Supreme Court of India
MRS. SARAH MATHEWversusTHE INSTITUTE OF CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASES BY ITS DIRECTOR - DR. K.M. CHERIAN & ORS.
- Citation
- 2013 INSC 784
- Decided
- 26 November 2013
- Disposal
- Reference answered
- Bench
- P SATHASIVAM
Holding
The period of limitation under Section 468 of the CrPC is computed from the date of filing of the complaint or institution of prosecution, not from the date the magistrate takes cognizance, and the Bharat Kale/Japani Sahoo line of authority is the correct law.
Summary
The Constitution Bench examined whether, for computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the relevant date is the filing of the complaint or the institution of prosecution, or the date a magistrate takes cognizance. The Court resolved a conflict between earlier decisions, holding that the complaint filing date governs and that the earlier judgments of Bharat Kale (followed in Japani Sahoo) correctly interpret the provision, while Krishna Pillai is limited to its special‑act facts. It emphasized that Section 473 allows condonation of delay caused by the complainant, not by the court, and that a liberal, purposive construction best serves legislative intent. Consequently, the relevant date for limitation is the complaint filing or prosecution initiation, and the reference was answered accordingly.
Issues considered
- Whether the date of filing a complaint/institution of prosecution or the date a magistrate takes cognizance is the relevant date for computing the period of limitation under CrPC s.468.
- Which earlier precedent—Bharat Kale (and Japani Sahoo) or Krishna Pillai—correctly interprets the limitation provision.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 190, s. 200, s. 201, s. 202, s. 204, s. 467, s. 468, s. 469, s. 470, s. 471, s. 472, s. 473
- Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 21
- Limitation Act, 1963
Subjects
Limitation periodCognizanceCriminal Procedure CodeSection 468Section 473Statutory interpretationPurposive constructionLegal maximsCondonation of delayProcedural law
Judgment
[2013] 12 S.C.R. 674
A MRS. SARAH MATHEW
v.
THE INSTITUTE OF CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASES BY
ITS DIRECTOR - DR. K.M. CHERIAN & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 829 of 2005)
B
NOVEMBER 26, 2013
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI, DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, RANJANA
PRAKASH DESAI, RANJAN GOGOi AND
S.A. BOBDE, JJ.]
c
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
ss. 468 and 469 rlw s. 473 - Bar to take cognizance after
lapse of the period of limitation - Commencement of period
D of limitation and extension thereof - Held: For the purpose of
computing the period of limitation u/s 468, the relevant date
is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution
of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes
cognizance - In view of s. 469, period of limitation in relation
E to an offence shall commence either from the date of offence
or from the date when the offence is detected - If the
complaint is filed after the period of limitation, complainant can
make an application for condonation of delay u/s 473 - Court
will have to issue notice to accused and after hearing the
· accused, and the complainant, decide whether to condone the
F delay or not - If the complaint is filed within the period of
limitation and court takes cognizance after the period of
limitation then complainant cannot be expected to make an
application for condonation of such delay - s.473 postulates
condonation of delay caused by the complainant in filing the
G complaint - It is the date of filing of the complaint which is
material - ss. 468 and 469 will have to be read with s. 473 -
Interpretation of statutes - Legislative intent - Limitation.
Chapter XXXVI - s.468 r!w ss. 469 and 473 - Bar to take
H 674
SARAH MATHEW v. INST OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 675
DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN
cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation - Taking of A
'cognizance' - Connotation of - Held: 'Cognizance' is entirely
an act of the court - Magistrate takes cognizance when he
applies his mind or takes judicial notice of an offence with a
view to initiating proceedings in respect of offence which is
said to have been committed - This is the special B
connotation acquired by the term 'cognizance' and it has to
be given the same meaning wherever it appears in Chapter
XXXVI - The only harmonious construction which can be
placed on ss. 468, 469 and 470 is that Magistrate can take
cognizance of an offence only if the complaint in respect of it c
is filed within the prescribed limitation period - He would,
however, be entitled to exclude such time as is legally
excludable - Besides, Cr.P.C. is a procedural law to be
construed liberally to serve justice - There is no scope for
application of doctrine of casus omissus - Interpretation of 0
statutes - Harmonious construction - Liberal construction -
Doctrine of casus omissus.
Interpretation of Statutes:
Purposive construction - Held: There is no ambiguity in E
the provisions of Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. - But, the
word 'cognizance' has not been defined in the Cr.P.C. The rule
of purposive construction can be applied in such a situation
- A purposive construction of an enactment is one which
gives effect to the legislative purpose by following the literal F
meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in
accordance with the legislative purpose or by applying a
strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in
accordance with legislative purpose - If in a case literal
interpretation appears to be in any way in conflict with the G
legislative intent or is leading to absurdity, purposive
interpretation will ..have to be adopted - Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - Chapter XXXVI.
Doctrine of reasonable construction - Court would
interpret a provision which would help sustaining the validity H
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A of Jaw by applying the doctrine of reasonable construction
rather than applying a doctrine which would make the
provision unsustainable and ultra vires the Constitution.
Heading of Chapter - Held: 'Heading' or 'title' prefixed to
sections or group of sections have a limited role to play in
8
construction of statutes - They may be taken as very broad
and general indicators or the nature of the subject matter dealt
with thereunder but they do not control the meaning of
sections if the meaning is otherwise ascertainable by reading
the section in proper perspective along with other provisions.
c
Maxims:
Relevance of legal maxims in interpreting a provision -
Held: Though legal maxims are not mandatory rules, but they
0 seNe as guiding principles - Maxims - (i) 'nu/furn tempus aut
locus occurrit regi', (ii) 'vigilantibus et non dormientibus, jura
subveniunt', (iii) 'actus curiae neminem gravabit' -
Applicability of.
There being conflict in the views taken in two-Judge
E Bench decisions in Bharat Kale' and Japani Sahoo 2 on
the one hand, and a three-Judge Bench decision in
Krishna Pillai3, on the other, on the question whether for
the purpose of computing the period of limitation u/s 468
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), the
F relevant date would be the date of filing of the complaint
or the date of institution of prosecution or whether the
relevant date would be the date on which the Magistrate
took cognizance of the offence, the mater was ultimately
referred to the Constitution Bench.
G
Answering the reference, the Court
1. Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2003) 8 SCC 559.
2. Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty 2007 (8) SCR 582.
H 3. Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran & Anr. (1990) supp. SCC 121.
SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 677
DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN
HELD: 1.1 The Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply A
to criminal proceedings except for appeals or revisions
for which express provision is made in Articles 114, 115,
131 and 132 thereof. The Criminal Procedure Code, 1898
contained no general provision for limitation. Though
under certain special laws there are provisions B
prescribing period of limitation for prosecution of
offences, there was no general law of limitation for
prosecution of other offences. This position underwent
a change to some extent when Chapter XXXVI was
introduced in the Cr.P.C. [para 15-16] [709-C-E; 708-F-G] c
The Assistant Collector of Customs, Bombay & Anr. v.
L.R. Melwani & Anr. 1969 SCR 438 =AIR 1970 SC 962 -
referred to
1.2 The object of Chapter XXXVI was to quicken the D
prosecutions of complaints and to .rid the criminal justice
system of inconsequential cases displaying extreme
lethargy, inertia or indolence. The effort was to make the
criminal justice system more orderly, efficient and just by
providing period of limitation for certain offences. E
However, the law makers did not want cause of justice
to suffer in genuine cases. Therefore, in Chapter XXXVI,
provisions have been made out for exclusion of time in
certain cases [s. 470], for exclusion of date on which the
court is closed [s.471], for continuing offences [s.472] and F
for extension of period of limitation in certain cases [s.
473]. Section 473 is crucial. It is an overriding provision
which enables courts to condone delay where such delay
has been properly explained or where the interest of
justice demands extension of period of limitation. It G
empowers the court to take cognizance of an offence
after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied
on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the
delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary
to do so in the interest of justice. Therefore, Chapter H
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A XXXVI is not loaded against the complainant. [Para 18
and 19] [715-G-H; 716-A, E-G]
State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh AIR 1981 SC 1054 -
referred to.
B 1.3 It is true that the accused has a right to have a
speedy trial and this right is a facet of Art. 21 of the
Constitution. Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. does not
undermine this right of the accused. While it encourages
diligence by providing for limitation it does not want all
C prosecutions to be thrown overboard on the ground of
delay. It strikes a balance between the interest of the
complainant and the interest of the accused. It is
significant to notice that where the legislature wanted to
treat certain offences differently, it provided for limitation
D in the section itself [e.g. ss.198(6) and 199(5)]. However,
it chose to make general provisions for limitation for
certain types of offences for the first time and
incorporated them in Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. [para
19] [716-G-H; 717-A-C]
E
1.4 Section 467 defines the phrase 'period of
limitation' to mean the period specified in s.468 for taking
cognizance of certain offences. Section 468 stipulates the
bar of limitation. Sub-s. (1) of s.468 makes it clear that a
fetter is put on the court's power to take cognizance of
F an offence of the category mentioned in sub-s. (2) after
the expiry of period of limitation. Sub-s. (2) lays down the
period of limitation for certain offences. Section 469
states when the period of limitation commences. It is
dexterously drafted so as to prevent advantage of bar of
G limitation being taken by the accused. It states that period
of limitation in relation to an offence shall commence
either from the date of offence or from the date when the
offence is detected. [para 21] [719-A-D]
H Rashmi Kumar (Smt.) v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada, 1996
SARAH MATH!OW v. INST OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 679
DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN
(10) Suppl. SCR 347 = (1997) 2 SCC 397 - referred to. A
1.5 Thus, Chapter XXXVI is a code by itself so far as
limitation is concerned. All the provisions of this Chapter
will have to be read cumulatively. Sections 468 and 469
will have to be read with s.473. [para 21] [719-G]
B
2.1 'Cognizance' is entirely an act of the court. The
term 'cognizance' has not been defined in the Cr.P.C. A
Magistrate takes cognizance when he applies his mind
or takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to
initiating proceedings in respect of offence which is said C
to have been committed. This is the special connotation
acquired by the term 'cognizance' and it has to be given
the same meaning wherever it appears in Chapter 36.
Taking cognizance may be delayed because of several
reasons. It may be delayed because of systemic reasons. D
It may be delayed because of the Magistrate's personal
reasons. [para 22 and 25] [719-H; 721-H; 722-A-B]
S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon
International Ltd.& Ors. 2008 (2) SCR 36 = (2008) 2 SCC 492; E
Jamuna Singh & Ors. v. Bhadai Shah 1964 SCR 37 =AIR
1964 SC 1541, Gopal Das Sindhi & Ors. v. State of Assam
& Anr. 1961 AIR 986; State of Maharashtra v. Sharadchandra
Vinayak Dongre & Ors. 1994 Suppl. (4) SCR 378 = (1995)
1 SCC 42-Referred to.
F
2.2 There has to be some amount of certainty or
definiteness in matters of limitation relating to criminal
offences. Therefore, the date on which complaint is filed
has to be taken as material for computing the limitation.
If the complaint is filed after the period of limitation, the G
complainant can make an application for condonation of
delay u/s 473 of the Cr.P.C. The court will have to issue
notice to the accused and after hearing the accused, and
the complainant, decide whether to condone the delay or
not. If the court takes cognizance after the period of H
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 s.c.q.
A limitation then, the complainant cannot be expected to
make an application for condonation of such delay.
