MULCHAND KHANUMAL KHATRIversusSTATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
- Citation
- 2012 INSC 151
- Decided
- 27 March 2012
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- RAJENDRA MAL LODHA
Holding
Section 11A imposes a mandatory two‑year period that begins from the date of publication of the declaration (or from the commencement of the 1984 Amendment when the declaration predates it), and only periods of court‑ordered stay are excluded; time taken to obtain a certified copy of a judgment cannot be excluded.
Summary
The appellant, a joint owner of land in Palanpur, Gujarat, challenged a government acquisition of his property and obtained interim relief from the Gujarat High Court. While the proceedings were pending, the Land Acquisition Act was amended in 1984 inserting Section 11A, which mandates that an award be made within two years of the declaration's publication, with only court‑stay periods excluded from the computation. The High Court held that the two‑year period should start only when a certified copy of its judgment was received by the acquiring authority, thereby excluding the time taken to obtain and serve the copy. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether Section 11A permits such exclusion and held that the only excluded period is the duration of a court‑ordered stay, not the time to obtain a certified copy. Consequently, the award made on 31 August 1998 was beyond the statutory period, causing the entire acquisition proceeding to lapse. The Court set aside the award and declared the acquisition proceedings terminated.
Issues considered
- Whether Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 allows exclusion of the time taken to obtain a certified copy of a High Court judgment and bring it to the notice of the acquiring authority for the purpose of computing the two‑year limitation period.
- From what date does the two‑year period prescribed in Section 11A commence when the declaration under Section 6 was published before the 1984 Amendment Act.
Legislation cited
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 11A, s. 4, s. 6
- Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984
- Limitation Act, 1963s. 12
Subjects
Judgment
[2012] 2 S.C.R. 586
A MULCHAND KHANUMAL KHATRI
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 4990 of 2003)
MARCH 27, 2012
B
[R.M. LODHA AND H.L. GOKHALE, JJ.]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - s. 11 A [as inserted by Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984] - Limitation period - For
C passing award u/s. 11 - Computation of - Held : The period
prescribed u/s. 11 A is mandatory - The period of two years
commences from the date of publication of declaration and
where declaration is published before Amendment Act, it is
from the date of commencement of Amendment Act - The
D only period excludable is the period during which proceedings
remained stayed under the order of a court and no other -
s. 11 A being a special provision, provisions of Limitation Act
and particularly s. 12 thereof cannot be read into it - Hence
the time taken in obtaining the certified copy of judgment and
E bringing it to the notice of the authority before passing of award
uls. 11, will not be excluded - On facts, award having not been
made within period prescribed u/s. 11 A, the entire acquisition
proceedings lapsed - Limitation Act, 1963 - s. 12.
Appellant-the land-owner had challenged the land-
F acquisition proceedings before High Court. He was
granted interim relief. In the meantime, the Land
Acquisition Act was amended by Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984. whereby s.11 A was inserted
prescribing the limitation period within which award
G could be passed. Thereafter, the High Court dismissed
the application of the appellant by order dated 11.1.1996.
The award u/s. 11 was passed on 31.8.1998.
The appellant challenged the passing of the award
H 586
MULCHAND KHANUMAL KHATRI v. STATE OF 587
GUJARAT & ORS.
· u/s.11, on the ground that the same was passed beyond A
two years from the date of the publication of the
declaration u/s. 6. The High Court held that the award
could not be said to have been passed beyond two years
because the time taken in obtaining the certified copy of
the judgment of High Court and the period from the date, B
the certified copy was obtained and it was brought to the
notice of the authority, has to be excluded.
In appeal to this Court, the question for
consideration was whether s.11A permits exclusion of
time taken in obtaining the cer:tified copy of the judgment C
of High Court and bringing it to the notice of the
authority.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
D
HELD: 1. The period prescribed in Section 11A of
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is mandatory. The
consequence of breach is provided in the provision itself
viz., the entire acquisition proceedings get lapsed. Insofar
as computation of the period is concerned, the period of E
two years commences from the date of the publication
of the declaration. Where the declaration has been
published before the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act,
1984, then the period commences from the
commencement of the Amendment Act. The only period
that is excludable is the period during which the action F
or proceedings to be taken pursuant to the said
declaration remains stayed under the order of a court
and no other. Section 11 A is a special provision for the
purposes of the Act and the legislative intent being clear
from the bare language of the explanation appended G
thereto, there is no justification to read the provisions of
the Limitation Act, 1963 and particularly Section 12
. thereof into it. [para 12] [594-B-D]
H
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 2 S.C.R.
A . Ravi Khullar and ~nr. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (2007)
,5 sec 231: 2007(4) SCR 598 - relied on.
2. In the present case, the award having not been
made within the period prescribed in Section 11 A of the
Act, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the
8
appellant's land has lapsed. The High Court was clearly
in error in excluding the period from January 11, 1996 to
September 5, 1997 (i.e. time taken in obtaining certified
copy of the order of High Court and the time taken in
C placing the same before the authority). This period
cannot be excluded under explanation appended to
Section 11A of the Act. [para 13] [594-E-F]
Case Law Reference:
2007(4) SCR 598 Relied on Para 11
D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
·'
4990 of 2003.
