Holding

The suit is barred by the three‑year limitation under Article 60(b)(ii) of the Limitation Act, 1963, and is not maintainable as it failed to seek the setting aside of the voidable sale deeds.

Summary

The suit concerned property of Petha Gounder that had been sold by his son Balaraman both in his own name and on behalf of his minor son Palanivel without court permission, violating Section 8 of the Hindu Minority & Guardianship Act, 1956. The plaintiffs, sons of Kannan, filed a suit in 1992 for declaration and possession but did not pray to set aside the voidable sale deeds. The defendants argued the suit was barred by limitation, invoking Article 60(b)(ii) of the Limitation Act, 1963, which provides a three‑year period from the death of a minor who dies before attaining majority. The trial court applied Article 65 (twelve‑year period) and allowed the suit; the appellate and High Courts applied Article 60 and held the suit time‑barred. The Supreme Court affirmed that the correct limitation period is three years under Article 60, that the sale deeds are only voidable (not void) and must be set aside before any claim for possession, and therefore the suit was barred and improperly framed. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the suit filed by the plaintiffs is barred by limitation.
Whether a suit for declaration and possession is maintainable without a prayer to set aside the voidable sale deeds executed by the natural guardian of a minor.
Whether the release deed executed by the minor's mother repudiated the alienation made by the guardian.

Legislation cited

Guardians and Wards Act, 1890
Hindu Minority & Guardianship Act, 1956s. Section 11, s. Section 8(1), s. Section 8(2), s. Section 8(3)
Indian Succession Act, 1925s. Section 119
Limitation Act, 1963s. Article 60, s. Article 65
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. Section 19, s. Section 21

Subjects

Limitation ActArticle 60Article 65voidable sale deedHindu Minority & Guardianship Actguardian of minorset asidepossessionrelease deedvested rightcontingent rightsuccession

Judgment

[2019] 4 S.C.R. 357 357

MURUGAN & ORS. A
v.
KESAVA GOUNDER (DEAD) THR. LRS. AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 1782 of 2019)
FEBRUARY 25, 2019 B
[ASHOK BHUSHAN AND K. M. JOSEPH, JJ.]
Limitation Act, 1963 – Arts.60 and 65 – Suit property belonged
to one ‘PG’, who had two sons, ‘K’ and ‘B’ and three daughters –
‘PG’ executed Will in 1971 bequeathing life interest to his sons ‘K’
C
and ‘B’ and thereafter to the two male heirs of his sons – ‘PG’
died – ‘B’ on his behalf and on behalf of his minor son ‘P’ sold
certain portion of the suit property to defendants-respondents in
1981-82– ‘B’ died in 1983, his minor son ‘P’ died on 11.02.1986 –
B’s wife executed registered Release Deed in 1986 in favour of the
plaintiffs-appellants (sons of ‘K’) for consideration – Plaintiffs filed D
suit in 1992 on the ground that ‘B’ had no authority to execute the
Sale Deeds on behalf of his minor son ‘P’ and the same were void –
Defendants inter alia contended that the suit was barred by limitation
as it was not filed within 3 years from the death of ‘P’, i.e. 11.02.1986
– Suit decreed – Defendants filed appeal – Allowed – Plaintiffs
E
filed second appeal in the High Court – Dismissed – Held: Part IV
of the Limitation Act, dealing with suits relating to “Decrees and
instruments”, contains Art.60 – Art.60 although provides for
limitation of a suit but also clearly indicates that to set aside a
transfer of property made by the guardian of a ward a suit is
contemplated – Art.60(b)(ii) refers to a suit when a ward dies before F
attaining majority – Present is a case where ‘P’ died before attaining
majority – Limitation to avoid instrument made by guardian of the
ward is 3 years from the death of ward when he dies before attaining
majority – Sale deeds by ‘B’ on his behalf and on behalf of his
minor son ‘P’, executed without the permission of the Court were in
G
contravention of s.8(2), 1956 Act and hence voidable – Sale deeds
being voidable and not void, plaintiffs cannot rely on Art.65, period
for limitation under which is 12 years – High Court rightly held
that limitation for suit was governed by Art. 60 and the suit was
barred by time – Alienations being voidable, were required to be set
H
357
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A aside before relief for possession can be claimed by the plaintiffs –
Suit filed by the plaintiffs without seeking prayer for setting aside
the sale deeds was, thus, not properly framed and could not have
been decreed – Sale deeds executed by ‘B’ were not repudiated or
avoided within the period of limitation as prescribed by law – Hindu
Minority & Guardianship Act, 1956 – s.8.
B
Hindu Minority & Guardianship Act, 1956 – s.8(3) – Right
under – Of the minor or any person claiming under him – Discussed.
Words & Phrases - “Vested Right” and “Contingent Right” –
Distinction between – Held: Vested right is the subject matter of
C s.19 of the 1882 Act while contingent interest is dealt with u/s.21 of
the 1882 Act – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – ss.19, 21.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Part IV of the Limitation Act, 1963 which deals
with suits relating to “Decrees and instruments” contains Articles
D 59 and 60. Article 65 is contained in Part V (suits relating to
immovable properties). Article 60(b)(ii)refers to a suit when a
ward dies before attaining majority. The present is a case where
‘P’ died on 11.02.1986 before attaining majority, his date of birth
being 16.07.1978, the limitation to avoid instrument made by
E guardian of the ward is 03 years from the death of ward when he
dies before attaining majority. [Paras 7, 8 and 9][366-G; 367-D;
360-A-B]
1.2 The period of limitation under Article 65 is available
when suit is filed for possession of immovable property on any
F interest therein based on title. The present is a case where by
registered sale deeds the property was conveyed by the father of
the minor. Thus, when sale deed was executed by Balaraman he
purported to convey the right of the minor also. The sale deeds
being voidable and not void, plaintiffs cannot rely on Article 65.
First Appellate Court and the High Court rightly held that
G limitation for suit was governed by Article 60 and the suit was
clearly barred by time. [Para 11][369-D, E]
1.3 In the present case, there is no dispute that sale deeds
executed by ‘B’ on behalf of himself and his minor son ‘P’ were
executed without obtaining permission of the Court. Sale deed
H in violation of Section 8(1) and 8(2) of the Hindu Minority &
MURUGAN & ORS. v. KESAVA GOUNDER (DEAD) THR. LRS. 359

