MRS. ASHA SHARMAversusCHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2011 INSC 626
- Decided
- 30 August 2011
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- B S CHAUHAN
Holding
The Allotment Rules must be applied as enacted; no new house may be earmarked until the previously earmarked house is vacated, out‑of‑turn allotments are permissible only within the 10% limit and not absolutely barred, and Rule 13(5) cannot be invoked to extend retention beyond the periods prescribed in Rule 13(2).
Summary
The appellant, a retired IAS officer appointed as State Information Commissioner, sought to retain the government house she occupied in Chandigarh beyond the four‑to‑six‑month period prescribed under Rule 13 of the Government Residences (Chandigarh Administration General Pool) Allotment Rules, 1996. The Estate Officer issued an eviction order, which was upheld on appeal, leading the appellant to file a writ petition. The High Court Single Judge issued several directions altering the operation of the Allotment Rules, including restrictions on out‑of‑turn allotments and earmarking, which were stayed by the Division Bench. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the statutory framework of the Allotment Rules, the validity of the High Court’s directions, and the appellant’s entitlement to retain the accommodation. The Court held that the Rules must be applied strictly: no new house may be earmarked until the previously earmarked house is vacated, out‑of‑turn allotments may be made only within the 10% ceiling and not absolutely prohibited, and Rule 13(5) cannot be used to extend retention beyond the periods in Rule 13(2). Consequently, the State was directed to allot the appellant alternative accommodation within fifteen days and to enforce her vacating the present house within two weeks, while setting aside the High Court’s contrary directions.
Issues considered
- The proper interpretation and enforcement of the Government Residences (Chandigarh Administration General Pool) Allotment Rules, 1996, particularly Rules 7, 8, 9, 11 and 13.
- Whether the High Court Single Judge’s directions that restricted out‑of‑turn allotments, earmarking and other procedural matters were consistent with the Allotment Rules.
- Whether a retired officer appointed as State Information Commissioner is entitled to retain the previously allotted government house beyond the period specified in Rule 13.
- Whether the authorities may allot two houses to a single government servant and the permissible extent of retention under Rule 13(5).
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 141, s. Article 142, s. Article 226, s. Article 32
- Government Residences (Chandigarh Administration General Pool) Allotment Rules, 1996s. Rule 11, s. Rule 13, s. Rule 7, s. Rule 8, s. Rule 9
Subjects
Judgment
[2011) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 881
MRS. ASHA SHARMA A
v.
CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 7524 of 2011)
AUGUST 30, 2011
B
[OR: 8.5. CHAUHAN AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.)
Government Residences (Chandigarh Administration
General Pool) Allotment Rules, 1996:
c
r. 13 - Allotment of accommodation - Appellant, an !AS
Officer was allotted government accommodation in
Chandigarh - She retired from service and was r.equired to
vacate the premises by 31st December, 2008 - On 31st
December, 2008, she was appointed as the State Information D
Commissioner - She requested to the authorities for
allotment of the government accommodation already in her
occupation, but her request was not accepted - Estate Officer
passed an eviction order against the appellant which was
upheld by the appellate authority - Writ petition - The Single E
Judge of the High Court directed that as soon as a'ny alternate
accommodation is allotted to appellant, as per her entitlement
under the Rules, she shall, within two weeks of such allotment,
vacate the house presently under her occupation - However,
the Division Bench stayed the directions of the Single Judge F
and directed the matter to be heard by a larger Bench - On
appeal, held: No new house for any category/post should be
earmarked unless the house already earmarked for such
category/post has been vacated and placed in the general
pool of the Chandigarh Administration for allotment in
accordance with the Allotment Rules - No case of retention G
of government accommodation beyond the periods specified
in the table to r. 13(2) of the Allotment Rules shall be
entertained by any authority under the Allotment Rules - An
order of eviction and damages was passed against the
881 H
882 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A appellant - The matter in that behalf is still pending final
hearing before the Single Judge - The parties are left to raise
all their contentions before the Single Judge, who shall decide
the matter in accordance with law - However, with regard to
the interim· order passed by the High Court, the State is
B directed to allot to her an alternative accommodation under
the category as per her entitlement, in pursuance of her
appointment as State Information Commissioner, within fifteen
days and she shall be liable to vacate the accommodation
presently in her occupation within two weeks thereafter- In the
c event the Government is unable to allot her an alternative
accommodation of her category for the reason of non-
availability of such accommodation, she should be provided
with appropriate accommodation, including private
accommodation of he_r status, within the same period.
D r. 7 - Earmarking of houses - Held: r. 7 provides for
earmarking of houses for specified officers from different
branches of the State Administration and those houses which
have not been so earmarked for any particular class of
Government employees would be allotted to the general pool
E of the Chandigarh Administration - This Rule and its sub-
Rules read together do not suffer from the vice of
arbitrariness, as earmarking of houses is a known concept in
relation to allotment of houses - In the instant case, the Single
Judge of the High Court gave a clarificatory direction that when
F earmarked houses are occupied by an officer, who is at that
time not entitled to that house, another house would not be
earmarked for any particular officer, until the occupied house
is vacated - One exception was carved out in favour of SSP,
Chandigarh - This clarificatory direction is not violative of any
G rule or is otherwise impermissible - These directions
attempted to ensure that there should not be more than one
earmarked house for the same post as per the need - This
would also ensure timely vacation of the earmarked houses
by the officers concerned, upon their transfer, promotion or
H posting to a post where they are not entitled to an earmarked
ASHA SHARMA v. CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION 883
AND ORS.
accommodation - There is no reason to interfere with A
imposition of such a condition which is in conformity with the
spirit of the said Rule.
r. 11 - Out-of-Turn Allotments - Held: s. 11 deals with Out-
of-Turn Allotments, i.e. the House Allotment Committee may
B
allot a house on Out-of- Turn basis to the cases specified
under clauses (a) to (g) of that Rule - r. 11 is a very
comprehensive rule which deals with the specific situations
where Out-of-Turn Allotment is permissible - The Allotment
Rules and the guidelines are intended to control the exercise
of discretion by the authorities concerned in granting Out-of- C
Tum Allotments - In the instant case, the absolute restriction
on Out-of- Tum Allotments imposed by the Single Judge of
the High Court was not just and fair and was opposed to the
statutory provisions of the Allotment Rules - Therefore, such
a restriction is not sustainable. D
r. 8 - Interpretation of - Held: The purpose of r. 8 is not to
allow discretionary allotment but is to provide overall powers
of coordination and control to the Administrator, U. T.,
Chandigarh - The words 'for the purposes of allotment to any E
class or category of eligible government servant' appearing
in r. 8 mean the allotment made in terms of the Allotment
Rules - Adding or withdrawing houses to the general pool is
a power vested in the authority under r. 8, but allotments still
are to be made in accordance with the substantive rules F
enabling the authorities to make regular allotments.
r. 9 - Objections regarding allotment of accommodation
- Held: r. 9 requires the authorities to invite applications for
allotment of accommodation and also provides the manner
in which the allotment of houses is to be made including G
showing the seniority of the applicants category-wise - There
is no provision requiring invitation of objections - Once there
is no rule, it will not serve any fruitful purpose to invite
objections to each allotment apart from unnecessarily
delaying allotments and rendering the working of the Rules H
884 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A more complex and difficult - Further, r.9(5) of the Allotment
Rules is a complete safeguard in regard to proper
maintenance of the seniority list of the applicants - The
directions issued by the Single Judge regarding invitation of
objections from aggrieved officers who might assert
B preferential claim is set aside.
r. 11 - Issues regarding the allotment of two houses to a
single officer and/or to his family, one in Chandigarh and one
in some other part of the same State; and the period of
C retention of the allotted house after the employee is retired,
promoted, transferred or is sent on deputation - Held: -The
said issue is of serious concern - There is no rule providing
that an officer who is posted outside Chandigarh!Panchkulal
Mohali and whose spouse is not entitled to any Government
accommodation of any category can be provided with two
D houses, one at the District/Division level to which he/she is
transferred and another at Chandigarh and its adjourning
areas - In absence of any such specific rule, it is directed that
the State shall not allot two different houses to one government
servant - In terms of r.11(1)(b) of the Allotment Rules, such
E allotment can be made in some circumstances but every effort
should be made to ensure that such situations arise only in
exceptional circumstances.
r. 13 - Retention of government accommodation - Held:
F A government servant cannot be permitted to retain the
accommodation beyond 4 to 6 months, which period is
permissible under the substantive rules - A government
servant knows in advance the period within which he has to
vacate the accommodation allotted to him as part of his
G employment and so he has to surrender the house in
question within the scheduled time - rr.13(1) and 13(2) are
comprehensive, specific and provide more than reasonable
time for a government servant to vacate the accommodation
a/lott~d to him/her - Court cannot Jose sight of the fact that a
large number of employees under different categories are
H awaiting their allotments and are being deprived of this benefit
ASHA SHARMA v. CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION 885
AND ORS.
for long periods because of excessive invocation of such A
discretionary powers - The provision is unguided and arbitrary
and cannot stand the scrutiny of law - More so, the licence
fee indicated is obviously minimal in comparison to the
market rent for the said premises - It is a matter which a Court
can safely take judicial notice of - Compelled by these B
circumstances, r. 13(5) is not sustainable and the authorities
are directed not to take recourse to the said provision under
any circumstance - No case of retention of government
accommodation beyond the periods specified in the table to
r. 13(2) shall be entertained by any authority under the c
Allotment Rules - The directions are passed being conscious
of the fact that the Allotment Rules are in place and that the
authorities are acting fairly and judiciously.
