MST. PARAM PAL SINGH THROUGH FATHERversusM/S NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. & ANR.

                       [2012] 13 S.C.R. 1232


A         MST. PARAM PAL SINGH THROUGH FATHER
                                  v.
             MIS NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. & ANR.
                 (Civil Appeal No.9084 of 2012)

                       DECEMBER 14, 2012
8
             [T.S. THAKUR AND FAKKIR MOHAMED
                    IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, JJ.)

        Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923- s.3- Truck driver
C employed with second respondent was driving truck to a
  destination 1152 kms. away in connection with the commercial
  transport operation of the second respondent - In course of
  driving activity, he felt uncomfortable and parked the truck on
  the side of the road soon whereafter he fainted and died -
o Claim for compensation under the Act - Held: There was
  casual connection to death of the deceased with that of his
  employment as a truck driver - Deceased would have
  definitely undergone grave strain and stress due to long
  distance driving - Vocation of driving was a material
E contributory factor if not the sole cause that accelerated his
  unexpected death to occur which in all fairness should be held
  to be an untoward mishap in his life span - Such 'untoward
  mishap' can be reasonably described as an 'accident'- Death
  of the truck driver was in an accident arising out of and in the
F course of his employment with the second respondent - Order
  of Commissioner awarding compensation to adopted son of
  dgceased accordingly upheld.
         Adoption - Validity of - Proof - In a simple ceremony
  deceased 'J' had expressed that he being a bachelor thought
G it fit to take appellant in adoption - Biological parents of the
  appellant were also willing to give him in adoption - Process
  of adoption was carried out in presence of respected persons
  of the Panchayat in a ceremony where goods and sweets were

H                               1232
 MST. PARAM PAL SINGH THROUGH FATHER v. NATIONAL 1233
                   INSURANCE CO.

distributed - Adoption Deed was written by the Sarpanch of        A
the village - Left thumb impression of 'J' was found affixed in
the Adoption Deed which was signed both by the biological
parents apart from three witnesses - Appellant was three years
old at the time when the adoption took place - In ration card,
name of 'J' was mentioned as father of the appellant - Held:      B
In view of oral and documentary evidence on record, it was
conclusively proved that appellant was the adopted son of 'J'.

  · One 'J' was employed as truck driver by the second
respondent. 'J' was driving a truck in connection with the
commercial transport operation of the second                      C
respondent from Delhi to Nimiaghat. When the truck
reached near Nimiaghat, 'J' felt giddy and, therefore,
parked the vehicle on the road side near a hotel and soon
thereafter he fainted. 'J' was removed to a nearby hospital
where the doctors declared him brought dead.                      D

     The appellant, claiming himself to be the adopted
son of 'J', filed application before the Commissioner of
Workmen's Compensation submitting that the death of 'J'
was due to the strain and stress of continuous driving            E
in the course of his employment with the second
respondent, that the vehicle which he was driving was
insured with the first respondent and that an additional
premium was also paid for coverage of compensation
payable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The                 F
Commissioner awarded compensation. In appeal,
however, the High Court held that the death of 'J' was due
to natural causes and it had no CAUSAL CONNECTION
with his employment and also held that the adoption of
the appellant was not proved and thus set aside the order         G
passed by the Commissioner. Hence the present appeal.

    Allowing the appeal, the Court
    HELD: 1.1. On a conspectus consideration of the
deed of adoption and the oral evidence led on behalf of           H
    1234   SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2012] 13 S.C.R.


A the appellant, it is found that there was a simple
  c~remony though not a mantra ceremony held in which
  the deceased participated wherein it was expressed that
  the deceased being a bachelor thought it fit to take the
  appellant in adoption for which the biological parents of
8 the appellant were also willing to give him in adoption.
  In the Adoption Deed it was specifically mentioned that
  the process of adoption was carried out in the presence
  of respected persons of the Panchayat in a ceremony
  where goods and sweets were distributed in
C commemoration of the function of adoption. It has come
  in evidence that the Adoption Deed was written by the
  Sarpanch of the village. The left thumb impression of the
  deceased was found affixed in the Adoption Deed which
  was signed both by the biological parents apart from
  three witnesses. It was stated that about 15 to 20 persons
0
  apart from women folk were present at the time when the
  adoption ceremony was held. The suggestion, that the
  deed was written later on, was duly denied by the
  witnesses. It was also stated that the appellant was just
  three years old at the time when the adoption took place.
E Further Exhibits AW1/5 and AW1/6 are the copies of
  ration cards in which the name of the deceased is
  mentioned as the father of the appellant. [Para 15] (1246-
  D-H; 1247-A-B]

F     1.2. It was, thus, conclusively proved that the
  appellant was the adopted son of the deceased having
  been adopted as early as on 15.02.1999 i.e. long before
  the death of the deceased, namely, 17.07.2002. The High
  Court in the impugned judgment completely misled itself
G by rejecting the claim of adoption by holding that the
  document was not registered with the Tahsildar, that no
  ceremony was held, that the adoptive father was not
  present, that there was no giving and taking of the
  adopted son and, therefore, the adoption of the appellant
H by the deceased not proved. On the contrary, every
 MST PARAM PALSINGHTHROUGH FATHER v. NATIONAL 1235
                 INSURANCE CO.

prescription required for a valid adoption was very much A
present in the form of both oral and documentary
evidence on record and consequently the conclusion of
the High Court in having held that the appellant was not
the adopted son of the deceased cannot be sustained
and the same is set aside. [Para 16) [1247-B-E]          B

    Lakshman Singh Kothari v. Smt. Rup Kanwar AIR 1961
SC 1378: 1962 SCR 477; M. Gurudas and others v.
Rasaranjan and others 2006 (8) SCC 367: 2006 (6) Suppl.
SCR 103 and Vishvanath Ramji Karate v. Rahibai Ramji C
Karate and others AIR 1931 Bombay 105 -referred to.