Therefore, the only harmonious construction which can
be placed on ss. 468, 469 and 470 of the Cr.P.C. is that
the Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence only if
B the complaint in respect of it is filed within the prescribed
limitation period. He would, however, be entitled to
exclude such time as is legally excludable. Examined in
light of legislative intent and meaning ascribed to the term
'cognizance' by this Court, it is clear that s.473 of the
C Cr.P.C. postulates condonation of delay caused by the
complainant in filing the complaint. It is the date of filing
of the complaint which is material. In taking cognizance
subjective element comes in. Therefore, it cannot be held
that relevant point for computing limitation would be the
date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. A court
0
of law would interpret a provision which would help
sustaining the validity of the law by applying the doctrine
of reasonable construction rather than applying a
doctrine which would make the provision unsustainable
and ultra vires the Constitution. [para 26-28] [722-E-H;
E 723-E-F; 724-C-E, H; 725-A]
U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Ayodhaya Prasad Mishra
2008 (13) SCR 373 = (2008) 10 SCC139 ; Vanka
Radhamanohari (Smt.) v. Vanka Venkata Reddy and others
F 1993 (3) SCR 287 = (1993) 3 SCC 4; Dau Dayal vs. State of
U.P. 1959 Suppl. SCR 639 =AIR 1959 SC 433 - referred
to.
2.3 The object of the criminal law is to punish
G perpetrators of crime. This is in tune with the well known
legal maxim 'nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi', which
means that a crime never dies. At the same time, it is also
the policy of law to assist the vigilant and not the sleepy.
This is expressed in the Latin maxim 'vigilantibus et non
H dormientibus, jura subveniunt'. Chapter XXXVI of the
SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR DISE. BY ITS 681
DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN
Cr.P.C. which provides limitation period for certain types A
of offences for which lesser sentence is provided, draws
support from this maxim. But, even certain offences such
as s.384 or 465 of the IPC, which have lesser punishment
may have serious social consequences. Provision is,
therefore, made for condonation of delay. Treating the B
date of filing of complaint or date of initiation of
proceedings as the relevant date for computing limitation
u/s 468 of the Code is supported by the legal maxim
'actus curiae neminem gravabit' which means that the act
of court shall prejudice no man. The court's inaction in c
taking cognizance i.e. court's inaction in applying mind
to the suspected offence should not be allowed to cause
prejudice to a diligent complainant. Chapter XXXVI thus
presents the interplay of these three legal maxims.
Though legal maxims are not mandatory rules, but they
0
serve as guiding principles. Use of legal maxims as
guiding principles in Bharat Kale and Japani Sahoo is
perfectly justified. [para 14 and 30] [707-E; 708-E; 726-D-
H; 727-A]
Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh E
(2003) 8 sec 559
Japani Sahoo v. Chand Mohanty 2007
(8) SCR 582 - Upheld.
Vanka Venkata Reddy and others 1993 (3) SCR 287 = F
(1993) 3 sec 4- referred to.
Broom's Legal Maxims, Tenth Edn. 1939 - referred to.
3.1 There is no ambiguity in the provisions of Chapter
XX.XVI of the Cr.P.C. But, the word 'cognizance' has not G
been defined in the Cr.P.C. The rule of purposive
construction can be applied in such a situation. A
purposive construction of an enactment is one which
gives effect to the legislative purpose by following the
literal meaning of the enactment where that meaning is H
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A in accordance with the legislative purpose or by applying
a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in
accordance with the legislative purpose. Therefore, this
Court is of the opinion that if in a case literal interpretation
appears to be in any way in conflict with the legislative
B intent or is leading tcl"absurdity, purposive interpretation
will have to be adopted. [para 32] [727-G-H; 728-A, C]
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Laxmi Narain Dhut 2007
(3) SCR 579 =(2007) 3 SCC 700; New India Assurance
C Company Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia and another etc. 2007
(13) SCR 598 =
(2008) 3 sec 279 - referred'
Francis Bennion on Statutory Interpretation; and
'PCinciples of Statutory Interpretation' by Justice G.P. Singh's
13th edition - 2012 -referred to.
D
3.2 Besides, while construing rules of limitation, the
approach should be in consonance with this Court's
observation in Mela Ram that "it is well established that
rules of limitation pertain to domain of adjectival law and
E that they operate only to bar the remedy but not to
extinguish the right". [para 35] [729-F]
Mela Ram v. The Commissioner of Income Tax Punjab
1956 SCR 166 - referred to.
F 3.3 There is no scope for application of doctrine of
casus omissus. It is not possible to hold that the
legislature has omitted to incorporate something which
this Court is trying to supply. The primary purpose of
construction of the statute is to ascertain the intention of
G the legislature and then give effect to that intention. After
ascertaining the legislative intention as reflected in the
42nd Report of the Law Commission and the Report of
the JPC, this Court is only harmoniously construing the
provisions of Chapter XXXVI along with other relevant
H provisions of the Cr.P.C. to give effect to the legislative
SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR D!SE. BY ITS 683
DIR.-DR. K.M. CHERIAN
intent and to ensure that its interpretation does not lead A
to any absurdity. It is not possible to say that the
legislature has kept a lacuna which is to be filld up by
judicial interpretative process so as to encroach upon the
domain of the legislature. This Court also concurs with
the observations in Japani Sahoo, where the Court has B
examined this issue in the context of Art. 14 of the
Constitution and opted for reasonable construction
rather than literal construction. [para 36-37] [730-A-E]
Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty 2007 C
=
(8) SCR 582 (2007) 7 sec 394- Upheld.
Shiv Shakti Co-operative Housing Society, Nagpur v.
=
Swaraj Developers & Ors. 2003 (3) SCR 762 (2003) 6 SCC
659 - referred to.
D
Law Commission of India, 42nd Report - referred to.
3.4 'Heading' or 'title' prefixed to sections or group
of sections have a limited role to play in the construction
of statutes. They may be taken as very broad and general
indicators or the nature of the subject matter dealt with E
thereunder but they do not control the meaning of the
sections if the meaning is otherwise ascertainable by
reading the section in proper perspective along with
other provisions. Therefore, it cannot be accepted that
heading of Chapter XXXVI is an indicator that the date of F
taking cognizance is material. [para 38] [731-D-E; 732-A]
MIS Frick India Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors, (1990) 1 SCC
400 - referred to.
3.5 It is true that penal statutes must be strictly G
construed. However, in the instant case, looking to the
legislative intent, this Court has harmoniously construed
the provisions of Chapter XXXVI so as to strike a balance
between the right of the complainant and the right of the
accused. Besides, Chapter XXXVI is part of the Cr.P.C., H
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A which is a procedural law and it is well settled that
procedural laws must be liberally construed to serve as
handmaid of justice and not as its mistress. [para 39] [732-
8, C-0]
B Muralidhar Meghraj Loya & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra
=
& Ors. 1977 (1) SCR 1 (1976) 3 SCC 684 and Kisan
Trimbak Kothula & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra 1977
=
(2) SCR 102 (1977) 1 SCC 300; Sardar Amarjeet Singh
Katra (dead) by LRs. & Ors. v. Promod Gupta (dead) by LRs.
C & Ors. 2002 Suppl. (5) SCR 350 =(2003) 3 SCC 272; N.
Balaji v. Virendra Singh & Ors. 2004 Suppl. (5)
SCR 96 = (2004) 8 SCC 312; Kai/ash v. Nanhku & Ors. 2005
(3) SCR 289 =(2005) 4 SCC 480; - referred to
4.1 Therefore, in the light of the legislative intent,
D authoritative judicial pronouncements and established
legal principles, this Court is of the opinion that Krishna
Pillai will have to be restricted to its own facts and it is
not the authority for deciding the question as to what is
the relevant date for the purpose of computing the period .
E of limitation u/s 468 of the Cr.P.C., primarily, because in
that case, the Court was dealing with s.9 of the Child
Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 which is a special Act. There
is no reference either to s.468 or s.473 of the Cr.P.C. in
that judgment. It does not refer to ss.4 and 5 of the Cr.P.C.
F which carve out exceptions for Special Acts. The Court
has not adverted to diverse aspects including the aspect
that inaction on the part of the court in taking cognizance
within limitation, though the complaint is filed within time
may work great injustice on the complainant. [para 40]
G · [732-E-F; 733-A-B]
Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran & Anr. (1990) supp.
sec 121 - disapproved.
A.R. Antu/ay v. Ramdas. Sriniwas Nayak 1984 (2) SCR
=
H 914 (1984) 2 SCC 500, held inapplicable.
SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR DISE. BY ITS 685
DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN
4.2 It is, therefore, held that for the purpose of A
computing the period of limitation u/s 468 of the Cr.P.C.,
the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the
date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which
the Magistrate takes cognizance. [para 41] [734-A-B]
B
Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty 2007
(8) SCR 582; and Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. v. State of
Andhra Pradesh (2003) 8 SCC 559 - Upheld.
UP. Power Corpon. Ltd. v. Ayodhya Prasad Mishra & Anr.
2008 (13) SCR 373 = (2008) 10 SCC 139; Udai Shankar C
Awasthi v. State of U.P. & Anr. 2013 (3) SCR 935 = (2013) 2
SCC 435; Sushi/ Kumar Jain v. State of Bihar 1975 (3) SCR
944, Sardar, R.R. Chari v. The State of Uttar Pradesh 1951
SCR 312 = AIR 1951 SC 207; Bhushan Kumar &Anr. v. State
(NCT of Delhi) & Anr. 2012 (2) SCR 696= (2012) 5 sec 424; D
State of Madras v. Gannon Dukerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd. 1959
SCR 379; Raghunath Rai Bareja and Anr. v. Punjab National
Bank and Ors. 2006 (10) Suppl. SCR 287 = (2007) 2 SCC
230; and State of H.P. v. Tara Dutt & Anr. 1999 (4) Suppl.
SCR 514 = (2000) 1 SCC 230; Municipal Corporation of E
Delhi V. Gurnam Kaur 1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 929 = (1989)
1 SCC 101; R.R. Chari and Darshan Singh Ram Kish an v.
State of Maharashtra 1972 (1) SCR 571 = (1971) 2 SCC
654; Tolaram Relumal & Anr. v. The State of Bombay 1955
SCR 439 =AIR 1954 SC 496; State of Jharkhand & Anr. v. F
Ambay Cements & Anr. 2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 125 = (2005)
1 SCC 368;, Bharat Aluminum Co. etc. v. Kaiser Aluminum
Technical Services etc. 2012 (12) SCR 327 = (2012) 9 SCC
552; Assistant Commissioner, Assessment-II, Bangalore &
Ors. v. Velliappa Textiles Ltd. & Anr. 2003 (3) Suppl. G
SCR 763 = (2003) 11 SCC 405; Maulavi Hussein Haji
Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat & Anr. 2004 (3 ) Suppl.
SCR 202 = (2004) 6 SCC 672; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak
. 1991 (3) Suppl. SCR 325 = (1992) 1 sec 225; Raj Deo
Sharma (//) v. State of Bihar 1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 124 = H
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A (1999) 7 SCC 604;, PK. Choudhary v. Commander, 48
BRTF, (GREF) 2008 (4) SCR 976 = (2008) 13 sec 229
Krishna Sanghai v. State of M.P. 1997 Cr.L.J 90
(MP);Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Tek Chand Bhatia
=
·1980 ( 1) SCR 910 (1980) 1 SCC 158; P.P. Unnikrishnan
B & Anr. v. Puttiyottil Alikutty & Anr 2000 Suppl. ( 3 ) SCR
=
142 (2000) 8 sec 131 - cited.