Allotment of accommodation - Duty of authorities - Held:
The authorities are expected to be consistent in their decisions D
and bring certainty to the Allotment Rules - This can only be
done by making fair, judicious and reasoned decisions on the
one hand and refraining from amending the Allotment Rules
except in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances on the
other - The Doctrine of Certainty can appropriately be applied E
to legislative powers as it is applicable to judicial
pronouncements - This would not mean that the power of the
Legislature to amend rules is restricted by judicial
pronouncements - But it is impressed upon the Legislature
that the rules of the present kind should not be amended so F
frequently that no established practice or settled impression
may be formed in the minds of the employees - Where the
employer has limited resources, there the employee has a
legitimate expectation of being dealt with fairly in relation to
allotment to such government accommodation. G
Administrative law:
Decision making process - Arbitrariness in - Held:
Whenever both the decision making process and the decision
taken are based on irrelevant facts, while ignoring relevant H
886 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A considerations, such an action can normally be termed as
'arbitrary' - Where the process of decision making is followed
but proper reasoning is not recorded for arriving at a
conclusion, the action may still fall in the category of
arbitrariness - Of course, sufficiency or otherwise of the
B reasoning may not be a valid ground for consideration within
the scope of judicial review - Rationality, reasonableness,
objectivity, application of mind and transparency are some of
the pre-requisites of proper decision making.
C Policy decisions - Judicial 1eview - Scope of- Held: The
Government is entitled to make pragmatic adjustments and
policy decisions, which may be necessary or called for under
the prevalent peculiar circumstances - The Court may not
strike down a policy decision taken by the Government merely
because it feels that another decision would have been more
D fair or wise, scientific or logical - Even if no rules are in force
to govern executive action, still such action, especially if it
could potentially affect the rights of the parties, should be just,
fair and transparent - Allotment of Government
accommodation is one of the statutory benefits which a
E Government servant is entitled to under the Allotment Rules
and, therefore, fair implementation of these Rules is a sine
qua non to fair exercise of authority and betterment. of the
employee-employer relationship bf!tween the Government
servant and the Government - Government Residences
F (Chandigarh Administration General Pool) Allotment Rules,
1996.
State action - Scope of judicial review of such actions -
Held: Court has power, depending on the facts and
G circumstances of a given case, to issue appropriate directions
in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India (by the High Court) and under Article 32 read with
Article 141. of the Constitution of India (by the Supreme Court)
- The Supreme Court in the process of interpreting the law
H can remove any lacunae and fill up the gaps by laying down
ASHA SHARMA v. CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION 887
AND ORS.
the directions with reference to the dispute before it; but A
normally it cannot declare a new law to be of general
application in the same manner as the Legislature may do -
The courts can issue directions with regard to the dispute in
a particular case, but should be very reluctant to issue
directions which are legislative in nature - Because of the new B
dimensions which constitutional law has come to include, it
becomes imperative for the courts in some cases, to pass
directions to ensure that statutory or executive authorities do
not act arbitrarily, discriminatorily or contrary to the settled
laws. c
Administrative Jurisprudence - Held: It is a settled canon
of Administrative Jurisprudence that wider the power
conferred, more onerous is the responsibility to ensure that
such power is not exercised in excess of what is required or
relevant for the case and the decision. D
CONSTITUTION OF IND/A, 1950: Articles 32 and 226
- Held: Confer on the Supreme Court and the High Court the
power to issue directions, orders or writs for achieving the
objectives of those Articles - In public interest, the courts may E
pass directions and even appoint committees for inducing the
Government to carry out the constitutional mandate - The
courts have been taking due care while exercising such
jurisdiction so that they do not overstep the circumscribed
judicial limits. F
The appellant was an IAS Officer and was allotted
government accommodation in Chandigarh. She retired
from service on 28th February, 2007. As per the
Government Residences (Chandigarh Administration
General Pool) Allotment Rules, 1996 which has been G
amended from time to time, she was entitled to retain the
Government accommodation, previously allotted to her
while she was in service, for a period of four months with
further possible extension upto six months, in terms of
Rule 13 of the Allotment Rules. This extension could be H
888 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A granted only in exceptional cases. Thus, she was
required to vacate the residential premises allotted to her
by 31st December, 2008. On 31st December, 2008, the
appellant was C!PPOinted as the State Information
Commissioner. As per the terms of appointment, she was
B entitled to Government accommodation and salary/
allowances of the same type and amount as were given
to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Haryana. She
applied to the authorities concerned requesting for
allotment of the government accommodation already in
c her occupation, but her request was not accepted. On
16th April, 2008, the Estate Officer passed an eviction
order against the appellant. The appellate authority
upheld the order. The appellant filed a writ petition before
the High Court. The Single Judge of the High Court
0 passed certain general directions in relation to the
procedure for allotment of Government houses, their
retention and various other aspects relating thereto. The
Single Judge directed that as soon as any alternate
accommodation is allotted to the appellant, as per her
entitlement under the Rules, she shall, within two weeks
E
of such allotment, vacate the house presently under her
occupation. It was further directed that no allotment
should be made in exercise of the discretionary powers
of the Administrator, UT., or Chief Ministers of Punjab and
Haryana; that no house should be allotted 'out of turn'
F without prior permission of the Court; that no house
should be 'earmarked' for any particular office/officer till
the earlier 'earmarked' house which were subsequently
'de-earmarked' and allowed to be retained by the officers,
who were not entitled to such allotment as their seniors
G in terms of pay, rank or status were still awaiting
allotment of that Type or above houses, are got vacated
except in the case of the SSP, Chandigarh in relation to
whom one time concession has been granted by order
dated 07 .03.2011; that a list of the 'prospective allottees'
H should be prepared and displayed on the websites of the
ASHA SHARMA v. CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION 889
AND ORS.
Chandigarh Administration two weeks in advance inviting A
objections, if any, from the aggrieved officers/officials
who might ·assert their preferential claim and only after
considering/deciding their objections, the allotment
letters should be issued; that no further 'addition' of the
houses should be made to the discretionary quota of the B
Chief Ministers of Punjab and Haryana nor the
possession of the vacant houses exceeding the said
quota should be given to the allottees. On appeal, the
Division Bench stayed the directions of the Single Judge
and directed the matter to be heard by a larger Bench. c
The instant appeal was filed challenging the order of the
Division Bench of the High Court.
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The allotment of government D
accommodation is governed by the statutory regime and
the Allotment Rules are concerned with various facets of
this concept. The Government Residences (Chandigarh
Administration General Pool) Allotment Rules, 1996 cover
concepts such as allotment, vacation, cancellation and E
preferential allotments of government accommodations.
Despite the fact that the Allotment Rules are in force their
proper implementation still remains an elusive
endeavour. The grievance of the officers/officials has still
persisted with regard to the manner in which the F
discretion under the Rules were being exercised. In other
words, the element of discretion vested under these rules
has caused serious dissatisfacti~n with the
implementation of these Allotment Rules. [para 8] [905-H;
906-A-C]
G
1.2. Arbitrariness in State action can be demonstrated
by existence of different circumstances. Whenever both
the decision making process and the decision taken are
based on irrelevant facts, while ignoring relevant
considerations, such an action can normally be termed H
890 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A as 'arbitrary'. Where the process of decision making is
followed but proper reasoning is not recorded for arriving
at a conclusion, the action may still fall in the category
of arbitrariness. Of course, sufficiency or otherwise of the
reasoning may not be a valid ground for consideration
B within the scope of judicial review. Rationality,
reasonableness, objectivity, application of mind and
transparency are some of the pre-requisites of proper
decision making. [para 9] [906-D-E]
C 1.3. The Government is entitled to make pragmatic
adjustments and policy decisions, which may be
necessary or called for under the prevalent peculiar
circumstances. The Court may not strike down a policy
decision taken by the Government merely because it
feels that another decision would have been more fair or
D wise, scientific or logical. The principle of reasonableness
and non-arbitrariness in governmental action is the core
of our constitutional scheme and structure. Its
interpretation will always depend upon the facts and
circumstances of a given case. Action by the State,
E whether administrative or executive, has to be fair and in
consonance with the statutory provisions and rules.
