N. KRISHNAMACHARIversusTHE MANAGING DIRECTOR APSRTC, HYDERABAD AND ORS.

A                  N. KRISHNAMACHARI
                            v.
    THE MANAGING DIRECTOR APSRTC, HYDERABAD AND ORS.

                                 AUGUST 12, 1994

B            (K. RAMASWAMY AND N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.]

          Limd Acquisition Act 1894: Sections 3(b), 4(1) and 6.

          State-Land acquisition--<::hallenge-Beneficiary of land-'-Wltether has
C locus standi to be impleaded as necessary parry-Acquisition-Notifica-
    tio,,...:...Oeciaration--<::ha/lenge to acquisition-Quashing of declaration and
    sustaining the notification-Validity of

          In the Land Acquisition proceedings initiated by the State of Andhra
    Pradesh, in which Respondent-Corporation was a beneficiary, the Revision
D   Petition filed by the respondent-Corporation was dismissed by the High
    Court on the ground that Review does not lie at the instance of the
    Respondent- Corporation. However, in the review petition relating to the
    interest of the petitioner the Division Bench set aside the order quashing
    the Notification under section 4(1) and upheld the declaration published
E   under section 6.

          In this Court it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that (i) on
    the question of locus standl of beneficiary to be impleaded as a party there
    was conflict of decisions of this Court in The Municipal Corporation of the
    City of Ahmedabad v. Chandula/ Shamaldas Patel & Ors., (1971] 3 S.C.C.
F   821 and Himalyan Tiles and Maro/es (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho,
    (1980] 3 SCR 235; (ii) there is a conflict of operation of the orders in two
    cases regarding the same notification published under section 4(1) which
    was quashed at the instance or others in this case the declaration alone
    has been quashed sustaining the notification under section 4.
G         Dismissing the petition, this Court

          HELD : 1. Respondent-Corporation Is a person interested within the
    meaning or section 3(b) or the Land Acquisition Act and that, therefore, it
    was entitled to support the validity of the notification issued under section
H   4(1) or the Act when it was the subject matter of the challenge in the High
                                         608
            N. KRISHNAMACHARI v. APSRTC, HYDERABAD                   609

Court. The High Court is, therefore, not right in its conclusion that the A
corporation is not an interested party and has committed grievous error
of law in refusing the Review Petition. [611·D, El

      2. The omission to bring to the notice of the· court important
provisions of law constitutes an infirmity in the judgment. Section 3(b)    B
defined in wide language, would bring within Its ambit the beneficiary to
be a person interested. This was not broughtto the notice of the Court in
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation's case. However, in view of the later
development of law in later decisions starting with Himalyan Tiles Case.
the conRict no longer subsists. (611-B, DJ
                                                                            c
     Himalyan Tiles and Marbles (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho,
(1980] 3 S.C.R. 235, referred to.

     The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal
Shamaldas Patel & Ors., (1971) 3 S.C.C. 821, explained and held per         D
incuriam.

      3. Notification under section 4(1) was published on July 8, 1988 and
substance was published on July 28, 1988, paper publication too was done ..
Immediately, the Writ Petitions were filed and further proceedings were
stayed by the High Court even before the declaration was published. Under E
these.circumstances, the declaration section 6 published on July 11, 1988
obviously was illegal. Accordingly, the declaration alone was rightly
quashed. [611 ·G, HJ

       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION              Special Leave Petition     F
(Civil) No. 12213 of 1994.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 15.4.94 of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in Rev. W.P.M.P.No. 21086 of 1993.

      K. Madhava Reddy, D. Prakash Recidy and Mrs. D. Bharatbi Reddy        G
for the Petitioner.

     B. Parthasarathy for the Respondents.

     The following Order of the Court .was delivered :                      H
     610                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A          The Government of Andhra pradesh published the Notification
     under s.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on July 8, 1988 acquiring
     certain lands for the construction of bus stand complex in Tirupathi town
     (Lord Balaji Pilgrimage centre) followed by a declaration issued under s.6
     with which we would later deal with. The notification was challenged by
     the interested persons including the petitioner In W.P. Nos. 838/90,
B    12450/88, 12919/88 and 13631/88. In some of the Writ Petitions, the
     A.P.S.R.T.C. - the beneficiary impleaded itself as a party respondent to the
     Writ Petitions. When the Writ Petition had come up for final hearing, the
     name of the counsel for the Corporation was not printed in the cause list
     published by the High Court. Consequently the counsel could not notice
C    the posting of the Writ Petitions and the disposal thereof. Thereafter, the
     counsel filed an application for review of the orders of the Division Bench.
     We are informed that in two cases, the Review Petitions seem to have been
     dismissed on the ground that Corporation was not a party to the Writ
     Petitions and that, therefore, the Review Petition would not lie at their
D    instance. The Review Petition relating to the interest of the petitioner in
     the lands in concerned, by the impugned order dated April 15, 1994 in
     Review W.P.M.P. No. 21806/93, the Division Bench set aside the order
     quashing the notification under s.4(1) and upheld quashing the declaration
     published under s.6 ~f the Act. Thus, this special leave petition.

