MSR LEATHERSversusS. PALANIAPPAN & ANR.

                     [2012) 9 S.C.R. 165


                       MSR LEATHERS                                 A
                               v.
                 S. PALANIAPPAN & ANR.
          (Criminal Appeal Nos. 261-264 of 2002)
                   SEPTEMBER 26, 2012
                                                                    B
 [R.M. LODHA, T.S. THAKUR AND ANIL R. DAVE, JJ.]

      Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - s. 138 - Dishonour
of cheque - Prosecution based upon second or successive
dishonour - When no prosecution initiated on first dishonour        C
- Whether permissible - Held: In view of s. 138 and the object
underlying therein, the prosecution based on second or
successive default in payment of cheque is permissible even
when no prosecution was initiated pursuant to first default -
Even the legislative intention was not to impose such               D
restriction - So Jong as the cheque remains unpaid within its
validity period and condition precedent for prosecution in
terms of proviso to s. 138 are satisfied, cheque holder's right
to prosecute the drawer remains valid and exercisable - The
benefit of further opportunity to the drawer by reason of a fresh   E
presentation of cheque, cannot help the defaulter to get a
complete absolution from prosecution - Interpretation of
Statues.

     Interpretation of Statutes - Purposive interpretation - The
court should adopt an interpretation which promotes and             F
advances the object sought to be achieved by the legislation,
in preference to an interpretation which defeats such object.

    Words and Phrases:
                                                                    G
    'Absolution' - Meaning of.

    'Cause of Action' - Meaning of, in the context of s. 138
of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

                              165                                   H
    166       SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A       A Division Bench of this Court referred the question
  to the three Judges Bench 'Whether the prosecution u/
  s. 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 based upon
  second or successive dishonour of cheque is
  permissible, if the holder of the cheque had not initiated
B prosecution when the cheque was dishonoured for the
  first time.

          Answering the reference, the Court

       HELD: 1. Prosecution based upon second or
C successive dishonour of the cheque is also permissible
  so long as the same satisfies the requirements stipulated
  in the proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable
  Instruments Act. [Para 33] [192-G]

0        2. Presentation of the cheque and dishonour thereof
    within the period of its validity or a period of six months
    is just one of the three requirements that constitutes
    'cause of action' within the meaning of Sections 138 and
    142(b) of the Act, an expression that is more commonly
E   used in civil law than in penal statutes. For a dishonour
    to culminate into the commission of an offence of which
    a court may take cognizance, there are two other
    requirements, namely, (a) service of a notice upon the
    drawer of the cheque to make payment of the amount
    covered by the cheque and (b) failure of the drawer to
F   make any such payment within the stipulated period of
    15 days of the receipt of such a notice. It is only when
    the said two conditions are superadded to the dishonour
    of the cheque that the holder/payee of the cheque
    acquires the right to institute proceedings for prosecution
G   under Section 138 of the Act, which right remains legally
    enforceable for a period of 30 days counted from the date
    on which the cause of action accrued to him. There is,
    however, nothing in the proviso to Section 138 or Section
    142 for that matter, to oblige the holder/payee of a
H   dishonoured cheque to necessarily file a complaint even
    MSR LEATHERS v. S. PALANIAPPAN & ANR.              167

when he has acquired an indefeasible right to do so. The      A
fact that an offence is complete need not necessarily lead
to launch of prosecution especially when the offence is
not a cognizable one. The complainant may, even when
he has the immediate right to institute criminal
proceedings against the drawer of the cheque, either at       B
the request of the holder/payee of the cheque or on his
own volition, refrain from instituting the proceedings
based on the cause of action that has accrued to him.
Such a decision to defer prosecution may be impelled by
several considerations. [Para 14] [181-C-H; 182-A]            c
     3. The expression 'cause of action' is more
commonly and easily understood in the realm of civil
laws. The expression is not defined anywhere in CPC to
which it generally bears relevance but has been
universally understood to mean the bundle of facts which      D
the plaintiff must prove in order to entitle him to succeed
in the suit. [Para 18] [184-A]

     State of Madras v. C. P. Agencies AIR 1960 SC 1309;
Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association v. U. 0.1. and     E
Ors. AIR 2001 SC 416: 2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 743 ;
Mohamed Khaleel Khan v. Mahaboob Ali Mia AIR 1949 PC
78- referred to.

     4. A careful reading of Sections 138 and 142, makes
it abundantly clear that the cause of action to institute a   F
complaint comprises the three different factual
prerequisites for the institution of a complaint. None of
these prerequisites is in itself sufficient to constitute a
complete cause of action for an offence under Section
138. The expression 'cause of action' appearing in            G
Section 142 (b) of the Act cannot therefore be understood
to be limited to any given requirement out of the three
requirements that are mandatory for launching a
prosecution on the basis of a dishonoured cheque.
Having said that, every time a cheque is presented in the     H
   168      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A manner and within the time stipulated under the proviso
  to Section 138 followed by a notice within the meaning
  of clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 and the drawer
  fails to make the payment of the amount within the
  stipulated period of fifteen days after the date of receipt
B of such notice, a cause of action accrues to the holder
  of the cheque to institute proceedings for prosecution of
  the drawer. [Paras 19 and 20] [184-D-H; 185-A-B]

       5. Simply because the prosecution for an offence
  under Section 13S must on the language of Section 142
C be instituted within one month from the date of the failure
  of the drawer to make the payment does not militate
  against the accrual of multiple causes of action to the
  holder of the cheque upon failure of the drawer to make
  the payment of the cheque amount. In the absence of any
D juristic principle on which such failure to prosecute on
  the basis of the first default in payment should result in
  forfeiture, it is difficult to hold that the payee would lose
  his right to institute such proceedings on a subsequent
  default that satisfies all the three requirements of Section
E 138. [Para 21] [185-D-E]