Rodger v. Comptoir D'Escompte De Paris (1870-71) VII
Moore N.S. 314 - referred to.
c Case Law Reference:
(2003) 8 sec 559 upheld para 1
2007 (8) SCR 582 upheld para 1
(1990) supp. sec 121 disapproved para 1
D
2008 (13) SCR 373 referred to para 4
1956 SCR 166 referred to para 4
2013 (3) SCR 935 cited para 4
E
1975 (3) SCR 944 cited para 5
2002 Suppl. (5) SCR 350 referred to para 5
2005 (3) SCR 289 referred to para 5
F 1951 SCR 312 cited para 5
2012 (2) SCR 696 cited para 5
1959 SCR 379 cited para 5
G 2006 Suppl. (10) SCR 287 referred to para 5
AIR 1981 SC 1054 referred to para 5
1993 (3) SCR 287 referred to para 5
1999 Suppl. (4) SCR 514 cited para 5
H
SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 687
DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN
1988 Suppl. (2) SCR 929 cited para 5 A
1972 (1) SCR 571 cited para7
2004 Suppl. (6) SCR 125 cited para 7
(2013) 11 sec 405 cited para 7
B
2004 Suppl. (3) SCR 202 cited para 7
2012 (12) SCR 327 cited para 7
2003 Suppl. (3) SCR 763 referred to para 7
c
2004 Suppl. (3) SCR202 cited para 7
1991 Suppl. (3) SCR 325 cited para 7
1999 Suppl. (3) SCR 124 cited para 7
2003 (3) SCR 762 referred to para 7 D
1994 Suppl. (4) SCR 378 referred to para 7
2008 (4) SCR 976 cited para 7
1997 Cr.L.J 90 (MP) cited para 7 E
2008 (2) SCR 36 referred to para 8
1980 (1) SCR 910 cited para 8
(1870-71) VII Moore N.S. 314cited para 8
F
2000 Suppl. (3) SCR 142 cited para 8
1996 Suppl. (10) SCR 347 referred to para 9
1984 (2) SCR 914 held inapplicable para 9
G
1969 SCR 438 cited para 15
1964 SCR 37 referred to para 23
1961 AIR 986 referred to para 23
H
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A 1959 Suppl. SCR 639 referred to para 28
2007 (3) SCR 579 referred to para 29
2008 (13) SCR 373 referred to para 33
(1990) 1 sec 400 referred to Para 38
B
1990 (1) sec 400 relied on Para 38
1977 (1) SCR 1 referred to para 39
1977 (2) SCR 102 referred to para 39
c
2004 Suppl. (5) SCR 96 referred to para 39
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 829 of 2005.
·D From the Judgment and Order dated 17.07.2002 of the
High Court of Judicature at Madras in Crl. O.P. No. 12001 of
1997.
WITH
E SLP(Crl.) Nos. 5687-5688 and 5764 of 2013.
Sidharth Luthra, ASG, Amarendra Sharan, S. Gurukrishna
Kumar, K. Swami, Prabha Swami, Nikhil Swami, Amit Anand
Tiwari, Kushagra Pandey, Avinash Tripathy, A.K. Kaul, Charul
F Sarin, Supriya Juneja, Arjun Dewan, D.S. Mahra, V. Mohana,
B. Raghunath, K.V. Vijayakumar, R. Anand Padmanabhan,
Amritha Sarayoo, Nikunj Dayal, Pramod Dayal for the
appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
(SMT .) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. 1. While
dealing with Criminal Appeal No. 829 of 2005 a two-Judge
Bench of this Court noticed a conflict between a two-Judge
Bench decision of this Court in Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr.
H
SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 689
DIR. - DR. K.M CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
v. State of Andhra Pradesh' which is followed in another two- A
Judge Bench decision in Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar
Mohanty2 and a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in
Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran &Anr. 3 • In Bharat Kale it was
held that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation,
the relevant date is the date of filing of complaint or initiating B
criminal proceedings and not the date of taking cognizance by
a Magistrate or issuance of a process by court. In Krishna
Pillai this Court was concerned with Section 9 of the Child
Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 which stated that no court shall
take cognizance of any offence under the Child Marriage C
Restraint Act, 1929 after the expiry of one year from the date
on which the offence is alleged to have been committed. The
three-Judge Bench held that since magisterial action in the
case before it was beyond the period of one year from the date
of commission of the offence, the Magistrate was not competent D
to take cognizance when he did in view of bar under Section 9
of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929. Thus, there was
apparent conflict on the question whether for the purpose of
computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'the Cr.P.C.') in E
respect of a criminal complaint the relevant date is the date of
filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution
or whether the relevant date is the date on which a Magistrate
takE;IS cognizance. The two-Judge Bench, therefore, directed
that this case may be put up before a three-Judge Bench for F
an authoritative pronouncement. When the matter was placed
before the three-Judge Bench, the three-Judge Bench doubted
the correctness of Krishna Pillai and observed that as a co-
ordinate Bench, it cannot declare that Krishna Pillai does not
lay down the correct law and, therefore, the matter needs to be G
referred to a five-Judge Bench to examine the correctness of
the view taken in Krishna Pillai. Accordingly, this appeal along
1. (2003) a sec 559.
2. (2001) 1 sec 394.
3. (1990) supp. sec 121. H
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A with other matters where similar issue is involved is placed
before this Constitution Bench.
2. No specific questions have been referred to us. But, in
our opinion, the following questions arise for our consideration:
B A. Whether for the purposes of computing the period
of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C the
relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint
or the date of institution of prosecution or whether
the relevant date is the date on which a Magistrate
c takes cognizance of the offence?
B. Which of the two cases i.e. Krishna Pillai or Bharat
Kale (which is followed in Japani Sahoo) lays down
the correct law.
D
3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at great
length and carefully read their written submissions. We may
give gist of their submissions and then proceed to answer the
questions which fall for our consideration.
E 4. Gist of submissions of Mr. Krishnamurthi Swami,
learned counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 829
of 2005.
a. Krishna Pillai was rendered in the context of
F Section 9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act,
1929. There is no reference to either Section 468
or Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. in this judgment. This
judgment merely focuses on the meaning of the tenn
'taking cognizance' and has accordingly interpreted
G Section 9 without reference to any provisions of the
Cr.P.C. Hence, this judgment cannot be considered
authority for the purposes of interpretation of
provisions of Chapter XXXVI. On the other hand
Bharat Kale considers various provisions of
Chapter XXXVI. All the provisions have been
H
SARAH MATHEW v. INST OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 691
DIR - DR K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J]
cumulatively read to conclude that the limitation A
prescribed is not for taking cognizance within the
period of limitation, but for taking cognizance of an
offence in regard to which a complaint is filed or
prosecution is initiated within the period of the
limitation prescribed under the Cr.P.C. This 8
judgment lays down the correct law.
b. Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. has to be read keeping
in view other provisions particularly Section 473 of
the Cr.P.C. A person filing a complaint within time
cannot be penalized because the Magistrate did C
not take cognizance. A person filing a complaint
after the period of limitation can file an application
for condonation of delay and the Magistrate could
condone delay if the explanation is reasonable. If
Section 468 is interpreted to mean that a D
Magistrate cannot take cognizance of an offence
after the period of limitation without any reference
to the date of filing of the complaint or the institution
of the prosecution it would be rendered
unconstitutional. A court of law would interpret a E
provision which would help sustaining the validity of
the law by applying the doctrine of reasonable
construction rather than accepting an interpretation
which may make such provision unsustainable and
ultra vires the Constitution. [U.P. Power Corpon. F
Ltd. v. Ayodhya Prasad Mishra & Anr4].
c. Chapter XXXVI requires to be harmoniously
interpreted keeping the interests of both the
complainant as well as the accused in mind.
G
d. The law of limitation should be interpreted from the
standpoint of the person who exercises the right and
whose remedy would be barred. The laws of
4. (2008) 10 sec 139. H
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 12 S.C.R.
A limitation do not extinguish the right but only bar the
remedy. [Me/a Ram v. The Commissioner of
Income Tax Punjab]. 5
e. If delay in filing a complaint can be condoned in
terms of Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. then. Section
8 468 of the Cr.P.C cannot be interpreted to mean
that a complaint or prosecution instituted within time
cannot be proceeded with, merely because the
Magistrate took cognizance after the period of
limitation.
c
f. The question of delay in launching a criminal
prosecution may be a circumstance to be taken into
consideration while arriving at a final decision.
However, the same may not by itself be a ground
D for dismissing the complaint at the threshold. [Udai
Shankar Awasthi v. State of U.P. &Anr. 6 ]. In certain
exceptional circumstances delay may have to be
condoned considering the gravity of the charge.
g. The contention that Section 468 should be
E interpreted to mean that where the Magistrate does
not take cognizance within the period of limitation
it must be treated as having the object of giving
quietus to petty offences in the Indian Penal Code
is untenable. Some offences which fall within the
F periods of limitation specified in Section 468 of the
Cr.P.C are serious. It could never have been the
intention of the legislature to accord quietus to such
offences.
G h. Procedure is meant to sub-serve and not rule the
cause of justice. Procedural laws must be liberally
construed to really serve as handmaid. Technical
5. 1956 SCR 166.
H 6. (2013) 2 sec 435.
SARAH MATHEW v. INST OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 693
DIR - DR K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J]
objections which tend to defeat and deny A
substantial justice should be strictly discouraged.
[Sushi/ Kumar Jain v. State of Bihar7 , Sardar
Amarjeet Singh Kalra (dead) by LRs. & Ors. v.
Promod Gupta (dead) by LRs. & Ors.•, Kai/ash v.
Nanhku & Ors. 9] B
5. Gist of submissions of Mr. S. Guru Krishnakumar,
learned senior counsel and Mrs. V. Mohana, learned counsel
· for respondent 1 in Criminal Appeal No. 829 of 2005.
a. Bharat Kale and Japani Sahoo do not represent C
the correct position in law. Krishna Pillai rightly
holds that the relevant date for considering period
of limitation is the date of taking cognizance.
b. The settled principies of statutory construction o
require that the expression 'cognizance' occurring
in Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. has to be given
its legal sense, since it has acquired a special
connotation in criminal law. It is a settled position
in law that taking cognizance is judicial application E
of mind to the contents of a complaint/police report
for the first time. [R.R. Chari v. The State of Uttar
Pradesh'°, Bhushan Kumar & Anr. v. State (NCT
of Delhi) & Anr. 11). If an expression has acquired a
special connotation in law, dictionary or general
F
meaning ceases to be helpful in interpreting such
a word. Such an expression must be given its legal
meaning and no other. [State of Madras v. Gannon
Dukerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd. 12}.
7. 1975 (3) SCR 944. G
8. 2003) 3 sec 212.
9. (20051 4 sec 480.
10. AIR 1951 sec 424.
11. (2012) 5 sec 424.
12. 1959 SCR 379. H
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 12 S C.R.
A c. The heading of Chapter XXXVI providing for
limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences
is clearly reflective of the legislative intent to treat
the date of taking cognizance as the relevant date
in computing limitation. Pertinently, Section 467
B defines the expression 'period of limitation' as the
period specified in Section 468 for taking
cognizance of an offence. The express language of
Section 468 makes it clear that the legislature
considers the relevant date for computing the date
c of limitation to be the date of taking cognizance and
not the date of filing of a complaint. Further, the
situations in Section 470 of the Cr.P.C. providing
for exclusion in computing the period of limitation
are again relatable to taking cognizance and
institution of prosecution. So also, exclusion under
D
Section 471 of the Cr.P.C. relates only to taking
cognizance and Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. also
provides for extension of period of limitation in
taking cognizance.
E d. The scheme of the Cr.P.C. envisages cognizance
to be the point of initiation of proceedings. Chapter
XIV of the Cr.P.C. which contains provisions of
taking cognizance is titled "Conditions requisite for
initiation of proceedings". All provisions contained
F therein use the expression 'cognizance'. They do
not refer to filing of complaint at all.
e. Where the words of a statute are absolutely clear
and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the
principles of interpretation other than the literal rule.
G
Even if the literal interpretation results in hardship
or inconvenience it has to be followed (Raghunath
Rai Bareja and Anr. v. Punjab National Bank and
Ors. 13). On a plain and literal interpretation of
H 13. (2007) 2 sec 230.
SARAH MATHEW v. INST OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 695
DIR - DR. K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. read in the background A
of object of Chapter XXXVI the intention of the
legislature is clearly evident that bar of limitation is
only for taking cognizance of an offence after the
expiry of the period specified therein.