Guardianship Act, 1956 is a voidable sale deed. The alienations, A
which were voidable, at the instance of minor or on his behalf
were required to be set aside before relief for possession can be
claimed by the plaintiffs. Suit filed on behalf of the plaintiffs without
seeking prayer for setting aside the sale deeds was, thus, not
properly framed and could not have been decreed. [Paras 13,
B
14, 20] [370-F; 372-A; 375-G-H]
1.4 The release deed dated 24.03.1986 has been brought
on the record as Annexure P-1. A perusal of the release deed
does not indicate that there is any reference of alienation made
by ‘B’ favour of the defendants. There being no reference of the
alienation made by ‘B’ on behalf of minor, there is no occasion to C
read release deed as repudiation of the claim on behalf of the
minor. Section 8(3), 1956 Act gives a right to the minor or any
person claiming under him, the relevant words in Section 8(3)
are “at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under
him.” Thus, alienation made on behalf of the minor can be avoided D
by minor or any person claiming under him. In event, minor dies
before attaining majority, obviously, his legal heirs will have right
to avoid the alienation. Sub-section (3) of Section 8 refers to a
disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian in
contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) as voidable.
When a registered sale deed is voidable, it is valid till it is avoided E
in accordance with law. The rights conferred by a registered sale
deed are good enough against the whole world and the sale can
be avoided in case the property sold is of a minor by a natural
guardian at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under
him. A document which is voidable has to be actually set aside F
before taking its legal effect. [Paras 21, 24] [376-A-C; 376-F-G]
1.5 Supreme Court time and again held that setting aside
of a sale which is voidable under Section 8(3) is necessary for
avoiding a registered sale deed. Court may, however, not to be
understood that it is holding that in all cases where minor has to G
avoid disposal of immovable property, it is necessary to bring a
suit. There may be creation of charge or lease of immovable
property which may not be by registered document. It may depend
on facts of each case as to whether it is necessary to bring a suit
for avoiding disposal of the immovable property or it can be done
H
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A in any other manner. The Limitation Act, 1963 has been enacted
by the Parliament after the enactment of Hindu Minority and
Guardianship Act, 1956. Article 60 of the Limitation Act, 1963
which provides for limitation “suits relating to decrees and
instruments”. The Limitation Act contemplates suit to set aside
a transfer of property made by the guardian of a ward for which
B
limitation is contemplated as three years. Article 60 of the
Limitation Act although provides for a limitation of a suit but also
clearly indicates that to set aside a transfer of property made by
the guardian of a ward a suit is contemplated. [Paras 28, 29]
[378-E-H; 379-A]
C 1.6 Section 11 of the 1956 Act contains a statutory
prohibition on “de facto guardian” of the minor from disposing of
the property of the minor. The transfer made by de facto guardian
is, thus, void and can be repudiated in any manner. It is well settled
that it is not necessary for a minor or any person claiming under
D him to file a suit for setting aside a void deed. A void deed can be
ignored. [Para 31] [379-G]
1.7 In the present case there having been no repudiation
of sale deed on behalf of minor, the question of voidable sale
deed becoming void does not arise. In the present case it was
E necessary for the person claiming through minor to bring an action
within a period of three years from the date of the death of the
minor to get sale deed executed by ‘B’ set aside. The sale deeds
executed by ‘B’ were not repudiated or avoided within the period
of limitation as prescribed by law. [Paras 34, 35] [382-B, C]

F Madhukar Vishwanath v. Madahav and Others (1999)
9 SCC 446; Narayan v. Babasaheb and Others (2016)
6 SCC 725 : [2016] 2 SCR 948; Nangali Amma Bhavani
Amma v. Gopalkrishnan Nair and Others (2004) 8 SCC
785; Gorakh Nath Dube v. Hari Narain Singh and
others (1973) 2 SCC 535 : [1974] 1 SCR 339 – relied
G on.
Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University
and Others (2001) 6 SCC 534 : [2001] 3 SCR 1129;
Vishwambhar and Others v. Laxminarayan (Dead)
Through LRs. and Another (2001) 6 SCC 163;
H Madhegowda (dead) by LRs. v. Ankegowda (dead) by
MURUGAN & ORS. v. KESAVA GOUNDER (DEAD) THR. LRS. 361

LRs. and Others (2002) 1 SCC 178 : [2001] 5 Suppl. A
SCR 290; Amirtham Kudumbah v. Sarnam Kudumban
(1991) 3 SCC 20 : [1991] 2 SCR 389; Madhegowda
(Dead) by LRs. v. Ankegowda (Dead) by LRs. and
others (2002) 1 SCC 178 : [2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 290;
G. Annamalai Pillai v. District Revenue Officer and
B
others (1993) 2 SCC 402 : [1993] 2 SCR 397 –
referred to.
Case Law Reference

(1999) 9 SCC 446 relied on Para 9
C
[2016] 2 SCR 948 relied on Para 10

[2001] 3 SCR 1129 referred to Para 16

(2001) 6 SCC 163 referred to Para 17
D
[2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 290 referred to Para 18

