.C.R.
A 24. In Civil Suit O.S. No. 404of1962, filed by the plaintiff in the
court of VII Assistant City Civil Judge, it was the stand of the plaintiff
that she had been dispossessed from the property in the year 1957.
Defendant had taken a plea at paragraph-14 of the written statement
that "after the death of Kotilingaraja in 1955, the property vested
on his son Chandrasekaralinga111 and after his death in 1956 on
B
his son this defendant, since then this defendant has been in exclusive
possession and enjoyment of the suit property paying the property
tax etc., with the pal/a in his na111e". At Paragraphs-28 and 29 of the
written statement also, the defendant had taken a specific plea on hostile
animus and exclusive possession. The averments read as follows:
c "28. This defendant submits that for the past 30 years and more
he has been in exclusive possession of the suit property and
Plaintiff's claim is also barred by adverse possession and limitation.
29. This defendant states that Patta over the suit property has
been ordered to be registered in his name and the claim of this
D plaintiff was rejected by the Settlement Enquiry Tahsildar, by his
order dated 14.11.1959, after due enquiry and notice to parties."
25. The above being the emerging true factual and correct legal
position, with a view to putting an end to five decades old disputes
• between a sister and brother, to avoid any further litigation and to get the
E families to reconcile and restore peace, we put a suggestion for a
reasonable settlement. Thanks to the sincere cooperation extended by
Sri Viswanathan, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, Sri V. K.
Shukla, learned Counsel for the respondent and the cooperation extended
by the parties themselves, it is heartening to note that a solution has
F evolved. Accordingly, it is ordered that the appellants shall be entitled to
35% and the respondent 65%. Let the suit property be accordingly
partitioned. If it is found that it is not possible to do so by metes and
bounds, let the property be sold and proceeds shared accordingly. We
direct the Principal City Civil Judge, Madras to take the required steps
to work out this order and finalise everything expeditiously, and in any
G case, within three months from the date of production ofa copy of this
judgment. The appeals are disposed of accordingly.
26. There shall be no order as to costs.
Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeals disposed of.
H
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