    State of Rajasthan v. Ram Prasad and another 2001
A.C.J. 647; Anand Bihari and others v. Rajasthan State Road
Trans. Corpn. and another 1991 A.C.J. 848 and Lalo Devi v.
Superintendent of Mines 1988 ACJ 886 - cited.                 D
     2.1. The entitlement to claim compensation is
dependent on fulfillment of the stipulations contained in
Section 3(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
However, there are decisions of the English Court as early
as of the year 1903 onwards stating that unlooked-for E
mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or
designed should be construed as falling within the
definition of an "accident" and in the event of such
"untoward" "unexpected" event resulted in a personal
injury caused to the workman in the course of his F
employment in connection with the trade and business
of his employer, the same would be governed by the
provisions of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act. Such a legal principle evolved from time immemorial
got the seal of approval of this Court. Thus, in the facts G
of this case, it can be validly concluded that there was
CAUSAL CONNECTION to the death of the deceased with
that of his employment as a truck driver. One cannot lose
sight of the fact that a 45 years old driver meets with his
unexpected death, may be due to heart failure while H ·
     1236    SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2012) 13 S.C.R.


 A driving the vehicle from Delhi to a distant place called
   Nimiaghat near Jharkhand which is about 1152 kms.
   away from Delhi, would have definitely undergone grave
   strain and stress due to such long distance driving. The
   deceased being a professional heavy vehicle driver when
 B undertakes the job of such driving as his regular
   avocation it can be safely held that such constant driving
   of heavy vehicle, being dependant solely upon his
   physical and mental resources & endurance, there was
   every reason to assume that the vocation of driving was
 c a material contributory factor if not the sole cause that
   accelerated his unexpected death to occur which in all
   fairness should be held to be an untoward mishap in his
   life span. Such an 'untoward mishap' can therefore be
   reasonably described as an 'accident' as having been
 0 caused solely attributable to the natur~ of employment
   indulged in with his employer which was in the course
   of such employer's trade or business. [Paras 21, 22 and
   27] [1249-G; 1250-C-E; 1255-A-E]
        2.2. Having regard to the evidence placed on record,
 E there is no scope to hold that the deceased was simply
   travelling in the vehicle and that there was no obligation
   for him to undertake the work of driving. On the other
   hand, the evidence as stood established proved the fact
   that the deceased was actually driving the truck and that
 F in the course of such driving activity as he felt
   uncomfortable he safely parked the vehicle on the side
   of the road near a hotel soon whereafter he breathed his
   last. In such circumstances, the conclusion of the
   Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation that the
 G death of the deceased was in an accident arising out of
   and in the course of his employment with the second
   respondent was perfectly justified and the conclusion to
   the contrary reached by the High Court deserves to be
   set aside. The order of the Commissioner for Workmen's
   Compensation shall stand restored. [Para 28] [1255-E-H;
·H 1256-A]
 MST. PARAM PAL SINGH THROUGH FATHER v. NATIONAL 1237
                   INSURANCE CO.

     Messrs Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Ritta       A
Farnandes 1969 A.C.J. 419; Shakuntala Chandrakant
Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali & Another IV (2006) ACC
769 (SC); Malfikarjuna G. Hiremath v. Branch Manager,
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another AIR 2009 SC 2019:
2009 (2) SCR 320; Smt. Sundarbai v. The General                8
Manager, Ordnance Factory, Khamaria, Jaba/pur 1976 Lab
l.C.1163 and Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Ibrahim
Mahmmod lssak 1969 A.C.J. 422 - referred to.

     Clover Clayton & Co. v. Hughes 1910 A.C. 242 -
referred to.                                                   C

                    Case Law Reference:
    1962 SCR 477               referred to       Para 7, 10
    1969 A.C.J. 419            referred to      Para 7, 22     D
    1969 A.C.J. 422            referred to      Para 7, 26
    2001 A.C.J. 647            cited             Para 7
    1991 A.C.J. 848            cited            Para 7
                                                               E
    1988 ACJ 886               cited             Para 7
    (2006) ACC 769 (SC)        referred to      Para 7, 23
    2006 (6) Suppl. SCR 103 referred to         Para 11
                                                               F
    AIR 1931 Bombay 105        referred to      Para 12
    1910 A.C. 242              referred to      Para 12
    2009 (2) SCR 320           referred to      Para 24
    1976 Lab l.C. 1163         referred to      Para 25        G

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
9084 of 2012.

                                                               H
    1238     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012) 13 S.C.R.


