Holding

The limitation prescribed in clause (ii) of the first proviso to Section 6(1) applies to a fresh declaration, and the period is counted from the date the Land Acquisition Officer receives the court order, making the second declaration valid.

Summary

The State of Karnataka and the Union of India issued a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to acquire 114 acres for the Defence Research & Development Organisation, dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A by invoking Section 17(4) and publishing a declaration under Section 6 on June 24, 1987. The Karnataka High Court quashed the emergency power, ordered a fresh enquiry under Section 5A and a new declaration, which was published on May 13, 1989. The appellants contended that the one‑year limitation for publishing a Section 6 declaration, measured from the original notification date, could not be satisfied after the court‑ordered enquiry, rendering the public purpose impossible. The Supreme Court held that the limitation period under clause (ii) of the first proviso to Section 6(1) applies afresh, with the clock starting from the date the Land Acquisition Officer receives the court order, and that a declaration issued within one year of that date is valid. It also clarified that there is no second date of notification for compensation purposes; the original Section 4(1) notification remains the relevant date. Consequently, the second declaration was upheld and the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the one‑year limitation prescribed in the first proviso to Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act applies to a fresh declaration after a prior declaration is quashed and a court orders a new enquiry.
From which date the limitation period for publishing a Section 6 declaration should be computed in such circumstances.
Whether the date of the second declaration creates a new date of notification under Section 4(1) for the purpose of computing compensation under Section 23(1).

Legislation cited

Income Tax Act, 1961s. 132
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 17, s. 23(1), s. 4(1), s. 5A, s. 6(1)
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984

Subjects

Land acquisitionSection 6 declarationLimitation periodPublic purposeSection 17(4) emergency powerSection 5A enquiryCompensationSupreme Court interpretation

Judgment

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\

A N. NARASIMHAIAH AND ORS. ETC.
;
v. y
STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
UNION OF iNDIA AND ORS.

JANUARY 17, 1996
B
[K. RAMASWAMY, B.L. HANSARIA ANDS. B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.)

Land Acquisition Act, 1894:

C Sections 4(1), 5-A, 6(1), 17, 23(1}-Limitation of one year prescribed
in clause (ii) of first proviso to sub-section (1) of S.6-Would apply to
publication of declaration under S.6(1} afresh-Declaration published within
one year from date of receipt of order of Court by Land Acquisition Of-
fice,-ffeld valid-After enquiry and considering objections, Government
deciding the land is needed for public purpose, declaration published under
D S.6 would become conclusive of the public purpose-Nonetheless, relevant •
date for S.23(1) is the date of publication of notification under S.4(1). r
Oxford English School v. Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors., [1995)
5 SCC 206; P. Chinnanna & Ors. v. State of A.P. & Ors., [1994) 5 SCC 486;
E Director of Income- tax, New Delhi & Anr. v. Pooran Mal and Sons & Anr.,
[1975) 2 SCR 104 and KC. Gounder & Anr. v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu & Anr.,
AIR (1980) Madras 251, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2635-42
of 1996 Etc. '
F
From the Judgment and Order dated 15/22.4.93 of the Karnataka
High Court in W.A. Nos. 17655-62 of 1989.

Rama Jois, P.R. Ramasesh, Naresh Kaushik and Lalitha Kaushik for
the Appellants.
G
K.N. Shulda, Y.P. Mahajan, Mrs. Anil Katiyar and M. Veerappa for
the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

H Leave granted.
698
N. NARASIMHAIAHv. STATE U.0.1. 699

Notification under Section 4( 1) of the Land Acquisition Act ( l of A
1894) (for short, "the Act") acquiring total extent of 114 acres of land in
Narayanpura Village in Bangalore District, Karnataka was published for
public purpose, viz., Defence Research & Development Organisation,
Government of India. The Government, exercising the power under Sec-
tion 17(4), dispensed with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act and the B
notification under Section 4(1) was accordingly published on January 22,
1987. Thereafter, the declaration under Section 6 was published on June
24, 1987.

