Holding

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellant under s.302 IPC, finding the sole eye‑witness testimony reliable and rejecting the parity and falsus doctrines.

Summary

The appellant Munna @ Puran Yadav and two co‑accused were tried for the murder of Chhota, the son of Gariba (PW‑4). Gariba, the father and sole eye‑witness, testified that the three accused entered his house, the co‑accused held the victim and the appellant fired the fatal shot. The trial court convicted the appellant under s.302 IPC; the co‑accused were convicted under s.302 read with s.34. The High Court confirmed the appellant's conviction but acquitted the co‑accused, giving them the benefit of doubt. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether a conviction can rest on a single, related eye‑witness, whether the principle of parity applies, and whether the post‑mortem timing and alleged falsus in uno, falsus omnibus doctrine defeat the prosecution. The Court held that a reliable sole witness, even if a relation, may support conviction, that parity does not compel acquittal of the appellant, and that the post‑mortem evidence corroborated the witness. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the conviction under s.302 IPC upheld.

Issues considered

The admissibility and reliability of testimony of a sole eye‑witness who is a relation witness
Whether the principle of parity requires the appellant's acquittal when co‑accused are acquitted
Whether the timing of death as indicated by the post‑mortem undermines the prosecution case
Whether the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus omnibus applies to discard the witness's testimony
Whether the offence constitutes murder under s.302 IPC or a lesser offence

Legislation cited

Arms Acts. 25, s. 27
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 34

Subjects

murdersole eyewitnessrelation witnessprinciple of parityfalsus in unoSection 302 IPCevidence appraisalpost‑mortem timingcriminal jurisprudence

Judgment

[2008] 15 S.C.R. 279

' MUNNA@ POORAN YADAV A
II.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
(Criminal Appeal No. 1025 of 2006)

NOVEMBER 4, 2008 B
[D.K. JAIN AND V.S. SIRPURKAR, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860 - s. 302 - Murder - Prosecution of
three accused - Sole eye-witness related to the deceased -
;
Conviction of the appellant-accused uls, 302 and of the co- c
accused u/s. 302134 by trial court - High Court confirming
conviction of appellant-accused - Acquittal of co-accused
giving them benefit of doubt - On appeal, held: Order of High
Court justified - Facts of the case support the prosecution
case - The evidence of the eye-witness is reliable and has D
~ been appreciated by courts blow with caution - Hence cannot
be discarded his being sole eye-witness and related witness ·
- Evidence of the eye-witness also cannot be discarded on
the principle of Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus - Appellant-
accused is not entitled to parity with the co-accused. E

Appellant-accused alongwith two other accused (A2
and A3) was prosecuted for having caused death of one
person. Prosecution case was that the accused persons
--! entered the house of the deceased and took him out. A- F
2 and A-3 caught hold of the hands of the deceased and
the appellant-accused fired at him, as a result of which
---\
<.
he died on the spot. PW-4 (father of the deceased) was
the sole eye-witness to the incident. Trial Court convicted
appellant-accused uls 302 IPC, while acquitted him ulss. G
25 and 27 of Arms Act. A-2 and A-3 were convicted uls.
302/34 IPC. High Court confirmed the conviction of the

. '
appellant accused. However, A-2 and A-3 were acquitted
giving them benefit of doubt.
279 H
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

/
A ~n appeal to this Court, appellant contended that the
evidence of PW4 should not have been relied upon
because he was the sole eye-witness, was a related
witness and his evidence was not believed in so far as it
related to A-2 and A-3; that the appellant has been
B falsely implicated; time of death as given by prosecution
is incorrect; that the appellant should also have been
acquitted by reason of parity with A2 and A-3; and that
as the shock had not been caused by the appellant, the
offence would be minor and not u/s. 302 IPC.
c Dismissing the appeal, the Court
,'
HELD: 1.1 This court can and may convict relying on '
the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly
reliable and that there was no legal impediment in
D convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single
witness. In the instant case, not only was the evidence
of PW-4 acceptable but it was also corroborated by his
immediate disclosure to P.W.5 and P.W.8. It was, therefore,
rightly accepted and acted upon. [Para 18] [291-G-H; 292-
E A]