       6. The right of the holder to present the cheque for
  encashment carries with it a corresponding obligation on
  the part of the drawer to ensure that the cheque drawn
F by him is honoured by the bank who stands in the
  capacity of an agent of the drawer vis-a-vis the holder of
  the cheque. There is nothing in the proviso to s. 138 to
  even remotely suggest that clause (a) would have no
  application to a cheque presented for the second time if
  the same has already been dishonoured once. Indeed if
G the legislative intent was to restrict prosecution only to
  cases arising out of the first dishonour of a cheque
  nothing prevented it from stipulating so in clause (a)
  itself. In the absence of any such provision, a dishonour
  whether based on a second or any successive
H
    MSR LEATHERS v. S. PALANIAPPAN & ANR.              169


presentation of a cheque for encashment would be a            A
dishonour within the meaning of Section 138 and clause
(a) to proviso thereof. [Para 22] [185-G-H; 186-A-C]

    7. So long as the cheque remains unpaid, it is the
continuing obligation of the drawer to make good the          8
same by either arranging the funds in the account on
which the cheque is drawn or liquidating the liability
otherwise. It is true that a dishonour of the cheque can
be made a basis for prosecution of the offender but once,
but that is far from saying that the holder of the cheque     C
does not have the discretion to choose out of several
such defaults, one default, on which to launch such a
prosecution. The omission or the failure of the holder to
institute prosecution does not, therefore, give any
immunity to the drawer so long as the cheque is
dishonoured within its validity period and the conditions     D
precedent for prosecution in terms of the proviso to
Section 138 are satisfied. [Para 22] [186-D-F]

     8. There is nothing in Section 142(b) to suggest that
prosecution based on subsequent or successive                 E
dishonour is impermissible. So long as the cheque is
valid and so long as it is dishonoured upon presentation
to the bank, the holder's right to prosecute the drawer for
the default committed by him remains valid and
exercisable. By reason of a fresh presentation of a           F
cheque followed by a fresh notice in terms of Section 138,
proviso (b), the drawer gets an extended period to make
the payment and thereby benefits in terms of further
opportunity to pay to avoid prosecution. Such fresh
opportunity cannot help the defaulter on any juristic         G
principle, to get a complete absolution from prosecution.
[Para 23] [186-G; 187-A-D]

     9. The proviso to s. 142(b) permits the payee to
institute prosecution proceedings against a defaulting
drawer even after the expiry of the period of one month.      H
    170      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A If a failure of the payee to file a complaint within a period
  of one month from the date of expiry of the period of 15
  days allowed for this purpose was to result in
  'absolution', the proviso would not have been added to
  negate that consequence. The statute as it exists today,
B therefore, does not provide for 'absolution' simply
  because the period of 30 days has expired or the payee
  has for some other reasons deferred the filing of the
  complaint against the defaulter. [Para 26) [188-F-H]

      Subodh S. Salaskar v. Jayprakash M. Shah and Anr.
C (2008) 13 SCC 689: 2008 (11) SCR 681 - referred to.

         10. The object underlying Section 138 of the Act is
    to promote and inculcate faith in the efficacy of banking
    system and its operations, giving credibility to Negotiable
D   Instruments in business transactions and to create an
    atmosphere of faith and reliance by discouraging people
    from dishonouring their commitments which are implicit
    when they pay their dues through cheques. The
    provision was intended to punish those unscrupulous
E   persons who issued cheques for discharging their
    liabilities without really intending to honour the promise
    that goes with the drawing up of such a negotiable
    instrument. It was intended to enhance the acceptability
    of cheques in settlement of liabilities by making the
F   drawer liable for penalties in case the cheque was
    dishonoured and to safeguard and prevent harassment
    of honest drawers. One of the salutary principles of
    interpretation of statutes is to adopt an interpretation
    which promotes and advances the object sought to be
G   achieved by the legislation, in preference to an
    interpretation which defeats such object. [Para 27) [189-
    A-E]

        New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax,
    Bihar AIR 1963 SC 1207: 1963 Suppl. SCR 459; Deputy
H
      MSR LEATHERS v. S. PALANIAPPAN & ANR.           171


Custodian, Evacuee Property v. Official Receiver AIR 1965    A
SC 951 : 1965 SCR 220 ; Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi (2005)
2 SCC 271: 2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 1141; S.P. Jain v. Krishan
Mohan Gupta (1987) 1 SCC 191: 1987 (1) SCR 411 - relied
on.
                                                             B
    Mosaraf Hossain Khan v. Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd.
(2006) 3 SCC 658:2006 (2) SCR 595 ; C. C. Alavi Haji v.
Palapetty Muhammed and Anr. (2007) 6 SCC 555: 2007 (7)
SCR 326 ; Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babula/ H. (2010)
5 SCC 663: 2010 (5) SCR 678 - referred to.
                                                             c
     11. Applying the purposive rule of interpretation and
the provisions of Section 138, it can be held that a
prosecution based on a second or successive default in
payment of the cheque amount should not be
impermissible simply because no prosecution based on         D
the first default which was followed by a statutory notice
and a failure to pay had not been launched. If the entire
purpose underlying Section 138 is to compel the drawers
to honour their commitments made in the course of their
business or other affairs, there is no reason why a person   E
who has issued a cheque which is dishonoured and who
fails to make payment despite statutory notice served
upon him should be immune to prosecution simply
because the holder of the cheque has not rushed to the
court with a complaint based on such default or simply       F
because the drawer has made the holder defer
prosecution promising to make arrangements for funds
or for any other similar reason. There is no real or
qualitative difference between a case where default is
committed and prosecution immediately launched and           G
another where the prosecution is deferred till the cheque
presented again gets dishonoured for the second or
successive time. [Para 31] [191-C-G]
    12. An interpretation which curtails the right of the
parties to negotiate a possible settlement without           H
    172      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A prejudice to the right of holder to institute proceedings
  within the outer period of limitation stipulated by law
  should be avoided there is no reason why parties should,
  by a process of interpretation, be forced to launch
  complaints where they can or may like to defer such
B action for good and valid reasons. Neither the courts nor
  the parties stand to gain by institution of proceedings
  which may become unnecessary if cheque amount is paid
  by the drawer. The magistracy in this country is over-
  burdened by an avalanche of cases under Section 138.
c If the first default itself must in terms of the decision in
  *Sadanandan Bhadran's case result in filing of
  prosecution, avoidable litigation would become an
  inevitable bane of the legislation that was intended only
  to bring solemnity to cheques without forcing parties to
0 resort to proceedings in the courts of law. (Para 32] (192-
  8-D]