The appellants had challenged the exercise of emergency power
under Section 17(4) by filing W.P. No. 13316-20/1987 and batch in the High C
Court of Karnataka and the learned single Judge quashed the.order of the
Government dispensing with enquiry under Section 5A and directed as
under:

"In the result these petitions are partly allowed and the declaration D
dated 24.6.1987 published in the Gazette dated 6.8.1987 made
under Section 6(2) of the Act read with Section 17(1) of the Act
as also that portion of the Preliminary Notification under Section
4( 1) of the Act dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A of
the Act in so far as the petitioners lands are concerned and also
the notice under Section 9(1) of the Act dated 12.8.1987 are E
quashed reserving liberty for the authorities to continue the ac-
quisition proceedings from the stage of preliminary notification.
The petitioners shall file their objections against the preliminary
notification within 30 days from the date of receipt of this order
and they shall file their objections against the preliminary notifica- F
lion within 30 days from the date of receipt of this order and they
shall present themselves before the Land Acquisition Officer - 3rd
respondent on 15.7.1988 without awaiting any fresh notices from
the said officer. The Land Acquisition Officer shall hold the
enquiry under Section 5A of the Act expeditiously and complete G
the proceedings in accordance with law."

Thereafter, enquiry under Section 5A was conducted and declaration
thereof was published on May 13, 1989. The validity of this declaration was
again questioned in present Writ Petition No. 19245/89 and baich. The
learned single Judge again allowed the writ petitions. The Division Bench H
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700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 1 S.C.R.

A by Judgment dated April 22, 1993 in Writ Appeal No. 2189-97 of 1992 and
batch allowed the appeals; set aside the order of the learned single judge
and consequently upheld the declaration published under Section 6 of the
Act.

The learned single .Judge had quashed the notification in the first
B instance giving liberty to the Government to conduct an enquiry under
Section 5A and it was accordingly completed within one year from the date
·•
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of the judgment. Declaration under Section 6 was published. The declara-
tion under Section 6 published in the first instance was within the period
prescribed under proviso to Se<:tion 6(1). The Division Bench has held that
C after the declaration under Section 6 was quashed in the first instance, the
limitation of one year does not apply. It further held that the view that the
declaration under Section 6 is still required to be published from the date
of the notification under Section 4(1) is not correct in law. It also found
that since there was no evidence on record as to which was the last of the
D dates of the publications contemplated under Section 4(1), it could not be
said that the limitation under Section 6 from that date is barred by r
limitation.

Shri Rama J ois, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants,
contended that in view of the judgments of this Court in Oxford English
E School v. Govemment of Tamil Nadu & Ors., [1995] 5 SCC 206 and P.
Chinnamta & Ors. v. State of A.P. & Ors., [1994] 5 SCC 486, the view of the
High Court is not correct in law. It is further contended by Sri Na1esh
Kaushik that if the view of the High Court is upheld there would be two
dates of notification under Section 4(1), namely, the notification as
F originally published under Section 4(1) and the date which was upheld by
the Court after the publication of second declaration under Section 6. The
date of declaration under Section 6 will be the date for determination of
compensation under Section 23(1). That would be incongruous with the
scheme of the Act. Therefore, construction should be put up in such a way
that both Section 4(1) notification and Section 5 declaration shouldoe-
G consistent with the scheme of the Act.

Shri Shukla, the learned senior counsel appearing for the Union of
India, contended that since the validity of the notification under Section
4(1) was upheld in the first round of the litigation, what was left to the
H Government was to conduct enquiry under Section SA in terms of the
\
i
N. NARASIMHAIAH v. STATE U.0.1. 701

direction issued by the High Court and on completion thereof, if the A
declaration is published under Section 6, the statutory compliance is made.
Notification under Section 4(1} stands upheld. Otherwise incongruity
would arise in every case. Though the notification under Section 4(1} and
the declaration under Section 6 were published within the limitation
prescribed under the Act, by act of the Court, if the declaration under B
Section 6 is quashed. giving power to the Government to conduct an
enquiry under Section 5A after giving opportunity to the claimants, decla-
ration under Section 6 can never be made within original period of limita-
tion and public purpose would be in jeopardy since under no circumstance
the enquiry and declaration under Section 6 could be done within the
limitation prescribed in the first instance. The second exercise wm1Ll cc ·-·
rendered fruitless since by that date the limitation prescnbed under the
proviso would stand expired. In a given case, though the action of the
Government may be within limitation, the orders of the Court would
intervene to defeat the public purpose. He, therefore, contended that the
construction would be such as would subserve not only the public purpose D
but also the orders of the court would be complied with and the remedy
of judicial review would be meaningful.