A       From the Judgment and Order dated 23.05.2007 of the
    High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in FAO No. 184 of 2005.

        R.K. Nain, Pratibha Nain and Mahender Singh for the
    appellant.

B       M.K. Dua for the Respondents.

        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J. 1. Leave
C granted.

       2. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High
  Court of Delhi passed in FAO No.184/2005 dated 23.05.2007.
  The said appeal before the High Court arose out of an award
  passed by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner in its
D order dated 29.12.2004 in WCD/113/NWD/02. The Workmen's
  Compensation Commissioner determined the compensation
  payable to the appellant herein in a sum of Rs.2,20,280/- along
  with another sum of Rs.2500/- as funeral charges under Section
  4(4) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. A separate show-
E cause-notice was issued for payment of interest and penalty.
  The respondent herein preferred the abovesaid appeal in FAO
  No.184/2005 in which the High Court passed the impugned
  order setting aside the order passed by the Commissioner. It
  is in the abovesaid background the appellant-claimant has
F come forward with this appeal.

       3. At the very outset, it is required to be stated that the
  appellant claimed himself to be the adopted son of the
  deceased Jeet Singh @ Ajit Singh. According to the claimant
  the deceased Jeet Singh @ Ajit Singh was employed as Truck
G Driver by the second respondent herein to drive truck bearing
  No.DL-IG-8255. It is stated that in July 2002 the deceased Jeet
  Singh @ Ajit Singh was assigned the duty of driving the
  abovesaid truck in connection with the trade and business of
  the second respondent from Delhi to Nimiaghat, that on
H 17.07.2002 when the vehicle reached near about the
  MST PARAM PAL SINGH THROUGH FATHER v. NATIONAL 1239
INSURANCE CO. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]

destination Nimiaghat, District Giridih, the deceased suffered       A
a health set-back and therefore he parked the vehicle on the
road side of a nearby hotel. It is further stated that immediately
after parking the vehicle he fainted and the persons nearby took
him to the hospital where the doctors declared that he was
brought dead. An FIR was stated to have been lodged with the         B
police and thereafter the postmortem was conducted at Civil
Hospital, District Giridih. The said truck was insured with the
first respondent herein. In the abovesaid background the
appellant preferred the application before the Commissioner
of Workmen's Compensation, Delhi contending that the death           c
of the deceased was in the course of his employment with the
trade and business of the second respondent and that his death
was due to stress and strain while driving the said truck
continuously over a period of time. It was further claimed that
at the time of his death the deceased was drawing wages at           D
the rate of Rs.3091/- per month apart from a sum of RS.50/-
per day as allowances and in all a sum of Rs.4591/- per month.
The age of the deceased was stated to be 45 years at the time
of his death. Appellant also claimed interest@ 12% p.a from
the date of accident till realization apart from claiming penalty.
                                                                     E
     4. The claim of the appellant was resisted by the first
respondent substantively on two grounds. In the first place it was
contended that the appellant had no locus to file the claim
petition inasmuch as he was not a dependant. It was then
contended that the death of the deceased was due to natural          F
causes and that there was no CAUSAL CONNECTION
between the death of the deceased and that of his employment.
The specific stand of the first respondent was that the deceased
was an unmarried person, that on that day he was not driving
the vehicle and that one Bhure Singh s/o Dharam Pal Singh            G
was driving the truck in question and that no accident took
place. The jurisdiction of the Commissioner was also
questioned.

     5. Before the Commissioner the biological father of the
                                                                     H
    1240     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 13 S.C.R.


A appellant examined himself as a witness who was cross-
  examined on behalf of the respondents. One Anil Sharma s/o
  the second respondent gave evidence on his side who was
  cross-examined by the counsel for the appellant. On behalf of
  the first respondent one A.B. Dutta was examined. On behalf
B of the appellant Exhibits AW1/1 to AW1/7 and AW1/R were
  marked. AW1/1 is the copy of FIR, AW1/2 is the copy of
  postmortem report, AW1/3 is the copy of insurance policy,
  AW1/4 is the copy of registration certificate, AW1/5 and AW1/
  6 are copies of ration card, AW1/7 is the copy of affidavit of
c Sh. Santokh Singh regarding the age and name of the
  deceased and AW1/R is the Adoption Deed.

        6. The Commissioner repelled both the contentions of the
  respondents, namely, about the locus of the appellant as well
  as the CAUSAL CONNECTION of the death of the deceased
D with that of his employment and awarded the compensation as
  mentioned above. The learned Judge, however, held that the
  death of the deceased was due to natural causes and it had
  no CAUSAL CONNECTION with his employment and also held
  that the adoption of the appellant was not proved.
E
        7. We heard Mr. R.K. Nain, learned counsel for the
  appellant and Shri M.K. Dua, learned counsel for the
  respondent(s). Learned counsel for the appellant strenuously
  contended that the impugned judgment of the High Court is
F liable to be set aside on both the grounds. According to learned
  counsel when once the employment of the deceased with the
  second respondent was proved there was every justification for
  the Commissioner in having held that the death of the deceased
  was in the course of his employment in an accident arising out
G of such employment. It was then contended that the learned
  Judge failed to consider the evidence which was placed before
  the Court relating to valid adoption of the appellant by the
  deceased in a ceremony held for that purpose where the
  biological father gave appellant in adoption when he was three
H years old which was accepted by the deceased to be his
  MST. PARAM PAL SINGH THROUGH FATHER v. NATIONAL 1241
INSURANCE CO. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]