(2004) 8 SCC 785 relied on Para 19

[1974] 1 SCR 339 relied on Para 24 E
[1991] 2 SCR 389 referred to Para 25

[2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 290 referred to Para 30

[1993] 2 SCR 397 referred to Para 32 F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1782
of 2019
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.04.2010 of the High
Court of Judicature at Madras in S.A. No. 644 of 2000.
G
V. Prabhakar, Ms. Jyoti Parasher, N. J . Ramchandar,
R. Chandrachud, Advs. for the Appellants.
Ms. V. Mohana, Sr. Adv., B. Ragunath, Mrs. N. C. Kavitha,
C. D. Singh, Vijay Kumar, Advs. for the Respondents.
H
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. 1. This is the plaintiff ’s appeal
challenging the judgment of Madras High Court dismissing the second
appeal filed by the plaintiffs-appellants.
2. Brief facts of the case are:-
B 2.1 The suit property belongs to one Petha Gounder. Petha
Gounder had two sons namely Kannan and Balaraman and
three daughters. Sengani Ammal was wife of Petha
Gounder. On 17.05.1971 Petha Gounder executed a Will
bequeathing life interest to his sons Kannan and Balaraman
C and thereafter to the two male heirs of his both the sons,
who were to take the property absolutely. Will further
stipulated that in event, there is no male heir to one of his
sons, the male heirs of other son will take the property. Petha
Gounder died on 28.11.1971 leaving behind his wife, two
sons Balaraman and Kannan and three daughters. Petha
D Gounder’s wife Sengani Ammal died on 02.02.1982.
Balaraman had one son namely Palanivel.
2.2 Balaraman on his behalf as well as on behalf of his minor
son had sold Item Nos.1 to 3 of the suit properties by
registered Sale Deed dated 15.12.1981. Balaraman also
E sold Item No.6 and a portion of Item No.7 by two Sale
Deeds dated 30.03.1981 and 31.03.1981 in favour of the
first defendant. Balaraman had sold Item No. 6 in favour
of the second defendant by registered Sale Deed dated
29.03.1982. Balaraman died in 1983 and Kannan died on
02.12.1984. Balaraman’s wife was Lakshmi. The plaintiffs
F are sons of Kannan. Palanivel, the son of Balaraman died
on 11.02.1986 while still a minor. Palanivel’s mother
Lakshmi Ammal executed a registered Release Deed dated
24.03.1986 in favour of the plaintiffs for a consideration.
The plaintiffs filed suit No.229 of 1992 praying for following
G reliefs:-
“VI. The plaintiffs therefore pray that the Hon’ble Court
may be pleased to:-
(a) Declare that the plaintiffs are entitled to the suit
properties;
H
MURUGAN & ORS. v. KESAVA GOUNDER (DEAD) THR. LRS. 363
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

(b) Direct the Defendants to deliver possession of the A
suit properties failing which order delivery of
possession through process of court;
(c) Direct the Defendants to pay the cost of the suit
and
(d) Grant such other reliefs as the Hon’ble Court may B
deem fit in the circumstances of the case.”
2.3 The plaintiffs’ case in the plaint was that Balaraman had no
authority to execute Sale Deed on behalf of his minor son
Palanivel and the Sale Deeds executed by Balaraman were
void. The plaintiffs being sons of Kannan are entitled for C
declaration and possession of the properties from the
defendants. It was further pleaded that validity of the Will
dated 17.05.1971 has been upheld by the Subordinate Judges
Court, Cuddalore in O.S. No. 447 of 1973.
2.4 The defendant filed written statement. The defendant’s
case was that Balaraman, in order to discharge his debts D
and for family necessity executed sale deed for himself
and on behalf of his minor son on 15.12.1981. The sale
deed binds the minor Palanivel. The release deed executed
by Lakshmi Ammal on 24.03.1986 will confer no right to
the plaintiffs. The suit is barred by limitation since the suit E
has not been filed within 03 years from the date of death of
Palanivel i.e. 11.02.1986. The suit as framed is not
maintainable. The defendants are not in illegal possession.
The defendants are bonafide purchasers for value. The
plaintiffs cannot file suit for declaration without praying for
setting aside the sale deeds. F
2.5 The trial court framed ten issues. Issue No.7 was “Whether
the suit is barred by limitation?”. Issue No.8 was “Whether
the plaintiffs are entitled to seek for declaration of title in
respect of suit properties?”. Issue No.9 was “Whether the
plaintiffs are entitled to seek for recovery of possession?”. G
The trial court while deciding Issue No.7 held that suit is
not barred by limitation. Trial court held that plaintiff having
filed the suit as reversioner, Article 65 of the Limitation Act
will apply. As per Article 65, period for limitation is 12
years, hence suit was within time. The Will dated
H
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A 17.05.1971 was held to be a valid Will. The sale deeds
executed by Balaraman are voidable. On release deed,
the trial court held that Lakshmi Ammal had no right in the
suit properties, as such the plaintiffs do not derive any new
right from the release deed. Trial court held that it is not
necessary to decide the truth and validity of the release
B
deed dated 24.03.1986. The trial court further held that there
was no necessity to file the suit seeking a prayer to set
aside the sale deeds separately since those sale deeds are
voidable and they can be ignored. It was held that plaintiffs
are competent to recover possession from the defendants.
C Trial court vide its judgment and decree dated 13.08.1997
decreed the suit.
2.6 The defendants aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court
filed appeal. The Principal District Judge vide its judgment
dated 31.08.1999 allowed the appeal dismissing the suit.
D Appellate Court held that since Palanivel died on 11.02.1986,
the suit should have been filed to set aside the sale deeds
and for possession within 03 years from his death. The suit
filed in 1992 was barred by limitation. The Appellate Court
relied on Article 60 of the Limitation Act. Aggrieved against
the judgment of the First Appellate Court, the plaintiffs filed
E second appeal in the High Court. High Court vide its
judgment dated 21.04.2010 dismissed the second appeal.
High Court had framed following substantial questions of
law for consideration:-
“i) Whether the Learned First Appellate Judge is correct
F in holding that the release deed Ex.A-15 dated
24.03.1986, is not avoiding the transfers by sales under
Exs. A-9=B-9, A-10=B-7, A-11=B-2 and A-12=B-9,
executed by the natural guardian late Balaraman, of
the properties belong to the deceased minor Palanivel?
ii) Whether the sale deeds executed by late Balaraman,
G
the natural guardian of minor Palanivel, of the properties
of the minor are valid in law when the said sale deeds
were executed in gross violation of Section 8(2)(a) of
the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, especially