Even if no rules are in force to govern executive action
·still such action, especially if it could potentially affect the
rights of the parties, should be just, fair and transparent.
F The standard of fairness is also dependant upon
certainty in State action, that is, the class of persons,
subject to regulation by the Allotment Rules, must be able
to reasonably anticipate the order for the action that the
State is likely to take in a given situation. The Allotment
G Rules have been framed with the approval of this Court
and thereafter have been amended by the State
Government with the intention to give some clarity and
certainty to the implementation of the Allotment Rules,
rather than subjecting it to further challenge on the
H ground of arbitrariness or discrimination. A Government
ASHA SHARMA v. CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION 891
AND ORS.
servant has a reasonable expectation of being dealt with A
justly and fairly in receiving rights that are granted to him/
her under the Allotment Rules. Allotment of Government
accommodation is one of the statutory benefits which a
Government servant is entitled to under the Allotment
Rules and, therefore, fair implementation of these Rules B
is a sine qua non to fair exercise of authority and
betterment of the employee-employer relationship
between the Government servant and the Government.
[Paras 10, 11] [906-G-H; 907-B-H]
Netai Bag v. State of West Bengal (2000) 8 SCC 262; C
Ramana Dayaram Sheffy v. International Airport Authority of
India (1979) 3 SCC 489: 1979 (3) SCR 1014 - relied on.
1.4. Another settled principle of law, applicable to the
instant case, is the scope of judicial review of such D
actions, which is usually quite limited. The Court has the
power, depending on the facts and circumstances of a
given case, to issue appropriate directions in exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
(by the High Court) and under Article 32 read with Article · E
141 of the Constitution of India (by this C9urt). It is a
settled canon of Constitutional Jurisprudence that this
Court in the process of interpreting the law can remove
any lacunae and fill up the gaps by laying down the
directions with reference to the dispute before it; but F
normally it cannot declare a new law to be of general
application in the same manner as the Legislature may
do. The courts can issue directions with regard to the
dispute in a particular case, but should be very reluctant
to issue directions which are legislative in nature. Be that G
as it may, because of the new dimensions which
constitutional law has come to include, it becomes
imperative for the courts in some cases, to pass directions
to ensure that statutory or executive authorities do not
act arbitrarily, discriminatorily or contrary to the settled H
892 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A laws. It was in light of these principles that this Court, vide
its judgment dated 7th May, 1996 set aside the Full Bench
Judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana,
brought into force some appropriate rules and sought to
ensure that the competent authority acted in accordance
B with law and that it avoided total arbitrariness in allocation
of government houses to its officers and employees.
Once those rules came into force and were ameoded
from time to time as per the leave granted by this Court,
it was not proper exercise of judicial discretion and
c jurisdiction to pass directions, which were in direct
conflict with the Allotment Rules which were approved by
this Court or with the directions which were issued by this
Court on earlier occasions. [Paras 13, 15, 16] [908-C-D;
910-F-G; 911-A-E]
D P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Kamataka (2002) 4 SCC
578 - Followed.
E.S.P. Rajaram and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(2001) 1 SCR 203; Union of India & Ors. v. M. Bhaskar & Ors.
E (1996) 4 SCC 416: 1996(2) Suppl. SCR 358; Guruvayoor
Devaswom Managing Committee v. C.K. Rajan (2003) 7
SCC 546: 2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 619; Reliance Airport
Developers (P) Ltd. v. Airport Authority of India and Ors.;
(2006) 10 sec 1: 2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 398; Chandigarh
F Administration v. Manpreet Singh (1992) 1 SCC 380; P.
Ramachandra Rao v. State of Kamataka (2002) 4 SCC 578
- relied on.
2. Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution confer on
the Court and the High Court the power to issue
G directions, orders or writs for achieving the objectives of
those Articles. The courts, in the past, have issued
directions for various purposes. In public interest, the
courts may pass directions and even appoint committees
for ·inducing the Government to carry out the
H
ASHA SHARMA v. CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION 893
AND ORS.
constitutional mandate. The courts have been taking due A
care while exercising such jurisdiction so that they do
not overstep the circumscribed judicial limits. The
Allotment rules were subjected to different amendments
from time to time and major amendments were carried out
in the years 1997, 1998, 2004, 2007 and 2009. Besides B
these, certain guidelines were also framed which became
part of the Allotment Rules. These amendments related
to changes in the definition clauses as well as the
substantive rules. This Court had granted leave by its
judgment dated 7th May, 1996 to the Chandigarh c
Administration to amend the rules, as and when. it
considered such amendment necessary. The leave
granted by this Court obviously meant that the
amendment should be necessity based and not be
intended to introduce the element of arbitrariness or D
discrimination in the rules and resultantly in the allotment
of the houses to the government officers/ officials. [paras
17, 20] [911-G-H; 912-A; 913-H; 914-A-D]
3.1. Rule 7 of the Allotment Rules, which deals with
the creation of pools of residences, provides for E
earmarking of houses for specified officers from different
branches of the State Administration and those houses
which have not been so earmarked for any particular
class of Government employees would be allotted to the
general pool of the Chandigarh Administration. This Rule F
and its sub-Rules read together do not suffer from the
vice of arbitrariness, as earmarking of houses is a known
concept in relation to allotment of houses. The Single
Judge of the High Court has given a clarificatory direction
that when earmarked houses are occupied by an officer, G
who is at that time not entitled to that house, another
house would not be earmarked for any particular officer,
until the occupied house is vacated. One exception is
carved out in favour of SSP, Chandigarh in terms of order
dated 7th March, 2011. This clarificatory direction is not H
894 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A violative of any rule or is otherwise impermissible. These
directions attempted to ensure that there should not be
more than one earmarked house for the same post as per
the need. This clarification or explanatory direction would
also ensure timely vacation of the earmarked houses by
B the officers concerned, upon their transfer, promotion or
posting to a post where they are not entitled to an
earmarked accommodation. Thus, there is no reason to
interfere with imposition of such a condition which is in
conformity with the spirit of the said Rule. It is directed
c that no new house for any category/post should be
earmarked unless the house already earmarked for such
category/post has been vacated and placed in the
general pool of the Chandigarh Administration for
allotment in accordance with the Allotment Rules. [para
D 23] (915-F-H; 916-A-D]
3.2. There is no specific rule controlling the
discretionary allotment by the Administrator, U.T.,
Chandigarh and the Chief Minister of State of Punjab and
Haryana respectively. However, Rule 8 identifies the
E Controlling Authority which is the Administrator, U.T.
Chandigarh, who would be the co-ordinating and
controlling authority in respect of the houses belonging
to Chandigarh Administration. He has been given the
power to add or withdraw houses from any pool for the
F purposes of allotment to any class or category of eligible
government employees and may also change the
classification of houses on the recommendation of the
House Allotment Committee. Rule 11 deals with Out-of-
Turn Allotments, i.e. the House Allotment Committee may
G allot a house on Out-of-Turn basis to the cases specified
under clauses (a) to (g) of that Rule. The House Allotment
Committee in its Meeting dated 27th March, 2003 has
further approved certain guidelines for the Out-of-Turn
Allotments. Rule 11 is a very comprehensive rule which
H! deals with the specific situations where Out-of-Turn
ASHA SHARMA v. CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION 895
AND ORS.
Allotment is permissible. The Allotment Rules and these A
guidelines are intended to control the exercise of
discretion by the authorities concerned in granting out-
of-turn allotments. There is some vagueness in Rule
11(1)(e), i.e. Out-of-Turn Allotments to a government
employee due to the 'functional requirements' of the post. B
This expression is neither explained nor have any
guidelines been issued in this regard. The criteria
provided in Guideline (2) for allotments made in public
interest under Rule 11 (1 )(f) is quite similar to the criteria
for determining functional requirements. Both these c
heads refer to the nature of official duties and functions
to be performed by the officer concerned. Thus, the
category of 'functional requirement' allotment is nothing
but a category created to allow more and more allotments
under this head. In light of these rules, the absolute D
restriction on Out-of-Turn Allotments imposed by the
Single Judge may not be just and fair and will be
opposed to the statutory provisions of the Allotment
Rules. Therefore, such a restriction is not sustainable.
