Supreme Court of India
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF AHMEDABAD & ORS.versusJAN MOHAMMED USMANBHAI & ANR.
- Citation
- 1986 INSC 83
- Decided
- 17 April 1986
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- O CHINNAPPA REDDY
Holding
The closure of the municipal slaughter house on the seven specified days does not constitute an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on trade and is a valid exercise of municipal power.
Summary
The Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad issued standing orders under Section 466(1)(D)(b) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, closing the municipal slaughter house on seven specified days each year. Jan Mohammed Usmanbhai, a beef dealer, challenged the orders as an unreasonable restriction on his right to carry on trade under Article 19(1)(g) and as discriminatory against butchers of cattle under Article 14. The High Court held the orders ultra vires, but the Supreme Court examined whether the restriction was reasonable in the interest of the general public. Relying on the principles of reasonable restriction and permissible classification, the Court held that the closure days, many of which coincided with religious observances promoting abstinence from meat, were a valid exercise of municipal power and did not infringe the fundamental right. Consequently, the classification of cattle‑slaughtering butchers was upheld as intelligible and related to the objective of livestock preservation. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court judgment and dismissing the writ petition.
Issues considered
- Whether the standing orders closing the municipal slaughter house on seven days violate Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
- Whether the classification of butchers dealing only with cattle infringes Article 14’s guarantee of equality.
- Whether the restriction imposed by the standing orders is a reasonable restriction under Article 19(6).
Legislation cited
- Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949s. 466(1)(D)(b)
Subjects
Article 19(1)(g)Article 14reasonable restrictionmunicipal corporationslaughter housestanding ordersclassificationpublic interestBombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Actfundamental rightstrade
Judgment
700
A
lllNICIPAL rotU'OKATION OF THE
CITY OF AillEDABAD & ORS.
v.
JAN KJIWllED USMANBHAI & ANR.
APRIL 17, 1986
B
[O, CHINNAPPA REDDY, E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, V. BALAKRISHNA
ERADI, R.B. MISRA AND V. KHALID, JJ,]
Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 - S.
466(1) (D) (b) - Standing Orders issued directing closure of
c slaughter house on seven specified days in a year - Whether
violates fundamental right to carry on trade.
Section 466 (l)(D)(b) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal
Corporation Act, 1949 confers on the Municipal Colllllissioner
power to make standing orders, rules and bye-laws. One of such
D powers extends to fixation of days and hours during which any
market, slaughter house or stock;rard may be kept open for
use. The appellant-COrporation framed such bye-laws on 18th
July 1957 and the same had been sanctioned by the Government.
A standing order was made by the Municipal Colllllissioner in the
year 1956 fixing four days as holidays in a year on which the..J
E nunicipal slaughter house shall remain closed. By an amendment '
to the said standing order effected on 17th September, 1965
three more holidays were added.
The respondent, a beef dealer, filed a writ petition
challenging the validity of the said two standing orders{
F
directing the closure of slaughter houses on seven days as ,
being violative of Arts. 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution!'
alleging that the closure of the slaughter house adversely
effected his trade; that the power to keep the nunicipal
slaughter house closed on any particular day in an area is
vested in the Municipal Commissioner and such a power could
G only be exercised by a standing order properly issued and
pronulgated by him; that under the earlier standing order of
1956 slaughter houses could be kept open for use on all days
except on the four days viz. Janmashtami, Jain Samvatsari, 2nd+
Oct. (Mahatama Gandhi's Birthday) and 12th February (Sharddha
day of Mahatama Gandhi); that the resolution passed by the
H
MUNICIPAL CORPN. v. JAN MOHD. 701
A
~Corporation on 18th January, 1965, adding three more days as
the closure days of the slaughter houses viz. 30th January
(Mahatama Gandhi's Nirwan Day), Mahabir Jayanti and Ram
Navami, was therefore, null and void; that the said standing
orders put an unreasonable restriction on the petitioner's
right to carry on his trade or business as a beef dealer and B
that restriction was not in the interest of the general public
bUt was based on extraneous considerations; that the standing
Ji>rders single out the petitioner and other butchers like him,
who slaughter only cattle and not sheep or goat, for hostile
discrimination inas1111ch as the standing orders effect only the
butchers who slaughter cattle and not those who deal in meat
of goat and sheep. c
Allowing the petition, the High Court held that the
impugned standing orders were ultra vires being violative of
Art. 19(l)(g) of the ConstitutiOO.- - -
The appellant-Corporation appealed to this Court, D
contending that the restriction imposed by the two standing
orders was a reasonable one and in the interests of the
general public.