          *Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar (1998)
    6 sec 514: 1998 (1) Suppl. SCR 178 - overruled.
E      Kumaresan v. Ameerappa (1991) 1 Ker L.T. 893; S.K.O.
  Lakshmanan Fireworks Industries v. K. V. Sivarama Krishnan
  (1995) Cri L J 1384 (Ker).; Si/ Import, USA v. Exim Aides
  Silk Exporters, Bangalore (1999) 4 SCC 567: 1999 (2) SCR
  958 ; Unip/as India Ltd. and Ors. v. State (Govt. of NCT Delhi)
F and Anr. (2001) 6 SCC 8:2001 (3) SCR 985 ; Oalmia Cement
  (Bharat) Ltd. v. Galaxy Traders & Agencies Ltd. and Anr.
  (2001) 6 SCC 463: 2001 (1) SCR 461 ; Prem Chand Vijay
  Kumar v. Yashpal Singh and Anr. (2005) 4 SCC 417: 2005
  (3) SCR 1029 ; S. L. Constructions and Anr. v. Alapati
G Srinivasa Rao and Anr. (2009) 1 SCC 500: 2008 (15) SCR
  51; Tameshwar Vaishnav v. Ramvishal Gupta (2010) 2 SCC
    329:2010 (1) SCR 204 - referred to.
                        Case Law Reference:

H         (1991) 1 Ker LT. 893     Referred to        Para 2
    MSR LEATHERS v. S. PALANIAPPAN & ANR.                  173

     (1995) Cri L J 1384 (Ker) Referred to           Para 5       A
     1999 (2) SCR 958            Referred to         Para 16
     2001 (3) SCR 985            Referred to         Para 16
     2001 (1) SCR 461            Referred to         Para 16
                                                                  B
     2005 (3) SCR 1029           Referred to         Para 16
     2008 (15) SCR 51            Referred to         Para 16
     2010 (1) SCR 204            Referred to         Para 16
                                                                  c
     AIR 1960 SC 1309            Referred to         Para 18
     2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 743 Referred to             Para 18
    AIR 1949 PC 78               Referred to        Para 18
     2008 (11) SCR 681           Referred to         Para 25      D

    2006 (2) SCR 595             Referred to        Para 27
    2007 (7) SCR 326             Referred to        Para 27
    2010 (5) SCR 678             Referred to        Para 27       E
    1963 Suppl. SCR 459          Relied on          Para 27
    1965 SCR 220                 Relied on          Para 28
    2004 (6) Suppl.SCR 1141 Relied on               Para 29
                                                                  F
    1987 (1) SCR 411             Relied on          Para 30
    1998 (1) Suppl. SCR 178 Overruled               Para 32
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 261-264 of 2002.                                              G

    From the Judgment & Order dated 19.1.2001 of the High
Court of Judicature at Madras in Criminal Revision Petition No.
618, 624, 664, 665 of 2000.
                                                                  H
    174       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A       Dr. A. Francis Julian, Danish Zubair Khan (for Arputham,
    Aruna & Co) for the Appellant.

          K.K. Mani for the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
          T.5. THAKUR, J. 1. In Sadanandan Bhadran v.
  Madhavan Sunil Kumar (1998) 6 SCC 514, this Court was
  dealing with a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable
  Instrument Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') in
c which the complainant had, after dishonour of a cheque issued
  in his favour, taken steps to serve upon the accused-drawer of
  the cheque a notice under clause (b) of proviso to Section 138
  of the Act. No complaint was, however, filed by the complainant
  despite failure of the accused to arrange the payment of the
D amount covered by the cheque. Instead, the complainant-payee
  of the cheque had presented the cheque for collection once
  again, which was dishonoured a second time for want of
  sufficient funds. Another notice was served on the drawer of the
  cheque to arrange payment within fifteen days of receipt of said
E notice. Only after failure of drawer to do so did the payee file a
  complaint against the former under Section 138 of the Act.

       2. After entering appearance, the drawer filed an
  application seeking discharge on the ground that the payee
  could not create more than one cause of action in respect of a
F single cheque and the complaint in question having been filed
  on the basis of the second presentation and resultant second
  cause of action was not maintainable. The Magistrate accepted
  that contention relying upon a Division Bench decision of Kerala
  High Court in Kumaresan v. Ameerappa (1991) 1 Ker LT. 893
G and dismissed the complaint. The order passed by the
  Magistrate was then questioned before the High Court of
  Kerala who relying upon Kumaresan's case (supra) upheld the
  order passed by the Magistrate. The matter was eventually
  brought up to this Court by special leave. This Court formulated
H the following question for determination:
    MSR LEATHERS v. S. PALANIAPPAN & ANR.                    175
              [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
    "Whether payee or holder of cheque can initiate                  A
    proceeding of prosecution under Section 138 of
    Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 for the second time if he
    has not initiated any action on earlier cause of action?"

      3. Answering the question in the negative this Court held      8
that a combined reading of Sections 138 and 142 of the Act
left no room for doubt that cause of action under Section 142(b)
can arise only once. The conclusion observed by the court is
supported not only by Sections 138 and 142 but also by the
fact that the dishonour of cheque gives rise to the commission       C
of offence only on the failure to pay money when a notice is
served upon the drawer in accordance with clause (b) of the
proviso to Section 138. The Court further held that ifthe concept
of successive causes of action were to be accepted the same
would make the limitation under Section 142{b) otiose. The
Court observed:                                                      D

    "7. Besides the language of Sections 138 and 142 which
    clearly postulates only one cause of action, there are other
    formidable impediments which negate the concept of
    successive causes of action. One of them is that for             E
    dishonour of one cheque, there can be only one offence
    and such offence is committed by the drawer immediately
    on his failure to make the payment within fifteen days of
    the receipt of the notice served in accordance with clause
    (b) of the proviso to Section 138. That necessarily means        F
    that for similar failure after service of fresh notice on
    subsequent dishonour, the drawer cannot be liable for any
    offence nor can the first offence be treated as non est so
    as to give the payee a right to file a complaint treating the
    second offence as the first one. At that stage, it will not be   G
    a question of waiver of the right of the payee to prosecute
    the drawer but of absolution of the drawer of an offence,
    which stands already committed by him and which cannot
    be committed by him again.