Kunju l/ias Balachandran v. State of Tamil Nadu, [2008)
2 SCC 151 and Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, AIR
(1957) SC 614, relied on.
..._

F 1.2. True, it is that P.W.4 is a relation witness and as
such requires a closer scrutiny keeping that factor in
mind. The High Court was quite alive to the fact that it was
(
the evidence of a near relation and therefore court had
to use caution. Such caution was exercised by the High
G Court while appreciating the evidence of PW4 and the
High Court was right in accepting his evidence. The court
should not only exercise the caution while appreciating
such evidence of relation witness but also it should be
seen from the judgment. The courts below have not only
:
H exercised caution but it is also apparent from the
MUNNA@POORAN YADAV v. STATE OF MADHYA 281
PRADESH

judgments that such caution is in fact exercised. [Para 11] A
[287-F-H; 288-A]
2. It cannot be said that the death must have
occurred much more than 24 hours earlier to the hour of
the post mortem i.e. near about 36 hours. The post
B
mortem clearly suggests that the death must have
-4
occurred between 24 hours to 36 hours. Therefore, if the
death is 24 hours prior to the post mortem with a
difference of about 2-3 hours as admitted by the doctor
in his cross examination then it is obvious that the death
might have occurred in the morning of 01.02.1997 which
c
completely matches the testimony of P.W.4. It is nowhere
tried to be brought out in the cross-examination that the
death had not occurred 24 hours prior to the post mortem
examination or that it had occurred much before that i.e.
about 36 hours. No suggestion was put to the doctor nor D
~ >
was the post mortem report assailed in the cross
examination on that particular aspect. [Para 9] (286-F-H;
287-A]
3.1. It is not correct to say that by reason of parity, E
the appellant should also be acquitted. The principle of
parity cannot be applied in this case, where it is
specifically proved that it was the appellant alone who
whipped out the gun and fired at the deceased killing him
j
instantly. Such evidence was not available against the
F
two acquitted accused. [Para 14] (290-F]
Akhil Ali Jehangir Ali Sayyed v. State of Maharashtra,
(
' (2003] 2 sec 708, distinghished.
3.2. In the instant case , the substratum of the
evidence of P.W. 4 has not been found to be false. Thus G·
there is no need to throw out the prosecution case in its
'~
entirety. On the other hand, both the courts below have
rightly chosen and relied on prosecution evidence. [Para
15] [291-B]
Bhagirath v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1976] 1 SCC 20, H
282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

A distinguished.
3.3. The High Court has only exercised a cautious
·approach in partly rejecting his evidence. High Court
realised the fact that when P.W.4 related the incident to
8 other witne~ses, he had not mentioned the names of A-
3 and A-2 nor had he suggested that they had caught
hold of the deceased and thereafter the. appellant had
shot fire from the fire arm; and that P.W.4 was a .sole eye-
witness to the incident and as he has not attributed any
C role to accused nos. 2 and 3, those accused should get
the benefit of doubt. It is not as if P.W.4 was totally
disbelieved nor was a finding recorded by the· courts·
below that he had falsely implicated the two accused
persons. It is one thing to disbelieve the witness and to
give benefit of doubt to the accused on the basis of that
0
evidence and it is quite another to hold that the witness
had deliberately and falsely implicated the two other
accused. The theory of falsus in uno, falsus omnibus ·
has long back ceased to apply in criminal jurisprudence
E of India. [Para 12) [288-C-E]
4. The doctor has very clearly opined that the shock
was the result of the firing by the appellant. In that view,
it is not correct to say that since the said shock had not
been caused by the appellant, the offence could not be ,L

F the one under Section 302 IPC but would be a minor
·offence. [Para 16) [291-C-D)
Case Law Reference :
c20031 2 sec 108 distinguished Para 14
G
£19761 1 sec 20 distinguished Para 15
.,,.,
c2008J 2 sec 151 relied on Para 18
AIR (1957) SC 614 relied on Para 18
H CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal

-
MUNNA@POORAN YADAV v. STATE OF MADHYA 283
PRADESH
..,
No. 1025 of 2006. A

From the Judgment and Order dated 22.9.2005 of the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Crl. Appeal No. 3102
of 1998.