,,.._ Allowing the appeal,
E
HELD : 1. The closure of slaughter house on seven days
specified in the two standing orders did not in any way put an
unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right guaranteed
. to the respondent under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
1"(717 CJ
F
:.., Banif ~ & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., (1959)
$.C.R. 629, Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India &
0rs., (1981) 1 s.c.a. 206, 257, Abcll11 lla1d.a Quraishi & Ors.
v. State of Bihar & Ors., (1961) 2 S.C.R. 610 and Mohd. Farult
v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., (1970) 1 S.C.R. 156,
referred to. G
2. The Court 1111st in considering the validity of the
~impugned law imposing prohibition on the carrying on a
business or a profession attempt an evaluation of its direct
and immediate impact upon the fundamental rights of the
citizens affected thereby and the larger public interest H
sought to be ensured in the light of the object sought to be
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1986] 2 s.c.R.
A
llchieved, the necessity to restrict the citizens' freedom, the
inherent. pernicious nature of the act prohibited or it~
capacity or tendency to be harmful to the general public, the
possibility of achieving the object by imposing a less drastic
restcaints, and ln the absence of exceptional situations such
as the prevalence of a State of emergency, national or local
B or the necessity to 11&intain necessary supplies or the
necessities to stop activities, inherently dangerous, the
existence of a machinery to satisfy the administrativ..l_
authority that a case for imposing restriction is made out or
a less drastic restriction may ensure the object intended to
be achieved. (713 G-H; 714 A-C]
c
3, Clause (6) of Art. 19 protects a law which imposes i~
the interes.t of general public, reasonable restrictions on th
exercise of the right conferred by sub-cl. (g) of cl. (1) o
Art. 19. It is left to the Court in· case of a dispute to
determine the reasonableness of the restriction imposed by the
D law. But the Court cannot proceed on a general notion of what
is reasonable in the abstract or even on a consideration of
what is ressonable from the point of view of the person or
persons on whom the restrictions are imposed. The right
conferred by sub-cl. (g) is expressed in general language and
if there had been no qualifying provision like cl. (6) t~
E right so conferred would have been an absolute one. What the '
Court has to do is to consider whether the restrictions
imposed are reasonable in the interest of general public.
(714 G-H; 715 A-BJ
State of Madras v. V.G. Haw, (1952] s.c.R. 597, relieaf
F upon.
4. The .expression "in the interest of general public" is
of wide import comprehending public order, public health,
public security, morals, economic welfare of the comm.Inity and
the objects mentioned in Part IV of the Constitution. No body
G can dispute a law providing for basic amenities; for the
dignity of human labour as a social welfare measure in the
interest of general public. (716 B-C]
.y
5.1 The tests of reasonableness have to be viewed in the
context of the issues which faced the legislature. In the
H construction of such laws and in judging their validity,
Courts llllSt ap.proach the problem from the point of view of
MUNICIPAL CORPN, v, JAN MOHD, 703
A
furthering the social interest which it is the purpose of the
~ legislation to promote. They are not in these matters
functioning in vacuo but as part of society which is trying,
by the enacted law to solve its problem and furthering the
moral and material progress of the COlllll.lnity as a whole.
[716 G-H; 717 A) B
Joti Prasad v. Onion Territory of Delhi, [1961) S.C.R•
..._1601, relied upon.
5.2 Normally, the legislature is the best judge of what
is good for the coDllllnity by whose sufferage it comes into
existence. This should be the proper approach of the Court. c
,--..,. But the ultimate responsibility for determining the validity
~ of the law mst rest with the Court and the Court mst not
~ shirk that solemn duty cast upon it by the Constitution.
[717 E-F)
5,3 In the instant case, it was, therefore, open to the D
Municipal Colllllissioner to fix days and hours at and during
which any slaughter house should be kept open for use. If the
Municipal Colllllissioner declares certain days as holidays for
the slaughter house in order to give facilities to the
,i._ m.micipal staff working in the mnicipal slaughter house, no
- body could have any objection to such a standing order. The E
grievance of the respondent is that the Municipal Colllllissioner
by standing orders had declared days concerning Mahatma
Gandhi, Lord Mahavir, Sri Ram and Lord Krishna as holidays.
_ Mahatama Gandhi and Lord Mahavir were apostles of non-violence
\ who lived and died for that cause. Mahatama Gandhi was
venerated by the people of India as the Father of the Nation. F
:.., Lord Mahabir preached and practised Ahimsa. Rama is considered
by the people to be the embodiment of all virtues. Krishna is
known to be the expounder of the philosophy of the Geeta.
Their birthdays are generally observed by the people not
merely as days of festivity but also as days of abstinence
from meat. One cannot, therefore, complain that these days are G
ill chosen as holidays. [715 E-H; 716 A-Bl
t 6. When the validity of a law placing restriction on the
exercise of a fundamental right, in Art. 19(l)(g) is
challenged, the onus of proving to the satisfaction of the
Court that the restriction is reasonable lies upon the State. H
If the law requires that an act which is inherently dangerous,
noxious or injurious to the public interest, health or saf cty
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 2 s.c.R.