However, the powers vested in the concerned authority E
under Rules 8 and 11 of the Allotment Rules will only be
·exercised: (a) upon recommendation of the House
Allotment Committee; (b) such recommendation should
be supported by reasons with the requirements of the job
and the data in support thereof; and (c) no allotments
would be made under the provisions of Rule 11(1)(e). The F
maximum restriction of 10 per cent of all allotments being
Out.,of-Turn Allotments, as contemplated under Rule 11(2)
of the Allotment Rules, shall be operative to entire Rule
11 as well as to Rule 8 of the Allotment Rules. In no event
shall Out-of-Turn Allotment exceed 10 per cent of all G
houses allotted in a year. This is primarily to control the
exercise of discretionary power as well as to ensure that
the persons entitled to residential accommodation in the
general pool are not made to wait unduly for an indefinite
period. [paras 24, 25] [916-D-H; 917-A-H; 918-A] H
896 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A 3.3. Allotments under different categories and with
the restrictions as stated in the Allotment Rules and the
guidelines shall continue to be in force and should not
be amended or altered except in exceptional
circumstances by the appropriate body. This alone can
B add some certainty to the application of these provisions
and to the expectations of the government employees,
who have a legitimate expectation of allotment of
government accommodation as part of their perks. It is
also directed that the purpose of Rule 8 of the Allotment
c Rules is not to allow discretionary allotment but is to
provide overall powers of coordination and control to the
Administrator, U.T., Chandigarh. When the words 'for the
purposes of allotment to any class or category of eligible
government servant' appearing in Rule 8 are examined,
0 these have to necessarily be construed to mean the
allotment made in terms of the Allotment Rules. Adding
or withdrawing. houses to the general pool is a power
vested in the authority under Rule 8, but allotments still
are to be made in accordance with the substantive rules
E enabling the authorities to make regular allotments.
[paras 26-27} [918-B-E]
3.4. Rule 9 of the Allotment Rules requires the
authorities to invite applications for allotment of
accommodation and also provides the manner in vyhich
F the allotment of houses is to be made including showing
the seniority of the applicants category-wise. There is no
provision requiring invitation of objections. Once there is
no rule, it will not serve any fruitful purpose to invite
objections to each allotment apart from unnecessarily
G delaying allotments and rendering the working of the
Rules more complex and difficult. Further, Rule 9(5) of the
Allotment Rules is a complete safeguard in regard to
proper maintenance of the seniority list of the applicants.
Thus, the directions issued by the Single Judge in that
H behalf is set aside. However, it is directed that the final
ASHA SHARMA v. CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION 897
AND ORS.
list of allotments made by the House Allotment Committee A
should be placed on the website of the Government, as
all interested persons would be entitled to know whether
they have been allotted the accommodation or not. [para
28] [918-G-H; 919-A-B]
B
3.5. The issue regarding the allotment of two houses
to a single officer and/or to his family, one in Chandigarh
and one in some other part of the same State; and the
second w;;is regarding the period of retention of the
allotted house after the employee is retired, promoted, C
transferred or is sent on deputation are of serious
concern. There is no rule on the records providing that
an officer who is posted outside Chandigarh/Panchkula/
Mohali and whose spouse is not entitled to any
Government accommodation of any category can be'
provided with two houses, one at the District/Division D
level to which he/she is transferred and another at
Chandigarh and its adjourning areas. In absence of any
such specific rule, it is directed that the State shall not
allot two different houses to one government servant. In
terms of Rule 11 (1 )(b) of the Allotment Rules, such E
allotment can be made in some circumstances but every
effort should· be made to ensure that such situations arise
only in exceptional circumstances. Even under the rules
of transfer of the Government servant, a married couple,
both of whom are government servants are normally F
posted at the same place. Be that as it may, it will be in
the interest of all concerned that Rule 11 (1 )(b) is invoked
sparingly and only by the authorities concerned, upon the
recommendation of the House Allotment Committee.
[para 29] (919-C·H] G
4.1. The issue with regard to the retention of
government accommodation is controlled by Rule 13 of
the Allotment Rules. The table under clause 2 of the said
Rule provides different periods of retention in different H
898 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A situations. Rule 13, sub-rule 5 further carves out an
exception, allowing the period of retention to be extended
beyond the period stated in the table under Rule 13(2) of
the Allotment Rules on payment of higher licence fee.
There is no reason why a government servant should be
B permitted to retain the accommodation beyond 4 to 6
months, which period is permissible under the
substantive rules. A govern'ment servant knows in
advance the period within which he has to vacate the
accommodation allotted to him as part of his employment
and so he has to surrender the house in question within
c
the scheduled time. What exceptional cases are
contemplated under Rule 13(5) of the Allotment Rules is
nowhere indicated. No guidelines are provided and it is
only for the authcrities concerned to decide whether the
case falls in that category or not. There are no compelling
D circumstances for permitting discretion to the authorities
under Rule 13(5) of the Allotment Rules. Rules 13(1) and
13(2) are comprehensive, specific and provide more than
reasonable time for a government servant to vacate the
accommodation allotted to him/her. The Court cannot
E lose sight of the fact that a large number of employees
under different categories are awaiting their allotments
and are being deprived of this benefit for long periods
because of excessive invocation of such discretionary
powers. The provision is unguided and arbitrary and
F cannot stand the scrutiny of law. More so, the licence fee
indicated is obviously minimal in comparison to th~
market rent for the said premises. It is a matter which a
Court can safely take judicial notice of. Compelled by
these circumstances, Rule 13(5) is not sustainable and
G the authorities are directed not to take recourse to the
said provision under any circumstance. No case of
retention of government accommodation beyond the
periods specified in the table to Rule 13(2) of the
Allotment Rules shall be entertained by any authority
H under the Allotment Rules. The directions are passed
ASHA SHARMA v. CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION 899
AND ORS.
being conscious of the fact that the Allotment Rules are A
in place and that the authorities are acting fairly and
judiciously. The directions issued by this Court are
primarily explanatory and are intended to narrow the
scope of discretion exercisable by the concerned
authorities. It is a settled canon of Administrative B
Jurisprudence that wider the power conferred, more
onerous is the responsibility to ensure that such power
is not exercised in excess of what is required or relevant
for the case and the decision. [paras 30-33] [920-A-H; 921-
A-C] c
4.2. The authorities are expected to be consistent in
their decisions and bring certainty to the Allotment Rules.
This can only be done by making fair, judicious and
reasoned decisions on the one hand and refraining from
amending the Allot~ent Rules except in exceptional .and D
extraordinary circumstances on the other. The Doctrine
of Certainty can appropriately be applied to legislative
powers as it is applicable to judicial pronouncements ..
This would not mean that the power of the Legislature to
amend rules is restricted by judicial pronouncements. But E
it is impressed upon the Legislature that the rules of the
present kind should not be amended so frequently that
no established practice or settled impression may be
formed in the minds of the employees. Where the
employer has limited resources, there the employee has F
a legitimate expectation of being dealt with fairly in
relation to allotment to such government accommodation.
Consequently, reverting to the case of the appellant, she
is admittedly occupying an earmarked house. An order
of eviction and damages has been passed against her G
and she has taken recourse to an appropriate remedy or
against which she has already taken an appropriate
remedy. The matter in that behalf is still pending final
hearing before the Single Judge. The parties are left to
raise all their contentions before the Single Judge, who H
900 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A shall decide the matter in accordance with law. However,
with regard to the interim order passed by the High Court,
the State is directed to allot to her an alternative
accommodation under the category which she is entitled
to, in pursuance of her appointment as State Information
B Commissioner, within fifteen days from today and she
shall be liable to vacate the accommodation presently in
her occupation within two weeks thereafter. In the event
the Government is unable to allot her an alternative
accommodation of her category for the reason of non-
e availability of such accommodation, she should be
provided with appropriate accommodation, including
private accommodation of her status, within the same
period. [para 34] [921-D-H; 922-A-C]
Case Law Reference:
D
(2000) 8 sec 262 relied on Para 10
1979 (3) SCR 1014 relied on Para 12
(2001) 1 SCR 203 referred to Para 14
E 1996 (2) Suppl. SCR 358 referred to Para 14
2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 619 referred to Para 14
2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 398 referred to Para 14
F 1991 (2) Suppl. SCR 322 referred to Para 14
(2002) 4 sec 578 Followed Para 15
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
7524 of 2011.
G
From the Judgment & Order dated 16.5.2011 of the High
Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in LP.A. No. 752 of
2011 (0 & M) in C.W.P. No. 20252 of 2008.
D.P. Singh, Praveen Kumar Aggarwal, Ashok K. Mahajan
H for the Appellant.
ASHA SHARMA v. CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION 901
AND ORS.
T.S. Doabia, M.S. Doabia, Sudarshan Singh Rawat for the A
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SWATANTER KUMAR, J. 1. Leave granted.
B
2. The present appeal is directed against the judgment
dated 16th May, 2011 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
at Chandigarh whereby the Division Bench stayed the
operation of the directions issued by the learned Single Judge
in the order dated 10th March, 2011 and referred the matter to c
a larger Bench keeping in view the nature .of the dispute and
its significance.