S.K. Gambhir, Anil Sharma, V.K. Singh and T.N. Singh for B
the Appellant.
-1

Siddhartha Dave and Vibha Datta Makhija for the
·l
Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by c
V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. 1. The Appellant herein challenges
his conviction for an offence under Section 302 for having
committed murder of one Chhota S/o Gariba. Initially three
accused persons were tried for the offence under Section 302 D
read with Section 34 IPC as also under Section 302 simpliciter.
They were Munna @ Puran Chamar (Yadav) S/o Khusali
Chamar (A-1), Barra@ Radhacharan S/o Kallu Chamar (A-
2) and Brijlal S/o Devicharan Chamar (A-3). In addition to the
above charge under Section 302, Munna was also tried for an E
offence under Sections 25 and 27 of Indian Arms Act. 1st
Additional Sessions Judge Chhattarpur, M.P. convicted the
appellant under Section 302 Simpliciter and sentenced him to
suffer rigorous imprisonment for life while acquitting him from
~
the charges under. Sections 25 and 27 of Arms Act whereas
F
the other two co-accused were convicted for offence under
Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.

2. Two Criminal Appeals came to be filed before the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh; one being by the appellant Munna
(Accused No. 1) and Brijlal (Accused No.3) while another G
appeal came to be filed by Barra @ Radhacharan (Accused
No. 2). The High Court allowed the appeal in the case of
Accused No. 2 and Accused No. 3 and acquitted them of the
charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. However,
the appeal of the present appellant Munna (Accused No.1) was H
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

/

A dismissed confirming his conviction for an offence under
Section 302 IPC. It is this judgment whi,ch is in challenge before
us.

3. The prosecution story is based on the First Information
Report (Ex. P-11) lodged by Gariba (P.W.4), the father of the .
;
B
deceased Chhota on 01.02.1997 to the effect that in the
morning, three accused persons came to his house when his
son Chhota was sleeping. The appellant then entered the house
\-
•
and took away Chhota to a nearby place - Chamrola (the
platform used by the villagers for chit- chatting etc.). It was
r
c further ~!IE3g~ct that whileithe two,acquitted accused caught hold
of Chhota by his hands, the appellant Munna fired at C.hhota
due to which he fell down and died on the spot. On that basis
the investigation started and after the completion of the
investigation, all the accused were tried before the 1st
D Additional Sessions Judge, Chattarpur. On their conviction, all ,.._
the accused filed appeals before the High Court whic~ resulted
in the conviction of the appellant being confirmed. If.

4. Shri S.K. Gambhir, learned Senior Counsel appearing
E on behalf of the appellant firstly contended that the High Court
was not justified in relying upon the evidence of sole eye witness t.
Gariba (P.W.4) on account of his interest and secondly as his
evidence was disbelieved insofar as it related to the original .
accused no. 2- Barra and accused no. 3 - Brijlal. He further ,L

F pointed out that the First Information Report in this case was
obviously incorrect as the timings of the First Information Report
could not match with the oral testimony of Gariba (P.W.4), in
that, he submitted that had the i.ncident taken place at about 7
O'clock in the morning and the police station at Jujharnagar I

G being six kilometres away, the First Information Report could r
I
not have been lodged at 8.05 O'clock as in fact much time was
/"'
spent in contacting the other persons who, admittedly, attended
the Police Station alongwith P.W.4- Gariba. The learned senior
counsel, therefore, says that the whole prosecution story itself
H becomes suspect.
MUNNA@ POORAN YADAV v. STATE OF MADHYA 285
PRADESH [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