From the Judgment & Order dated 26.12.2002 of the High
E Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad Special Civil Application No.
7738 of 1998.
Subrat Birla, S.C. Birla for the Appellant.
Hemantika Wahi, Jesal, Rojalin Pradhan for the
F Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R.M. LODHA, J. 1. The judgment and order dated
December 26, 2002 passed by the Gujarat High Court is under
G challenge in this Appeal by special leave.
2. The appellant claims to be joint owner of the land being
Survey No. 11430 admeasuring 34 sq. mtr. at Palanpur, Gujarat.
On April 1, 1980, a notification was issued under Section 4 of
H the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, 'the Act') that
MULCHAND KHANUMAL KHATRI v. STATE OF 589
GUJARAT & ORS. [R.M. LODHA, J.]
proposed acquisition of the appellant's land and some other A
land for the public purpose, namely, construction of Palanpur
City and taluka Police Station. The said notification was
published in the Government Gazette on January 8, 1981. Later
on, Section 4 notification was revised and published in the
Official Gazette on September 22, 1983. The declaration under B
Section 6 was published on January 5, 1984. The appellant
challenged the acquisition of his land through the above
notifications in a Special Civil Application before the Gujarat
High Court. An interim relief in the above matter was granted
on April 18, 1984. c
3. The Act was amended on September 24, 1984 by the
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (for short, 'the
Amendment Act') whereby Section 11A was brought in the
statute book.
D
4. The Special Civil Application filed by the appellant wa$
dismissed on January 11, 1996. The Dy. Collector made the
award on August 31, 1998.
5. Before the High Court, inter alia, the argument was
canvassed on behalf of the appellant that the award having E
been passed beyond two years from the date of the publication
of the declaration under Section 6, by virtue of Section 11A of
the Act, the entire acquisition proceedings had lapsed. The
High Court, however, repelled the above argument and held as
follows: F
"The submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner
was thC!t their earlier petitions were dismissed and the stay
granted earlier stood vacated by the Division Bench of this
Court on 11.1.96. Therefore, the Authority was supposed G
to declare the Award within a period of 2 years from that
day i.e. 11.1.96. The said period would expire on January
10, 1998 whereas Award u/s 11 came to be passed only
in August, 1998 which is admittedly after a period of 2
years. It is no doubt true that the Division Bench of this H
i
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 2 S.C.R.
A Court earlier dismissed their writ petitions on 11.1.96 and
vacated the interim relief, but the vacation of interim relief
granted in favour of the petitioners must be brought to the
notice of the concerned Authority. Merely because they
were represented through their counsel before the court
B would not be sufficient. Unless and until certified copy of
the said judgment and order passed by the court is brought
to the notice of the Authority, the Authority is not supposed
to act. The period of 2 years would start only from the date
of the notice. In reply affidavit it has been clearly stated that
c the copy of the judgment and order passed by this Court
on 11.1.96 was received by them only 5.9.97.
In that view of the matter, admittedly the Award dt. 31.8.98
passed u/s 11 of the Act was within a period of 2 years."
D 6. From the above discussion, it is apparent that the High
Court was of the view that unless and until certified copy of the
judgment and order passed by the court was brought to the
notice of the authority, the authority was not supposed to act
and the period of two years under Section 11A of the Act would
E start only from the date of such notice and as the copy of the
judgment and order passed by the High Court on January 11,
1996 was received by the competent authority on September
5, 1997, the respondents were entitled to the benefit of the
entire period from January 11, 1996 to September 5, 1997.
F 7. We are unable to accept the view of the High Court.
8. Section 11A of the Act reads as under:-
11A. Period within which an award shall be made.-
G (1) The Collector shall make an award under section 11
within a period of two years from the date of the publication
of the declaration and if no award is made within that
period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the
land shall lapse:
H
~
MULCHAND KHANUMAL KHATRI v. STATE OF 591
GUJARAT & ORS. [R.M. LODHA, J.]
Provided that in a case where the said declaration A
has been published before the commencement of the Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be
made within a period of two years from such
commencement.
B
Explanation.- In computing the period of two years
referred to in this section, the period during which any
action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said
declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be
excluded.
c
9. Section 11A mandates that an award shall be made by
the Collector under Section11 of the Act within a period of two
years from the date of the publication of the declaration. The
non-adherence to this period results in entire acquisition
proceedings being lapsed. The proviso that follows sub-section D
(1) states that where the declaration under Section 6 has been
published before the commencement of the Amendment Act
the award shall be made within a period of two years from such
commencement. The Explanation appended to Section 11A
clarifies that the period during which any action or proceeding E
relating to acquisition taken pursuant to such declaration
remains stayed by an order of the court, such period shall be
excluded.