H
MURUGAN & ORS. v. KESAVA GOUNDER (DEAD) THR. LRS. 365
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

when the mother, who claimed under the minor avoided A
the sale immediately on the demise of the minor?
iii) Whether first appellate Judge is correct in holding that
the suit is not maintainable, since the suit was not filed
to set aside the sales within three years from the date
of demise of minor Palanivel? B
2.7 The High Court held that alienations made by Balaraman
can be construed only as a voidable alienations and not void
alienations. High Court held that plaintiffs suit ought to have
been filed within 03 years as per Article 60 of the Limitation
Act. All substantial questions of law were decided in favour C
of the defendants-respondents. High Court dismissed the
second appeal. Aggrieved against the judgment, this appeal
has been filed.
3. Shri V. Prabhakar, learned counsel for the appellants in support
of the appeal contends that Article 60 of the Limitation Act shall not D
apply and the suit was rightly held to be governed by Article 65 by the
trial court, which was well within time. It is submitted that the option to
repudiate the action on behalf of the minor having been exercised by
mother of the minor, the sale deed executed by Balaraman become void
from its inception. Sale deeds executed by Balaraman were without
E
permission of the Court and were without legal necessity, hence was
rightly repudiated by his mother Lakshmi Ammal. On the strength of
repudiation of the alienation by Lakshmi Ammal, the sale deeds become
void and there was no necessity for praying for setting aside the sale
deeds and suit for declaration and possession was fully maintainable.
Article 60 would have been applicable only if the suit was filed for setting F
aside the sale deeds.
4. Ms. V. Mohana, learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondents refuting the submissions of the counsel for the appellants
contends that suit was clearly barred by time, it having been not filed
within 03 years from the date of death of the minor. It is further submitted G
that release deed dated 24.03.1986 cannot be accepted as repudiation
of the sale deeds. It is submitted that without praying for setting aside
the sale deeds, the decree of possession could not have been claimed by
the plaintiffs. Limitation was governed by Article 60 of the Limitation
Act.
H
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A 5. Learned counsel for the parties have relied on various judgments,
which shall be referred to and considered while considering the
submissions in detail.
6. From the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and
pleadings on record, following are the issues, which arise for consideration
B in this appeal:-
(i) Whether the suit filed by the plaintiffs-appellants was barred
by limitation?
(ii) Whether without praying for setting aside the sale deeds
executed by Balaraman, the suit for declaration and
C possession was maintainable?
(iii) Whether the plaintiffs can successfully contend that by
execution of release deed dated 24.03.1986 by Lakshmi
Ammal, sale deeds executed by Balaraman were successfully
repudiated?
Issue No. 1
D
7. The trial court has held that suit has been filed within time
relying on Article 65 whereas the Appellate Court as well as the High
Court relied on Article 60 and held that suit was barred by time. Part IV
of the Limitation Act, which deals with suits relating to “Decrees and
instruments” contains Articles 59 and 60. Article 60 is as follows:-
E
“_________________________________________________
Description of suit Period of Time from which
Limitation period begins to run
__________________________________________________________

60 To set aside a transfer of
F property made by the
guardian of a ward-

(a) by the ward who
has attained majority.
Three years When the ward attains majority.
(b) by the ward's
G legal representative-
i) When the ward dies Three years When the ward attains majority.
within three years from
the date of attaining
majority.
ii) When the ward dies Three years When the ward dies.
H before attaining majority.”
MURUGAN & ORS. v. KESAVA GOUNDER (DEAD) THR. LRS. 367
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

8. Article 65 is contained in Part V (suits relating to immovable A
properties), which is as follows:-

“65. For possession of immovable Twelve Years When the possession of
property or any interest therein the defendant becomes
based on title. adverse to the plaintiff.
Explanation.- For the purposes B
of this article-
(a) Where the suit is by a
remainderman, a
reversioner (other than a
landlord) or a devisee, the
possession of the
defendant shall be C
deemed to become
adverse only when the
estate of the
remainderman,
reversioner or devisee, as
the case may be, falls into
D
possession;

(b) where the suit is by a
Hindu or Muslim entitled
to the possession of
immovable property on
the death of a Hindu or E
Muslim female, the
possession of the
defendant shall be
deemed to become
adverse only when the
female dies;
F

(c) where the suit is by a
purchaser at a sale in
execution of a decree
when the judgment-
debtor was out of G
possession at the date of
the sale, the purchaser
shall be deemed to be a
representative of the
judgment-debtor who was
out of possession.”
H
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A 9. Article 60(b)(ii)refers to a suit when a ward dies before attaining
majority. The present is a case where Palanivel died on 11.02.1986
before attaining majority, his date of birth being 16.07.1978, the limitation
to avoid instrument made by guardian of the ward is 03 years from the
death of ward when he dies before attaining majority. This Court had
occasion to consider Articles 60 and 65 of the Limitation Act in reference
B
to alienation made by a de-facto guardian of a minor. In the case of
Madhukar Vishwanath Vs. Madahav and Others, (1999) 9 SCC
446, the maternal uncle of the appellant has executed a sale deed. The
appellant after becoming major on 22.08.1966 filed a suit on 07.02.1973
praying that transferors be required to deliver the possession of the
C property. On behalf of appellant, Article 65 was relied for the purposes
of limitation. This Court held that it is Article 60 and not Article 65,
which is applicable. Paragraph No. 4 and 5 of the judgment are relevant,
which are quoted as below:-
“4. XXXXXXXXX
D That the defendant, Baburao Madhorao Puranik, was the
appellant’s de facto guardian had been established and, therefore,
the disposal by him of the said property was void. Being void, it
was open to the appellant to file the suit for possession of the said
property and the period for limitation for such suit was prescribed
E by Article 65.
5. ……………………Even if the suit was entertained as pleaded,
no decree for possession could have been passed without first
finding that the alienation was not for legal necessity and was,
therefore, bad in law. To such a suit the provisions of Article 60
F apply. Article 60 relates to a suit to set aside a transfer of property
made by the guardian of a ward by the ward who has attained
majority and the period prescribed is three years commencing on
the date on which the ward attains
majority………………………”
G 10. This Court in Narayan Vs. Babasaheb and Others, (2016)
6 SCC 725 again had occasion to consider Article 60 of the Limitation
Act. In the above case, this Court held that a suit by minor for setting
aside the sale of his property by his guardian is governed by Article 60 of
the Limitation Act. In Paragraph Nos. 25 and 26, following was laid
down:-
H
MURUGAN & ORS. v. KESAVA GOUNDER (DEAD) THR. LRS. 369
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