5. The learned senior counsel next contended that Chhota A
himself was a dreaded criminal and, therefore, a number of
persons in and around the village were his enemies. The
learned counsel argued that it may be that Chhota was found
dead outside hi's house and not knowing as to who had killed
Chhota, his father had falsely implicated the three accused .8
_, persons who had no reason, atleast visible reason to commit
murder of Chhota . The learned senior counsel also to'ok us
through the post mortem report to suggest that the death had
occurred much earlier to the time indicated in the post mortem
report. We were taken through the medical evidence more G
particularly of Dr. S.S. Chourasia (P.W. 2). Lastly, learned
r-
...
senior counsel suggested that the evidences of other witnesses
like Ambika Prasad (P.W.1) as also of Sunderlal Vishwakarma
(P.W.3), Mstt. Munni Bai (P.W.5) and Rahmat (P.W.8) could not
be believed and according to the learned senior counsel both D
;.
the courts below erred in accepting that evidence.
6. As against this, Shri Siddhartha Dave, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the State supported the conviction and
pointed out that there was no reason for Gariba (P.W.4) to
E
falsely implicate the accused. He pointed out that it was quite
possible for Gariba to reach the police station at about 8
. O'clock in the morning and to lodge the First Information
....._
Report. He also pointed out that the medical evidence as well
' as the post mortem report itself showed that the death had
F
taken place at the time as indicated in post mortem report and
thus supports the evidence of the doctor. Lastly, the learned
. counsel pointed out that the other witnesses were rightly
believed by the Sessions Court as well as the High Court as
corroborative evidence of Gariba (P.W. 4)
G
.. 7. It is on this backdrop that we have to consider the
correctness of the judgment.

8. The first and the foremost thing is that the homicidal
death of Chhota by firing is not disputed. There is practically
H
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

A no challenge to the evidence of the Dr. S.S. Chaurasia (P.W.2)
who asserted that the deceased had died due to the bullet
wound which was slightly below the back side of the neck and
the bullet turned towards the right rupturing internal organs and
breaking bones of right side ribs stopped below the skin. In
B par~ 9 of his examination in chief, he opined that the death of
the deceased was caused due to shock suffered due to firearm
injury to him. There is hardly any cross examination of the
witness except a feeble suggestion that the injury could not be
sustained if the bullet is fired from the sides. One other
c suggestion was regarding the timing of injury in which the doctor
affirmed that there could be difference of 2--3 hours in the
period of injury. The learned counsel for defence argued that
in the post mortem report, it was indicated that the timing of
injury and death could be about 24 hours to 36 hours earlier
o from the time of post mortem. The post mortem was conducted
on 02.02.1997, i.e. the next day at 9.00 a.m. From this, the
learned counsel argued that if 36 hours have to be counted
backwards from 9.00 a.m. on 2.2.1997, then the death of
I Chhota could not have occurred in the morning but it must be
E somewhere at night between 01.02.1997 and 02.02.1997. It
was on this basis that the learned counsel tried to develop his
theory of false implication as also the wrong timing of filing of
F.l.R.
9. This basic premise about the hour of death is wholly
F incorrect. The post mortem clearly suggests that the death must
have occurred between 24 hours to 36 hours. Therefore, if the
death is 24 hours prior to the post mortem with a difference of
about 2-3 hours as admitted by the doctor in his cross
examination then it is obvious that the death might have
G occurred in the morning of 01.02.1997 which completely
matches the testimony of Gariba (P.W.4). It is nowhere tried to
be brought out in the cross-examination that the death had not
occurred 24 hours prior to the post mortem examination or that
it had occurred much before that; i.e. about 36 hours. No
H
MUNNA@POORAN YADAV v. STATE OF MADHYA 287
PRADESH [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

suggestion was put to the doctor nor was the post mortem A
report assailed in the cross examination on that particular
aspect. The learned senior counsel argued that it was the duty
of the prosecution to establish the timing of injury and the death
and that it had failed to establish the exact hour. We do not
agree with this contention in as-much-as the post mortem 91
report specifically states that the death had occurred 24 hours
-1 prior to the post mortem was conducted. We, therefore, reject
the contention of the learned senior counsel that the death must
have occurred much more than 24 hours earlier to the hour of
the post mortem near about 36 hours. c
10. Once this basic argument is rejected, the rest of the
arguments based on this very aspect predominantly must fall
and the argument that Chhota was already dead at night and
~ only was found to be shown in the morning has to be rejected.
\ D
> 11. Further, learned senior counsel had developed an
argument that the three accused had never come to the house
of the deceased nor did the appellant enter the house of the
deceased. On seeing the evidence of Gariba (P.W.4), Munni
Bai (P.W.5) and Rahmat (P.W.8), there is nothing to disbelieve E
their evidences. Gariba (P.W.4) specifically deposed that the
three accused had come and appellant had actually entered the
house. It was tried to suggest by the learned senior counsel that
this was not possible since the appellant had never earlier
entered the house of Gariba. In our opinion, such a plea is not F
possible. True, it is that Gariba (P.W.4) is a relation witness and
r
as such requires a closer scrutiny keeping that factor in mind.
When we see the judgment of the High Court, it is clear that the
High Court was quite alive to the fact that it was the evidence
of a near relation and therefore court had to use caution. We G
---( are satisfied that such caution was exercised by the High Court
~ while appreciating the evidence of Gariba (P.W.4) and the High
Court was right in accepting the evidence of Gariba. The rule
of appreciation of a relation witness is now well-settled. The
court should not only exercise the caution while appreciating H
288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

