Holding

The protection against eviction under Section 10(4)(i) ceases when a tenant engaged in essential services is transferred to another town, and a revisional court cannot re‑assess evidence to disturb the concurrent factual findings of lower tribunals.

Summary

The landlord filed an eviction petition under the A.P. Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960, claiming bonafide need for the premises. The tenant, employed in a department notified as an essential service, was transferred from Tenali to Marcherla, about 110 miles away. The Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority allowed eviction, but the High Court, invoking Section 10(4)(i), held that the tenant remained protected from eviction despite the transfer and also re‑examined the evidence, overturning the lower courts’ findings. The landlord appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court held that the protection under Section 10(4)(i) ceases once the tenant is transferred to another town, as the purpose of the provision is to prevent hardship at the place of posting, and that the High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction by re‑assessing evidence and disturbing the concurrent factual findings. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court order and allowed the landlord’s appeal, granting the tenant a six‑month stay on eviction subject to payment of arrears.

Issues considered

Whether the protection against eviction under Section 10(4)(i) of the A.P. Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960 continues to apply to a tenant who is transferred to another city or town.
Whether a High Court exercising revisional jurisdiction may re‑assess evidence and overturn concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Rent Controller and the First Appellate Authority.

Subjects

evictionessential servicesrent controlrevisional jurisdictiontenant transferlandlord-tenant disputebonafide need

Judgment

MUDIGONDA CHANDRA MOULI SASTRY
v.
BHIMANEPALLI BIKSHALU AND ORS.

AUGUST 4, 1999

[V.N. KHARE AND SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI, JJ.] B

A.P. Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960-Sections
10(3) and 10 (4)(i)-lnterpretation of-Eviction petition filed by landlord-
Tenant claiming protection against eviction on the ground that he is employed C
in a department catering essential services-Tenant transferred to another
city or town-Applicability of protection under S.10(4)(i) of the Act-Held,
when a tenant engaged in catering essential services has been transferred
to another city or town, the protection to such a tenant against an order
passed under S. J0(3) of the Act ceases to be available to him in respect of
premises in his original place of posting. D
Revisional Jurisdiction-Concurrent finding of facts by two courts-
No a/legation that the said findings suffered from any legal infirmity-High
Court re-assessing evidence and interfering with concurrent finding offacts-
Held, under the facts and circumstances High Court exceeded its power while
exercising revisional jurisdiction. E
Appellant-landlord filed a petition for eviction of the respondent-tenant
on the ground of bonafide requirement, besides other grounds not relevant
for the purpose of the present appeal, which was allowed by the Rent
Controller. Appeal preferred by the tenant against the order of the Rent F
Controller was dismissed by the Appellate Authority. Revision petition filed
by the tenant against the order of the Appellate Authority was allowed by the
High Court on the ground that by virtue ofS.I0(4Xi) of A.P. Building (Lease,
Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960, no order of eviction could be passed
against the tenant, as the tenant is employed in a department, which has been
declared as catering an essential service; and that the transfer of tenant to G
another town would not come in the way of protection available to the tenant
under S.10(4)(i) of the Act. The High Court further, after re-assessing
evidence reversed the finding of facts as regards other grounds for eviction
- arrived at by the courts below. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the
appellant has filed the present appeal.
H
69
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A The contentions of the appellant were that the tenant having been
transferred to another town, the protection under S.10(4)(i) of the Act, was
not available to the tenant; and that it was not open to the High Court, ~bile
· exercising its revisional jurisdiction, to re..;assess the evidence and reverse
concurrent finding of facts recorded by the courts below.

B Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1. A perusal of Section 10(4)(i) of the A.P. Building (Lease,
Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960 shows that no order of eviction can be ·
passed under sub-section (3) of Section J 0 of the Act against any tenant, who
C is engaged in any employment or Class of employment notified by the
government as an essential service for the purposes of this sub-section. The
tenant, who was working in a department which was declared as an essential
service by the Government by issuing a notification under Section 10(4)(i)
of the Act, was transferred to another town which was about 110 miles from
his original place of posting. The object behind clause(i) of sub-section ( 4)
D of Section 10 is that an employee who is employed for rendering an essential
service is not to be ejected from the premises of which he is a tenant lest
he would be put to hardship and inconvenience which may, ultimately, interfere
in his working in catering essential services to the society. Keeping in mind/
the object, it is held that once a tenant who was engaged in catering essential
E services, has been transferred to another city or town, the protection to such .
a tenant against an order passed under sub-section(3) of Section 10 of the
Act ceases to be available to him as he is no longer required to cater
essential services. If a literal interpretation to clause (i) of Sub-section (4)
of Section 10 is given, then it would lead to an anomalous position. For
example, if a tenant working in a department which is rendering essential
F services is transferred to another city or town where he is posted in a ·
department which is also engaged in providing essential services and he
takes a premises on rent for his residence, it would mean that such a tenant
enjoys protection against eviction at both places, namely, in the original
place of posting and subsequent place of posting. But that is not the object
G behind the provision of Section 10(4)(i) of the Act. The view of the High
Court is repugnant to the object behind the provisions of the Act.
[72-D-H; 73-A-D]

2. The Rent Controller and the First Appellate Authority after assessing
the evidence recorded concurrent finding of facts that the need of the landlord
H was bonaflde. It was not pointed out that the said finding suffered from any
M.C.M. SASTRYv. B. BIKSHALU [V.N. KHARE, J.] 71

legal infirmity. Under such circumstances, it was also not open to the High A
._·.Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction to have indulged in re-
assessment of evidence and thereby interfered with the concurrent finding
of facts recorded by the two courts below, especially when it was found by the
High Court that the tenant's wife had already acquired a vacant accommodation
in the tenant's original place of posting where the disputed premises is B
situated and the tenant himself was transferred to another town. (73-D-F)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2590of1997.

From the Judgment and Order dated 12.2.96 of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court in C.R.P.No. 2507of1994.
c
Ms. B. Sunita Rao for the Appellant.

Sunil Kumar for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

V. N. KHARE, J. This is a landlord's appeal. The landlord filed a petition
D
for eviction of the respondent-tenant from the premises in dispute on the
grounds, namely, (a) he required the said premises for his own needs; (b) the
tenant has committed default in payment of rent; (c) the tenant has acquired
an alternative accommodation; and (d) the premises was in a dilapidated
condition which required reconstruction. The Rent Controller, after having E
satisfied that the grounds for eviction were well-substantiated, allowed the
petition filed by the landlord. Aggrieved, the tenant preferred an ·appeal. The
appellate authority dismissed the appeal filed by the tenant. The High Court,
however, in the Civil Revision Petition filed by the tenant held, that by virtue
of sub-section (4) (i) of Section 10 of A.P. Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) F
Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') no order of eviction can
be passed against the tenant, as the tenant is in the employment in a
department which has been declared as an essential service. The High Court
further, after re-assessing the evidence, reversed the finding of facts as
regards other grounds for eviction of the tenant arrived at by the two courts
below. Consequently, the revision petition filed by the tenant was allowed and G
the petition filed by the. landlord for eviction of the tenant was rejected.

Learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the order of the High
Court on two grounds. Firstly, that the tenant having been transferred from
Tenali to Marcherla - another town, the protection under sub-section 4 (i) of
Section IO, was not available to the tenant and, secondly, it was not open to H
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A the High Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction to re-assess the
evidence and arrive at a different finding contrary to the concurrent finding
of facts recorded by the two courts below.

After we heard the matter, we find that both the submissions of learned
counsel for the appellant are well-substantiated. So far as the first submission
B is concerned, it is worthwhile to reproduce Section 10 (4) (i) of the Act, which
is as under :-

"Section 10 (4) - No order for eviction shall be passed under sub-
section (3) -

c (i) against any tenant who is engaged in any employment or class
of employment notified by the Government as an essential service for
the purposes of this sub-section unless the landlord is himselfengaged
in any employment or class ofemployment which has been so notified;
or" ..... .