B
f. Chapter XV of the Cr.P.C. sets out procedure to be
followed in respect of complaints filed directly to a
Magistrate. It reflects a well laid out scheme which
envisages judicial application of mind to be a pre-
requisite for initiation of proceedings. The definition
of the term 'complaint' contained in Section 2(d)
c·
also makes this evident. Thus, initiation of
proceedings in criminal law can only be upon taking
cognizance. It is clear, therefore, that under Section
468 of the Cr.P.C. legislature has barred taking of
cognizance as envisaged by Chap,t,ers XIV and XV D
after expiry of period of limitation. Hence, the date
for purpose of limitation would be the date of taking
cognizance. Mere filing of a complaint does not
result in cognizance being taken, for the law
requires the court to apply its mind judicially even E
before deciding to issue process.
g. There was no period of limitation under the old
Cr.P.C. A long delay led to serious negligence on
the part of the prosecuting agencies, forgetfulness F
on the part of the prosecution and defence witness
and mental anguish to the accused. Infliction of
punishment long after the commission of offence
impairs its utility as social retribution to the offender.
To obviate these lacunae Chapter XXXVI was
G
introduced in the Cr.P.C.
h. Bharat Kale and Japani Sahoo have missed the
object of introduction of Chapter XXXVI in the
Cr.P.C. namely to serve larger interest of
H
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A administration of criminal iustice keeping in view
the interest of the accused and the interest of
prosecuting agencies. Ttiese judgments fail to
advert to the prejudice that will be caused to the
accused if benefit of delay in taking cognizance is
B not given to them. The likelihood of prejudice being
caused to the complainant which weighed with this
court in the above two decisions can be taken care
of by Section 473 which provides for condonation
of delay. [State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh 14 ,
c Vanka Radhamanohari (Smt.) v. Vanka Venkata
Reddy and otflers' 5 and State of H.P. v. Tara Dutt
& Anr. ' 6]
i. Object of Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. has not been
considered in Bharat Kale and Japani Sahoo. They
D ar~sub-silenti<i in this regard. (Municipal
Corporation of Delhi V. Gurnam Kaur17 }. They
have also not taken note of difference of language
in Sections 468 and 469 of the Cr.P.C.
E j. There are seven exceptions in the Cr.P.C. to
Section 468 namely Sections 84(1), 96(1), 198(6),
199(5), 378(5), 457(2) and the proviso to Section
125(3). In all these provisions period of limitation
has been expressly provided by the legislature. The
F language of each of these provisions is different
from language of Section 468. A perusal of these
seven exceptions show that what is intended in
Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. is limitation for taking
cognizance and not for filing complaints.
G 6. Gist of submissions of Mr. Padmanabhan, learned
14. AIR 1981 SC 1054.
15. (1993) 3 sec 4.
16. (2000J 1 sec 101.
H 17. (1989) 1 sec 101.
SARAH MATHEW\'. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR DISE. BY ITS 697
DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
counsel for respondent 2 in Criminal Appeal No. 829 of 2005. · A
a. The legislature has been very specific wherever
time limit has to be fixed for initiation of prosecution.
In certain special legislations like the Negotiable
Instruments Act bar of limitation is not co-related to 8
taking cognizance of an offence by a court, but it ii\
co-related to filing of a complaint within a specific
period. It is apparent that the bar under Chapter
XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. must be co-related to taking
cognizance of an offence by the court in view of C
specific language used by the relevant sections
contained therein.
b. Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. is captioned as
'Limitation for Taking Cognizance of Certain
Offences'. Therefore, this Chapter has to be D
understood as a Chapter placing limitation upon the
court for the purposes of taking cognizance within
the timeframe prescribed and not for filing of a
complaint. In this Chapter the word 'complaint' or
'complainant' are conspicuously absent. Emphasis E
is on 'offences'.
c. Section 473 of the Cr.P.C enjoins a duty on the
court to examine not only whether the delay has
been explained or not but whether it is necessary F
to do so in the interest of justice.
d. If the charge-sheet is hit by Section 468, the Court
may then resort to Section 473 in exceptional cases
in the interest of justice. The same consideration
may not arise if a private cemplaint is filed. Section G ·
473 is designed to cater to situations when for
genuine reasons investigation is delayed. It is not
intended to give long rope to litigants who take long
time to approach the court.
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A e. Marginal Heading or Note can be usefully referred
to, to determine the sense of any doubtful
expression in a section ranged under that heading
though it cannot be referred to for giving a different
effect to clear words in the section.
B
7. Gist of submissions of Mr. Amrendra Sharan, learned
senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in SLP (Crl.) Nos.
5687-5688 of 2013 and SLP (Crl.) No. 5764 of 2013.
a. Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. is a complete code
c in itself which deals with issue of bar of limitation
for taking cognizance of an offence.
b. A bare reading of Section 468 of the Cr.P.C leaves
no manner of doubt that the bar of limitation applies
D as on the date of cognizance. It specifically targets
cognizance and it debars taking cognizance of an
offence after expiration of the statutory period of
limitation. One cannot make fundamental alteration
in the words of the statute. Taking cognizance
cannot be altered to filing complaint within statutory
E
period.
c. Taking cognizance is distinct from filing complaint.
The term cognizance has been defined by this Court
in R.R. Chari and Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v.
F State of Maharashtra' 6 . Cognizance takes place
when a M'agistrate first takes judicial notice of an
offence on a complaint, or on a police report or
upon information of a person other than a police
officer.
G
d. Operation of legal maxims can be excluded by
statutes but operation of statutes cannot be
·excluded by legal maxims. Reliance on a maxim by
H 1s. (1971J 2 sec 654.
SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 699
DIR. - DR K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.)
this Court in Japani Sahoo for carving out an A
exception and supplying words to the complete
Code of limitation is erroneous.
e. Penal statutes have to be interpreted strictly.
[Tolaram Relumal & Anr. v. The State of
8
Bombay]' 9 • It is the cardinal rule of interpretation
that where a statute provides a particular thing
should be done, it should be done in the manner
prescribed and not in any other way. (State of
Jharkhand & Anr. v. Ambay Cements & Anr. 20)
c
f. The rule of Casus Omissus stipulates that a matter
which should have been, but has not been provided
for in the statute cannot be supplied by the courts
as, to do so, will be legislation by court and not
construction. The legislative casus omissus cannot D
be supplied by judicial interpretative process. There
is no scope for supplying/ supplanting any word,
phrase or sentence or creating any exception in
Chapter XXXVI which is a complete Code in itself.
[Shiv Shakti Co-operative Housing Society, E
Nagpur v. Swaraj Developers & Ors. 21 , Bharat
Aluminum Co. etc. v. Kaiser Aluminum Technical
Services etc. 22 , Assistant Commissioner,
Assessment-II, Bangalore & Ors. v. Vefliappa
Textiles Ltd. & Anr. 23]. F
g. Japani Sahoo does not lay down the correct law
because by stipulating that the date of limitation is
to be calculated from the date of filing of complaint
rather than from the date on which the cognizance
G
19. AIR 1954 SC 496.
20. (2005) 1 sec 368.
21. (2003l s sec 659.
22. (2012) 9 sec 552.
23. (2003) 11 sec 405. H
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A is taken, it has created a casus omissus, where
the language of the statute was plain and no casus
omissus existed.
h. The Golden Rule of Interpretation provides that a
statute has to be interpreted by grammatical or
B
literal meaning unmindful of the consequences if the
language of the statute is plain and simple.
[Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State
of Gujarat & Anr"].
c i. The Law Commission's 42nd Report demonstrates
the rational for introduction of limitation in Cr.P.C.
The legislature wanted to ensure that prosecution
should not result in persecution especially in cases
of minor offences which could be tried and
D disposed of speedily.
j. The accused has a fundamenta'1 right to speedy trial
which is a facet of Article 21. {AR. Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak25 ("Antu/ay '1992' Case')] Therefore, it is the
duty of the courts to take cognizance within a ,
E
prescribed timeframe. If the court fails to do so, it
is not open to it to take cognizance of such offence
as it might prejudice the right of the accused.
Therefore, no cognizance can be taken after the
period of limitation. [Raj Deo Sharma (II) v. State
F of Bihaf6 and Sarwan Singh.]
k. The accused has a right to be heard at the time of
condonation of delay in taking cognizance by the
courts. Delay cannot be condoned without notice to
G the accused. [State of Maharashtra v.
Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongre & Ors. 27 , P.K.
24. (2004) a sec 405.
25. (1992) 1 sec 225.
2s. (1999) 1 sec 604.
H 21. (1995) 1 sec 42.
SARAH MATHEW v. INST OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 701
DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J]
Choudhary v. Commander, 48 BRTF, (GREF}2 8 , · A
Knshna Sanghai v. State of M. P. 29}
I. The accused have to be heard when an application
under Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. is moved by the
prosecution before cognizance is taken. Section B
468 of the Cr.P.C. is clear and unambiguous and
it bars taking cognizance of an offence, if on the
date of taking cognizance the period prescribed
under Section 468(2) of the Cr.P.C. has expired.
Japani Sahoo. therefore, does not lay down the C
correct law.
8. Gist of submissions of Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned
Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the respondent-
State (NCT of Delhi) in SLP (Crl.) Nos. 5687-5688 of 2013 and
SLP (Crl.) No. 5764 of 2013. D
·a. Bharat Kale lays down the correct law and not
Krishna Pillai.
b. Legislative history of Chapter XXXVI indicates its
object. E
c. Stage of process is not to be mistaken for
cognizance. Cognizance indicates the point when
a court takes judicial notice of an offence with a
view to initiating process in respect of the offence F
[S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v.
Videocon International Ltd. & Ors. 30}. Cognizance
is entirely a different thing from initiation of
proceedings, rather it is the condition precedent to
the initiation of proceedings by the court. G
Cognizance is taken of the case and not of
28. (2008) 13 sec 229.
29. 1997 Cr. L.J. 90 (MP).
30. (2008) 2 sec 492. H
\
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 12 S.CR.
A persons. Under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. it is the
application of mind to the averments in the
complaint that constitutes cognizance (Bhushan
Kumar). Stage of process is not relevant for the
purpose of computing limitation under Section 468
B of the Cr.P.C.
d. Chapter XXXVI has to be read as a whole. To
understand the scheme of this Chapter reference
may be made to Vanka Radhamanohari.
c e. On interpretation of Section 473 of the Cr.P.C
particularly the disjunctive 'or' used therein
reference may be made to Municipal Corporation
of Delhi v. Tek Chand Bhatia. 31 Once the
complainant has acted with due diligence and there
D are delays on the part of the Court, it would be in
the interest of justice to condone such delay and not
call for explanation from the complainant which in
any case he cannot possibly give. On condonation
of delay reference may be made to Sharadchandra
E Dongre.
f. Taking cognizance is not dictated by the
prosecution of the complaint or police report but is
predicated upon application of judicial mind by the
Magistrate which is not in the control of the
F individual instituting the prosecution. If date of
taking cognizance is considered to be relevant in
computing limitation, the act of the court can
prejudice the complainant which will be against the
maxim 'the acts of courts should not prejudice
G anyone'. [Rodger v. Comptoir D'Escompte De
Paris32].
31. (1980) 1 sec 158.
H 32. (1870-71) VII Moore N.S. 314.