     8. The other impediment to the acceptance of the concept        H
    176        $UPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A         of successive causes of action is that it Will make the
          period of limitation under clause (c) of Section 142 otiose,
          for, a payee who failed to file his complaint within one
          month and thereby forfeited his right to prosecute the
          drawer, can circumvent the above !imitative clause by filing
B         a complaint on the basis of a fresh presentation of the
          cheque and its dishonour. Since in the interpretation of
          statutes, the court always presumes that the legislature
          inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative
          intention is that every part should have effect, the above
c         conclusion cannot be drawn for that will make the provision
          for limiting the period of making the complaint nugatory."

       4. The Court then tried to reconcile the apparently
  conflicting provisions of the Act - one enabling the payee to
  present the cheque and the other giving him opportunity to file
D a complaint within one month and observed:

        " ..... Having given our anxious consideration to this
        question, we are of the opinion that the above two
        provisions can be harmonised, with the interpretation that
E       on each presentation of the cheque and its dishonour, a
       fresh right - and not cause of action - accrues in his
       favour. He may, therefore, without taking pre-emptory
       action in exercise of his such right under clause (b) of
       Section 138, go on presenting the cheque so as to enable
F      him to exercise such right at any point of time during the
       validity of the cheque. But once he gives a notice under
       clause (b) of Section 138, he forfeits such right for in case
       of failure of the drawer to pay the money within the
       stipulated time, he would be liable for offence and the
       cause of action for filing the complaint will arise. Needless
G
       to say, the period of one month for filing the complaint will
       be reckoned from the day immediately following the day
       on which the period of fifteen days from the date of the
       receipt of the notice by the drawer expires."

H      5. The Court accordingly dismissed the appeal while
    MSR LEATHERS v. S. PALANIAPPAN & ANR.                      177
              [TS. THAKUR, J.]
affirming the decision of the Kerala High Court in Kumaresan's        A
case (supra), no matter the same had been in the meantime
overruled by a decision of the Full Bench of that Court in S.K.D.
Lakshmanan Fireworks Industries v. K. V. Sivarama Krishnan
(1995) Cri L J 1384 (Ker).
                                                                      B
     6. When the present appeal first came up for hearing
before a bench comprising Markandey Katju and B. Sudershan
Reddy, JJ., reliance on behalf of respondents was placed upon
the decision of this Court in Sadanandan Bhadran's case
(supra) to argue that the complaint in the instant case had also      C
been filed on the basis of the second dishonour of a cheque
after the payee of the cheque had issued a notice to the drawer
under clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act based
on an earlier dishonour. On the ratio of Sadanandan Bhadran's
case (supra) such a complaint was not maintainable, argued
the respondents. The Court, however, expressed its reservation        D
about the correctness of the view taken in Sadanandan
Bhadran's case (supra) especially in para 9 thereof and
accordingly referred the matter to a larger Bench. That is
precisely how the present appeal has come up for hearing
before us. It is, therefore, evident that this Court has repeatedly   E
followed the view taken in Sadanandan Bhadran's case
(supra). But a careful reading of these decisions reveals that
in these subsequent decisions there had been no addition to
the ratio underlying the conclusion in Sadanandan Bhadran's
case (supra).                                                         F

     7. Before adverting to the submissions that were urged at
the Bar we may briefly summarise the facts in the backdrop of
which the issue arises for our determination. Four cheques for
a total sum of rupees ten lakhs were issued by the respondent-        G
company on 14th August, 1996 in favour of the appellant which
were presented to the bank for collection on 21st November,
1996. The cheques were dishonoured in terms of memo dated
22nd November, 1996 for insufficiency of funds. A notice under
clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 was then issued by the           H
appellant to the respondent on 8th January, 1997 demanding
    178      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A payment of the amount covered by the cheques. Despite
  receipt of the notice by the respondent the payment was not
  arranged. The appellant's case is that the respondent assured
  the appellant that the funds necessary for the encashment of
  the cheques shall be made available by the respondent, for
B which purpose the cheques could be presented again to the
  bank concerned. The cheques were accordingly presented for
  the second time to the bank on 21st January, 1997 and were
  dishonoured for a second time in terms of a memo dated 22nd
  January, 1997 once again on the ground of insufficiency of
c funds. A statutory notice issued by the appellant under clause
  (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act on 28th January, 1997
  called upon the respondent-drawer of the cheques to arrange
  payment of the amount within 15 days. Despite receipt of the
  said notice on 3rd February, 1997, no payment was arranged
D which led to the filing of Complaint Case No.1556-1557/1997
  by the appellant before the II Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras
  for the offence punishable under Section 138 read with Section
  142 of the Act. The Magistrate took cognizance and issued
  summons to the respondents in response whereto the
  respondents entered appearance and sought discharge
E primarily on the ground that the complaint had not been filed
  within 30 days of the expiry of the notice based on the first
  dishonour of the cheque. It was also alleged that the statutory
  notice which formed the basis of the complaint had not been
  served upon the accused persons. The Magistrate upon
F consideration dismissed the applications for discharge which
  order was then assailed by the respondents before the High
  Court of Madras in Criminal Appeal Nos. 618, 624, 664, 665/
  2000.

G      8. The High Court has, by the order impugned in this
  appeal, allowed the revision and quashed the orders passed
  by the Magistrate relying upon the decision of this Court in
  Sadanandan Bhadran's case (supra) according to which a
  complaint based on a second or successive dishonour of the
H cheque was not maintainable if no complaint based on an
    MSR LEATHERS v. S. PALANIAPPAN & ANR.                    179
              [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
earlier dishonour, followed by the statutory notice issued on the   A
basis thereof, had been filed.