Having given careful and anxious consideration to the respective
, contentions, the question is: whether the limitation prescribed under
second proviso to Section 6(1} would be applicable after the notification E
under Section 4(1} has been quashed by the High Court? With a view to
' appreciate the contentions, it is necessary to look into the scheme of the
Act. Section 4(1} of the Act gives power of eminent domain, viz., t0 acquire
the land of an owner for public purpose. Section 4(1) enables the officers
to have the notification published in the State Gazette or the local Gazette, F
as the case may be, amended as per the State Amendment. The local
publication in the prescribed manner enables the authorities under the Act
to take measurement etc. to determine extent of the land required for
public purpose and then to take a decision to proceed with the acquisition
as contemplated in Chapter III of the Act. Under Section 17(1) read with
Section 17(2}, if the State Government is of the opinion that the lands are G
urgently required for talcing possession of the land for public purpose,
Section 17(4} gives power to the State Government to dispense with the
enquiry under Section 5A. Thereafter Section 6 declaration is required to
be published. After 15 days from the date of expiry of the notice issued
under Section 9, the Government is empowered to take possession of the H
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I

702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 1 S.C.R.

A land. By operation of Section 17(2) though award has not been made, the
lands stand vested in the State free from all encumbrances. In other cases,
after the declaration under Section 6 was published in the prescribed
manner, public purpos.e mentioned in Section 4(1) becomes conclusive.
Award enquiry in Part III shall be gone through and after passing the ·
B award, the .possession of the land would be taken and under Section 16 of
the Act the lands stand vested in the State free from all encumbrances.
Determination of compensation under Section 18 etc. would be followed
by Stages.

In the light of the scheme of the Act, when the exercise of the power
C under Section 17(4) dispensing with enquiry under Section 5A is quashed
by the Court, the question would be whether the State is required to have
the declaration published under Section 6 within limitation prescribed
under Proviso to Se«tion 6(1) of the Act? Section 6(1) reads thus :

"6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose. - (1)
D Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the ap-
propriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if
any, made under Section 5-A, sub-section (2), that any particular
land is needed for a public purpose, or for a company, a declara-
tion shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary
E to such Government or of some officer duly authorised to certify
its orders, and different declarations may be made from time to
time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same
notification under Section 4, sub-section (1), ii;respective of
whether one report or different reports has or have been made
(wherever required) under Section 5A, sub-section (2) :
F
Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land
covered by a notification under Section 4 sub-section (1). -

(i) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (1 of 1967) but
G before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment)
Act, 1984 shall be made after the expiry of three years from the
date of the publication of the notification: or

(ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition
H (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year
i
N. NARASIMHAIAHv. STATE U.0.1. 703

from the date of the publication of the notification : A
\
• Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless
the compensation to be awarded for such property to be paid by
a company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund
controlled or managed by a local authority.
B
,, Explanation 1. - In computing any of the periods referred to in the
t first proviso the period during which any action or proceeding to
be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4,
sub-section (1), is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.

Explanation 2. - Whether the compensation to be awarded for such
c
property is to the paid out of the funds of a corporation owned or
controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be
compensation paid out of public revenues .
•
The limitation, under the first proviso begins to run from the last of D
" the date on which the notification under Section 4(1) is published. By
operation of clause (ii) of first proviso to sub-section (1), the declaration
under Section 6 shall be published within one year from the date of the
last of the dates of the publication of the notification as required under
Section 4(1) of the Act. Explanation I to Section 6(1) postulates that in
computing !he period referred to in the first proviso, the period during
E
, which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification
issued under Section 4 ( 1) is stayed by an order of the Court, the period
' during which the proceedings are p_ending, shall be excluded. In other
words, before the declaration under Section 6 is published, if.£urther
proceedings are stayed by an order of the Court, further action stands F
interdicted, the running of limitation stops and the time occup,ieol in the
Court proceedings should be excluded in computation of the period of
limitation mentioned in proviso to Section 6(1). After the said period is
excluded and if tht declaration published is within the limitation of one
year, then necessarily the notification under Section 4(1) would remain
G
valid .
......
If that be the position, when the exercise of the power under Section
17 (4) dispensing with enquiry under Section SA is quashed by the Court
and liberty is given to the State to proceed further in accordance with law,
i.e., to conduct enquiry under Section SA and even after conducting the H
I

704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) 1 S.C.R.
f
A enquiry as prescribed under Section 5A the Government forms opinion
that the land was needed for public purpose and declaration was published, I
the question is: whether the limitation prescribed under clause (ii) of the
first proviso to sub-section (1) would still remain operative and be capable
to be complied with?