SARAH MATHEW v. INST OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 703
DIR. - DR. K.M. CHER+AN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI. J.]
g. Krishna Pillai relates to Section 9 of the Child A
Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 which is a special law
and which provides for a limitation for taking
cognizance and could exclude the application of
Chapter XXXVI and, hence, Section 473 of the
Cr.P.C. and perhaps in such facts there was no B
reference to Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. Similar is
the view in P.P. Unnikrishnan & Anr. v. Puttiyottil
Alikutty & Anr. 33 •
h. It is settled law that Sections 4 and 5 of the Cr.P.C. C
create an exception for special laws with special
procedures. Krishna Pillai was in the context of
specific limitation period where Section 473 of the
Cr.P.C. had no application. Thus, it cannot be
considered or applied to interpret Sections 468 and
473 of the Cr.P.C. as they stand. On the contrary, D
view taken in Bharat Kale and Japani Sahoo
relying upon Rashmi Kumar (Smt.) v. Mahesh
Kumar Bhada,34 reach the same conclusion as
contended herein i.e. the acts of the court should
not prejudice anyone. E
9. Having given the gist of the submissions, we shall now
advert to Krishna Pillai, Bharat Kale and Japani Sahoo which
have led to this reference. In Krishna Pillai this Court was
concerned with Section 9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, F
1929 which reads as under:
"No court shall take cognizance of any offence under this
Act after the expiry of one year from the date on which
the offence is alleged to have been committed."
G
It was not disputed that cognizance of the offence had
been taken by the court more than a year after the offence was
33. c2000) a sec 131.
34. (1997) 2 sec 397. H
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A committed. The appellant challenged the continuance of
prosecution by filing an application under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C. before the High Court contending that the co!'Jnizance
was barred under Section 9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act,
1929. It was contended by the respondent that since the
B complaint had been filed within a year from the commission of
the offence it must be taken that the court has taken cognizance
on the date when the complaint was filed. Therefore, the
complaint cannot be said to be barred by limitation. This Court
quoted the following· observations of the judgment of the
C Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak
("Antulay '1984' Case'~ 5 :
"When a private complaint is filed, the court has to
examine the complainant on oath save in the cases set
out in the proviso to Section 200 CrPC After examining
D
the complainant on oath and examining the witnesses
present, if any, meaning thereby that the witnesses not
present need not be examined, it would be open to the
court to judicially determine whether a case is made out
for issuing process. When it is said that court issued
E process, it means the court has taken cognizance of the
offence and has decided to initiate the proceedings and
a visible manifestation of taking cognizance process is
issued which means that the accused is called upon to
appear before the court."
F
This Court observed that cognizance has assumed a
special meaning in our criminal jurisprudence and the above
extract from Antulay '1984' Case indicates that filing of a
complaint is not taking cognizance and what exactly constitutes
G taking cognizance is different from filing a complaint. This Court
observed that since the magisterial action in the case before
it was beyond the period of one year from the date of
commission of the offence, the Magistrate was not competent
H 35. (1984) 2 sec 500.
SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 705
DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
to take cognizance when he did in view of the bar under Section A
9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929.
10. Before discussing Bharat Kale, it is necessary to go
to Rashmi Kumar (Smt.) on which reliance is placed in Bharat
Kale. In that case, the question was whether the complaint filed B
by the complainant-wife against the husband under Section 406
of the IPC in September, 1990 was time barred. The offence
under Section 406 of the IPC is punishable with imprisonment
which could extend to three years or with fine or with both.
Therefore, under Section 468(3) of the Cr.P.C., the limitation C
period for the said offence is three years. It was urged by the
counsel for the husband that the evidence of the complainant-
wife recorded under Section 200 of the Cr.P .C. establishes that
in October, 1986 the complainant-wife demanded return of
jewelry and the husband refused to return the jewelry. Therefore, 0
the period of limitation began to run from October, 1986 and
the complaint filed in September, 1990 was time barred, it
having been filed beyond the period of three years. A three-
Judge Bench of this Court negatived this contention and held
that it was clearly averred in the complaint that on 5/12/1987, E
the complainant-wife had demanded jewelry from the husband
and the husband had refused to do so and, therefore, the
complaint filed on 10/9/1990 was within three years from the
date of demand of jewelry and refusal to return it by the
husband. Thus, for the purpose of computation of period of F
limitation, the date of filing of the complaint was held to be
relevant.
11. In Bharat Kale, the offence under the Drugs and Magic
Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954 was
detected on 5/311999. The complaint was filed on 3/3/2000 G
which was within the period of limitation of one year. However,
the Magistrate took cognizance on 251312000 i.e. beyond the
period of one year. It was argued that since cognizance was
taken beyond the period of.-one year, the bar of limitation
H
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 12 S.C.R.
A applies. After considering the provisions of Chapter XXXVI of
the Cr.P.C. this Court observed that they indicate that the
limitation prescribed therein is only for the filing of the complaint
or initiation of the prosecution and not for taking cognizance.
It, of course, prohibits the court from tcil<ing cognizance of an
s offence where the complaint is filed before the court after the
expiry of the period mentioned in the said Chapter. This Court
further observed that taking cognizance is an act of the court
over which the prosecuting agency or the complainant has no
control. A complaint filed within the period of limitation cannot
c be made infructuous by an act of the court which will cause
prejudice to the complainant. Such a construction will be
against the maxim 'actus curiae neminem gravabit', which
means the act of court shall prejudice no man. It was also
observed relying on Rashmi Kumar (Smt.) that the legislature
0 could not have intended to put a period of limitation on the act
of the court for taking cognizance of an offence so as to defeat
the case of the complainant.
12. In Japani Sahoo, the complainant therein filed a
complaint in the court of the concerned Magistrate alleging
E commission of offences punishable under Sections 161, 294,
323 and 506 of the IPC. On 8/8/1997 learned Magistrate on
the basis of statements of witnesses issued summons for
appearance of the accused. The accused surrendered on 23/
11 /1998 and thereafter filed a petition under Section 482 of the
F Cr.P.C. in the High Court for quashing criminal proceedings
contending inter a/ia that no cognizance could have been taken
by the court after the period of one year of limitation prescribed
for the offences punishable under Sections 294 and 323 of the
IPC. The High Court held that the relevant date for deciding the
G bar of limitation was the date of taking cognizance by the court
and since cognizance was taken after the period of one year
and the delay was not condoned by the court by exercising
power under Section 473 of the Code, the complaint is liable
to be dismissed. On appeal, this Court referred to another well
H known maxim 'nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi' which
SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 707
DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
means that a crime never dies. This Court elaborately A
discussed the scheme of Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. and
after following Bharat Kale held that it is the date of filing of
complaint or the date on which criminal proceedings are
initiated which is material.
13. At the outset, we must deal with the criticism leveled
against Bharat Kale and Japani Sahoo that they place undue
reliance on legal maxims. It was argued that legal maxims can
neither expand nor delete any part of an express statutory
provision, nor can they give an interpretation which is directly c
contrary to what the provision stipulated. Their operation can
be excluded by statutes but operation of statutes cannot be
excluded by legal maxims.
14. It is true that in Bharat Kale a~d Japani Sahoo this
Court has referred to two important legal maxims. We may add 0
that in Vanka Radhamanohari, to which our attention has been
drawn by the counsel, it is stated that the general rule of
limitation is based on Latin maxim 'vigilantibus et non
dormientibus, jura subveniunt', which means the vigilant and
not the sleepy, are assisted by laws. We are, however, unable E
to accept the submission that reliance placed on legal maxims
was improper. We are mindful of the fact that legal maxims are
not mandatory rules but their importance as guiding principles
can hardly be underestimated. Herbert Broom in the preface
to the First Edition of his classical work "Legal Maxims" (as F
seen in Broom's Legal Maxims, Tenth Edition, 1939) stated:
"In the Legal Science, perhaps more frequently than in
any other, reference must be made to the first principles.
Indeed, a very limited acquaintance with the earlier G
Reports will show the importance which was attached to
the acknowledged Maxims of the Law, in periods when
civilization and refinement had made comparatively little
progress. In the ruder ages, without doubt, the great
majority of questions respecting the rights, remedies, and H
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A liabilities of private individuals were determined by an
immediate reference to such maxims. many of which
obtained in the Roman Jaw, and are so manifestly
founded in reason, public convenience, and necessity,
as to find a place in the code of every civilized nation. In
B more modern times, the increase of commerce, and of
national and social intercourse, has occasioned a
corresponding increase in the sources of litigation, and
has introduced many subtleties and nice distinctions,
both in legal reason and in the application of legal
c principles, which were formerly unknown. This change,
however, so far from diminishing the value of simple
fundamental rules, has rendered an accurate
acquaintance with them the more necessary, in order
that they may be either directly applied, or qualified, or
limited, according to the exigencies of the particular case,
D
and the novelty of the circumstances which present
themselves.
In our opinion, therefore, use of legal maxims as guiding
principles in Bharat Kale and Japani Sahoo is perfectly
E justified.
15. To address the questions which arise in this reference,
it is necessary to have a look at the legislative history of
Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. The Criminal Procedure Code,
F 1898 contained no general provision for limitation. Though
under certain special laws like the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881, Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, the Police Act,
1861, The Factories Act, 1948 and the Army Act, 1950, there
are provisions prescribing period of limitation for prosecution
G of offences, there was no general law of limitation for
prosecution of other offences. The approach of this Court while
dealing with the argument that there was delay in launching
prosecution, when in the Criminal Procedure Code (1898),
there was no general provision prescribing limitation, could be
H ascertained from its judgment in The Assistant Collector of
SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIO VASCUlAR OISE. BY ITS 709
DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
Customs, Bombay & Anr. v. L.R. Melwani & Anr. 36 . It was A
urged before the High Court in that case that there was delay
in launching prosecution. The High Court held that the delay
was satisfactorily explained. While dealing with this question,
this Court held that in any case prosecution could not have been
quashed on the ground of delay because it was not the case B
of the accused that any period of.limitation was prescribed for
filing the complaint. Hence the complaint could not have been
thrown out on the sole ground that there was delay in filing the
same. This Court further observed that the question of delay in
filing complaint may be a circumstance to be taken into C
consideration in arriving at the final verdict and by itself it affords
no ground for dismissing the complaint. This position underwent
a change to some extent when Chapter XXXVI was introduced
in the Cr.P.C. as we shall soon see.
D
16. It is pertinent to note that the Limitation Act, 1963 does
not apply to criminal proceedings except for appeals or
revisions for which express provision is made in Articles 114,
115, 131 and 132 thereof. After conducting extensive study of
criminal laws of various countries, the Law Commission of India
E
appears to have realized that providing provision of limitation
for prosecution of criminal offences of certain type in general
law would, in fact, be good for the criminal justice system. The
Law Commission noted that the reasons to justify introduction
of provisions prescribing limitation in general law for criminal
F
cases are similar to those which justify such provisions in civil
law such as likelihood of evidence being curtailed, failing
memories of witnesses and disappearance of witnesses. Such
a provision, in the opinion of the Law Commission, will quicken
diligence, prevent oppression and in the general public interest G
would bring an end to litigation. The Law Commission also felt
that the court would be relieved of the burden of adjudicating
inconsequential claims. Paragraph 24.3 is material. It reads
thus:
36. AIR 1970 SC 962. H
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A "24. 3 - In civil cases, the law of limitation in almost all
countries where the rule of law pre1'ails, Jurists have
given several convincing reasons to justify the provision
of such a law; some of those which are equally applicable
to criminal prosecutions may be referred to here:-
B
(1) The defendant ought not to be ca//ed on to resist a
claim when "evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared."
(2) The law of limitation is also a means of suppressing
c fraud, and perjury, and quickening diligence and
preventing oppression.
(3) It is in the general public interest that there should be
an end to litigation. The statute of limitation is a statute
D of repose.
(4) A party who is insensible to the value of civil remedies
and who does not assert his own claim with promptitude
has little or no right to require the aid of the state in
enforcing it.
E
(5) The court should be relieved of the burden of
adjudicating inconsequential or tenuous claims."