“25. A close analysis of the language of Article 60 would indicate A
that it applies to suits by a minor who has attained majority and
further by his legal representatives when he dies after attaining
majority or from the death of the minor. The broad spectrum of
the nature of the suit is for setting aside the transfer of immovable
property made by the guardian and consequently, a suit for
B
possession by avoiding the transfer by the guardian in violation of
Section 8(2) of the 1956 Act. In essence, it is nothing more than
seeking to set aside the transfer and grant consequential relief of
possession.
26. There cannot be any doubt that a suit by quondam minor to C
set aside the alienation of his property by his guardian is governed
by Article 60. To impeach the transfer of immovable property by
the guardian, the minor must file the suit within the prescribed
period of three years after attaining majority.”
11. Now, coming to Article 65, on which reliance has been placed D
by learned counsel for the appellants. The said period of limitation is
available when suit is filed for possession of immovable property on any
interest therein based on title. The present is a case where by registered
sale deeds the property was conveyed by the father of the minor was
eonominee party. Thus, when sale deed was executed by Balaraman
he purported to convey the right of the minor also. The sale deeds being E
voidable and not void, plaintiffs cannot rely on Article 65. We, thus, are
of the view that first Appellate Court and the High Court has rightly held
that limitation for suit was governed by Article 60 and the suit was clearly
barred by time.
12. It is important to find from the sale deed what was conveyed. F
This we say, as appellant has a case that the father of the minor was
given a life estate and after his death alone the minor was to get a right.
In this regard we may notice the distinction between a vested right and
a contingent right. Vested right is the subject matter of Section 19 of the
Transfer of Property Act whereas a contingent interest is dealt with G
Section 21 of the Transfer of Property Act. Since the life estate followed
by an absolute right is created by a will, the relevant provision is Section
119 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. Section 119 reads as follows:

H
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A “119. Date of vesting of legacy when payment or possession
postponed.—Where by the terms of a bequest the legatee is not
entitled to immediate possession of the thing bequeathed, a right
to receive it at the proper time shall, unless a contrary intention
appears by the Will, become vested in the legatee on the testator’s
death, and shall pass to the legatee’s representatives if he dies
B
before that time and without having received the legacy, and in
such cases the legacy is from the testator’s death said to be vested
in interest.
Explanation.—An intention that a legacy to any person shall
not become vested in interest in him is not to be inferred merely
C from a provision whereby the payment or possession of the thing
bequeathed is postponed, or whereby a prior interest therein is
bequeathed to some other person, or whereby the income arising
from the fund bequeathed is directed to be accumulated until the
time of payment arrives, or from a provision that, if a particular
D event shall happen, the legacy shall go over to another person.”
It is relevant that we notice illustration No.(iii) which reads as follows:
“(iii) A fund is bequeathed to A for life, and after his death to B.
On the testator’s death the legacy to B becomes vested in interest
in B.”
E
Therefore, the absolute right bequeathed in favour of Palanivel became
vested in him upon the death of Petha Gounder.
Issue No.2
13. In the present case, there is no dispute that sale deeds executed
F by Balaraman on behalf of himself and his minor son Palanivel were
executed without obtaining permission of the Court. Section 8 of the
Hindu Minority & Guardianship Act, 1956, which is relevant is as follows:-
8. Powers of natural guardian.- (1) The natural guardian of a
Hindu minor has power, subject to the provisions of this section,
G to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for
the benefit of the minor or for the realisation, protection or benefit
of the minor’s estate; but the guardian can in no case bind the
minor by a personal covenant.
(2) The natural guardian shall not, without the previous permission
H of the court,-
MURUGAN & ORS. v. KESAVA GOUNDER (DEAD) THR. LRS. 371
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

(a) mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or A
otherwise any part of the immovable property of the minor or
(b) lease any part of such property for a term exceeding five
years or for a term extending more than one year beyond the
date on which the minor will attain majority.
(3) Any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian, in B
contravention of subsection (1) or sub-section (2), is voidable at
the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him.
(4) No court shall grant permission to the natural guardian to do
any of the acts mentioned in sub-section (2) except in case of
necessity or for an evident advantage to the minor. C

(5) The Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890), shall apply to
and in respect of an application for obtaining permission of the
court under sub-section (2) in all respects as if it were an
application for obtaining the permission of the court under section
29 of that Act, and in particular- D
(a) proceedings in connection with the application shall be deemed
to be proceedings under that Act within the meaning of section
4A thereof.
(b) the court shall observe the procedure and have the powers
E
specified in sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of section 31 of that
Act; and
(c) an appeal shall lie from an order of the court refusing
permission to the natural guardian to do any of the acts
mentioned in sub-section (2) of this section to the court to
F
which appeals ordinarily lie from the decisions of that court.
(6) In this section, “Court” means the city civil court or a district
court or a court empowered under section 4A of the Guardians
and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890), within the local limits of whose
jurisdiction the immovable property in respect of which the
application is made is situate, and where the immovable property G
is situate within the jurisdiction of more than one such court, means
the court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any portion
of the property is situate.”

H
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A 14. This Court time and again has considered the cases of alienation
by natural guardian in contravention of Section 8 and Section 8(2) of the
1956 Act. This Court held that sale deed in violation of Section 8(1) and
8(2) is a voidable sale deed. Voidable has been defined in Black’s Law
Dictionary, Tenth Edition as under:-
B “Valid until annulled; esp., (of a contract) capable of being affirmed
or rejected at the option of one of the parties. This term describes
a valid act that may be voided rather than an invalid act that may
be ratified.”
15. Salmonds on Jurisprudence, Twelfth Edition has noticed the
C distinction between Valid, Void and Voidable in following passage:-
“… A valid agreement is one which is fully operative in accordance
with the intent of the parties. A void agreement is one which entirely
fails to receive legal recognition or sanction, the declared will of
the parties being wholly destitute of legal efficacy. A voidable
D agreement stands midway between these two cases. It is not a
nullity, but its operation is conditional and not absolute. By reason
of some defect in its origin it is liable to be destroyed or cancelled
at the option of one of the parties to it. On the exercise of this
power the agreement not only ceases to have any efficacy, but is
deemed to have been void ab initio. The avoidance of it relates
E back to the making of it. The hypothetical or contingent efficacy
which has hitherto been attributed to it wholly disappears, as if it
had never existed. In other words, a voidable agreement is one
which is void or valid at the election of one of the parties to it.”
16. This Court in Dhurandhar Prasad Singh Vs. Jai Prakash
F University and Others, (2001) 6 SCC 534 had noted the distinction
between Void and Voidable. In Paragraph No. 22, following has been
laid down:-
“22. Thus the expressions “void and voidable” have been the
subject-matter of consideration on innumerable occasions by
G courts. The expression “void” has several facets. One type of
void acts, transactions, decrees are those which are wholly without
jurisdiction, ab initio void and for avoiding the same no declaration
is necessary, law does not take any notice of the same and it can
be disregarded in collateral proceeding or otherwise. The other
type of void act, e.g., may be transaction against a minor without
H
MURUGAN & ORS. v. KESAVA GOUNDER (DEAD) THR. LRS. 373
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