B Having considered the respective contentions, we are of the con-
sidered view that if the construction as put up by the learned counsel for 1
the appellants is given acceptance, i.e., it should be within one year from
the last of the dates of publication under Section 4(1), the public purpose
would always be frustrated. It may be illustrated thus : In a given case
C where the notification under Section 4(1) was published, dispensing with
the enquiry uqder Section SA and declaration was published within one
month and as the urgency in the opinion of the Government was such that
it did not broo.k the delay of 30 days and immediate possession was
necessary, but possession was not taken due to dilatory tactics of the
D interested person and Court ultimately finds after two years that the •
exercise of urgency power was not warranted and so it was neither valid
nor proper and directed the Government to give an opportunity to the .
.interested person and the State to conduct an enquiry under Section 5A,
then the exercise of the power pursuant to the direction of the Court will
be. fruitless as it. would take time to conduct enquiry. If the enquiry is
E dragged for obvious reasons, declaration under Section 6(1) cannot be
published within the limitation from the original date of the publication of
the notification under Section 4(1). A valid notification under Section 4(1) '
becomes invalid. On the other hand, after conducting enquiry as per Court
order and, if the declaration under Section 6 is published within one year
from the date of the receipt of the order passed by the High Court, the
F
notification under Section 4(1) becomes valid since the action was done
pursuant to the orders of the Court and compliance with the limitation
prescribed in clauses (i) and (ii) of the first proviso to sub- section (1) of
the Act would be made.

G It is true that this Court in Oxford English School's case (supra) in
paragraph 7 had held that when declaration under Section 6 was quashed
and the notification under Section 4(1) was upheld, the second declaration
is required to be published within the same period prescribed in clause (i)
of first proviso. In that case, the limitation of three years under clause (i)
H of the first proviso to sub-section (1) could not be complied with. The
N. NARASIMHAIAH 1•. STATE U.0.1. 705

notification under Section 4(1) was held to be invalid. Unfortunately, the A
\ above distinction was not brought to the notice of this Court when the case
was considered and decided. Similarly, the ratio in P. Chinna1111a's case
(supra) directly does not deal with the problems but observations in
paragraph 5 do support the contention of the appellants as possession was
not taken in these cases and the observations get attracted. But it was not
B
necessary in that case to deal with that question since the possession under
•
'f
Section 17(2) was already taken and the land stood vested in the State.

Thi_s conclusion reached by us gets support from a decision of this
Court rendered in Director of Income-tax, New Delhi & Anr. v. Poora11 Mal
and Sons & Anr., [1975] 2 SCR 104 under the Income Tax Act, in an c
analogous situation. Under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, it is
mandatory that an order is requires to be made under sub-section (5)
within one year from the date when the proceedings are taken. In that case
proceedings were taken and order was made within one year, but without
• any notice to the assessee. The order was quashed. From the date of initial D
period of limitation the subsequent order was barred. It was contended
that the action initiated under Section 132 was required to be done within
the original period and an order made after expiry of the period, was
invalid in law. This Court considered thy contention and held that if the
period of time prescribed under Section 132{5) is held to be mandatory,
and if any direction was given by a Court in a writ proceedings, an order E
made in pursuance of such a direction would not be subject to limitation
prescribed under Section 132(5). Even if the period of time fixed under
Section 132(5) is held to be mandatory that requirement was satisfied when
the first order was made. Thereafter, if any direction is given under Section
132(12) or by a court in writ proceedings, as in this case, it cannot be said F
that an order made in pursuance of such a direction would be subject to
the limitation prescribed under Section 132(5). Once the order has been
made within ninety days, the aggrieved person has got the right to approach
the notified authority under Section 132(11) within thirty days and that
authority can direct the Income-tax Officer to pass a fresh order. The G
contention that even such a fresh order should be passed within ninety
days, would make the sub-sections (11) and (12) of Section 132 ridiculous
and useless. It cannot be said that what the notified authority could direct
under Section 132, could not be done by a High Court while exercising its
power under Article 226 of the Constitution. To hold otherwise would
make the powers of the Court under Article 226 wholly ineffective. The H
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706 SUPREME COURT REP OR TS [1996] 1 S.C.R.