3. This Court had issued directions on the same subject
matter and approved the draft rules which were placed before
it vide judgment dated 7th May, 1996 in Civil Appeal No. 8890 D
of 1996. Keeping in view the importance of the issues raised
and the likelihood of such issues arising repeatedly before the
High Court, this Court had issued notice vide order dated 3rd
•
June, 2011, declined to pass any interim order and directed
that the matter be listed for final hearing at that stage itself. E
Resultantly, this matter was finally heard by this Court.
4. Before we dwell upon the legal issues arising in the
present appeal, it will be necessary for us to refer to the basic
facts giving rise to the same. The appellant is an officer F
belonging to the Indian Administrative Services and had been
allocated to the Haryana Cadre. She was allotted House No.
55, Sector 5, Chandigarh vide order dated 11th October, 1996,
when her husband was posted on deputation to the Government
of India. She retired from service on 28th February, 2007. As G
per the Government Residences (Chandigarh Administration
General Pool) Allotment Rules, 1996 which has been amended
from time to time, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Allotment
Rules'), she was entitled to retain the Government
accommodation previously allotted to her while she was in H
902 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A service for a period of four months with further possible
extension upto six months, in terms of Rule 13 of the Allotment
Rules. This extension could be granted only in exceptional
cases. In other words, she ought to have vacated the residential
premises allotted to her by 31st December, 2008.
B
5. On 31st December, 2007, the appellant was appointed
as the State Information Commissioner with effect from 3rd
January, 2008. As per ·her terms of appointment, she was
entitled to Government accomrnodation and salary/ allowances
of the same type and amount as were given to the Chief
C Secretary to the Government of Haryana. She had applied to
the authorities concerned requesting for allotment of the same
accommodation, i.e., House No.55, Sector 5, Chandigarh to
her, but her request had not been accepted. Proceedings for
eviction began against her before the Estate Officer. The Estate
D Officer vide his order dated 9th April, 2008 declared the
appellant an unauthorised occupant and passed an order of
eviction on 16th April, 2008. Aggrieved by the said order, the
appellant preferred an appeal before the Additional District
Judge, Chandigarh which, however, came to be dismissed vide
E order dated 22nd October, 2008. This order of the Appellate
Authority was challenged by the appellant through a writ petition
in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana being Writ Petition
No. 20252 of 2008. In this writ petition, the contention raised
by the appellant was that she, in the capacity of an officer of
F the Administrative Service and later, on becoming the State
Information Commissioner, was entitled to retain the
accommodation previously allotted to her. It was contended that
she was being evicted from the premises illegally, without
authorization and in an illegal manner. The learned Single Judge
G of that Court vide order dated 10th March, 2011, passed certain
general directions in relation to the procedure for allotment of
Government houses, their retention and various other aspects
relating thereto. The learned Single J.udge modified the order
dated 1st December, 2008 passed by the Division Bench when
H
ASHA SHARMA v. CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION 903
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
the writ came up for hearing before the Single Judge qua the A
appellant and directed that as soon as any alternate
accommodation is allotted to her, as per her entitlement under
the Rules, she shall, within two weeks of such allotment, vacate
the house presently under her occupation. Further, he directed
the concerned authorities to sympathetically consider the case B
of the appellant for waiving of any penal rent imposed upon her
and that no such penal rent would be payable till the
Administrator of U.T. Chandigarh makes his decision in this
regard. However, besides granting these reliefs to the
appellant, the Court also passed the following directions : c
"Having heard Dr. Dhemka IAS in person and learned
Senior Standing counsel for UT. Administration and
keeping in view the fact that a number of Government
houses kept un-allotted under the orders of this Court serve
no one's purpose and rather their condition is deteriorating D
for want of proper up-keep and maintenance, the interim
order dated 14.12.2009 is modified and the Chandigarh
Administration is permitted to allot the vacant houses to
the eligible applicants, subject to the following conditions/
directions: E
(i) No allotment shall be made in exercise of the
discretionary powers of the Administrator, UT., or Chief
Ministers of Punjab and Haryana.
(ii) No house shall be allotted 'out of turn' without prior F
permission of this Court.
(iii) No house shall be 'earmarked' for any particular office/
officer till the earlier 'earmarked' house which were
subsequently 'de-earmarked' and allowed to be retained G
by the officers, who were not entitled to such allotment as
their seniors in terms of pay, rank or status were still
awaiting allotment of that Type or above houses, are got
vacated except in the case of the SSP, Chandigarh in
H
904 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A relation to whom one time concession has been granted
vide order dated 07.03.2011.
(iv) A list of the 'prospective allottees' shall be prepared
and displayed on the websites of the Chandigarh
Administration two weeks in advance inviting objections,
B
if any, from the aggrieved officers/officials who might
assert their preferential claim. It is only after considering/
deciding their objections that the allotment letters shall be
issued.
c (v) The list of the prospective allottees shall be placed
before this Court also on the adjourned date and any
aggrieved officer/official shall be entitled to submit
objections thereto;
D (vi) A public notice of the information at Sr. Nos. (iv) and
(v) above shall be got published by the Chandigarh
Administration at least in two daily newspapers;
(vii) No further 'addition' of the houses shall be made to
the discretionary quota of the Chief Ministers of Punjab and
E Haryana nor the possession of the vacant houses
exceeding the said quota, as it exists today, shall be given
to the allottees.
(viii) An order of precedence amongst the functionaries of
F Constitutional, Statutory and Executive Authorities shall be
prepared and placed before the Court on the adjourned
date."
6. Aggrieved by the directions issued by the learned
Single Judge, as afore-noticed, Chandigarh Administration
G preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of that Court
being LPA No. 752 of 2011 which resulted in the order dated
16th May: 2011, whereby the Court stayed the directions of the
learned Single Judge and directed the matter to be heard by
a larger Bench. The basic contention raised before the Division
H
ASHA SHARMA v. CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION 905
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
Bench was that since the prevalent Allotment Rules had been A
framed with the approval of this Court as per its order dated
7th May, 1996, no directions contrary thereto could be issued
by the learned Single Judge. A somewhat similar argument is
also raised before us in the present appeal.
B
7. It is an undisputed position, which also appears from
the record, that a Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana, in Writ Petition No. 16863 of 1994 entitled Court on
its own motion v. Advisor to the Administration, U. T.
Chandigarh & Ors. had noticed the arbitrariness in the practice C
of allotment of houses in the Union Territory of Chandigarh
(hereinafter referred to as 'U.T., Chandigarh'). It was noticed
in that judgment that the allotments were being made contrary
to the earlier Allotment Rules. The Bench struck down Rule 7
of the earlier Allotment Rules, that had been in force at the
relevant time, as arbitrary, quashed certain allotments made in D
favour of the officers and issued certain directions vide its
judgment dated 1st June, 1995. The Chandigarh Administration
had preferred an appeal before this Court against this judgment
which, as already noticed, was registered as C.A. No. 8890 of
1996 and finally disposed of vide order dated 7th May, 1996. E
A three Judge Bench of this Court had set aside the order of
the High Court and approved the draft rules which were placed
before it. This Court in its judgment also directed certain
amendments to be carried out to the draft rules particularly
Rules 2(k), 4 and provisos to Rules 13 and 19. In furtherance F
to this, the Chandigarh Administration issued a notification
dated 28th June, 1996 duly publishing the Allotment Rules of
1996 with which we are concerned in this case. This Court had
granted liberty to the Chandigarh Administration to carry out
amendments to the Allotment Rules, if necessary. These G
Allotment Rules were thereafter amended from time to time, but
the Allotment Rules of 1996 still substantially remain in force
till date.
8. The allotment of government accommodation is H
906 SUPREME; COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A governed by the statutory regime and the Allotment Rules are
concerned with various facets of this concept. The Allotment
Rules of 1996 cover concepts such as allotment, vacation,
cancellation and preferential allotments of government
accommodations. Despite the fact that the Allotment Rules are
B in force their proper implementation still remains an elusive
endeavour. The grievance of the officers/officials has still
persisted with regard to the manner in which the discretion
under the Rules were being exercised. In other words, the
element of discretion vested under these rules has caused
c serious dissatisfaction with the implementation of these
Allotment Rules.
9. Arbitrariness in State action can be demonstrated by
existence of different circumstances. Whenever both the
decision making process and the decision taken are based on
D irrelevant facts, while ignoring relevant considerations, such an
action can normally be termed as 'arbitrary'. Where the process
of decision making is fol!owed but proper reasoning is not
recorded for arriving at a conclusion, the action may still fall in
the category of arbitrariness. Of course, sufficiency or otherwise
E of the reasoning may not be a valid ground for consideration
within the scope of judicial review. Rationality, reasonableness,
objectivity and application of mind are some of the pre-
requisites of proper decision making. The concept of
transparency in the decision making process of the State has
F also become an essential part of our Administrative law.