adopted son. The learned counsel relied upon the decisions            A
in Lakshman Singh Kothari V. Smt. Rup Kanwar- AIR 1961
SC 1378, Messrs Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Pvt. Ltd. V.
Ritta Famandes - 1969 A.C.J. 419, Mackinnon Mackenzie &
Co. Pvt. Ltd. V. Ibrahim Mahmmod lssak 1969 A.C.J. 422,
State of Rajasthan V. Ram Prasad and another- 2001 A.C.J.             B
647, Anand Bihari and others V. Rajasthan State Road Trans.
Corpn. and another - 1991 A.C.J. 848, Lalo Devi V.
Superintendent of Mines -1988 ACJ 886 and Shakuntala
Chandrakant Shreshti V. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali & another
- IV (2006) ACC 769 (SC) in support of his submission.                c
     8. Though notice was duly served on the second
respondent, he did not evince any interest in contesting this
appeal. Learned counsel for the first respondent in his
submissions contended that the judgment of the High Court
does not call for any interference. According to learned counsel      D
since there was no accident and the death of the deceased was
due to natural causes, no compensation was payable under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. Learned counsel also
contended that the adoption of the appellant by the deceased
was not proved in the manner known to law.                            E

     9. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties
and having perused the judgment of the learned Judge as well
as that of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner and
all other material papers placed before us, we find that the          F
judgment of the learned Judge cannot be sustained.

      10. In the first instance we wish to deal with the issue
relating to validity of the adoption of the appellant since if only
his adoption is held to be valid there is scope for examining
his right to claim compensation over the death of the deceased        G
as his adopted son. In Hindu Law in the celebrated decision
of this Court reported in Lakshman Singh Kothari (supra), the
legal requirement for a valid adoption has been succinctly
stated in paragraph 10 which reads as under:
                                                                      H
    1242     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 13 S.C.R.


A       "10. The law may be briefly stated thus: Under the Hindu
        law, whether among the regenerate caste or among
        Sudras, there cannot be a valid adoption unless the
        adoptive boy is transferred from one family to another and
        that can be done only by the ceremony of giving and taking.
B       The object of the corporeal giving and receiving in adoption
        is obviously to secure due publicity. To achieve this object
        it is essential to have a formal ceremony. No particular
        form is prescribed for the ceremony, but the law requires
        that the natural parent shall hand over the adoptive boy and
c       the adoptive parent shall receive him. The nature of the
        ceremony may vary depending upon the circumstances of
        each case. But a ceremony there shall be, and giving and
        taking shall be part of it. The exigencies of the situation
        arising out of diverse circumstances necessitated the
        introduction of the doctrine of delegation; and, therefore,
D
        the parents, after exercising their volition to give and take
        the boy in adoption, may both or either of them delegate
        the physical act of handing over the boy or receiving him,
        as the case may be, to a third party."
E        11 . The said legal position has been consistently followed
    by this Court which can be mentioned by referring to a recent
    decision of this Court reported in M. Gurudas and others V.
    Rasaranjan and others - 2006 (8) SCC 367. Paragraphs 26
    and 27 are relevant for our purpose which read as under:
F
        "26. To prove valid adoption, it would be necessary to bring
        on record that there had been an actual giving and taking
        ceremony. Performance of "datta homam" was imperative,
        subject to just exceptions. Above all, as noticed
        hereinbefore, the question would arise as to whether
G
        adoption of a daughter was permissible in law.
        27. In Mu/la's Principles of Hindu Law, 17th Edn., p. 710,
        it is stated:

H              "488. Ceremonies relating to adoption.-(1) The
  MST. PARAM PAL SINGH THROUGH FATHER v. NATIONAL 1243
INSURANCE CO. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]

           ceremonies relating to an adoption are-                A
           (a) the physical act of giving and receiving, with
           intent to transfer the boy from one family into
           another;
           (b) the datta homam, that is, oblations of clarified   8
           butter to fire; and

           (c) other minor ceremonies, such as putresti jag
           (sacrifice for male issue).

         (2) The physical act of giving and receiving is
                                                                  c
    essential to the validity of an adoption.       ·

          As to datta homam it is not settted whether its
    performance is essential to the validity of an adoption in
    every case.                                                D
         As to the other ceremonies, their performance is not
    necessary to the validity of an adoption.
         (3) No religious ceremonies, not even datta homam,       E
    are necessary in the case of shudras. Nor are religious
    ceremonies necessary amongst Jains or in the Punjab."
     12. In this context, it will be worthwhile to note the
requirement of registration of an Adoption Deed. Section 17
of the Registration Act specifically refers to the documents of F
which registration is compulsory. The deed of adoption is not
one of the documents rrientioned in sub-section 1 of Section
17 which mandatorily required registration. Sub-section 3 of
Section 17 only refers to the mandatory requirement of
registration of an authorization that may be given for adopting G
a son executed after 01.01.1872 if such authorization was not
conferred by a Will. Dealing with the said provision relating to
authorization, it has been held in the decision reported in
Vishvanath Ramji Karate V. Rahibai Ramji Karate and others
- AIR 1931 Bombay 105 by a deed of adoption as H
    1244    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 13 S.C.R.