E          It is contended by Mr. Madhava Reddy, Learned Senior counsel
     that there is a conflict of decisions as regards self-same matters that two
     Review Petitions were dismissed relating to other claimants holding that
     the Corporation was not a necessary party, in other words it was not an
     interested party .;;;.d Review Petition in the impugned order was allowed
·F   by implication that the Corporation was an interested party. It is also
     further contended that on the question of locus standi of the beneficiary
     to be impleaded as a party, there is a conflict of decisions of this Court in
     The Municipal Corpn. of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulai Shama/das
     Patel & Ors., [1971) 3 SCC 821 and Himalyan Titles and Moroles (P) Ltd.
     v. Francis Victor Coutinho, [1980) 3 SCR 235, and when this conflict was
G    brought to the notice of another bench that Bench has distinguished the
     decision of the Aluned.abad Municipal Corporation case (supra) and that
     therefore, the conflict still subsists and requires to be resolved. We do not
     find force in the contentions. In Alunedabad Municipal Corporation case
     (supra) the Bench had held that when the property was acquired for the
H    benefit of the Municipal Corporation by the State, though ultimately the
           N. KRISHNAMACHARI v. APSRTC, HYDERABAD                    611

municipality may be benefited, it has no right to file an appeal against the A
decision of the High Court as the Corporation is not an interested party.
It would appear that s.3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, definition of
"person interested" had not been brought to the attention of the learned
Judges. When s.3(b) defined in a wide language, would bring within its
ambit the beneficiary to be a person interested, the omission to bring to B
the notice of the court important provisions of the law constitutes an
infirmity in the judgment. However, in later decisions starting with
Himalyan Tiles case (supra) this Court consistently has held that the
beneficiary is a person interested to protect the interest which the
beneficiary seeks to acquire in the land under the notification, including
perfect title to the property and payment of proper compensation. There- C
fore, it is entitled to challenge the award when it was made without notice
to it even by filing a Writ Petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, apart
from impleading itself as a party respondent in the acquisition proceedings
or pending appeal or independently filing an appeal under s.54 of the Act.
In view of this later development of law, we do not find that the conflict D
any longer subsists. Therefore, we hold that A.P.S.R.T.C. is a person
interested within the meaning of s.3( d) of the Act and that, therefore, it
is entitled to support the validity of the notification issued under s.4(1) of
the Act when it is the subject matter of the challenge in the High Court.
The High Court is, therefore, the right in its conclusion that the Corpora-
tion is not an interested party and the High Court has committed grievous E
error of law in refusing the Review Petition. But, however, that order is
not before us.

       It is next contended that there is a conflict operation of the orders
in two cases regarding the same notification published under s.4(1) which F
was quashed at the instance of others and in this case the declaration alone
has been quashed sustailling the notification under s.4(1). A reading to the
Order of the Division Bench discloses that the entire notification under
s.4(1) has been sustained. Only declaration under s.6 was quashed. It would
be seen that Notification under s.4(1) was published on July 8, 1988 and G
subsistence was published on July 28,1988, paper publication too was done.
Immediately, the Writ Petitions were filed on August 26, 1988 and further
proceedings were stayed by the High Court even before the declaration
was published. Under these circumstances, the declaration under s.6 pub-
lished on July 11, 1988 obviously was illegal. Accordingly, the declaration
alr>ne was rightly quashed. It is represented that after filing the Writ H
    612                   SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [1994)SUPP.2S.C.R.

A Petition, the Corporation had negotiated with the petition confining the
    need to acquire only 54 cents of land out of the petition's land. We do not
    express any opinion on this. It is open to the petitioner, if he so desires, to
    negotiate with the Corporation or with the Government and it is for the
    Government to take appropriate decision.

B         The S.L.P. is accordingly dismissed with the above clarification.

    T.N.A.                                                     Petition dismissed.