A
or is likely to prove a nuisance to the coDlllmity shall be
done under a permit or a licence of an executive authority, itl-
is not per se unreasonable and no person may clai11 a licence
or a permit to do that act as of right. Where the law
providing for grant of a licence or permit confers a
discretion upon an administrative authority regulated by rules
B or principles, express or implied, and exerciseable in
consonance with the rules of natural justice, it will be
presumed to imp:o9e a reasonable restriction. Where, however,_._
power is entrusted to an administrative agency to grant or
withhold a permit or licence in its uncontrolled discretion
the law ex facie infringes the fundamental right under Art.
c 19(l)(g).~lmposition of restriction on the exercise of a
fundamental right may be in the form of control or 1 ,.,.
prohibition. But when the exercise of a fundamental right is{
prohibited, the burden of proving that a total ban on the+-
exercise of the right alone may ensure the maintenance of the :
interest of general public lies heavily upon the State.
D (713 C-<;]
7, While Art. 14 forbids class legislation it does not
forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of
legislation. There is always a presumption in favour of
constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him,~
E who attacks it, to show that there has been a clear violation
of the constitutional principles. The Courts llll8t presume that
the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the
needs of its own people, that its laws are directed against
problems made manifest by experience and that its
discriminations are based on adequate grounds. The legislature -{"
F is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its '
restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the ~
clearest, and finally, that in1 order to 'sustain the
presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into
consideration matters of C0111110n knowledge, matters of C0111110n
rapport, the history of the times and may assume every state
G of facts which can be conceived to be existing at the time of
legislation. [717 D-H; 718 A-Bl
8. The butchers wllo slaughter cattle formed the well +
defined class based on their occupation. That classification
is based on intelligible differentia and distinguishes them
H from those who kill goats and sheep and this differentiation
has close connection with the object sought to be achieved by
MUNICIPAL CORPN. v. JAN MOHD. [MISRA, J.] 705
---(the impugned Act, namely the preservation, protection and the A
iq>rovement of livestock. The attainment of these objectives
may well necessitate that the slaughterers of cattle should be
dealt with differently than the slaughterers of goats and
sheep. The standing orders, therefore, adopt a classification
based on sound and intelligible basis and can quite clearly
stand the test. [718 E-G] B
~ CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 1685 of
1970.
: From the Judgment and Order dated 3rd March, 1970 of the
Gujarat High Court in S.C.A. No. 102 of 1965.
c
l S.T. Desai, T.U. Mehta, H.S. Parihar, Mrs. A.K. Verma,
tJoel Peres, D.N. Mishra and Vipin Chandra for the Appellants.
G.A. Shah, Girish Chandra, C.V. Subba Rao and R.N.
Poddar for the Respondents.
D
T.U. Mehta and H.J. Zaveri for the Interveners.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R.B. MISRA, J. Slaughter of cows and calves has been a
- sensitive issue and it has generated violent sentimental E
differences time and again between different sections of the
people of this country. Part IV of the Constitution of India
~enshrines what are called the Directive Principles of State
· Policy. These Directive Principles are not enforceable in a
court of law but are nevertheless fundamental in the
"\governance of the country and are to be applied by States in F
making laws. Article 48 contained in Part IV provides :
"48. The State shall endeavour to organise
agriculture and animal husbandry in modern and
scientific lines and shall, in particular, take
steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and G
prohibiting the slaughter, of cows and calves and
other milch ·and draught cattle."
It appears that pursuant to Article 48 of the
Constitution several States enacted laws for the preservation
H
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19861 2 s.c.R.
A
and prohibition of the slaughter of cows and calves and other).--
milch and draught cattle. The State of Bihar enacted the
'Bihar Preservation and Improvement of Animals Act, 1955' the
U,P. State enacted the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow
Slaughter Act, 1955 and Madhya Pradesh enacted the C. P. and
Berar Animal Preservation Act, 1949, hereinafter referred to
B as the Bihar, U,P. and C.P. & Berar Acts respectively, for
short. These Acts put a total ban on the slaughter of all
categories of animals or species of bovine cattle. The-l
constitutional validity of these Acts was challenged in Mohd.
Hanif ~eshi & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1959]
S.C.R, 629, by those whose trade or business was affected, as :
c being violative of Arts. 14, 19(l)(g) and 25 of the
Constitution. This Court held : t
"The result is that we uphold and declare that the t'
Bihar Act in so far as it prohibits the slaughter
of cows of all ages and calves of cows and calves
D of buffaloes, male and female, is constitutionally
valid and we hold that, in so far as it totally
prohibits the slaughter of she-buffaloes, breeding
bulls and working bullocks (cattle and buffalo),
without prescribing any test or requirement as to
their age,or usefulness, it infringes the rights of~,
E the petitioners under Art. 19(l)(g) and is to that
extent void.
