N. BALAKRISHNANversusM. KRISHNAMURTHY

                           N. BALAKRISHNAN                                        A
                                   v.
                          M. KRISHNAMURTHY

                           SEPTEMBER 3, 1998

            [S. SAGHIR AHMAD AND K.T. THOMAS, JJ.)                                B

      Limitation Act, 1963 : Section 5.

        Delay-Co11do11atio11 of-Discretion of cowt--Exercise of-Guidelines
stated-Defe11da11t filed an application to co11do11e delay of 883 days in C
approachi11g the court to set aside ex-parte decree against him--No11-action
011 the part of his advocate cited as expla11atio11 for the delay-Defendant also
complained about the conduct of his advocate before Consumer Redressal
Fomm and received Rs. 50,000 as co111pe11sation-T1ial cowt accepted defen-
dants apla11atio11 for delay and condoned it-However; High Court in D
revision set aside the trial court's order 011 ground that defendant was negligent
and not careful enough to ve1ify the stage of proceedings at any point of
time-Held : Words "sufficient cause" should be co11stmed liberally-Le11gt.h
of delay is 11ot releva11t; acceptability of explanation is the only criterion-/11
the absence of ma/a fide i11te11tion or deliberate delay as a dilatOI)' strategy, E
court must condone the delay-But while doing so court should bear in mind
the litigation expenses incwred by opposite pa1ty and should compe11sate him
accordi11gly-011ce court co11do11es delay in positive exercise of discretio11,
supe1ior court, more particularly revisional court, should not non11ally disturb
such co11do11atio11-But if co11do11atio11 is refused it would be open to superior
court to come to its own finding after considering the cause of delay afresh-In
                                                                                   F
the circumstances of the case, High Court in revision e1red in upsetting the
trial cowt's order condoning the delay especially when the defendant's co11-
duct does not 011 the whole wanwlt castigati11g him as an i1Tespo11sible litigant
having regard to one's busy occupation in present day's life.
                                                                                  G
      Time-limit-Fixatio11--0bject of-Held: Not meallt to destroy rights of
parties-/( is founded 011 public policy-Lifespan for legal remedy is f1JCed for
general welfare.

      Words a11d Phrases :                                                        H
                                     403
    404                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A         "Sufficient cause''-Meaning of-In the context of S. 5 of the Limitation
    Act, 1963.

          Maxims:

          "Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium---1\feaning of
B
           The respondent filed a suit, which was decreed ex pane against the
    appellant-defendant. The appellant filed an application to set aside the
    ex-pane decree and also filed an application under Section 5 of the Limita-
    tion Act, 1963 for condonation of delay of883 days. Non-action on the part
    of the appellant's advocate was cited as a cause for the delay. The appellant
C   also filed a complaint against the said advocate before the District Con-
    sumer Disputes Redressal Forum and received a compensation of Rs.
    50,000. The trial court accepted the appellant's explanation for the delay
    and condoned it. However, the High Court in revision set aside the order
    of the trial court on the ground that the appellant was negligent and was
D   not careful enough to verify the stage of the proceedings at any point of
    time. Hence this appeal.

          Disposing of the appeal, this Court

          HELD : 1.1. The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the
E dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. lime-limit
    fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the
    expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. [409-8)

         1.2. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties.
  They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek
F their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair
  the damage by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fJXes a life-span
  for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal in.iury so suffered. The law
  of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim
  Interest reip11blicae 11p sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a
G period be put to litigation). The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept
  alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. [409-C-F]

        2.1. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court.
  Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not say that such discretion can
  be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is
H no matter; acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes
               N. BALAKRISHNAN v. M. KRISHNAMURTHY                       405

 delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable     A
 explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be
 condoned, as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. (408-F-G]

      2.2. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the
result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court
should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction,          B
unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or
arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court
refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be
free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to
superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled b(the                c
conclusion of the lower court. [408-G-H; 409-A]

          3. In every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the
  litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to tum down his plea and to
  shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala [ides
  or it is not put forth as part of dilatory strategy the court must show utmost D
· consideration to, the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think
  that the dell!~ was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time the
  court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. [409-H; 410-A-B]

      Shankuntala Devi Jain v. Kwital Kwnwi, AIR (1969) SC 575 and State
 of West Bengal v. 771e Administrator, Howrah Municipality, AIR (1972) SC
                                                                                E
 749, relied on.