A such evidence, but also it should be seen from the judgment.
We do find that the courts below have not only exercised
caution but it is also apparent from the judgments that such
caution is in fact exercised.

12. The defence counsel tried to suggest that Gariba
8
(P.W.4) had falsely implicated Barra (A-2) and Brijlal (A-3) and
that the High Court had in fact disbelieved the evidence of the
witness in so far as those two accused are concerned and
hence his evidence should be disbelieved even as regards the
C appellant, we do not agree. The High Court has only exercised
a cautious approach in partly rejecting Gariba's evidence. The
High Court realised the fact that when Gariba (P.W.4) related
the incident to other witnesses, he had not mentioned the
names of Brijlal (A-3) and Barra (A-2) nor had he suggesled
that they had caught hold of the deceased and thereafter Munna
D (A-1) had shot fire from the fire arm. The High Court also had
realized that Gariba (P.W.4) was a sole eye-witness to the
incident and as he has not attributed any role to accused nos.
2 and 3, those accused should get the benefit of doubt. We do
not attach much importance to this kind of rejection of the
E evidence of the eye-witnes$. It is not as if Gariba (P.W.4) was
totally disbelieved nor was a finding recorded by the courts
below that he had falsely implicated the two accused persons.
The High Court merely gave the benefit of doubt to those two
accused considering that immediately after the incident, the
F witness had not stated the above story regarding the role
played by the two accused persons to Munni Bai (P.W.5) and
Rahmat (P.W.8). It is one thing to disbelieve the witness and to
give benefit of doubt to the accused on the basis of that
evidence and it is quite another to hold that the witness had
G deliberately and falsely implicated the two other accused. That
did not happen in this case. A criticism would have been ,,-
justified had the finding been that Gariba (P.W.4) deliberately
and falsely implicated the two accused in this case. However,
that did not happen. The High Court merely gave the benefit of
H
MUNNA@POORAN YADAV v. STATE OF MADHYA 289
PRADESH [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

doubt to accused nos. 2 and 3 and, therefore, it was quite A
justifiable to believe the testimony as against the appellant
while granting benefit of doubt to accused nos. 2 and 3.
Obviously the theory of falsus in uno, falsus omnibus has long
back ceased to apply in our criminal jurisprudence. We,
therefore, do not see anything wrong in the High Court accepting B
the evidence of P.W.4 against the appellant which evidence was
,, well corroborated by the evidence of Munni Bai (P.W.5) and
Rahmat (P.W.8). They were the witnesses who were informed
about the role of Munna almost immediately after the incident.
c
13. Much was tried to be suggested about the time of F.l.R.
We have seen the original Hindi First Information Report as
also the original Hindi evidence of the witness. The witness has
/
specifically stated that the time was the day-break time, sun
was about to rise (Din Nikalne me·thaa). Considering that the 01.
witness was not a literate witness and did not know how to read
"r.>
the watch, the mention of 7 O'clock as the time of incident in
the First Information Report appears to be the handiwork of the
person who recorded the First Information Report. Much
importance cannot be given to such insignificant factors. Much
E
was tried to be suggested from the evidence of Gariba (P.W.4)
that immediately after the incident, he went to the neighbours,
like Ambika Prasad (P.W.1) and Sunderlal Vishwakarma
(P.W.3) and substantial time was spent and, therefore, he could
not have reached alongwith all those persons to Jujharnagar
,,'> F
police station at about 8 O'clock which was six kilometers away.
In our considered opinion, such criticism has no merits. Nothing
has come in the evidence as to how these persons reached
the police station. There is no cross examination to any of these
witnesses regarding the time taken from the village to the police
G
station. If that is so, it would not be possible to reject the First
Information Report on that flimsy ground alone. Again the
distance between the village and the police station which is
given in First Information Report is six kilometers approximately.
That in our opinion is not such a distance which would not be
H
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