10. Insofar as present case is concerned, there is no
dispute that the proviso that follows sub-section (1) of Section F
11A is attracted because the declaration under Section 6 was
published before the commencement of the Amendment Act
and the award was made after coming into force of Section
11 A. The period of two years shall thus commence from
September 24, 1984 when the amendment to the Act was G
notified. It is also not in issue that in computing the period of
two years, the period during which the interim relief granted by
the Gujarat High Court remained operative shall have to be
excluded. The stay order of the High Court remained operative
for the period September 24, 1984 to January 11, 1996. The H
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 2 S.C.R.
. A question is, whether Section 11A of the Act permits exclusion
of time that was taken in obtaining the certified copy of the
judgment and order passed by the High Court ana the period
from the date the certified copy was obtained and it was
brought to the notice of the authority.
B 11. The question with which we are concerned came up
for consideration in Ravi Khullar and Another Vs. Union of
India and Others, (2007) 5 SCC 231. In paras 54, 55 and 56
of the report, this Court stated as follows:
c "54. In the matter of computing the period of limitation three
situations may be visualized, namely, (a) where the
Limitation Act applies by its own force; (b) where the
provisions of the Limitation Act with or without
modifications are made applicable to a special statute;
D and (c) where the special statue itself prescribes the
period of limitation and provides for extension of time and/
or condonation of delay. The instant case is not one which
is governed by the provisions of the Limitation Act. The
Land Acquisition Collector in making an award does not
E act as a court within the meaning of the Limitation Act. It
is also clear from the provisions of the Land Acquisition
Act that the provisions of the Limitation Act have not been
made applicable to proceedings under the 'Land
Acquisition Act in the matter of making an award under
.Section 11-A of the Act. However, Section 11-A of the Act
F ·does provide a period of limitation within which the
Collector shall make his award. The Explanation thereto
also provides for exclusion of the period during which any
action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the
declaration is stayed by an order of a court. Such being
G the provision, there is no scope for importing into Section
11-A of the Land Acquisition Act the provisions of Section
· 12 of the Limitation Act. The application of Section 12 of
the Limitation Act is also confined to matters enumerated
, therein. The time taken for obtaining a certified copy of the
H
MULCHAND KHANUMAL KHATRI v. STATE OF 593
GUJARAT & ORS. [R.M. LODHA, J.]
judgment is excluded because a certified copy is required A
to be filed while preferring an appeal/revision/review etc.
challenging the impugned order. Thus a court is not
permitted to read into Section 11-A of the Act a provision
fo1 exclusion of time taken to obtain a certified copy of the
judgment and order. The Court has, therefore, no option B
but to compute the period of limitation for making an award
in accordance with the provisions of Section 11-A of the
Act after excluding such period as can be excluded under
the Explanation to Section 11-A of the Act.
55. Our conclusion finds support from the scheme of the C
Land Acquisition Act itself. Section 11-A of the Act was
inserted by Act 68 of 1984 with effect from 24-9-1984.
Similarly, Section 28-A was also inserted by the
Amendment Act of 1984 with effect from the same date.
In Section 28-A the Act provides for a period of limitation D
within which an application should be made to the
Collector for redetermination of the amount of
compensation on the basis of the award of the Court. The
proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 28-A reads as
follows:- E
"Provided that in computing the period of three
months within which an application to the Collector
shall be made under this sub-section, the day on
which the award was pronounced and the time F
requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be
excluded."
56. It will thus be seen that the legislature wherever it
considered necessary incorporated by express words the
rule incorporated in Section 12 of the Limitation Act. It has G
done so expressly in Section 28-A of the Act while it has
consciously not incorporated this rule in Section 11-A even
while providing for exclusion of time under the Explanation.
The intendment of the legislature is therefore unambiguous
and does not permit the court to read words into Section H
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 2 S.C.R.
A 11-A of the Act so as to enable it to read Section 12 of .
the Limitation Act into Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition
t· Act."
12. We are in respectful agreement with the above legal
position. The period prescribed in Section 11A is mandatory.
8
The consequence of breach is provided in the provision itself
viz., the entire acquisition proceedings get lapsed. Insofar as
computation of the period is concerned, the period of two years
cor.imences from the date of the publication of the declaration.
C Where the declaration has been published before the
Amendment Act, then the period commences from the
commencement of the Amendment Act. The only period that
is excludable is the period during which the action or
proceedings to be taken pursuant to the said declaration
remains stayed under the order of a court and no other. Section
D 11 A is a special provision for the purposes of the Act and the
legislative intent being clear from the bare language of the
explanation appended thereto, we find no justification to read
the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 and particularly
Section 12 thereof into it.
E
13. In view of the above legal position and the facts noticed
above, we hold as we must, that the award having not been
made within the period prescribed in Section 11A of the Act,
the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the appellant's land
F has lapsed. The High Court was clearly in error in excluding the
period from January 11, 1996 to September 5, 1997. This
period cannot be excluded under explanation appended to
Section 11A of the Act.
14. In view of the above, Civil Appeal is allowed and the
G impugned judgment and order is set aside. The entire
proceedings for the acquisition concerning the appellant's land
is declared to have lapsed. No costs.
K.K.T Appeal allowed.
H
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