       4.1. However, while condoning delay the Court should not forget the
 opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and
 he too would have incurred quite a large litigation expenses. It would be      F
 salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to !aches on the
 part of the applicant the court shall compensate the opposite party for his
 loss. [410-B-C]

       4.2. In the instant case, the appellant's conduct does not on the whole
 warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant. What he did in G
 defending the suit was not very far from what a litigant would broadly do.
 Of course, it may be said that he should have been more vigilant by visiting
 his advocate at short intervals to check up the progress of the litigation.
 But during these days when everybody is fully occupied with his own
 avocation of life an omission to adopt such extra vigilance need not be used H
    406                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A as a ground to depict him as a litigant not aware of his responsibilities,
    and to visit him with drastic consequences. [408-D-F]

         4.3. The explanation for the delay set up by the appellant was found
  satisfactory to the trial court in the exercise of its discretion and the High
  Court went wrong in upsetting the finding more so when the High Court was
B exercising revisional jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the respondent must be
  compensated particularly because the appellant has secured a sum of Rs.
  Fifty thousand from the delinquent-advocate through the Consumer Dis-
  putes Redressal Forum. Therefore, the impugned order is set aside by
  restoring the order passed by the trial court but on a condition that appel-
C lant shall pay a sum of Rs. Ten thousand to the respondent (or deposit it in·
  this Court) within one month from the date of this judgment. [410-C-E]

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 4575-76
    of 1998.

D        From the Judgment and Order dated 13.11.97/26.2.98 of the Madras            ,.
    High Court in C.R.P. No. 2694/96 and R.A. No. 125 of 1997.

          Krishnaswami for the Appellant.

          Gaurav Jain and Ms. Abha Jain for the Respondent.
E
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          THOMAS, J. Leave granted.

          Explanation for the apparently inordinate delay in moving an ap-
F plication was accepted by the trial court under Section 5 of the Limitation
    Act, 1963, but the High Court in revision reversed the finding and conse-
    quently dismissed the motion. That order of the High Court has given rise
    to these appeals.

G         Facts barely needed for these appeals are the following:

        A suit for declaration of title and ancillary reliefs filed by the respon-
  dent was decreed ex-parte on 28.10.1991. Appellant, who was defendant in
  the suit, on coming to know of the decree moved an application to set it
  aside. But the application was dismissed for default on 17.02.1993. Appel-
H !ant moved for having that order set aside only on August 19, 1995 for
      N. BALAKRISHNAN v. M. KRISHNA MURTHY [K.T. THOMAS, J.)            407

which a delay of 883 days was noted. Appellant also filed another applica-     A
tion to condone the delay by offering an explanation which can be sum-
marized thus:

       Appellant engaged an advocate (one Sri MS Ra_jith) for making the
motion to set the ex-palte decree aside but the advocate failed to inform
him that the application was dismissed for default on 17.2.1993. When he       B
got summons from the execution side on. 5.7.1995 he approached his
advocate but he was told that perhaps execution proceedings would have
been taken by the decree holder since there was no stay against such
execution proceedings. On the advice of the same advocate, he signed some
papers including a Vakalatnama for resisting the execution proceedings,        C
besides making a payment of Rupees Two Thousand towards advocate's
fees and other incidental expenses. But the fact is that the said advocate
did not do anything in the court even thereafter - On 4.8.1995 the execution
warrant was issued by the court and he became suspicious of the conduct
of his advocate and hence rushed to the court from where he got the
disquieting information that his application to set aside the ex-pwte decree   D
stood dismissed for default as early as 17.2.1993 and that nothing was done
in the court thereafter on his behalf. He also learned that his advocate has
left the profession and _joined as legal assistant of M/s. Maxworth Orcheads
India Limited. Hence he filed the present application for having the order
dated 17.2.1993 set aside.                                                     E
      Appellant did not stop with filing the aforesaid application. He also
moved the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Madras North
ventilating his grievance and claiming a compensation of rupees one lakh
as against his erstwhile advocate. The said forum passed final order direct-
ing the said advocate to pay a compensation of Rs. Fifty thousand to the       F
appellant besides a cost of Rs. Five Hundred.