A Court in exercising its powers under Article 226 has to mould the remedy
to suit to the facts of a case. When Section 132(5) permits an Income-tax I ,
Officer to pass an order within ninety days that power cannot in any way
be whittled down by a rule made under that section.

It is contended by Shri Naresh Kaushik that ratio as noted above was
B founded on ·concession and, therefore, the ratio would not be applied to
the facts of this case. We are afraid, we cannot accept the contention. This .,,•
.
Court had pointed out a! page 111 at D that apart from the consent of the
parties, even on point of law, that would be the result. Similar view was
taken by a Full Bench of Madras High Court in KC. Gounder & Anr. v.
C Govt. of Tamil Nadu & Anr., AIR (1980) Madras 251.

We are of the opinion that running of the limitation should be
counted from the date of the order of the court received by the Land
Acquisition Officer and declaration is published within one year from that
D date. It would be consistent with the scheme of the Act and it would •
j
subser\!e the public purpose. Parliament amended the Act and prescribed
limitation since the acquisition proceedings were unduly delayed for years
and the owners of lands were put to hardship. If operation of limitation
under clause (ii) of first proviso to Section 6(1) is not applied, we would
come back to square and defeat the legislative purpose of limitation
E prescribed under the Act. The Government is bound under the order of
the Court to hold an enquiry under Section 5A. Thereafter, if the Govern-
ment still opines that the land is needed for public purpose, declaration
under. Section 6 should be published within one year as indicated above.
This interpretation would render judicial review efficacious and meaningful
F and public purpose subserved and the aggrieved owner would get an
opportunity to vinl!licate his grievance. Thus, we hold that the limitation
prescribed in clause (ii) of the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 6
would apply to publication of declaration under Section 6(1) afresh. If it
is published within one year from the date of the receipt of the order of
the Court by Land Acquisition Officer, declaration published under Sec-
G tion 6(1) would be valid.

The second contention that there would be two dates of notification
under Section 4(1) as initially published and the one deemed to be pub-
lished consequent to upholding of second declaration under Section 6(1)
H and that the compensation under Section 23(1) is required to be deter-
N. NARASIMHAIAH v. STATE U.0.1. 707

mined with reference to second date, is untenable. The declarati!Jn under A
\ Section 6(1) gives only conclusiveness to the public purpose specified in
Section 4(1) and the notification under Section 4(1) still remains valid
which is relevant for the purpose of computation of market value as
envisaged under Section 23(1) of the Act. When the Court upholds the
declaration it would relate back to the date of publication under Section B
4(1). Therefore, there are no two dates for the purpose of computation of
> the market value as contended for. The purpose of enquiry under Section
• SA is to determine whether the land is needed for the public purpose and
the affected owner or interested person gets a right to show that the public
purpose mentioned in Section 4(1) is not the public purpose or some other
land is more suitable or is available for the public purpose or his lands C
need to be excluded from public purpose as the proposed land may be in
excess of requirement. Once the Government, after holding the enquiry has
considered the objection& and decided that the land is needed for public
purpose, declaration published under Section 6 would become conclusive
of the public purpose. Nonetheless, relevant date for Section 23(1) is the D
date of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1).

Admittedly, in this case the second declaration was published within
one year even from the date of the order passed by the High Court and,
therefore, the view of the Division Bench is required to be upheld. Thus,
we hold that the declaration published under Section 6(1) on May 13, 1989 E
is valid and the notification dated January 22, 1987 under Section 4(1) does
not become invalid. The Land Acquisition Officer should conduct and
complete award enquiry within one year from the date of the receipt of the
order of this Court.

The appeals are accordingly dismissed but, in the circumstances, F
without costs.

G.N. Appeals dismissed.