    9. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881,
constituting Chapter XVII of the Act which was introduced by
Act 66 of 1988, inter alia, provides:
                                                                    B
    "138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds
    in the account. Where any cheque drawn by a person on
    an account maintained by him with a banker for payment
    of any amount of money to another person from out of that
    account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt     C
    or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either
    because of the amount of money standing to the credit of
    that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it
    exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account
    by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall          D
    be deemed to have committed an offence and shall,
    without prejudice. to any other provision of this Act, be
    punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend
    to two year, or with fine which may extend to twice the
    amount of the cheque, or with both"                             E

      10. Proviso to Section 138, however, is all important and
stipulates three distinct conditions precedent, which must be
satisfied before the dishonour of a cheque can constitute an
offence and become punishable. The first condition is that the
cheque ought to have been presented to the bank within a
                                                                    F
period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within
the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. The second
condition is that the payee or the holder in due course of the
cheque, as the case may be, ought to make a demand for the
payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in           G
writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the
receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return
of the cheque as unpaid. The third condition is that the drawer
of such a cheque should have failed to make payment of the
said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to         H
    180      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 9 S.C.R.

A the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of
  the receipt of the said notice. It is only upon the satisfaction of
  all the three conditions mentioned above and enumerated under
  the proviso to Section 138 as clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof
  that an offence under Section 138 can be said to have been
B committed by the person issuing the cheque.

       11. Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act governs
  taking of cognizance of the offence and starts with a non-
  obstante clause. It provides that no court shall take cognizance
  of any offence punishable under Section 138 except upon a
C complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may
  be, by the holder in due course and such complaint is made
  within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises
  under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138. In terms of sub-
  section (c) to Section 142, no court inferior to that of a
D Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first
  class is competent to try any offence punishable under Section
  138.

        12. A careful reading of the above provisions makes it
E manifest that a complaint under Section 138 can be filed only
  after cause of action to do so has accrued in terms of clause
  (c) of proviso to Section 138 which, as noticed earlier, happens
  no sooner than when the drawer of the cheque fails to make
  the payment of the cheque amount to the payee or the holder
F of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the notice required
  to be sent in terms of clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of
  the Act.

       13. What is important is that neither Section 138 nor
  Section 142 or any other provision contained in the Act forbids
G the holder or payee of the cheque from presenting the cheque
  for encashment on any number of occasions within a period of
  six months of its issue or within the period of its validity,
  whichever is earlier. That such presentation will be perfectly
  legal and justified was not disputed before us even at the Bar
H by learned counsel appearing for the parties and rightly so in
     MSR LEATHERS v. S. PALANIAPPAN & ANR.                     181
               [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
light of the judicial pronouncements on that question which are       A
all unanimous. Even Sadanandan Bhadran's case (supra) the
correctness whereof we are examining, recognized that the
holder or the payee of the cheque has the right to present the
same any number of times for encashment during the period
of six months or during the period of its validity, whichever is      B
earlier.

     14. Presentation of the cheque and dishonour thereof
within the period of its validity or a period of six months is just
one of the three requirements that constitutes 'cause of action'      C
within the meaning of Sections 138 and 142(b) of the Act, an
expression that is more commonly used in civil law than in penal
statutes. For a dishonour to culminate into the commission of
an offence of which a court may take cognizance, there are two
other requirements, namely, (a) service of a notice upon the
drawer of the cheque to make payment of the amount covered            D
by the cheque and (b) failure of the drawer to make any such
payment within the stipulated period of 15 days of the receipt
of such a notice. It is only when the said two conditions are
superadded to the dishonour of the cheque that the holder/
payee of the cheque acquires the right to institute proceedings       E
for prosecution under Section 138 of the Act, which right
remains legally enforceable for a period of 30 days counted
from the date on which the cause of action accrued to him.
There is, however, nothing in the proviso to Section 138 or
Section 142 for that matter, to oblige the holder/payee of a          F
dishonoured cheque to necessarily file a complaint even when
he has acquired an indefeasible right to do so. The fact that
an offence is complete need not necessarily lead to launch of
prosecution especially when the offence is not a cognizable
one. It follows that the complainant may, even when he has the        G
immediate right to institute criminal proceedings against the
drawer of the cheque, either at the request of the holder/payee
of the cheque or on his own volition, refrain from instituting the
proceedings based on the cause of action that has accrued to
him. Such a decision to defer prosecution may be impelled by          H
    182       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A   several considerations but more importantly it may be induced
    by an ass.urance which the drawer extends to the holder of the
    cheque that given some time the payment covered by the
    cheques would be arranged, in the process rendering a time
    consuming and generally expensive legal recourse unnecessary.
B   It may also be induced by a belief that a fresh presentation of
    the cheque may result in encashment for a variety of reasons
    including the vicissitudes of trade and business dealings where
    financial accommodation given by the parties to each other is
    not an unknown phenomenon. Suffice it to say that there is
c   nothing in the provisions of the Act that forbids the holder/payee
    of the cheque to demand by service of a fresh notice under
    clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act, the amount
    covered by the cheque, should there be a second or a
    successive dishonour of the cheque on its presentation.
D       15. Sadanandan Bhadran's case (supra) holds that while
  a second or successive presentation of the cheque is legally
  permissible so long as such presentation is within the period
  of six months or the validity of the cheque whichever is earlier,
  the second or subsequent dishonour of the cheque would not
E entitle the holder/payee to issue a statutory notice to the drawer
  nor would it entitle him to institute legal proceedings against
  the drawer in the event he fails to arrange the payment. The
  decision gives three distinct reasons why that should be so. The
  first and the foremost of these reasons is the use of the
F expression "cause of action" in Section 142(b) of the Act which
  according to the Court has been used in a restrictive sense and
  must therefore be understood to mean that cause of action
  under Section 142(b) can arise but once. The second reason
  cited for the view taken in the Sadanandan Bhadran's case
G (supra) is that dishonour of a cheque will lead to commission
  of only one offence and that the offence is complete no sooner
  the drawer fails to make the payment of the cheque amount
  within a period of 15 days of the receipt of the notice served
  upon him. The Court has not pressed into service the doctrine
H of "waiver of the right to prosecute" but held that the failure of
    MSR LEATHERS v. S. PALANIAPPAN & ANR.                    183
              [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
the holder to institute proceedings would tantamount to              A
"absolution" of the drawer of the offence committed by him. The
third and the only other reason is that successive causes of
action will militate against the provisions of Section 142(b) and
make the said provision otiose. The Court in Sadanandan
Bhadran's case (supra) held that the failure of the drawer/          B
payee to file a complaint within one month resulted in forfeiture
of the complainant's right to prosecute the drawer/payee which
forfeiture cannot be circumvented by him by presenting the
cheque afresh and inviting a dishonour to be followed by a fresh
notice and a delayed complaint on the basis thereof.                 c
       16. With utmost respect to the Judges who decided
Sadanandan Bhadran's case (supra) we regret our inability to
fall in line with the above line of reasoning to hold that while a
cheque is presented afresh the right to prosecute the drawer,
if the cheque is dishonoured, is forfeited only because the          D
previous dishonour had not resulted in immediate prosecution
of the offender even when a notice under clause (b) of proviso
to Section 138 had been served upon the drawer. We are
conscious of the fact that Sadanandan Bhadran's case (supra)
has been followed in several subsequent decisions of this Court      E
such as in Si/ Import, USA v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters,
Bangalore, (1999) 4 SCC 567, Uniplas India Ltd. and Ors. v.
State (Govt. of NCT Delhi) and Anr., (2001) 6 SCC 8, Da/mia
Cement (Bharat) Ltd. v. Galaxy Traders & Agencies Ltd. and
Anr., (2001) 6 SCC 463, Prem Chand Vijay Kumar v. Yashpa/            F
Singh and Anr., (2005) 4 SCC 417, S.L. Constructions and
Anr. v. A/apati Srinivasa Rao and Anr., (2009) 1 SCC 500,
Tameshwar Vaishnav v. Ramvisha/ Gupta, (2010) 2 SCC 329.