As regards the U,P, Act we uphold and declare, for
reasons already stated, that it is constitutionally{'
valid in so far as it prohibits the slaughter of ,
F cows of all ages and calves of cows, male and I'
fetMle, but we hold that in so far as it purports'
to totally prohibit the slaughter of breeding
bulls and working bullocks without prescribing any
test or requirement as to their age or usefulness,
it offends against Art. 19(l)(g) and is to that
G extent void.
As regards the Madhya Pradesh Act we likewise
declare that it is constitutionally valid in so far+"
as it prohibits the slaughter of cows of all ages
and calves of cows, male and female, but that it is
H void in so far as it totally prohibits the
MUNICIPAL CORPN, v. JAN MOHD. [MISRA, J.] 707
A
slaughter of breeding bulls and working bullocks
without prescribing any test or requirement as to
their age of usefulness.
We also hold that the Act is valid in so far as it
regulates the slaughter of other animals under B
certificates granted by the authorities mentioned
therein."
The · Court observed that these Acts were made by the
States in discharge of the obligation laid on them by Art. 48
• of the Constitution.
c
' Article 19(1)(g) confers a fundamental right upon a
\citizen to practise any profession, or to carry on any
·ioccupation, trade or business. Article 14 enjoins that the
State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or
the equal protection of the laws within the territory of
India. Article 13(2) provides that the State shall not make D
any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by
this Part and any law made in contravention 1>f this clause
shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.
-~ Dealing with Fundamental Rights as given in Part Ill and
the Directive Principles as detailed in Part IV of the E
Constitution, the Constitution Bench in Minerva Mills Led. &
Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 206, 257,
observed as follows :
"The significance of the perception that Parts Ill
and IV together constitute the core of commitment F
to social revolution and they, together, are the
conscience of the Constitution is to be traced to
a deep understanding of the scheme of the Indian
Constitution. Granville Austin's observation brings
out the true position that Parts Ill and IV are
like two wheels of a chariot, one no less important G
than the other. You snap one and the other will
lose its efficacy. They are like a twin fornula for
achieving the social revolution, which is the ideal
which the visionary founders of the Constitution
set before themselves. In other words, the Indian
Constitution is founded on the bed-rock of the H
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1986] 2 s.c.R.
A
balance between Parts III and IV. To give absolut~
primacy to one over the other is to disturb the
harmony of the Constitution. This harmony and
balance between fundamentel rights and directive
principles is an essential feature of the basic
structure of the Constitution.
B
This is not mere semantics. The edifice of our
Constitution is built upon the concepts~
crystallised in the Preamble. We resolved to
constitute ourselves into a Socialist State which
carried with it the obligation to secure to our
c people justice-social, economic and political. We,
therefore, put Part IV into our Constitution r
containing directive principles of State policy .
which specify the socialistic goal to be achieved.t './
We promised to our people a democratic polity which -
carries with it the obligation of securing to the
D people liberty of thought, expression, belief,
faith and worship; equality of status and of
opportunity and the assurance that the dignity of
the individual will at all costs be preserved. We,
therefore, put Part III in our Constitution
conferring those rights on the people. Those rights-(
E are not an end in themselves but are the means to
an end. The end is specified in Part IV. Therefor.,,
the rights conferred by Part III are subject to
reasonable restrictions and the Constitutfon
provides that enforcement of some of them may, in /
stated uncommon circumstances, be suspended. But 1
F just as the rights conferred by Part III would he
without a radar and a compass if they were not/'
geared to an ideal, in the same manner the attain-
ment of the ideals set out in Part IV would become
a pretence for tyranny if the price to be paid for
achieving that ideal is human freedoms. One of the
G faiths of our founding fathers was the purity oE
means. Indeed, under our law, even a decoit who ha:;
colllllitted a tmlrder cannot be put to death in the
exercise of right of self-defence after he has mad1~ ~
good his escape. So great is the insistence of
civilised laws on the purity of means. The goals
H set out in Part IV have, therefore, to be achieved
MUNICIPAL CORPN. v. JAN MOHD. [MISRA, J,) 709
A
without the abrogation of the means provided for by
Part III. It is in this sense that Parts III and IV
together constitute the core of our Constitution
and combine to form its conscience. Anything that
dest.-oys the balance between the two parts will
ipso facto destroy an essential element of the
B
basic structure of our Constitution."
~ Attempts were, however, made from time to time to
circumvent the judgment of this Court in K:>bd. Hanif
Quareshi's case (supra). After the judgment in that case the
legislatures of the State of Bihar and U.P. passed Amendment
Acts prescribing minimum age of animals to be slaughtered. The c
Bihar Act prohibited slaughter of a bull, bullock or she-
buf falo unless the animal was of 25 years of age and was
useless. Under the U.P. Act slaughter of a bull or buffalo was
permitted only if it was over 20 years of age and was
permanently unfit. The Madhya Pradesh Legislature passed a new
Act, the M.P. Agricultural Cattle Preservation Act, 1959 under D
' which slaughter of a bull, bullock or buffalo except on a
certificate issued by the competent authority was prohibited.