A covered within an hour or so. Giving overall consideration to
this aspect, we are of the opinion that the First Information
Report was a genuine document and was correctly recorded
at the time wheh it·was given and there is nothing unusual in
the timings of First Information Report. We, therefore, reject the
B argument of the defence on that ground.
14. Learned counsel relied on a reported decision in Akhil ,_..
Ali Jehangir Ali Sayyed v. State of Maharashtra, [2003] 2 SCC
708 in support of his contention, that if the two other accused
were acquitted on the similar kind of evidence, the appellant
c should not have been convicted. The learned senior counsel
invited our attention to para 6 which is to the following effect :
"6 ...... As the second accused Jabbar was placed in the
same situation as the appellant in this case (if not lesser),
D Article 21 of the Constitution would not permit us to deny
the same benefit to the second accused, notwithstanding {.

the fact that the SLP and the review application filed by
him have been dismissed by this Court.... "

We do not think that this court has laid down any such law
E that when the two other accused persons are acquitted (by
giving benefit of doubt), the third one must be given the same
benefit of doubt. Such is not a law laid down. We cannot apply
the principle of parity in this case where it is specifically proved
that it was the appellant alone who whipped out the gun and
F fired at the deceased killing him instantly. Such evidence was
not available against the two acquitted accused. We, therefore,
reject the argument that by reason of parity, the appellant should
also be acquitted.

G 15. The learned counsel also relied on another judgment
reported in Bhagirath v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1976] 1
sec 20 and more particularly the observations in para 18 which (

, are to the following effect :

'\H "18 ... when the substratum of the evidence given by the
MUNNA@ POORAN YADAV v. STATE OF MADHYA 291
PRADESH [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
"' eyewitnesses examined b~ the prosecution was found to A
be false, the only prudent course, in the circumstances
of this case, left to the court was to throw out by the
~ prosecution case in its entirety against all the accused"
Whereas in the present case, the substratum of the
B
evidence of P.W. 4 has not been found to be false. On the other
.,. . hand, both the courts below have rightly chosen and relied on
prosecution evidence.

16. Lastly, almost by way of a desperate argument, the
learned senior counsel tried to argue on the nature of the t
offence. It was the contention of the learned counsel that doctor
had opined that the death had been caused by shock, and since
the said shock had not been caused by the appellant, the
offence could not be the one under Section 302 IPC but would
). be a minor offence. We have recorded this contention only for D
being rejected. The doctor has very clearly opined that the shock
was the result of the firing by the appellant. In that view, the
argument is rejected.

17. Learned senior counsel also argued that since there
E
was solitary eye-witness, his evidence should have been
rejected.
~
18. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State
relied on the decision reported in Kunju Alias Balachandran
v. State of Tamil Nadu, [2008] 2 SCC 151 which deals with F
the subject of the appreciation of the single eye-witness. This
Court following the oftly quoted decision in Vadivelu Thevar v.
State of Madras, Al R ( 195 7) SC 614 and accepting that
decision came to the conclusion that this court can and may
convict relying on the testimony of a single witness provided he G
.... is wholly reliable and that there was no legal impediment in
convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness.
In the present case, not only was the evidence of PW-4 Gariba
acceptable but it was also corroborated by his immediate
H.
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

.A disclosure to P.W.5 and P.W.8. It was, therefore, rightly accepted
and acted upon. The contenttons of the learned senior counsel
for the defence must be rejected... In short, we do not find any
merit in the present appeal and It is dismissed. •'
B 19. It is reported that the appellant was released on bail
during the pendency of his appeal. The State shall take
immediate steps to arrest him by issuing Non-bailable warrants ' ..
against him and arrest him for undergoing the rest of the
sentence.

C KK.T. Appeal .dismissed.

J.

t.
I

I
J

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