being represented by a next friend. Such a transaction is a good A
transaction against the whole world. So far as the minor is
concerned, if he decides to avoid the same and succeeds in avoiding
it by taking recourse to appropriate proceeding the transaction
becomes void from the very beginning. Another type of void act
may be which is not a nullity but for avoiding the same a declaration
B
has to be made. Voidable act is that which is a good act unless
avoided, e.g., if a suit is filed for a declaration that a document is
fraudulent and/or forged and fabricated, it is voidable as the
apparent state of affairs is the real state of affairs and a party
who alleges otherwise is obliged to prove it. If it is proved that the
document is forged and fabricated and a declaration to that effect C
is given, a transaction becomes void from the very beginning.
There may be a voidable transaction which is required to be set
aside and the same is avoided from the day it is so set aside and
not any day prior to it. In cases where legal effect of a document
cannot be taken away without setting aside the same, it cannot be
D
treated to be void but would be obviously voidable.”
17. In Vishwambhar and Others Vs. Laxminarayan (Dead)
Through LRs. and Another, (2001) 6 SCC 163, which was a case
of challenge to alienation without Court’s sanction and without legal
necessity, this Court held that the alienation by natural guardian was
voidable. In the above case, the mother, natural guardian of two minors E
has executed the sale deed before they attained majority. Minors after
attaining majority had filed suit pleading that sale deeds are not binding
and operative on the legal rights of plaintiff, and prayed that the said sale
deeds be set aside to the extent of their share and the suit for possession
of the land be decreed. In the above case, after considering Section 8 F
this Court held that sale deeds were voidable at the instance of the
plaintiff. This Court further held that if the plaintiffs were required to
have the sale deeds set aside before making any claim in respect of suit
properties sold then a suit without such a prayer was of no avail to the
plaintiffs. Following was held in Paragraph No.9:-
G
“9. …………………………………The question is, in such
circumstances, are the alienations void or voidable? In Section
8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, it is laid
down, inter alia, that the natural guardian shall not, without previous
permission of the court, transfer by sale any part of the immoveable
H
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A property of the minor. In sub-section (3) of the said section, it is
specifically provided that any disposal of immoveable property by
a natural guardian, in contravention of sub-section (2) is voidable
at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him.
There is, therefore, little scope for doubt that the alienations made
by Laxmibai which are under challenge in the suit were voidable
B
at the instance of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs were required to
get the alienations set aside if they wanted to avoid the transfers
and regain the properties from the purchasers. As noted earlier in
the plaint as it stood before the amendment the prayer for setting
aside the sale deeds was not there, such a prayer appears to have
C been introduced by amendment during hearing of the suit and the
trial court considered the amended prayer and decided the suit on
that basis. If in law the plaintiffs were required to have the sale
deeds set aside before making any claim in respect of the properties
sold, then a suit without such a prayer was of no avail to the
plaintiffs. In all probability, realising this difficulty the plaintiffs
D
filed the application for amendment of the plaint seeking to
introduce the prayer for setting aside the sale deeds. Unfortunately,
the realisation came too late. Concededly, Plaintiff 2 Digamber
attained majority on 5-8-1975 and Vishwambhar, Plaintiff 1 attained
majority on 20-7-1978. Though the suit was filed on 30-11-1980
E the prayer seeking setting aside of the sale deeds was made in
December 1985. Article 60 of the Limitation Act prescribes a
period of three years for setting aside a transfer of property made
by the guardian of a ward, by the ward who has attained majority
and the period is to be computed from the date when the ward
attains majority. Since the limitation started running from the dates
F
when the plaintiffs attained majority the prescribed period had
elapsed by the date of presentation of the plaint so far as Digamber
is concerned. Therefore, the trial court rightly dismissed the suit
filed by Digamber. The judgment of the trial court dismissing the
suit was not challenged by him. Even assuming that as the suit
G filed by one of the plaintiffs was within time the entire suit could
not be dismissed on the ground of limitation, in the absence of
challenge against the dismissal of the suit filed by Digamber the
first appellate court could not have interfered with that part of the
decision of the trial court. Regarding the suit filed by Vishwambhar,
it was filed within the prescribed period of limitation but without
H
MURUGAN & ORS. v. KESAVA GOUNDER (DEAD) THR. LRS. 375
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

the prayer for setting aside the sale deeds. Since the claim for A
recovery of possession of the properties alienated could not have
been made without setting aside the sale deeds the suit as initially
filed was not maintainable. By the date the defect was rectified
(December 1985) by introducing such a prayer by amendment of
the plaint the prescribed period of limitation for seeking such a
B
relief had elapsed. In the circumstances, the amendment of the
plaint could not come to the rescue of the plaintiff.”
18. To the same effect is the judgment of this Court in
Madhegowda (dead) by LRs. Vs. Ankegowda (dead) by LRs. and
Others, (2002) 1 SCC 178, where in Paragraph No. 25, following has
been held:- C