A certificate could not be issued unless the animal was of
over 20 years' age and was unfit for work or breeding. These
~ Acts were again challenged in Abdul Balda ~raeshi & Ors. v.
State of Bihar & Ors., (1961) 2 S.C.R. 610. This Court took E
the view that the ban on the slaughter of bulls, bullocks and
she-buffaloes below the age of 20 or 25 years was not a
reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public
and was void. It was on the basis that a bull, bullock or
~ buffalo did not remain useful after 15 years and whatever
little use it may have then was greatly offset by the economic F
\ disadvantages of feeding and maintaining unserviceable cattle.
This Court further held that the additional condition that the
animal must, apart from being above 20 or 25 years of age,
also be unfit was a further unreasonable restriction. Accord-
ingly the relevant provisions in the Bihar, U,P, and Madhya
Pradesh Acts were declared invalid. G
The present case is apparently another attempt, though on
'i a slightly different ground, to circumvent the judgment of
this Court in K:>bd. Banif ~reshi 's case (supra). The writ
giving rise to the present appeal sought to challenge two
Standing Orders made by the Municipal Commissioner of the H
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19861 2 s.c.R.
A
Municipal ~orporation of the City of Ahmedabad in exercise of '>---
his powers under s. 466(l)(D)(b) of the Bombay Provincial
Municipal Corporation Act 1949 directing that the Municipal
?laughter houses should be kept open for use on all days
except on seven days mentioned in the two standing orders.
B Janmohammed Usmanbhai is a beef dealer having his shop
outside Sarangpur Darwaza in Ahmedabad city. His case is that
he gets his animals slaughtered at the slaughter house owned ~
by the Municipal Corporation. The Municipal Corporation framed
bye-laws relating to markets and slaughter houses on 18th
C
July, 1957 and these bye-laws had been sanctioned by the
Government of Bombay as it then was. Section 466( l )(D )(b) of
the Act confers on the Municipal Commissioner power to make
standing orders consistent with the provisions of the Act and
the rules and bye-laws. One of such powers extends to fixation
t
of days and hours during which any market, slaughter house or
stock-yard may be kept open for use and a standing order was
D made by the Municipal Connnissioner in the year 1956 fixing
four days as holidays on which the 1111nicipal slaughter house
shall remain closed. By an amendment to the standing order
effected on 17th September, 1965 three more days were added
thus making' a total list of seven days in a year on which the
1111nicipal slaughter house was to be kept closed. ~
E
Janmohammed Usmanbhai challenged the validity of the
aforesaid two standing orders framed under s. 466(l)(D)(b) of
the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949
directing the closure of slaughter houses on seven days named ,
in the standing orders being violative of Arts. 14 and {
F 19(l)(g) of the Constitution inas1111ch as t:he closure of the
slaughter house adversely effected his trade as animals could r
not be admitted in the slaughter house on those seven days
specified in the standing orders and therefore he could not
get the mea~ of those animals for his beef shop.
G It appears that at the time of the presentation of the
writ petition the amended standing order adding three more
days to the list of holidays in the slaughter house had not
seen the light of the day. The Municipal Corporation of ~
Ahmedabad lu¥1, however, passed a resolution on 18th January,
1965 whereby three more days were added to the list of
H holidays for the slaughter house. The petitioner took up a
MUNICIPAL CORPN. v. JAN MOHD. (MISRA, J.) 711
A
~plea that the power to keep the nunicipal slaughter house
closed on any particular day in an area vested in the
Municipal Commissioner and such a power could only be
exercised by a standing order properly issued and pronulgated
by the Municipal Connnissioner. Under the earlier standing
order on 1956 made by the Municipal Connnissioner nunicipal B
slaughter houses could be kept open for use on all days except
on the following four days viz. Janmashtami, Jain Samvatsari,
4-2nd October (Mahatama Gandhi's Birthday) and 12th February
(Sharaddha Day of Mahatama Gandhi). The resolution passed by
the Corporation on 18th January, 1965 declaring three
additional holidays for the slaughter houses, therefore, was
null and void. During the pendency of the "7rit: petition, how- c
ever, a new standing order was made by the Municipal
Commissioner on 17th September, 1965 in exercise of his powers
under s. 466(1 )(D)(b) of the Bombay Provincial. Municipal Cor-
poration Act adding three more days as the closure days of the
slaughter houses : 30th January (Mahatama Gandhi's Nirwan
' D
Day), Mahavir Jayanti and Ram Navmi to the previous list.
Consequently respondent No. 1, the petitioner in the writ
petition, applied for the amendment of the writ petition,
which was allowed by the Court on 12th August, 1969. By the
amendment he challenged the validity of the amended standing
~.._order adding three more days as holidays. The result was that
the respondent No. 1 challenged the constitutional validity of E
all the seven days declared as holidays in the slaughter
houses.