A distinguished from authority to adopt does not require
  registration.
       13. Keeping the above statement of law in mind as regards
  the procedure to be followed for a valid adoption and the
  statutory stipulation that an adoption deed does not require
8
  registration, the claim of the appellant as the adopted son of
  the deceased requires to be considered. We find from the
  record that the appellant has produced Exhibit AW1/R which
  is the copy of the Adoption Deed. To appreciate the claim of
  the appellant in the proper perspective the contents of the said
C document can be usefully referred to which reads as under:
                   "TRUE TRANSLATION IN ENGLISH
                                  Stamp
D       ADOPTION DEED
        1. Ajit Singh son of Surta Singh son of Deva Singh, am
        residing at village Dhariwal Kalan, Tehsil & Distt-
        Gurdaspur, Punjab (hereinafter called the first party). That
E       I am unmarried so I have no children. Keeping in mind that
        in absence of the children one becomes without any care.
        Hence, for the purpose of proper maintenance a son is
        necessary. So, I have thought it fit to take Master Parampal
        son of Sh. Santokh Singh and Smt. Nirmal Kaur (hereinafter
F       called the second party) resident of village Dhariwal Kalan
        in adoption and they have decided to give. Master
        Parampal's date of birth is 8-12-1996. His bringing up is
        being done by me and I am planning to send him to school.
        For the interest of his health and medication I myself do
G       care. Parampal Singh is a very obedient boy and he
        always remains obedient to me and show me utter respect.
        I always have a great affection for him. I want that whatever
        I leave behind be owned by Parampal Singh. I, in the
        presence of all respected persons and Panchayat, adopt
        Master Parampal Singh as my son and in the ceremony
H
  MST. PARAM PAL SINGH THROUGH FATHER v. NATIONAL 1245
INSURANCE CO. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]

     goods and sweets are distributed for the happiness of one           A
     and all.
    Adoption Deed is reduced in writing for the purpose of
    proof.

     First party                           Second party                  B

     Ajit Singh LTI                        Sd/-
     Sd/- Gurbax Singh           Nirmal Kaur
     Sarpanch 15/2/1999          Sd/-
     Gram Panchayat Seal & Stamp                                         c
     Dhariwal Kalan

     Witnesses:-                           Witnesses:-
     Sd/-                                  Sd/-
     Nishan Singh                                                        D
                                           Tarsem Singh
     S/o-Dayal Singh                       S/o-Bawa Singh
     Viii- Chhina Retwala                  R/o-Dhariwalkalan
     15/2/1999                             Sd/-
                                           Karnail Singh                 E
                                           Nambardar
                                           Vill-Kallu Sohal"

      14. The biological father of the appellant filed his proof
affidavit on behalf of the appellant and offered himself for cross-
                                                                         F
examination. In the said affidavit it was specifically mentioned
that the appellant was the dependent of the deceased workman
as his adopted son. In the course of the cross-examination of
the appellant by the respondents, the witness produced the
original Adoption Deed along with the photocopy and after
verifying with the original the photocopy was marked as Exhibit          G
AW1/R. The relevant part of cross-examination as regards the
adoption of the appellant-can be extracted which are as under:
     "...... It is correct that Ajit Singh is-my elder brother. At the
    ~ime of writing of this Adoption Deed there were 15-20               H
    1246     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 13 S.C.R.


A        persons present. Those who were present were known to
         me. This Adoption Deed was written by "SARPANCH OF
         THE VILLAGE" Shri Gurbux Singh. At the time of writing
         of this 'Adoption Deed' no mantra ceremony was done. It
         is wrong to say that at the time of writing of this 'Adoption
B        Deed' Ajit Singh was not present. 'Adoption Deed' exbt.
         AW1/R at point 'A' my signatures are there. At point 'B' &
         'C' there are signatures of witnesses. At point 'D' there
         was signature of SARPANCH. At point 'E' there are
         signatures of another witness. Signatures are of only five
c        persons. Apart from 15-20 people there were some women
         as well. It is wrong to say that this 'Adoption Deed' has
         been written afterwards. At the time of writing of this
         'Adoption Deed' Parampal was 3 years old. It is wrong to
         say that I am deposing falsely."