     17. All these decisions have without disturbing or making       G
any addition to the rationale behind the decision in
Sadanandan Bhadran's case (supra) followed the conclusion
drawn in the same. We, therefore, propose to deal with the three
dimensions that have been highlighted in that case while
holding that successive causes of action are not within the
                                                                     H
comprehension of Sections 138 and 142 of the Act.
    184      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A         18. The expression 'cause of action' is more commonly
    and easily understood in the realm of civil laws. The expression
    is not defined anywhere in the Code of Civil Procedure to which
    it generally bears relevance but has been universally understood
    to mean the bundle of facts which the plaintiff must prove in
s   order to entitle him to succeed in the suit. (See State of Madras
    v. C.P. Agencies AIR 1960 SC 1309; Rajasthan High Court
    Advocates Association v. U.0.1. & Ors. 2001 SC 416
    Mahaboob Ali AIR 1949 PC78).

          19. Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is
C perhaps the only penal provision in a statute which uses the
    expression 'cause of action' in relation to the commission of
    an offence or the institution of a complaint for the prosecution
    of the offender. A careful reading of Sections 138 and 142, as
    noticed above, makes it abundantly clear that the cause of
D action to institute a complaint comprises the three different
    factual prerequisites for the institution of a complaint to which
    we have already referred in the earlier part of this order. None
    of these prerequisites is in itself sufficient to constitute a
    complete cause of action for an offence under Section 138. For
E instance if a cheque is not presented within a period of six
    months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period
    of its validity, whichever is earlier, no cause of action would
    accrue to the holder of the cheque even when the remaining
  · two requirements, namely service of a notice and failure of the
F drawer to make the payment of the cheque amount are
    established on facts. So also presentation of the cheque within
    the stipulated period without service of a notice in terms of
    Section 138 proviso (b) would give no cause of action to the
    holder to prosecute the drawer just as the failure of the drawer
G to make the payment demanded on the basis of a notice that
   does not satisfy the requirements of clause (b) of proviso to
    Section 138 would not constitute a complete cause of action.

       20. The expression 'cause of action' appearing in Section
  142 (b) of the Act cannot therefore be understood to be limited
H to any given requirement out of the three requirements that are
    MSR LEATHERS v. S. PALANIAPPAN & ANR.                         185
               [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
mandatory for launching a prosecution on the basis of a                   A
dishonoured cheque. Having said that, every time a cheque is
presented in the manner and within the time stipulated under
the proviso to Section 138 followed by a notice within the
meaning of clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 and the drawer
fails to make the payment of the amount within the stipulated             8
period of fifteen days after the date of receipt of such notice, a
cause of action accrues to the holder of the cheque to institute
proceedings for prosecution of the drawer.