\.- The main ground of challenge was that the impugned
standing orders put an unreasonable restriction on the
'\ petitioner's right to carry on his trade or business as a beef F
dealer and that restriction was not in the interests of the
general public but was based on other extraneous consider-
ations. The other ground of attack was that the standing
orders single out the petitioner and other butchers like him
who slaughter only cattle and not sheep or goat, for hostile
discrimination inasnuch as the standing orders effect only the G
butchers who slaughter cattle and not those who deal in meat
of goat and sheep.
~
The High Court relying on Mohd. Faruk v. State of Madhya
Pradesh & Ors., (1970) 1 S.C.R. 156 held that the impugned
H
standing orders were ultra vires being violative of Art.
19(1)(g) of the Constitution. In that case the bye-laws of the
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1986] 2 s.c.R.
A
Jabalpur Municipality permitted the slaughter of various',>--
animals including bulls and bullocks. A licence bad to be
obtained for that purpose. The slaughter of animals in places
outside the premises fixed by the !11lnicipality was prohibited
by s. 257(3) of the Act and the sale of meat, within the area
of the Municipality, of the atimals so slaughtered in the
B premises not fixed by the I111nicipality was also prohibited.
Under the notification by which the bye-laws were issued in
1948 bulls and bullocks could be slaughtered in the premises+
fixed for the purpose but by the notification dated 12th
January, 1967 the confirmation of bye-laws in so far as they
C
related to bulls and bullocks was cancelled. The effect of
that notification was to prohibit the slaughter of bulls and
bullocks within the Municipality of Jabalpur.
cancellation of the confirmation of bye-laws, it was urged,
This
imposed a direct restriction upon the fundamental right of the
1
petitioner under Art. 19(l)(g) of the Constitution. This Court
laid down
D
"The impugned notification, though technically
within the competence of the State Government,
directly infringes the fundamental right of the
petitioner guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(g), and may be .
upheld only if it be established that it seeks to ,....I._
E impose reasonable restrictions in the interests of
the general public and a less drastic restrictions
will not ensure the interest of the general
public."
This Court further observed
F
"The sentiments of a section of the people may be I'
hurt by permitting slaughter of bulls and bullocks
in premises maintained by a local authority. But a
prohibition imposed on the exercise of a
fundamental right to carry on an occupation, trade
G or business will not be regarded as reasonable, if
it is imposed not in the interest of the general
public, but merely to respect the susceptibilities
and sentiments of a section of the people whose way ~
of life, belief or thought is not the same as that
of the claimant."
H
MUNICIPAL CORPN. v. JAN MOHD. [MISRA, J,] 713
A
The High Court, however, overruled the objection based on
~Art. 14 of the Constitution.
The appellants have now come to challenge the judgment
and order of the High Court by certificate, and they contend
that the restriction imposed by the two standing orders was a B
reasonable one and in the interests of the general public.
A Before proceeding to deal with the points urged on behalf
of the appellants it will be appropriate to refer to the well-
established principles in the construction of the
constitutional provisions. When the validity of a law placing
;
restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right in Art. c
---,_ (19)(l)(g) is challenged, the onus of proving to the
1 satisfaction of the Court that the restriction is reasonable
-1 lies upon the State. If the law requires that an act which is
inherently dangerous, noxious or injurious to the public
interest, health or safety or is likely to prove a nuisance to
the coDDlllnity shall be done under a permit or a licence of an D
executive authority, it is not per se unreasonable and no
person may claim a licence or a permit to do that act as of
right. Where the law providing for grant of a licence or
permit confers a discretion upon an administrative authority
;.__regulated by rules or principles, express or implied, and
exerciseable in consonance with the rules of natural justice, E
it will be presumed to impose a reasonable restriction. Where,
- however, power is entrusted to an administrative agency to
grant or withhold a permit or licence in its uncontrolled
discretion the law ex facie infringes the fundamental right
'Yunder Art. 19(l)(g).--rmposition of restriction on the exercise
of a fundamental right may be in the form of control or F
\prohibition. But when the exercise of a fundamental right is
prohibited, the burden of proving that a total ban on the
exercise of the right alone may ensure the maintenance of the
interest of general public lies heavily upon the State. In
this background of legal position the appellants have to
establish that the restriction put on the fundamental right of G
the respondents to carry on their trade or business in beef
was a reasonable one. The Court nust in considering the
-f validity of the impugned law imposing prohibition on the
carrying on of a business or a profession attempt an
evaluation of its direct and immediate impact upon the
fundamental rights of the citizens affected thereby and the H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19861 2 s.c.R.