“25.……………………The minor, on attaining majority, can
repudiate the transfer in any manner as and when occasion for it
arises. After attaining majority if he/she transfers his/her interest
in the property in a lawful manner asserting his/her title to the
same that is sufficient to show that the minor has repudiated the D
transfer made by the “de facto guardian/manager”.
19. This Court further held in Nangali Amma Bhavani Amma
Vs. Gopalkrishnan Nair and Others, (2004) 8 SCC 785 thatthe
alienation made in violation of Section 8(2) is voidable, holding it to be
void would not only be contrary to the plain words of the statute but E
would also deprive the minor of the right to affirm or ratify the transaction
upon attaining majority. Following was held in Paragraph No.8:-
“8. In view of the express language used, it is clear that the
transaction entered into by the natural guardian in contravention
of sub-section (2) was not void but merely voidable at the instance F
of the minor. To hold that the transaction in violation of Section
8(2) is void would not only be contrary to the plain words of the
statute but would also deprive the minor of the right to affirm or
ratify the transaction upon attaining
majority…………………………….” G
20. The alienations, which were voidable, at the instance of minor
or on his behalf were required to be set aside before relief for possession
can be claimed by the plaintiffs. Suit filed on behalf of the plaintiffs
without seeking prayer for setting aside the sale deeds was, thus, not
properly framed and could not have been decreed.
H
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A Issue No.3
21. The question is as to whether by execution of the release
deed dated 24.03.1986 in favour of the plaintiffs, there was repudiation
of the alienation made by Balaraman. The release deed has been brought
on the record as Annexure P-1. A perusal of the release deed does not
B indicate that there is any reference of alienation made by Balaraman in
favour of the defendants. There being no reference of the alienation
made by Balaraman on behalf of minor, there is no occasion to read
release deed as repudiation of the claim on behalf of the minor. Section
8(3) gives a right to the minor or any person claiming under him, the
relevant words in Section 8(3) are “at the instance of the minor or any
C person claiming under him.” Thus, alienation made on behalf of the
minor can be avoided by minor or any person claiming under him. In
event, minor dies before attaining majority, obviously, his legal heirs will
have right to avoid the alienation.
22. The submission raised by the learned counsel for the
D respondents is that for avoiding sale of immovable property of a minor
as contemplated under sub-section (3) of Section 8, the minor or any
person claiming under him has to bring an action i.e. to file a suit within
the limitation prescribed.
23. Learned counsel for the appellants has refuted the submission
E and contended that the avoidance of a sale of immovable property by a
minor can be in any manner. It is submitted that it is not necessary for
minor or the person claiming on his behalf to bring a suit for avoiding a
sale deed.
24. We have noticed above that sub-section (3) of Section 8 refers
F to a disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian in contravention
of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) as voidable. When a registered sale
deed is voidable, it is valid till it is avoided in accordance with law. The
rights conferred by a registered sale deed are good enough against the
whole world and the sale can be avoided in case the property sold is of
G a minor by a natural guardian at the instance of the minor or any person
claiming under him. A document which is voidable has to be actually set
aside before taking its legal effect. This Court in Gorakh Nath Dube
vs. Hari Narain Singh and others, (1973) 2 SCC 535, while making
distinction between void and voidable document held:

H
MURUGAN & ORS. v. KESAVA GOUNDER (DEAD) THR. LRS. 377
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

“5………We think that a distinction can be made between cases A
where a document is wholly or partially invalid so that it can be
disregarded by any court or authority and one where it has to be
actually set aside before it can cease to have legal effect. An
alienation made in excess of power to transfer would be, to the
extent of the excess of power, invalid. An adjudication on the
B
effect of such a purported alienation would be necessarily implied
in the decision of a dispute involving conflicting claims to rights or
interests in land which are the subject-matter of consolidation
proceedings……”
25. In Amirtham Kudumbah vs. Sarnam Kudumban, (1991)
3 SCC 20, this Court had occasion to consider the provisions of Section C
8(3) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. The facts of the
case have been noticed in paragraph 5 which is to the following effect:
“5. The relevant facts are that the suit property belonged to
one Veerammal. She had a daughter by name Kaliammal.
Veerammal died shortly after she purchased the property in 1948. D
She left behind her husband Kandayya and their daughter
Kaliammal. Subsequently, Kandayya married a second time when
his daughter Kaliammal was a minor. She thereupon left her
father’s house and resided with her maternal grandfather who
protected and maintained her. During her minority, Kandayya sold E
the property on October 29, 1959 to Jainulavudeen. On April 25,
1966, Jainulavudeen in turn sold the property to the defendant-
appellant. Subsequently, on May 26, 1966 the plaintiff obtained a
deed of sale of the suit property in his favour from Kaliammal
who had by then attained majority. The plaintiff thereafter instituted
the present suit (O.S. No. 491 of 1968) against the appellant to F
set aside the transfer of property made by Kandayya and for
recovery of its possession.”
26. One of the questions which came for consideration in the
above case was that “whether a transferee from a minor after he attained
majority, can file a suit to set aside the alienation made by the minor’s G
guardian or the said right is one to be exercised only by the minor? A
person entitled to avoid such a sale is either the minor or any person
claiming under him. This Court held that either the minor, or his legal
representative in the event of his death, or his successor-in-interest
H
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A claiming under him by reason of transfer inter vivos, must bring action
within the period prescribed for such a suit, i.e. three years. Following is
laid down in paragraph 9:
“9. The effect of this sub-section is that any disposal of
immovable property by a natural guardian otherwise than for the
B benefit of the minor or without obtaining the previous permission
of the court is voidable. A person entitled to avoid such a sale is
either the minor or any person claiming under him. This means
that either the minor, or his legal representative in the event of his
death, or his successor-in-interest claiming under him by reason
of transfer inter vivos, must bring action within the period
C prescribed for such a suit, i.e. three years from the date on which
the minor died or attained majority, as the case may be. In the
present case, the suit was brought, as found by the courts below,
within three years after the minor attained majority.”
27. In Vishwambhar and others vs. Laxminarayan(Dead)
D through LRs. and another (supra) this Court has observed that if in
law the plaintiffs were required to have the sale deeds set aside before
making any claim in respect of the properties sold, then a suit without
such a prayer was of no avail to the plaintiffs.
28. This Court time and again held that setting aside of a sale
E which is voidable under Section 8(3) is necessary for avoiding a registered
sale deed. We may, however, not to be understood that we are holding
that in all cases where minor has to avoid disposal of immovable property,
it is necessary to bring a suit. There may be creation of charge or lease
of immovable property which may not be by registered document. It
F may depend on facts of each case as to whether it is necessary to bring
a suit for avoiding disposal of the immovable property or it can be done
in any other manner. We in the present case are concerned with disposal
of immovable property by natural guardian of minor by a registered sale
deed, hence, we are confining our consideration and discussion only
with respect to transfer of immovable property by a registered deed by
G a natural guardian of minor.
29. The Limitation Act, 1963 has been enacted by the Parliament
after the enactment of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. Article
60 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which provides for limitation “suits relating
to decrees and instruments”. The Limitation Act contemplates suit to
H set aside a transfer of property made by the guardian of a ward for
MURUGAN & ORS. v. KESAVA GOUNDER (DEAD) THR. LRS. 379
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