10. The Government is entitled to make pragmatic
adjustments and policy decisions, which may be necessary or
called for under the prevalent peculiar circumstances. The Court
G may not strike down a policy decision taken by the Government
merely because it feels that another decision would have been
more fair or wise, scientific or logical. The principle of
reasonableness and non-arbitrariness in governmental action
is the core of our constitutional scheme and structure. Its
H interpretation will always depend upon the facts and
ASHA SHARMA v. CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION 907
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
circumstances of a given case. Reference in this regard can A
also be made to Netai Bag v. State of West Bengal [(2000) 8
sec 262J.
11. Action by the State, whether administrative or
executive, has to be fair and in consonance with the statutory
8
provisions and rules. Even if no rules are in force to govern
executive action still such action, especially if it could potentially
affect the rights of the parties, should be just, fair and
transparent. Arbitrariness in State action, even where the rules
vest discretion in an authority, has to be impermissible. The
exercise of discretion, in line with principles of fairness and C
good governance, is an implied obligation upon the authorities,
when vested with the powers to pass orders of determinative
nature. The standard of fairness is also dependant upon
certainty in State action, that is, the class of persons, subject
to regulation by the Allotment Rules, must be able to reasonably D
anticipate the order for the action that the State is likely to take
in a given situation. Arbitrariness and discrimination have inbuilt
elements of uncertainty as the decisions of the State would then
differ from person to person and from situation to situation, even
if the determinative factors of the situations in question were E
identical. This uncertainty must be avoided. The Allotment Rules
have been framed with the approval of this Court and thereafter
have been amended by the State Government with the intention
to give some clarity and certainty to the implementation of the
. Allotment Rules, rather than subjecting it to further challenge on F
· the ground of arbitrariness or discrimination. A Government
servant has a reasonable expectation of being dealt with justly
and fairly in receiving rights that are granted to him/her under
the Allotment Rules. Allotment of Government accommodation
is one of the statutory benefits which a Government servant is G
entitled to under the Allotment Rules and, therefore, fair
implementation of these Rules is a sine qua non to fair exercise
of authority and betterment of the employee-employer
relationship between the Government servant and the
Government. H
908 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A 12. The public law principles controlling the administrative
actions of the public authorities are well settled. Right from the
case of Ramana Dayaram Sheffy v. International Airport
Authority of India [(1979) 3 SCC 489] this Court cautioned that
conditions of work cannot be arbitrarily altered and held that
B even the power of relaxation has to be exercised within the
limited scope available, failing which, it would tantamount to
denial of opportunity to employees.
13. Another settled principle of law, applicable to the
C present case, is the scope of judicial review of such actions,
which is usually quite limited. The Court has the power,
depending on the facts and circumstances of. a given case, to
issue appropriate directions in exercise of jurisdiction under
Article. 226 of the Constitution of India (by the High Court) and
under Article 32 read with Article· 141 of the Constitution of India
D (by this Court).
14. In the case of E.S.P. Rajaram and Ors. v. Union of
India and Ors. [(2001) 1 SCR 203], this Court explained that
the source of power of this Court to issue directions and pass
E the orders, as was explained in paragraph 18 of the case titled
Union of India & Ors. VS. M. Bhaskar & Ors. [(1996) 4 sec
416], could be traced to Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
This provision vests power in this Court to pass such decree
or make such orders as would be necessary for doing
F complete justice in the context of any case or matter pending
before it. This provision contains no limitation which provides
the causes or circumstances in which such power may be
exercised. The exercise of power is left completely to the
discretion of the highest Court of the country and its order or
G decree is thereafter binding on all Courts or Tribunals
throughout the territory of India. However, in the case of
Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee vs. C.K. Rajan
[(2003) 7 sec 546] this Court, while specifying the scope and .
ambit of the Public Interest Litigation, clearly distinguished
H between the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the
ASHA SHARMA v. CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION 909
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
Constitution and the powers of this Court under Article 142 of A
the Constitution and observed '[T]he Court would ordinarily not
step out of the known areas of judicial review. The High Courts
although may pass an order for doing complete justice to the
parties, it does not have a power akin to Article 142 of the
Constitution of India'. Usefully, reference can also be made to B
the judgment of this Court in the case of Reliance Airport
Developers (P) Ltd. v. Airport Authority of India and Ors.
[(2006) 10 sec 1], where while considering the scope for
judicial interference in matters of administrative decisions, this
Court held that it is trite law that exercise of power, whether c
legislative or administrative, will be set aside if there is manifest
error in the exercise of such power or if the exercise of power
is manifestly arbitrary. Courts would exercise such power
sparingly and would hardly.interfere in a manner which may
tantamount to enacting a law. They must primarily serve to D
. bridge any gaps or to provide for peculiar unforeseen situations
that may emerge from the facts and circumstances of a given
case. These directions would be in force only till such time as
the competent legislature enacts laws on the same issue. The
high courts could exercise this power, again, with great caution E
and circumspection. Needless to say, when the High Court
issues directions, the same ought not to be in conflict with laws
remaining in force and with the directions issued by this Court.
In the case of Chandigarh Administration v. Manpreet Singh
[(1992) 1 sec 380] while dealing with a matter of admission
. to engineering colleges and reservation of seats etc., this Court F
held as under:
"11. Counsel for Chandigarh Administration and the
college (petitioners in SLP Nos. 16066 and 16065 of
1991) contended that the High Court has exceeded its G
jurisdiction in granting the impugned directions. He
submitted that High Court, while exercising the writ
jurisdiction conferred .upon by Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, does not sit as an appellate authority
over the rule-making authority nor can it rewrite the rules. H
910 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A If the rule or any portion of it was found to be bad, the High
Court could have struck it down and directed the rule-
making authority to re-frame the rule and make admissions
on that basis but the High Court could not have either
switched the categories or directed that Shaurya Chakra
B should be treated as equivalent to Vir Chakra. By its
directions, the High Court has completely upset the course
of admissions under this reserved quota and has gravely
affected the chances of candidates falling in category 4 by
downgrading them as category 5 without even hearing
them. These are good reasons for the categorisation done
by the Administration which was adopted by the college.
21. While this is not the place to delve into or detail the
self-constraints to be observed by the courts while
exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226, one of them,
D which is relevant herein, is beyond dispute viz., while acting
under Article 226, the High Court does not sit and/or act
as an appellate authority over the orders/actions of the
subordinate authorities/tribunals. Its jurisdiction is
supervisory in nature. One of the main objectives of this
E jurisdiction is to keep the government and several other
authorities and tribunals within the bounds of their
respective jurisdiction. The High Court must ensure that
while performing this function it does not overstep the well
recognised bounds of its own jurisdiction."
F
15. It is a settled canon of Constitutional Jurisprudence that
this Court in the process of interpreting.the law can remove any
lacunae and fill up the gaps by laying down the directions with
reference to the dispute before it; but normally it cannot declare
G a new law to be of general application in the same manner as
the Legislature may do. This principle was stated by a Seven-.
Judge Bench of this Court in the case of P. Ramachandra Rao
. v. State of Kamataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578].
16. On a proper analysis of the principles stated by this
H
ASHA SHARMA v. CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION 911
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
a
Court in catena of judgments including the judgment afore- A
referred, it is clear that the courts can issue directions with
regard to the dispute in a particular case, but should be very
reluctant to issue directions which are legislative in nature. Be
that as it may, because of the new dimensions which
constitutional law has come to include, it becomes imperative B
for the courts in some cases, to pass directions to ensure that
statutory or executive authorities do not act arbitrarily,
discriminatorily or contrary to tt-ie settled laws. It was in light of
these principles that this Court, vide itsjudgment dated 7th May,
1996 set aside the Full Bench Judgment of the High Court of c
Punjab and Haryana, brought into force some appropriate rules
and sought to ensure that the competent authority acted in
accordance with law and that it avoided total arbitrariness in
allocation of government houses to its officers and employees.
Once those rules have come into force and were amended from D
time to time _as per the leave granted by this Court, in our
considered view, it was not proper exercise of judicial discretion
and jurisdiction to pass directions, which were in direct conflict
with the Allotment Rules which were approved by in conflict this
Court or with the directions which were issued by this Court on
earlier occasions. Shortly, we shall proceed to discuss the E
scope and effect of the directions issued by the learned Single
Judge of the High Court, their correctness and impact upon the
existing rules and the lacuna, if any, which still exists in day-to-
day implementation of the Allotment Rules.
F
17. On the analysis of the above principles, it emerges that
the Court would exercise its jurisdiction to issue appropriate
writ, order or directions with reference to the facts and
circumstances of a given case. Normally, the courts would not
step in to pass directions, which could, at times, be construed G
as a form of legislation. Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution
confer on this Court and the High Court the power to issue
directions, orders or writs for achieving the objectives of those
Articles. The courts, in the past, have issued directions for
various purposes. In public interest, the courts may pass H
912 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A directions and even appoint committees for inducing the
Government to carry out the constitutional mandate. The courts
have been taking due care while exercising such jurisdiction
so that they do not overstep the circumscribed judicial limits.