D         15. Conspectus consideration of the deed of adoption and
    the oral evidence led on behalf of the appellant, we find that
    there was a simple ceremony though not a mantra ceremony
    held in which the deceased participated wherein it was
    expressed that the deceased being a bachelor thought it fit to
E   take the appellant in adoption for which the biological parents
    of the appellant were also willing to give him in adoption. In the
    Adoption Deed it was specifically mentioned that the process
    of adoption was carried out in the presence of respected
    persons of the Panchayat in a ceremony where goods and
F   sweets were distributed in commemoration of the function of
    adoption. It has come in evidence that the Adoption Deed was
    written by Gurbux Singh on 15.02.1999 who was the Sarpanch
    of the village at that point of time. The left thumb impression of
    the deceased was found affixed in the Adoption Deed which
G   was signed both by the biological parents apart from three
    witnesses, namely, Nishan Singh s/o Dayal Singh of village
    Chhina Retwala, Tarsem Singh s/o Bawa Singh r/o
    Dhariwalkalan and Karnail Singh Nambardar of village Kallu
    Soha. It was stated that about 15 to 20 persons apart from
H   women folk were present at the time when the adoption
  MST. PARAM PAL SINGH THROUGH FATHER v. NATIONAL 1247
INSURANCE CO. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]

ceremony was held. The suggestion, that the deed was written A
later on, was duly denied by the witnesses. It was also stated
that the appellant was just three years old at the time when the
adoption took place. Further Exhibits AW1/5 and AW1/6 are
the copies of ration cards in which it is mentioned that the father
of the appellant is Ajit Singh.                                     B

       16. All the above factors which are born out by records as
well as in the oral version of the witnesses, examined on behalf
of tl:le appellant, in our considered opinion conclusively proved
that the appellant was the adopted son of the deceased having C
been adopted as early as on 15.02.1999 i.e. long before the
death of the deceased, namely, 17.07.2002. Unfortunately, the
learned Judge in the impugned judgment has completely misled
himself by rejecting the claim of adoption by holding that the
document was not registered with the Tahsildar, that .no
ceremony was held, that the adoptive father was not present, D
that there was no giving and taking of the adopted son and,
therefore, the adoption of the appellant by the deceased not
proved. On the contrary, as stated above, we find that everyone
of the prescription required for a valid adoption were very much
present in the form of both oral and documentary evidence on E
record and consequently the conclusion of the learned Judge
in having held that the appellant was not the adopted son of
the deceased cannot be sustained and the same is set aside.
Having reached the above conclusion, we proceed to deal with
the claim of the appellant on merits.                             F
     17. On merits to retrace the facts, the deceased Jeet Singh
@ Ajit Singh was employed as truck driver by the second
respondent. His services were utilized for driving the truck
belonging to the second respondent bearing No.DL-IG-8255. G
The deceased was driving the said truck in connection with the
commercial transport operation of the second respondent from
Delhi to Nimiaghat on 17.07.2002. According to the claimant
when the truck reached the near about of Nimiaghat, District
Giridih, the deceased felt giddy and, therefore, parked the H
    1248     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 13 S.C.R.


A vehicle on the road side near a hotel and soon thereafter he
  stated to have fainted. The deceased was removed to a nearby
  hospital where the doctors declared him brought dead. An FIR
  was lodged with the Police Station, Nimiaghat in FIR No.7/2002
  dated 18.07.2002. The postmortem was stated to have been
B conducted on 19.07.2002 and thereafter the dead body was
  taken to his native place for performing last rites. The claimant
  in his application before the Commissioner submitted that the
  death of the deceased was due to the strain and stress of
  continuous driving in the course of his employment with the
c second respondent, that the vehicle which he was driving
  bearing No.DL-IG-8255 was insured with the first respondent
  vide covering note No.0968499 for the period of 14.02.2002
  to 13.02.2003 and that an additional premium was also paid
  for coverage of compensation payable under the Workmen's
D Compensation Act. The claimant, as an adopted son of the
  deceased, claimed compensation as his dependant.

        18. As far as the merits of the claim was concerned, the
  stand of the first respondent in its written statemerit was that
  the deceased was not in the employment of the second
E respondent, that no accident took place in the course of the
  employment of the deceased with the second respondent, that
  the deceased was not holding a valid license at the time of
  alleged accident, that the deceased was under the influence
  of alcohol or drug at the time of alleged accident and, therefore,
F no compensation was payable and the first respondent was not
  liable to pay any compensation. The second respondent also
  took the stand in his written statement that the deceased was
  not in his employment and that he was not in his professional
  visit in the truck bearing No.DL-IG-8255 to Nimiaghat. It was
G also stated that one Bhure Singh s/o Dharam Pal Singh was
  driving the said truck and that in all possibilities the said Bhure
  Singh might have given lift to the deceased and the deceased
  might have died due to heavy dose of drug with tea.

         19. On behalf of the first respondent its Divisional Manager
H
  MST PARAM PAL SINGH THROUGH FATHER v. NATIONAL 1249
INSURANCE CO. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]

filed his proof affidavit while on behalf of the second1espondent   A
one Anil Sharma was examined. As far as the employment of
the deceased was concerned, the Commissioner has noted
that the FIR which was marked as Exhibit AW1/1 disclose that
the second driver Shure Singh himself admitted therein that the
deceased was the senior driver who was driving the vehicle at
                                                                    8
the time of his death. As regards the said piece of evidence
contained in AW1/1 nothing was brought out in his evidence
either by way of trip sheet or attendance register or payment
of wages register or any other document to show that the
deceased was not in the employment of the second respondent
at any point of time or on the fateful day. The Commissioner
                                                                    c
also noted that there was no cross-examination of WW1/A
Santokh Singh on that issue. On the other hand RW.1 Anil
Sharma in his cross-examination admitted that a sum of
Rs.10,000/- was given to the family of the deceased for
cremation purposes. Therefore, the issue relating to the            D
employment of the deceased by the second respondent as
found to have been established before the Commissioner
cannot be assailed.