       Though, the trial court was pleased to accept the aforesaid explana-
tion and condoned the delay, a single Judge of the High Court of Madras
who heard the revision, expressed the view that the delay of 883 days in G
filing the application has not been properly explained. Hence the revision
was allowed and trial court order was set aside. An application for review
was made, but that was dismissed. Hence these appeals.

      The reasoning of the learned single Judge of the High Court for
reaching the above conclusion is that the affidavit filed by the appellant     H
    408                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A was silent as 'to why he did not meet his advocate for such a long period.
    According to the learned single Judge:

              "If the appellant was careful enough to verify about the stage of
              the proceedings at any point of time and had he been misled by
              the counsel then only it could have been said that due to the
B          · .conduct of the counsel the party should not be penalised."

          Learned single judge then observed that when the party is in utter
    negligence, he cannot be permitted to blame the counsel. Learned single
    judge has further remarked that:
c            "A perusal of the affidavit does not reveal any diligence on the part
             of the respondent in the conduct of the proceedings. When already
             the suit has been decreed ex-parte, the respondent ought to have
             been more careful and diligent in prosecuting the matter further.
             The conduct of the respondent clearly reveals that at any point of
D            time, he has not realised his responsibility as a litigant."

           Appellant's conduct does not on the whole warrant to castigate him
    as an irresponsible litigant. What he did in defending the suit was not very
    much far from what a litigant would broadly do. Of course, it may be said
E   that he should have been more vigilant by visiting his advocate at short
    intervals to check up the progress of the litigation. But during these days
    when everybody is fully occupied with his own avocation of life an omission
    to adopt such extra vigilance need not be used as a ground to depict him
    as a litigant not aware of his responsibilities, and to visit him with drastic
    consequences.
F
        It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of
  the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion
  can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay
  is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Some-
  times delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of
G acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long
  range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the
  court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive exercise
  of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such
  finding, much less in revisonal jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion
H was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a
      N. BALAKRISHNAN v. M. KRISHNA MURTHY [KT THOMAS, J.]                  409

different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such        A
cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the
delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding
even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court.

       The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function
of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance         B
substantial justice. Time limit fixed for approaching the court in different
situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would
transform into a good cause.

       Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They
are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their
                                                                                   c
remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the
damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fJXes a life-span
for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time
is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time
newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal             D
remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for" each
remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending
uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded
on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis
litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules
                                                                                   E
of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are
meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their
remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive
for a legislatively fJXed period of time.

      A Court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in                  F
foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption
that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has
held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act
should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice
vide Shalamtala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, AIR (1969) SC 575 and State            G
of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality, AIR (1972) SC
749.

      It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some
lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to
turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation H
    410                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A does not smack of ma/a fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory
    strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when
    there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the
    party deliberately to gain time then the court should lean against accep-



B
    tance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Court should not
    forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a
    loser and he too would have incurred quite a large litigation eiepenses. It
                                                                                    -
    would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to
    !aches on the part of the applicant the court shall compensate the opposite
    party for his loss.

C       In this case explanation for the delay set up by the appellant was
  found satisfactory to the trial court in the exercise of its discretion and the
  High Court went wrong in upsetting the finding, more so when the High
  Court was exercising revisional jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the respondent
  must be compensated particularly because the appellant has secured a sum
  of Rs. Fifty thousand from the delinquent advocate through the Consumer
D Disputes Redressal Forum. We, therefore, allow these appeals and set
  aside the impugned order by restoring the order passed by the trial court
  but on a condition that appellant shall pay a sum of Rupee Ten thousand
  to the respondent (or deposit it in this court) within one month from this
  date.
E            The appeals are disposed of accordingly.

    v.s.s.                                                 Appeals disposed of.




                                                                                    .,/