which limitation is contemplated as three years. Article 60 of the A
Limitation Act although provides for a limitation of a suit but also clearly
indicates that to set aside a transfer of property made by the guardian of
a ward a suit is contemplated.
30. We may notice a judgment of this Court reported in
Madhegowda (Dead) by LRs. vs. Ankegowda (Dead) by LRs. and B
others, (2002) 1 SCC 178. This Court in the above case had occasion
to consider Section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956.
In the above case sister of a minor acting as guardian sold immovable
property by registered sale deed. In the above reference this Court had
made following observations:
C
“25………Undoubtedly Smt Madamma, sister of the minor,
is not a “guardian” as defined in Section 4(b) of the Act. Therefore,
she can only be taken to be a “de facto guardian” or more
appropriately “de facto manager”. To a transfer in such a case
Section 11 of the Act squarely applies. Therefore, there is little
scope for doubt that the transfer of the minor’s interest by a de D
facto guardian/manager having been made in violation of the
express bar provided under the section is per se invalid. The
existence or otherwise of legal necessity is not relevant in the
case of such invalid transfer. A transferee of such an alienation
does not acquire any interest in the property. Such an invalid E
transaction is not required to be set aside by filing a suit or judicial
proceeding. The minor, on attaining majority, can repudiate the
transfer in any manner as and when occasion for it arises. After
attaining majority if he/she transfers his/her interest in the property
in a lawful manner asserting his/her title to the same that is
sufficient to show that the minor has repudiated the transfer made F
by the “de facto guardian/manager”.”
31. The above observations were made by this Court in the context
of Section 11 of the Act, 1956. Section 11 of the Act contains a statutory
prohibition on “de facto guardian” of the minor from disposing of the
property of the minor. The transfer made by de facto guardian is, thus, G
void and can be repudiated in any manner. It is well settled that it is not
necessary for a minor or any person claiming under him to file a suit for
setting aside a void deed. A void deed can be ignored. The above
observations cannot be held to be applicable to transfer made by a natural
guardian under Section 8(3) of the Act. H
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A 32. We may notice one more judgment of this Court relied on by
the learned counsel for the appellants that is G. Annamalai Pillai vs.
District Revenue Officer and others, (1993) 2 SCC 402. The
question which arose for consideration in the said case has been noticed
in paragraph 1 of the judgment in following words:
B “1. The short question for consideration in this appeal is whether
lease deed in dispute, which was voidable in terms of Section 8(3)
of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (the Act) when
validly avoided, was effective from the date of the lease deed so
as to make the transaction void and unenforceable from the very
inception.”
C
33. The land in dispute was owned by one Janarthanan. His father,
Purushothaman executed a registered lease deed in favour of appellant
on 12.12.1971 on which date the owner was minor. The appellant filed
application before Tehsildar to be registered as a tenant which was
contested by Janarthanan. Janarthanan contended that his father has no
D right or title to deal with land and lease by his father is in contravention
of Section 8 of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. Tehsildar
held that there was no valid lease which order was confirmed by the
High Court against which judgment appeal was filed. In paragraphs 5
and 6 following has been laid down:
E “5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. We have been
taken through the orders of the Revenue authorities, judgment of
the learned Single Judge and of the Division Bench of the High
Court in writ appeal. The Division Bench of the High Court, in a
lucid judgment, answered the question — posed by us in the
F beginning — in the affirmative and against the appellant-Annamalai
Pillai on the following reasoning:
“We have already seen that clause (3) of Section 8 of the
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, specifically makes
the transaction voidable. The lease executed by the guardian
G in this case is prohibited and in that sense it was without any
authority. On the legal efficacy and the distinction between
valid, void and voidable agreements, we find the following
passage in Salmond on Jurisprudence, Twelfth Edition at
page 341:

H
MURUGAN & ORS. v. KESAVA GOUNDER (DEAD) THR. LRS. 381
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

‘… A valid agreement is one which is fully operative in A
accordance with the intent of the parties. A void agreement
is one which entirely fails to receive legal recognition or
sanction, the declared will of the parties being wholly
destitute of legal efficacy. A voidable agreement stands
midway between these two cases. It is not a nullity, but its
B
operation is conditional and not absolute. By reason of some
defect in its origin it is liable to be destroyed or cancelled at
the option of one of the parties to it. On the exercise of this
power the agreement not only ceases to have any efficacy,
but is deemed to have been void ab initio. The avoidance of
it relates back to the making of it. The hypothetical or C
contingent efficacy which has hitherto been attributed to it
wholly disappears, as if it had never existed. In other words,
a voidable agreement is one which is void or valid at the
election of one of the parties to it.’
This distinction has also been judicially noticed in the Privy D
Council judgment reported in Satgur Prasad v. Harnarain Das
and in the Division Bench judgment in S.N.R. Sundara Rao and
Sons, Madurai v. CIT. The Division Bench held, following the
said Privy Council judgment as follows:
‘When a person, who is entitled to dissent from the alienation, E
does so, his dissent is in relation to the transaction as such and
not merely to the possession of the alienee on the date of such
dissent.
The effect of the evidence is, therefore, to get rid of the
transaction with the result that in law it is as if the transaction F
had never taken place.’
We have, therefore, no doubt that when the fifth respondent
avoided the lease executed by his father, the fourth respondent,
the lease became void from its inception and no statutory rights,
could, therefore, accrue in favour of the appellant herein.” G
6. We agree with the reasoning and the conclusions reached by
the Division Bench of the High Court and as such this appeal has
to be dismissed.”

H
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A 34. Learned counsel for the appellants relying on the above decision
contends that sale by Balaraman when has been avoided by release
deed it became void from the very beginning. There can be no quarrel to
the proposition laid down in G. Annamalai Pillai vs. District Revenue
Officer and others(supra). In the present case there having been no
repudiation of sale deed on behalf of minor, the question of voidable sale
B
deed becoming void does not arise.
35. We are, thus, of the considered opinion that in the present
case it was necessary for the person claiming through minor to bring an
action within a period of three years from the date of the death of the
minor to get sale deed executed by Balaraman set aside. We, thus,
C conclude that the sale deeds executed by Balaraman were not repudiated
or avoided within the period of limitation as prescribed by law. Issue
No.3 is answered accordingly.
36. In view of the foregoing discussions, we do not find any merit
in this appeal. The appeal is dismissed accordingly.
D

Divya Pandey Appeal dismissed.

E

F

G

H