The Law Commission stated its case for extending
limitation to original prosecutions as under:
F
"24. 11 - It seems to us that there is a strong case for
having a period of limitation for offences which are not
very serious. For such offences, considerations of
fairness to the accused and the need for ensuring
G freedom from prosecution after a lapse of time should
outweigh other considerations. Moreover, after the expiry
of a certain period the sense of social retribution loses
its edge and the punishment does not seNe the purpose
of social retribution. The deterrent effect of punishment
H which is one of the most important objectives of penal law
SARAH MATHEW v. INST OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 711
DIR - DR K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J]
is very much impaired if the punishment is not inflicted A
promptly and if it is inflicted at a time when it has been
wiped off the memory of the offender and of other persons
who had knowledge of the crime.
Paragraphs 24.13, 24.14, 24.20, 24.22, 24.23, 24.24, B
24.25, and 24.26 could also be advantageously quoted.
"24.13 - At present no court can throw out a complaint
solely on the ground of delay, because, as pointed out
by the Supreme Court, "the question of delay in filing a
complaint may be a circumstance to be taken into C
consideration in arriving at the final verdict, but by itself,
it affords no grounds for dismissing the complaint". If is
true that unconscionable delay is a good ground for
entertaining grave doubts about the truth of the
complainant's story unless he can explain it to the D
satisfaction of the court. But it would be illegal for a court
to dismiss a complaint merely because there was
inordinate delay.
24.14. -We, therefore, recommend that the principle of E
limitation should be introduced for less serious offences
under the Code. We suggest that, for the present,
offences punishable with fine only or with imprisonment
upto three years should be made subject to the law of
limitation. The question of extending the law to graver F
offences may be taken up later on in the light of the
experience actually gained.
24.20. -The question whether prosecution commences on
the date on which the court takes cognizance of the
offence or only on the date on which process is issued G
against the accused, has been settled by the Supreme
Court with reference to Section 15 of the Merchandise
Marks Act, 1889. Where the complaint was f/1ed within
one year of the discovery of offence, it cannot be thrown
out merely because process was not issued within one H
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A year of such discovery. The complainant is required by
section 15 of the Act to "commence prosecution" within
this period, which means that if the complaint is
presented within one year of such discovery, the
requirements of section 15 are satisfied. The period of
B limitation is intended to operate against complainant and
to ensure diligence on his part in prosecuting his rights,
and not against the Court. It will defeat the object to the
enactment deprive traders of the protection which the law
intended to give them, to hold that unless process is
c issued on their complaint within one year of the discovery
of the offence, it should be thrown out.
24.22 -Secondly, as in civil cases, in computing the
period of limitation for taking cognizance of offence, the
time during which any person has been prosecuting with
D the due diligence another prosecution whether in a court
of first instance or in a court of appeal or revision, against
the offender, should be excluded, where the prosecution
relates to the same facts and is prosecuted in good faith
in a court which, from defect ofjurisdiction or other cause
E of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
24.23 -Thirdly, in the case of a continuing offence, a fresh
period of limitation should begin to run at every moment
of the time during which the offence continues; and we
F recommend the insertion of a provision to that effect.
24.24 - Impediments to the institution of a prosecution
have also to be provided for. Such impediments could
be (a) legal, or (b) due to conduct of the accused, or (c)
due to the court being closed on the last day.
G
As regards legal impediments, two aspects may be
considered, first, the time for which institution of
prosecution is stayed under a legal provision, and
secondly, prosecutions for which previous sanction is
H
SARAH MATHEW v. INST OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 713
DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
required, or notice has to be given, under legal provision. A
Both are appropriate cases for a special provision for
extending the period of limitation. We recommend that,
where the institution of the prosecution in respect of an
offence has been stayed by an injunction or order, than,
in computing the period of limitation for taking B
cognizance of that offence, the time of the continuance
of the injunction or order, the day on which it was issued
or made, and the day on which it was withdrawn, shall be
excluded.
24. 25 -We also recommend that where notice of C
prosecution for an offence has been given, or where for
prosecution for an offence the previous consent or
sanction of the Government or any other authority is
required, in accordance with the requirements of any law
for the time being in force, then in computing the period D
of limitation for taking cognizance of the offence, the
period of such notice or, as the case may be, the time
required for obtaining such consent or sanction, shall be
excluded.
E
24.26 -As illustrations of impediments caused by the
conduct of the accused, we may refer to his being out of
India, and his absconding or concealing himself. Running
of the period of /imitation should be excluded in both
cases." F
17. The Joint Parliament Committee ("the JPC") accepted
the recommendations of the Law Commission for prescribing
period of limitation for certain offences. The relevant
paragraphs of its report dated 30111/1972 read as under:
G
"Clauses 467 to 473 (new clauses) - These are new
clauses prescribing periods of limitation on a graded
scale for launching a criminal prosecution in certain
cases. At present, there is no period of limitation for
criminal prosecution and a Court cannot throw out H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A complaint or a police report solely on tne ground of delay
although inordinate delay may be a good ground for
entertaining doubts about the truth of the prosecution
story. Periods of limitation have been prescribed for
criminal prosecution in the laws of many countries and
B the Committee feels that it will be desirable to prescribe
such periods in the Code as recommended by the Law
Commission.
Among the grounds in favour of prescribing the limitation
may be mentioned the following:
c
1. As time passes the testimony of witnesses become
weaker and weaker because of lapse of memory and
evidence becomes more and more uncertain with the
result that the danger of error becomes greater.
D
2. For the purpose of peace and repose it is necessary
that an offender should not be kept under continuous
apprehension that he may be prosecuted at any time
particularly because with the multifarious laws creating
new offences many persons at some time or the other
E
commit some crime or the other. People will have no
peace of mind if there is no period of limitation even for
petty offences.
3. The deterrent effect of punishment is impaired if
F prosecution is not launched and punishment is not
inflicted before the offence has been wiped off the
memory of the persons concerned.
4. The sense of social retribution which is one of the
purposes of criminal law looses its edge after the expiry
G
of a Jong period.
5. The period of /imitation would put pressure on the
organs of criminal prosecution to make every effort to
ensure the detection and punishment of the crime
H quickly.
SARAH MATHEW v. INST OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 715
DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
The actual periods of limitation provided for in the new A
clauses would, in the Committee's opinion be appropriate
having regard to the gravity of the offences and other
relevant factors.
As regards the date from which the period is to be
8
counted the Committee considered has fixed the date as
the date of the offence. As, however this may create
practical difficulties and may also facilitate an accused
person to escape punishment by simply absconding
himself for the prescribed period, the Committee has also C
provided that when the commission of the offence was not
known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any
police officer, the period of limitation would commence
from the day on which the participation of the offender in
the offence first comes to the knowledge of a person
aggrieved by the offence or of any police officer, D
whichever is earlier. Further, when 11 is not known by whom
the offence has committed, the first day on which the
identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved
by the offence or to the police officer making
investigation into the offence. E
The Committee has considered it necessary to make a
specific provision for extension of time whenever the court
is satisfied on the materials that the delay has been
properly explained or that the accused had absconded. F
This provision would be particularly useful because
limitation for criminal prosecution is being prescribed for
the first time in this country".
18. Read in the background of the Law Commission's
Report and the Report of the JPC, it is clear that the object of G
Chapter XXXVI inserted in the Cr.P.C. was to quicken the
prosecutions of complaints and to rid the criminal justice system
of inconsequential cases displaying extreme lethargy, inertia or
indolence. The effort was to make the criminal justice system
H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A more orderly, efficient and just by providing period of limitation
for certain offences. In Sarwan Singh, this Court stated the
object of Cr.P.C in putting a bar of limitation as follows:
"The object of the Criminal Procedure Code in putting a
bar of limitation on prosecutions was clearly to prevent
B
the parties from filing cases after a long time, as a result
of which material evidence may disappear and also to
prevent abuse of the process of the court by filing
vexatious and belated prosecutions long after the date
of the offence. The object which the statutes seek to sub-
c serve is clearly in consonance with the concept of
fairness of trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. It is, therefore, of the utmost
importance that any prosecution, whether by the State or
a private complainant must abide by the letter of law or
D take the risk of the prosecution failing on the ground of
limitation."
19. It is equally clear however that the law makers did not
want cause of justice to suffer in genuine cases. Law
E Commission recommended provisions for exclusion of time
and those provisions were made part of Chapter XXXVI. We,
therefore, find in Chapter XXXVI provisions for exclusion of time
in certain cases (Section 470), for exclusion of date on which
the Court is closed (Section 471), for continuing offences
F (Section 472) and for extension of period of limitation in certain
cases (Section 473). Section 473 is crucial. It empowers the
court to take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the
period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the
circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly
G explained or that it is necessary to do so in the interest of
justice. Therefore, Chapter XXXVI is not loaded against the
complainant. It is true that the accused has a right to have a
speedy trial and this right is a facet of Article 21 of the
Constitution. Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. does not undermine
H this right of the accused. While it encourages diligence by
SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 717
DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
providing for limitation it does not want all prosecutions to be A
thrown overboard on the ground of delay. It strikes a balance
between the interest of the complainant and the interest of the
accused. It must be mentioned here that where the legislature
wanted to treat certain offences differently, it provided for
limitation in the section itself, for instance, Section 198(6) and B
199(5) of the Cr.P.C. However, it chose to make general
provisions for limitation for certain types of offences for the first
time and incorporated them in Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C.
20. To understand the scheme of Chapter XXXVI it would c
be advantageous to quote Sections 467, 468, 469 and 473 of
the Cr.P.C. Section 467 reads as under:
"467. Definitions. - For the purposes of this Chapter,
unless the context otherwise requires, "period of limitation"
means the period specified in section 468 for taking D
cognizance of an offence"
Section 468 reads as under:
"468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period E
of limitation. -(1) Except as otherwise provided
elsewhere in this Code, no Court, shall take cognizance
of an offence of the category specified in sub-section(2),
after the expiry of the period of limitation.
(2) The period of limitation shall be- F
(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine
only;
(b) one year, if th<Foffence is punishable with G
imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;
(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but
not exceeding three years.
H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A (3) For the purposes of this section, the period of
limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried
together, shall be determined with reference to the offence
which is punishable with the more severe punishment or,
as the case may be, the most sevem punishment."
B
Section 469 reads as under:
"469. Commencement of the period of limitation. - (1)
The period of limitation, in relation to an offender, shall
commence, -
c
(a) on the date of the offence; or
(b) where the commission of the offence was not
known to the person aggrieved by he offence or to
any police officer, the first day on which such
D
offence comes to the knowledge of such person or
to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or
(c) where it is not known by whom the offence was
committed, the first day on which the identity of the
E offender is known to the person aggrieved by the
offence or to the police officer making
investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier.
(2) In computing the said period, the day from which such
period is to be computed shall be excluded."
F
Section 473 reads as under:
"473. Extension of period of limitation in certain cases.
- Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing
G provisions of this Chapter, any Court may take
cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of
/imitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the
circumstances of the case that the delay has been
properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the
H interests ofjustice."
SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS. 719
DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
21. Gist of these provisions could now be stated. Section A
467 defines the phrase 'period of limitation' to mean the period
specified in Section 468 for taking cognizance of certain
offences. Section 468 stipulates the bar of limitation. Sub-
section (1) of Section 468 makes it clear that a fetter is put on
the court's power to take cognizance of an offence of the B
category mentioned in sub-section (2) after the expiry of period
of limitation. Sub-section (2) lays down the period of limitation
for certain offences. Section 469 states when the period of
limitation commences. It is dexterously drafted so as to prevent
advantage of bar of limitation being taken by the accused. It c
states that period of limitation in relation to an offence shall
commence either from the date of offence or from the date
when the offence is detected. Section 470 provides for
exclusion of time in certain cases. It inter alia states that while
computing the period of limitation in relation to an offence, time o
taken during which the case was being diligently prosecuted
in another court or in appeal or in revision against the offender,
should be excluded. The explanation to this section states that
in computing limitation, the time required for obtaining the
consent or sanction of the government or any other authority E
should be excluded. Similarly time during which the accused
is absconding or is absent from India shall also be excluded.