      20. Once we cross the said hurdle only other question to      E
be considered is whether death of the deceased was in an
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with
the second respondent? It is common ground that the vehicle
which was driven by the deceased did not meet with any road
accident on 17.07.2002. As a matter of fact, the deceased while     F
driving the vehicle from Delhi to Nimiaghat when reached near
the destination, namely, Nimiaghat felt giddy and thereafter
stated to have collapsed as he was found in a faint condition
in the vehicle which he managed to park on the road side.

     21. The entitlement to claim compensation is therefore         G
dependent on fulfillment of the stipulations contained in Section
3(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which read as under:

    "3. Employer's liability for compensation.-(1) If personal
                                                                    H
    1250    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                {2012] 13 S.C.R.


A       injury is caused to an employee by accident arising out of
        and in the course of his employment, his employer shall
        be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the
        provisions of this Chapter:

              Provided that the employer shall not be so liable -
8
               (a)

               (b)

                      (i)
c
                      (ii)

                      (iii) ......        "

       22. However, there are decisions of the English Court as
D early as of the year 1903 onwards stating that unlooked-for
  mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed
  should be construed as falling within the definition of an
  "accident" and in the event of such "untoward" "unexpected"
  event resulted in a personal injury caused to the workman in
E the course of his employment in connection with the trade and
  business of his employer, the same would be governed by the
  provisions of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
  Such a legal principle evolved from time immemorial got the
  seal of approval of this Court and for this purpose we can refer
F to the celebrated decision in Ritta Farnandes (supra). After
  referring to the decision of House of Lords in Clover Clayton
  & Co. V. Hughes reported in 1910 AC. 242 this Court referred
  to the relevant passage in the decision of House of Lords in
  paragraph 4, which reads as under:
G
        "4. Even if a workman dies from a pre-existing disease, if
        the disease is aggravated or accelerated under the
        circumstances which can be said to be accidental, his
        death results from injury by accident. This was clearly laid

H
  MST. PARAM PAL SINGH THROUGH FATHER v. NATIONAL 1251
INSURANCE CO. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]

    down by the House of Lords in Clover Clayton & Co.     v.A
    Hughes where the deceased, whilest tightening a nut with
    a spanner, fell back on his hand and died. A post mortem
    examination showed that there was a large aneurism of
    the aorta, and that death was caused by a rupture of the
    aorta. The aneurism was in such an advanced condition B
    that it might have burst while the man was .asleep, and very
    slight exertion or strain would have been sufficient to bring
    about a rupture. The County Court Judge found that the
    death was caused by a strain arising out of the ordinary
    work of the deceased operating upon a condition of body C
    which was such as to render the strain fatal, and held upon
    the authorities that this was an accident within the meaning
    of the Act. His decision was upheld both by the Court of
    Appeal and the House of Lords:

          "No doubt the ordinary accident,",,said Lord D
          Loreburn, L.C. "is associated with something
          external: the bursting of a boiler or an explosion in
          a mine, for example. But it may be merely from the
          man's own miscalculation, such as tripping and
          falling. Or it may be due both to internal and E
          external conditions, as if a seaman were to faint in
          the rigging and tumble into the sea. I think it may
          also be something going wrong within the human
          frame itself, such as straining of muscle or the
          breaking of a blood vessel. If that occurred when F
          he was lifting a weight, it would properly be
          described as an accident. So, I think, rupturing an
          aneurism when tightening a nut with a spanner may
          be regarded as an accident."

   With regard to Lord Macnanghten's definition of an G
   accident being "an unlooked for mishap or untoward event
   which is not expected or designed" it was said that an
   event was unexpected if it was not expected by the man
   who suffered it, even though everyman of commonsense
                                                            H
    1252         SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012) 13 S.C.R.


A          who knew the circumstances would think it certain to
           happen."

        23. In a recent decision of this Court in Shakuntala
    Chandrakant Shreshti (supra), the factors to be established to
    prove that an accident has taken place have been culled out
8   and stated as under in paragraph 28:

           "28. In a case of this nature to prove that accident has
           taken place, factors which would have to be established,
           inter alia, are:
c
            1.     stress and strain arising during the course of
                   employment

            2.     nature of employment

D           3.     injury aggravated due to stress and strain"

           24. In Mal/ikarjuna G. Hiremath V. Branch Manager,
     Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and another reported in AIR 2009
     SC 2019 the principles to attract Section 3 of the Workmen's
E    Compensation Act have been stated as under in paragraph 14:

           "14. There are a large number of English and American
           decisions, some of which have been taken note of in ES/
           Corpn's case (supra) in regard to essential ingredients for
           such finding and the tests attracting the provisions of
F          Section 3 of the Act. The principles are:

           (1) There must be a casual connection between the injury
           and the accident and the accident and the work done in
           the course of employment.
G          (2) ihe onus is upon the applicant to show that it was the
           work and the resulting strain which contributed to or
           aggravated the injury.