D A perusal of the aforesaid provision shows that no order of eviction can be '
passed under sub- section (3) of Section JO of the Act against any tenant,
who is engaged in any employment or class of employment notified by the
Government as an essential service for the purposes of this sub-section. In
the present case, the tenant was working as Senior Assistant (Accounts) in
E LT.I., Tenali. The Government issued a notification under sub-section (4) (i)
of Section 10 declaring service in I. T. I. as an essential service. Therefore, any
person in employment in LT.I. enjoyed immunity from eviction from any order
that may be passed under sub-section (3) of Section I 0 of the Act. But, in
the present case, the tenant was transferred from Tenali to Marcherla - a place.
which is about 110 miles from Tenali. Under such circumstances, the question
F that arises for consideration is whether a tenant employed in a department
catering essential services if transferred to another city or town, will he still
enjoy the protection from eviction from any order that may be passed under
sub-section (3) of Section I 0 of the Act ? The aforesaid provisions show that
the object behind clause (i) of sub-section (4) of Section I 0 is that an
G employee who is employed for rendering an essential service is not to be
ejected from the premises of which he is a tenant lest he would put to a
hardship and inconvenience which may, ultimately, interfere in his working in
catering essential services to the society. Keeping in mind the object we are
of the view that once a tenant, who was engaged in catering essential
services, has been transferred to another city or town, the protection to such
H a tenant against an order passed under sub-section (3) of Soction 10 of the· ,,

.
·~'
M.C.M. SASTRYv. B. BIKSHALU [V.N. KHARE, J.] 73

Act ceases to be available to him as he is no longer required to cater essential A
services. If we give a literal interpretation to clause (i) of sub-section (4) of
Section 10, then it would lead to an anomalous position. For example, if a
tenant working in a department which is rendering essential services is
transferred to another city or town where he is posted in a department which
is also engaged in providing essential services and he takes a premises on B
rent for his residence, does it mean that such a tenant enjoy's protection
against eviction at both places, namely, in the original place of posting and
subsequent place of posting. But that is not the object behind the provision
of Section l 0 (4) (i) of the Act. It was pointed out before the High Court by
,- the appellant that in view of transfer of the tenant from Tenali, the protection
from ejectment under Section 10 (4) (i) is not available to him but the High C
Court rejected the said submission on the ground that the transfer of tenant
from Tenali would not come in the way of protection available to the tenant.
This view of the High Court is repugnant to the object behind the provisions
of the Act. Therefore, we find that the view taken by the High Court in
applying sub-section (4) (i) of Section IO of the Act in the present case, was
totally misplaced. D

Coming to the second submission what we find is that, that the Rent
Controller and the First Appellate Authority after assessing the evidence
recorded concurrent finding of facts that the need of the landlord was bonafide.
It was not pointed out that the said finding suffered from any legal infirmity. E
Under such circumstances, it was also not o.pen to the High Court in exercise
of its revisional jurisdiction to have indulged in re-assessment of evidence
and thereby interfered with the concurrent finding of facts recorded by the
two courts below, especially when it was found by the High Court that the
tenant's wife had already acquired a vacant accommodation in the town of
Tenali and the tenant himself was transferred from Tenali to Marcherla. Since F
the petition deserves to succeed on these two grounds, we are not inclined
to go into the other grounds on which the landlord sought eviction of the
respondent-tenant.

For the aforesaid reasons, we find that the judgment and order passed G
by the High Court under appeal is not sustainable in law and, therefore, liable
to be set aside. We order accordingly. The appeal is, therefore, allowed.
However, there shall be no order as to costs.

After the order was dictated; learned counsel appearing for the tenant
prayed that the respondent-tenant may be granted some time to vacate the H
74 • SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. I S.C.R.

, A premises. To this, counsel for the appellant has no objection. We, therefore,
direct that the respondent-tenant shall not be dispossessed from the premises
in question for a period of six months i.e. upto 31st of January, 2000 provided
the respondent-tenant deposits the arrears of rent/damages, if any, before the
Rent Controller within two months and continues to pay month to month rent/
B damages to the landlord. The respondent-tenant on the expiry of the aforesaid
period shaft hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of the premises
to the landlord.

A.K.T. Appeal allowed.