Section 471 provides for exclusion of date on which court is
closed and Section 472 provides for continuing offence.
Section 473 is an overriding provision which enables courts to F
condone delay where such delay has been properly explained
or where the interest of justice demands extension of period
of limitation. Analysis of these provisions indicates that Chapter
XXXVI is a Code by itself so far as limitation is concerned. All
the provisions of this Chapter will have to be read 9umulatively. G
Sections 468 and 469 will have to be read with Section 473.
22. It is now necessary to see what the words 'taking
cognizance' mean. Cognizance is an act of the court. The term
'cognizance' has not been defined in the Cr.P.C. To understand
H
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A what this term means we will have to have a look at certain
provisions of the Cr.P.C. Chapter XIV of the Code deals with
'Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings'. Section 190
thereof empowers a Magistrate to take cognizance upon (a)
receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b)
B upon a police report of such facts; (c) upon information received
from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own
knowledge, that such offence has been committed. Chapter XV
relates to 'Complaints to Magistrates'. Section 200 thereof
provides for examination of the complainant and the witnesses
c on oath. Section 201 provides for the procedure which a
Magistrate who is not competent to take cognizance has to
follow. Section 202 provides for postponement of issue of
process. He may, if he thinks fit, and shall in a case where the
accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he
o exercises his jurisdiction, postpone the issue of process
against the accused and either inquire into the case himself or
direct an investigation to be made by a police officer for the
purpose of deciding whether there is sufficient ground for
proceeding. Chapter XVI relates to commencement of
E proceedings before the Magistrate. Section 204 provides for
issue of process. Under this section if the Magistrate is of the
opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding and the
case appears to be a summons case, he shall issue summons
for the attendance of the accused. In a warrant case, he may
F issue a warrant. Thus, after initiation of proceedings detailed
in Chapter XIV, comes the stage of commencement of
proceedings covered by Chapter XVI.
23. In Jamuna Singh & Ors. v. Bhadai Shah, 37 relying on
R.R. Chari and Gopal Das Sindhi & Ors. v. State of Assam &
G Anr. ,38 this Court held that it is well settled that when on a
petition or complaint being filed before him, a Magistrate
37. AIR 1964 SC 1541.
H 38. AIR 1961 SC 986.
SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 721
DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J]
applies his mind for proceeding under the various provisions A
of Chapter XVI of the Cr.P.C., he must be held to have taken
cognizance of the offences mentioned in the· complaint.
24. After referring to the provisions of the Cr.P.C. quoted
by us hereinabove, in S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer, B
this Court explained what is meant by the term 'taking
cognizance'. The relevant observations of this Court could be
quoted:
"19. The expression "cognizance" has not been defined
in the Code. But the word (cognizance) is of indefinite C
import. It has no esoteric or mystic significance in
criminal law. It merely means "become aware of" and
when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it
connotes "to take notice of judicially". It indicates the point
when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an D
offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of
such offence said to have been committed by someone.
20. "Taking cognizance" does not involve any formal
action of any kind. It occurs as soon as a Magistrate E
applies his mind to the suspected commission of an
offence. Cognizance is taken prior to commencement of
criminal proceedings. Taking of cognizance is thus a sine
qua non or condition precedent for holding a valid trial.
Cognizance is taken of an offence and not of an offender. F
Whether or not a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an
offence depends on the facts and circumstances of each
case and no rule of universal application can be laid down
as to when a Magistrate can be said to have taken
cognizance."
G
In several judgments, this view has been reiterated. It is
not necessary to refer to all of them.
25. Thus, a Magistrate takes cognizance when he applies
his mind or takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A initiating proceedings in respect of offence which is said to have
been committed. This is the special connotation acquired by
the term 'cognizance' and it has to be given the same meaning
wherever it appears in Chapter XXXVI. It bears repetition to
state that taking cognizance is entirely an act of the Magistrate.
B Taking cognizance may be delayed because of several
reasons. It may be delayed because of systemic reasons. It may
be delayed because of the Magistrate's personal reasons.
26. In this connection, our attention is drawn to the judgment
C of this Court in Sharadchandra Dongre. It is urged on the basis
of this judgment that by condoning the delay, the Court takes
away a valuable right which accrues to the accused. Hence, the
accused has a right to be heard when an application for
condonation of delay under Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. is
0 presented before the Court. Keeping this argument in mind, let
us examine both the view points i.e. whether the date of taking
cognizance or the date of filing complaint is material for
computing limitation. If the date on whiCh complaint is filed is
taken to be material, then if the complaint is filed within the
E period of limitation, there is no question of it being time barred.
If it is filed after the period of limitation, the complainant can
make an application for condonation of delay under Section 473
of the Cr.P.C. The Court will have to issue notice to the accused
and after hearing the accused and the complainant decide
F whether to condone the delay or not. If the date of taking
cognizance is considered to be relevant then, if the Court takes
cognizance within the period of limitation, there is no question
of the complaint being time barred. If the Court takes
cognizance after the period of limitation then, the question is
G how will Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. work. The complainant will
be interested in having the delay condoned. If the delay is
caused by the Magistrate by not taking cognizance in time, it
is absurd to expect the complainant to make an application for
condonation of delay. The complainant surely cannot explain
H that delay. Then in such a situation, the question is whether the
SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 723
DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J]
Magistrate has to issue notice to the accused, explain to the A
accused the reason why delay was caused and then hear the
accused and decide whether to condone the delay or not. This
would also mean that the Magistrate can decide whether to
condone delay or not, caused by him. Such a situation will be
anomalous and such a procedure is not known to law. Mr. B
Luthra, learned A.S.G. submitted that use of disjunctive 'or' in
Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. suggests that for the first part i.e.
to find out whether the delay has been explained or not, notice
will have to be issued to the accused and for the later part i.e.
to decide whether it is necessary to do so in the interest of C
justice, no notice will have to be issued. This question has not
directly arisen before us. Therefore, we do not want to express
any opinion whether for the purpose of notice, Section 473 of
the Cr.P.C. has to be bifurcated or not. But, we do find this
situation absurd. It is absurd to hold that the Court should issue o
notice to the accused for condonation of delay, explain the
delay caused at its end and then pass order condoning or not
condoning the delay. Law cannot be reduced to such absurdity.
Therefore, the only harmonious construction which can be
placed on Sections 468, 469 and 470 of the Cr.P.C. is that the E
Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence only if the
complaint in respect of it is filed within the prescribed limitation
period. He would, however, be entitled to exclude such time as
is legally excludable.
F
27. The role of the court acting under Section 473 was
aptly described by this Court in Vanka Radhamanohari (Smt.)
where this Court expressed that this Section has a non-obstante
clause, which means that it has an overriding effect on Section
468. This Court further observed that there is a basic difference
between Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Section 473 of the G
Cr.P.C. For exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, the onus is on the applicant to satisfy the court that there
was sufficient cause for condonation of delay, whereas, Section
473 enjoins a duty on the court to examine not only whether such
H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 12 S.C.R.
A delay has been explained but as to whether, it is the requirement
of justice to ignore such delay. These observations indicate the
scope of Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. Examined in light of
legislative intent and meaning ascribed to the term 'cognizance'
by this Court, it is clear that Section 473 of the Cr.P.C.
B postulates condonation of delay caused by the complainant in
filing the complaint. It is the date of filing of the complaint which
Is material.
28. We are inclined to take this view also because there
C has to be some amount of certainty or definiteness in matters
of limitation relating to criminal offences. If, as stated by this
Court, taking cognizance is application of mind by the
Magistrate to the suspected offence, the subjective element
comes in. Whether a Magistrate has taken cognizance or not
will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. A diligent
0
complainant or the prosecuting agency which promptly files the
complaint or initiates prosecution would be severely prejudiced
if it is held that the relevant point for computing limitation would
be the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. The
E complainant or the prosecuting agency would be entirely left at
the mercy of the Magistrate, who may take cognizance after the
limitation period because of several reasons; systemic or
otherwise. It cannot be the intention of the legislature to throw
a diligent complainant out of the court in this manner. Besides
it must be noted that the complainant approaches the court for
F redressal of his grievance. He wants actior to be taken against
the perpetrators of crime. The courts functioning under the
criminal justice system are created for this purpose. It would
be unreasonable to take a view that delay caused by the court
G in taking cognizance of a case would deny justice to a diligent
complainant. Such an interpretation of Section 468 of the
Cr.P.C. would be unsustainable and would render it
unconstitutional. It is well settled that a court of law would
interpret a provision which would help sustaining the validity of
the law by applying the doctrine of reasonable construction
H
SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 725
DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
rather than applying a doctrine which would make the provision A
unsustainable and ultra vires the Constitution. (U.P. Power
Corporation Ltd. v. Ayodhaya Prasad Mishra).
29. The conclusion reached by us is reinforced by the fact
that the Law Commission in clause 24.20 of its Report, which B
we have quoted hereinabove, referred to Dau DayaP 9 where
the three-Judge Bench of this Court was dealing with a Special
Act i.e. the Merchandise Marks Act, 1889. Section 15 of the
Merchandise Marks Act, 1889 stated that no prosecution shall
be commenced after expiration of one year after the discovery c
of the offence by the prosecution. The contention of the
appellant was that the offence was discovered on 26/4/1954
when he was arrested, and that, in consequence, the issue of
process on 22/7/1955, was beyond the period of one year
provided under Section 15 of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1889 0
and that the proceedings should therefore be quashed as
barred by limitation. While repelling this contention, the three-
Judge Bench of this Court observed as under:
"6. It will be noticed that the complainant is required to
resort to the court within one year of the discovery of the E
offence if he is to have the benefit of proceeding under
the Act. That means that if the complaint is presented
within one year of such discovery, the requirements of
Section 15 are satisfied. The period of limitation, it should
be remembered, is intended to operate against the F
complainant and to ensure diligence on his part in
prosecuting his rights, and not against the court. Now, it
will defeat the object of the enactment and deprive traders
of the protection which the law intended to give them, if
we were to hold that unless process is issued on their G
complaint within one year of the discovery of the offence,
it should be thrown out. It will be an unfortunate state of
the law if the trader whose rights had been infringed and
39. AIR 1959 SC 433. H
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A who takes up the matter promptly before the criminal
court is, nevertheless, denied redress owing to the delay
in the issue o; process which occurs in court."
Though, this Court was not concerned with the meaning
8 of the term 'taking cognizance', it did not accept the submission
that limitation could be made dependent on the act of the
Magistrate of issuing process. It held that if the complaint was
filed within the stipulated period of one year, that satisfied the
requirement. The complaint could not be thrown out because
C of the Magistrate's act of issuing process after one year.
30. As we have already noted in reaching this conclusion,
light can be drawn from legal maxims. Legal maxims are
referred to in Bharat Kale, Japani Sahoo and Vanka
Radhamanohari (Smt.). The object of the criminal law is to
D punish perpetrators of crime. This is in tune with the well known
legal maxim 'nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi', which
means that a crime never dies. At the same time, it is also the
policy of law to assist the vigilant and not the sleepy. This is
expressed in the Latin maxim 'vigilantibus et non
E dormientibus, jura subveniunt'. Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C.
which provides limitation period for certain types of offences
for which lesser sentence is provided draws support from this
maxim. But, even certain offences such as Section 384 or 465
of the IPC, which have lesser punishment may have serious
F social consequences. Provision is, therefore, made for
condonation of delay. Treating date of filing of complaint or date
of initiation of proceedings as the relevant date for computing
limitation under Section 468 of the Code is supported by the
legal maxim 'actus curiae neminem gravabit'which means that
G the act of court shall prejudice no man. It bears repetition to
state that the court's inaction in taking cognizance i.e. court's
inaction in applying mind to the suspected offence should not
be allowed to cause prejudice to a diligent complainant.