      21. There is, in our view, nothing either in Section 138 or         C
Section 142 to curtail the said right of the payee, leave alone
a forfeiture of the said right for no better reason than the failure
of the holder of the cheque to institute prosecution against the
drawer when the cause of action to do so had first arisen.
Simply because the prosecution for an offence under Section
138 must on the language of Section 142 be instituted within              D
one month from the date of the failure of the drawer '.o make
the payment does not in our view militate against the accrual
of multiple causes of action to the holder of the cheque upon
failure of the drawer to make the payment of the cheque amount.
In the absence of any juristic principle on which such failure to         E
prosecute on the basis of the first default in payment should
result in forfeiture, we find it difficult to hold that the payee would
lose his right to institute such proceedings on a subsequent
default that satisfies all the three requirements of Section 138.
                                                                          F
     22. That brings us to the question whether an offence
punishable under Section 138 can be committed only once as
held by this Court in Sadanandan Bhadran's case (supra). The
holder of a cheque as seen earlier can present it before a bank
any number of times within the period of six months or during             G
the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. This right of the
holder to present the cheque for encashment carries with it a
corresponding obligation on the part of the drawer to ensure
that the cheque drawn by him is honoured by the bank who
stands in the capacity of an agent of the drawer vis-a-vis the
                                                                          H
holder of the cheque. If the holder of the cheque has a right, as
    186      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A indeed is in the unanimous opinion expressed in the decisions
  on the subject, there is no reason why the corresponding
  obligation of the drawer should also not continue every time the
  cheque is presented for encashment if it satisfies the
  requirements stipulated in that clause (a) to the proviso to
B Section 138. There is nothing in that proviso to even remotely
  suggest that clause (a) would have no application to a cheque
  presented for the second time if the same has already been
  dishonoured once. Indeed if the legislative intent was to restrict
  prosecution only to cases arising out of the first dishonour of a
c cheque nothing prevented it from stipulating so in clause (a)
  itself. In the absence of any such provision a dishonour whether
  based on a second or any successive presentation of a cheque
  for encashment would be a dishonour within the meaning of
  Section 138 and clause (a) to proviso thereof. We have,
  therefore, no manner of doubt that so long as the cheque
0
  remains unpaid it is the continuing obligation of the drawer to
  make good the same by either arranging the funds in the
  account on which the cheque is drawn or liquidating the liability
  otherwise. It is true that a dishonour of the cheque can be made
E a basis for prosecution of the offender but once, but that is far
  from saying that the holder of the cheque does not have the
  discretion to choose out of several such defaults, one default,
  on which to launch such a prosecution. The omission or the
  failure of the holder to institute prosecution does not, therefore,
  give any immunity to the drawer so long as the cheque is
F dishonoured within its validity period and the conditions
  precedent for prosecution in terms of the proviso to Section 138
  are satisfied.

       23. Coming then to the question whether there is anything
G in Section 142(b) to suggest that prosecution based on
  subsequent or successive dishonour is impermissible, we need
  only mention that the limitation which Sadanandan Bhadran's
  case (supra) reads into that provision does not appear to us
  to arise. We say so because while a complaint based on a
H default and notice to pay must be filed within a period of one
    MSR LEATHERS v. S. PALANIAPPAN & ANR.                    187
              [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
month from the date the cause of action accrues, which implies      A
the date on which the period of 15 days granted to the drawer
to arrange the payment expires, there is nothing in Section 142
to suggest that expiry of any such limitation would absolve him
of his criminal liability should the cheque continue to get
dishonoured by the bank on subsequent presentations. So long        B
as the cheque is valid and so long as it is dishonoured upon
presentation to the bank, the holder's right to prosecute the
drawer for the default committed by him remains valid and
exercisable. The argument that the holder takes advantage by
not filing a prosecution against the drawer has not impressed       c
us. By reason of a fresh presentation of a cheque followed by
a fresh notice in terms of Section 138, proviso (b), the drawer
gets an extended period to make the payment and thereby
benefits in terms of further opportunity to pay to avoid
prosecution. Such fresh opportunity cannot help the defaulter
                                                                    0
on any juristic principle, to get a complete absolution from
prosecution.

      24. Absolution is, at any rate, a theological concept which
implies an act of forgiving the sinner of his sins upon
confession. The expression has no doubt been used in some           E
judicial pronouncements, but the same stop short of recognizing
absolution as a juristic concept. It has always been used or
understood in common parlance to convey "setting free from
guilt" or "release from a penalty". The use of the expression
"absolution" in Sadanandan Bhadran's case (supra) at any rate       F
came at a time when proviso to Section 142(b) had not found
a place on the statute book. That proviso was added by the
Negotiable Instruments (Amendment and Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act, 2002 which read ~s under:
                                                                    G
    "Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken
    by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant
    satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not
    making a complaint within such period."

    25. The Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to            H
    188        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 9 S.C.R.
                                                                           ,
A the Amendment Bill, 2002 suggests that the introduction of this
  proviso was recommended by the Standing Committee on
  Finance and other representatives so as to providediscretion
  to the Court to waive the period of one month, which has been
  prescribed for taking cognizance of a case under the Act. This
B was so recognised judicially also by this Court in Subodh S.
  Salaskar v. Jayprakash M. Shah & Anr. (2008) 13 SCC 689
  where this Court observed:

          "11. The [Negotiable Instruments] Act was amended in the
          year 2002 whereby additional powers have been conferred
c         upon the court to take cognizance even after expiry of the
          period of limitation by conferring on it a discretion to waive
          the period of one month.

          xx xx xx xx
D
          24 ... The provisions of the Act being special in nature, in
          terms thereof the jurisdiction of the court to take
          cognizance of an offence under Section 138 of the Act was
          limited to the period of thirty days in terms of the proviso
          appended thereto. The Parliament only with a view to
E
          obviate the aforementioned difficulties on the part of the
          complainant inserted proviso to Clause (b) of Section
          142 of the Act in 2002. It confers a jurisdiction upon the
          court to condone the delay ... ".