           (3) If the evidence brought on records establishes a greater
H
  MST. PARAM PAL SINGH THROUGH FATHER v. NATIONAL 1253
INSURANCE CO. [FAKKIR MO~ED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]

    probability which satisfies a reasonable man that the work     A
    contributed to the causing of the personal injury, it would
    be enough for the workman to succeed, but the same
    would depend upon the fact of each case."

     25. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Smt. Sundarbai
V. The General Manager, Ordnance Factory, Khamaria,
                                                                   8
Jabalpur reported in 1976 Lab l.C. 1163 in paragraph 10 the
principles have been culled out as under:

    "10. On a review of the authorities, the principles insofar
    as relevant for our purposes may be stated as follows:         C

    (A) Accident means an untoward mishap which is not
    expected or designed by the workman. "Injury" means
    physiological injury.

    (8) "Accident" and "injury" are distinct in cases where        D
    accident is an event happening externally to a man; e.g.
    when a workman falls from a ladder and suffers injury. But
    accident may be an event happening internally to a man
    and in such cases "accident" and "injury" coincide. Such
    cases are illustrated by bursting of an aneurism, failure of   E
    heart and the like while the workman is doing his normal
    work.

    (C) Physiological injury suffered by a workman due mainly
    to the progress of disease unconnected with employment, F
    may amount to an injury arising out of and in the course of·
    employment if the work which the workman was doing at
    the time of the occurrence of the injury contributed to its
    occurrence.

    (D) The connection between the injury and employment           G
    may be furnished by ordinary strain of ordinary work if the
    strain did in fact contribute to or accelerate or hasten the
    injury.

                                                                   H
    1254    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 13 S.C.R.


A       (E) The burden to prove the connection of employment with
        the injury is on the applicant, but he is entitled to succeed
        if on a balance of probabilities a reasonable man might
        hold that the more probable conclusion is that there was
        a connection."
B        26. Again in yet another celebrated decision of this Court
    in Ibrahim Mahmmod lssak (supra) this Court has set down
    the principles applied in such cases as under in paragraph 5:

        "5. To come within the Act the injury by accident must arise
c       both out of and in the course of employment. The words
        "in the course of the employment" mean "in the course of
        the work which the workman is employed to do and which
        is incidental to it." The words "arising out of employment"
        are understood to mean that "during the course of the
D       employment. injury has resulted from some risk incidental
        to the duties of the service. which. unless engaged in the
        duty owing to the master. it is reasonable to believe the
        workman would not otherwise have suffered." In other
        words there must be a casual relationship between the
E       accident and the employment. The expression "arising out
        of employment" is again not confined to the mere nature
        of the employment. The expression applies to employment
        as such to its nature, its conditions, its obligations and its
        incidents. If by reason of any of those factors the workman
        is brought within the zone of special danger the injury
F
        would be one which arises 'out of employment'. To put it
        differently if the accident had occurred on account of a risk
        which is an incident of the employment, the claim for
        compensation must succeed, unless of course the
        workman has exposed himself to an added peril by his
G       own imprudent act. In Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway
        Co. v. Highley, Lord summer laid down the following test
        for determining whether an accident "arose out of the
        employment."

H                                                (Emphasis added)
  MST. PARAM PALSINGH THROUGH FATHER v. NATIONAL 1255
INSURANCE CO. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.)

      27. Applying the various principles laid down in the above A
decisions to the facts of this case, we can validly conclude that
there was CAUSAL CONNECTION to the death of the
deceased with that of his employment as a truck driver. We
cannot lose sight of the fact that a 45 years old driver meets
with his unexpected death, may be due to heart failure while B
driving the vehicle from Delhi to a ~istant place called Nimiaghat
near Jharkhand which is about 1152 kms. away from Delhi,
would have definitely undergone grave strain and stress due
to such long distance driving. The deceased being a
professional heavy vehicle driver when undertakes the job of      c
such driving as his regular avocation it can be safely held that
such constant driving of heavy vehicle, being dependant solely
upon his physical and mental resources & endurance, there was
every reason to assume that the vocation .of driving was a
material contributory factor if not the sole cause that accelerated D
his unexpected death to occur which in all fairness should be
held to be an untoward mishap in his life span. Such an
 'untoward mishap' can therefore be reasonably described as
an 'accident' as having been caused solely attributable to the
 nature of employment indulged in with his employer which was E
 in the course of such employer's trade or business.

     28. Having regard to the evidence placed on record there
was no scope to hold that the deceased was simply travelling
in the· vehicle and that there was no obligation for him to
undertake the work of driving. On the other hand, the evidence F
as stood established proved the fact that the deceased was
actually driving the truck and that in the course of such driving
activity as he felt uncomfortable he safely parked the vehicle
on the side of the road near a hotel soon whereafter he
breathed his last. In such circumstances, we are convinced that G
the conclusion of the Commissioner of Workmen's
Compensation that the death of the deceased was in an
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with
the second respondent was perfectly justified and the conclusion
to the contrary reached by the learned Judge of the High Court H
    1256    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 13 S.C.R.


A   in the order impugned in this appeal deserves to be set aside.
    The appeal stands allowed. The order impugned is set aside.
    The order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation
    shall stand restored and there shall be no order as to costs.

B 8.8.B.                                         Appeal allowed.



                           END OF 2012