A
larger public interest sought to be ensured in the light of\
the object sought to be achieved, the necessity to restrict:>--
the citizen's freedom, the inherent pernicious nature of the
act prohibited or its capacity or tendency to be harmful to
the general public, the possibility of achieving the object by
imposing a less drastic restraint, and in the absence of
B exceptional situations such as the prevalence of a state of
emergency, national or local, or the necessity to maintain
necessary supplies or the necessity to stop activities~
inherently dangerous, the existence of a machinery to satisfy
the administrative authority that a case for imposing
restriction is made out or a less drastic restriction may
c ensure the object intended to be achieved.
In the light of the aforesaid principles the question for
consideration is whether the closure of the slaughter house on*-
r
seven days specified in the two standing orders puts a
reasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the
D petitioner guaranteed under Art. 19(l)(g) of the Constitution.
Out of the seven days declared as closed days for the
slaughter house three of the days are connected with Mahatma
Gandhi, that is, 2nd October being his birthday, 12th February
being his Sharaddha Day and the 30th January as his Nirwan
day, and out of the remaining four days, Janmashtami relates~
E to the birth day of Lord Krishna, Ram Navami relates to the ·
birth day of Sri Ram, Mahabir Jayanti and Jain Samvatsari
relate to Lord Mahabir, the exponent of Jainism. Normally the
legislature is the best judge of what is good for the
colll!llnity by whose suffrage it comes into existence. This
should be the proper approach of the Court. But the ultimate {
-
F responsibility for determining the validity of the law DJJst
rest with the court and the court DJJst not shirk that solemn!
duty cast upon it by tne Constitution.
Clause (6) of Art. 19 protects a law which imposes in the
interest of general public reasonable restrictions on the
G exercise of the right conferred by sub-clause (g) of clause
(1) of Art. 19, Obviously it is left to the court in case of a
dispute to determine the reasonableness of the restrictions
imposed by the law. In determining that question the court ~
cannot proceed on a general notion of what is reasonable in
the abstract or even on a consideration of what is reasonable
H from the point of view of the person or persons on whom the
restrictions are imposed. The right conferred by sub-clause
MUNICIPAL CORPN, v. JAN MOHD, [MISRA, J,] 715
A
(g) is expressed in general language and if there had been no
-..J. qualifying provision like clause (6) the right so conferred
would have been an absolute one. To the persons who have this
right any restriction will be irksome and may well be regarded
by them as unreasonable. But the question cannot be decided on
that basis. What the Court has to do is to consider whether B
the restrictions imposed ,are reasonable in the interest of
general public. In the State of Madras v. V.G. Row, [1952]
_,. S,C,R. 597 this Court laid down the test of reasonableness in
the following terms :
"It is important in this context to bear in mind
that the test of reasonableness, whereever c
prescribed, should be applied to each individual
statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or
general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down
as applicable to all cases. The nat11re of the right
alleged to have been infringed, the underlying
purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and D
urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby,
the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing
conditions at the time, should all enter into the
judicial verdict."
In the instant case it was open to the Municipal E
Commissioner to fix days and hours at and during which any
- slaughter house should be kept open for use. If the Municipal
Commissioner declares certain days as holidays for the
slaughter house in order to give facilities to the Dllnicipal
~ staff working in the Dllnicipal slaughter house, no body could
~ve any objection to such a standing order. The grievance of F
""' the petitioner-respondent in the instant case l.s on the ground
that the Municipal Commissioner by standing orders had
declared days concerning Mahatma Gandhi, Lord Mahavir, Sri Ram
and Lord Krishna as holidays. Mahatma Gandhi and Lord Mahavir
were apostles of non-violence who lived and died for that
cause. Mahatma Gandhi, venerated by the People of India as the G
Father of the Nation was an apostle of non-violence. Mahavir
preached and practised Ahimsa and even today has a large
following in the State of Gujarat. Rama and Krishna are the
beloved of the Hindu Pantheon and are worshiped by large
sections of the people. Rama is considered by them to be the
embodiment of all virtues and of everything that is good in H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (19861 2 s.c.R.
A
humanity. Krishna is known to be the expounder of the
philosophy of the Geeta. Their birthdays are generally ~
observed b}' the people not merely as days of festivity but
also as days of abstinence from meat. One cannot, therefore,
complain that these days are ill chosen as holidays.
B The expression 'in the interest of general public' is of
wide import comprehending public order, public health, public
security, morals, economic w-etfare of the colllIIUnlty and the .Jr
objects mentioned in part IV of the Constitution. Nobody can
dispute a law providing for basic amenities; for the dignity
of human labour like provision for canteen, rest rooms,
c facilities for drinking water, latrines and urinals etc. as a
social welfare measure in the interest of general public. ( -
Likewise in respect of legislations and notifications
concerning the wages, working conditions or the other -\'
amenities for the working class, the courts have adopted a
liberal attitude and the interest of the workers has been
D protected notwithstanding the hardship that might be caused to
the employers. It was, therefore, open to the Legislature or
the authority concerned, to ensure proper holidays for the
Municipal staff w~rking in the Municipal slaughter houses and
provide certain closed days in the year. Even according to the
obgervatlons of the Hlgh Court nobody could have any objection~
E to the standing orders issued by the Municipal Commissioner
under section 466(l)(d)(b) if Municipal slaughter houses w-ere
closed on certain days in order to ensure proper holidays for
the IMlnicipal staff working in the Municipal slaughter houses.