Chapter XXXVI thus presents the interplay of these three legal
H maxims. Provisions of this Chapter, however, are not
SARAH MATHEXV v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 727
DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
interpreted solely on the basis of these maxims. They only serve A
as guiding principles.
31. It is submitted that the settled principles of statutory
construction require that the expression 'cognizance' occurring
in Chapter XXXVI should be given its legal sense. It is further B
submitted that if an expression acquires a special connotation
in law, dictionary or general meaning ceases to be helpful in
interpreting such a word. Reliance is also placed on the
heading of Chapter XXXVI providing for "Limitation for taking
cognizance of certain offences". Reliance is placed on c
observations of the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Sa1Wan
Singh, where in the context of limitation on prosecution it is
observed that it is of utmost importance that any prosecution,
whether by the State or by the private complainant, must abide
by the letter of law. Relying on Raghunath Rai Bareja, it is 0
urged that the first principle of interpretation of the statute in
every system is the literal rule of interpretation. Purposive
interpretation can only be resorted to when the plain words of
statute are ambiguous. It is submitted that there is no ambiguity
here and, therefore, literal interpretation must be resorted to.
E
32. There can be no dispute about the rules of
interpretation cited by the counsel. It is true that there is no
ambiguity in the relevant provisions. But, it must be borne in
mind that the word 'cognizance' has not been defined in the
Cr.P.C. This Court had to therefore interpret this word. We have F
adverted to that interpretation. In fact, we have proceeded to
answer this reference on the basis of that interpretation and
keeping in mind that special connotation acquired by the word
'cognizance'. Once that interpretation is accepted, Chapter
XXXVI along with the heading has to be understood in that light. G
The rule of purposive construction can be applied in such a
situation. A purposive construction of an enactment is one which
gives effect to the legislative purpose by following the literal
meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance
H
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A with the legislative purpose or by applying a strained meaning
where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the
legislative purpose (See: Francis Bennion on Statutory
Interpretation). After noticing this definition given by Francis
Bennion in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Laxmi Narain
B Dhut:'0, this Court noted that more often than not, literal
interpretation of a statute or a provision of a statute results in
absurdity. Therefore, while interpreting statutory provisions, the
courts should keep in mind the objectives or purpose for which
statute has been enacted. In light of this observation, we are
C of the opinion that if in the instant case literal interpretation
appears to be in any way in conflict with the legislative intent
or is leading to absurdity, purposive interpretation will have to
be adopted.
0 33. In New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Nusli Neville
Wadia and another etc. 41 while dealing with eviction
proceedings initiated under the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 this Court was concerned
with interpretation of Sections 4 and 5 thereof. This Court was
E of the view that literal meaning thereof would place undue
burden on the noticee and would lead to conclusion that the
landlord i.e. the State would not be required to adduce any
evidence at all. This Court observed that such a construction
would lead to an anomalous situation. In the context of fairness
F in State action this Court observed that with a view to reading
the provisions of the said Act, in a proper and effective manner,
literal interpretation which may give rise to an anomaly or
absurdity will have to be avoided. This Court further observed
that so as to enable a superior court to interpret a statute in a
G reasonable manner, the court must place itself in the chair of a
reasonable legislator. So done, the rules of purposive
construction will have to be resorted to which would require the
40. c2001) 3 sec 100.
H 41. c2ooa) 3 sec 279.
SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 729
DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
construction of the statute in such a manner so as to see that A
it's object is fulfilled.
34. In this connection, we may also usefully refer to the
following paragraph from Justice G.P. Singh's 'Principles of
Statutory Interpretation' [13th edition - 2012]. B
"With the widening of the idea of context and importance
being given to the rule that the statute has to be read as
a whole in its context it is nowadays misleading to draw
a rigid distinction between literal and purposive
approaches. The difference between purposive and literal C
constructions is in truth one of degree only. The real
distinction lies in the balance to be struck in the particular
case between literal meaning of the words on the one
hand and the context and purpose of the measure in
which they appear on the other. When there is a potential D
clash, the conventional English approach has been to
give decisive weight to the literal meaning but this
tradition is now weakening in favour of the purposive
approach for the pendulum has swung towards purposive
methods of constructions." E
35. We must also bear in mind that we are construing rules
of limitation. Our approach should, therefore, be in consonance
with this Court's observation in Mela Ram that "it is well
established that rules of /imitation pertain to domain of F
adjectival law and that they operate only to bar the remedy
but not to extinguish the right".
36. It is argued that legislative Casus Omissus cannot be
supplied by judicial interpretation. It is submitted that to read
Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. to mean that the period of limitation G
as period within which a complaint/charge-sheet is to be filed,
would amount to adding words to Sections 467 and 468. It is
further submitted that if the legislature has left a lacuna, it is not
open to the Court to fill it on some presumed intention of the
legislature. Reliance is placed on Shiv Shakti Co-operative H
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A Housing Society, Bharat Aluminum, and several other
judgments of this Court where doctrine of Casus Omissus is
discussed. In our opinion, there is no scope for application of
doctrine of Casus Omissus to this case. It is not possible to
hold that the legislature has omitted to incorporate something
B which this Court is trying to supply. The primary purpose of
construction of the statute is to ascertain the intention of the
legislature and then give effect to that intention. After
ascertaining the legislative intention as reflected in the 42nd
Report of the Law Commission and the Report of the JPC, this
C Court is only harmoniously construing the provisions of Chapter
XX.XVI along with other relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C. to
give effect to the legislative intent and to ensure that its
interpretation does not lead to any absurdity. It is not possible
to say that the legislature has kept a lacuna which we are trying
o to fill up by judicial interpretative process so as to encroach
upon the domain of the legislature. The authorities cited on
doctrine of Casus Omissus are, therefore, not relevant for the
present case.
E 37. We also concur with the observations in Japani Sahoo,
where this Court has examined this issue in the context of
Article 14 of the Constitution and opted for reasonable
construction rather than literal construction. The relevant
paragraph reads thus:
F "The matter can be looked at from different angle also.
Once it is accepted (and there is no dispute about it) that
it is not within the domain of the complainant or
prosecuting agency to take cognizance of an offence or
to issue process and the only thing the former can do is
G to file a complaint or initiate proceedings in accordance
with law, if that action of initiation of proceedings has
been taken within the period of /imitation, the complainant
is not responsible for any delay on the part of the court
or Magistrate in issuing process or taking cognizance of
H an offence. Now, if he is sought to be penalised because
SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 731
DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
of the omission, default or inaction on the part of the court A
or Magistrate, the provision of law may have to be tested
on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. It can
possibly be urged that such a provision is totally
arbitrary, irrational and unreasonable. It is settled law that
a court of law would interpret a provision which would help B
sustaining the validity of law by applying the doctrine of
reasonable construction rather than making it vulnerable
and unconstitutional by adopting rule of litera /egis.
Connecting the provision of limitation in Section 468 of
the Code with issuing of process or taking of cognizance c
by the court may make it unsustainable and ultra vires
Article 14 of the Constitution."
38. So far 'heading' of the chapter is concerned, it is well
settled that 'heading' or 'title' prefixed to sections or group of
sections hav~ a limited role to play in the construction of D
statutes. They may be taken as very broad and general
indicators or the nature of the subject matter dealt with
thereunder but they do not control the meaning of the sections
if the meaning is otherwise ascertainable by reading the
section in proper perspective along with other provisions. In E
Mis. Frick India Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. 42 , this Court has
observed as under:
"It is well settled that the headings prefixed to sections
or entries cannot control the plain words of the provisions; F
they cannot also be referred to for the purpose of
construing the provision when the words used in the
provision are clear and unambiguous; nor can they be
used for cutting down the plain meaning of the words in
the provision. Only, in the case of ambiguity or doubt the G
heading or sub-heading may be referred to as an aid in
construing the provision but even in such a case it could
not be used for cutting down the wide application of the
clear words used in the provision."
42. (1990) 1 sec 400. H
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A Therefore, the submission that heading of Chapter XXXVI
is an indicator that the date of taking cognizance is material
must be rejected.
39. It is true that the penal statutes must be strictly
8 construed. There are, however, cases where this Court has
having regard to the nature of the crimes involved, refused to
adopt any narrow and pedantic, literal and lexical construction
of penal statutes. [See Muralidhar Meghraj Loya & Anr. v. State
of Maharashtra & Ors. 43 and Kisan Trimbak Kothu/a & Ors. v.
C State of Maharashtra44 ]. In this case, looking to the legislative
intent, we have harmoniously construed the provisions of
Chapter XXXVI so as to strike a balance between the right of
the complainant and the right of the accused. Besides, we must
bear in mind that Chapter XXXVI is part of the Cr.P.C., which
is a procedural law and it is well settled that procedural laws
0
must be liberally construed to serve as handmaid of justice and
not as its mistress. [See Sardar Amarjeet Singh Katra, N.
Ba/aji v. Virendra Singh & Ors. 45 and Kai/ash].
40. Having considered the questions which arise in this
E reference in light of legislative intent, authoritative
pronouncements of this Court and established legal principles,
we are of the opinion that Krishna Pillai will have to be
restricted to its own facts and it is not the authority for deciding
the question as to what is the relevant date for the purpose of
F computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the
Cr.P.C., primarily because in that case, this Court was dealing
with Section 9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 which
is a special Act. It specifically stated that no court shall take
cognizance of any offence under the said Act after the expiry
G of one year from the date on which offence is alleged to have
been committed. There is no reference either to Section 468
43. (1976) 3 sec 684.
44. (1977) 1 sec 300.
H 45. c2004) a sec 312.
SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 733
DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
or Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. in that judgment. It does not refer A
to Sections 4 and 5 of the Cr.P.C. which carve out exceptions
for Special Acts. This Court has not adverted to diverse
aspects including the aspect that inaction on the part of the
court in taking cognizance within limitation, though the complaint
is filed within time may work great injustice on the complainant. B
Moreover, reliance placed on Antulay '1984' Case, in our
opinion, was not apt. In Antulay '1984' Case, this Court was
dealing inter a/ia with the contention that a private complaint
is not maintainable in the court of Special Judge set-up under
Section 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 ('the 1952 C
Act). It was urged that the object underlying the 1952 Act was
to provide for a more speedy trial of offences of corruption by
a public servant. It was argued that if it is assumed that a private
complaint is maintainable then before taking cognizance, a
Special Judge will have to examine the complainant and all the D
witnesses as per Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. He will have to
postpone issue of process against the accused and either
inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be
made by a police officer and in cases under the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947 by police officers of designated rank for E
the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground
for proceeding. It was submitted that this would thwart the object
of the 1952 Act which is to provide for a speedy trial. This
contention was rejected by this Court holding that it is not a
condition precedent to the issue of process that the court of F
necessity must hold the inquiry as envisaged by Section 202
of the Cr.P.C. or direct investigation as therein contemplated.
That is matter of discretion of the court. Thus, the questions
which arise in this reference were not involved in Antulay '1984'
Case: Since there, this Court was not dealing with the question G
of bar of limitation reflected in Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. at
all, in our opinion, the said judgment could not have been usefully
referred to in Krishna Pillai while construing provisions of
Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. For all these, we are unable to
endorse the view taken in Krishna Pillai. H
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R.
A 41. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of
computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the
Cr.P.C. the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint
or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on
which the Magistrate takes cognizance. We further hold that
B Bharat Kale which is followed in Japani Sahoo lays down the
correct law. Krishna Pillai will have to be restricted to its own
facts and it is not the authority for deciding the question as to
what is the relevant date for the purpose of computing the
period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C.
c
42. The Reference is answered accordingly. The Registry
may list the matters before the appropriate courts for disposal.
R.P. Reference answered.
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