B 18. In light of the above legal framework, we would now
revert to examine the legal questions raised before us. There
are primarily three issues which require the consideration of this
Court:
1. The interpretation and enforcement of the Allotment
C Rules framed by Notification dated 28th June, 1996
and the amendments made to it from time to time;
2. The relevancy of the directions issued by this Court
vide its judgment dated 8th December, 1995; and
D 3. The conflict between the directions of this Court and
the Rules framed thereafter and the directions
issued by the learned Single Judge of the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana.
E 19. We would further be required to examine whether the
Allotment Rules, as amended from time to time, are in conflict
with the earlier judgment of this Court or whether they suffer from
any basic legal infirmity or are ex facie arbitrary and, if so, what
directions could be passed to remedy such elements of
F arbitrariness, particularly, in view of the directions issued by the
learned Single Judge of the High Court. We may notice that
during the course of arguments before us, it was also pointed
out that because the action of the authorities in allotting two
houses of the same category, one at Chandigarh and the other
G outside Chandigarh (both within the State of Punjab and/or
Haryana) which is not permissible, great hardship and
discrimination has been caused to the employees placed in the
same category. Secondly, it was also argued that. taking
advantage of the time factor involved in the decision making
H by the Committee, the officers allotted to higher category
ASHA SHARMA v. CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION 913
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
accommodation continue to retain both houses i.e. one of a A
lower category and other of a higher category for an
unnecessarily long period, thus, causing prejudice to the
interests of others. For example, it is alleged that in the case
of the appellant, she is retaining the higher category house and
continues to hold such accommodation even now, when she is B
actually entitled to an accommodation of lower category.
However, according to the appellant, as State Information
Commissioner also, she is entitled to the same
accommodation and perks that the Chief Secretary of the State
is entitled to. It is argued on behalf of the appellant that there is c
no transparency in the functioning of the Allotment Committee.
According to the respondents, she will not be entitled to retain
an earmarked accommodation.
20. It is also contended on behalf of different parties that
arbitrariness in allotment of houses still persists. There is no D
need for adding houses to the Chief Minister's pool and
increasing the discretionary quota. It is the claim of the appellant
that the imposition of damages/charges on her is arbitrary and
she is entitled to retain the same accommodation. First and
foremost, we have to consider the nature of the changes in the E
Allotment Rules as approved by this Court, whether such
changes are disadvantageous to the government servants and
whether they increase the arbitrariness in the implementation
of the Allotment Rules. We have already noticed that the rules
in force at the relevant time were the subject matter of F
controversy before the Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab
and Haryana and had given rise to filing of a Special Leave
Petition (converted into C.A. No. 8890 of 1996), It was in this
petition that the draft rules had been filed, approved with certain
amendments, as directed by this Court and thereafter published G
vide Notification dated 28th June, 1996, to finally result in the
Allotment Rules. These rules were also subjected to different
amendments from time to time and major amendments were
carried out in the years 1997, 1998, 2004, 2007 and 2009.
Besides these, certain guidelines were also framed which H
914 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A became part of the Allotment Rules. These amendments related
to changes in the definition clauses as well as the substantive
rules. For example, Rule 7, which is related to the earmarking
of houses was amended on 7th May, 1998; Rule 8, concerning
the Controlling Authority was amended vide Notification dated
B 2nd June, 1997; Rule 11, which related to Out-of-Turn Allotment,
was amended vide Notifications in 1997 and again vide
Notification dated 4th August, 2004; Rules 13 and 14 relating
to the period for which allotment subsists and concessional
period for further retention and fixation of licence fee were
c amended by different amendments including those dated 17th
December, 2009 and 11th October, 2007 respectively. These
amendments have to be examined in. light of the fact that this
Court granted leave vide its judgment dated 7th May, 1996 to
the Chandigarh Administration to amend the rules, as and when
D it considered such amendment necessary. The leave granted
by this Court obviously means that the amendment should be
necessity based and not be intended to introduce the element
of arbitrariness or discrimination in the rules and resultantly in
the allotment of the houses to the government officers/ officials.
E 21. Having stated the aforementioned principles, we will
now proceed to discuss the scope and desirability of the
directions issued by the learned Single Judge of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana. The learned Single Judge, while
dealing with the case of the present appellant, issued certain
F general directions with regard to Out-of-Turn Allotment, the
addition and earmarking of houses, allotment of discretionary
quota and the Chief Minister's quota, instances of allotment of
two houses to one officer, the display of lists of prospective
allottees on the website and the drawing up of an order of
G precedence amongst the Constitutional, Statutory and Executive
functionaries. The Court issued prohibitory orders as well. All
these directions had been stayed by the Division Bench of that
Court in an appeal preferred by the Chandigarh Administration.
22. As already noticed, fairness in State action is the
H
ASHA SHARMA v. CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION 915
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
essence of proper governance. Where the authotities exercise A
their powers under the rules, they are expected to exercise the
discretion vested in them fairly and with the intention to attain
a balance between exercise of discretionary power and the
larger public interest sought to be achieved by such discretion.
Arbitrariness or irresponsible exercise of the power vested in B
the authorities, has been a matter of great concern before the
courts. The Full Bench of High Court of Punjab and Haryana
had declared Rule 7 of the Allotment Rules of 1972 as
unconstitutional and being without any proper guidelines
because the possibility of exercising unguided power resulted c
in arbitrariness on various occasions. Though that judgment had
been set aside by this Court, surely it was still expected that
the draft rules, as approved by this Court, would be acted upon
fairly and without arbitrariness. However, the matters have not
ended with the implementation of the new rules and, therefore, D
litigation in respect of these rules has been a continuous affair.
The matter, which can be said to be of some public importance
is not a question of the interpretation of the Allotment Rules as
such, but is one of the manner of exercise of power with
reference to the Allotment Rules.
E
23. Rule 7 of the Allotment Rules, which deals with the
creation of pools of residences, provides for earmarking of
houses for specified officers from different branches of the
State Administration and those houses which have not been
so earmarked for any particular class of Government F
employees would be allotted to the general pool of the
Chandigarh Administration. This Rule and its sub-Rules read
together do not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness, as
eannarking of houses is a known concept in relation to allotment
of houses. The learned Single Judge of the High Court of G
Punjab and Haryana has given a clarificatory direction that when
earmarked houses are occupied by an officer, who is at that
time not entitled to that house, another house would not be
earmarked for any particular officer, until the occupied house
is vacated. One exception is carved out in favour of SSP, H
916 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A Chandigarh in terms of order dated 7th March, 2011. We do
not think that this clarificatory direction is violative of any rule
or is otherwise impermissible. These directions attempt to
ensure that there should not be more than one earmarked
house for the same post as per the need. This clarification or
B explanatory direction would also ensure timely vacation of the
earmarked houses by the officers concerned, upon their
transfer, promotion or posting to a post where they are not
entitled to an earmarked accommodation. Thus, we see no
reason to interfere with imposition of such a condition which is
C in conformity with the spirit of the aforesaid Rule. We, thus
direct that no new house for any category/post should be
earmarked unless the house already earmarked for such
category/post has been vacated and placed in the general pool
of the Chandigarh Administration for allotment in accordance
with the Allotment Rules.
0
24. The next direction to which certain objections were
raised by the parties appearing before this Court is with regard
to Out-of-Turn Allotment and allotment of houses in exercise of
the discretionary powers of the Administrator, U.T., Chandigarh
E and the Chief Minister of Punjab and Haryana respectively. At
the outset, it may be noticed that there is no specific rule
controlling the discretionary allotment by the Administrator, U.T.,
Chandigarh and the Chief Minister of State of Punjab and
Haryana respectively. However, Rule 8 identifies the Controlling
F Authority which is the Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh, who
would be the co-ordinating and controlling authority in respect
of the houses belonging to Chandigarh Administration. He has
been given the power to add or withdraw houses from any pool
for the purposes of allotment to any class or category of eligible
G government employees and may also change the classification
of houses on the recommendation of the House Allotment
Committee. Rule 11 deals with Out-of-Turn Allotments, i.e. the
House Allotment Committee may allot a house on Out-of-Turn
basis to the cases specified under clauses (a) to (g) of that
H Rule. The House Allotment Committee in its Meeting dated 27th
ASHA SHARMA v. CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION 917
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
March, 2003 has further approved certain guidelines for the Out- A
of-Turn Allotments.