The only objection was that the standing orders direct closure
..
of the slaughter houses on Janamashtami, Jain Samvatsari, 2nd -{
F October (Mahatama Gandhi's birthday), 12th February (Sharaddha
day of Mahatama Gandhi), 30th January (Mahatma Gandhi's Nirvan !"
day), Mahavir Jayanti and Ram Navami. These days were declared
as holidays under the standing orders for the Municipal
Corporatiotl slaughter houses.
G The tests of reasonableness have to be viewed in the
context of the issues which faced the legislature. In the
construction of such laws and in judging their validity,
courts llllst approach the problem from the point of view of ~
furthering the social interest which it is the purpose of the
legislation to promote. They are not in these matters
H functioning in vacuo but as part of society which is trying,
MUNICIPAL CORPN, v. JAN MOHD. [MISRA, J,] 717
by the enacted law, to solve its problems and furthering the A
-.(moral and material progress of the co111111nity as a whole. (See
Joti Prasad v. Union Territory of Delhi, [1961] s.c.R. 1601)
If the expression 'in the interest of general public' is of
wide import comprising public order, public security and
public morals, it cannot be said that the standing orders
closing the slaughter houses on seven days is not in the B
interest of general public.
In view of the aforesaid discussion we are not prepared
to hold that the closure of slaughter house on seven days
specified in the two standing orders in any way put an
unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right guaranteed
-\to the petitioner-respondent under Article 19(l)(g) of the c
l Constitution.
This leads us to the second contention raised on behalf
of the respondent, which is based on Art. 14 of the
Constitution. The High Court had repelled this contention for
a valid reason with which we fully agree. D
It is now well-established that while Art. 14 forbids
class legislation it does not forbid reasonable classification
~for the purposes of legislation and that in order to pass the
test of permissible classification two conditions must be
fulfilled, namely, (i) the classification must be founded on E
an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or
things that are grouped together from others left out of the
group and (ii) such differentia must have rational relation to
)-the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.
The classification, may be founded on different basis, namely,
..'\geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the F
like and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus
between the basis of classification and the object of the Act
under consideration. There is always a presumption in favour
of constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon
him, who attacks it, to show that there has been a clear
violation of the constitutional principles. The courts must G
presume that the legislature understands and correctly
appreciates the needs of its own people, that its , .. ,JS are
1-directecI against problems made manifest by experience and that
its discriminations are based on adequate grounds. It must be
borne in mind that the legislature is free to recognise
H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 2 s.c.R.
A
degrees of harm and may confine tts restrictions to those
cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest, and finally~
that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality
the court may take into consideration matters of common know-
ledge, matters of common rapport, the history of the times and
may assume every state of facts which can be conceived to be
existing at the time of legislation.
B
· The objects sought to be achieved by the impugned stand-
ing orders are the preservation, protection and improvement o~
live-stock. Cows, bulls, bullocks and calves of cows are no
doubt the most important cattle for the agricultural economy
of this country. Female buffaloes yield a large quantity of
c milk and are, therefore, well looked after and do not need as r-·
much protection as cows yielding a small quantity of milk,
require. As draught cattle male buffaloes are not half as~
useful as bullocks. Sheep and goat give very little milk
compared to the cows and the female buffaloes, and have
D
practically no utility as draught animals. These dlfferent
categories of animals being susceptible of classification into
separate groups on the basis of their usefulness to society,
the butchers who kil 1 each category of animals may also be
placed in distinct classes according to the effect produced on
society by the carrying on of their respective occupations._..
The butchers who slaughter cattle formed the well defined ·
E
class based on their occupation. That classification is based
on intelligible dif ferentia and distinguishes them from those
who kill goats and sheep and this differentiation has a close
connection with the object sought to be achieved by the
impugned Act, namely the preservation, protection and the -{
improvement of our livestock. The attainment of these
F
objectives may· well necessitate that the slaughterers of /"
cattle should be dealt with differently than the slaughterers
of say, goats and sheep. The standing orders, therefore, in
our view, adopt a classification based on sound and in-
telligible basis and can quite clearly stand the test laid
G
down above.
For the foregoing discussion, the appeal must succeed. It
is accordingly allowed. The judgment and order of the High 4'
Court dated 3rd March, 1970 are set aside and the writ
petition filed by the respondents before the High Court stands
dismissed with costs.
H
A.P.J •. Appeal allowed.
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