F       26. The proviso referred to above now permits the payee
  to institute prosecution proceedings against a defaulting
  drawer even after the expiry of the period of one month. If a
  failure of the payee to file a complaint within a period of one
  month from the date of expiry of the period of 15 days allowed
G for this purpose was to result in 'absolution', the proviso would
  not have been added to negate that consequence. The statute
  as it exists today, therefore, does not provide for 'absolution'
  simply beca.use the period of 30 days has expired or the payee
  has for some other reasons deferred the filing of the complaint
H against the defaulter.
     MSR LEATHERS v. S. PALANIAPPAN & ANR.                      189
               [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
      27. It is trite that the object underlying Section 138 of the    A
Act is to promote and inculcate faith in the efficacy of banking
system and its operations, giving credibility to Negotiable
 Instruments in business transactions and to create an
atmosphere of faith and reliance by discouraging people from
dishonouring their commitments which are implicit when they            B
pay their dues through cheques. The provision was intended
to punish those unscrupulous persons who issued cheques for
discharging their liabilities without really intending to honour the
promise that goes with the drawing up of such a negotiable
instrument. It was intended to enhance the acceptability of            c
cheques in settlement of liabilities by making the drawer liable
for penalties in case the cheque was dishonoured and to
safeguard and prevent harassment of honest drawers. (See
Mosaraf Hossain Khan v. Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd. (2006) 3
SCC 658, C. C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed & Anr.                 D
(2007) 6 SCC 555 and Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babula/
H. (2010) 5 sec 663). Having said that, we must add that one
of the salutary principles of interpretation of statutes is to adopt
an interpretation which promotes and advances the object
sought to be achieved by the legislation, in preference to an
interpretation which defeats such object. This Court has in a          E
long line of decisions recognized purposive interpretation as
a sound principle for the Courts to adopt while interpreting
statutory provisions. We may only refer to the decisions of this
Court in New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales
Tax, Bihar (AIR 1963 SC 1207), where this Court observed:              F
     "It is a recognised rule of interpretation of statutes that
     expressions used therein should ordinarily be understood
     in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of
     the statute, and which effectuate the object of the               G
     Legislature. If an expression is susceptible of a narrow or
     technical meaning, as well as a popular meaning, the Court
     would be justified in assuming that the Legislature used
     the expression in the sense which would carry out its object
     and reject that which renders the exercise of its power
     invalid."                                                         H
    190        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A       28. Reference may also be made to the decision of this
    Court in Deputy Custodian, Evacuee Property v. Official
    Receiver (AIR 1965 SC 951 ), where this Court observed:

          "The rules of grammar may suggest that when the section
          says that the property is evacuee property, it prima facie
B
          indicates that the property should bear that character at the
          time when the opinion is formed. But Mr. Ganapathy Iyer
          for the appellants has strenuously contended that the
          construction of s. 7(1) should not be based solely or
          primarily on the mechanical application of the rules of
c         grammar. He urges that the construction for which Mr.
          Pathak contents and which, in substance, has been
          accepted by the High Court, would lead to very anomalous
          results; and his arguments is that it is open to the Court to
          take into account the obvious aim and object of the
D         statutory provision when attempting the task of construing
          its words. If it appears that the obvious aim and object of
          the statutory provisions would be frustrated by accepting
          the literal construction suggested by the respondent, then
          it may be open to the Court to enquire whether an
E         alternative construction which would serve the purpose of
          achieving the aim and object of the Act, is reasonably
          possible."

         29. The decision of this Court in Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi
F   (2005) 2 SCC271, reiterates the rule of purposive construction
    in the following words:

          "Even if there exists some ambiguity in the language or the
          same is capable of two interpretations, it is trite the
          interpretation which serves the object and purport of the
G         Act must be given effect to. In such a case the doctrine of
          purposive construction should be adopted."

       30. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in S.P.
  Jain v. Krishan Mohan Gupta (1987) 1 SCC 191, where this
H Court observed:
    MSR LEATHERS v. S. PALANIAPPAN & ANR.                     191
              [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
     "We are of the opinion that law should take a pragmatic          A
     view of the matter and respond to the purpose for which it
     was made and also take cognizance of the current
     capabilities of technology and life- style of the community.
     It is well settled that the purpose of law provides a good
     guide to the interpretation of the meaning of the Act. We        B
     agree with the views of Justice Krishna Iyer in Busching
     Schmitz Private Ltd's case (supra) that legislative futility
     is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility
     permits."

     31. Applying the above rule of interpretation and the            C
provisions of Section 138, we have no hesitation in holding that
a prosecution based on a second or successive default in
payment of the cheque amount should not be impermissible
simply because no prosecution based on the first default which
was followed by a statutory notice and a failure to pay had not       D
been launched. If the entire purpose underlying Section 138 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act is to compel the drawers to
honour their commitments made in the course of their business
or other affairs, there is no reason why a person who has issued
a cheque which is dishonoured and who fails to make payment           E
despite statutory notice served upon him should be immune to
prosecution simply because the holder of the cheque has not
rushed to the court with a complaint based on such default or
simply because the drawer has made the holder defer
prosecution promising to make arrangements for funds or for           F
any other similar reason. There is in our opinion no real or
qualitative difference between a case where default is
committed and prosecution immediately launched and another
where the prosecution is deferred till the cheque presented
again gets dishonoured for the second or successive time.             G
      32. The controversy, in our opinion, can be seen from
another angle also. If the decision in Sadanandan Bhadran's
case (supra) is correct, there is no option for the holder to defer
institution of judicial proceedings even when he may like to do
                                                                      H
    192      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A so for so simple and innocuous a reason as to extend certain
  accommodation to the drawer to arrange the payment of the
  amount. Apart from the fact that an interpretation which curtails
  the right of the parties to negotiate a possible settlement without
  prejudice to the right of holder to institute proceedings within
B the outer period of limitation stipulated by law should be avoided
  we see no reason why parties should, by a process of
  interpretation, be forced to launch complaints where they can
  or may like to defer such action for good and valid reasons.
  After all, neither the courts nor the parties stand to gain by
c institution of proceedings which may become unnecessary if
  cheque amount is paid by the drawer. The magistracy in this
  country is over-burdened by an avalanche of cases under
  Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. If the first default
  itself must in terms of the decision in Sadanandan Bhadran's
  case (supra) result in filing of prosecution, avoidable litigation
0
  would become an inevitable bane of the legislation that was
  intended only to bring solemnity to cheques without forcing
  parties to resort to proceedings in thP. courts of law. While there
  is no empirical data to suggest that the problems of
  overburdened magistracy and judicial system at the district level
E is entirely because of the compulsions arising out of the
  decisions in Sadanandan Bhadran's case (supra), it is difficult
  to say that the law declared in that decision has not added to
  court congestion.

F      33. In the result, we overrule the decision in Sadanandan
  Bhadran's case (supra) and hold that prosecution based upon
  second or successive dishonour of the cheque is also
  permissible so long as the same satisfies the requirements
  stipulated in the proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable
G Instruments Act. The reference is answered accordingly. The
  appeals shall now be listed before the regular Bench for
  hearing and disposal in light of the observations made above.

    K.K.T.                                   Reference answered.

H