25. Rule 11 is a very comprehensive rule which deals with
the specific situations where Out-of-Turn Allotment is
permissible. The Allotment Rules and these guidelines are B
intended to control the exercise of discretion by the authorities
concerned in granting out-of-turn allotments. There is some
vagueness in Rule 11(1)(e), i.e. Out-of-Turn Allotments to a
government employee due to the 'functional requirements' of
the post. This expression is neither explained nor have any C
guidelines been issued in this regard. The criteria provided in
Guideline (2) for allotments made in public interest under Rule
11 (1 )(f) is quite similar to the criteria for determining functional
requirements. Both these heads refer to the nature of official
duties and functions to be performed by the officer concerned.
Thus, the category of 'functional requirement' allotment is D
nothing but a category created to allow more and more
allotments under this head. In light of these rules, the absolute ·
restriction on Out-of-Turn Allotments imposed by the learned
Single Judge may not be just and fair and will be opposed to
the statutory provisions of the Allotment Rules. Therefore, we E
are unable to sustain such a restriction. However, we would
further clarify that the powers vested in the concerned authority
under Rules 8 and 11 of the Allotment Rules will only be
exercised: (a) upon recommendation of the House Allotment
Committee; (b) such recommendation should be supported by F
reasons with the requirements of the job and the data in support
thereof; and (c). no allotments would be made under the
provisions of Rule 11(1 )(e). The maximum restriction of 10 per
cent of all allotments being Out-of-Turn Allotments, as
contemplated under Rule 11 (2) of the Allotment Rules, shall be G
operative to entire Rule 11 as well as to Rule 8 of the Allotment
Rules. In no event shall Out-of-Turn Allotment exceed 10 per
cent of all houses allotted in a year. This is primarily to control
the exercise of discretionary power as well as to ensure that
the persons entitled to residential accommodation in the H
918 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A general pool are not made to wait unduly for an indefinite
period.
26. Allotments under different categories and with the
restrictions as stated in the Allotment Rules and the guidelines
B shall continue to be in force and should not be amended or
altered except iri exceptional circumstances by the appropriate
body. This alone can add some certainty to the application of
these provisions and to the expectations of the government
employees, who have a legitimate expectation of allotment of
C government accommodation as part of their perks.
27. We also direct that the purpose of Rule 8 of the
Allotment Rules is not to allow discretionary allotment but is to
provide overall powers of coordination and control to the
Administrator, U.T., Chandigarh. When the words 'for the
D purposes of allotment to any class or category of eligible
government servant' appearing in Rule 8 are examined, these
have to necessarily be construed to mean the allotment made
in terms of the Allotment Rules. Adding or withdrawing houses
to the general pool is a power vested in the authority under Rule
E 8, but allotments still are to be made in accordance with the
substantive rules enabling the authorities to make regular
allotments.
28. Neither the judgment of this Court passed in Civil
Appeal No. 8890of1996 nor the Allotment Rules duly notified
F by the Government, require publishing of list of prospective
allottees on website and inviting objections to the same. Rule
9 of the Alltoment Rules requires the authorities to invite
applications for allotment of accommodation and also provides
the manner in which the allotment of houses is to be made
G including showing the seniority of the applicants category-wise.
There is no provision requiring invitation of objections. Once
there is no rule, in our considered view, it will not serve any
fruitful purpose to invite objections to each allotment apart from
unnecessarily delaying allotments and rendering the working of
H
ASHA SHARMA v. CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION 919
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
the Rules more complex and difficult. Further, Rule 9(5) of the A
Allotment Rules is a complete safeguard in regard to proper
maintenance of the seniority list of the applicants. Thus, we set
aside the directions issued by the learned Single Judge in that
behalf. However, we direct that the final list of allotments made
by the House Allotment Committee should be placed on the B
website of the Government, as all interested persons would be
entitled to know whether they have been allotted the
accommodation or not.
29. Now, we will deal with the other two arguments that C
were raised before us. One argument was in regard to the
allotment of two houses to a single officer and/or to his family,
one in Chandigarh and one in some other part of the same
State; and the second was regarding the period of retention of
the allotted house after the· employee is retired, promoted,
transferred or is sent on deputation etc. These are matters of D
serious concern. There is no rule that has been brought to our
notice or is available on the records providing that an officer
who is posted outside Chandigarh/Panchkula/Mohali and whose
spouse is not entitled to any Government accommodation of
any category can be provided with two houses, one at the E
DistricVDivision level to which he/she is transferred and another
at Chandigarh and its adjourning areas. In absence of any such
specific rule, we consider it appropriate to direct that the State
shall not allot two different houses to one government servant.
In terms of Rule 11(1)(b) of the Allotment Rules, such allotment F
can be made in some circumstances but' we are constrained
to observe that every effort should be made to ensure that such
situations arise only in exceptional circumstances. We are
informed that even under the rules of transfer of the Government
servant, a married couple, both of whom are government G
servants are normally posted at the same place. Be that as it
may, it will be in the interest of all concerned that Rule 11 (1 )(b)
is invoked sparingly and only by the authorities concerned, upon
the recommendation of the House Allotment Committee.
H
920 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A 30. The issue with regard to the retention of government
accommodation is controlled by Rule 13 of the Allotment Rules.
The table under clause 2 of the said Rule provides different
periods of retention in different situations. Rule 13, sub-rule 5
further carves out an exception, allowing the period of retention
B to be extended beyond the period stated in the table under Rule
13(2) of the Allotment Rules on payment of higher licence fee.
We see no reason why a government servant should be
permitted to retain the accommodation beyond 4 to 6 months,
which period is permissible under the substantive rules. A
c government servant knows in advance the period within which
he has to vacate the accommodation a'llotted to him as part of
his employment and so he has to surrender the house in
question within the scheduled time.
31. What exceptional cases are contemplated under Rule
D 13(5) of the Allotment Rules is nowhere indicated. No guidelines
are provided and it is only for the authorities concerned to
decide whether the case falls in that category or not. We are
unable to see any compelling circumstances for permitting
discretion to the authorities under Rule 13(5) of the Allotment
E Rules. Rules 13(1) and 13(2) are comprehensive, specific and
provide more than reasonable time for a government servant
to vacate the accommodation allotted to him/her. The Court
cannot lose sight of the fact that a large number of employees
under different categories, are awaiting their allotments and are
F being deprived of this benefit for long periods because of
excessive invocation of such discretionary powers. The
provision is unguided and arbitrary and cannot stand the
scrutiny of law. More so, the licence fee indicated is obviously
minimal in comparison to the market rent for the said premises.
G It is a matter which a Court can safely take judicial notice of.
32. Compelled by these circumstances, we find Rule 13(5)
not sustainable and the authorities are directed not to take
recourse to the said provision under any circumstance. No case
of retention of government accommodation beyond the periods
H
ASHA SHARMA v. CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION 921
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
specified in the table to Rule 13(2) of the Allotment Rules shall A
be entertained by any authority under the Allotment Rules.
33. We have issued the above directions being conscious
of the fact that the Allotment Rules are in place and that the
authorities are acting fairly and judiciously. The directions that .
8
we have issued are primarily explanatory and are intende~ to
narrow the $Cope of discretion exercisable by the concerned
authorities. It is a settled canon of Administrative Jurisprudence
that wider the power conferred, more onerous is the
responsibility to ensure that such power is not exercised in C
excess of what is required or relevant ·for the case and the
decision.
34. We expect the authorities to be consistent in their
decisions and bring certainty to the Allotment Rules. This can
only be done by making fair, judicious and reasoned decisions D
on the one hand and refraining from amending the Allotment
Rules except in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances
on the other. The Doctrine of Certainty can appropriately be
applied to legislative powers as it is applicable to judicial
pronouncements. We must not be understood to say that the E
power of the Legislature to amend rules is restricted by judicial
pronouncements, but we want to impress upon the Legislature
that the rules of the present kind should not be amended so
frequently that no established practice or settled impression
may be formed in the minds of the employees. Where the F
employer has limited resources, there the employee has a
legitimate expectation of being dealt with fairly in relation to
allotment to such government accommodation. Consequently,
reverting to the case of the appellant, she is admittedly
occupying an earmarked house. An order of eviction and G
damages has been passed against her and she has taken
recourse to an appropriate remedy or against which she has
already taken an appropriate remedy. The matter in that behalf
is still pending final hearing before the learned Single Judge.
The parties are left to raise all their contentions before the
H
922 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A learned Single Judge, who shall decide the matter in
accordance with law. However, with regard to the interim order
passed by the High Court, we direct the State to allot to her an
alternative accommodation under the category which she is
entitled to, in pursuance of her appointment as State Information
B Commissioner, within fi~een days from today and she shall be
liab!e to vacate the accommodation presently in her occupation
within two weeks thereafter. We make it clear that in the event
the Government is unable to allot her an alternative
accommodation of her category. for the reason of non-
e availability of such accommodation, she should be provided
with appropriate accommodation, including private
accommodation of her status, within the same period.
35. The appeal, for the reasons afore-recorded and with
the directions afore-given, is disposed of while leaving the
J) parties to bear their own costs.
D.G. Appeal disposed of.
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